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This thesis examines the dominant responses to and struggles around immigration in contemporary political discourse in Greece. While immigration in Greece has received considerable scholarly and public attention, the question of racism has either been ignored or framed in problematic ways. This thesis argues that the question of racism should play a central role in accounting for these problematizations of immigration. Drawing on Poststructuralist theory and Psychoanalysis it is argued that the potency of racism in Greek political discourse emerges from its disavowed character as well as from the ways it is specifically inflected in appeals to Greece's self-understanding as a hospitable nation. Following how racism as a signifier figures (or is absent) in discourses around immigration and security, this thesis discloses the political and ideological operations at work whose critical explanation is articulated around the development of social, political and fantasmatic logics that characterize, sustain or challenge these discourses. This thesis shows not only how racism has come to be signified as itself a threat to Greek hospitality, but also how and why the social myth that any racist traits are new or effects of immigration enjoys widespread popularity.

After reviewing the literature on the relations between 'Greek' and 'other', the immigration 'problem' in the 1990s, and its emergence as a security issue, a theoretical framework gravitating around the concepts of rhetoric and fantasy is developed as a means of approaching the political and ideological dimensions of racism. This approach is deployed in the investigation of parliamentary discourse on immigration and the 'demographic problem' (1990-2001), administrative detention and its contestation in the case of Pagani, Lesvos (2004-2010), urban immigration-related security practices in the centre of Athens (2010), and the Law School occupation by 300 immigrants on collective hunger strike (2011). These chapters trace the complicated and mobile relationships between racism, filoxenia, migration and security, suggesting that political discourse on immigration draws energies from the way the political and ideological dimensions of racism are foregrounded, amplified or made to resonate.
Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASDE</td>
<td>Higher Confederation of Large Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>European Committee for the Prevention of Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERF</td>
<td>European Refugee Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBF</td>
<td>External Borders Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRE</td>
<td>European Council on Refugees and Exiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRI</td>
<td>European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDIM</td>
<td>Greek Society for Demographic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSTAT</td>
<td>Hellenic Statistical Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMN</td>
<td>European Migration Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENAR</td>
<td>European Network Against Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERF</td>
<td>European Return Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURODAC</td>
<td>European Dactyloscopy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROJUST</td>
<td>European Union Judicial Cooperation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Union Law Enforcement Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROSUR</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Fundamental Rights Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Union External Borders Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHM</td>
<td>Greek Helsinki Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCS</td>
<td>Hellenic Council of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLHR</td>
<td>Hellenic League for Human Rights Integration Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEMO</td>
<td>Center of Research for Minority Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCHR</td>
<td>National Commission for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICUM</td>
<td>Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABITs</td>
<td>Rapid Border Intervention Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Throughout this thesis there are references to statements drawn from parliamentary minutes. References are made to code names designating the nature of the statement as categorized in the list below. All references to parliamentary documents also include the date of the session/publication in the form dd/mm/yy. Some documents include several statements to which I refer and their code names may be a combination of some of the elements described below (e.g. PLDBSPPM111114). In the appendix of this thesis there can be found a more analytical table which comprises a longer list of documents that includes all those referred to in the text and many more whose investigation has informed my arguments. Although the documents are not listed in chronological order, they cover the period between October 1993 and February 2014. Each entry comprises the code name of the document, the name/political affiliation of the speaker, and a brief statement that describes the argument made in the original statement, or a combination thereof when the document comprises more than one relevant statement. The criteria of relevance are the repetition of key terms this thesis examines (racism, immigration, security and filoxenia). The overall number of sessions figuring in the appendix table are 113. It should be noted that some of the statements that figure on the list (as well as in the appendix of print material) one may for good reasons see as offensive and indeed racist. I have tried throughout not to reproduce hate speech or first world fantasies of superiority. The argumentative context of this thesis should make this make clear.

PLDB: Parliamentary Debate
OQ: Oral Question
OR: Oral Response
WA: Written Answer
WQ: Written Question
SP: Speech
PM: Prime Minister
MI: Minister
PP: President of the Parliament
COM: Parliamentary Commission
CM: Committee on Migration
CD: Committee on the Demographic
Acknowledgments

There is a number of people to whom I am grateful for accomplishing this thesis. I would like to thank Yannis Stavrakakis who read and commented on the very first draft of my research proposal. His encouragement and support throughout the years has been invaluable and I have benefited significantly from numerous discussions. I would also like to thank Han Dorussen who has oriented my attention to the discourse of 19th century European travelers. It was then that I first thought about incorporating ideas about the image of Greece in my research. I also thank Thomas Plumper whose critical comments in the course of a professional development seminar made me realize that writing a thesis is partly about being able to convince peers. Special thanks go to all the administrative staff, current and past, at the Department of Government, Jackie Pells, Susan Swan, Abigail-Kate Reid, Sarah Lawson, Alex West and Sallyann West. They have been tolerant and supportive.

I would also like to thank the staff of the Albert Sloman Library at the University of Essex as well as the staff at the British Library who have helped me unearth old books on hospitality as a western tradition. Also, the staff at the Municipal Library of Thessaloniki have been most helpful in giving me access to national newspaper and public document archives. I owe my gratitude to Annika Werner, Verena Kroess and Sven Regel at the Manifesto Project who have kindly shared part of their archive on Greece consisting of media transcripts of political speeches and political parties election programs. I am also particularly indebted to Vicky Djordjevic whose support during difficult times was invaluable.

This thesis would not have been accomplished were it not for the engagement of fellow peers with my work and countless after hours discussions we have had on our projects. A special thanks thus to Amr Abdelrahman, Emilio Alier, Luis Castro, Nazli-Sila Cesur, Amneris Chapparo, Deniz Eroglu, Steve Gormley, Christos Illiadis, Leonidas Karakatsanis, Michael Polley, Savvas Voutyras, Graham Walker, Adam Wright, Onur Yildiz and Max Zherebkin and many others.

I am mostly grateful to the Ideology and Discourse Analysis group. The research seminar I attended for three years has been the single most intellectually stimulating experience while it has also been a school for how relations between teachers and students can be democratic. My thesis has been marked by the intense discussions facilitated by Jason Glynos, David Howarth and Aletta Norval in the IDA seminar. I would like to thank each individually. Jason Glynos has contributed significantly in all stages of research and writing. I thank him for his meticulous engagement with the details and the structure of the thesis. Aletta Norval has also read carefully various pieces of my work, making useful and insightful suggestions. My supervisor, David Howarth, has been inspiring and supportive. His supervision, allowing me to go my own way without much interference, made me anxious at times but after all more autonomous and confident. I thank him for all his engagement and help.

I would also like to thank my family, my friends and anyone I may forget for all their valuable contributions. Last but not least, I would like to thank Karmen Cheung, who was, and still is, a major source of inspiration for me.
An integral aspect of writing up a thesis involves giving an account to others and being answerable for all research decisions made, including the choice of the topic itself. One is accountable, among other things, for the topic's social relevance. not only to academic peers but crucially to the wider public. But most of the time one has to answer to conventional questions like 'what is your thesis on?' in rather small-talk, every day, casual encounters. In these encounters one may be asked to justify the significance of their topic but also one may generate or re-formulate the very questions themselves. For this thesis, such questions posed outside the academic 'context of justification' have prompted various insights, depending on how my response would matter to whom posed the question and what it would mean to them. Circumstantially or strategically, different answers would be devised on my part. Often, I would say I work on immigration in Greece The reactions to this 'framing' were often expressive of an understanding of the timeliness, gravity and political import of the issue at hand. By contrast, when I would opt to say I work on racism, the reactions varied from expressions of surprise to downright scepticism: 'I didn't know there's racism in Greece', or, 'yes, but isn't immigration...?' Evidently, more interesting would be the reactions of Greeks to the latter framing of my topic: with a tone of dismissal and an air of certainty, many people – including the educated and leftist ones – were keen to say: 'Greeks were xenophobic but never racist until very recently'. Others still, would implicitly or explicitly go on to suggest that 'there is no racism in Greece'.

1
The main aim of this thesis is to unsettle the *certainties* exemplified in these anecdotes – namely, that immigration is a contemporary problem and that racism does not exist – examine how they came about and acquired prominence, what practices they are enmeshed with, what is their use and how they are contested. Eventually, its aim is to persuade its readers that the inverse is rather the case: namely, that racism is a contemporary, yet not novel, *political* problem and immigration a phenomenon whose elevation to an 'objective' problem has taken a lot of work across contexts of which Greece constitutes a 'case'.

The intuition that oriented my research from the outset was that there was – and still is – something problematic about the way in which racism is the object of contemporary political discourse in Greece – the way it is spoken about and, more broadly, as Ernesto Laclau would put it, 'taken up'. My intuition was that the way ordinary people, engaged citizens, the media or politicians seemed to talk about racism, bespoke and was symptomatic of a certain reluctance on the part of the polity at large to confront the question of racism, a reluctance which in itself was likely meaningful and in need of critical explanation. What was puzzling was what seemed to me to be a generalized inability to register racism as an issue even worth addressing; and, when addressed, the puzzling aspect would be why racism appears almost invariably as an 'aberrant' social phenomenon. Hence, the first question this thesis asks is *how* and what kind of problem has racism been in the Greek context? What can we learn by studying the meaning of this word in context and its various uses? What sense are we to make of such social inertia that make it unlikely to think about and relate to the 'real' of racism in different ways, including becoming less racist? How can we address such a broad topic without the risk of platitudes and unnecessary generalizations? Although these questions will be shown to have a more universal resonance, this thesis is primarily concerned with their
particularity in the context of contemporary Greek political discourse.

These questions acquire different meaning today in comparison to the recent past and therefore the qualification 'contemporary' in Greek political discourse stands in need of clarification. Some public attention has as of late shifted toward racism, that is, after Golden Dawn emerged forcefully, but not unexpectedly, in Greek political life. However, when this research project was conceived and while the research itself was undertaken, there seemed to be one major 'problem' with which Greek society was thought and said to be faced: immigration. In the chapters that follow it becomes clear how immigration acquired somehow the characteristics of an 'existential' threat. It is my contention that unless we deconstruct actuality so framed, it is not possible to address critically the question of racism. That is, unless we understand how immigration became an object of political contention and government, we cannot hope to understand what kind of problem racism has come to represent in the Greek context. Nor are we going to be able to appraise the 'Golden Dawn' phenomenon – the meteoric rise of a far right party during the economic crisis – and its conditions of emergence in Greek political life, unless we inquire into the recent past and further back. Only in this way would its emergence be possibly thought of as less enigmatic or surprising and more intelligible.

From this last point of view, this thesis could be read as contributing to our understanding of the pre-history of Golden Dawn, tracing the various elements whose circulation in political discourse since at least the early 1990s made possible their condensation in the racist discourse of Golden Dawn. So, a central claim this thesis takes issue with is that racism is 'new', an effect of and response to immigration or, more recently, a phenomenon localized in the deeds of Golden Dawn.

To date, there is little social scientific research on racism conducted in the Greek context. By contrast, there is plenty of socio-political research on contemporary
immigration to Greece that alludes to racism or in which the word racism figures in
certain ways. But no published research has attempted to problematize the meaning of
racism by looking at its concrete uses. There is practically and literally little
understanding of what racism means in the Greek context. Nor has a sustained effort to
politicize the question of racism or to re-frame it as a political issue taken place. This
predicament constitutes a challenge. First, given the ‘silence’ of social scientists about
racism in Greece, it becomes necessary to broach the topic in an indirect fashion .and to
delimit the problem from scratch. I do this by examining ‘responses’ to immigration as a
‘proxy’ for the study of racism: what books were written about it and how they were
written, what public events addressed it, what politicians and the public made of the
prospect of co-habiting with the ‘foreigner’. For in these problematizations we can trace
how the complex relationship between immigration and racism has been framed.
Second, this ‘silence’ (or the figures of racism that do in fact emerge in social science
discourse), could potentially constitute themselves part of the problem this thesis
attempts to address. In a nutshell, my claim is that in order to address racism we have to
see how and why immigration acquired prominence as an object of socio-political
discourse in Greece so as to be able to displace immigration from the centre of attention
and progressively bring on the problematic of racism, developing simultaneously the
theoretical tools by which to interpret, characterize, explain and evaluate more broadly
racism itself.
Another 'problem theme' this thesis articulates with the question of racism and
immigration is that of security. Arguably, once we begin to reflect on the nature of the
dominant responses to immigration, exemplified in the pervasiveness of portrayals of
immigration as a 'threat' or, at any rate, as a 'problem', or as a cause of social anxiety,
fear, and malaise, it is impossible to get around the question of security, however
conceived: national, territorial, societal or political, or, indeed, psychological. For, as this thesis sets out to make explicit, the discourse on migration in Greece undergoes a fundamental transformation between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, whose chief characteristic is its progressive articulation with, subsumption to and, at times, exhaustion by the discourse of security. Investigating multiple languages and practices of security erected to confront immigration – from highly regulated practices of incarceration of people crossing borders to spontaneous citizens' patrols – this thesis focuses on the role that different conceptualizations of racism play in their enactment. It thereby tries to make visible certain relationships between specific, 'symbolic' elements in the context of specific discursive practices. The elements I have introduced so far are three: racism, immigration and security.

There is finally a fourth element which will be shown to be of significance in the context and orientation of this thesis: the question of hospitality. The problematic of hospitality, far from belonging simply to the 'cultural' realm is intensely political, essentially concerning the way we relate to the 'other' and to ourselves and, eventually, justice itself. The problematic of hospitality thus imposes itself on anyone anyway, but the question I am interested in is not a normative one about how hospitality imposes itself, but how it is subjectively assumed and negotiated in the context of Greek political discourse. Fundamentally, this thesis tries to furnish a very simple explanation derived from the description of empirical evidence: that hospitality, in the Greek case – *filoxenia* – in all the multiplicity of its invocations in the context of security and migration politics plays a key role in the *a priori* disqualification of racism as an object of public attention and thereby contributes to its disavowal and dissimulation. For what this thesis tries also to reveal is the resonance of this with a whole domain of discourse usually disqualified from serious inquiry in the context of political analysis: myths, narratives, anecdotes,
jokes, conspiracies etc. The domain circumscribed by this description is the domain of national fantasy and imagination in which hospitality functions as part of a rhetoric of self-praise and, in a sense, as a real, functioning line of 'defence'. To access this domain one has to generate 'data' from 'unofficial' sources or at the very least 'para'-official sources. I will say more about this in my discussion of how the archive that constitutes this thesis corpus of empirical material was delimited.

Before elaborating more on the Greek 'case' it is necessary to foreground a more 'universal' dimension of the problem. Although 'race' has long been considered an unscientific term the realization that this fact is irrelevant to the persistence of various racisms has enabled research communities to address this issue with increasing attentiveness to the political, ideological and affective nature of racism.\textsuperscript{1} Mainstream political studies, however, have neglected and marginalized questions about race and racism.\textsuperscript{2} This thesis sets out to investigate the political \textit{aspect of} racism against the backdrop of the inherited, de-politicized and 'continuous aspect perception' of it as an aberrant social phenomenon.\textsuperscript{3}

Political studies have also only marginally come to get a grip of racism as an object of controversy, misunderstanding and political disputes or as a sign that divides opponents and unites subjects in different social contexts -- lay and academic. Thus, not only in theoretical controversies over what the meaning of racism is but also, fundamentally, in intractable, situated antagonisms arising from and evident in claims about its very social 'objectivity', about whether and how it actually exists. A study of the ways in which we –

\textsuperscript{1} For discussions on the persistence of racism and the reasons for the limited role of social and racial theory debates on racial practice, see Seshadri-Crooks (2000); Carter-Bob (2000); Rabinow (1991); Hill (1998)

\textsuperscript{2} See Solomos (1986) and Jones (2008)

\textsuperscript{3} I make use here of Wittgenstein's notion of 'seeing aspects'. For a detailed discussion, see Norval (2007: 110-117). The point is not to constitute 'racism' as a new object or to 'falsify' all existing interpretations, but rather to become aware of connections, links and things that can be thought together with racism, in other words to articulate novel understandings of racism in the present.
citizens and researchers alike – attach meaning to the word 'racism' – or, otherwise, leave it aside – not only could make explicit its political resonances and aspects but it could also serve to problematize 'our attachments to ourselves and to other persons'.

This approach to racism differs significantly from critical realist approaches insofar as racism is taken to be a phenomenon that does not exist outside 'discourse'. This does not mean that racism is merely a set of ideas or 'talk' or that it is not real. It rather means that all social reality is meaningful and thus that 'racism' cannot refer to anything that lies beyond discourse. The paradox might not be that racism 'really' exists and that it is misrepresented or that people mis-recognize themselves as to who they 'really' are. Rather, the paradox lies with how racism as a phenomenon exists as simultaneously present and absent, necessary and accidental, and how its social meaning is at once both contested and given. This thesis examines how this happens in Greek political discourse – in social rhetoric, self-interpretations and in the role certain problematizations of

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4 Cavell (1982: 355). My approach here following Cavell and Norval suggests that the ways in which we use concepts like exclusion, discrimination, racism, xenophobia, are indicative of the ways in which we relate to the 'other', and, therefore, their study can be seen as a 'proxy' for the study of the relationship between the 'self' and 'other', between identity and difference. For an example of such approach that foregrounds this ontological dimension see, Campbell (1998). See also Foucault's project of 'historical ontology' which comprises an approach to how we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge, as subjects acting on others, and as moral subjects, that is, in relation to to truth, power, and ethics, Foucault (1984: 351).

5 What I mean here is no matter whether we approach the question of what racism is or the question of how racism is in relation to other phenomena, we will encounter objects that are themselves meaningful or products of interpretations. For example, racism could be reduced to a phenomenon of exclusion, prejudice or violence, or it could be examined in relation to specific political fields, e.g security/migration, but in either case we encounter again objects whose identity is not 'objectively' fixed. Foucault himself contrasts the 'lateral', breadth, genealogical approach to the 'vertical', interpretive approach. For the latter he says: ' [...] when all is said and done, underneath it all everything is already interpretation'. This is not to suggest that a genealogical perspective is not interpretive; it is rather to emphasize the idea that genealogy does not look for the 'truth' or the 'origin' one anticipates to capture with interpretation. It does, instead, examine conditions of possibility of contingent historical forms, including the essentialism that comes into play in the constitution of true and objective 'problems'. See Foucault cited in (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 106-7). For more elaborated accounts of the methodological implications of genealogy see Hook (2001).

6 Henry Staten (1984: preface) argues for the significance of turning attention to language and to how we situate ourselves as ethical and linguistic subjects. His view is that we should be 'enjoining a strategic suspension of the realist perspective in order to look at something we are inclined to overlook'.

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racism play in the enactment of security and other political responses to immigration.

The case of Greek racism

Seeing Greek anti-immigrant racism as a case study in political analysis requires clarifying what a case is and what Greek racism could be a case of. I understand the case here to be a kind of 'problem-event', something at once singular, general and normative.⁷ Greek racism is approached here as a particular kind of entity which for more than two decades has figured in a plurality of ways as the 'case' of sociologists, social psychologists; intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations; the Greek government and local authorities; grassroots socio-political movements, as well as a case discussed in quasi-public contexts such as mailing lists, discussion forums and social media.⁸ More recently, with the prominence of Golden Dawn in the Greek political scene, the 'case' of Greek racism has also drawn considerable international attention.

How and when did these accounts become possible and how can we make sense of them? In other words, instead of beginning by directly problematizing racism, this thesis takes a step back and asks: how has racism been a 'problem' in the Greek context?

In numerous accounts – lay and academic – racism in Greece figures as a particular case of some kind of general Greek problem pertaining to prevailing norms of governance and public reason in the country. Racism in Greece, as I will show, is often seen as a particular 'problem' pointing to something broader to which it is subsumed, namely

⁸ For example, see the controversy on the Modern Greek Studies Association mailing list over whether anti-Albanian slogans chanted by Coast Guard squads whilst parading in public, were racist or not. There, responding to a case of denying racism by a contributor to the list, anthropologist Loring Danforth (2010) wrote: 'If someone were to state that Americans were racist, I (as an American) would not deny the statement, I would agree with it. Then I would continue to work to try to eliminate it from American society. It is difficult to fight racism if one denies that it exists'.

8
Irrationality and 'incomplete' modernization. Irrationality has been the 'master-trope' by which most aspects of Greek politics are understood and by which racism in general is conceptualized in 'rationalist' discourses, scientific or otherwise.

'The peculiarly Greek path to modernization', it is argued, is grounded on a conception of the collective good defined not 'through some form of collective rationality but rather quintessentially and transcendentally on the basis of culture and ethnicity'. Or, even 'the grammar of social relationships is not structured by systemic rationality and normativity'. Both Greece and racism, either separately or combined, I argue, have been paradigmatic cases of 'irrationality' (and therefore 'extreme/deviant' cases vis-à-vis conventional notions of rationality). Irrationality has been the 'principle of reading' of both and this thesis examines the possibilities for another more nuanced and critically productive reading. Displacing racism to the realm of the 'irrational' would be problematic, for in such case as it has been argued, 'condemnation replaces explanation, which is what happens when some phenomena are seen as aberrations dispossessed of any rational cause'.

'Greek racism' can be said to signify, relate to, and condense a range of 'problems': for researchers of migration – whose impetus and rationale for research is often explicitly political and situated – racism towards immigrants in Greece may signify lack of institutions and integration policy, and more generally, anomy, lack of 'rule of law' or flawed 'modernization'; it may signify geo-political, historical and cultural 'particularity'.

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9 Simply put, a binary and historicist conception of society and culture underpins a number of accounts on Greek political culture that oppose 'traditionalist' to 'modernist' tensions in society. See Mouzelis (1978); Diamandouros (1993) (Gropa & Triandafyllidou 2009).
10 Gropas & Triandafyllidou (2009: 20)
11 Charalambidis & Demertzis (1993: 219); Diamandouros (1993) calls the 'underdog' culture, the persistent and resistant to change 'traditionalist' culture. Moschonas (1997) examines modernization as 'structural-functional differentiation of roles and institutions'
12 For a typology of what 'case studies' are indicative of, see Flyvbjerg (2001; 2011)
13 Laclau (2005: 250)
'backwardness', and eventually, the transgression from taken-for-granted norms of rationality, morality, and socio-political conduct seen as prevalent in the West. For example, Andrew Geddes writes:

The large presence of irregular migrants is coupled with a public intolerance of their presence in Greece [...] informality and irregularity have important implications for immigration and immigrant policies, but these categories are not just synonyms for 'backwardness' [...] Southern European societies are not as highly organized, the penetration of society by state institutions is at a lower level [...]14 (my emphasis)

Therefore, there are broadly two distinct yet interrelated problems: First, that Greece is generally another name for 'irrationality' –. Second, that racism is a particular entity that has been thought as a 'problem' in exteriority to 'rationality', as I will be explaining further on. Thus, it would be tempting to approach racism in Greece as a normal case of what lies outside and threatens the realm of 'Reason', in other words as a case of deviance. The early work of T. Lipowatz who explores issues of political psychology in Greece is a case in point as he argues that 'in a society that neither the state or its citizens obey the laws [...] the elements of difference, law and moderation is absent'. For him, the racist amounts to a psychotic who 'resists the very use of Reason'.15 The medicalization of social phenomena through analogy is far from innocent: just like the South African psychiatrist J.B.F Laubscher and his ethnopsychiatrist colleagues would find affinity between 'the European psychotic and the average African',16 thus, portraying irrationality as the norm 'outside' the western world, contemporary accounts that identify racism with the psycho-pathology of psychosis serve to constitute racism as an aberrant, 'foreign' and 'other' phenomenon.

More often than not, however, as Geddes' argument illustrates, racism is not named as

14 Geddes (2003: 150)
15 See Lipowatz (1991: 229); (1990: 237)
16 McCullogh, Jock (1995: 81)
such. This thesis examines then not only how 'Greek racism' has been constituted as a present but aberrant phenomenon in specific European contexts and Western imagination in the recent past but also how 'racism' is displaced from and marginalized within public discourse in Greece, that is, how it is fabricated as a 'non-event'.

Just broaching the first aspect, I focus analytical attention on the second, on the pervasive throughout Greek society and administration social myth that 'there is no racism in Greece'. The social sciences in Greece appear in indirect ways to reinforce this myth by qualifying – like some of their Western counterparts working within specific epistemological paradigms – more neutral, 'scientific' and a-historical categories for study such as 'prejudice', or by entirely unqualified assertions such as that racism was not even a familiar term for the majority of Greeks before the 1990s.

What makes a range of equivalent to racism objects more qualified for problematization? How can we account for the resistance to taking on questions about racism, especially, racism in one's own society? How can we explain the 'sudden' electoral rise of the neo-Nazi political party of Golden Dawn as a racist party rather than a mere effect of the current 'crisis'? Simultaneously, those scarce accounts of racism that do exist, reduce it and/or the myth of its 'non-existence' to symptoms of irrationality, in-genuine dissemination of Enlightenment values or low levels of institutionalization. In both cases, the opportunity to address the question of racism not as given socially aberrant 'problem', but in its ambiguous, 'problematized' dimension is closed off. In pursuing this latter path, we are obliged to take seriously a whole domain of statements normally excluded from political analysis: narratives, myths, 'irrational' statements, anecdotal/unofficial narratives and

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17 See Veyne (1984: 19). According to Veyne, a 'non-event' is an event 'not yet recognized as such [...] the historicity of which we are not conscious as such'. See also Lukes (2005)[1974] who addresses issues of agenda-setting, and therefore 'problem'-defining' as a function of power, and Schröter (2013).

18 See Papadimitriou (2000: 298)
'subjugated' knowledges, sentiments and struggles over the 'origins' and the future of the 'self' and its relationship to the 'other'. In that sense, the approach developed here is genealogical, if genealogy, as Carter puts it, 'restores an important measure of hermeneutic credibility to “race thinking”'. In our case, the various 'modalities' of the negation of racism are not symptoms of 'irrationality', but an index of the concealment of hierarchical power relations and of the 'unevenness' of the social. The case of contemporary Greek, anti-immigrant racism should thus not be taken up by these standards imbued with normative, disciplinary and politically significant content. Nor should criteria be established by which to proceed to measurements of the aberration to some given European or Western norm. Analyzed from a Poststructuralist Discourse Theory point of view, informed by postcolonial and anthropological theories, the Greek 'case' does not serve to re-enforce dominant Western imaginaries of social, political and moral 'progress'. 'Greece' is not taken for granted to be the designation of a 'liminal' case against which the norm is merely affirmed, naturalized and taken for granted. Much of the scholarship on public policy and migration, sociology of discrimination and psychosocial research on prejudice, race and racism, that focuses on Greece - often times inserting Greece in a broader sub-regional context (e.g the 'Mediterranean'/newer immigration countries' or the 'atavistic Balkans', or Southeast Europe) merely searches to confirm already dominant paradigms in ways that are not attentive to the their own contingent assumptions and far from ideal positions of

19 I draw here on two traditions of inquiry that converge on the point of giving primacy to lay knowledge. I thus draw on the research orientation of the history of ideas, where the object of study is, according to Foucault (2002: 154), 'the whole interplay of representations that flow anonymously between men'. For Foucault, the history of ideas is concerned with 'opinions', 'errors', 'types of mentality' and 'tangential rumor'. The second tradition is that of phronetic research which begins with the analysis of local knowledges with the aim of making visible configurations of power and knowledge, and thus facilitate social change. See (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012).

20 Carter (2000: 30)

enunciation. 22 How such imaginary and ideological identifications with universal inclusion and human rights, non-discrimination and non-violence, and eventually 'Reason', are played out in the formation of EU policy in concert with the 'machinery' of social science classifications and statistics, which are thereby productive of their disciplinary and discursive 'margins', is something this thesis reflects upon. The word 'margins' here points to a limit which has a disciplinary function: to measure and quantify difference from the norm. For instance, in the collective volume Statistics and Reality, Baldwin-Edwards argues in relation to 'irregular' immigration in Greece: 'Compilation of reliable statistics is seen as an attribute of a developed state [...] Greek politicians appear not to be troubled by comments such as “worse population statistics than any African country”'. 23

Such accounts make it seem as if issues, like 'illegal' immigration or 'ineffective' migration policies are mere effects of poor 'state capacity'. In doing so they downplay systematically and occlude any analysis that situates such problematic policy fields in the context of broader racial and social antagonisms. They take a certain objectivity of racism for granted, if at all, rather than in historically contingent relations to these political fields. Few, if any, accounts of Greek responses to immigration are prepared to deal with ambiguity or indeterminacy, that is, with the 'ontological contingency to which all terms, projects and identities are exposed'. 24 Such accounts identify with statist ideals and logics, rather than treating the 'state' as itself an articulatory practice. Such practice,

22 What I mean here is that one may 'freely' choose one's own object of study, but there is always some 'problem-defining discourse' (Marcus, 1998: 12) that makes certain objects more qualified than others for study. Of course, such discourses implicate one's own normative stance which gives particular form to our interpretations and evaluations (Griggs and Howarth, 2012: 171)


24 Norval (2007: 52; 1996); see also Howarth (2010) for an account of how 'radical contingency' of the social is the condition of thinking the constitution of social relations in terms of articulatory practices where the meaning of any object needs to be 'fixed' and remains necessarily vulnerable to hegemonic struggle.
according to Howarth, comprises 'fixed systems of rules, norms, resources, practices and subjectivities that are linked together in particular ways' whose hegemonic form is always a balance between coercion/force and forging of consent through practices that aim at the 'organic coupling of state and civil society'. In order to avoid the culprits of 'developmental historicism', 'modernist-empiricism' and positivism, but to take these into account as discourses (or 'paradigms'), a genealogical perspective that understands the state as a historically contingent form that is not only expressive of the 'logic of difference' and 'staatwissenschaft', i.e governmental rationality, but one that articulates both political logics of equivalence and difference and is never ultimately fully integral (or heterogeneous) to 'society' is necessary. This analysis shall help us characterize the political dimension and ambiguity of racism.

Further, under the pretense of scientific 'neutrality', arguments are often conveyed by way of rhetorical comparisons and hyperboles that betray 'eurocentric' self-understandings of 'superiority' and 'rationality'. Therefore, a genealogical account has to draw attention to how different languages and rhetorical tropoi converge and amplify certain social meanings. In this respect, certain strands of the discourse of the social sciences are understood as internal to the discourse of the state in diverse ways and playing a role in power struggles.

25 Howarth (2010: 312). This is roughly the Gramscian notion of the integral state (civil + political society), see Torfing's (2005) essay 'Discourse Theory'.
26 Bevir and Rhodes reject what they call 'developmental historicism' that has been the dominant narrative of states, re-told by social scientists for whom the state would be conceived as the embodiment of a substantive idea with a teleological history. They distinguish between 'developmental historicism' 'modernist-empiricism' which they associate more with positivism, however in practice and in certain contexts the two distinct logics of approaching the state are not necessarily distinct. see Bevir and Rhodes (2010).
27 For an interesting account of how social science explanation based on reducing social contingency, complexity and the unfolding of events to necessity, and on 'converting the real into the rational' is ultimately an obstacle to critical explanation, see Hirschman (1987: 174)
28 I use here the term 'logic of equivalence' in an unqualified way to capture the dimension of antagonism which from the point of view of the 'logic of difference' is experienced as 'parochial' and 'irrational'. An example of this can be found in the descriptions of populism, see Laclau (2005).
The case of Greek racism should therefore be cautiously approached from a standpoint that does not naturalize colonial or 'crypto-colonial' versions of Western scientific, political and moral imagination. My aim at a general level is to destabilize the almost natural opposition between the 'West' and the 'rest' by bringing to view the ambiguities of the Greek case. Rather than the exception to some norm, I argue, the case of Greek racism exemplifies precisely how the Western disciplinary 'gaze' gets embodied in bureaucratic procedure and elite discourse, official and civil society practice, and uncritical social science practice. This 'gaze' is examined here as to its role in shaping the rationales of certain socio-political interventions and in making possible certain kind of responses (ad hoc institutional arrangements, spectacular interventions etc.) while excluding others. Far from being necessarily a vector of social change, this gaze, I argue, can often be seen to have paralyzing effects and reproducing social inertia.

Such 'gaze' could be visible in some of the arguments and narratives I analyze about racism being a problem gia tin eikona mas ['for our image']; the image of the self pros ta ekso ['to the outside'], or, sto eksoteriko ['abroad']. This thesis explores these 'symbolic' dimensions of identification, which bespeak of how the subject relates to that 'agency whose gaze I try to impress with my ego image', as a result of the research decision to question 'historicist' and rationalist assumptions in formulating the questions about Greek racism. The problem I am concerned with is not so much why despite all

29 On the notion of crypto-colonialism see Herzfeld (2002);
30 See Pagden (2002) and Chatterjee (2004) and Chakrabarty (2000) on the general project of 'provincializing' Europe; and Herzfeld (2002a; 2002b) on the specificity of the Greek 'case' for such a project.
31 I use the term 'gaze' here to denote, as Foucault puts it, 'the act of observing' and 'internalization'. Foucault insists that the 'gaze' does not determine subjectivity (Krips, 2010: 6). The disciplinary power that Foucault's account aims to capture is not so different from Lacan's conception of the 'symbolic' where the 'gaze' refers to how the subject is seen by the Other. See Krips (2010).
32 In psychoanalytic discourse the 'symbolic' and 'imaginary' correspond to the relation to the 'Other', the authority (Ego-Ideal) and the relation to the 'self' (Ideal-Ego). See Žižek's essay 'Ego Ideal and Superego' (2006).
knowledge, facts and evidence about racism, racism still persists, but how what we might call narratives about racism could tell us something about how racism persists and what is the role of the internalization of this gaze. The disciplinary 'gaze' that constitutes the exceptional case as an aberration and thereby asserts the position of an 'achieved fullness' and superiority is dealt with as a concrete element of the problem of the ideological operations at play in the constitution of racism as a 'problem' in general. This, for Žižek, is the 'imaginary' aspect of identification and it concerns the 'idealized self-image of the subject'. Part of the survey in chapter 2 aims precisely at bringing into view how the 'discursive' turn in the study of racism has focused on the deconstruction of the sharp distinction between racism/rationality which operates as a foundation for relegating racism to the realm of the irrational, aberrant and subjective, away from 'us' and inscribed onto a certain 'them'. Racism, I would argue, will best be understood in relation to what Ernesto Laclau has called the 'social frontier separating the normal from the pathological' whose historical constitution accounts for how a range of phenomena have historically been subsumed under the rubric of 'irrationality'. This is all the more relevant when it comes to analyzing the politics of 'race' and racism in Greece and presenting the findings in a Western, scholarly environment.

**Racism, rhetoric and frontiers**

The focus of this study however is not the discursive production of the 'Western gaze' upon Greek practices and anti-immigrant racism-related phenomena, embodied in interventions of international organizations and European institutions like the ECRI or the CPT. The problem of the 'gaze' is used throughout the thesis in a heuristic manner to show how both Greece and racism are already constituted entities in certain discourses and to account for social change or inertia and ideological responses.

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33 Ernesto Laclau (2005: 19-20)
The object of this study is the formation of racism as an object and subject of discourse that shapes and is being shaped by the context of contemporary 'securitizations' of migration. Drawing on post-structuralist theorization of rhetoric, I examine the tropes that govern the social production and contestation of the meaning of racism in Greece in relation to what is commonly referred to in Greece as to metanastefiko ['the issue of immigration'] and whose dominant signification as the problem in Greece, I argue, partly accounts for the reproduction and concealment of racism. The being of immigration as a 'threat' should therefore be approached as a key element of the 'tropological' construction of the 'social'. By 'trope'/tropological' I refer to both the linguistic vehicles by which meaning is transferred and to the form that social division takes. The force of this signification, I would argue, does not come from some 'irrational' fears or from a maladjustment to 'objective' conditions; rather it can be shown to be deeply ingrained in the discourse of security whose multiple and dispersed sites and articulations are the object of analysis of this thesis.

It is necessary at this point to clarify a semantic ambiguity that penetrates the politics of migration in the Greek context. It is commonplace for scholars to write in English that in the early 1990s Greece abruptly 'became a country of immigration' with the entry (and deportation) of a few thousands following socio-political turbulence in the Balkans and the USSR, to fall immediately into the classification 'newer immigration countries', prior to that being 'a country of emigration'. Official and lay narratives on migration in the Greek context are invariably ordered around this knowledge too. But such conceptual schema and translation is not without problems. First, in Greek language there is no equivalent distinction to the pair 'emigration/immigration'. The terms 'metanastefsi'/metanastis' which are the only available terms corresponding to the

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34 See Laclau & Mouffe (2001) and below Chapter 3 of this thesis.
generic 'migration'/migrant', are used to refer to both emigration/immigration. Strictly speaking, what changed in the late 1980s with the broader dislocation brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union was the discourse on migration. In the Greek case, its object shifted from the Greek emigrant to that of the foreign immigrant. In turn, the framing of the foreign immigrant as *lathromenastis* ['smuggled immigrant'] and thereby as a security threat was central in consolidating what kind of 'problem' migration begun to signify in public discourse since the early 1990s. Second, the expression 'country of emigration' that takes a particular experience as characteristic of the country as a whole, as it has been rightly argued, obscures a 'particular history of reception' in Greece not only of refugees in the early 20th century, but also of immigrants to Greece during the second half of the 20th century. Therefore such seemingly neutral descriptions of 'Greece's emigratory past and the immigratory present', implicitly naturalize 'homogeneity' and portray 'diversity' as a new phenomenon. They construct the 'turns' to which they respond and of which they constitute the 'solutions'. In that, such descriptions often resemble the rationale that has justified numerous security interventions post-1990s as responses to a 'new' and 'overwhelming' phenomenon that threatens Greece. This thesis shows how and why it was with the Albanian immigrants' arrival in the early 1990s that the terms of public debate on immigration reception practices changed dramatically. It is in this context that racism emerged as an ambiguous object of struggles around security, immigration and identity.

Chapter 4 of this thesis examines the discourse of political representatives in the Greek parliament during the 1990s and after 2000. 'Racism' figures invariably at the center of these debates: security measures from the early 1990s to date have been predominantly

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35 One of the few articles that stresses the shift in policy focus is Kountouri's (2009)
36 See Karamandidou (2009: 31)
37 See Kambouri (2005)
framed as the response to citizens’ insecurity and as necessary in order to prevent racism and xenophobia from *emerging* within Greek society. The so-called ‘myth of homogeneity’ – and official state dogma - has as its corollary the myth that *racism is essentially foreign to Greek culture*. This latter myth was reiterated during the 1990s in much ‘mainstream’ political discourse to account for racism as a merely possible or accidental effect of the ‘problem’ of immigration.

The ideological aspect which I examine throughout this thesis concerns not so much the misrepresentation of reality. It rather concerns the nature of socio-political responses to contingent phenomena, be it that of immigrations in the 1990s or racism, and how the latter are symbolically framed. In order to attend to the ideological dimensions of narratives about racism, I approach the period in the early 1990s as a ‘dislocatory’ period that opened up the possibilities for a number of discourses – migration, race and security – to reiterate or repeat themselves.³⁸

All empirical chapters in a way attempt to address the complex relationship between racism, security and immigration. Disentangling this ‘bundle’ of ‘complex relational phenomena’,³⁹ I argue, allows us to bring into view differing and contending visions of security, of what racism is, and of what ought to constitute community. Further, by focusing on the struggle over the determination of these entities, we can get a ‘snapshot’ of the shifting political frontiers in Greece. For, as it has been argued, political frontiers are ‘those mechanisms through which social division is instituted, and “insiders”

³⁸ The category of dislocation serves to foreground the specific nature of social relations, because the dislocatory moment is that in which the ontological contingency of social relations is manifested. Thus a ‘dislocated’ subject experiences its ‘mode of being’ as interrupted. This relates also to the conception of ‘the political’ in the sense that a political practice makes visible the moment of institution of social practices. See Glynos and Howarth (2007: 110-11). However, the category of dislocation should not be confused with ‘crisis’, at least not in a lay sense.

distinguished from “outsiders”\(^{40}\). For example, in the discourse of those subjects for whom immigration constitutes a clear 'threat' and for whom 'the only racism that exists in Greece is that against the Greeks', a view that progressively gained more visibility as the 'crisis' that begun in 2009 was intensifying, there are 'insiders' and 'outsiders', the former being the 'Greek people' and the latter being the 'elites' and the 'immigrants'. By contrast, for other subjects doing security and envisioning Greek society as a population irrespective of ethnic, racial and other divisions, racism came to represent a problem equivalent to 'illegal immigration', 'terrorism (left-wing and Islamic)', 'drug-trafficking' and so on. In this latter discourse, the political frontier, the mode of social division, proves itself more resistant to reading. These antagonistic security discourses appear to be 'in solidarity', when we examine how the 'Left' parliamentary and extra-parliamentary have attempted to re-draw the political frontier by identifying racism with the 'state'-far-right' nexus and by making commensurate the demands of 'Greeks' and 'foreigners' as 'workers under threat'. And yet, if we look further at this side of the political spectrum, we find perspectives that depict racism as cutting across 'society' making the difference between 'Left' and 'Right' obsolete. This goes some way to explain Ernesto Laclau's argument that 'the space of representation is a broken and murky mirror, constantly interrupted by a heterogeneous 'Real' which it cannot master'\(^{41}\).

The approach to racism as a key 'signifier' is not to deny the 'objectivity' of volumes of evidence of anti-immigrant racism in Greece. It rather is to be attentive to what these 'social facts' mean and to what uses they are being put. 'Hard' evidence of racism might mean necessity for more security and 'law and order', that capitalism targets the weakest of society, yet another conspiracy against Greeks or simply nothing because Greece is naturally synonymous with hospitality. Attention is focused on analyzing the forms of

\(^{40}\) Norval (1996: 4)

\(^{41}\) Laclau, Ernesto (2005: 141).
contestations of and around racism, where 'racism' becomes a 'floating' element, amenable to appropriation and inscription on different projects. Thus, Greece on this account becomes a case of analyzing racism in relation to the drawing and displacement of political frontiers, thus, to political logics and to the contestation of social logics that characterize the fields of security and migration politics. I thus examine racism in relation to the politics of security and migration and as an inherent possibility of the political, that is, of the condition of possibility of the 'social' and socio-political hegemony. Thus, through the examination of racism as a 'political fighting word', as a 'weapon' used in politics, I argue, it becomes possible to bring into sharp view the reproduction, transformation and contestation of the hegemonic racial formation in Greece.\footnote{This framing of the problem is consistent with a poststructuralist research agenda where the emphasis is placed on acts of political institution, reproduction and re-iteration of discourses and projects, and contestation. See (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 5).}

An implication of this argument is that racism can have a social existence only insofar as it is being 'taken up'. The implications of this are clear in the following example given by Ernesto Laclau in his article 'Articulation and the limits of metaphor': 'Let us suppose that in a neighborhood there is racist violence and the only force capable of confronting it are the trade unions. We would think that, normally, opposing racism is not the natural task of trade unions'. Such 'taking up', Laclau argues, 'derives from relations of contiguity, i.e its nature is metonymic'. If this 'taking up' persists it will be the case that what was a contingent articulation will progressively become naturalized, that is, the trade union's anti-racism will have become over time 'essential belonging' (Laclau 2008: 69). Trade unionism will become another name for anti-racism. For Laclau, this movement from metonymy to metaphor, is what hegemony and, therefore, politics is all about. In this example, the question of racism is something to be taken up by social
forces and articulated in a political manner. In another 'chain of signification' racist violence, as I show later in this thesis, might be equivalent to the violence and anomie of the trade unions and to a series of other 'problems' for government. This means that the social meaning of racism is essentially ambiguous and that it is only by means of hegemonic and rhetorical operations that its meaning is stabilized. In the chapters to follow I analyze these operations and map out how racism has been taken up by different institutional and other actors in recent Greek politics.

As racism, however, is not mere violence or the negation of order, but rather it penetrates and inhabits order, it would be fruitful to examine the issue from an even more nuanced perspective. In a description of how 'middle America' came into being in the US in the 1960s, Kazin tells us about folks who 'were defensively proud of themselves - whites with steady jobs or small, local businesses. While not overtly racist they were also not particularly sensitive to or concerned about the specific problems of black people' [My emphasis]. Further, he goes on to say that what united this 'majority' was nothing more than a 'shared dislike of a governing and cultural elite and its perceived friends in the ghettos or campus'. We can see here that racism is said to be a 'disavowed' aspect of a political, popular identity. Now, with the concept of 'disavowal' it is possible to open up a productive, psycho-social perspective on questions about subjectivity without reducing racism to an aberrant phenomenon.

Therefore, the point here is not to say that racism is equal to populism and that both phenomena are aberrant, 'pathological deviations' from a normal order but to see how phenomena that are discursively constructed as exterior to a certain order are actually constitutive of it. In other words, the point is not to project racism onto equivalential forms of political mobilization but to see how racism relates to the mutual

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43 Kazin quoted in Laclau (2005:137)
'contamination' of logics of difference and equivalence. The above example shows us that for unity to be constructed, a social division through boundaries has to be instituted and then dissimulated. As Norval puts it, the representation of unity 'makes it seem that the institution of social division is not itself a social fact'. From this point of view, we can, make better sense as to how 'middle America' was not overtly racist but rather 'defensively proud'. These two examples tell us little about the nature of racism besides that it is a politically pertinent issue. But they do raise issues that implicate the question of racism with 'modes of identification' and political articulation. Both of these examples invite us to think of racism as an element of broader phenomena linked to the construction of political subjectivity and political frontiers, while the latter also raises the question of the dissimulation or veiling of racism, in short, the question of ideology. This is an important question because it is the question of how collective identities relate, not only to the 'other', but to their own acts of exclusion, how they represent themselves to themselves. This is important because it points to one of the conditions for hegemony: the concealment of the act of exclusion.

By 'bracketing' the objectivity of racism it becomes possible to approach the question of ideology from an anti-essentialist and post-foundationalist vantage point. Rather than considering the myth of the absence of racism in Greece as a formulation of the general problem of the 'denial of racism' with the assumptions of false consciousness and reality/ideas distinctions that conventionally animate such formulations, I turn attention to something rather obvious whose sense of 'givenness' has prevented any serious consideration of how it may relate to racism, security and immigration: the rhetoric of

Norval (1996: 4)

See Laclau (1990:68-69). Laclau in a Nietzschean vein, argues that for a discourse to become hegemonic what is required is the 'elimination of the specifically political nature of victorious practices'. From this point of view, the 'truth' of a hegemonic discourse is always an illusion 'whose illusionary nature has been forgotten' (Nietzsche cited in de Man, 1979: 110).
Greek *filoksenia* [hospitality].

How racism is socially signified, or what it signifies amongst contenders in a political fight or amongst subjects of government, is permanently under negotiation, but it also rests on powerful and hegemonic social and historical assumptions: the language of *filoksenia* [hospitality], I show further on, constitutes 'common sense' and 'ordinary knowledge' by which the encounter between the 'self' and the 'other' is regularly interpreted and by which racism becomes (un)intelligible. I explore the repetitions of this language and its metaphorical extension into the domains of security and migration politics. The ideological dimension manifests itself in the ways in which *filoksenia* acquires the features of an *essence* while racism acquires the features of an *accident*. These textual operations are seen as integral to concrete responses to contemporary immigrations and presences of foreigners in the Greek context whose detailed examination eventually can serve to show how we 'reflect ourselves to ourselves' in practice.

The intuition about *filoksenia* being an element worthy of attention in this study of anti-immigrant racism is primarily not normative, although the question of hospitality *is* the question of the deconstruction of rigid identities and of the interruption of ipseity, that is, the question of justice. Rather, it comes from its actual displacement and uses in

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46 The translation of the term *filoxenia* into hospitality is not without difficulties. This is because the term hospitality engulfs the meaning of hostility, in other words, it subverts itself, whereas the greek term *filoksenia* is less ambiavent. As Benveniste (1969) has argued, the word 'xenos', as opposed to the latin 'hostis' does not condense the meaning of 'enemy'.

47 See Simon (1988: 775). Simon stresses the *practical* significance of ideology because it is in 'practical involvements' that subjectivity is constituted. His proposed distinction, drawing on the work of Michel Foucault is between 'actuarial' and 'disciplinary' practices. In the context of this study such distinction is useful in conceptualizing different kinds of responses to immigration and accordingly to racism.

48 Derrida underlines the necessary relation between deconstruction and justice since the latter is the name for '[...] what will not let itself be deconstructed, that is, for that which gives deconstruction its movement, for what justifies it'. Derrida (2002: 104).
the contemporary political and practical domain of securitized migration. In this context it has served to nominate with cynicism (?) security practices like administrative detention and manifestly racist, 'sweep' police operations. Are these 'catchphrase' extensions and if so how do we understand them? What work does 'hospitality' do for security politics and how does it change its meaning?

Further, in less direct ways, metaphors of 'host-guest' and 'house', have been abundantly used to articulate a political stance against immigration. Golden Dawn has recurrently called its political opponents to take immigrants 'at their home'. Indeed, one of my informants, a moderate, social-democrat, told me he would 'take them home' were they not 'so many', pointing at the limited space of his living-room and the necessity of some form of detention. Perhaps, G. Karatzaferis, one of the 'witty' politicians of the far-right, put it in the most succinct of terms:

Greece does not have the capacity to feed two million. It is not one. It is two million. To understand what is happening in Greece: someone comes at your house at night and breaks in. You ask him 'why did you break my window glass'? 'I'm hungry', he says. 'Nice, sit down and eat', you reply to him, 'I'll place you in a corner'. Well, in five years time he says 'I want the house undivided'. [...] I gave you hospitality, medication to get well, but I am not going to give you my house undivided.

Such narratives are particularly meaningful because they are consonant to the national self-imagery of goodness and hospitality as essential traits of the culture or race. Such imagery is not 'anecdotal'. It is rather inscribed, written, rather than simply unofficially spoken, for instance, in national curricula and folk literature textbooks: 'A foreign couple traveling with us wonders about the village woman's goodness. And I explain to them

49 In the discipline of anthropology changing epistemological paradigms allowed the practitioners to investigate the ways in which traditional themes of anthropology are becoming increasingly entangled with security contexts. See (Goldstein, 2010: 489).

50 These metaphors are naturalized in the discourse of social science. In immigration studies, it is commonplace to refer to 'guest-workers', or 'host-countries'.

that since the old times, goodness has been a feature of our race [...] in the blood of the Greek there is a lot of sensibility’.\textsuperscript{52} It would be wrong, however, to reproduce an 'orientalist' discourse by assigning the rhetoric of hospitality, blood and race the status of signifying an exclusively Greek self-image or a 'circum-mediterranean unity'.\textsuperscript{53} For, as Benveniste has shown, these articulations go back to the very origin of all Indo-European language: \textit{Aryaman}, in Sanskrit, was both the god of hospitality and the 'name of the man of the same language, the same race'.\textsuperscript{54}

The language of \textit{filoksenia} can thus be compared with how identical or similar languages have in other contexts played the role of veiling discrimination and racism. Tracing the languages of hospitality in slaveholding societies of the Old South, and comparing these with contemporary 'rationalizations' of racism in Greece could reveal much rhetorical and even genealogical resonance between seemingly unrelated contexts and thereby add to our interpretive and contextualizing strategies. Although impossible to be undertaken here, such inquiry could cut through time and space to examine how founding texts of Western rationality, like Homer's epics, were taken up by literate and upper social classes in the American South who would thereby re-discover their origins in the classical Hellenic tradition. For instance, hospitality figures centrally in the \textit{Iliad}, which was included in the curricula in the Old South and, according to Genovèse, was 'taught in the original'.\textsuperscript{55} Southern hospitality was sung ('That Southern Hospitality') and praised:\textsuperscript{56} 'Northern Church hospitality is a system; Southern church hospitality is an

\textsuperscript{52} Zalokostas (1960: 132). There are similar examples in middle education literature textbooks, for instance, Rodakanakis' (1947) 'Filanthropia' ['filanthropy] and Christovasilis (1957) 'I Filoxenia' [hospitality].
\textsuperscript{53} Herzfeld (1987).
\textsuperscript{54} Benveniste (1969: 100)
\textsuperscript{55} Fox-Genovese & Genovese (2005: 256). For broader questions on paternalism see Genovese & Fox-Genovese (2011)
instinct', Abbott wrote in 1902. Walford, at the other side of the Atlantic, asserted that 'one of the noblest instincts of our race is that which prompts hospitality'. But whereas slavery was abolished in the British Empire in 1833, in the state of S. Carolina, this 'agreed-on fiction', was effectively mobilized to naturalize the legal practices that made slavery possible. In reply to allegations of HM's Consul regarding violations of international law, the special Committee of S. Carolina legislature responded:

We retain the right to exclude from our territory any class of persons who might be burdensome to the public, or dangerous to the health, or peace, good order, and security of the community.

Appealing to the right of 'self-preservation [...] a right which is above all constitutions, and above all laws', Governor Meads sought to justify the imprisonment of coloured 'seamen'. The allegations were debunked by a rather 'defensive' response to HM's Consul:

[Indeed, there is too much reason to believe that the murmurs and complaints against it, which come to us from abroad, are prompted much less by inconveniences actually felt than by a spirit of unfriendliness to our social order and institutions.]

It is important to foreground this comparative dimension not only because hospitality appears to play the same role in naturalizing oppression and justifying racism, but also because in that context as well as in contemporary Greece, security is enacted in the name of 'self-preservation' and one of the values to be preserved, paradoxically, is that of hospitality. In both cases, 'exclusion from the territory', as I will show, is not exclusion per se but rather a kind of 'exclusionary inclusion' that produces subordinated subjects.

These two widely disparate, temporally and spatially contexts, I argue, are in some

57 Abbott (1902: 112)
58 Walford (1885: 64)
59 McPherson argues that although Southern hospitality is a performance, an etiquette, it is nevertheless, a 'powerful one with material effects'. (2003: 150).
60 All passages quoted from Adams (1852: 356-63)
respects disturbingly similar.

**Greek racism and other racisms: research design**

The strategy followed here is to consider Greek racism as one racism amongst others without this meaning that such 'relativization' in specific contexts cannot or has not become problematic. Greek racism is considered here in its historical singularity but also as a case of *normal* racism very much like British racism, racism in the Old South, Apartheid racism,61 Nazi racism, European racism and so on. Greek racism, I argue, cannot be properly understood without examining the symbolic and affective 'work' *other* racisms play in the constitution of what socially prevails as racism in 'here and now' circumstances in the context of Greece. This is not only to argue that the history of Greek racism cannot be seen in abstraction from the histories and *logics* of other racisms, but also that allusions and analogies to 'other' racisms shape the political imagination of contemporary engagements against racism in Greece, as it happens, for example, with the use of marked terms such as 'Apartheid' or the 'Camp' the re-significations of which I examine in chapters 5 and 6.

The case here however is equally emphasizing the question of how we might link the 'anti-immigrant' with the question of racism and it is here that following the construction and deconstruction of security discourse in the present is imperative. To avoid reducing racism to a parasitic phenomenon we have to adopt a viewpoint on contemporary and emergent security practices, but this only raises the question of what constitutes a security practice. An approach to what is contemporary about anti-immigrant racism or what present struggles around security in particular contexts are indicative of, is not to

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61 This point seems to go against Derrida's assertion about Apartheid's exemplarity, 'something like a racism par excellence, the most racist of racisms' see (Derrida, 1985: 291-2). However, it is its exemplarity that makes it commensurable to other racisms in that the name can stand as a metaphor.
adopt a 'timely' approach to given, contemporary 'problems'. By contrast, it involves an 'untimely' dimension that establishes 'a relationship to the present different from reigning opinion'.

The analysis of the case of anti-immigrant Greek racism proceeds by focusing on a number of different sites of debate and social conflict in which racism figures as a 'problem' or constitutes an element of problematizations. It is clearly impossible to 'say everything'. The media, legislative, judicial, parliamentary debates, ordinary language and practice, civil society and grassroots political activism, emerging (e-) publics, are sites anyone would be led to in 'following the antagonism' whose subject matter is racism. More specifically, the question of anti-immigrant racism and its 'disavowal' has led me to examine the contestation of security practices and the languages used for their (de)legitimization and that led me to consider more seriously the discourse of _filoksenia_.

Clearly, however, such research strategy is vulnerable more to a 'combination and contexture disorder', where one can lose focus and get lost in ever-expanding contexts, attempting to link them in a paranoid fashion, rather than to a 'selection disorder' where one might fail to contextualize a given object. In that sense, the research design here mirrors some of the imagined conspiracies and plots this thesis analyses. But to reflect on the tensions that characterize the construction of an object of study is more desirable than not, something that anthropologists who cultivate what is called an 'ethnographic imagination' know all too well:

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62 On this point see Rabinow (2008: 59). Rabinow delineates the object of study for anthropologists which is contemporary phenomena but not in the sense that one works 'on something that is generally perceived as important' (ibid: 57). By contrast, the anthropology of the contemporary is meant to examine assemblages as they emerge, 'in the making' and thus make them available for critical scrutiny. Derrida (2002: 86) makes a similar point in 'Deconstructing Actuality' as he argues that thinking about the present is not to delve into actuality but to reflect on how '[...] actuality is made: it is important to know what it is made of, but it is just as important to know that it is made, [...] the “reality” [...] reaches us through fictional constructions'.

63 See Fortun (2009: 182)
Ethnography [...] is not about everything. There are always margins and disavowals. Research design is a key space for working this through and for learning to be caught by and implicated in the ethnographic game. Certitude about what one is doing should not be the goal. Anxiety should be played rather than mastered. [...] A patience and sensibility for what many would term “method” is thus critical.  

The method I follow is retroductive and problem-driven. This means that the re-description of particular problems in the context of each of the aforementioned sites aims not only towards something that exceeds the immediate context of the case – for example the contestation around an ‘administrative’ detention center could function as an exemplar of the broader terms and logics of the contestation around racism in Greece, but it could also serve to reflect upon ‘theory’. For instance, the analysis of racial tensions in the urban environment of Athens might point to complexities of articulating various levels of analysis and thinking of the unity/dispersion of discourses. But all cases framed here are addressed from the specific point of view of ideology analysis. Racism is not approached as an ideology but rather as a signifier whose articulations re-activate political and ideological operations.

Further, the cases are framed in a way that does not permit the subsumption of the ‘empirical’ under the ‘theoretical’. These analyses begin with problematizations of ‘native’ terms – ‘contextualized self-interpretations’. In fact, they begin with the problematization of problematizations. This means that by focusing on ‘text’ for the most part, this study opens up to thinking racism as a ‘problematic’ and problematized phenomenon, that is, a problem inviting thought and reflection, and to how such problematizations are made

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64 (ibid, 2009: 182)
65 I am drawing here on the specific method Foucault derives from reflecting on his way of approaching the relation between science, politics and ethics. Problematization for Foucault does not suggest the analysis of problems which are “out there”; it rather suggests the analysis of these dislocatory moments whereby problems get detached from given systems of representation, and become open to reflection and thought. As he puts it: “Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to
possible: What do people do when they talk about racism? What knowledge and assumptions underpin people's engagements with the phenomenon of racism? What are talks and conflicts over racism indicative of? More specifically: how, when and why did racism emerge as an object of problematization in the Greek context? What other 'problems' are commensurate to the 'problem' of racism in this specific spatial and temporal context?

In such approach clearly we cannot enter from a non-theoretically informed position, because such position is untenable; but neither can we enter with a pre-established and fixed theoretical framework. Having in mind that both politics and theory inform the epistemological background of research into racism, that researchers, eventually, do not do anything 'different in kind from the citizens involved in the argumentation', and having in mind that all accounts articulate ontological assumptions, one could proceed with an investigation of the empirically contested nature of racism and the inherent instability, 'contestability' of its meaning. This is to begin with the minimal assumption of the historical, social and contingent being of Greek and all racisms. And here lies the first paradox that I would like to address and of which the Greek case is indicative: How can the meaning of 'racism' be both contingent and at the same time appear in a necessary fashion, i.e as an aberrant phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon that exhibits a 'quality of exteriority'?

question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals”. See Foucault's interview (1997:117) 'Polemics, Politics, Problematizations'. However, this formulation might be misleading in that it appears that it postulates a sharp division between practice/thought, or in, Wittgenstenian terms, understanding/interpretation. If we dispel the idea that “stepping back” from practice is not a literal withdrawal from practice, but it can be a moment of it, the idea of problematization takes on its full significance. In addition, Foucault seems to contrast problematization with what he calls polemics and taking positions. This does not mean though that problematizations cannot emerge in political contexts, that is, contexts where disagreement, dispute and adversity prevail.

Tully (2004: 91)

I borrow this phrase from J. A. Miller who draws on J. Lacan's notion of 'estimacy'. Estimacy refers to the paradox of that which is most intimate and yet is not 'a point of transparency, but rather a point of opacity', that which appears as a 'foreign body, a parasite' (1994: 76). This, for
One of my claims here is that a logic of displacement characterizes the production of the Greek case as a 'liminal', 'marginal' case in or heterogeneous to the 'Western' context. The same logic is a good candidate for exploring the rhetorical dimensions of problematizations of racism in Greece, of how speaking subjects constitute themselves as exterior to and 'unknowing of' racism; it allows us to consider in the Greek context the displacement of debates on racism to a margin and the becoming central of the metanastefítko, signifying more often than not the 'problem of immigration'. In the context of contemporary 'securitized' migration, the same logic can function for understanding certain cases which I investigate: territorial displacements producing the marginal place of administrative detention, or, the means of governing 'social heterogeneity' by displacing social frontiers; thus, here, the concept of displacement seems to emerge from the empirical material itself, and can then be examined in its nuances.

Another concept I put forward as an alternative 'principle of reading' is that of defense. If displacement characterizes a diverging set of responses, linguistic, institutional, societal, to what are variously cast as 'problems', a 'not-in-my-backyard' logic - the concept of defense illuminates another aspect, the political and rhetorical one. There are principally two reasons why I was led to the idea of defense. 1) The context. The context

Miller, is a way into thinking of how 'the exterior is present in the interior'. From this point of view, the notion of extimacy is similar to the Derridean notion of the supplement, for both the extimate and the supplement are experienced as external threats, but also constitute the 'inside'. Here, we can draw an analogy also to Herzfeld's notion of cultural intimacy which suggests that there are aspects of identity that are 'source of embarrassment', but which 'provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality' (Herzfeld, 2005: 3), or we could point at the disjuncture between 'official/unofficial discourse.

Both displacement and defence are not concepts that have not previously evoked to describe the kind of nationalism (i.e 'reactive nationalism') that is characteristic of the Greek context. See Mouzelis (1994: 43-45). What I would like to see however is the possibility of freeing these categories from their rationalist and developmental connotations. For example, in the work of Mouzelis these categories are inscribed in a framework that distinguishes a priori between 'civic' and 'reactive/defensive' nationalism and relates the latter to political formalism, under-development etc.
referred to as 'securitized migration' constitutes a field of representation overdetermined by signifiers of 'threat'. In the empirical context I investigate, languages of war, invasion, and defense are employed by subjects in 'making sense' of and experiencing contemporary immigration; there is also material, technical/scientific and military practices constituting and dealing with 'illegal' immigration. The concept of defense speaks literally to the means, material and symbolic, in short, discursive, by which the issue of immigration has been hegemonically signified as a 'problem' in the Greek context and beyond. Also, the metaphor of 'defense' serves to underline the genealogical aspect of racism, that is, both how 'racism' as a signifier is used as a weapon that elicits defensive or aggressive responses, and how racism as a historico-political phenomenon belongs to the order of antagonism and war that is constitutive of all societies. 2) The concept of defense however serves another purpose: that of foregrounding the constitutive dimension of rhetoric in shaping reality, social 'objectivity' and politics. It is suggested that if we are to give an account of rhetorical strategies and understand the question of rhetoric in the context of this study, we have to shift attention to the ways in which tropes are the linguistic equivalent of psychological defense mechanisms.\footnote{See White (1978: 2)} Similar to how the 'ego' – the speaking subject – defends itself from whatever threatens its coherence, figural speech and tropes constitute reality in a way that insulates it from contingency but also making possible its subversion.

\textbf{Chapter overview}

\textit{Chapter 1} surveys the place of anti-immigrant racism in Greece across disciplinary frontiers. It focuses on two periods: Prior to 1990 and after 1990. This temporal threshold is given by existing periodizations that define the present landscape in Greece as determined by the 'new' reality of immigration and multiculturalism, as opposed to a
past of homogeneity. I survey the literature that has focused on how relations of identity/difference have been 'fixed' hegemonically in the Greek context before 1990. Further, I examine the diverse scholarly research on contemporary immigration in Greece and focus on the relationship between racism and immigration. I argue that particular conceptualizations of racism make possible particular accounts of migration politics and that reductionist accounts of racism problematize it as a problem of irrationality. I shift attention to social rhetoric, common sense, and the obvious to argue that 'hospitality' and its metaphorical extension into the domains of security and migration politics, account for the dissimulation of racism. This hypothesis is followed through in all subsequent chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

Chapter 2 shows how 'migration' has been theorized as an object of security discourses in the recent past and how such link can be contested. The second part of this chapter focuses on the historico-political and psycho-social nature of the 'race' question. I argue that the marginality of racism and the depoliticizing ways of engaging with racism can be countered with a detailed analysis of racism as a problematized political and ideological phenomenon.

Chapter 3, largely theoretical but also articulating empirical material, elaborates a theoretical framework of discourse analytical categories such as myth, imaginary, ideology and fantasy in order to refine the analysis of how racism and filoksenia have been rhetorically produced as antithetical entities, bearing the status of 'accident' and 'essence' respectively. It is my contention that the condition for the reproduction of the current racial and socio-political regime is precisely the naturalization of this distinction which articulates a particular world-view and type of subjectivity.

Rather than a historical 'accident' or a phenomenon subsumable to irrationality, racism
can be approached as the name contingently ascribed by social actors to antagonistic phenomena which involve struggles, defense and displacement of frontiers and institutionalized, discursive practices. Racism is thus approached as a metaphor of antagonism. The last part of this chapter discusses some general methodological issues and the archive on which this thesis is based.

Chapter 4 examines in some detail the period of 'national reconciliation' in Greece as well as the broader dislocated context marked by the collapse of the USSR during the late 1980s. It shows how certain representations and problematizations of immigration, security and race were reiterated in the early 1990s with the 'event' of population flows from Albania. Here, I show how these 'bundles' of problematizations circulated in the press and parliamentary discourse and how competing interpretations of how migration, security and racism relate to each other, tell us about the ways in which anti-immigrant racism came to be signified as a threat to identity equivalent to a number of other threats and about the ways in which these narratives were subject to interruption.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 focus more tightly on the present or the near past. These chapters investigate cases of areas of struggle around immigration. Chapter 5 examines how administrative detention emerged as a necessity for the Greek state, how this practice has been sustained and what kinds of logics animate the responses to and contestations of this practice. I argue that as a practice of control, administrative detention has produced the 'problem' it sought to address, namely, 'illegal migration'. It has reproduced and legitimized itself by displacing the 'problem' of 'illegal immigration' to the margins of public visibility and by its articulation with the language of filoksenia and anti-racist rhetoric. The contestation of administrative detention, in particular in the case of Pagani Detention Center, is examined as to the heterogeneity and historicity of positions from which it emanates. This examination shows how these struggles are not simply about the
redefinition of the relation between ‘natives' and 'foreigners'. They are also about re-drawing political frontiers more generally.

Chapter 6 follows the antagonism over security, migration and race in the urban context of Athens and examines the different, often contradictory, ways in which security discourse was deployed and contested as racist. This chapter was initially about explaining how the election of Golden Dawn in the local council was possible and how grassroots mobilization of civic militias and committees was officially responded to with ambivalence.

Chapter 7 turns to the broader question of citizenship and re-describes a key struggle of immigrants as a struggle for citizenship and visibility in 2011. In this chapter I show how the security and ideological apparatus was successfully mobilized to repress the struggle of immigrants and de-legitimize their demands. The second part of the chapter examines a decision of the Supreme Court during the same period, according to which the newly adopted, favorable to immigrants and their rights legislation, was deemed unconstitutional, and the widespread controversy that characterized this debate.

The analysis in the following chapters addresses in more detail the issues raised here. Each chapter represents particular aspects of the problem at hand and thus as a whole the chapters can be seen as articulating empirical, theoretical and methodological dimensions. With the development on these elements the problem becomes both that of accounting for the political dimensions of racism in a specific context and that of developing the theoretical horizon in which such an analysis is possible.
1 The Myth of Homogeneity and the 'Present' of Immigration

This chapter reviews a number of works which are mainly not on racism in Greece but whose common element is that they could be useful in weaving a genealogical perspective on contemporary anti-immigrant racism in the Greek context. Although racism is rarely the object of analysis in most of these accounts it figures in certain ways and it can sometimes be seen to be their raison d’être. It is precisely certain conceptions of what racism is and a commitment on the part of researchers to dissolve certain ‘myths’ or to invent new ones that drives research into certain areas. In relation to contemporary immigration I show how certain researchers conceive of their work as a response to anti-immigrant racism and set about to dispel myths of wide currency in public discourse regarding, for instance, the impact of immigrants on labor markets, welfare and overall structure of the economy, or on social and cultural life. Other accounts of migration policy intervene in what they take to be a domain of policy in need of modernization and regulation. Much of these works being internal to practical fields as ‘solutions’ of sorts to governing migration and the risks associated with it, are treated as potentially internal to the problem of study rather than external, ‘objective’ knowledge. In that sense, parts of the literature on immigration must be approached as responses to the dominant responses to immigration with their own conditions of possibility and range of solutions procured.

More specifically, I follow social science discourses on immigration that help us situate

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70 The question here is: what made racism available to us in such and such ways in the present? What historical practices and struggles made possible a certain array of contemporary problems and solutions while excluding others? Genealogy, according to Glynos and Howarth (2007: 233n), shows the ‘contingency of identities and practices’ and allows one to ‘foreground the possibilities foreclosed by present hegemonic logics’. See also Howarth (2003: 437).
the problematization of racism in certain practical contexts where we are confronted with the logics that govern particular sets of given social relations, exemplified, for example, in exclusionary criteria in public law determining third country nationals eligibilities for work permits, construction and exploitation of informal cheap labor, criteria determining the status of 'nativeness' and 'foreignness', access to formal political rights. These social logics rooted at various levels of governmental and unofficial practice constitute the way in which the relationship between the self and the foreign migrant is 'fixed' in a certain way. Logics of homogeneity, discrimination, racialization, hierarchization, assimilation, informality and irregularity are discussed by drawing on discussions on various aspects and levels of 'contemporary' responses to immigration. Mapping out this context contributes to an understanding of how the 'problem' of immigration came into being from the 1990s onwards. This literature review also serves to highlight ontological, methodological and empirical issues emerging from these accounts.

Because the near past and present of immigration is inseparable from past historical experiences constitutive of identities in Greece – like that of Greek 'emigration' or the reception of new populations during critical historical junctures – and because both evoke problems of how identity confronts, responds or relates to difference, I begin with a brief excursus to how the relationship between Greece and its historical 'others' has been approached by a range of scholars, from anthropologists and historians, to sociologists and political scientists. This review should give a historical background and establish a certain continuity between the present 'of immigration' and the past. The

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71 For reasons of space I cannot elaborate on any comparative dimensions between the reception of refugees in the past and in the present or on the experience of diaspora, Greek emigration. However, Laliotou substantiates the argument that the memory of diaspora 'is complementary to the concurrent silencing of migrant histories in Greece' (Laliotou, 2010: 251).

72 Again, in Foucauldian terms, I aim not at understanding the present in terms of continuity to the past. The point here is the 'reversal' and questioning of dominant interpretations. For
majority of the works that investigate the status of 'otherness' in Greece provide critical readings of official discourse and prevailing dogmas about 'otherness' without the understanding of which it is impossible to give an account of the present predominance of the immigration 'problem' in public debate. The focus thus is on practices which sought to structure Greek identity as hegemonic in the region and on how the relationship between the 'self' and the 'other' has been governed. In this part I discuss the contours of how 'homogeneity' became social reality in Greece and what 'social logics' were available by the early 1990s to respond to immigration.

**Erasing historical minorities**

Before discussing the making of 'homogeneity' it is crucial to evaluate the place of 'Turkey' and 'Europe' in the national imagination, in view of the fact that both entities seem to be related to what is taken to be the immigration 'problem' in public discourse. The 'other' that Turkey represents goes back into a history that is impossible to recount here. However, in both national imaginaries the 'other' and his politics represent a 'threat': The 'Megale Idea', an irredentist Greek political dogma operative until the 1930s, served to constitute Greece as the 'enemy' who constantly undermines Turkish sovereignty. On the other hand, Turkey has come to represent for Greece an ‘other’ who attempts to break the continuity of the trans-historical ‘genos’ (origin, nation). This is merely a gross formulation of what has been elaborated and supported with empirical

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example, where the assumption governing much of the research on immigration to Greece is that the 1990s immigrations mark a radical break from the past, the injunction from a genealogical perspective would be to reverse the assumption and see what it actually does and why such desire to establish the present in certain terms. Conversely, where an assumption of continuity is at play in understanding, for example, the responses to immigration, we might resist positing 'irrationality' as the catch-all criterion of explanation. Genealogy's insistence on tracing discontinuity is, among others, a precaution against subsuming reality to pre-established epistemological criteria. But genealogy also allows to question the fantasy of pure discontinuity, novelty and rupture that obstructs history from view and installs a sense of naive presentism, i.e the idea that certain disruptive phenomena are 'new'.

73 See chapter 4 of this thesis.
research that I cannot discuss here. It is notable however that this antagonism mediates the terms by which the immigration 'problem' comes into being through narratives which I discuss in chapter 4.

More recently, a number of critical studies mostly from the discipline of social anthropology have oriented research in the direction of 'deconstructing' the prevailing national, mutually exclusive imaginaries. In this respect, some have closely examined how European, ‘orientalist’ discourse has portrayed the Greek-Turkish relationship as ‘naturally’ inimical (see Theodossopoulos 2007). Through close observation, Theodossopoulos and the contributors to his edited volume suggest that practices of homogenization (or nationalization) in the ‘making’ of modern Greece have been coupled with attempts to foster a notion of cultural incompatibility amongst regionally adjacent populations. These works gain their authority from participant observation in local communities across the borders with neighboring countries. Similarly, other works have examined the construction of the ‘ethnotic Balkans’ in Western accounts which sought to understand violence and antagonisms in this geographical region (Green 2005).

It is also often held that the ‘other’ of Greece has been Europe, or better, that Europe has ‘seen’ Greece as an ‘exotic other’- part of the ‘restless Balkans’. In both cases, it should be noted that relations with the ‘other’ cannot be exhausted or reduced to oppositions between clearcut ethnic divisions, national borders, or gaps in political modernity. The reason is that integral to the Greek identity, and to any identity for that matter, are differences that render identity unstable and permanently unfixed. For

74 See Kitsikis (1978); Koliopoulos & Veremis (2002); Millas (2004); Volkan and Itzkowitz (1994)
75 About Greece as the object of Western imagination and exploration qua Orient see: Mazower (2004), and especially the accounts of 18th and 19th century travellers that he cites.
76 I draw on poststructuralist conceptualizations of analytical categories, such as ‘society’, ‘identity’. For an extensive account, see Howarth (2000); Phillips and Jørgensen (2002):
instance, Greece has not been the ‘most significant Other’ of Turkish identity (see Theodossopoulous 2007). As the case of the Kurds in Turkey shows us, an ‘internal difference’ assumes a more ambivalent position vis-à-vis the national ‘self’.

*The ambiguous status of ‘internal others’*

It is intuitive to assume the existence of ‘internal others’ in the sense of a regionally 'cultural/ethnic' pluralism compatible with ‘Greekness’ as a number of ethnographic studies show (Campbell 1964, 2002), but also within the national territory, embodied in ethn(ot)ic, linguistic and religious minorities as diverse as the Vlachs and the Roma (see Clogg 2002). To claim this without qualifications, however would be to inadvertently assume Greek identity as ‘open’ to heterogeneous elements, which could only be an expression of a desirable state of affairs or a normative standpoint. For instance, the segregation and public ‘invisibility’ of Roma people appears to be persistent in the shadow of a fostered homogeneity of Greek society (European Roma Rights Centre 2003). Certainly, it is not plausible to claim an existing state of diversity by getting around the hegemonic public discourse that denies such reality. Cultural diversity – embodied in ethnic and cultural ‘others’ who recognize themselves (and are racialized by public institutions) as ‘minorities’ – ‘foreigners’ excluded from public, political and social life in Greece; they all represent the ‘internal’ others. Tsitselikis and Christopoulos (2008) argue that at the high level of the Greek state there have been three strategies of dealing with ‘internal others' during the 20th Century: *Assimilation, expulsion* and *communal segmentation*. During the period of the irredentist ‘Megale idea’, that is, during the imperialist aspirations of the Greek state up until 1923, the content of ‘Greekness’ was under negotiation. Territorial expansion and nationalization

37 I draw on poststructuralist conceptualizations of analytical categories, such as ‘society’, ‘identity’. For an extensive account, see Howarth (2000); Phillips and Jørgensen (2002: 38-41).
aspired to the assimilation of non-Greek populations. Where this has not been possible the alternative of protecting ethnic/religious communities, according to the Ottoman millet model, has been a necessity (2008: 37).

Through specific practices, most notably the exchange of populations which considerably altered the cultural landscape by being deliberate acts of ‘making’ homogeneity, different populations were further separated (Clark 2006; Hirschon 2004; Pentzopoulos 2002). For Greece the founding of a new state involved the construction of a homogeneous identity, its actual practice being ‘cultural purification […] coercion, conversion, expulsion and elimination of those who were considered to be incompatible with the nationalist blueprint’ (Izkirimli & Sofos 2008: 38). Such practices contributed to the effect that the ‘other’ was gradually assumed to be absent from the Greek territory. Accordingly, the practice shifted to the expulsion of those who, according to the new conceptualization of 'nativeness' on the grounds of the distinction between 'homogeneis' and 'allogeneis' (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2008:39), failed to meet the criteria of ‘Greekness’. Cases in point are the expulsion of Muslims of Thesprotia and Slavomacedonians (Karakasidou 1997, 2002a; Margaritis 2005). Suppression of local linguistic idioms was also part of a broader logic of assimilation pervasive in the Greek administration, especially in periods of ‘authoritarian’ rule (Kostopoulos 2000; Karakasidou 2002a). However, as recent studies have shown, this practice has actually contributed to the reproduction of linguistic difference ‘below’ the official level (Kostopoulos 2002).

Historical accounts of the practices of homogenization of cultural diversity in the Greek territory is an expanding one. There are significant works about the Jewish communities over Greece that examine the period up to 1945 (Benveniste 2004), that is when Jewish-ness ceased to form part of local identities as Greek Jews and their cultural
heritage were surgically purged (see Mazower, 2004; Hesse & Laquer 2005). Further, archival research conducted by D. Lithoxoou provides detailed descriptions of the dates, locations and names of villages in the area of Epirus that ‘turned’ Greek by mere acts of being renamed (Lithoxoou 2005, 2006) from Slavic into Greek.

The official representation of the Greek territory as ethnically defined and a firm assumption of Greek society as homogeneous appear to rely on hegemonic social norms significantly fostered by a state ideology often described as authoritarian. Greek identity has been forged during the 20th century as a site where religion, language, history and customs largely overlap (see Millas 2002). As the promotion of politics of homogenization and the imposing of sameness came to be combined with a ‘logic of disavowal’ (Tsitselikis and Christopoulos 2008), characteristic of official public discourse in what concerns the issue of minorities, repression of collective ‘memory’ became possible. At the level of both everyday understanding and official discourse ‘minorities do not exist’.

During dislocatory periods of the history of the Greek state, such as the Civil War (1944-9), the communities marked as ‘different’ from the national body would be visible only to be stigmatized as ‘trojan horses’ of enemy neighbor states, thus, existing only as foes: ‘Xenophobia […] derives not from national identity but from this particular national identity.’ (Millas 2002: 24) What is argued by Millas is that a different kind of national identification (i.e civic) would have been more receptive of difference. Such national identification that allows for the existence of ‘minorities’ presupposes, according to the author, that ‘concepts such as citizenship, ethnicity, origin […] and the nation acquire a more contemporary definition and function.’ (ibid: 26). Lithoxoou (2006) espouses a similar argument in that he puts faith in the tradition of the Enlightenment supposedly absent from the Greek political culture: ‘Just as metaphysics
is the dominant way in which people understand themselves, despite two centuries of
Enlightenment, national myths are the dominant way through which people understand
the past.’ (Lithoxooou 2006: 126). He further understands the present conjuncture as one
that allows for a more rational reappraisal of history. Presumably, the driving force of
the transformation to a ‘post-national’ regime is the approach of Greece to the
geographical and political locale of the Enlightenment, that is, continental Europe and
its public institutions. This approach can be understood in contemporary terms as the
integration of Greece in the European Union. This often appears as a natural, inevitable,
irreversible and genuinely progressive process.

Although one needs to be skeptical about the investment of this transformation with a
faith in ‘rationalism’ and in the ‘Enlightenment’, it is worth understanding that there is a
transformation under way. Millas (2002: 25-6) observes a timid proliferation of
discourse about ‘otherness’ in Greece by civil society, institutional and academic actors.
Similarly, Lithoxooou (2006) observes the demise of the forces that sustain the national
myths of homogeneity: ‘This allows today the publication of works that contest the
various versions of the national myth without the author running the risk to find himself
accused in the court of Law; however, the impact of these works is rather limited’ (2006:
127).

If these transformations take place at the level of (contesting) official ideologies and
practice, the ‘production of difference’ has been, nonetheless, more complicated.
Papataksiarchis (2006) draws on the concept of ‘segmentation’ of collective identity, to
explore unofficial discourse and practices in everyday life. ‘Segmentation’ refers to the
way in which particular differences are related to each other despite their difference.
Segmentation has historically enjoyed legitimacy within the Ottoman administrative
practice of differentiating between distinct religious communities as particular
differences subject to the regime. Laurie Hart (1999) argues that identity in geographical regions characterized by profound cultural diversity, such as Macedonia, Epirus and Thrace, has been historically produced in opposition to other ones. In this regard, segmentation is linked to 'ethnicism'. As opposed to the logic of assimilation, which fails to recognize the ‘other’, segmentation and ethnicism presuppose the affirmation of the existence of an ‘other’ the relation to whom defines identity (Eriksen 1993:11-12; Papataksiarchis 2006). However, according to ethnographic findings, cultural differentiation amongst adjacent communities implied a conception of difference, such that ‘other’ communities would be understood as being representative of inferior cultures. Self-understandings premised on the logic of segmentation have been articulated through tropes of hyperbole of difference (Papataksiarchis 2006: 29), something that goes some way to explaining the conflict between contending ‘neighbors’ in the region.

‘Kinship’, according to the anthropologists, is a key issue related to the logic of segmentation, but also to the nationalist ‘imaginary’. Papataksiarchis (2006) links the question of ‘foreignness’ with the ways in which segmentation has been ‘inelastic’ in defining who the ‘other’ is. In these cases, he argues, kinship is the criterion which differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’: ‘As to this property, the logic of segmentation appears to be sharing with Greek nationalism an emphasis on biological origin as prerequisite for identification, reproducing, thus, the conception of the ‘family’ as a molecule of the nation and the organic conception of society’ (2006: 32). However, contrary to what modernization theories suggest, namely that social bonds based on kinship are an attribute of underdeveloped, non-Western countries, anthropologists argue that 'blood' is not an uncommon 'marker of inclusiveness' in all Indo-European cultures. What is of interest here is that both nationalism and segmentation, despite the difference in their
respective logics, construct ‘foreignness’ as an object unworthy of appreciation and as essentially inferior (2006: 31).

More recently, phenomena linked to the logic of segmentation, such as ‘agonistic regionalism’, the politicization of regional identities and anti-state politics, have rendered Greek society more receptive, ‘hospitable’, to cultural difference by displacing national conceptions of ‘foreignness’. However, it is argued, this shift has not questioned the criterion of sameness as ‘while opposing the formalist language of the state, the practices of agonistic regionalism reproduced the xenophobic emphasis on cultural particularity, re-enforcing the ethno-romantic infrastructure of the Greek state’ (2006: 38) This is important as it links the question of local mobilization in terms of its content to problematizations of racism. As I show in further chapters, there is a link between local struggles and the emergence of the ‘immigration problem’.

In this part I gave a brief account of how we might contextualize from a historical point of view how the question of racism is inscribed on and connected to certain domains of practices and certain logics that characterize these practices. In the next part I discuss a range of works that problematize existing problematizations of immigration, focusing more or less in the present. These works are products of discursive practices, that is, they have conditions of possibility, they respond in certain ways to existing socio-political pressures, controversies and they establish meaningful relations between themselves, their object of study and the overall context.

'Unforeseen immigration' or the 1990s 'turn'

Virtually all accounts of contemporary immigration provide more or less explicit periodizations to distinguish between the 'present' and the 'past'. The temporal landmark for this operation can be seen to be situated in the late 1980s- early 1990s. What is the
meaning of this temporal boundary, however, given that most of the authors generally agree that the transformation has been more evenly distributed over time,\textsuperscript{78} with 1976 being the year in which the balance between net emigration and net immigration shifts toward the latter? Why is it that, as Danopoulos and many others put it, “only since the early 1990s [...] Greece became the recipient of immigration' (2004: 100)?

The meaning of this cliche statement varies depending on the context and the argumentative strategies of which it constitutes the premise. For Danopoulos, who examines the economic, social, and security risks of immigration to this 'small, rocky and resource-poor country' (ibid: 101), immigration 'threatens to dilute the Greek identity and cultural homogeneity' (ibid: 103). In this account, the shift means that immigration emerges as a 'problem' of the order of the population and national identity. From an inverse angle, Triandafyllidou and Gropas argue that immigration is 'gradually obligating state institutions and public opinion to recognize that Greece has become de facto multicultural and multi-ethnic' (2009: 959). Despite the substantial difference in what researchers do with this premise, it is the case that accounts that do not explicitly problematize the givenness of this periodization, do reproduce the myth of an 'emigration-only', 'homogeneous' country. The 'forgetting' of historical complexity and acts of exclusion as a result of either ideological, normative or analytical 'bias' naturalizes identity and de-politicizes hierarchies of power.

It is clear that there is a disagreement among social scientists about the 'facts' (who came, when etc.), about the kind of challenge immigration poses to Greece and yet, paradoxically, a tacit agreement that 'contemporary' immigration is \textit{really} about the 1990s onwards. An agreement established by binary distinctions between the 'past' and the 'present', the 'sender'/receiver', 'sender'/host' country, in short by linguistic

\textsuperscript{78} See Cavoundis (2006: 637)
conventions that barely reflect any 'objective' reality. What is less clear, still, is how this narrative is re-iterated across different contexts and what it does in the ways it is articulated.

The role of national immigration statistics and knowledge on immigration to Greece is important here in pushing a bit further the question of what it means that Greece 'became an immigration country' in the early 1990s. Because if for researchers this constitutes a 'fact', the official state position was that 'Greece is not an immigration country' until 1995, a counter-'fact' supported by the lack of transparency and objective, data-informed debate on immigration. It has thus been argued that 'hard-data' emerged only after 1997 and that 'the modernization of immigration data collection' continued with the 2001 census and with subsequent immigration laws. The low quality, lack and non-disclosure of statistical knowledge on immigration, often on grounds of 'national security', has served various purposes from illegal expulsions to claims for 'fiscal transfers from Brussels, in order to deal with the “massive” illegal immigration from which Greece suffers.' (Baldwin-Edwards & Apostolatou, 2009: 255). Regarding the issue of national security, the authors of a report in 2004 wrote:

'Non-provision of data is a remarkable exception to the general principles of public openness and accountability: we do not comprehend the claim of “national security reasons” as a justification for failing to provide immigration data' (ibid: 35)

They referred to the Ministry of Public Order – one of the many authorities to whom the jurisdiction of collecting certain data belongs – whose problem, they write, 'lies in its

79 This position as far as I understand has not been changed, save for some periods of PASOK rule. ND has recurrently made clear that Greece is a homogeneous country with a 'national body'. See New Democracy, Press Office, 'Speech of the President of New Democracy, Mr. Antonis Samaras to the Secretary of Migration Policy', 5 July 2010. http://arxeio.nd.gr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63405&Itemid=486 [accessed 20/10/2010].
self-perception of its role in the Greek polity and society' (ibid: 36). For these researchers, the fact that Greece has become a country of immigration signifies the necessity of governing the phenomenon and statistics is a 'normal tool in the pursuit of good governance' (40). The absence of this rationale is explained in the following:

The relationship between Greek immigration statistics and 'reality' cannot be understood in a one-dimensional model of the sort that is implicit in much contemporary western social science; owing to post-Ottoman history and the recent development of the modern Greek nation-state, there is not merely one 'reality' which statistical data can be thought to represent.  

Andrew distinguishes from a seemingly different perspective between 'older' and 'newer' immigration countries. According to him, the resulting irregularity and informality of immigration due to lack of governmental rationality might be a matter of 'catching-up' or a matter of southern 'exceptionalism' in comparison to Northern Europe. But, he argues '[u]nderlying this could be the dubious assumption that these countries are in some sense 'backward' and not capable of dealing with the issues in the same way that older immigration countries have (for one thing this assumes great success and attainment of objectives in these older immigration countries)' (Geddes: 2003: 149-150). The issue for him, nevertheless, is that in southern Europe migrants are seen as 'illegals, rather than say as asylum seekers in older immigration countries.' (ibid: 171). Considering the responses of southern European countries, however, he notes that the EU had a 'decisive influence' in terms of restriction, repression and external control of immigration.

Distinguishing between the content of these problematizations and the position from which they are enunciated, we could argue that in terms of content, they point to certain logics, namely, informality and irregularity. These logics help us understand how the Greek state has responded to immigration and, as I will show further on, characterize

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dispersed practices within society. But in terms of the position from which they are 'constructed and named' things are more complicated.\textsuperscript{81} For example, Baldwin-Edwards constructs these logics as more or less conscious decisions to further particular interests or as manifestations of underdevelopment, Geddes is more skeptical about what they are exemplary of. The Greek state itself, would interpret them, from a different perspective: it would construct them, as Baldwin-Edwards hints, as an effect of the 'massive' volume of immigration in the 1990s and as a result of the unpreparedness to deal with the phenomenon. Indeed, some scholarly accounts, explain the lack of a 'modern', 'rational' approach to immigration and, thus, the ensuing logic of 'irregularity', by appeal to the fact that immigration caught Greece 'by surprise'.\textsuperscript{82} As I show in chapter 5, the trope of, let us say, 'surprise' has been much repeated nearly two decades after Greece became an 'immigration country'.

A further point has to be made regarding the position from which these arguments are made. The argument of Baldwin-Edwards, as well as those of other researchers in migration studies who adhere to statist approaches to immigration, are historicist. By this I mean that they construct their objects of study in terms of historical development, positing contrasts between 'modern'/pre-modern', 'developed'/underdeveloped', they impose unity and coherence, where, in fact, there is 'regularity in dispersion' in the sense in which we might think simultaneously of a 'pattern and an open-endedness'.\textsuperscript{83} In Chakrabarty's terms: 'This “first in Europe, then elsewhere” structure of global historical time [is] historicist' in that it imposes a 'measure of cultural distance (at least in

\textsuperscript{81} A social logic, Glynos and Howarth mention, captures the rules or norms governing a practice or a regime of practices (2007: 137-9)

\textsuperscript{82} Triandafyllidou & Veikou attribute the reluctance of the Greek state to accept immigration to 'the novelty and unexpected character of the phenomenon' However, the persistence of this reluctance, they argue, suggests a link with the 'ethnocultural definition of Greek nationality and citizenship' (2002: 191).

\textsuperscript{83} Regularity in dispersion is the principle of intelligibility of 'discourse' and captures what 'is at stake in conceptualizing social logics'. Glynos & Howarth (2007: 87)
institutional development) that [is] assumed to exist between the West and the non-West.84

The naming of contemporary immigration is another issue that derives from putting into question the dichotomic periodization. Danopoulos talks about 'flood' and the 'Albanian avalanche' (102). In another study, Lianos argues that immigration flow to Greece after 1990 'is really huge' and that 'Greece has experienced such large flows of immigrants for the first time in its history'85 Other authors, will invariably talk about 'strong immigration currents', 'increasing flows', 'dramatic and sudden increase' of immigrant influx.86 Equally, when Diamantouros (2004) speaks of ‘unprecedented migration wave’ in the 1990s, unintentionally blurs the distinction between pro/anti-immigrant discourses. One problem, thus, emerging from the literature itself is the very language we use to describe historical facts. This aspect is not adequately explored in most of the available analyses. As I will show later, there is a striking similarity between scholarly and technical/practical, political and everyday language. These languages circulate between contexts and add significantly to a sense of 'crisis' and 'emergency'. For now, I will focus on the dimensions of this 'new' phenomenon. It is with this immigration, during the 1990s, mostly that of Albanians fleeing disorderly the collapsing and crossing the borders with Greece, or by boats heading to the Italian coast that 'migration' became an issue in the attention of both political personnel and academic research in Greece or on Greece.87 It is noteworthy that there is less than a dozen of sociological research articles on immigration to Greece written before 1990. Since 1990, there is at least a couple of hundreds. From our point of view, that Greece became a country of immigration means

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84 Chakrabarty (2000: 7)
85 Lianos (2004)
86 See Kostaki, A. et al. (2009) and Triandafyllidou & Gropas (2005)
87 This is not to suggest that officially the Greek state did not regard 'immigration' as a threat too before the 1990s by adherence in European Union conventions, but such problematizations of 'immigration' however were less publicly pronounced.
that immigration became an object of discourse including academic discourse.

Immigrant labor

Much of the discussion about immigration in Greece inescapably evolves around the question of (national) economy and transnational labor force mobility (Ioakimoglou 2001; Psimmenos 1999, 2001; Iosifidis 2001; Markova 2001; Markova & Sarris 1997; Lianos, Sarris & Katseli 1996). Some of these approaches, based on the assumptions of econometric models, examine migration to Greece from the perspective of its impact to the local economy, investments, payment rates and public costs. A major objective of these works - often openly stated – is to demonstrate the benefits of the local economy from migration. However, the orientation and drive of such research is not exclusively concerned with economics neither does it take the phenomenon of migration to Greece in abstraction from its impact on ‘Greek society’. As Ioakimoglou observes, ‘a frequent problem that econometric models are asked to give an answer to, is the impact of immigration on the pay rates of native workers’ (2001: 83). The key to understanding this concern is to ask what or who poses this problem: ‘The “economical racism” of Greeks is based on the assumption that the number of working places is given, stable and, worse, that it is defined magically by ‘the Greek economy’ (ibid: 85). Thus, frequently, analyses of the economic impact of immigration respond in a way to what the researchers understand by ‘racism’. Given the central role these analyses attribute to the economic aspect of social relations they produce research which scientifically aims at invalidating the racist arguments. This is important to do, it is claimed, because ‘the “economical racism” of Greeks legitimizes ethically other aspects of racism within the subjugated classes’ (ibid: 81).

More sociological accounts, notably those influenced by industrial sociology, seem to
situate their research less in the context of considerations about local phenomena and more in the context of international labor processes, their patterns and industrial relations (Psimmenos 1999; 2001). The objects of analysis are the new local patterns of labor and the new social spaces that the flow of 'international migration' brings about in Greece and which are central to the experience of the immigrants themselves.88

Psimmenos (2001) argues that contemporary migrations are to be seen as part of a process of economic and cultural globalization. He argues that the different kinds of migration are differentiated with regard to labor. The *de facto* distinction is that between displaced people and people whose trans-national mobility ought to be examined as part of structures of industrialization and of the international division of labor. Drawing on recent studies (King et al. 2000), he suggests, ‘illegal’ immigration, understood as a category related to the emergence of concrete immigration policies within this context, gives a solution to a variable demand for labor force. This demand is at a macro-level associated with the post-Fordist organization of labor in western economies from which the need for more flexible spatio-temporal labor mobility arises. In what regards the local context of the Mediterranean economic entrepreneurship, it contributes to a functioning of international migration in accordance with the trends of liberalizing national economies. In that context, unskilled migrant labor is characterized by *precarity*, *de-specialization* and *de-collectivization* of labor norms. The particularities of south-east Mediterranean economies, that is, ‘family-run businesses, para-economy, low living standards, lack of control mechanisms and insufficient legal provisions’ (2001: 101),89 account for the smooth integration of a global phenomenon into local structures.

88 There is a number of empirical studies of social, economic and urban integration of immigrants. See, Hatziprokopiou (2003); Psimmenos (2004); on the role of 'social capital' in processes of incorporation of immigrants, see Iosifidis et al. (2007)
89 For an account of strategies of 'ethnic' entrepreneurship as a function of opportunity structures in the Greek informal sector, see Lazaridis & Koumandraki 2003.
However, he notes, the immigrant enters into a complex web of power relations. What is worth to consider, it is suggested, is ‘the system of multiple social exclusion of immigrants’ (ibid: 103), understood as ‘a process that produces and reproduces forms of labor/labor force and social relations’ (ibid: 104; my emphasis).

While such accounts try to bridge the gap between macro-analyses which model (the regulation of) migration flux, and those that focus in the local milieus and their ‘systems and mechanisms of power’ (ibid: 122), they are inadequate in some respects. There are two reasons, in my view, to be mentioned: First, the overall impression that the system of the ‘economy’ is privileged in providing an account of migration. The point here is not to take the distinction ‘displaced people/ economic migrants’ for granted and, accordingly, examine migrant groups which fall into the second category; and, as it were, reify them into the workings of shifting, global, economical structures described as if they had an intentionality of their own: ‘[…] labor force is being put into motion through common networks into spaces of collective labor, while, simultaneously, it (global structure) fragments, selects and categorizes labor force to situate it into social spaces, whose chief characteristics are, precarity, “slave labor” and deprivation of rights and communal life’ (ibid: 122-3). Recent migration from central Asia to Europe could reveal much more complex routes to migration; such evidence would reveal overlapping motivations for immigration, which, if examined, would be likely to blur the state-sanctioned distinction between displaced people/economic migrants (Pavlou, 2004a).

Second, the priority given to ‘the economy’ in explaining not only the mobility and flux

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90 It is worth pointing out that the ‘migrant’ is also a woman whose experience is very often radically different and in many ways much more problematic. For accounts of women’s immigration to Greece, in relation to issues of domestic labour and sex trade, see Karakatsanis & Swarts (2003); Maratou-Alipranti & Fakiolas (2003).
of migrants, but also the kind of exclusion they experience at the local milieu of Greece, is highly problematic: As it was emphasized above, the ‘system of multiple exclusion of immigrants’ is to be understood as primarily a system subsumed to the economy for it mainly produces and reproduces forms of labor and, by extension, other uneven social relations. Interestingly enough, such line of argumentation can easily be, and has been, assimilated by social actors who argue for the deportation of ‘illegal’ immigrants. Their accounts are analyses of how ‘neo-liberal’ forms of governance are 'responsible' for immigration to Greece and, consequently, for the dislocation of labor relations. In such accounts the possibility of forming a perception that constructs a ‘they’ as an equivalence between 'capitalism' and the 'immigrants' as the pawns deployed by it, is indeed high. Apart from these considerations, it remains the case that an analysis that rests heavily on the prioritization of the economic dimension of social relations cannot capture a range of practices to which immigrants are subjected and which have little to do with their class position and more with ethnicity, race and gender.

In this respect, few studies have touched on more unconventional subjects, such as police practices and perceptions of immigrants (see Antonopoulos 2006; 2008), national rituals of parades and the exclusions of immigrant pupils from 'holding the flag' (Tzanelli, 2006). Also, Jordan et. al., provide rich comparative evidence of organizational cultures of authorities dealing with immigrants in Greece, Italy, Germany and the UK. Concerned with ethnic discrimination/categorization they examine how 'assumptions and ideologies about national and cultural difference' informed the judgment of employees. They found a mix of neoliberal values of efficiency, flexibility and service provision and nationalism as immigrants 'are not even perceived as legitimate subjects of policy implementation' (2013: 384). However, their case is hardly nuanced and subsumptive as it 'applies' rigid analytical between 'new'/'old'
rational'/efficient', 'clientilistic'/inefficient', 'ethnic'/civic', countries and identities.

Immigration: problem or opportunity?
Now, where the 'economical' is conceived in its global dimension, and where the conceptual framework is (exclusively) that which recognizes identifiable actors – global elites, on the one hand, and immigrants, on the other – as global ‘players’ whose 'moves' have effects on any local society – and for that matter on Greece – something like the following may be the case: '[...] the phenomena which are associated with migration to Greece are recognized, are the objects of discourse, essentially as problems, and in particular, alien problems, which have intruded, have been imposed and have been added on to Greek society by the mere presence of immigrants in Greece' (Marvakis, 2004: 97; Marvakis, Parsanoglou & Pavlou, 2001). The concern expressed by these authors derives from an observation of the terms of the public discourse about immigration and the immigrants in Greece. What they argue is that by understanding immigration as a 'problem' we are in the terrain of the dominant expression of public discourse in Greece which obscures the uneven relations of power and domination and seeks to 'manage' the 'problem' of migration. They explain (Marvakis, Parsanoglou & Pavlou, 2001: 15-7): the debate is structured around xenophobic arguments, namely, it is concerned with the 'problems' that immigrants ‘cause’, or it excludes the immigrants as victims – 'migrants have problems'.

In Greece, Pavlou argues (2004a: 43), the encounter with newly formed communities of immigrants has been characterized by two opposing tensions that both share one common characteristic: the construction of ethno-cultural difference as a value in its own right. 'Heterophilia', serves to make the immigrants 'exotic', objects that 'add value', while ‘heterophobia’ argues for the segregation of incommensurable cultures. ‘The
common matrix of the racist and the heterophilic approach is the depoliticization of difference [...]’ (ibid: 47).

If the discourse of 'management' in Greece is equivalent to the EU discourse on migration in that both opt for their integration through 'utilitarian and technocratic' methods (ibid: 54), then, the differentiation consists in that in Greece the criterion of cultural *sameness* is a *sine qua non* for integration.\(^9^1\) It becomes clear then, how homogeneity, rather than equality, is the concern that penetrates official practices related to migration. This is evident when it comes to the right 'to have rights’, which is not ‘independent from citizenship/nativeness and, thus, origin and identification with the dominant ethno-cultural model’ (ibid: 56). In other words, immigrants in Greece are not to be 'equal to us’, but, rather, they are to be 'same with us’. The case of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who are considered by the authorities as belonging to the same *genos* [*homo-geneis*], exemplifies precisely this: that nativeness is the criterion according to which rights and citizenship are allocated (Christopoulos, 2001: 73); and that those considered as ‘natives’ ought to be the same along lines of ethnicity, religion and culture. It is rightly argued that this conceptualization draws on a parochial conception of society which identifies society with the nation, the state and territorial boundaries (Marvakis, 2004:111). A question, however, remains as to what its articulation as 'parochial' implies in terms of what we described above as historicist thought.

As dominant public discourse about immigration incorporates contradicting elements, xenophobic and xenophilic alike, there are to be found at many levels and sectors of public life views, accounts and practices which consider migration as an 'opportunity'

\(^9^1\) ‘Integration’ is a rather ambiguous term. It can abstractly mean openness to diversity, but also it can mean ‘reception’ of migration.
Such accounts of immigration tend to victimize migrants, consider them incapable of addressing their problems themselves or, by praising culture, essentialize their difference (Tsimpiridou, 2004). Also, a utilitarian justification is frequently provided in support of immigration in Greece, namely that the economy and the ‘topos as a whole’ benefits from migrants. However, Pavlou observes (2004a: 61), these arguments, despite their differentiation from blatantly anti-immigrant discourse, conceal the actual conditions under which immigrants contribute to the economy, and thereby, legitimize the current migration policy.

The state of limbo in which immigrants find themselves in Greece is also represented in the constant shifts of public discourse as to the naming of immigrants (ibid: 62). Terms like the police-inspired lathrometanastes ['clandestine-migrants'] or the bureaucratic allodapos ['alien'], he notes, have been replaced by terms like 'economic migrants', but, yet, not 'migrants', as this term is positively marked and alludes to Greek diaspora in the 20th century (ibid: 62; Kampouri 2005). However, this is only partially true, as the former terms not only have they not been replaced but recently they have been code names for a range of police and civil practices profiling racialized subjects. In fact, when these writings were produced, on the eve of the Olympiad in Athens in 2004 there was a growing sense that migrants should be understood as ‘workers’ and ‘contributors’ to the ‘miracle’ of the Olympics. ‘Illegal migration’, although constantly present in official, nationalist and security discourse, re-appears as an intense threat in need of containment after 2005.

Rather opportunistic and often contradictory, Greek migration policy has sought to create 'illegal migration' throughout the 1990s, since it did not address the issue of

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92 For a rather ‘thick’ ethnographic description of immigrant labour which also links to broader contexts of Agricultural policy in the EU, see Lawrence (2007).
nativeness/citizenship for the immigrants. Some two and a half million migrants who have been working in Greece were deported during the period 1991-2003 (Pavlou 2004b: 65), while a 45.8% of those given the status of nativeness have been ‘homogeneis’ rather than ‘foreigners’ (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas, 1999; Fakiolas, 1999). The problem of the ‘sans-papier’, Pavlou writes (ibid: 66), has been replaced by that of quasi-legal migrants, who, given that they are not eligible for citizenship qua ‘foreigners’, have to renew annually their residence permits in what appears to be a daunting task. This practice is directly related to the reproduction of ‘illegal migration’, since the authorities make it typically complex, time-consuming and expensive for the immigrants to get through such procedure. Rather than the resolution of such dis-functional barriers, the Greek state has promoted an attitude according to which inherently problematic dynamics of Greek society are ‘baptized problems of immigration’. This accounts for the social legitimization of ‘(anti)migration policy which constitutes a conscious strategy’ (Pavlou, 2004b: 71; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). In what concerns refugees and asylum-seekers, the number of humanitarian residence permits has reached a percentage of 0.9% for the year 2005 (Pouloupoulou, 2007)

Christopoulos (2004) provides a comprehensive synopsis of the status of ‘foreigners’ in contemporary Greece: ‘They cannot remain foreigners, nor become Greek’ (2004: 362). He describes the dominant logic as one where assimilation is the path to social integration, but, simultaneously, he notes, this path is blocked for foreigners in the name of the ‘pre-ethnic, organic and static category of genos’ (ibid.). Indeed, the privileging of the ‘ethnic’ over the ‘civic’ in Greek public culture is one of the major concerns that he expresses, especially, to the extend that it informs concrete policies regarding citizenship.

Institutional studies have focused on the shifts in Greek immigration policy, often characterized as contradictory, inefficient and piecemeal. For comprehensive accounts of Greek immigration policy see: Triandafyllidou (1996); Kontis (2000); Georgoulas (2001); and the edited volume Amitsis and Lazaridi (2001).
(Christopoulos, 2001; 2002). The solution to this problematic situation is, according to the author, a shift towards political association rather than a cultural one, administrative rather than ideological.

From a more normative evaluation standpoint, he argues, the challenge of migration is precisely this, a challenge to re-signify Greek identity or 'Greekness': Greekness has come to signify a universally higher culture in a society in which 'inferior' cultures were previously reigning (2004: 64). Such re-signification must be translated into a new politics of citizenship in accordance with a civic culture of liberal universalism. However, he observes, the tension between this culture of civic rights for all and its underside, 'the liberal fortress Europe' (ibid: 76), between exclusion and inclusion, is where the sensible demand for a more inclusive order emerges from.

It is difficult not to notice certain characteristics of some of these authors, some of whom are affiliated with KEMO/HLHR. A rather extreme formulation of these characteristics is found in the introduction to the edited volume, *I Ellada tis Metanasteusis* ['The Greece of Migration'], by N. Diamandouros (2004). His writing best exemplifies what is simply implicit in other accounts. His account frames the problematic relationship between Greek identity and heterogeneity, crystallized in official and social responses to the recent phenomenon of migration, in terms of cultural belatedness of Greek society as *a whole* to adjust to a set of 'objective' and irreversible conditions; membership in political and economical formations at the international level; political stabilization and the demise of authoritarianism, the end of civil disputes, as well as internal social integration; and, a 'huge, above all, unprecedented migration wave in the 1990s' (ibid: 10-12). Such rearrangements have brought, according to the author, Greek society *vis-à-vis* 'objective' conditions.
Although between quote marks, the 'objective' significantly displaces the contingent element in the analysis, something which may not be problematic, provided that we read the text as a normative one. However, if the purpose is to intervene, taking into account the contemporary conjuncture, then the purportedly exceptional obstacles to 'modernization' have to be re-examined: '[t]he only potentially conceivable exception is grave political and socio-economical turbulence at the international level [...] a deep international economic crisis similar to that of the 1930s' (ibid: 13). In retrospect, it is arguably the case that Diamantouros did not properly predict recent turbulence in the global economic sphere, nor the effects it appears to have as to the re-articulation of anti-immigrant, political and social formations.

Also, his account barely takes into account the distance between European Union's public posture vis-à-vis abstract notions of 'pluralism' and 'multiculturalism' and the concrete policies that are currently at work. For him, that Greece belongs to 'western' liberal democracies means that Greece is as a whole on the track of diversification, the inevitable telos of which is the harmonious (and profitable) co-existence of Greeks with other cultures, and of Europeans with the post-colonial world.

In such kinds of narratives, which, in fact, approximate political rather than scholarly discourse, the perception of migration in a negative way and the actions based on such assumption, are not embedded social practices but 'subjective' obstacles to the 'objective' course of historical progress. The progress that facilitates the overcoming of obstacles is already observable, he argues, in the 'inflated sense of collective competence' (ibid: 24). The summer of 2004, indeed, saw massive national pride for the successful organization of the Olympic Games. Soon after that, on the occasion of a football match between Albania and Greece (2-1, 4/09/04), the very reasons that Diamantouros cites as opportunities to establish a status of diversity, contributed precisely to the opposite: A
massive 'wave' of violence against Albanian immigrants (Golfinopoulos, 2007).

**The anthropological/discursive perspective**

Traditionally, anthropology is known to be concerned with the 'exotic' or the cultural 'other'. As, however, late modern, cross-cultural mobility increases, the encounters of the 'self' with the 'other' takes place in contexts way more complicated than the traditional ethnographic one. In the following I will discuss Papataksiarchhis' (2006) inquiry into Greece’s 'own others' and Tsimpiridou's (2004) perspective on this issue.

Tsimpiridou (2004) raises a number of methodological issues regarding the approach of contemporary migration to Greece: Echoing one of the proponents of the reworking of cultural anthropology in the 1980s (see Appadurai 1986), she is skeptical towards approaches of this phenomenon that use the categories of 'cultural identity', 'culture' or 'multiculturalism' as analytical/descriptive categories (Tsimpiridou 2004: 141-2). Why this is important to keep in mind is because they are part of the grammar of political elites (EU) and local assemblages (municipalities, organizations). Then, she goes on to argue that to link migration with the notion of 'culture' in a fashion that appears to be natural, is to disjoint migration from the notion of society (ibid: 142). Thus, she claims, we are rather confronted with a choice between analyses of migration in terms of culture and human rights, and analyses in terms of the Rights of the citizen vis-à-vis the state, and analyses that focus on 'the negotiation of new relations of migrants with local societies and the global culture' (ibid: 151). The last perspective is the stuff of anthropology, in particular, of cultural critique (see Marcus & Fischer 1986; Clifford & Marcus 1986).

Her overall perspective on approaching migration is also shaped by the 'subaltern' problematic, that is, by a concern 'with the fantasy of those subjected to globalization'
(Tsimpiridou 2004). This concern has methodological and pragmatic implications. It is methodological because she thus understands the object of her study and the framing of her questions about migration to Greece. But it is also pragmatic to the extend that the subaltern creates his subjectivity in opposition to the dominance she suffers: 'Unless we adopt a critical and reflective stance towards the issue of 'foreigners' [...] the bio-politics of exclusion will become the arms of resistance of immigrants analogously to the way in which the bio-politics of colonialism have made possible religious fundamentalism and, in turn, terrorism against Western hegemony' (ibid: 169-70). We could argue that this kind of approach is based on the 'resistance and accommodation' paradigm of ethnography that became very much prevalent in the 1980s by focusing on 'the marginalized, the disadvantaged in the face of world-historical and systemic forces and their effects in everyday lives' (Marcus in Rabinow & Marcus 2008: 89).

The tensions around the issue of contemporary migration to Greece, she argues, ought to be examined by locating them in the context of historical practices that have shaped Greek identity. Drawing on the work of Michael Herzfeld (1987), she identifies two major themes: First, the 'traditional relation of aversion between citizen/state, namely, citizens against the state and an authoritarian state against its citizens.' (Tsimpiridou 2004:157). Herzfeld understood the characteristic ambivalence of Greek attitude towards the 'other', the 'foreigner' in analogy to this particular relation with the state. What Tsimpiridou then seems to be doing is to conceptualize the official responses to immigration and the traditional authoritarianism of the Greek state towards its citizens as equivalent terms in an explanation of the forms of subordination of migrants.

Papataksiarchis (2006), also himself drawing heavily on Michael Herzfeld's work, adds

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94 For detailed accounts of Albanian immigrants’ ethnographic lifestories, see Nitsiakos (2003). Also Lambrianidis and Lymberaki (2001) present the 'mutual advantage' of both immigrants and locals from their co-existence.
an interesting problematic about 'hospitality'. In his text *The burdens of otherness* he takes issue with the socially embedded practice of hospitality [filoksenia]. To be sure, he is not the first to do so, as what is known as 'Mediterranean anthropology' (see Herzfeld 1980), has long been preoccupied with *Helleniki Filoxenia* – 'the generous reception that the Greeks are traditionally known to offer to "foreigners"' (Papataksiarchis 2006: 2). From a critical perspective he examines the presuppositions of this practice in Greece and, drawing on the relevant literature (see Cowan 1998), he returns again to the question of homogeneity and sameness: 'Within Greek society it has been a historically legitimate view that familiarity amongst people reflects their sameness and that sociability is a function of cultural community.' (Papataksiarchis 2006:1) If sameness is a presupposition for the practice of hospitality, it then follows that the practice of hospitality is predicated on inhibiting the other's cultural identity (ibid: 2). From such a configuration between the 'self' and the 'other', 'hospitality, as a practice, comes to bridge in hierarchical terms the supposedly cultural incompatibility of the familiar with the foreign [...]’ (ibid), and elsewhere, 'it [hospitality] neutralizes the other's identity', which can be held up 'so long as it is socially and politically unfruitful' (ibid: 4). As he notes, the fact that the other is tolerated to hold up to her cultural particularity is instrumental to the effect of 'rhetorically renouncing all accusations of racism'. To speak in contemporary terms, he is also right in claiming that the 'idiom of hospitality' is publicly and officially used to describe the relationship between immigrants and the 'host'-society. Eventually, as hospitality is exclusively 'Helleniki filoxenia' it is proclaimed to be a 'national characteristic', a 'symbol of supremacy over others' (ibid: 4).

This account raises an important issue. It connects contemporary immigration to Greece and the ambivalent responses to it with Greek identity and with that which allows the latter to conceal racism concerning ‘our’ practices: 'We, Greeks, are hospitable…'.
However, this account is only suggestive as to the language of hospitality and its contemporary re-significations. For this reason a number of questions could possibly arise: How is the ‘practice’ of hospitality different from the ‘idiom’ of hospitality? What is meant by ‘idiom’? Could ‘idiom’ be translated into an elaborated concept such as ‘myth’ or ‘imaginary’? What kind of history could that myth have and how would it be related to the instances in which ‘hospitality’ is invoked, recalled or used to displace responsibility for the actual lack of it?

‘Hospitality is not a concept which lends itself to objective knowledge’, Derrida, (2000) argues. However, Papataksiarchis and his collaborators adopt an empiricist and rather limited perspective: theirs, is not a second-order ‘problematization’ perspective that would allow an analysis of ‘hospitality’ as a term conditioning our speech about ‘racism’. They, therefore, miss the opportunity to approach not the practice of hospitality as such in local contexts, but a kind of meta-‘hospitality’, the practice itself as indistinguishable from its narrativization across contexts. It is through such inquiry, I believe, that we can critically explore ‘hospitality’ in Greece today, that is by examining not only power relations at play between hosts and guests but also the subject's relation to their acts of exclusion or to ambivalent inclusion.

**Racism in the spotlight**

A small number of critical works (Voulgaris, Dodos, Kafetzis, Lyrintzis et al 1995; Dodos, Kafetzis, Michalopoulou et al 1996; Pavlou 2001; Trubeta 2000; Ventoura 2004), as well as those that examine racist attitudes and perceptions of the ‘xeno’ in Greece (Figgou 1999; Triandafyllidou 2000; Triandafyllidou & Mikrakis 1995;) address ‘racism’ and ‘xenophobia’ in relation to the range of phenomena we discussed in

See also Karakatsanis & Swarts (2007) who use survey data to study variations of attitudes towards foreigners based on age and education.
this chapter. These works are either concerned with racism in particular contexts, such as the context of media (Pavlou 2001), everyday life and interaction (Tsiakalos, Kogidou, Tressou 1997), or with racism at the intersection of global and local phenomena and practices (Ventoura 2004). Finally, Lipowatz (1990, 1991) provides critical, yet reductionist, readings of Greek racism with the tools provided by Freudian psychoanalysis.

Ventoura (2004) starts her account of how racism intermingles with the phenomenon of nationalism by giving a straightforward definition of racism: ' […] racism is a system of beliefs and actions, […] it defines a social group as different […], by claiming that differences and hierarchies are innate characteristics, the purpose being to contain the 'other' in an unchangeable inferior social strata. In contemporary times the notion of a biologically determined race has given way to the notion of a timeless cultural essence.' (2004: 178­9). From there, she goes on to argue that 'racist discourse today assumes the form of defending cultural identity and national borders from the danger that the 'other' represents.' (2004: 180).

She starts her account by observing that the notion of 'identity' is always related to the notion of the ‘foreigner’, or the ‘other’. Actually, what defines 'identity' is precisely this relationship which entails some form of xenophobia. But what is distinctive, she argues echoing Etienne Ballibar (1991), about modern xenophobia is its interrelatedness with 'the state logic and power and with political life.' (2004: 176). What she argues here is that the state in its very founding moment distinguishes between 'citizens' and 'foreigners'. The state has a central role in the definition of who the subjects of social,

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66 For a comprehensive account of the portrayal of immigrants in media and popular culture see the theoretically informed review essay of Karakasidou 2002b. For an interpretation of the framing of Albanian immigrants as 'destitute thieves’ in relation to property crime and to Greeks' self-perceptions as 'modern' and 'affluent', see the excellent article by Bakalaki (2003).
economic and political rights, privileges are. In particular, state-sanctioned acts of citizenship, legal transformations and institutional re-arrangements can be said to construct different types of subjects, such as ‘citizens’ with rights, and ‘non-citizens’ with no rights whatsoever.

In the case of Greece, it is observed, there are further state-sanctioned distinctions that allow the concepts of ‘citizenship’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘origin’ to appear as identical: The official distinction between ‘homo-geneis’ and ‘allo-geneis’ in the case of second-generation migrants who are considered as ineligible for citizenship, exemplifies how the state reproduces inequality along ethnic lines, privileging subjects from a particular genos, culture, linguistic idiom, religious conviction and so on. It is thus the very distinction, the difference between subjects produced, employed in institutional and practical contexts that produces and reproduces a certain kind of national identity on different levels. If ‘racism’, then, is the problem thereby produced, that is, the problem emerging from the articulation of state-sanctioned legal acts and practices of power with the ‘national’, it seems that it is a ‘racism’ of the institutional kind.

Further, she suggests that the particularity of ‘racist discourse’ in Greece, besides its institutional aspect, consists in reproducing certain narratives and myths on the basis of which the Greek national identity becomes naturalized: ‘part of the Left, which fights against racism, perceives the nation as a timeless product of the transcendental ‘Greek civilization’, the explanation being the ‘efforts (of the Left) to defy the charge of national treason and to prove that it struggles for the country and the nation’s own benefit’ (ibid: 197). This perspective tells us something about how racism is related to political frontiers within Greek society. I will be returning to this question in subsequent chapters.
Ventoura’s account poses interesting questions as to the content of ‘racist discourse’ today in Greece. It also addresses in a logical fashion the connections between racist discourse, state practices and broader political contexts. Of particular importance is her brief analysis of how anti-racist practice shares common premises with racist practice. What she argues is that both rely on the same essentialist conception about ‘our’ identity. But her account lacks a sustained analysis of the ways in which this actually happens precisely through the constitution of the meaning of the term ‘racism’. In other words, she seems to by-pass a critical ‘reading’ of the social actors’ definitions of ‘racism’, while it is those definitions that, partially, constitute what one normally understands by ‘racist discourse’. In her account, the representation of the national ‘self’ is related to racism, in the sense that she characterizes self-understandings of superior culture as ‘racist’. But in so doing, she fails to give an account of how ‘racism’, its social construction and emergence as a particular kind of problem, according to particular social actors in particular historical circumstances, is actually the very vehicle that produces essentialized representations of the ‘self’.

Last, Thanos Lipowatz (1990; 1991) has addressed explicitly the issue of racism. Coming from a sociological and Freudian-psychoanalytical perspective he links theoretical discussions about ‘race’ and ‘racism’ with the contemporary manifestations of it in Greece. A racist, he argues, is characterized at the ‘affective’ level by ‘an absolute rejection of the other’, and at the cognitive level by ‘prejudice’. In trying to grasp something of the rhetoric of the racist he goes on to argue that the racist ‘rejects Discourse as such’, by which he means that the racist refuses to subject his views to critical scrutiny. As such, racism is seen as the opposite of what he calls ‘modern Enlightenment’. Modern Enlightenment, in his account, is equivalent to pluralism, as proponents of Enlightenment take on the ‘symbolic element of Difference’, that is, they
affirm ‘Difference’, ‘non-unity’ and ‘heterogeneity’. By contrast, the racist is designed as someone who negates the difference of the other and the Law. The racist is ‘structurally analogous’ to the fetishist as well as to the psychotic. Further, he distinguished between ‘racism’ and ‘ethnocentrism’/‘xenophobia’: ‘Ethnocentrism’, he argues, ‘always accompanies the conflicts between people, while racism is based on a delirium’ (Lipowatz, 1991: 229).

When it comes to Greece, he says, ‘there is a widespread ideology according to which there is no racism or antisemitism in Greece’. He goes on to assert that ‘nobody can be sure that he/she is not a racist’ and that only the ‘other’ is racist’. He finally remarks that in Greece the culture of Human Rights is not adequately embedded.

I think that ‘racism’ so framed, in stark opposition to the ‘culture of Human Rights’, ‘tolerance’, Enlightenment and progress, is rather misleading. It pre-empts any analysis of how racist practices can be articulated with progressive and human rights discourses. It implies that had Greece been more receptive to these western achievements there would be considerably less racism. It is thus implied that racism is an ‘exception’, the ‘symptom’ of a failed Enlightenment. What is more, to describe racism as analogous to the state in which difference and the symbolic law are radically rejected is somewhat mystifying. As I will show, racism is more often than not essentially ambiguous and covert.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I tried to give an insight about the kinds of scholarly problematizations of Greek identity in its relationship with forms of heterogeneity. I focused on the ‘problem’ of minorities and on the more recent ‘problem’ of migration. I have also placed emphasis on the dominant representation of the beginning of the 1990s as the period in
which cultural homogeneity is put into question. A number of problematics seemed to recurrently appear: the representation of the Greek society as ‘homogeneous’, the criterion of sameness in the representation and production of cultural difference, the characterization of migration as a ‘problem’, or alternatively, as an ‘opportunity’; the consequent representation of Greek ‘culture’ as either incommensurable with other cultures or transgressive of European culture, as well as, that regarding the practice of hospitality. I showed that, in some cases, it is not the pursuit of objective knowledge that researchers are after, but, rather, the will to intervene into actual debates in Greece, to break with certain myths and to eliminate racism. But equally, there are problems of congruence between official and academic discourse.

There are some questions, however, emerging from these accounts: 1) if we put into question any historicist perspectives on Greek responses to immigration that frame the latter more or less as 'exceptions' thereby affirming the 'norm' do we not then have to shift attention to that which is left almost entirely unexamined in migration studies, namely, the construction of security discourse? 2) if racism has not been an object of detailed analysis in these studies, should we not shift attention to theorizing racism in more detail? 3) If hospitality appears to be not simply a traditional, 'cultural' practice, but also a kind of metaphor in the context of immigration politics, should we not shift attention to its re-iterations, uses and links to these other elements?
This chapter brings together three problematics. First, the emergence of 'migration' as a security issue in recent years and the contestation of such link. Second, the place of questions about racism in the study of 'securitized' migrations and more broadly in the 'discourse' of social sciences. Third, the historico-political and psychosocial nature of the 'racial' question.

This is a 'survey' across disciplinary frontiers that aims at drawing attention to how racism has been problematized or how, why and with what effects it has been 'silenced' in certain areas of study in the social sciences. I take security studies as an exemplary case of scholarly discourse in which the question of racism has been marginalized and even 'disavowed'. By giving an account of how immigration has come to be considered and analyzed as a security issue and describing the different categories we have to think through the socio-political discursive practices the concepts of 'securitization' and 'societal security' evoke, I will show how the Greek example of the recent politics of control and their contestation can serve as a site of 'reading' the constitution of the meaning of security, racism, migration, citizenship, and of what is hegemonically 'society' itself, in the way it imagines itself confronted with the 'foreigner'. It also points to a certain 'context' to be designed and described in which struggles and social antagonisms take place. Further, the genealogical work of Michel Foucault on the politics of race and history is considered as a further articulation of the problematic of security.

There is no question of providing a comprehensive survey in this context and hence discourse in inverted commas.
with that of racism. I argue that it is not only the biopolitical/control direction that this period of Foucault's work takes us to but also to a direction that makes visible the political aspect of racism: its relationship to 'society' and to historical struggles for hegemony, in other words its relationship not only to the reproduction of practices of control, but also to politics and the political, and thus to the logic of equivalence; and its relationship to (national) imagination, myth and language, that is, the stuff of ideology. These ideas are further developed in the next chapter.

Security studies and Migration
There is hardly any up-to-date textbook in Security Studies that goes without devoting a chapter on how migration has over the past two decades been incorporated not only into the policy agenda of national securities but also into the research agenda of researchers in the field (see Hughes and Meng 2011; Cavelty and Mauer 2010). As early as 1992 Myron Weiner was observing from a realist perspective that migration was 'engaging the attention of heads of states, cabinets, and key ministries involved in defense, internal security, and external relations' (Weiner 1992-3: 91). The two terms, 'security' and 'migration' would appear simultaneously, increasingly often in prominent journals such as International Security and Security Studies. In the latter, Doty suggested that one can trace an 'emerging consensus' amongst both academics, practitioners and lay actors that border-crossing 'be considered a security issue' and that this consensus seemed to follow the 'widening' of the security agenda and attempts to redefine the concept of security (1998: 71). As Buzan explains, the Western societies' fear of immigration, became one of the challenges which traditionalist approaches to security could not meet: 'the narrowness of the military state-centric agenda was analytically, politically and normatively problematic' (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 187). How did security studies then cope with this novel 'reality' of migration constituting an object of security?
Buzan and Hansen's (2009) *Evolution of International Security Studies* traces the origins of the linguistic 'turn' in Security Studies in works associated with (Critical) Peace Research. These works drawing on Austin and/or Searle emphasized the power of language to structure, influence and/or (mis)represent 'what is out there', challenging thus realist approaches to security: '[T]he central claim was that the choice of different metaphors, euphemisms or analogies had fundamental consequences for how reality was understood and hence, also, for which policies should be adopted' (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 141-2). In the next few paragraphs I will focus on two analytical concepts that speak to our concern with how migration came to be seen, analyzed, and politically calculated as a security issue. Let me begin with the concept of 'securitization' before moving to an appraisal of 'societal security'.

The idea of 'securitization' is inextricably linked to processes of social construction, however there is a number of different constructivist approaches that differ significantly according to the 'mixture' of ontological and epistemological presuppositions (Doty, 1998: 73); Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory is one prominent amongst them, examining how security issues 'emerge, evolve and dissolve' (Balzacq, 2010: 56). Securitization Theory and the notion of 'societal security' are neatly encapsulated by Ole Wæver who argues against traditionalist emphasis on national security, military threats and sovereignty: 'We can then strip the classical discussion of [security studies] preoccupation with military matters by applying the same logic to other sectors, and we can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to society [...]’ (1998: 49) and further 'we can identify a specific field of social interaction, with a specific set of actions and codes, known by a set of agents as the security field.' (ibid:

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98 The term 'Copenhagen School' was coined by McSweeney (1996) in his critical review of Buzan's and Waever's approach to security. For a comprehensive statement of Securitization theory in the 1990s, see Buzan et al. (1998)
49). According to Wæver, the role of the elites is central in casting issues through “speech acts” as security pertinent: 'the instrument of securitization' consists in the simple naming of 'threats' in security speech acts at any sector and at any time from an authoritative position and, further, 'security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites' (Ibid: 50-1). By such utterances, such as 'migration is a threat', where 'the utterance is itself the act' (ibid: 50), the sector – say migration policy – is securitized in a performative manner; security as a 'speech act' transposes an issue from the realm of 'normal politics' to the realm of security politics, that is, the realm of existential threats and of Schmittian decisionism over who is 'friend' and who is 'foe', where any means possible can be mobilized, for example, by declaring a 'state of exception'.

Further, the concept of 'societal security' came about to mediate in controversies about the meaning of security. As Buzan and Hansen explain in retrospect, the concept designated a 'middle position' between traditional state-centric conceptualizations of security and newer ideas about either 'individual security' or 'global security' (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 213). Buzan's first formulation was placing the individual as the 'irreducible unit to which the concept of security can be applied (1991: 35) and was arguing that insecurity of individuals-citizens and of the state itself are 'irreversibly connected' (ibid: 39). 'Societal security' in its most crisp formulation then 'concerns the ability of society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats[...]; societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms (Wæver et al., 1993: 23). For theorists of the Copenhagen school, societal threats do not designate threats incommensurable to national security or

90 Karyotis & Patrikios (2010) using Greece as a case study question the emphasis of securitization theory on political elites. They make a step towards acknowledging other actors in making competent security claims but they remain confined to a consideration of institutional actors, such as religious elites.
political threats. By contrast, 'even the interplay of ideas and communication can produce politically significant societal and cultural threats[...] matters of language, religion, and local cultural tradition all play their part in the idea of the state and may need to be defended or protected against seductive or overbearing cultural imports' (Buzan 1991: 122-3). Thus, 'societal security' comes to speak to the gap between state/individual security. If, however, the unit of analysis here is 'politically significant ethno-national and religious identities' (Waever in Weaver et al. 1993: 23), there is a tension created as to how to differentiate between the security of groups in society and the security of society as a whole (ibid: 20). This work on the idea of societal security directly engaged the question of international migration: 'What will be the effect of potentially large movements on societies long used to [imagining] a fairly high degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity?' (Waever et al. 1993: 2), and, further, '[B]ut the question of policies for societal security is more complicated than just how it relates to state security. What happens when societies cannot look to the state for protection [...], because the state cannot insulate society from the pressures of internationalization?' (Buzan in Waever et al. 1993: 57-8). To historicize these research questions, it could be said that what made their formulation possible was the dissolution of Cold War frontiers and the increased mobility that ensued.

Much debate has taken place in addressing the ontological, epistemological and political deficiencies of Securitization Theory. Most prominently figure arguments about the central importance attributed to the role of the elites and institutions in the 'making of' security: 'Theories of social construction, and understandings of language/discourse as a productive practice [...] suggest a more subtle and nuanced manner in which issues become socially constructed as particular kinds of issues', and, further, 'it is important that we leave open the possibility that securitization of an issue can come from varied
and dispersed locales, for example, from below, so to speak, from the masses[...] language is too unwieldy for elites to control it totally or to limit our understanding of its productive power to a one-way instrumental process' (Doty, 1998: 73).

McDonald (2008) summarizes three objections to Copenhagen school’s Securitization theory that have been systematically raised by scholars in the field. **First**, he argues, the form of the security act is narrow in that it only encompasses speech acts and ‘discursive interventions’ of actors ‘institutionally legitimate to speak to speak on behalf of a particular collective’ (McDonald, 2008: 564). The concern here is similar to Doty’s concern mentioned above, and it is a twofold concern: By focusing on dominant actors’ speech acts exclusively not only we miss the analytical opportunity to address how security is constructed by other actors as well, but we also miss the non-linguistic construction of security. **Second**, McDonald asks therefore of the ‘struggle’ that empowers and marginalizes other ‘voices’ around the definition of security and struggle (ibid: 573), as well as of non-linguistic, material, forms of representation in the making of security (ibid: 564).

In his view, it is problematic to see the construction of security as taking place exclusively ‘at particular instances’ because such approach would fail to capture what

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100 Doty's argument is methodological and suggests that we should be more attentive to actors other than the elites. From a more normative perspective, McSweeney makes a similar point. He argues that we cannot rely on the notion of 'societal security' or identity as such in order to evaluate essentialist identity claims. For him, it is not a problem of how security is 'hegemonized' rather than static, but that Buzan's theory does not provide criteria for resolving disputes and competing identity claims and leaves us in 'something of a postmodernist maze' (1996: 88). Although he brings up the question of racism and xenophobia, he argues that these disputes are at bottom philosophical/moral rather than political. He is however right in pointing out the lack of critical edge in Buzan's approach and even a possible complicity as the latter treat essentialist identity claims as facts rather than objects of interpretation. For a more elaborated account of this last point, see Eriksson (1999).

101 On the convergence of this point see Hansen (2000), who raises the same problem from the point of view of subjects’ deprived of voice. She thus brings in a feminist perspective in dissecting the problems with a theory that is 'grounded on the possibility of speech'.
Huysmans *pace* Bigo calls the institutionalization of immigration as a security threat (see Huysmans 2006; 2011). This process fixes the meaning of migration as a threat ‘without dramatic moments’. Further, such conceptualization of context does not inquire into what contexts have made possible the security intervention in the first place. Last, it seems that defining the security speech act as such an exceptional ‘moment’, reifies and reproduces the sharp dichotomy between security and ‘normal politics’ (ibid: 576).

**Third,** the implication of understanding the nature of a security act as a designation of ‘from what or whom we need protection’ has a collateral consequence: it does not allow for space to reflect on and analyze ‘articulations of the values in need of being protected’ (ibid: 579). Thus McDonald asks that we pay attention to historical narratives, culture and identity insofar as they are ‘underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization’ (ibid: 573).

If we accept that the nature of language is to be an incomplete social structure over which no single group, or even 'society', has complete mastery, these arguments create the possibility of thinking about 'security' in more plural ways than what 'top-down' approaches to security allow us to do. They draw attention for example on, civil society interventions, grassroots and private actors: Who 'speaks' security, from which position, with what effects? Is there one or multiple languages of security and what entity is invoked – for whom is security done? - in speaking or doing security? Do we have any *a priori* criteria of determining the significance of what qualifies as an instance of security? Should we rather turn attention to instances of struggles around security?

At the same time, the need to think beyond the strictly 'linguistic' confronts us with 'materiality' and with the necessity to withstand the realist challenge. How can we think of security in such way that it would involve both linguistic and material dimensions?
How can we think of security as reproduced unspoken and routinely, without 'reproduction' meaning pure necessity? I will now address in more detail some of these questions before addressing specifically the link between security and migration and how that hinges upon questions of race.

Jef Huysmans and Vicky Squire provide us with an account of how a critical political analysis of mobility could be conducted. As they argue, this necessitates a prior 're-framing' of the relation between security and migration, that is, a shift away from understanding migration as a security threat in any realist strategic or objectivist fashion. They would rather consider security by drawing on critical works in which 'security is conceived of as a knowledge, discourse, technology, or practice that mediates the relation between the social processes of human mobility and the search for governmental control and steering capacity over them' (Huysmans & Squire, 2010: 170). As they argue: ‘Rather than a value or a fact, security becomes a language and/or an interest, knowledge or professional skill linked to particular organizations, that are always shaped in a relation to other languages, actors, practices that contest it’ (ibid: 173). In the field of Critical Security Studies the emphasis is on ‘the struggles over the legitimacy of specific methods of governing the migration area […] and the legitimizing effects that can be derived from using security language in politics.’ (ibid: 173). With these moves the research agenda effectively broadens in scope to include questions of exclusion, violence as well as questions about the rhetoric, institutionalized technologies and strategies that make possible such exclusion and violence. What makes the link between migration and security possible and sustainable is, Huysmans argues in an earlier article, a ‘multiplicity of practices’ (Huysmans, 2000: 758). One way to characterize this multiplicity of practices, actors, discourses and technologies, he argues is by invoking Bigo’s category of the ‘security continuum’ to refer to a continuum of objects such as
‘borders, terrorism, crime and migration’, which constitute objects of security knowledge transferable amongst security professionals, bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic agencies and so on.

Huysmans makes the further point that ‘migration is a nodal point in the internal security field’. What he means by that is that ‘migration’ and relevant clusters of concepts ‘have a capacity to connect the internal security logic to the big political questions of cultural and racial identity’ (2000:761). For instance, demographic knowledge, both in its 'scientific' and its lay/political modalities, is particularly interesting in this respect as immigration figures in opposition to 'natural' population growth and either as a 'solution' to demographic decline or as 'race/culture suicide'. In chapter 4, demography is shown to be a site of competing discourses and socio-political contest on immigration. I will return to questions of culture and race in a further section but, first, I will turn to Vicky Squire’s work in the field with an eye on how to further characterize the migration-security ‘nexus’ as well as on how to think through the issue of the multiplicity of security practices. Can we approach security neither as a fully integrated nor as a fully dispersed practice?

Vicky Squire engages with security as a kind of ‘politics of control’. In her edited volume The Contested Politics of Mobility, she brings together all these concerns about language, subjectivity, practices, and politics to address the following question: How can

102 See for example, the maps of Eurostat (Appendix 2a and 2b). The category of ‘natural growth’ of the population is counterposed to ‘migration’. In this context if migration acquires its identity in opposition to ‘natural’ growth, it constitutes a not-natural cause of growth and therefore a source of societal insecurity. It is thus that immigration might be considered ‘race suicide’ rather than a ‘solution’ to demographic decline. More broadly, if demography is concerned with reproduction and survival, as it is often framed (see Caldwell, et al., 2006) then, societal security and demography are hardly distinguishable. From this point of view, it could be argued that demography is implicated in a constant ‘war of positions’ and it is a key weapon in the hegemonic and ideological contest over immigration. For an empirical analysis of demographic knowledge and its articulation with media, political and elite discourse in the case of Italy, see Krause (2001).
we think of securitization and practices of control as productive of ‘irregular migration’? How is security thought of as productive of categories, moral hierarchies and what political struggles underpin the constitution of ‘irregular’ movement of people as ‘an object of and as a subject of politics’? Attention here shifts from security as such to ‘the politics of mobility’. This move aims to foreground the idea that ‘irregularity’ is ‘contested, resisted, appropriated and re-appropriated through a series of political struggles’ (Squire, 2011: 5). This suggests the ambivalence of ‘irregularity’ as produced in between the ‘internally fractured’ politics of control and migration, and through struggles around mobility (ibid:5). According to Squire, the category of irregularity can serve as a frame of analysis of ‘border-zones’, that is, ‘dispersed, multi-dimensional and contested sites of political struggle’. Irregularity, it is suggested, is a condition produced through practices of ‘subjectifications or (ab)normalizations’ (ibid: 6) rather than a ‘fixed property or status’ (ibid:7). But irregularity as also a condition that is produced irregularly ‘through the (re)bordering practices of national, international and/or transnational agencies’ (ibid:7). On the other hand, ambivalence characterizes irregularity insofar it is both the object of control and a subject of politics and this is what calls for critical attention. What she calls the ‘analytics of irregularity’, therefore, serves to draw attention to struggles in ‘border-zones’, that is ‘physical or virtual sites marked by the intensification of political struggles over the condition of irregularity’ (ibid: 14). It is further suggested that this approach marks a break with Agambenian accounts of border-zones where the latter are simply seen ‘as sites of biopolitical control’ (ibid:15). What is meant here is that struggles and politics, or politics as struggle are given ontological priority over 'spatialized paradigmatic descriptions of biopolitical projects'. Thus, the logic of the analytics of irregularity, is distinct from the logic of the ‘politics of exception’, where control is ‘spectacular’, while it is also distinct from the
‘analytics of unease’, where control takes on a more every-day, mundane and standardized movements. By focusing on struggles, the analytics of irregularity seeks to foreground an approach to the politics of mobility whose logic is distinctively political, that is constituted and contested by struggles.

To better understand how this approach differs from constructivism it is necessary to turn to the ontological assumptions of Ernesto Laclau’s theory of discourse. Squire affirms what is called an ontology of ‘lack’ whereby social structures are understood as incomplete rather than as self-enclosed totalities. From this point of view, we can see how such objects as ‘society’ are not presupposed in the analysis of security. Drawing on what is likely a Lacanian insight she ‘conceive[s] a state-centric order of political community as necessarily failing or incomplete’ (Squire, 2006:42). The ontology of ‘lack’ permeates equally to every possible structure, be it a ‘language’ or a socio-political formation. Therefore, ‘signifiers such as ‘the state’, ‘the nation’, the ‘economy’ and ‘society’ are partially fixed through a discursively constituted social order in which asylum is opposed’ (ibid: 43). What is more ‘the failure of these privileged nodal points to fully fix themselves is projected onto a supplementary other’ (ibid:43). This analysis makes possible a conceptualization of security as designating those ‘necessary’ practices by which a specific order attempts to deal with its own ‘lack’. In so doing, ‘that which is named as outside of the order continuously intrudes or disrupts the identity of its referent objects, and as such the object and its other are not strictly separate, but are mutually constituted through processes of equivalence and difference’ (ibid: 44-5). One possible way of drawing a frontier between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is by articulating antagonistic, oppositional elements. For example, ‘societal security’ implies the ability of ‘society’ to reproduce itself vis-à-vis certain ‘threats’. Here, society is taken as a whole – difference is obliterated – in relation to ‘a
negative and external ‘something’” (ibid: 45). Squire maintains that the logic of equivalence is a more exclusionary logic, whereas the logic of difference is a more inclusionary logic. She gives the example of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants. In her research on the contested politics of asylum she explores what she calls a ‘logic of selective opposition’ which ‘functions to maintain order even when the limits of the order become apparent’ (ibid: 46), ‘Good’ migrants become one difference, different from ‘good’ citizens but also from ‘bad’ migrants, ‘constructed as more disruptive’ (ibid:46), and, therefore, in need of exclusion.

We can now argue that the migration-security ‘nexus’ is constituted through logics of equivalence and difference, exclusion and inclusion. Indeed, if security does not only construct ‘threatening objects’ and ‘threatened selves’, but is also institutionalized, practical and ‘silent’, it becomes clear how we can think of security as both oppositional (creating equivalences) and differential (managing differences) (see Squire, 2006: 47). It now makes sense in what ways the politics of control are ‘internally fractured’, as it was earlier suggested. The interplay of these two logics makes the politics of control inherently unstable. The politics of control cannot but be seen as a sustained attempt to deal with external and internal ‘threats’ as well as a politics that has no ultimate unity because of its internal permeation by logics of difference and equivalence. From this point of view we can better understand how different ‘voices’ and actors of security may be such only by maintaining their differences and contradictions as to how they construct ‘migration’ and the social order in the name of which security practices are articulated. As Glynos and Howarth put it, 'the gathering of heterogeneous elements under a name is necessarily a singularity' (2007: 180). Because security comprises a multiplicity of de-centred practices at various levels, locales, with various referent objects, various ‘threats’ and various logics of constructing identity and difference, does
not mean that it has no identity, i.e., a prevailing or hegemonic logic. By contrast, it means that the relation between these elements, that they might be described as moments of a single discourse, is non-necessary (ibid: 180). Security thus, is a ‘regime of practices’, or in Foucault’s terms an ‘apparatus’ whose principle of unity is dispersion. It is not a mere multiplicity of heterogeneous elements, neither is it a structured totality.

For now, I will continue on the analysis of security/migration but I will try to come to grips with a slightly different question. Given the conspicuous absence of questions about race/racism in security studies, save for its possible framing as yet another source of danger for societal security, what is the relationship between racism – the politics of race – and security/migration configurations? How has this relationship been theorized or displaced from scrutiny? Tackling this question will bring us to revise our understanding of how the politics of race can be at play with the politics of security and migration; or, why the politics of race can be plausibly seen in the context of contemporary regimes of security and mobility. In order to answer to this question I am leaving security studies behind and open to broader social science discourses.

**The silencing of racism**

Questions about ‘race’ and racism have been rather marginal in the context of

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103 The Foucauldian notion of the ‘apparatus’ should not be confused with his notion of discourse, or *epistème*. As he points out, the notion of the apparatus has to do with the ‘said’ as much as with the ‘unsaid’, the material/practical (Foucault, 1980-194-5). That he thus postulates a difference between the ‘discursive’ and the non-discursive is a problem. By contrast, for Laclau and Mouffe, all social forms are symbolically mediated and thus discursive. Regarding the question of dispersion/unity of the apparatus, Foucault lends his argument to misinterpretation as he claims that an ‘apparatus’ is ‘thoroughly heterogeneous’. He thus seems to argue against any notion of unity/universality or articulation. This has been pointed out by critics (see Fenton, 2011: 184) who argue that this is incongruent with the concept of hegemony. This criticism might be valid, however, Deleuze's reading of Foucault on the notion of the apparatus, is closer to a Discourse Theory perspective, as he points out that Foucault does not use universals as a ground, but rather as 'singular processes – of unification, totalization, [...] objectification' (1992: 162). From a Discourse Theory perspective, heterogeneity means similarly 'the constitutive failure of any objectivity to attain a full identity' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007: 110).
International Relations (Jones, 2008; Vitalis 2000), just as they have been in security studies as a sub-discipline of IR. Jones, arguing from a critical realist perspective, claims that the 'structural silencing of race' is due to several reasons: first, the 'institutional appearance of contemporary international order' (ibid: 908) and, second, the hegemony of the empiricist paradigm in political studies and IR in particular. As to the first reason, she notes, 'legal regimes and institutions […] rest on and uphold norms of racial equality and universal human rights' (ibid: 908). As to the second, empiricism dictates the appraisal of empirical phenomena, the 'observation and description of empirical forms and processes' (ibid:909). This, as Wight has shown, means that racism is seen in terms of agency, agency 'aberrant to the normal social order' (Jones, 2008: 909). In other words, only individual behavior and explicit institutional arrangements qualify for study. Further, the focus on institutions and discourse (language), Jones argues, precludes analyses of race/racism that foreground the significance of historical forms of racial oppression and 'restrict[s] analysis of racial inequalities to the level of specific societies rather than the international' (ibid: 909).

Jones's argument is that the 'silencing' of race, the relative scarcity of studies on race/racism, are due to empiricism which cannot 'see' beyond or behind what is officially proclaimed or what is immediately present and given. This is problematic, it is claimed, because even in discursive approaches that focus on 'race'/racism, the focus is on 'identity, discourse and practice', as the case is with the work of Balibar and Wallerstein. Jone's epistemological argument boils down to the idea that there is racism, that the global structure is racialized, and while 'questions of subjectivity, consciousness, identity and ideology are clearly important aspects of racial power and oppression', it is more important to develop an account that 'encompasses structural dimensions […]' to explain how 'racial inequality is routinely produced by an international order formally
committed to racial equality and universal human rights' (ibid: 908-909). This is the critical realist position. It carries strong assumptions about materiality but it fails to see how materiality is intertwined with symbolic forms, in other words, it fails to acknowledge the discursive nature of all structures.\footnote{There are further issues with a conception within the critical realist perspective of the 'symbolic' as a superstructure not constitutive of reality itself. There is therefore a notion in many of these authors that discursive approaches are characterized by a 'reality deficit'. The implicit assumption is that language and what is being said is the 'spectacular' aspect of what is really going on: Huysmans argues that 'the political spectacle refers to the creation and circulation of symbols in the political process. This 'spectacle as a drama in which meaning is conferred through evoking crisis situations, emergencies, rituals [...] and political myths' (Huysmans, 2006: 73). Although it cannot be exaustively described here, Huysmans argument, as well as Jones's privilege a conception of reality to which one can have epistemological access independently of any mediation of the symbolic.} It further displaces the possibility of understanding race/racism as a singular discursive form to a discussion about exploitation under capitalism.

In a different and more context specific vein, Huysmans directly addresses racism in relation to migration politics and 'insecurity' in the context of EU. Huysmans argues that in practices of border control 'by linking illegal immigration and asylum seekers one inevitably envisages and singles out third-world nationals simply because many asylum seekers arrive from these countries' (2006:74). He notes that they are 'pictured' as 'culturally (and sometimes as racially) different' (ibid: 74). His account of racism is set against approaches that speak of a 'European-level form of racism – Euro-racism'. His account however downplays the centrality of racism in what regards empirically the inclusion-exclusion of migrants: 'Given the diversity of racist practices in different member states and their difference with the racial effects of the European integration process it is difficult to argue that a specific form of racism exists that is present in all member states'. These methodological arguments are the kinds of arguments that Jones, articulating a more 'holistic' approach to race, would oppose. Indeed, in opposition to this kind of empiricism where true is only what is valid according to
rationalist/empiricist criteria, I will show further on how post-colonial theory has been challenging the assumptions of euro-centric accounts and narratives of security and thus make it possible to rethink the relationship between European 'regimes of security' and race.

There is, Huysmans argues, 'a more indirect relationship between migration policy in the EU and racism and xenophobia' (ibid: 75). He argues how the security 'framing' of the policy domain portrays groups of migrants negatively. 'Such a policy', he says, 'risks sustaining public expressions of racism and xenophobia in the present political context' (ibid: 75). He further addresses questions about how struggles 'against the representation of migration as a cultural danger' have also their place in EU's common migration and asylum policy, which is understood by the policy-makers as a 'an instrument dealing with the rise of racist, xenophobic, and extreme nationalistic practices in Europe' (ibid: 76). The terms of framing migration as a cultural threat in political debate, Huysmans writes, 'has played an important role in giving nationalist movements and extreme right-wing parties and their ideas on immigration and asylum a prominent place in the political field.' (ibid: 77). Huysmans basically argues that the political field is ambivalent, both sustaining and identifying against nationalism, racism and xenophobia.

The security identity articulated officially rests 'on the fear of revival of extreme nationalism, racism and xenophobia' (bid: 76) but it does have simultaneously as its object 'immigrants who are presented as burden, challenging societal and political stability'. There is, last, 'right-wing parties and their ideas' that are thus given 'place in the political field' (ibid: 77). Their ideas, Huysmans argues, 'have seeped into policy agendas because mainstream parties from the left and the right countered by playing out security and migration themes in their fight for the support of the people' (ibid:77).

I want to suggest that although Huysmans is right in saying that there is a link between
security and racism via immigration, his account of racism is not as nuanced and elaborated. We can see this in the way in which he frames the problem as one where there is a structured field in which nationalism, racism and xenophobia are a language and a political identity that finds its place in an already constituted political field. Racism here is understood, even if implicitly, as discourse, but in such way that the full potential of the category of 'discourse' is not taken up. His account of racism as a discourse, reduces racism to a linguistic phenomenon. What is more, being the case that these dimensions exist and that racism is linked to the 'symbolic', language, rhetoric and doxa they are not to be dismissed as readily as epiphenomena to a reality whose constitution takes place at a different, structural, level, for these dimensions are constitutive of reality.

What I want to emphasize here is that there are different ways in which it is possible to frame racism. For instance, Vicky Squire talks of 'formations of racism' (Squire 2011). This is different from saying that racism is located at the level of debates, words, and spectacles. She characterizes explicitly certain forms of security as racism, any issue about migration as prone to racialization (ibid: 104). Squire also engages with accounts that directly come to grips with constructions of racism as practices, 'not only giv[ing] succour to racists but are themselves racist.' (Squire, 2006: 33) This does not mean that the meaning of racism collapses into 'security', rather that, racism is not an effect of security, neither its purported raison d'être but rather an element that can become a moment,\(^{105}\) which we can characterize, explain and critically engage with. Further, she notes, the dynamics of racialization 'dissimulate their racisms and dis-articulate 'race' and 'immigration' through a politics of nativism' (ibid: 105). Thus, from her point of view, the 'silencing of racism' is structural, but this does not mean that its 'real'/material

\(^{105}\) See Laclau and Mouffe (2001)
dimensions are obstructed from view. Rather, I think, it means that a discursive construction of racism as socially 'absent' takes place in a routine fashion. We are thus looking at the possible links between security and the framing of exclusion. Indeed, one of the problems emerging, here, is the framing of racism itself as a security threat. It is paradoxical however that what can be defined from a certain perspective as societal security can from another be defined as racism.

Ibrahim goes a step further and argues that the securitization of migration enacted by a plurality of actors, including academics, is outright racist, as it is based on the assumption that 'cultural difference leads to social breakdown' (2005: 164) and articulates migrants as source of risk and insecurity. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, the traditional, though secondary, emphasis of security studies on social cohesion as a source of security problems, made possible novel articulations of 'societal security' and immigration as a threat (Waever and Hansen, 2011: 28). Ibrahim takes up Barker's notion of 'new racism' to name directly the appraisal of 'cultural difference' and its use as a criterion of exclusion as a 'racist discourse'. Racism for Ibrahim is a 'particular form of prejudice' (2005: 165), and the problem with Huysmans' account is that he fails to make explicit that the securitization of migrants 'is racial prejudice' (171). While I am sympathetic to her attempt to name racism, her account has certain problems. It can be said that it culturalizes the politics of race/racism insofar that she reduces racism to a question about 'culture'. Although culture works as a 'classificatory system' as she points out, and as such, as I will show later, it has largely replaced explicit discourses of racial superiority, it is not clear that racism has to do exclusively with representations of culture. A genealogical, rather than an idealist, approach to racism necessitates that we attend to the political itself, that is, to antagonism and struggles. And one of the forms these struggles might take is that between 'races'. Further, as it has been rightly observed,
the characterization of racism as 'new' is misleading at the least. Ann Stoler, drawing on Foucault, makes precisely this point: racism 'always appears as renewed and new at the same time' (Stoler, 1995: 89). Racism is always new because it 'harnesses itself to progressive projects' while it 'draws on a cultural density of prior representations that are recast in new form' (ibid: 90). Last, there is a problem of reducing racism to prejudice, and, indeed, in the context of shifting epistemological paradigms in social psychology that she invokes, this issue can highlight different strategies of displacing racism as an antagonistic phenomenon from scrutiny. I will now elaborate further on these points.

**Foucault, race wars, history**

Foucault's genealogy of 'race struggles' in the *Society Must be Defended* lectures he gave in 1975-6 (2004) has received the least of scholarly attention amongst his writings (Stoler, 1995; Kelly 2004). Although Foucault himself and scholars generally agree that his intention was not to write a 'genealogy of racism', these lectures help us to come to grips with a historico-political reading of racism. Foucault begins with playing 'subjugated', disqualified knowledges, 'what people know locally', against 'the coercion of a unitary, formal and scientific theoretical discourse' (2004:10). If this is the general form of subjugated knowledges, Foucault states that he is combining archaeology as 'the method specific to the analysis of local discursivities' and genealogy as 'the tactic' that allows one to critically deploy these freed, or desubjugated knowledges retrieved. (ibid: 10-11). Foucault proposes to address the question of power and history as questions whose 'grid of intelligibility' is provided in terms of 'conflict, confrontation and war' (ibid:15). If power, he asks, 'is simply a continuation of war by other means' (ibid: 18), does this not imply that:

 [...]the political structure of society is so organized that some can *defend* themselves against others, or can defend their *domination* against the rebellion of
others, or quite simply defend their *victory* and perpetuate it by subjugating others?" (ibid: 18; my emphases)

Here Foucault puts the emphasis on struggles and domination thus displacing the centrality of questions about sovereignty/legitimacy in the history of political thought: 

'[...] we should be extracting operators of domination from relations of power, both historically and empirically'. In the context of these lectures, his genealogy begins from historical 'race struggles' in post-medieval Europe and the emergence of what he calls a 'historico-political' discourse. This 'strange', historical discourse (ibid: 49) was a discourse on society and its relationship to war in contradistinction to the discourse that sought to establish 'de facto and de jure' the monopoly of waging war, war as a practice functioning at the 'outer limits' of the state, and eradicate it from within the social body (ibid:48). Historico-political discourse was thus paradoxical in that it spoke of antagonism and was an antagonistic discourse itself: 'A binary structure runs through society' and 'this battlefront puts us all on one side or the other, there is no such thing as a neutral subject' (ibid: 51). This discourse also displaced absolute conceptions of truth.106 At different epochs it would articulate different “programs of truth” as Foucault's accomplice would say (Veyne 1988), 'from the perspective of the sought-for victory and ultimately, so to speak, of the survival of the speaking subject himself' (Foucault, 2003: 52).

As Mariana Valverde points out, when Foucault speaks about 'race' the emphasis is on 'race struggles' (Valverde, 2011: 142) and I will be discussing this as it seems to me to articulate a different social ontology than the one usually proffered by 'governmentality'

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106 Foucault describes this discourse as articulating myths, affects and bitterness, a rhetorical discourse in which truth functions as a weapon. He draws an analogy between this discourse and the figure of the sophist (2003: 56-8), as portrayed by philosophers and whose exclusion was constitutive of the history of philosophy (see Foucault, 2011: 32).
and biopolitics scholars of Foucault. But for now, I will try to elaborate on race struggle and racism following Foucault himself. From the seventeenth century onwards, he argues, the particular articulation of the 'binary structure' that runs 'beneath order and peace' (Foucault, 2003: 59), is that of a race war. This idea arises in the 17th century first in England in the discourse of the Levellers and the Puritans and then in the anti-monarchical struggles in France, a discourse articulating 'bitterness' and 'ressentiment'. The same discourse whose form was antagonistic was trans-mutated into what became a 'historico-biological' discourse, having the support of philology and articulated with (romanticist) nationalism in the 18th and 19th century. In the first years of the nineteenth century, it takes yet a different content: it becomes class struggle that erases the racial conflict traces (ibid: 59-60).

The 'race struggle' discourse however does not establish two races in opposition to each other. Rather, it consists in 'splitting of a single race', it takes place between the race 'portrayed as the one true race' against those 'who pose a threat to the biological heritage', this subrace that 'ceaselessly infiltrates the social body [...] constantly being re-created in and by the social fabric' (ibid: 61). In its first formulation, however, Foucault suggests that this racism was articulated like this: 'we have to defend ourselves against our enemies because the State apparatuses, the law and the power structures not only do not defend us against our enemies; they are the instruments our enemies are

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107 A number of scholars approach these lectures as a prelude to Foucault's turn to biopolitics and governmentality. Foucault towards the end of that year's lectures turns to biopolitics and never goes back to any theorization of racism in relation to struggles. Indeed, he abandons even the problematic of security (Dillon & Neal, 2011:11) This has prompted many to elevate the governmentality/biopolitics to a principle of intelligibility not only of racism but also of how power is exercised tout court. For example, Neal argues that Foucault 'steps back' from the genealogical principle of struggle and the war model (Neal, 2006). Rasmussen (2011) argues that racism, as articulated in Foucault's account, should be approached as a 'form of government'. The problem here is not that racism is not related to biopolitical government, but the postulation of biopolitical government as a substitute to the political. I think this unilateralization of the governmentality paradigm, the attempt to 'apply' Foucault's arguments for crafting an all encompassing 'sociology of modernity' (Valverde, 2010) is rather problematic.
using to pursue and subjugate us' (ibid: 61). in its biologicalization it becomes a 'racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products [...] one of the basic dimensions of social normalization'. I cannot focus here on the 'biopolitical' transcription of the race war, but I do want to say that its initial inscription and articulation within 'blood and soil' narratives is not just the discourse's etiology that vanished after its class and biological articulations. Quite the contrary and despite Foucault's conceptual decision to maintain the term 'racist discourse' to designate the 'socio-biological' articulation of the discourse on race struggles which served the purpose of colonial domination in the nineteenth century (ibid: 65), I would like to see in this thesis how this discourse of 'blood and soil' may help us link the question of contemporary racism in Greece with this 'historico-political' discourse and with security practices in large. For security in its traditional and 'widened' form is a historico-political discourse insofar as it draws a frontier between the national 'self' and its various 'others': 'abnormals', 'intruders', 'foreigners', 'internal' and 'external' enemies.

Mariana Valverde brings out this dimension that privileges neither 'historico-political' discourse, the discourse on race struggle, nor the biopolitics framework. This is rather useful because it would be empirically implausible to argue that the biopolitical paradigm is coextensive to the play of power in contemporary European societies. This is especially true when it comes to 'semi-peripheral' European countries with their own very different histories and politics. When Foucault says that racism links the two biopolitical and incompatible functions, that of killing and that of making live, and that it is acceptable on the basis of eliminating biological threats rather than political

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108 Scholars have raised concerns over Foucault's Eurocentric thought (Valverde, 2007: 167; Delanty and Isin, 2003) and it would be problematic indeed to take the biopolitics/governmentality framework and 'apply' it on cases where it is far from clear that forms of liberal rule are well-established. If Foucault's work focused on European struggles the question emerging when examining the Greek case is 'What is Europe?', and what is the relationship between Greece and Europe.
adversaries (ibid: 256) he does not mean that this antagonistic dimension through which race struggles are articulated has been obliterated in modern times. Indeed, Valverde points out how discourses about national honor and cultural essentialism articulate with biopolitical functions (Valverde, 2007: 177). To put it simply, contemporary racism can be approached both as a biopolitical tactic in the government of the population and proceeds to 'cleansings' from what infiltrates and corrupts the social body, and as a tactic in a struggle for 'racial' hegemony. As I show in further chapters, this is mostly clear in the Greek case, where migration has been constructed as a threat to the population whose normal reproduction depends upon disciplinary and security practices (law and order) but also as a threat to Greek society insofar as 'society' is another name for 'race'. These are the two dimensions of security discourse I will be exploring as well as their contestation that also depends on articulating a 'race struggle' discourse. Foucault's work clearly helps us conceptualize racism as a discourse that both divides up the population through logics of equivalence and attempts to manage it by logics of difference, where 'evidence of hostilities between peoples is swept under the carpet' (Valverde, 2007: 166). This last point, gives us a clue as to how racism itself has been 'securitized'. In my analysis of the Greek case, I take on board Valverde's point that 'blood and soil', culturalist and nationalist narratives and 'abstract universalism' characteristic of biopolitics do not drive each other out, yet 'they are not speaking to the same issues. They are not using the same rhetorical register' (Valverde, 2011: 148).

Now, what's the relationship between the discourse of race struggle, in its contemporary modalities and security? Bigo brings to attention the rift between 'internal' and 'external' security, the former having to do with population and the latter with 'war and survival' (Bigo, 2011). Thus, security is related both to a discourse of war and a discourse of regulation and management of a population. The two however are not in a relation of
exteriority to each other. Their 'extimacy' is founded precisely on the question of immigration (Bigo, 2001) and the reactions to it. Criminologists, way before IR scholars engage with questions about societal security, were working on 'constructions of deviance' that regarded, for instance, both radical nationalists and immigrants' (Bigo, 2011: 104). This raises an interesting point: How are we to think of security here if, radical nationalists speak the discourse of race war in doing 'traditional security' – that is, designate 'threats', while at the same time they are the objects of discourses that construct deviance by saying: 'Racism is another threat to societal cohesion'. In other words, how is it possible to conceptualize the paradox that practices of security that can be said to be themselves racist, also construct racism as the threatening object? What is the threshold that defines what kind of racism is a problem and what is not?

Postcolonial security-migration and race

Postcolonial thought further problematizes any easy access into questions of race and security and mobility. Buzan and Hunsen (2009: 201) argue that as the works of Spivak and Said were gaining purchase in social sciences during the 1990s, something like a 'postcolonial ISS perspective begun to crystallize'. The postcolonial perspective, among other things would take issue with deep-rooted convictions that other than Western states are 'failed' or 'underdeveloped' [...] in need of catching up'. Postcolonialists argue that 'there is a recurring economic, social and military unequal relationship between the West and the rest' (ibid: 201). In a way, postcolonial theory challenged the Euro-centric assumptions that would not only cast the Western state as the criterion according to which the 'rest' will be evaluated, but also post-structuralism and postcolonialism would

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109 The appeal to 'social cohesion' is important here. Security is often enacted in the name of safeguarding social cohesion, one threat to which is racism. Thus, as Goodman has shown (2008) in the British context it can be possible to justify harsh treatment of asylum seekers by appealing to social cohesion. It is paradoxical then that such harsh treatment might be seen as necessary to avert racism.
see how the 'rest' was actually divided and categorized further into 'inferior identities', by means of 'Western political and academic construction of 'the Southern', 'the Oriental', the 'underdeveloped' and the 'failed' Other (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Doty, 1996). A variation of this theme we find in Geddes’ work on South European migration policy: as he puts it:

How can policy developments in Southern Europe be explained? Is the politics of migration in southern Europe distinct because these are newer immigration countries? This temporal dimension may imply catch-up as they become more like older immigration countries. Perhaps the politics of migration differs because these are southern European countries and in some way exceptional […] (Geddes, 2003: 149)

The ambiguous positioning of Greece in the dichotomy 'modern West'/'most of the world' (Chatterjee, 2004: 8), 'global north'/'global south' being neither 'western' nor 'postcolonial', makes it an exemplar case which raises theoretical, empirical and political questions directly relevant to critical approaches to security in Europe. For example, the fact that Greece 'did not have colonies' has often been used as strategy of mitigating responsibility for receiving migrants and refugees. On the other hand, the fact that Greece has not been colonized allows Greek politicians and ordinary citizens to assume a position of superiority vis-a-vis the postcolonial world. In fact, the Greek case may allow us to approach the question by deconstructing or 'provincializing' the very idea of 'Europe' (See Chakrabarty 2000; Pagden 2002; Huggan and Law 2009; Gourgouris 1996). The Greek case might better be thought as a case of 'crypto-colonialism' (Herzfeld: 2002), a discursive product 'ideologically constructed by colonialist Europe' through a process of 'colonizing the ideal' (Gourgouris, 1996: 5-6). As Herzfeld, explains summarily:

110 Geddes replies to his own question negatively. But the interesting thing is that he poses the question in the first place. This means at the very least that he tries to respond, modify and take issue, with a pre-existing discourse which he does not adequately submit to critical scrutiny.
the modern country, even its own travel brochures, yields to the commanding presence of a high antiquity created in the crucible of late-eighteenth-century Aryanism – that same tradition of cultural eugenics that bred the Nazis' “race science” and, at least in one controversial but persuasive historiographic reading, occluded both Semitic and Egyptian (“African”) contributions to European culture.\footnote{Hertzfeld (2002: 900) refers to Martin Bernal's \textit{Black Athena} (1987). Evidence that I presented in the Introduction support more the 'persuasive' aspect of Bernal's work rather than the opposite.}

In empirical terms, the characterization of the security-migration 'nexus' in the internal margins of Europe inescapably involves the 'cultural' question of local and particular collective memories, histories and even mythologies, which inform the heterogeneous and 'hybrid' security practices producing 'illegals' and their contestation. The point of taking on board the postcolonial problematic is therefore twofold: an avoidance of subsuming the Greek case into pre-existing Western-centric \textit{and} postcolonial problematics. What I want to do then is not to restore the disadvantaged pole “most of the world” vis-a-vis the 'West', but to probe the limits of the 'West' itself. Having given an account of the complexities that emerge from articulating the question of race and race politics with contemporary debates and politics of security and mobility in a 'postcolonial' world, I will show in the remaining lines of this chapter how discussions of racism' are displaced and silenced in certain areas of the humanities and how could it be problematized.

**Racism as a 'problem' – the case of social psychology**

Until this point I have shown not only how 'migration' has come to be theorized as a security issue but also correlatively how questions about 'race' and/or racism in the field of political studies in general have not been approached with adequate attention. Critical and post-structuralist research, however, has managed to bring into attention the various ways in which racism is linked to security practices. These theoretical perspectives allow
us specifically to take issue with the ways in which racism is framed in and constitutes these discourses. In this last section of this chapter I want to further pitch my analysis around the question of 'race'/racism. For if in antiquity and early modern times 'race' did not exist as a concept,112 but other adjacent categories would do the work of justifying exclusion, discrimination, and if in modernity, as Foucault and others tell us, racism becomes scientific,113 in late modernity, in the present, racism becomes a 'problem'. This is because although science has convincingly shown that 'race' is not real, racism still persists. But how exactly does it persist? What I will try to do in the next few paragraphs is to cast some ambiguity into how racism has been a problem by looking at social psychology and race/cultural studies.

In a way similar to the silencing of 'race' in political studies, the question of 'race' and racism has been disqualified from analysis in other disciplines. In social psychology, from its early times, 'racism' has been effaced in favor of 'prejudice'. As G.W Allport put it 'The lexicon of human groups [...] is poor', 'race is a mischievous and retardative term in social sciences' (1979)[1954]. His seminal work, *The Nature of Human Prejudice*, explores the nature of human relations from the perspective of prejudice and does so with an explicit objective: an intervention into what the author sees as an

112 Goldberg (2002) argues for thinking about the specificity of 'race' as a modern phenomenon and cautions tendencies of 'parochialist' readings of pre-modern ethnocentrisms in terms of race; see also (Huxley, 1939:9). However, political philosophy from its inception took issue with discursive categorizations that today we would be prone to consider 'racialized'. Plato for example, took issue with the 'Greeks'/barbarian' distinction (Kamtekar, 2002:1), Aristotle questioned explored the issue of 'natural slavery', in issue later re-contextualized by apologists of New World Colonialism (Ward & Lott, 2002: preface). In early modern times, Thomas More (1999: 13)[1516], would liken 'savages' to the 'beasts' inhabiting uninhabited lands, while Kant, according to some readings seems to be the founder of the scientific concept of 'race' (Bernasconi, 2002: 147).

113 Here, of course, we should not only have in mind the pseudo-scientific concept of 'race' in the discourse of Nazism for the description of which the term 'racism' was first mobilized (Blum, 2002; Miles 1993) but also 'mainstream' social science. For example, in the beginning of the 20th century the category of 'race' was used in an absolutely natural sense in prominent scientific journals, like the *Americal Journal of Sociology*. For an elegantly weaved argument that justifies slavery see (Reinsch, 2001[1905])
antagonism-riven global conjuncture, justified in the preface of the 1954 edition on the
grounds that rationality and technology have accelerated globalization and proximity
amongst people. 'However', he admits, our deficit in social knowledge seems to void at
ever step our progress in physical knowledge' (1979: xv). According to Allport
'animosity', 'endless antagonism' and 'imaginary fears' are all attributed to the 'nature of
prejudice'. The essence of prejudice, Tajfel tells us, derives from the need to simplify
and systematize a complex amount of information (Tajfel, 1999: 114). Allport's aim is to
gain objective insight into the universal nature of prejudice (Bruehl, 1996: 16).
Achieving this, rivalry is prone to end. So, he argues, 'without knowledge of the roots of
hostility, we cannot hope to employ intelligence effectively in controlling its
destructiveness' (Allport, 1979: preface). Latent within his justification is an existential
faith in the good nature of human kind that 'prefers the sight of kindness and friendliness
to the sight of cruelty. Normal men everywhere reject, in principle and in preference, the
path of war and destruction. They like to live in peace and friendship with their
neighbor' (ibid: xvi). In other words, according to Allport, people think they prefer and
uphold the norm of harmony.

In an age of unprecedented interaction and conflict between different people, G. W
Allport, as a proponent of a certain scientific paradigm and ethos, works in the direction
of disenchanting prejudice, of unveiling its true nature as a means to contribute to the
minimization or ending of human rivalry. But it is possible that his research orientation
is driven by his faith in the possibility of doing away with rivalry by means of scientific
reason. It is clear how from this perspective there is no space for an analysis of racism
without reducing it to a cognitive phenomenon that pertains to false or 'erroneous'
knowledge. There is thus a double reduction: a reduction of racism to a problem of
knowledge (external to and above struggles) and cognition (individualism).
Prejudice, Allport argues features two characteristics: 'Erroneous generalization' and 'hostility'. Generalization is to be understood in the sense of categorization. Social categorization is a central process, consisting primarily in cognitive mechanisms and has implications as to how we think of out-groups (see Billig & Tajfel, 1973). What happens when former pre-judgments are in conflict with evidence? What mechanisms does prejudice set in motion when faced with a fact that contradicts our prejudice?. The mechanism is the 'device of admitting exceptions' in order to maintain the prejudice intact. This is the device of 're-fencing' (Allport, 1979:23-24).

Consider, however, an example of 'race' talk: 'there is racism in country X...but it is only a marginal phenomenon'. From the point of view of 'framing' racism, we could say that the implicit prejudgment here is 'there is no racism in country X'. Racism is the exception in such proposition, and Allport's device helps us see how re-fencing as a discursive/argumentative strategy allows to register exceptions to prior categorizations.

For Allport and proponents of the cognitive paradigm, it is the lack of self-insight, that of 'habitual open-mindedness' (my emphasis) that instigates prejudice. There is, however, another related process facilitating prejudice. 'Externalization', Allport argues, describes the way in which for prejudiced people 'things seem to happen out “there”'. By contrast, ‘“tolerant people tend to believe that our fate […] lies in ourselves’ (1979: 404). Then, it is better to think of things happening to him rather than as caused by him […] it is not I who hates and injures others; it is they who hate and injure me' (1979: 404). 'Externalization', in behavioral terms, is the expression of a 'preference to explain behavior in terms of external forces rather than subjective, inner, psychological processes' (Duckitt, 2005: 396).

This is plausible a picture and intuitive, but if externalization is also the way in which
science constitutes itself in opposition to something alien to it (its object) (Adorno, 2005: 37), we should assume, and we could trace how prejudiced is written as alien to the culture the scientist identifies with, that prejudice can be localized in the 'conservative', the 'close-minded', the 'intolerant'. Allport assumes a neutral standpoint, one that presupposes that prejudice is 'out there', since the scientist, is the person whose virtue is habitual open-mindedness and moral autonomy. The mistaken premise here is either an idealized picture of social science or a far-reaching, almost untenable self-reflexivity. Does not Allport and proponents of the cognitive paradigm take for granted that rationality is synonymous with tolerance, thus, dissociated to racism (prejudice)? At work here is an 'ethic of cognition', that is the, ethos according to which laying bare the mechanisms of prejudice/racism from a scientific perspective, entails that historical manifestations of prejudice automatically lose credibility. Underpinning this view is the assumption of a singular, universal prejudice which comes in different variations (see Bruehl, 1996). Besides, there is a sense in which even if we accept that racism/race do not constitute valid objects of research, prejudice and related phenomena are cast as 'parasitic' rather than endemic to late modern societies: 'Like a virus that has mutated, racism may have evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat' (Gaertner et al., 1996: 4)

The cognitive paradigm in social psychology has identified how racism/prejudice are ambivalent and some forms of racism are not obvious (Katz & Hass, 1988). This idea has been further theorized in theories about 'symbolic racism' (Sears, 1988), 'modern racism' (McConahay, 1986), 'aversive racism' (Kovel, 1970; Murell et al. 1994; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), all of which attempt to explain forms of racism other than overt ones.

\[114\] N. Smith critically engages an argument of Gellner, according to whom 'anything must be true before it can significantly claim other merits' (Gellner cited in Smith, 1997:11). Therefore the role of the scientist could be seen as that of 'disenchanting' and showing the true nature of things, a task that alone can discredit the erroneous assumptions.
Within the cognitive paradigm, thus, racism in its explicit form belongs to the past and it is the subtlety of racism that becomes problematic. Heirs of Allport's thinking identify in 'modern racism [...] a form of modern prejudice that characterizes the racial attitude of many whites with egalitarian values, who regard themselves as non-prejudiced, but who discriminate in subtle, rationalizable way' (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000: 17).

The cognitive paradigm in the social psychology of prejudice/racism, itself, cannot escape the vicious circle that the problematic it introduces poses: In Allport's terms, if re-fencing is the device that allows registering exceptions, is it not the case that the implicit distinction between rational/tolerant/open-minded and irrational/prejudiced, which maps onto the distinction between self/other allows only for exceptional, accidental manifestation of discriminatory behavior of individuals, thus, reducing a social phenomenon, to a mere 'aberration'?

Some of these issues are neatly captured by the research agenda of the heretic strand of Critical Legal Studies known as Critical Race Theory that addressed racism in American society head-on:115 'CRT recognizes that racism is ingrained in the fabric and system of the American society. The individual racist need not exist to note that institutional racism is pervasive in the dominant culture.'116 I quote this particular statement of assumption despite the fact that it is not attributed to any particular proponent of CRT because it is the most cited 'catch-phrase' and the one that engenders the most strong of 'defenses' amongst readers and commentators across the web – a fact that alone lends itself to critical interpretation. One of the major premises of CRT is the idea that what obstructs social change in terms of race is the 'mindset' that characterizes the dominant majority within American society. CRT scholars tap into this mindset by focusing on

115 For a comprehensive introduction to CRT see Delgado and Stefancic (2001).
116 From UCLA's School of Public Affairs student's blog. http://spacs.wordpress.com/what-is-critical-race-theory/
'storytelling' and 'counter-storytelling': 'the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared cultural understandings persons in the dominant group bring to discussions of race' (Delgado & Stefancic, 1993: 462). Counter-stories, parables, anecdotes are 'devices' which Critical Race theorists mobilize in order to show the 'contingency, cruelty and self-serving-nature' of dominant group stories, as well as to expose the presuppositions of racism (ibid: 463). CRT takes issue with what they call 'modern myths' (Bell, 1985), such as liberalism's 'colorblindness', meritocracy, while they focus attention on the uses of metaphors (Delgado, 1990). CRT research orientation is largely influenced by postmodernist philosophy and by the works of Derrida and Foucault in particular (Cook 1992). I will elaborate on the study of myths, anecdotes and metaphors in the next chapter. For now, I will describe two theoretical/methodological routes to the study of race. They both converge to the study of discourse and to the particular problem of the denial of racism.

**The discursive 'turn'**

This section focuses on the work of Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter who iterate the problematic that we discerned already in Allport, that is, the problematic of how racism becomes 'invisible' and/or aberrant. They do so by deconstructing the opposition between prejudice/racism and tolerance along with introducing methodological and theoretical points. Potter and Wetherell (1987) – although not the first within their discipline that draw attention to language and identity (see Billig 1987; 1991) – are very explicit in their disagreement with the cognitive paradigm in its traditional form. For them, it is not any more inner, cognitive mechanisms of the individual that should be central to the study of racism, Rather, it is the language of racism that becomes the object of analysis. Drawing, in part, on Garfinkel's project of ethnomethodology (1984) [1967], they shift attention to 'social texts', namely, 'forms of spoken interaction, formal
and informal, and written texts of all kinds'. In their view, language is constitutive of all social life and representation (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 7)

Discourse analysis, as operationalized by Potter and Wetherell for the study of racism, shifts attention to the way in which linguistic activities naturalize and individualize social phenomena of discrimination (Potter and Wetherell, 1992: 2). Their project is situated in some of the re-workings of the Marxist problematic of ideology (see Gramsci 1992; Althusser 2008; Hall 1980), while their conception of language is largely influenced by Austin (1962) and Saussure (2006) who give primacy to the symbolic mediation through language of all social interaction. Thus, they argue, 'racism needs to be seen as a series of ideological effects, within flexible, fluid and varied contexts (Potter and Wetherell, 1992: 59).

Keeping track of the problematic of the dissimulation of racism into other objects we are looking, from this perspective into modalities by which 'deracialization of discourse' becomes effective (Solomos and Bulmer, 2004).117 The stories people tell about their society is for them an object of analysis rather than a 'resource through which the nature of the social is discovered' (Potter and Wetherell, 1992 ibid: 149). In other words, what they claim is that in the study of racism, we have to work with and beyond 'contextualized self-representations'. This method allowed them to interpret how New Zealanders mobilize argumentative strategies to avoid responsibility for racism: Maori and anti-racist activists are characterized in this 'text' as 'extremists', as opposed to 'sensible, normal, and average Maoris' (1992: 155), and as susceptible to 'improper influence' by 'one or two people who are stirring' (interviewee in Potter and Wetherell,

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117 See also Essed's (1991: 43-44) study into 'everyday racism' where the object of study is self-interpretations of daily actions and strategies of refusal to take responsibility for racism or even merely registering its social nature, by not naming or putting the word in inverted commas, for example in the written press.
Underlying such construction is, of course, a certain view about society: anti-racist mobilization is discredited as unnecessary and 'agents of influence' as capable of impinging on a 'peaceful and harmonious society' (ibid: 155).

They parallel those constructions of society as 'uniform versus multiform', manifesting 'a nearly total social consensus which can then be positioned as under threat' with structuralist-functionalist accounts of society (1992: 159). In this case the exception, the 'dysfunctional' to the harmonious, integrated, order is basically the 'anti-racists'; also, racism itself becomes exceptional, since those interviewed have nothing against Maoris as such, who they see as 'modest' as themselves. Crucially, however, for the authors, the distinction between 'moderate' and 'extremist', premised on a harmonious picture of society, is not taken as a reified distinction such as that between the cognitive dispositions of 'dogmatism' and 'tolerance', or that between 'open-minds' and 'closed-minds' (Rokeach, 1960 quoted in Potter and Wetherell, 1992: 167). Instead, according to the authors, the effects of moderation and extremism 'are publicly available and collectively shared resources which structure political discussion and dispute' (ibid: 167), and further, 'the formulation and deployment of these resources is sustained by broader recognizable discourses or philosophies of liberalism and individualism [...]'

It becomes increasingly clear that approaching ‘racism’ involves a stumbling in an ambivalence that renders racism hypodermic. However, there have been different understandings of what this ambivalence is about. Potter and Wetherell (1992), drawing on Billig, argue that this ambivalence is endemic to common sense reasoning: 'Common sense [...] is a composite of egalitarian and authoritarian strands, of individualism and collectivism, and emphasizes both special expertise and shared knowledge, both prejudice and tolerance' (1992: 176). Thus, Pakeha New Zealanders argue for 'equal
rights' and for 'the primacy of rationality', drawing on discourses of modernity (ibid: 178), while arguing for the maintenance of a discriminatory status quo. Interviewees cannot understand themselves to be racists because they are 'practical', 'down-to-earth folk' and 'get on with the job'. These self-descriptions 'involve the fantasy of the reasonable individual in perfect control of their behavior'. Racism is prone to disappear, figure as a mistake, or exception, when, as they put it, 'cognitive omniscience [is] replacing ambivalence and mixed motives' (ibid: 180). In contrast, however, to the cognitive paradigm theorization of this ambivalence, they argue that the ambivalence is not between 'a feeling and a value', rather, 'between competing frameworks for articulating social, political and ethical questions' (ibid: 197). It is precisely in terms of 'competing frameworks' that Potter and Wetherell advance their critique to the cognitive paradigm itself and articulate what they see as a more self-reflexive approach to racism:

Accounting in terms of prejudice can draw attention away from immediate social reform towards utopian visions; it can provide a logic and a method for justifying individual conduct; and it can establish a positive identity and a benevolent 'vocabulary of motives' vis-à-vis other, supposedly less enlightened individuals. (ibid: 201)

The argument here is that the very terms by which scientific discourse is approaching the problem of racism are the same with those lay discourse utilized by way of either externalizing or displacing racism beyond identity. The 'prejudice problematic' (ibid: 201), they say, alludes both to the way in which the discursive practice of the 'cognitive paradigm' constructs racism as external to the contexts and categories it identifies with, namely, scientific/western rationality, tolerance, and so on, and to the way in which any other social actor does the same in order to displace accountability or responsibility for racism.

The 'prejudice problematic', it seems, not only does it furnish a logic and a method to
justify individual conduct, but also, the very move of psychologising racism – to be found in both the scientific and lay modality of the problematic – manifests an ambivalent logic of localization and universalization. That is, it draws attention to 'failings of individuals', rather than stressing structural, social, arrangements of power (ibid: 208), while, simultaneously, it subsumes the 'failing' to a universal cognitive mechanism irrespective of local, historical and societal relations. This could be one way to approach the problem of how identity is always at odds with racism, how actually, it displaces racism to unfamiliar contexts of irrationality, extremity marginality or periphery. As the authors put it, 'strangely, these people [...] who suffer from a problem [...] is usually always someone else' (ibid: 204). One important implication of the logic described, besides a potentially 'scapegoat' understanding of racism is that, in localizing racism in such way, one effectively manages to disarticulate racism from 'collective group reactions'; for instance, a mob turning against immigrants, would be justified as competing for scarce resources (ibid: 208). Thus, we are dealing with a logic of individuation.

Further, they argue, 'the prejudice problematic [...] feeds into and reinforces a utopian vision of society [...] '(ibid: 209). If (western) identity is always already tolerant, then it follows that it is always someone else that is 'prejudiced'. According to this rationalistic logic that equates prejudice with irrationality and gives to both a negative connotation (see Gadamer, 1979), identity is effectively naturalized. It becomes harmonious, scarcely attentive to its tensions and it subscribes to a faith in utopia in at least two ways: First, it 'lives out', experiences the existence of a (racial) utopia, conversely to that which the classical understanding of utopia – as that which is to come or is untenable – implies. Further, in constructing the problem of racism as individual, cognitive, misappropriation of facts, it assumes the possibility of actually ever reaching this utopia through the
advent of reason.

**Theoretical and Practical Resonances**

Potter's and Wetherell's work that we looked at, echoes some of the concerns that have been raised already from the late seventies in the context of political and scholarly debates in Britain. In that respect, their work resonates strongly with a multi-disciplinary strand that started to develop at the time and whose effect has been that of articulating discussions about racism, ethnicity, ideology and new social movements. In this part, I will look into the way in which the Marxist problematic of ideology has fed into interventions around racism, giving, thus, a distinct shape to the contemporary 'problem of racism', radically different to the shape it was given within the context of prejudice studies. Also, I will suggest that academic discourse about racism has gradually become more self-reflective when framing the problem of the 'deracialization of discourse', in ways that put into question modern and late-modern moral, political and social identities.

These developments in the orientation of research have pointed out the situated character of academic interventions, as researchers explicitly assumed a position within the social and acknowledged the contingent and political aspect inherent to the enunciation of their statements. This new paradigm in social theory has striven to move away from essentialist understandings of racism, has drawn attention to the tensions within identity and, thus, has pointed to the contingent nature of the then contemporary hegemonic configuration.

In the early 1980's a heated debate was taking place about the construction of 'racism' in the discourse of the Conservative Party, as a problem for which the National Front was to be held exclusively responsible. If racism was said to be localized in the discourse of the extreme right-wing, then, it would be perfect political correct for Thatcher's cabinet
minister, Enoch Powell, to say publicly that 'immigrants would cause “rivers of blood”'
(Essed & Goldberg, 2002: 8). In this context, Martin Barker's 'The New Racism' (1981)
responded to a phenomenon that he saw as increasingly related to racism: '[...] just as
dangerous as prejudices about other people, if not more so, are theories which result in
justifications for keeping ourselves separate' (Barker, 2000[1981]: 81). Here, Barker
refers to 'new Tory racism' that he saw as highly resonant with advances in modern
socio-biology, neo-Darwinism and ethology. Of course, behind the phenomenon of
scientific validity, there were racist assumptions about essential distinctions between
groups.

But let's see what broader theoretical arguments were articulated at the time. As
Philomena Essed and Theo Goldberg argue in their edited volume Race Critical
Theories (2000), 'while whites overwhelmingly considered racism a matter of individual
prejudice and false belief', a whole new conceptual apparatus was developing to criticize
insidious and embedded, 'hidden and anchored' (Goldberg, 1990: xv) forms of racism.
Indeed, research was, at the time, re-directed towards theorizing the shifting
intersections of race, class and gender as sites of oppression. Towards an understanding
of the new social movements which were responding to these issues (see Bonnett: 1993);
and towards an explanation of the role of ideology in sedimenting social configurations
of oppression. In that respect, the work of Antonio Gramsci and Luis Althusser (1971)
has been highly influential offering a vocabulary to address such questions.

In 1980 Stuart Hall (2002) is one of the first people who draws extensively on the work
of Gramsci and Balibar to address the question of 'racially structured social formations'
(2002: 39), whereby, 'social formation' means a number of instances articulated into a
unity [...] as much through their differences as through their similarities'(2002: 44 -45).
In so doing, he took issue with two prevalent tendencies, namely, the economic account
of racial formations and the sociological one (2002: 39). The former would be
reductionist for it attributed an 'overwhelmingly determining effect' (ibid.) of economic
relations and structures on 'racial' divisions, while the latter would essentially reify 'race'
treating it as a social category. The Althusserian problematic offered a way out of the
dilemma between reductionism and essentialism.

Racism, according to Hall, does not have a 'general history' (Hall, 1978), rather, it is 'a
set of economic, political and ideological practices, of a distinctive kind, concretely
articulated with other practices in a social formation [...] which secure the hegemony of
a dominant group in such way as to dominate the whole social formation in a form
favorable to the long-term development of the economic productive base' (ibid: 59).
Further, he argues, racism serves the capital to defeat 'those alternatives which would
represent the class as a whole – against capitalism, against racism' (ibid: 63). Racisms,
he then claims, have the function of 'decomposing classes into individuals [...] economic
groups into 'peoples', solid forces into 'races' (ibid: 64).

In this account, however, essentialism is avoided only partially. Arguably, Stuart Hall
gets around the objectivist problem of the reification of 'race' only to return with the
reification and essentialist account of 'class'. Racism, in this account, becomes an
integrated, structural, 'tool'. 'Race', on the other hand, is reduced to an epiphenomenon,
an identity, in stark opposition to a raw, material force – a problem that has been
described as 'class' essentialism. In a historical materialist account, then, class pre-exists
objectively, and racism comes in, as it were, to decompose it.

For Winant and Omi (2002: 123-4), by contrast, the problem is how to approach race
neither as objective nor as an illusion, a 'purely ideological construct'. For them, race is
approached as a 'complex of social meanings', signifying and symbolizing social
conflict. Race connects meaning with social structure and everyday experience, and in that sense, a racial formation is the 'synthesis and outcome' of a number of racial projects, and refers to the 'socio-historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed'. For Winant (2000; 2004: preface) the major problem in the present politics of race is how to engage with an ambiguous situation where racial hegemony is 'reinventing white supremacy' while appealing to 'color blindness' and 'cultural pluralism'. Here the question is again that of the 'dissimulation' of racism. A number of studies on representations of racism come to confirm that across different contexts the patterns of framing racism converge around the problem of the dissimulation of racism.118

I have thus far tried to show that ‘racism’ has progressively been constructed as an object of study that is different from other ones such as ‘prejudice’. This object, in order to be inspected, must not presuppose a rational and objective subject to whom it stands in exteriority. Indeed, this very distance between the subject and the problem, i.e racism, has itself been on the focus. Understanding racism from an anti-foundational perspective, requires breaking with a sharp distinction between subject and object, because if Allport was quick to solidify a superior identity and attribute ‘prejudice’ to otherness, the way racism has been approached by any non-positivist creates the

118 To name but a few of these studies, Montgomery (2005) examines how the 'time and space' of racism is represented in Canadian history textbooks as a phenomenon 'antithetical' to what Canada represents, how this superiority is imagined and sustained through adjacent, racialized and organicist portrayals of Canada as a 'mature' nation focused on peace rather than war (2006; 2008). See also, Barnes et al. (2001) study into how members of dominant in-groups express and conceal racism. Every and Augoustinos (2007) study the constructions of racism in the Australian parliament and argue that the denial of racism can be seen as the expression of a 'social taboo' against unjustified exclusion of outgroups (2010). Herzog et al., (2008) explore what they call the phenomenology of racism in relation to the politics of signification and show how racism as a signifier in policy oscillates between affirmation and denial. See also van Dijk's work addressing the same problem (1992); Mellor et al. (2001), Mayer & Michelat (2001). It is common in these approaches to encounter a framing of the problem as one of disjuncture between reality and self-interpretations. See also, more nuanced accounts such as Goodman & Johnson (2013), Goodman & Burke (2011).
possibility of thinking about racism as more embedded in ‘here and now’ social structures. It is in that direction of analysis that psychoanalysis could yield even more fruitful results.

**Psychoanalysis and Racism**

So far we saw how ‘racism’ as such has not always been a concern for theorists and academics, and when it did, it was taken up in many different ways. By now, a whole range of meanings is attached to the concept and its use is said to be inflationary (Wodak & Reislig, 2001: 5). The fact that it is admittedly a ‘political ‘fighting word’’ means that both the word and the objects it brings into existence are constantly under contestation. It also means that 'naming' racism will elicit 'defensive' responses and by this I deliberately invoke psychoanalytic meanings attached to 'defense'.

By defensive responses I mean modes of resistance to change. As Lacan puts it, the analyst should be constantly asking of his analysand: 'what defense has he come up with now?' and should strive to identify how the analysand will try to assume a position such that 'everything we might say to him will be ineffective'.\(^{119}\) I will focus here more on negation, which, Freud argues, is a 'speech act' (Freud, 2001). It is at the level of speech and writing that we can study these phenomena, as the mechanisms of defense are by definition social as linguistic phenomena and subjective, enunciated by the 'speaking subject': 'the analysis of resistances identifies the subject's 'patterns of the ego, its defenses', says Lacan, while wondering whether it has meaning outside of analysis. Following a long tradition of articulating the 'social' and the 'psychical', I suggest, helps us interpret certain accounts of racism as forms of defensive 'speech' and thus to account for the question of the resistance to register and acknowledge racism.

Freud talks of judgments as performative acts whose function is 1) to affirm/dis-affirm 'the possession by a thing of a particular attribute' and 2) asserting or disputing that a presentation has an existence in reality. For example, the existence of racism might be affirmed or negated. It might also turn out to be the other's racism in which case the concept of projective identification is useful. Such un-ambiguous statements however are rare, as in fact they are much more complex and nuanced. For example, a Greek ex-deputy Foreign Minister once said to a diverse audience of a congress on 'Migrants-racism-xenophobia' that the reasons why Greek society 'represses' (rather than processing) the question of racism and xenophobia are two: first, the

fact that in our topos, there are no extreme phenomena of racism. I am not referring to individual cases, which eventually have a positive function as they sensitize the Greek public opinion. In Greece we do not have extreme phenomena of racism. Greek society is not a society dominated by a deep sense of xenophobia. And, second,

'that we are one of few countries in which there are no political parties that refer to or promote such views. I believe this is a good didagma, the fact that is that in Greek society there are no politically expressed racist perspectives'.

She then added, that:

Of course there are issues in Greek society that have to do with the use of immigrants as cheap labor, issues that have to do with domestic assistance a lower-paid foreigner might provide. The issues however are not related to forms of xenophobia or racism, at least as we know them in other countries.

Here, it is not simply a matter of affirming/dis-affirming. From her perspective, the question of racism is 'repressed' because there are neither extreme nor politically articulated phenomena of racism. There is no talk because there is no thing to talk about,

121 Papazoi cited in Ktistakis (2001)
or, better the things that must be addressed are not related to the topic (i.e. racism). I would argue that the question of racism can indeed be approached in relation to 'repression'. We would not argue with the Minister that what is repressed is because it does not exist. Rather, we could say that what 'does not exist', what is negated is because it is repressed, that is, forbidden and prohibited under conventional and moral law. Racism and 'race' are precisely such objects.

Among negation and projective identification, the idea of negation is interesting as, according to Freud, it refers to 'a way of taking cognizance' of what is repressed

Examples of negation regard how 'racists refuse to be designated as such' (Ballibar 1991) through a complex linguistic construction of 'racism' in overlapping contexts, against which, the subject demarcates one's sites and practices as already irreproachable. Thus, this survey reaches a limit where it needs to answer to the question: How do we make sense of moments of 'forgetting', disavowing, negating, being ignorant of racism in 'here and now' social structures?

I believe that psychoanalytical theory would be of great potential to account for the force that these logics of 'displacement', 'externalization' or 'dissimulation', exhibit. These logics present us with a contradiction, when we might claim, as we should, that the meaning of racism is historically and culturally contingent and, yet, it keeps appearing in a quasi-necessary pattern as a phenomenon 'out there' or 'somewhere else'. How and why does a dominant racial formation register its own acts of racist exclusion as 'alien' and 'threatening?

Michael Rustin (1991), in his book The Good Society and the Inner World, observes that the sociology of racism has been very much focused on systems of belief, 'in their facticity and causal potency', but not on explaining 'where this potency comes from'

122 Freud (2001: 235)
Taking the lead from Klein, Rustin argues, that we should go back to the psyche’s ‘inner world’ if we want to understand the mechanisms of racism. The ‘inner world’, he says, is ‘populated by phantasies’ and is structured on the basis of ‘projective’ and ‘introjective’ identifications by which he means that internal anxieties are projected onto others who are, then, taken to be something else other than what they really are. This is an explanation of racism as such, but from this point of view, it is also possible to say that racism is dis-affirmed, that we are always already tolerant and not racist, in an attempt to expel ‘bad feelings’ from the psyche. As Freud put it: 'What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical'.

From a Freudian perspective this works also in the way in which instincts undergo transformations, one of which is the reversal of content. An instance of this, Freud says, is found in the 'transformation of love into hate'.

Using the concept of ‘projective identification’ captures some instances of speech acts that affirm or negate racism. It seems, however, to have limited descriptive value rather than explanatory while it also can be reductionist, if taken to describe pathologies at the social level. The explanation, from the Kleinian perspective is not unproblematic: In this account, ‘systems of belief’ are taken to reflect or (mis)represent reality rather than construct it. Pace, ‘phantasies’ misrepresent the other. The other is taken to be something else than what he really is. Also, it is not made clear how the ‘phantasies’ are shaped and, importantly, why racism evokes ‘bad feelings’.

This account is based on Freudian assumptions that Fink has suggested are unfruitful (Fink, 1999). Distinctions between inside/outside, psychical/social reality, subject/object. What is more, these rigid distinctions enable one to frame racism as a

123 Freud, (2001: 237)
124 Freud, (2001b: 127)
problem of 'misrepresentation' of reality, or as an 'illusion'. However, if we are interested in the signification of racism as constitutive of racism itself, in the way in which speaking subjects relate to racism and thereby construct (non)racialized images of themselves or social reality, we have to start by the particular phenomena. And the latter are always more complex and tend to blur such sharp distinctions.

However, the Lacanian ‘return to Freud’ seems to furnish a way to understand the construction of racism in a broader and more context-specific way, without reducing it to a problem of individual (rather than social) projective identification; and without framing racism either as an ideological problem of distorted beliefs or as an innate psychical mechanism of ‘phantasy’. In Lacanian theory, reality, ideology and ‘fantasy’ cannot be distinguished in the sense that the latter two misrepresent the former. ‘Fantasy’, rather than distorting a factual reality, is precisely that which sustains it (see Žižek: 1989). Similarly, ‘ideology’ is not a system of beliefs that describes (in)adequately some pre-linguistic reality, rather, it is the very structuring factor of social reality (ibid.).

Therefore, racism could be approached not as a problem of ‘foreclosure’ of the dimensions of Law, Difference, the Other and so forth, but as a problem of repression and desire: A 'covert' racism in compliance with the Law, and, thus, a kind of subjectivity needing to repress the thoughts which do not befit one's moral principles (see Fink 1999:113). That the ‘aspirations’ of racism are illegal and forbidden,125 does not mean that there is no proliferation of discourse around it. The category of ‘fantasy’ is useful in that it can account both for racism and its repressed nature: That through ‘fantasy’ we project onto others characteristics seems to be a secondary, derivative function. The first is that fantasy prevents a certain symbolic order from collapsing in

125 On this point see Seshadri-Crooks (2000)
the face of dislocatory events: Following Lacan, Stavrakakis argues that 'the illusion of a well-ordered totality' activates the element of fantasy (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62), when the totality shows itself as an illusion. By using the category of ‘fantasy’ in this way we could account for a big number of narratives whose function is to dissimulate racism. For example when we ‘blame the other’ for racism. If a symbolic order excludes racism from legitimacy, then the role of fantasy is to prevent this order from collapsing: We know it is an illusion to ‘blame the other’ for racism or but we do it all the same.

In terms of Lacanian enjoyment, we could start thinking about the ambiguities that result from the claim that it is more enjoyable to be an anti-racist, a democrat, while occasionally (or persistently), transgressing this 'ideal' (see Glynos, 2003: 7-9), than being a self-proclaimed racist. A distinction could be worked out here between unbearable guilt resulting from realizing that one no longer holds on to the ideal, while he must do so, and a more secret, impermanent and enjoyable guilt resulting from transgressing the ideal one holds on to. However, holding on to the ideal of denouncing racism does not in itself or necessarily entail any particular actions, far less does it mean that one is disposed to put into question her own practices. Lacan's distinction between the 'subject of the enunciated' and the 'subject of the enunciation' is worth recalling: Holding on to the ideal of anti-racism can be 'without endangering the subjective position from which you are ready to enforce the change' (see Zizek: 2008). This subject is, effectively, split: At an official discursive level is a democrat, respects difference and advocates for equality, yet, in a 'private', community-structuring level, that is, in an affective manner, undermines his own identity.

This chapter begun with an analysis of how immigration has become an object of study in security studies and how this relates to problematizations of racism. It moved on to a survey of how racism has been approached in some significant fields in the social
sciences, and it ended up by delineating racism as a phenomenon that is located at the level of the constitution of the social, in other words as a historico-political phenomenon particular to the question of hegemony. But also, racism as a signifier and its uses in context can be thought of as an object whose problematizations tell us something about how subjectivity is formed in language.
3 Hospitality and Racism as Ideological Objects

In chapter 2 I showed how security and migration politics have become commensurable in recent decades and what theoretical shifts the increasing politicization of migration as a security issue made possible. I also accounted for the ways in which questions about racism have been marginalized and, in fact, depoliticized in this area of studies, and in political studies more generally. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, I demonstrated how the rationale of security practices targeting migration – and more generally – can be seen as historically and conceptually racialized in that they mobilize both a 'historico-political' and a 'bio-political' discourse of threats. I then addressed the ways in which questions about 'race' and racism have been silenced or dissimulated within scientific and human sciences discourse more generally and how cultural studies have drawn on a number of theoretical resources – most notably post-Marxism and psychoanalysis to account for a number of problems associated with the study of racism. I argued that the 'denial of racism' has in recent years come to figure as a central problematic that hinges on questions of identity, subjectivity, discourse and ideology. In this chapter, I will refine this analysis by elaborating on a distinctively post-structuralist theory and method and I will discuss the research directions the conceptualization of racism from a post-structuralist perspective entails. I will, finally, outline my methodology and the archive I compiled along these lines.

I do not aim here to provide a theory of ideology with which to explain the politics of
racism, or to account for racism as an ideology. Rather, I elaborate on a number of key concepts which could help us problematize the ‘sense of obviousness’ that characterizes certain aspects of the discourses of race and *filoksenia* in the Greek context. In particular, I develop a set of theoretical categories with which to problematize discourses about the nature and character of Greek society and politics that circulate in the making of security and migration politics. Thus, I draw attention to recent theorization of ideology and to the particular ideology that I seek to critically explain throughout the thesis. I do so by discussing the role of essentialism in cementing ideological discourse, the function of social myths in the articulation and contestation of ideology, while I also evaluate the use of the concept of ‘fantasy’ in accounting for how ideology works and what it does, especially, regarding its role in giving particular form to social antagonism. The role of rhetoric and of figurative speech shall be explored here in its relationship to ideology and throughout the thesis. The articulation of these concepts with my object of study also points to a certain methodology. This research practice will outline the links between different registers and sites of discourse – official as well as unofficial.

**Racism, Hospitality and Myth**

The meaning of racism, as it was suggested in the previous chapter, is contingent upon its use in different socio-political contexts. Its meaning is ‘contestable’ in theory and concretely contested in practice. Yet, both in its use in human science and lay/political discourse in Greece its meaning appears to be decontested, signifying a phenomenon that takes place or comes from ‘somewhere else’. In the Greek context, as I show in the next chapter, it has figured as a ‘threat’ exterior to ‘social cohesion’, as blatantly ‘absent’, as the ‘other's' racism, as a ‘possibility'-effect of immigration, and, most crucially, as the *antithesis* of ‘filoxenia’. It is this paradox that I would like in this chapter to re-describe
as a phenomenon amenable to ideological analysis. The paradox lies not in the fact that there really is racism but it is represented as ‘absent’, but that its meaning really is ‘quasi-contingent’ and yet it persistently appears in a ‘necessary’ conceptual configuration. What does this tell us?

I will begin my analysis with an account of structuralist and Post-Marxist accounts of myth and ideology in order to elucidate the relationship between the statement “there is no racism in Greece” and its characterization as a contemporary social myth. This seems plausible as, according to Claude Levi-Strauss, one of the uses of the category of “myth” is to designate (arbitrarily) ’products of oral literature [...]’ (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 79). Indeed, it is the case that despite the fact that this statement is reiterated in the discourse of identifiable social and political actors, the ‘voice’ in myths as well as in legends and folktales is ‘a collective voice’, that is, myths ‘come precisely from “nowhere”’ (White, 2010: 120). Myths pertain to ‘lay’ discourse. By the same token, filoksenia besides being an element of Classical Greek myth and epic, can be approached as an element of a contemporary social myth insofar as myths can be understood to establish oppositions between different elements and insofar as ‘filoksenia’ seems to acquire its meaning in opposition or as antithetical to ‘racism’.

Levi-Strauss analysis of myths exemplifies the transposition of structural linguistics in the field of social sciences. In a nutshell, Levi-Strauss understands societies as ‘complex symbolic orders’ and postulates ‘conscious linguistic phenomena’ and ‘unconscious’, ‘deep’ infrastructures underlying social practices (Howarth, 2000: 23). Saussure’s structural account of language differentiates between oral language or language use (speech or parole) and langue – the system that makes any combination of linguistic elements possible in speech, but Levi-Strauss understands myth both as parole and as langue. This means that social myths for Levi-Strauss are ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’
phenomena, that is, both 'surface narratives' and 'underlying set of timelessly related elements' (ibid: 27). The surface narrative of myth speaks of 'events alleged to have taken place in time: before the world was created, or during its first stages – anyway, long ago' (Levi-Strauss, 1955: 430)

To illustrate, the UNESCO Courier in a 1990 issue devoted to 'The Art of Hospitality' begins by noting how in ancient Greece hospitality was a sacred duty, while the article specific to Greece provides a brief chronicle of hospitality that spans millenia, from Homeric times to the present, through the Middle ages and the Byzantine Empire up to World War II. The author begins with a personal, 'anecdotal' experience during a journey in Greece where a woman in Peloponnese told him that 'Greek hospitality is not for sale'. He traces this unconditional and without strings attached 'law of hospitality' back to the story of Ulysses given to us by Homer. Ulysses was greeted by Nestor of Pylos who invited the foreigners to the festivities, and it was not until latter that Nestor said: 'Only now that they have tasted the pleasures of food is it fitting to ask the strangers who they are' (Homer cited in Kedros, 1990: 26). Through a brief excursus into the Byzantine empire, whose 'over-generous hospitality certainly appears to have precipitated the empire's decline', he reaches the near past and tells of WWII resistance fighters who escaped Nazi round-ups 'by slipping through doors opportunely opened by friends, who would take them in and shelter them'. Kédros closes his text with a comment that follows almost naturally from three thousand years of a tradition that cannot be mistaken: 'even today the Greek word “xenos” means both “foreigner” and “guest”' (ibid: 28).

We could comment on many aspects of this text – the structure of the narrative, its rhetoric as well as its pragmatological content, its intertextual relationship with other similar narratives to be found in widely disparate contexts, but this is not what I need for
the purpose of the present chapter. Instead I would merely point out the specific 'function' of the myth: the function of the particular text re-signifying the Homeric epic and of the issue as a whole is to establish a global genealogy or a history of hospitality across cultures, celebrate a tradition that belongs to humanity and establish a conceptual association between 'hospitality' and cultures of 'tolerance'. The text interpellates its readers as agents of a global normative tradition. Throughout my thesis I engage with other re-significations of the Homeric epic quite different from this one, and I advance the hypothesis, that 'hospitality' or 'filoxenia' has constituted itself as a mythical entity or as an element of a contemporary social myth.126 This allows me to consider the conditions of racism being dissimulated.

Back to the structuralist theorization of myth. Levi-Strauss's concern was with recovering 'deep' structures, eternal and universal 'rules of transformation' that regulate relationships across all societies (Howarth, 2000: 27). Roland Barthes's concern, who was no less influenced by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, was social critique and the critique of ('bourgeois') ideology in his society (see Barthes 1972[1957]; Ungar 2004:167). In this respect, although his field was 'literature', the rationale of his work resonates the 'repatriation of anthropology' as cultural critique in the early 1980s (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 110). Barthes' conceptualization of myth implies primarily 'social usage', 'utterance' and 'speech' over the synchronic dimension, and to that extend it seems more appropriate a conception of myth for understanding the use of the myth of hospitality in the contemporary Greek context.

Barthes approaches myth as a 'type of speech', a particular 'mode of signification [...]

126 To give an example of a different signification of hospitality, Karavanta (2011) in a more recent issue of the Unesco Courier, asks 'what happened to hospitality?' Her text has little to do with 'praising' Greek culture and more to do with bringing into critical focus the rise of nationalisms, racisms and xenophobias.
with historical limits, conditions of use', that is not defined by the content, but 'by the way in which it utters this message' (Barthes, 1972: 109). Therefore, it is important to underline the idea that myth, for Barthes, does not equal fiction in terms of its content. Contrast this conception of myth to Levi-Strauss arguing that 'the substance of myth does no lie in its style [...] but in the story which it tells'. For Levi-Strauss, myth in modern societies has been 'largely replaced by politics' (Levi-Strauss, 1955: 430), but the way both function are equivalent; they both draw on the past to make use of it in the present and in the future. The difference between Barthes and Levi-Strauss conception of myth does not lie so much in what they think we do with myths, but rather in how they situate myth with regard to a semiological chain and where they seek for myths. For Barthes emphasizes that myth is to be understood as a 'second-order semiological system' constructed upon anyone that pre-existed it. Myth is a 'metalanguage', a language about language. Any signifier thus can be approached as 'the final term of the linguistic system or the first term of the mythical system' (Barthes, 1972: 114-6). If we take the example of 'filoksenia', we see how, if we are to think of myth, we would have to differentiate between the 'plane of language' where 'filoksenia' literally denotes 'care/love of the foreigner', whereas, if we move to the mythical plane the signifier can be put into any use. Barthes's analysis seems less constricting since any object can be treated as a mythical one, in contrast to Levi-Strauss with whose approach we would have to make presuppositions about what qualifies as a myth by focusing on content (e.g the uses of classical Greek mythology).

Barthes's account becomes more appealing in informing our intuition that there is something about the phenomenon of the 'denial of racism' that lends itself as a mythical

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127 I refer here exclusively to the early work of Roland Barthes in which he distinguished sharply between 'denotative' and 'connotative' meaning while later he would drop such sharp distinction. On the significance of this turn see Laclau, E. (2007: 544).
phenomenon. Barthes explicitly develops in ‘Myth Today’ his conception of mythical speech in relationship to ambiguity: myth *distorts* and *naturalizes* as it opens up a tension between literal content and mythical form. The ambiguity consists in that although myth is ‘defined by its intention’, this intention ‘is somehow frozen, purified, eternalized, made absent by this literal meaning’ (ibid: 124). Mytical speech, Barthes argues is de-politicizing, converts history into nature, semiological systems into a ‘statement of a fact’.

Myth presents social reality as ‘natural’ and objective: ‘we are just too many’, actors who justify anti-immigration stance say. It speaks of what ‘goes without saying’. Therefore, it is not necessary to ‘negate’ racism explicitly, although that this does happen raises the question of why negating speech acts occur so often. It seems that negating racism ‘goes not without saying’, to use Lacan’s phrase. Yet the myth cannot be reduced to the statement ‘there is no racism’ as many lay commentators have it. The myth, by contrast, may as well consist in saying that there is racism, but *essentially* saying that it’s ‘somewhere else’, that is, not a product of our own creation. Thus, a series of statements about racism examined throughout this thesis can be interpreted from this point of view as *displacements* of meaning made possible by the fact that it is possible through language use to naturalize identity and inflect intention.

Barthes has it that depoliticization through mythical speech is defined by use and needs of the speaker (ibid: 144). He thus understands rhetoric and language use in an instrumental way. Here, ideology does not seem to lie so much in mis-recognition but in the capacity to persuade and deceive about the objectivity and natural character of states of affair. I will return to this with a view to reconciling a conception of ideology and rhetoric in the next section.

Until here I approached myth with an eye on establishing a link between myth and

128 Barthes (1972: 124)
ideology. For Barthes myth is a kind of narrative form which is an instrument of ideology and this is down to his conception of language. Barthes's critique aims at unveiling reality from its ideological distortion. However, as Hayden White points out in his discussion of Lukacs's work on "realistic writing", narrative is also 'a mode of consciousness, a way of viewing the world that conduces to the construction of ideology'. Narrative is inescapable in any discourse, White argues, which is equivalent to saying that narrative 'produces' ideology and that 'ideology serves a narrativistic apprehension of reality' (White, 2010: 277).

This view resonates easily with Norval's central thesis on the 'ubiquity' of ideology (Norval, 2000). This thesis takes issue with the prevalent in political science and theory thesis of the 'end of ideology' that postulates a post-ideological/metaphysical world. Norval is in line with a number of contemporary theorists whose work make the point that although the concept of ideology has always been understood as some kind of falsity opposed to the 'order of truth' and despite the fact that such sharp duality between absolute truth/falsity has compromised the study of ideology and has diverted attention away from it, even -or, especially, amongst so-called postmodernist theorists (see Foucault...), it is possible to re-work fundamental assumptions about the nature of ideology rather than abandon the enterprise of ideology critique. The ubiquity of ideology thesis is what makes possible, Norval argues, the establishment of links between divergent approaches to ideology that range from morphological analysis (see Freeden 1996) to post-Marxist and Psychoanalytic approaches. (Norval, 2000: 315-7). Barthes's analysis of how any object can be 'constructed' as a mythical object with the naturalization of its meaning, as well as White's ubiquity of narrative as productive of ideological effects, resonates to a certain degree with the gearing of ideology analysis towards the study of 'processes of decontestation' through 'forms of representation,
conventions and political discourses [...] (ibid: 316). In light of this approach we can re-interpret the paradox of racism whose meaning is 'quasi-contingent' but appears as decontested – a phenomenon taking place “elsewhere”, the decontested meaning of hospitality or “filoxenia”, not only as an ideological myth and narrative but also as a form of closure 'covering over the power relations that are central to a given concept (ibid: 322). Further, the various links and associations between adjacent concepts across contexts (filoxenia/hospitality/tolerance), can be seen as specifically ideological forms of conceptual decontestation. I address and elaborate some of these themes throughout this thesis. For the moment, I will return to the question of ideology as seen from the point of view of the critique of essentialism in Marxist theory. For it is not only political concepts and their depoliticization, as it were, that post-Marxist theories of ideology put into question but 'society' and 'identity' as such (Norval, 2000: 327).

**Essentialism**

I will refer to two different takes on essentialism which despite their similarities can also elucidate certain crucial differences in perspective. Diana Fuss states that the common use of “essentialism” denotes 'a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 'whatness' of a given entity' (1989: xi). However, the concern with essentialism does not end with the affirmation, say, of an anti-essentialist ontology or with the observation that things in reality have no positive essence and concepts no positive, essential meaning. 'Anti-essentialism' is a feature of post-structuralist thought that makes it possible to analyze social phenomena from a non-essentialist, ontological standpoint. Things as well as meanings are rather seen as essentially contingent. However, essentialism persists, as it were, and in the same way we now know very well – researchers and most laymen – that 'race' is not a real predicament, yet racism persists, essentialism is largely still the basis on which
socio-political identities are grounded. To refer thus just to 'texts', the question is: 'if this text is essentialist, what motivates its deployment?' (ibid: xi) The text I referred to previously that seems to identify 'filoxenia' as an essential, cultural practice throughout Greek history can be interpreted from precisely this perspective: It can be said that its motivation or intention is to interpellate subjects as 'hospitable'. What gives this interpretation its impetus is the fact that at the time when the text was produced (1990), the collapse of the Soviet Union was already engendering large population movements, hence the 'call' for hospitality in order to pre-empt or counter oppositional politics of racism and xenophobia and foster politics of 'openness' to the foreigner. So, if for critical social scientists it is a common topos that there is no intrinsic, primordial or a-historical essence to things, the same cannot be said about how communities of speakers – or societies, for that matter, see, interpret themselves, others and objects or pursue their actions. Indeed, essentialism, can be put into a variety of uses, it can be 'effectively deployed in the service of both idealist and materialist, progressive and reactionary, mythologizing and resistive discourses' (ibid: xii). Thus, the rift between anti-essentialism as epistemology and essentialism as social 'reality' seems to be insurmountable. These questions, as anthropologists have persistently shown, for example, by reflecting on the 'crisis of representation' (Marcus and Fischer, 1986), confront us with the critical potential of social theory and practice: What can critical social and political theorizing do in the face of essentialisms that are put in political use? For essentialism, similarly to what ideology does (Goldie 2007), proves to be a rather enduring legitimation strategy (Epstein 1987: 30). It is for that reason that to pursue ideology analysis requires focus on the history of ideas and 'historically informed conceptual analysis (Norval, 2000: 320) and perhaps not only.

If Fuss articulates a conception of essentialism in terms of 'belief' this is not the case
with other theorists more poststructuralism-oriented. For instance, Smith (1992: 89) writes: 'Essentialist discourse can be loosely defined as a type of discourse in which the determinacy and repeatability of an identity are grounded on essence or form'. Smith's works partly focuses on the strategies by which racism was ideologically dissimulated in New Right discourse in the context of Britain. Rather than abandoning the term 'racism' she has effectively shown how essentialist representations of cultural difference operated and with what effects. In her work, racism does not have a pre-established abstract meaning; instead she treats both 'race' and racism as 'nodal points' (not 'issues') and she examines how racism in a sense was constructed as absent by its persistent, 'disavowal', 'de-racialization' and transformation into an entirely different object, namely, 'natural humanism' (Smith, 1994: 56-7). This type of analysis does not require that we hold on to notions of 'belief' or 'preference' in understanding either an object that is socially represented and whose representations constitute 'social facts', or identity as such. The question of 'belief', I would argue, is bracketed in favor of an analysis of these representations as 'nodal points' in the construction of identity. This seems to me to be an entirely different research strategy from naming racism in advance and analyze subsequently its ideology or its discourse. In this way it is possible to avoid treating both ideology as false consciousness (belief in 'metaphysical' essence) and instrumentalism (conscious stratégic/cynical manipulation of reality). In the next section I will show how at best we can talk about a 'rhetorical' or ideological 'truth', or simply a 'special modality of belief', not false/true, but 'verbal' (Veyne, 1983: 79), in thinking about and interpreting myth, essentialist discourse and ideology. I will now finish this section by looking at Ernesto Laclau's understanding of the function of ideology in relation to a number of key concepts like myth, imaginary, empty and floating signifier, antagonism and dislocation. I will pitch this description at the level of considering 'society' and its
Laclau's entry point to the critique of ideology and essentialism is in a nutshell the following: the Marxist conception of ideology situates the phenomenon at the level of 'social totality' and identifies it with 'false consciousness' (Laclau, 1990: 89). These two 'nodal points' of the Marxist theory of ideology rest on what he believes and shows to be a dubious 'essentialist conception of both society and social agency' (ibid: 89). Where does 'essentialism' lie here? Laclau shows how, if 'society' is taken as a fully structured 'intelligible totality' as the case is with structuralism, we have a pure fixation of the meaning of the signifier 'society'. Even with what we have already indicated in this chapter, one could be suspicious with a formulation that decontests the meaning of 'society': 'Society is this'. One cannot at the same time argue that all identity and meaning is relational and that 'society' can be known and described positively, only by reference to itself. But since the meaning of 'society' cannot be fixed it cannot not be fixed either. For if its meaning was all together contingent and purely contested, the thesis that ideology is ubiquitous would not hold. There would be no ideological fixation. This is a paradoxical position but Laclau makes clear that the 'social' is both the 'infinite play of differences' and the 'attempt to limit that play'. This way of thinking about any structure including 'society' is anti-essentialist insofar as its limits are not given but always contestable and subject to hegemonic (ideological) closures: 'The social always exceeds the limits of the attempts to constitute society' (ibid: 91). This fixation is achieved with 'nodal points'. Let me attempt to re-iterate the example of filoxenia. When confronted with a statement like 'this society is hospitable to foreigners' inasmuch as when we are confronted with a statement like 'this society is racist', I think we are dealing with an essentialist representation of the social for in both statements the meaning of 'society' appears as fully given, fixed and saturated. The identity of society
presents itself as objective, 'positive and non-contradictory' (ibid: 91). In fact, because
the 'objective' representation of society as 'hospitable' denies any 'excess' or 'otherness',
we would be in a situation where, as Clifford Geertz famously put it, 'objectivity is
self-congratulation and tolerance a sham' (Geertz, 1983: 16). Of course, this is merely an
illustration of what could only be established by situating such statements in context. I
will return however to this idea of 'self-celebration' in the next section where I will pick
up specifically on rhetoric.

I referred to Laclau's conception of 'society' as an impossible object that becomes
possible only partially and as an attempt to hegemonize the 'social'. The limit of 'society'
as an objective and closed system of differences cannot but be precarious and it is
always subject to displacement. How is that? In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,
Laclau and Mouffe argue that what constitutes the limits of society are antagonisms. In
other words, antagonisms 'show' and make possible the 'experience' of the 'impossibility
of [society] fully constituting itself.' (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 125). Laclau, in his later
work, revises this thesis. What becomes the limit to all objectivity, and thus, the primary
ontological category, along with 'contingency', is 'dislocation'. The category of
dislocation makes it possible to think of how identities are formed through processes of
identification, because it is dislocation that makes visible the contingency, in other
words the 'failure' of discursive structures to confer identity on social actors (see
Howarth, 2000). Imagine a subject that fully identifies as member of a 'hospitable'
society. What would amount to a dislocation in that case would perhaps be a public
racist outburst, generalized racial violence and so on. If other discourses representing
society differently were available, one would expect such subject to 'see' social reality in
a different way, save for an ideological response.

This takes us right into the discussion about the function and role of 'myth' and
'imaginary' in Laclau's theory. But first let me quote once again one of Roland Barthes's poetic descriptions of myth: 'The function of myth is to empty reality: it is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a haemorrhage, or perhaps an evaporation, in short a perceptible absence'. This description resonates fully what Laclau has in mind when he talks not about myth but when he talks about dislocation. For Barthes myth is ideological because it departs from 'literalness' and from 'unambiguous referentiality' (see White, 2010: 198-99); while it seems that for Barthes there can be non-ideological discourse, for Laclau this is not the case at all. For Laclau, myth is ideological for precisely the opposite reason, namely, because it 'fills' reality, it produces it anew with new content in the wake of a dislocatory experience. If a subject that identifies as a member of a 'homogeneous society' one day and the next as a member of a 'multicultural society', it is because a new myth, a 'new space of representation' has presented itself 'as an alternative to the dominant structural discourse'. Or, take the example of 'racism' coded as a symptom of a generalized anomie. This 'framing' of racism clearly situates racism in a dislocated context. In such case, racism is another name for a 'culture of violence' or a lack of 'order' or 'rule of law'. It could then be argued that such 'framing' produces dislocation by framing the dominant structure essentially as a non-structure: it attempts to institute a space of representation 'as a critique of a lack of structuration accompanying the dominant order' (Laclau, 1990: 63-4). Such 'mythical subject' is split between its own literal content (say a liberal, anti-populist subject) and its representation as the principle that fully embodies 'spatiality and structurality' as such. I make this more clear in my discussion of the so-called 'dislocatory' transformation of the Greek society from a 'homogeneous' to a 'multicultural' society in the early 1990s in the following chapter.

The concept of 'social imaginary'. What makes possible the emergence of 'mythical
spaces' is as Laclau puts it 'a perception or an intuition of a fullness that cannot be granted by the reality of the present' (ibid: 63). As I indicated, an example could be the articulation of multiculturalist and human rights discourse given the wake of the 1990s dislocation of Greek society. In this discourse the dislocation constituted an 'opportunity' for the restructuring of institutions and of society at large which at the time prevented the 'multicultural' polity from being. But imagine that this discourse becomes hegemonic (without that implying anything about practice). It will then be the case that an increasing number of demands will be prevented from being formulated as such. Rather they will be 'compensated for or offset by the myth of an achieved fullness' (ibid: 64).

But it will also be the case that further demands that cannot be represented within this new space, will not be 'heard' or they will be dealt with as illegitimate, 'extreme' demands. But it is the accumulation of such demands and dislocations that constituted in the first place the condition of possibility for a new space of representation. The ideological operation would here consist in legitimating the space of representation by discursively constructing it as a fully achieved, natural order. This has clearly the consequence of, in fact, it necessitates the de-legitimation of 'radical' grievances and struggles. Thus, when a myth becomes hegemonic it starts functioning as a 'surface of inscription'. The condition of possibility of a social imaginary, Laclau argues, is the 'incomplete character of myth', the fact that myth will strive towards an objectivity that is in essence unattainable. Full objectivity cannot be achieved and there is always something like a residual heterogeneity. Not simply a difference but radical otherness.

Two notes, however. Laclau wants to formalize on the constitution and dissolution of social imaginaries. He thus empties the category of 'myth' from all its 'particular' content, its associations with that which is 'primitive and whose re-emergence in modern societies would constitute an outbreak of irrationality' (ibid: 67). But in doing so does he
not implicitly avoid taking clear stance with the rationalist imaginary that dominates in
the field of politics and treats rhetoric, figurative, and mythical language as parasitic to
rather than constitutive of the field itself? Second, in the context of the same analysis,
Laclau seems to contradict himself in making the argument of what 'constitutes political
victory'. There he refers to the necessity of cultivating the 'myth of origins' to 'rub out the
contingent traces of [...] “ignoble” beginnings' (ibid: 68-69). Is this not the point where
the mythical space of representation, in order to constitute itself, must have recourse to
doxa and to draw on a knowledge that essentially 'comes from nowhere' rather than
being 'rationally' valid according to any criteria? In his later work, Laclau (2005) adopts
a more clear position by postulating the ontological character of rhetoric.

I will now briefly discuss 'heterogeneity', its relationship to ideology and this will take
me to a discussion about fantasy. Traditionally, the category of 'heterogeneity' is
understood as pure 'exteriority' to a space of representation, that is, 'absence of common
space' (Laclau, 2005: 140). This is not so difficult to grasp because, in a sense, what was
argued before is that a myth is heterogeneous to a given 'objective' structure. Laclau
gives in his later work the example of how Hegel's historicist discourse is precisely
defined upon the exclusion of 'peoples without history'. In that sense, for example, the
emergence of the postcolonialist myth, can be seen as absolutely heterogeneous to the
order that would deny the historicity of other than Western societies. Or, Laclau, invites
us to consider the place of the 'lumpenproletariat' vis-a-vis the structure of bourgeois
society: for a coherent history to be established, what is necessary is the exclusion of the
'character of the pure outsider' (ibid: 142-144). In a sense, pure 'interiority' vs pure
'exteriority'. Since, however, for Laclau, there are no 'pure' structures, it means that the
game is different. Homogeneity is constantly threatened by heterogeneity, the inside is
permanently 'corrupted' and permeated by the 'outside' (ibid: 153). In a sense, this
formulation mirrors the Lacanian conception of the 'Real' as that which interrupts the 'symbolic'.

How does this translate into something more concrete? How can this be linked to the question of ideology? A good answer is given by Thomassen (2005: 298) who argues explicitly: 'the “negation” of dislocation – its externalization – [creates] the purity of the inside'. The 'inside' to constitute itself as pure – homogeneous – it must discursively dissimulate the 'excessive' and 'undecidable', the 'discursive aporias' (ibid: 301-3). Thus, the ideological operation amounts precisely to the discursive 'framing' of dislocation as that which threatens the purity – an already fully constituted entity – of the inside from the outside. *It must dissimulate its own instability as pure exteriority.* Since these operations are discursive, Thomassen argues, heterogeneity is 'inherently linked to representation' (ibid: 302). This is why the study of the 'heterogeneous' lends itself to ideology analysis and must proceed through the examination of particular, concrete analyses of the discursive presence of heterogeneity.

Heterogeneity is thus something of an 'unnameable' thing which we can nevertheless approach fruitfully but carefully. Or to put it differently, since we cannot study or identify the 'unnameable' as such, we need to approach the forms of its appearance in discourses, as Thomassen argues. But according to what criterion? The criteria could only be contextual. Two examples which I think indicate the more and the less plausible way: Thomassen, for instance, takes 'refugees' to be the 'heterogeneous excess from the constitution of borders and divisions' (2007: 191). Refugees are these entities that reveal the exclusionary nature of borders, put them into question by permeating them, and stand in a position of exteriority to national categories. This is one way to trace heterogeneity. The other way is to focus on recurrent attempts of naming. Here, Peter Stallybrass gives us a particularly good insight: '[...] in the mid-nineteenth century,
social heterogeneity was the *obsessive site/sight of the representable'* and, further, the
“unnameable thing[…] produced a veritable *hysteria of naming*” (Stallybrass, 1990: 72;
my emphases). Methodologically speaking, this insight provides a starting point to think
of heterogeneity and ideology. In the context of this study, this insight is translated in an
effort to capture the polysemy and ambiguity of names used interchangeably, and are all,
at bottom, a *metaphor* of the same thing: 'foreigners”, “illegals”, “aliens”, “immigrants”
to mention just the 'mainstream' ones; the different names and the *plethora* of
descriptions of the entry into the country of foreigners: “flood”, “tsunami”, “avalanche”
and so on; the plurality of significations of racism itself which I have already mentioned.
Thus, we can trace heterogeneity in the proliferation of scores of metaphors that attempt
to “come to terms” with phenomena that cannot easily be represented within a particular
order. The influx of culturally foreign peoples cannot be easily represented in a
“homogeneous” order for that would amount to the “order” putting itself into question
and changing. Therefore, ideology somehow refers to *resistance* to change but it can
also refer to the exact opposite, the speed and/or direction of change (see Glynos and
Howarth, 2007: 145) . Racism cannot be represented in an order whose fullness is
represented as 'hospitable'. Thus racism must be discursively constructed as 'marginal',
'threatening' and so on.

Laclau and Zac also give a very fruitful example, that of the *desaparacidos* in many
Latin American countries. Although they are properly talking about signifiers that
operate as 'nodal points', their discussion can be interpreted from the point of view of
ideology and heterogeneity: The *desaparecidos* are not officially recognized, the
government refuses to acknowledge substandard arrests, thus their existence is denied 'in
the world of objects'. But equally, the government may acknowledge their existence but
attribute responsibility “elsewhere”, namely, to “subversive” organizations. They may,
even assume responsibility but “marginally”, essentially again displacing responsibility. The status of desaparacidos thus is far from objective: 'the desaparecidos point to the existence of another space, a space of suspension, which is both part of and excluded, from the realm of society' (Laclau and Zac, 1994: 33-4). The analogies between this example and the polysemy of racism that I analyze in this thesis is hopefully more than obvious.

The logic of fantasy
The idea of 'logic of fantasy' aims at giving a particularly psychoanalytic inflection to the ideological dimension by invoking the concepts of enjoyment, force and affect (see Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 145). The logic of fantasy, in a sense, is related to the ways that heterogeneity is domesticated in discourse, or as Glynos and Howarth succinctly put it: 'the logic of fantasy takes its bearings from the various ontical manifestations of radical contingency' (ibid: 145). That is, the logic of fantasy concerns the way in which subject relate to and 'experience' a dislocation. It does not so much have to do with what they will do – whether or not they will reproduce or put into question a practice or an idea – but how they will do it. If by political practices we understand practices of contestation of given, sedimented social practices, it is the case that their condition of possibility is contingency, but it is not the case that they necessitate on the part of the subject 'attentiveness to radical contingency' (ibid: 147). In that respect, 'fantasmatic logics' relate to both social and political practices and the way in which the latter are 'cathectically' invested by subjects. Or, as Laclau and Zac puts it, in clearly Lacanian terms, 'imaginary identification' misrecognizes the impossibility of fullness: the illusion of the closure is the illusion of the ego' (Laclau and Zac, 1994: 31). In the politics of racism the examples abound: from hegemonic and official narratives that 'racism does not exist', to the rhetoric of 'eliminating racism' once and for all by the institution of the
'rule of law', or class reductionist narratives that have the 'unity' of the working class blocked by racialized divisions ("Greeks" vs. "foreigners") imputed by 'the capitalists', the logic of fantasy is at full operation.

Fantasy exhibits two dimensions, Glynos and Howarth argue, namely, the 'beatific' and the 'horrific' (2007: 147). It is possible to see here the analogy between this and the two aspects of myth that were mentioned before. The beatific dimension of fantasy consists in articulating a myth that 'promises' a fullness to come 'once the obstacle is overcome', but the myth, as it was previously argued is a 'principle of reading' of a given situation as 'lacking'. Hence, the horrific dimension of fantasy or myth: 'it foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable' (ibid: 147). From this point of view, in subsequent empirical chapters I have interpreted certain narratives about racism. Recurring narratives that I analyzed seem to be paradoxical in that respect because they would at once articulate a 'belief' in eradicating racial tensions as a means of achieving a 'multicultural' identity (beatific) and/or community and a 'belief' that unless racial tensions are eradicated an already fully constituted identity and community will be put under the threat of societal breakdown and disintegration (horrific). As Glynos and Howarth put it: 'aspects of social reality having to do with fantasmatically structured enjoyment often possess contradictory features, exhibiting a kind of extreme oscillation between incompatible positions' (2007: 148)

Racism can thus be approached as a 'fantasmatic object'. But this is the case for yet another reason. Glynos and Howarth develop a criterion that follows from precisely their previous point: Does this object 'resist[s] public official disclosure'? (2007: 148): In a sense, this question if addressed in the context of the politics of racism in Greece, speaks straight into the heart of the problem, for the main thrust of my initial problematization was precisely this: the official lack of problematizations of racism in the Greek state and
society. How can this idea of racism being a fantasmatic object that indicates something about the mode of enjoyment of contemporary Greek subjectivity be further elaborated?

The problematic of 'self-transgression' has from the outset in the context of this research appeared mostly significant in accounting for the persistence of representing racism in the terms that I have been developing. Further, establishing the place of *filoxenia* in nationalist 'imagination' has clarified the initial intuition that some form of enjoyment is at play in cases of denial of racism, especially, in those cases that appear less as cases of 'self-deception' and make one actually wonder: 'is this rather cynicism?' As Glynos and Howarth point out: '[t]he guilt which may accompany the transgression of an officially affirmed ideal is a possible, indeed, fairly common, mode of experiencing enjoyment.' (2007: 107)

A distinction could be worked out here between a type of unbearable guilt resulting from realizing that one no longer holds on to the ideal, while he *must* do so, and a more secret, impermanent and enjoyable guilt resulting from transgressing the ideal one holds on to. However, holding on to the ideal of denouncing racism does not in itself or necessarily entail any particular actions, far less does it mean that one is disposed to put into question her own practices. Lacan's distinction between the 'subject of the enunciated' and the 'subject of the enunciation' is worth recalling: Holding on to the ideal of anti-racism can be 'without endangering the subjective position from which you are ready to enforce the change' (see Zizek: 2008). Therefore, racism could be approached not as a problem of ‘foreclosure’ of the dimensions of Law, Difference, the ‘other' and so forth, but as a problem of repression: A 'covert' racism in compliance with the Law, and, thus, in need to repress the thoughts which do not befit one's moral principles (see Fink 1999)
We could add to that yet another dimension in order to address an empirically identifiable aspect of the problem. Why guilt and not any other mode of enjoyment? What are these moral principles and what is the function of the 'Other' - an authority or 'someone to whom “we” strive to be likeable' (Stavrakakis, 2012), here? Recurring narratives about 'the Europeans', 'the Westerners' have proved mostly difficult to analyze and interpret. However, the very history of the idea(l) of filoxenia, as I indicated in the introduction, seems to confirm the hypothesis that the force of ideological identification with 'hospitality' is mediated through the 'gaze' of that authoritative 'Other'. It is not only that the concept of filoxenia is possibly isomorphic' to the concept of tolerance' that has equally been subjected to scrutiny as to its ideological functions (Brown 2008), but also a genealogical relationship that implicates 'Greeks' and the 'West' seems to be at play here, certain 'nodal points' of which can be traced in the ideology of slave-holding societies in the American South as well as in 19th century romanticism and the discourse of western travelers in the Mediterranean. These questions I could not but approach in a suggestive manner in the context of this thesis but they do seem to point to a broader problem.

**Fantasy, rhetoric, ideology**

With the notion of fantasy an obvious contradiction may arise: is not the articulation of contradictory and incompatible positions characteristic of fantasy, counter-productive in terms of rhetoric? Glynos and Howarth put forward what they call a 'constitutive conception of rhetoric, where rhetorical patterns 'shape our language use and meaning in non-conscious ways' (2007: 75). But rhetoric is equally defined in terms of its intended effects, that is, 'the faculty of speaking appropriate to the purpose of persuading (Vico 1996: 5). Thus, how is one to persuade if one is inconsistent, sometimes to point of absurdity? Here we could draw on the idea that posits a discrepancy between knowledge
and interests that we find in Bergson or Levi-Strauss, but as Veyne points out, this would presuppose that truths and interests are different things, it may rather be the case that 'practice thinks what it does' (Veyne, 1983: 85). Or, if we are to bracket the problem of rhetoric as an instrument, we may ask, how does rhetoric achieve its effect of 'gripping' the 'audience' if it is contradictory, even clumsy in its utterances? Here, we can draw on Husserl's distinction between the 'world of real experience' and that of the imaginary which has a different 'time and space', which makes it possible to say that various truths may be equally true on different registers; thus, according to Raymond Aron, the 'imaginary' and 'ideology' would be one of them, the 'reality' and the 'ideas of others'.

What these authors point to is according to Veyne, a certain 'duplicity with ourselves and from this point of view it would be futile to attempt to determine what “the” true thought is'. Drawing on Marx he sees truths as inseparable from powers and thought as belonging to the 'infinitely pluralized monism of power'. Veyne's discussion of the Panegyric as an instantiation of what he calls 'rhetorical truth', is a good example that informs our intuition about the function of the discourse of filoxenia. These 'verbal behaviors, in which language informs less than it fulfills a function' would occur mostly in international relations and at the domestic level. In the latter, the Panegyric's meaning was to praise the city, cultivate its origins and, and make the citizens – each as an individual - experience a strange privilege (ibid: 79-82): 'the individual was proud, not to belong to that city rather than another one, but to be citizen instead of not being one' (1983: 81); That myth can be seen as a political ideology that 'grips' people, according to this line of thought, does not entail, non-contradictory position: people may 'laugh at them', be 'ironical', or see them as 'ridiculous formalities'. But this may only re-enforce their function. In my analysis of the uses of filoxenia in parliamentary debates this
becomes quite clear.

Such conceptualization of rhetoric as constitutive allows us to approach it not as the opposite of logic and rationality, but by contrast as ‘an instrument of an expanded social rationality’, Laclau argues, and adds: ‘everything depends on the performative act’ that ‘emptiness’ of symbols and ‘imprecision’ aim at (Laclau, 2005: 12). It follows that rhetoric is not merely rhetoric but also the ‘very logic of the constitution of political identities' (ibid: 19). Similarly, what Veyne calls 'constitutive imagination' is not something reducible to the individual but rather ‘a kind of objective spirit in which individuals are socialized’. As to the constitutive function of rhetorical truth qua imagination, Veyne gives us an example which can be interpreted from a Laclauian perspective: 'When men depend on an all-powerful man, they experience him as [...] a mere mortal. But they also experience him as their master and therefore also see him as a god' (Veyne, 1983: 90). it is this 'split', that allows us to say that rhetorical operations are constitutive of identities. For what this example tells us is that something particular metonymically comes to represent something universal and that this duality rather than being an impediment to identification with that symbol is actually its actually its condition of forceful success. In analytical terms, this points to the constitutive role of rhetorical categories – such as metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor and catachresis – in discourse theory's ontology (see Howarth, 2005: 342; Howarth and Griggs, 2006; Laclau, 2005: 19) In other words, social reality and identities are constructed rhetorically through metaphoric and metonymic operations, through the constant tension between 'grammar' and 'rhetoric', rules of formation and subversion of those rules. On the other hand, rhetoric designates, at the 'ontical' level (Howarth, 2005: 342), the range of tropes and figures that we can draw on in order to analyze particular texts. Thus, for example, in several occasion in the analysis to follow in the next chapters, I discuss the tropes of
hyperbole, synecdoche, and irony.

Methodological notes and the archive
So far I have elaborated on the key theoretical concepts which orient my research while simultaneously pointing at how I engage with the empirical material. The methodological imperative that determines what empirical material I engage with, was simply to ‘follow’ the signifier and the 'dispute' (Marcus 1998; Mautner 2008), without excluding – in principle – any domain of political discourse. By political discourse I mean to denote in a post-Gramscian way the ‘whole’ set of differences that make up the couple state-civil society (Howarth, 2010). Whether hegemonic or otherwise, political discourse is 'multi-sited', comprising of different 'elements' scattered and linked throughout the 'social'. Therefore, I am following ‘racism’ and the whole controversy around immigration in any socio-political domain which, by certain criteria related to the form of my research questions and hypothesis, was likely to yield material for interpretation.

Given my overarching theme of the everyday, commonsensical 'disavowal' of racism I was led to focus more on the 'unofficial' or the 'para-official' sources – i.e. public 'chit-chat' and commentary, even 'fictional' narratives and arguments, rather than to official statements, although in most cases, the 'unofficial' permeates and inhabits the 'official'. That was the first criterion of selecting material, while, inversely, a second criterion involved attentiveness to more official statements about racism and the values against which it derives its meaning. Following the problematization of ‘racism’ at the intersection of the discourse of political parties representatives and civil society actors in 'rhetorical situations' allows us to see how public imagination as to 'who we are' is appealed to in broad state discourse. This methodological compass led me to constitute
my main corpus for Chapter 4: parliamentary debates and state-civil society discourse, media and public conferences, however the particularity of each of these three domains (in terms of who speaks, from what position, to whom etc.) is not neglected either.

Further, given the emphasis on the political dimension of racism I delimit political discourse by focusing partly on grassroots activism in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The idea behind this is that grassroots activism discourse, racist and anti-racist alike, represents the practices and struggles that escape the 'official' domain of political discourse and speak directly to how racism is the object of socio-political contention in concrete, local and particular terms – the base level in which social antagonism can be an object of analysis: here, that racism is a phenomenon not unrelated to (what counts as) the state security apparatus – is not my arbitrary decision but rather a social 'fact' in the sense that grassroots (anti-racist) activism contests security practices as racist. This question of 'naming', however, generates data at the official level as well, for instance, in the official redescription of practices of security as practices of hospitality or as necessary to eradicate racism. In a sense, chapters 5, 6, and 7 attempt to capture a moment of the social antagonism around the nature of the relationship between racism and security.

It is vital to indicate that on the whole this thesis draws on and discusses 'non-reactive' textual material as much as it describes practice, linguistic or non-linguistic alike (see Howarth 2005). This thesis engages more with texts but it does not try to deduce from the texts the reality of practices. In that respect its focus is limited and does not aspire to offer an 'in-depth' explanation of the construction of subjectivity. Such a perspective would necessitate 'triangulating' with interviews. Although I have had many informal communications with human- rights and legal experts, activists, lay, ordinary people, and a Deputy Minister of PASOK in 2010, I could not have a number of others with

129 I had an informal meeting with the Deputy Minister for the Protection of the Citizen
security authorities and practitioners. The reasons for not pursuing this path were complex and diverse; Some of my informants – mostly immigrants – were rather uneasy with my declared intentions to conduct 'fieldwork' in detention centers. They raised the issue of 'complicity' and this would jeopardize my affiliation with them. A whole set of ethical questions concerning my identity as 'citizen', 'researcher' and political subject were unavoidably raised. I resolved it would not be ethical on my part to make use of my privileged position to pop in and out from detention centers at will and then report on my thesis on the 'experiences' of detainees. Neither did I think that I could say something meaningful in the way of describing and analyzing experiences of migrants that would not be reduced to common places. That the 'voice' of immigrants is nearly absent in a thesis on racism, is a clear limitation. However, these limitations made possible a different approach: instead of focusing in depth in single sites of discourse, I drew attention to the struggles that permeate political discourse in the problematization of racism, immigration and security.

The cases chosen in the following chapters can be thought as 'paradigmatic cases' in the Greek context. Paradigmatic cases are cases functioning as 'exemplars or metaphors for an entire society' (Howarth, 2005: 331). Before discussing the particular cases, it is worth making explicit how the Greek case as such can be construed as a paradigmatic case for the study of ideology and racism. Viewed from a 'macro' perspective that takes into account broader ideological, political and sociological trends, the Greek case exceeds the boundaries of the Greek context. From this perspective, the Greek case can be seen as a 'peripheral' case, which nonetheless puts into question the (ideological)
distinction between 'center' and 'periphery'. Indeed, although initially I started working on the problem of the disavowal of racism in Greece, it soon became clear that problematizing the Greek case could easily reinforce tendencies of 'othering' Greece vis-a-vis the 'centre' of the 'West'. This would carry the risk of obscuring the repetition and iteration of the same problems in different, adjacent or overlapping contexts. But the Greek case may be thought as a critical case as well, because it shows clearly that the framing of racism under the rubric of irrationality – a nearly universal phenomenon in the western world – not only cannot adequately capture what is at stake with racism but also it undercuts effective political organization and agenda-setting against it.

The particular cases I examine – the 'problem' of immigration in parliamentary discourse in the 1990s (Ch. 4), the emergence, reproduction and contestation of administrative detention of 'aliens' (Ch. 5), the urban racial tensions in the 'symbolic' and material center of the nation in 2009-2010 (Ch. 6), Athens, as well as the struggle of the migrants, its delegitimation and the struggles around citizenship in February 2011 (Ch. 7) – were all chosen according to criteria of representability of broader social movements and stases. What I mean is simply that the language of parliamentarians across party divides I examine in Chapter 4, can plausibly be seen as being formed by and forming, in turn, society at large. The (linguistic) means that different actors employ to engage the question of racism or the problematization of practices of controlling immigration in the case of Pagane (Chapter 5) reflect broader intertextual links that spread across discourses. The case of Athens, among other things, while not indicative of the case with other cities, is indicative of the rhetoric by which the far-right gained momentum across Greece in the period 2009-2012 (Chapter 6). It is representative of the origins of what later became a nationwide 'phenomenon'. In Chapter 7, similarly, the re-framing of the immigrants' struggle, its naming by the state apparatus as a 'threat' to security, as well as
the punitive and paradigmatic Court Decision in response to the hunger strike, are taken as representative of the broader state problematization of immigration. Finally, in Chapter 7, given the increasing salience of web practices of posting, commenting etc., the way in which a certain 'public' emerged in response to relatively immigrant-friendly legislation proposed by PASOK in 2009 is taken as representative just of itself.

For each of the cases I assembled as much as possible what was 'said' in print and digital media and the delimitation of the search was based again on the idea of following the signifier(s) via 'snowballing' techniques. More specifically, for the first part of chapter 4, I relied on media discourse and focused on the period between 1989-1990. This selection was based on wanting to get a sense of how the particular experience of the early 1990s' global dislocation was reproduced in the context of printed, 'mainstream' press discourse, a key-source of constructing and informing public opinion. I focused on the daily, 'mainstream' press on account of its central role in processes of consolidating hegemony and forging consent, in short, in what is called “media politics” (Phelan and Dahlberg, 2011: 4-5). Further, the significance of printed press in the period in the early 1990s in the Greek context is derived from constituting the major sources of information prior to the advent of privately or corporately owned television and radio stations. The printed press material from this period was collected at the national press archives in the Municipal Library of Thessaloniki, but newspaper sources were also supplemented with other documents where possible. All newspaper material from 1995 onwards was collected on the Web by simple search tools within the newspapers' digital archives.

Two national newspapers (“Eleftherotypia” and “Kathimerini”) formed the central focus of my analysis, but I also included material drawn from local newspapers (“Makedonia”). The selection of these specific newspapers, one being more liberal-democratic (Eleftherotypia) and the other more conservative (Kathimerini), was
deliberate in order to adopt a broad view on a range of positions across the national ideological map. Further, both newspapers during the 1990s (and beyond) enjoyed a nation-wide readership. Their circulation figures, despite the lack of detailed statistics, were throughout these periods in the tens of thousands and both newspapers were consistently in the top 3-5 most read newspapers in Greece.\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Eleftherotypia} – now under different publication regime and having been split into two different newspapers, was well established as the newspaper of the ‘\textit{metapolitefsi}’ that endorsed PASOK’s popular-democratic project of the ‘Change’ in the 1980s. Its readers have always been of a certain educational status, democratic with socialist ‘sensibilities’. \textit{Kathimerini}, on the other hand, is traditionally the \textit{status quo}, ‘law and order’ newspaper. Contrary to \textit{Kathimerini} and other newspapers on which I partly draw on (“\textit{To Vima}”, “\textit{Ta Nea}”), \textit{Eleftherotypia} can be assumed to be less party/state-affiliated and in some ways, due to ownership status, simply less structurally enmeshed with the state, public contracts (e.g constructions, tele-communications etc.,), the publisher of \textit{Eleftherotypia} being the publisher of the \textit{Larousse Britannica Encyclopedia} in Greece. Of course, this does not make him any more ‘objective’, for as his Chief Editor for 31 years put in an interview he entered publications ‘for ideological reasons’.\textsuperscript{131} Both newspapers can be safely assumed to have had a great impact especially until the mid-2000s, that is, until electronic media started to make substantial inroads into the media landscape. Their discourse has formed and been forming a good deal of what counts socially as ‘news’, and ‘socio-political’ actuality.

\textsuperscript{130} Some basic figures are available on the websites of the major press distribution agencies in Greece ‘\textit{Evropi}’ and ‘\textit{Argos}’: \url{http://en.europenet.gr/default.asp?catid=32130}; \url{http://www.argoscom.gr/}. It is impossible to derive diachronic data from the daily circulation reports available on these websites as data exists only for the period after 2012. What can be established with certainty though is the overall decline of circulation numbers regarding the above-mentioned newspapers from the 1990s ($\geq$20000) to the 2000s and into the 2010s ($\leq$10000). Monthly and annual figures are available on the website of the Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, \url{http://www.eihea.gr/default_en.htm}.

\textsuperscript{131} See \url{www.iefimerida.gr/news/83248}. 
In getting a sense of how the 'fact' of contemporary migrations and immigrations after 1990 was registered and acted upon by the political class/elites, I relied on parliamentary minutes which I exhaustively scrutinized for references of 'racism', 'hospitality', 'security' and 'migration'. The publicity of these documents as well as their 'unedited', naturally occurring language qualified them as potentially good sources. Since I was interested in 'narratives' of 'selfhood' in its encounter with the 'foreigner', I found parliamentary debates a good source of evidence, since the kind of talk one finds in everyday parliamentary proceedings is both conventional, regulated and authoritative, and simultaneously not devoid of everyday, ordinary, unofficial language, expressing 'tacit knowledge' revealing the affects of 'cultural intimacy' (Herzfeld, 1996: 3).

Combining the analysis of narratives with an emphasis on the broader social context I sought to map out a critical number of statements about racism and hospitality and make use of them accordingly in answering empirical or theoretical questions that I posed in the first place in an intuitive manner. All material was collected from the official portal of the Hellenic Parliament. The parliamentary digital archive constitutes a vast resource of parliamentary debate, Commissions' work, and other reports, all sessions since roughly 1993 being accessible in document form (.pdf and/or .doc). The statements discussed in the text were selected as representative of a broader set of list entries (113) which figure in the appendix. Further, these documents were focused on and 'isolated' from an initial pool of approximately 450 documents, produced in successive search sessions, some of which turned out to be irrelevant and others of little interpretive interest due to repetition or irrelevance to the argumentative context of the thesis.

132 For a complete list of the documents consulted see Appendix. 114 different parliamentary sessions were selected by criteria of relevance from a broader pool of documents. The number of statements collected are slightly more (135) since in some sessions there would be more than one speaker debating the relevant issues.
For chapter 5, my archive was also compiled by a variety of sources: local and national press, exhaustive collection of anti-racist and 'no-border' activist material – brochures, pamphlets, on site inquiries and informal communication with activists; as well as lay activist material comprising critical, thick descriptions of administrative detention. Most of the material here was retrieved from digital archives (local press) and personal archives (brochures, pamphlets, booklets, bulletins etc.). I also scrutinized the digital archives of ECRI, CPT and UNHCR. I focused on these organizations because of their position in the field of 'managing' immigration-related practices and phenomena, the UNHCR covering the more 'humanitarian' aspect, the CPT addressing issues around discrimination, racism and torture in the context of practices of control (prisons, detention facilities etc.); the ECRI, more generally, surveying the public domain for violations of fundamental rights. Further, these organizations are discussed more centrally and selected from a much broader network of interconnected civil society actors and (inter-)governmental organizations (fragments of which are described throughout the thesis) because of their perceived 'otherness' in the Greek context. They are 'European' and dealt with as such, that is, with a certain dose of ambiguity and some 'defense'. Their encounters with the Greek authorities which are thoroughly documented in annual reports, is a good way of exploring resistance to change, either with regard to governing immigration or in terms of acknowledging and acting against racism. Regarding these organizations' sayings, the material was collected from official documentation available on the said organizations' web pages.

The strategy I followed in chapter 6 was similar, with a relatively all-encompassing collection of material, of national, and local newspapers – political activism printed material, NGOs reports and interventions, political speeches and brochures, and visual documentary sources. In this, like in the previous chapters, the line between what
constitutes simply a ‘source’ of evidence and what constitutes part of a discourse to be
analyzed is often blurred. Here, the collection of material followed similar ‘snowballing’
techniques of following the controversy and adding representations and perspectives of
the actors involved until no more new data could be produced and it was ‘simply more of
the same' (Mautner, 2008: 35). The selection of material in this chapter, in line with the
thesis, was meant to show how racism and its ‘disavowal’ take different forms which we
can understand by reference to the shifting structure of socio-political division. All
empirical evidence for this chapter was collected on the web, except for activist material,
brochures, self-publications, posters, flyers, etc. which were collected on-site and forms
part of my personal archive.

In the last chapter, the strategy was similar. I aimed at describing an 'event' from its
relevant angles to get a sense of how it was registered in public consciousness and what
its effects were. I compiled an archive of migrants' sayings and doings, governmental
and judicial discourse and supplementary documents. The section on citizenship and the
arguments made there, were based primarily on one central document – the Supreme
Administrative Court's decision – previous legislation, as well as 'textual' responses to
that decision that ranged from official Human Rights actors reports, articles in the press
and press releases, to legal commentaries and associations discourse, and grassroots
migrants' and local activist textual and visual material. All this material was accessed
through digital governmental, party, activist and press archives. In this chapter I also
drew on political ethnography and new media research to enable me to productively use
an archive of nearly 3000 comments of laymen and women on the Government's 'Open
Government initiative' on the occasion of the proposed legislation for the naturalization
and citizenship status of foreign residents. In order to produce the desired archive of the
thousands of comments which were scattered in hundreds of web pages, a special
recursive html parser was developed in the open-source programming language Perl. The initial index page of the comments was manually fed to the parser, and from that point on, the parser spawned multiple clones of itself simultaneously loading the hundreds of the pages containing the comments. From each page, the comments were automatically separated from unwanted web elements (images, etc) and all the comments were finally stitched into a single pdf. This was the single piece of archive produced in an 'automated' way, whereas the rest of Web sources were scrutinized manually.

In this section I have outlined how the cases were selected and how the corpus of statements was delimited given the question of the disavowal of racism in political discourse and the struggles that constitute the meaning of racism. The media, the ordinary language of parliamentarians, grassroots activism as well as civil society actors sayings and doings, on the whole can be said to reflect the tensions and convergences that characterize and make up to a certain extend political discourse. Although the task of justification and explanation of methodological decisions is far from exhaustive, the reader should expect to find methodological and rationale-related arguments throughout the chapters that follow.
4 Emerging Problems, New Imaginaries

This chapter examines how the dislocatory and protracted period marked by the end of the Cold War transformed migration, security and race discourses in the Greek context. In the first part, I reconstruct aspects of the local, historico-political context of the 1980s, in particular, aspects of hegemonic struggle for national representation. In that period, the increasing extension of the logic of difference through the incorporation of wider social and political strata into the state, the homogenization and nationalization of the social, simultaneously meant drawing a frontier between the national 'us' and the foreign 'them', one 'minor' aspect of which, was the sharpening of the divisions between 'native' and 'foreign', immigrant workers. I then show how the ‘opening’ of the Albanian-Greek borders late in 1990 – a moment of a broader regional ‘dislocation’ – that was experienced and cast in ‘crisis’ terms, elevated the question of foreign immigrants to a different symbolic and ideological dimension and made possible new articulations of the 'problem' of immigration with race and security discourses but also with a plurality of oppositional discourses.

In the second part, I shift attention to parliamentary debates to see how these events were registered, represented and problematized in the discourse of parliamentary representatives of political forces. Here, I am more concerned with how racism came to

133 Diamandouros (2004: 12) argues that a new social reality in the 1990s was a result of a cumulative combination of factors among which ‘the wide social ramifications and effects of the politics of inclusion’ [...], during the decades of 1970 and 1980, of the social strata that the post-civil war and the authoritarian regime of the colonels had systematically marginalized'. Regarding the 1980s specifically, this inclusion has often been seen as a function of PASOK's populist political strategies (see Sotiropoulos 2006: 215; Lyrintzis 1987).
be problematized during the 1990s and post-2000 in parliamentary debates. This analysis of shifting racial, racist and anti-racist rhetoric is not so much an analysis of racist or anti-racist discourse as it is an analysis of the meaning of racism in relation to other 'objects' and 'subjects' in a range of conflicting and adjacent discourses. I show how racism has figured variably but hegemonically as the other's racism, as a non-event, as possibly new and as a threat to Greek identity. This 'social rhetoric' and rhetorical strategies that exemplify what I have called the logic of defense, amounted to successful attempts to re-institute *filoksenia* as a social imaginary. In the last part, I demonstrate how *filoksenia* not only became the dominant metaphor by which migration-security policy was articulated and legitimized in the 1990s but also how *filoksenia* as a signifier served to dissimulate racism by providing its conditions of discursive inscription.

**The 1980s and the national reconciliation**

In the 1970s and 1980s numerous communities of foreign immigrants were residing and working in Greece. Their histories and struggles at the workplace, barely documented, tell us of wildcat strikes and attempts to overcome divisions between 'native' and 'foreign' workers, such as in the case of the National Can strike in October 1974. In other cases, for example in the case of Polish workers in constructions in the 1980s, barriers of national identity and language would prove to be enough to prevent any equivalential links from emerging. Although foreign workers were radicalizing, for

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134 The term is used by the anthropologist M. Herzfeld whose work has partly focused on the 'margins of Europe' and it can be seen as an equivalent term to 'ordinary language'. As he puts it: "rhetoric of social life [is not] some spurious gloss on reality (which is how the vulgar positivism of everyday talk treats rhetoric) but the accessible dimension of social reality itself". See Herzfeld (1987b: preface)

135 Indicatively, immigrants from Pakistan, India, Libya, Lebanon, Philippines, Thailand, Sudan, Ghana, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone were customarily occupied in shipyards, mines, kattling as well as in domestic labor. According to the population census of 1991, their number was an estimate of 130.000. See Georgoulas (2001).

136 For a history of social struggles up to 1983, see Aftonomi Protovoulia Politon (1983)

137 In the 1980s the trade union of construction workers, controlled by the KKE was rather hostile towards foreign workers from Poland whom they saw as 'agents' and 'traitors'. See Spn, Zipo
instance by demands that the cost of their transport to and from work 'becomes a cost for the employer', a demand addressed in the course of the strike in Karelas textile industry in 1980, the figure of the 'foreign worker' was far from constituting a 'national threat'. However, during the 1980s, the official trade unions were in full collaboration with the state, reviewing the regulations governing the employment of foreign workers. Although immigration was hardly at the top-level of the political agenda, there were demands – partly satisfied – from organized labor unions for stricter terms of employment for foreign migrants. 'Public opinion', also, would increasingly hold 'foreign workers' responsible for unemployment. Overall, however, it is safe to argue that the figure of the 'foreign worker' was marginal and largely 'invisible' and that any problem it was seen to pose was rather confined in the sphere of production and labor relations.

By contrast, the question of the Greek diaspora and the policies for the return of Greek emigrants was more pressing as it appears in political speeches and political manifestos. The term 'migrant', for example in PASOK's 1985 pre-election campaign, which was noting that 'the migrant feels today the care and affection of our country', was not referring to Polish or Egyptian workers; rather it was referring to PASOK's earlier commitment in 1981 to initiate policies for returnees – Greek emigrants – for whom

(2001) On the disavowed origin of the racist ideals of Greek society and on their (admitted) use. Further, they saw them as the impoverished proletariat whose function is to deprecate in general domestic labor and rights, in a press release addressed to the Parliament. See Linardos-Rylmon (1993)

138 Spn, Zipo (2001: 18-19)
139 Spn, Zipo (2001) provide a detailed and referenced chronicle of struggles, events and 'public' opinion' around the issue of immigration and anti-immigrant racism, that covers roughly the period before and after 1991. They provide documentation of the history of solidarities and hostilities between immigrants and native workers. Evidence of hostile public opinion towards immigrants is also reflected in the surveys conducted by Eurobarometer (1989). However, eurobarometer can also be seen to reproduce, if not outright construct, problematizations, when, for, example, it refers to 'perceptions of “aliens”' and to '[t]he immigration problem originating from non-EC countries' (1992: 63)
140 See (PASOK 1985: 126). The 'Program of the Second Term of the Change' included a specific section on diasporic Hellenism comprising measures for social, economic and political integration.
special provisions were to be taken such as facilitations in housing and social integration.  

'Foreign workers' was obviously a different category from that of 'return immigrants'. The difference was – and still is – purely a difference of ethnicity. Return immigrants and refugees from the collapsing Soviet Union, many of whom Communists into political exile since the 50s and 60s, were received differently, at least, officially, where policy was dictated by the post-dictatorial (1974 onwards) spirit of national 'reconciliation'.

What made this difference possible was an emerging 'national' consensus, the reconciliation process by which the post-dictatorial regime aimed at re-arranging the national space of representation by overcoming the antagonistic frontier established from the civil war (1944 -1949) onwards, between 'national-minded' and 'communists'. It is worth mentioning that the military dictatorship, which only came to an end in 1973, largely saw itself as the political force responsible for saving society from its 'anarchist world-views' and from the danger of succumbing to the 'communist threat'.

Reconciliation formally took place by legalizing the Communist Party (1974) as well as by symbolic gestures such as incinerating the archive of the records of political convictions (1989).

During the 1985 elections both major parties, PASOK and ND, identified what each of them saw as the forces of 'anomaly' against which they tried to produce national

142 Theodossopoulos (1981).
143 The legalization of KKE and the abolition of Law 509 by which thousands were displaced and arrested was seen as a precondition for democratizing the political life of the country, given the intrinsic links between the working class and the party. The incineration of the archive took place in the context of 'lifting the consequences of the Civil War' and was decided by the coalition government of SYN and ND.
For PASOK, the forces of anomaly were identified with those who sought to maintain the 'civil-war' legacy and who are 'a threat to the constitutional order', that is, the right-wing state. By contrast, ND's 'never again left-wing, never again right-wing, never again civil war, dispute and anomaly' was targeting PASOK and its tolerance to 'anarchists', 'terrorists' and 'crime'. In PASOK’s discourse, ND was not only what blocked national unity but also what prevented national independence and socialist development. By identifying his opponent with Thatcher and Reagan, and by a rampant anti-Americanism, Andreas Papandreou sought to underline that his socialist government meant that 'the people is in power'.

The production of 'the people', however, is necessarily the production of a heterogeneous residue. At a certain level of official discourse of PASOK the 'foreigners' meant the 'West': Andreas Papandreou famously reiterated K. Karamanlis equally famous dictum: 'We belong to the West'. In 1985 election time he declared that 'we belong to Greece' and 'Greece belongs to Greeks'. What made possible the representation of the unity of the Greek people in the 1980s, that is, the antagonistic frontier between 'Greece' and 'foreigners'-qua-'the West', the 'foreign powers', also made oblique the representation of the figure of the 'foreign worker' and the 'foreign immigrant'. The one pole of the antagonism, a homogeneous Greek pole, left no space for representing particular demands or ethnic differences in the constitution of the working class and of society more broadly.

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144 Hauser (1998: 92) argues with regard to Nea Dimokratia and PASOK that 'they both merged political aspirations of conservatives and socialists with powerful icons of national identity'.

145 See Papandreou's (1985) Election Campaign Speech presented at Syntagma Square, Athens, Greece. (01.06). See previous note for Hauser's ethnographically inflected rhetorical analysis of these conventional but passionate events, taking place one week before the elections at the 'symbolic' centre of power, Syntagma Square.

146 See Karamanlis (1985) Election Campaign Speech presented at Syntagma Square, Athens, Greece (31.5).

147 Papandreou (1985)

148 PASOK (1985)
Thus, during the 1980s, the extension of both equivalential and differential logics can be traced simultaneously across different regional levels. The production of national unity against the 'foreigner' had the consequence of drawing a frontier between 'Greece' and what prevents it from being fully and independently Greece, that is the 'foreigners' outside. At the same time, we have the extension of the logic of difference through social division: between 'foreign' and 'return' migrants; between 'legal' and 'illegal' foreign migrants; between 'native' and 'foreign' workers. By nationalizing and unifying the 'native' working class, the regime managed to prevent the eruption of any radical and equivalential demands.

From 1989 onwards and with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes the question of immigration falls more firmly into the national security agenda. The 'external', Cold War 'threat', threatens to become 'internal' as a consequence of increased mobility and permeability of borders. This was more than visible in the national press where an abundance of reporting on collapsing neighboring regimes, for example, Chausetsku's Romania, were alerting the public to the dangers the changing political terrain in the region poses for Greece. Equally, however, a celebratory undertone was emphasizing the victory of democracy and the demise of totalitarianism. As the Prime Minister at the time put it, Albania 'evolves towards democracy and the free market'.

**The 'descent of the myriad refugees'**

Throughout 1990, the Albanian regime is under collapse and the first, initially 'fugitives'

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149 *I Kathimerini*, 10 January 1991

150 The 'descent of the myriads' is another phrase that betrays the analogy between immigration and military offensives, as it alludes to Xenophon's *Anabasis*, where ten thousand Greeks joined forces with Cyrus to capture Persia. Much later, in 2012, the Minister of Public Order observed that: 'since the Dorian descent, 4000 years ago, the country has not experienced an invasion of such magnitude'. [http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=469853](http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=469853).
and then 'lathrometanastes' ['smuggled' migrants], started arriving in Greece. Border-crossing from Albania [mid1990-1991] was immediately seen as a clearcut threat, crucially, as I will show further on, because of the Albanians' perceived 'Muslim' identity – a criterion that made possible a new class of divisions between 'Christian' Voreopirotes and 'Muslim' Albanians, the 'good' and the 'bad' fugitives. When the borders 'opened' in the end of 1990, immigration talk took another dimension immediately associated to crime,\textsuperscript{151} the 'demographic problem', rural desertification, that is, problems pertaining to social modernization: problems of urbanization, demographic decline and rural underdevelopment, in addition to more diachronic concerns with the labor market.\textsuperscript{152} These 'problems', however, were not experienced primarily in a 'rational', calculative manner. They were fundamentally experienced in a national existential, historico-political manner. Indeed, Albanian immigrants were seen in nationalist (socialist and otherwise) discourses as 'vehicles' of the 'Turkish threat', carrying it over into Greek territory.\textsuperscript{153} Such threat was experienced as cultural, societal, and eventually racial. The 'Turkish threat', as I show later in this chapter, was played out later in the 1990s in relation to 'illegal' immigration from the east, whereby Turkey was seen to intentionally traffic and 'smuggle' Muslim migrants into Greece. Initially, however, migratory flows from Albania represented more than what they 'literally' were;

\textsuperscript{151} Bakalaki argues that crime and in particular burglaries were during the 1990s prominent sources of insecurity but were experienced as the underside of a modernization and affluence. 'Success' and 'vulnerability'. Bakalaki (2003).

\textsuperscript{152} In a letter sent to the ministers of Public order and Labor in October 1991, the Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE), was pointing out the necessity for state regulation of labor immigration as a function of shortages in domestic supply of labor. It was thereby expressing its concern with migrants workers 'human rights' and with 'phenomena of racism and xenophobia that appear in traditional immigration countries, such as Germany and France, where the percentage of foreign workers closes to 10 percent of the total labor force, and the danger of their dissemination given that we are going through a period of economic recession and increased unemployment'. Cited in spn, zipo (2001: 27).

\textsuperscript{153} This is a symptomatological reading of arguments across political parties divides. This space is not a homogeneous, nationalist space. Rather, it is criss-crossed by oppositional discourses and contradictory statements and arguments.
they came to represent something much broader like a part of what was later re-invented as the 'Turkish-Muslim arrow' which threatens Christian Orthodox Greece.

The proliferation of a discourse of ‘rights’ and particularisms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, parallel to the end of the Cold war,¹⁵⁴ and to the collapse of the Soviet Union and other quasi-totalitarian regimes in Yugoslavia, Romania and eventually in Albania, had manifold consequences in the Greek case. It created dislocations which brought about ‘immigration’ at the forefront of socio-political actuality. It also made possible the use of rights discourses to advance foreign policy ‘interests’ in the early 1990s. At a time where the ‘minority issue’ in Greece was almost entirely disavowed in public discourse and foreign migrants in Greece were 'invisible',¹⁵⁵ Greek foreign policy, assuming its role as an outpost of democratization in the Balkan region articulated the grievances of ethnic Greeks residing in Albanian territory in the language of rights: The Greek minority, it was proclaimed, suffered in the hands of the Communist regime in Albania and had the right to emancipate itself. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs had just a year before wished the Greek minority to celebrate the following year ‘free Christmas’. Without saying that his sayings caused the flow, these interventions did play a crucial role in the development of the situation.

Large numbers of ‘fugitives’, as they would be characterized in the media, were crossing the border separating Albania from Greece, some arriving in borderland townships, and others as far as Athens. The official position was that no ethnic Greek is turned down but

¹⁵⁴ According to Laclau the ‘globality’ of such totalizing projects as ‘free world’ and ‘communist societies’ entered into crisis in the first half of the 1990s with the result of emerging, rebellious particularisms – ‘ethnic, racial, national […]’, Laclau (1996: vii). Elsewhere, Laclau makes visible the paradox of the language by which these particularisms started to emerge. The discourse of rights is paradoxical insofar as it asserts, for example, the right of national minorities to self-determination, that is, it asserts a ‘universal principle grounded in universal values’ (1994: 4)

¹⁵⁵ I am referring to ethnic minorities residing within the Greek territory which the Greek state would not grant them existence or recognition. See Christopoulos (2008)
the members of the Homogeneia ought to remain in Albania. As the prime minister declared: ‘[the Government’s aim] is that a democratic Albania shall be able to guarantee to the Greek minority viable conditions of respect of individual and religious freedoms’.

The rate of entry of Albanian nationals, either of Greek origin or otherwise, alarmed a number of actors, the Hellenic Army, the National Institute of Rehabilitation of Homogeneis, and a range of ministries, who mobilized the state apparatus in order to contain the phenomenon and provide shelter for the ‘fugitives’, including hotels, military camps and so on. The associations of Vorioepirotes also saw these acts of fleeing as posing a threat to Greece as this would mean that the Orthodox element in the neighboring country would diminish to the extent that Albania would transform into a homogeneously ‘Muslim Country’. On the other hand, the Greek government asked for the active support of the EC, while it was made possible to begin a reassessment of the rather parochial legislation that regulated matters of entry and residence of foreigners that was in effect since 1929. It is thus that during this short period of time, we encounter the ‘origin’ of the transformation of Greek society from ‘a country of emigration’ to a ‘country of immigration’, a transformation deemed to become a ‘major national issue’. This ‘discursive event’ was what became known and captured the imagination of Greeks as the ‘first wave’ of contemporary immigration to Greece.

In their public statements for the New Year in 1991, the head of the Greek Government and the President of the Republic, addressed the challenges that Greece would confront in the years to come. They both saw the day of their statement as a political landmark since it was right ten years before that Greece had joined the EC. Their statements

156 I Kathimerini, 3 January 1991.
157 I Kathimerini, 3 January 1991
figured in fragmented or complete form in more or less all the mainstream press. The former noted how Eastern Europe’s path to democracy and ‘free economy’ would be not without hardship but also, by contrast, how Greece was in a relatively privileged position by virtue of being determinately in the European project of economic integration. The latter turned to a century’s history to observe that after the end of the *Megale Idea* in 1922, the Greek people existed ‘racially and politically marginalized, without care for the protection of its permanently threatened security’. All this changed by adherence to the European project. This had a major political advantage for the President, K. Karamanlis: Being in the EC meant that the Greek borders would equally be European borders with obvious effects for the consolidation of security.\(^{159}\) The representation of the migratory flows from Albania as widely threatening phenomena was what constituted the problem of which security was the solution.

It is interesting to note how from the point of view contesting/decontesting meaning, we see during this period terms that would later be entirely incorporated in political and everyday language. Being much more familiar with post-2000 mainstream press discourse, it was impossible to explain away the fact that designations that later became literal, like ‘country of immigration’ at the time they would appear in inverted commas, if at all. Aside that ‘country of immigration’ denotes a *particular* experience as characteristic of the country as a *whole*, we saw that the premise 'country of emigration' does not stand historical scrutiny. The opposition itself seemed to stand as a metaphor of socio-political modernity: From a stagnant society to one of challenges, from traditional to modern.\(^{160}\)

\(^{159}\) *I Kathimerini*, 1 January 1991.

\(^{160}\) For example, in an article of *Elefterotypia*, the phrase was found within inverted commas as a quote from *Der Spiegel*. *Elefterotypia*, 7 January 1991. The article was citing *Der Spiegel* saying that the 'opening of the borders' was a plan on the part of the Alia regime to rid of the Greek minority.
A plethora of analyses of the potential effects of immigration populated the press during that period. From articles on international migration and demographic trends that threaten the ‘white race’ in Europe and the Greek ‘nation’, to articles-opinions about the trends in immigration to Greece and comparisons to Turkey’s ‘third-world’ birth rates, there was burgeoning sense that immigration becomes a kind of objective problem whose dimensions, nevertheless, were contested from various positions.

In one of the very first articles on the ‘fugitives’ from Albania we find a very interesting syllogism, elements of which were available across the press: the title of the article read ‘Greece has become a center of attraction of foreign migrants’ and had a sub-heading signaling the ‘dangers that this issue breeds for the economy and society’, the author quotes the Prime Minister who reportedly characterized the said issue as the ‘[t]op priority issue that Greek society is going to face’. As he wrote, the problems to emerge in the context of the then ‘crisis’ would be i) increase in unemployment of Greeks, ii) increase in crime, iii) sub-cultural pluralism as a result of the ‘entirely different’ cultures in which foreign migrants had been socialized. The conclusion was that there is a danger of emerging racism within the low-income populations who will turn against the ‘invaders’ and towards marginal political movements.

Let me consider one ‘response’ to this line of argument coming from a prominent liberal intellectual and journalist, Takis Michas. His response to the emerging panic about the ‘fugitives’ came only days later in the same newspaper (I Kathimerini). After asking how much legitimate are public opinion concerns about the arrival of a few thousand people he suggests in contradistinction to the argument about prospective unemployment and crime, that migrants actually ‘produce wealth, to the extent that they can operate in a
framework that encourages private (economic) initiative’. He also saw in the coming of immigrants an opportunity to address the demographic problem. For him, it was a ‘contradiction between concerns about diminishing birth rates and discontent about population increase by a few thousand’ young migrants.  

We see here two positions that the emerging discourse on migration comprises: one for which the 'demographic' is a problem related to the continuity and reproduction of the nation, race and culture, and one for which the ‘demographic' is a problem for the economy. Whereas the former sees the 'demographic problem' as one where foreign immigrants are part of the problem, rather than part of its solution, the latter sees demographics simply as a function of the differentialist capacity for production. In the first case, immigrants are cast as burdens to the economy and to society with its cultural norms, in the second case, immigrants are portrayed as catalysts for change and economic growth.

What we customarily take to be a temporal landmark, namely, the end of the Cold War, had a particular significance in the context of Greece. It is what made possible not only population movements towards Greece, but also the classification of these heterogeneous populations into hierarchical and normatively imbued categories. And while there were steady influxes of refugees during the 1980s, it was from the end of the 1980s on that there was an explosion of categories each of which designated what is to be done: So ‘Pontian-Greeks’ throughout 1989 coming from USSR, would be received...
by the state as *Pallinostountes* [returnees] and special housing provision would be made available, reinforcing simultaneously the Greek element in Muslim villages of Thrace.\footnote{In particular, the Ministry of Agriculture in December 1989 alloted 600 acres for the settlement of Pontic Greeks, 50 of which at the Muslim village of Eulalon in Xanthi. See *Eleftherotypia*, 31 December 1989. The policy of re-enforcing the Greek-Orthodox population. This policy can be seen in continuity to the historically prevailing logic of cultural and ethnic homogenization, itself a modernizing and rationalizing tendency.} Albanian *Homogeneis* would be scrutinized for being truly such rather than Albanian ‘Muslims’ – a signifier which in that context would reiterate the Turkish ‘threat’; ‘fugitives’, ‘*lathrometanastes*’ were terms that entered forcefully everyday life and debate.

The paradox with the proliferating discourse of rights and particularisms in the case of the Greek speaking minority or ‘*Vorioepirotes*’ was that it made possible for the official Greek state to obtain a discursive means to articulate their grievances for a relative autonomy from the oppressing regime, but also it made it possible that these people and co-nationals from Albania see to their right to free movement.

Contrary then to the *doxa* that stems from the ‘ideological narrativization’ of recent history, I argue that in the wake of the 1990s, Greece, strictly speaking, neither *became a ‘country of immigration’*\footnote{What I want to emphasize here, following Foucault, is the idea that a chronological discontinuity such as that represented by the early 1990s, which makes possible to speak about different periods of Greece's history of migration, and assuming for itself the presence of a 'temporal dislocation' is 'both an instrument and an object of reserach; because it divides the field of which it is the effect’, see Foucault (2002[1969]: 9-10). This is not to affirm instead the notion of continuity, but rather to stress that the constructed nature of discontinuity necessarily makes possible that some things be said and 'framed' in particular ways and others to be excluded from the field of representation. When, for example, social scientists agree that the beginning of the 1990s constitutes a threshold beyond which Greece becomes a 'country of immigration' it becomes possible to use immigration as a category by which to inquire and 'read' into the 'political, cultural, social and economical being’ of the country itself. See Diamandouros (2004: 9).} nor did it *confront* the challenges of migration. What was rather the case is that a new discourse on immigration was articulated around the event of Albanian emigration to Greece, overdetermined from the outset by a plurality of security, racial, cultural and humanitarian concerns. This is not to argue that emigration
from Albania was insignificant but to underline the possibility of periodizations according to other criteria than the 'turn' signified by the volume of Albanian emigration, for example, by criteria of legislative responses.\textsuperscript{168}

Immigration became a ‘problem’ in this conjuncture, not only because of issues about culture or crime, but because it was interpreted as ‘a plan’ by the collapsing Albanian regime to rid of the Greek minority.\textsuperscript{169} Now, what this meant in that context was an increasing homogeneity of the ‘Muslim element' in the region, which metonymically evoked the Turkish 'threat'. As one journalist in Kathimerini commented on what one of his informants said about some of the ‘fugitives’ being ‘Turkish’ and ought to be deported, contrary to the ‘Vorioepirotes’ who are ‘Greeks’ and ‘brothers’:

Turkish, of course, they are not; Their religion is Muslim and they are Albanian fugitives. But these…minor shades are of no concern to the county [Thesprotia] with the lowest per capita income in the country. And it is obvious that to the extent that the locals have to choose between Greeks and Albanians, they will choose the Greeks.\textsuperscript{170}

The 'demographic problem'

Initiated by Mitsotakis in 1991, the bi-partisan committee for the study of the 'demographic problem',\textsuperscript{171} which it saw as a 'major and burning problem', stated in its report that 'the survival of Hellenism' is at stake, and that unless the problem is addressed, low birth-rates ‘threaten our race’\textsuperscript{172}. Foreign immigration, which is not seen

\textsuperscript{168} Kourtovik (2001) for example distinguishes between the period of tolerance of foreign residents and workers until 1990; the period of illegalization, a period of irregularization, marked by the 'repressive' law 1975/1991.; and the period of criminalization. Others however, see this last period as a period of normalization and integration, but these are two sides of the same coin. Irregularization and integration/assimilation.

\textsuperscript{169} This view was expressed by various actors, including the Spokesman for the Government, local Orthodox bishops, as well as popular politicians like Papathemelis who envisaged the fleeing as a 'satanic plan' orchestrated by Alia. See Makedonia, 3 January 1991; Kathimerini, 3 January 1991; Eleftherotypia, 2 January 1991.

\textsuperscript{170} I Kathimerini, 27 January 1991.

\textsuperscript{171} The Committee was formed on November 25, 1991 with the suggestion of Mitsotakis. Leading the Committee were three representatives of ND (president), PASOK (vice-president) and SYNASPISMOS (Secretary). Members of the Committee like Paphiathemelis were consistently politicizing the 'demographic' in national, cultural terms during the 1990s and thereafter.

\textsuperscript{172} Bi-Partisan Parliamentary Commission on the Demographic Problem (1993: 30)
as 'natural' population change, in this document figures predominantly as a threat:

With the massive influx of smuggled-migrants-foreigners, particularly Muslims from Afro-Asiatic countries, Greece is transforming into a place of reception of migrants who cause serious socioeconomic problems [...] and who cannot adjust into the Greek society due to the utterly different culture of Islam which is not only a religion but a way of life (1993: 15)

The Committee was clear as to why the issue of foreign population should be carefully considered: 'so that we will be able to avoid phenomena of racism and xenophobia' (ibid: 16). Immigrants are seen as an agent of disorder and anomy in their capacity as 'illegal' and racism is portrayed as the inevitable and regretful result of the impossible co-existence between peoples of different cultures, especially where one's culture 'needs order', and the other's is the cause of 'disorder'.

The document compared Greece's population decline with adjacent 'Muslim countries', notably, Albania and Turkey, whose increased birth rates signal a threat with which Greece has been previously acquainted: 'Demographic decline of classical Greece and Byzantium led, according to valid sources, to centuries-long subordination and nearly total extinction' (ibid: 30), it is noted.

The discussion of the 'demographic', largely associated with large families demands, was on-going until 2008-9. The committee report itself resurfaced widely through

173 It should be mentioned that as the document mobilizes statistics and makes use of the language of demographic studies, there is a much broader issue around questions of demographic representation and essentialist, racial discourses. Thresholds established in demographic discourse between 'natural population change', or simply 'natural change' and 'immigration' naturalize categories such as 'native' and denaturalize movement and migration. See, for example, population maps of Eurostat (Eurographics Association 2007); and the Eurostat Yearbook (2010: 18).

174 The report is cited and quoted also in a number of blogs of associations of families with many kids, for example, syllogospolyteknoralisas.blogspot.com/2012/11/blog-post_6.htm; as well as on the website of the Higher Association of Large Families in Greece (ASPE), see http://www.aspe.gr/. A search on Google for the members sitting in the committee yields interesting results: an article in To Vima, by G. Marinos in December 2012, where he talks about the 'demographic crime' committed. The 'demographic' is described as a the top problem, as he adopts the rationale of the document in talking about Muslims 'that give birth non-stop'; see To Vima, 9 December 2012.
'patriotic' blogs with titles like 'the forgotten report' or 'the hidden report' in the wake of the debate on citizenship for 'second-generation' immigrants in 2011.

I have shown how a discourse on migration was transformed during the late 1980s. Catalytic role in such transformation played the migrations from Albania, which, at a time of proliferation of nationalist discourses across the political spectrum, were interpreted as a continuation of the 'Turkish-Muslim' threat. Such threat was predominantly demographic if by 'demographic problem' we understand the problem of the continuation of 'race' as such or in its transcriptions: 'are we going to consign the affair of our national survival to aliens who are going to supplement our own low birth rates?'

The ambiguity of a signifier: racism

This section examines the socially ambiguous meaning of racism in parliamentary discourse, specifically, in parliamentary day-to-day proceedings and debates. A careful study of the repetitions of 'racism' in this kind of discourse between the years 1993 and 2001, and later, shows how 'racism' surfaced as an object of political discourse and was problematized repeatedly in correlation to a number of distinct and overlapping policy fields. Racism as an object of political discourse is established by successive yet discontinuous statements which insofar as they are such only in their 'enunciative function' they also inevitably require the determination of 'what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it' (Foucault, 2002: 107)

Thus, I also oriented my attention to the type of subject figuring within statements about racism and the type of subject presupposed for these statements to be possibly uttered.

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175 Mihaloliakos, PLDB191199; PLDB061099; during that session the discussion slid from social security to the demographic with prominent PASOK representatives cautioning about Turkey's estimated population for 2020 that will reach 100 million and pointing out low enrollment in Athens' schools of Greek pupils and increased enrollment of foreign children.
This serves as a precursor for the exploration of the re-articulation of the myth of filoxenia in the attempt of the state to form an ideological horizon based on it. However, this is not an archaeological analysis but rather an analysis of ideology, a 'doxology'. From a theoretical and methodological point of view, this part brings to our attention issues that have to do with political language as rhetoric. Thus, I am focusing on metaphors, figures of speech and even entirely mythical propositions in order to evaluate their function in sustaining and/or subverting certain meaningful ‘problems’ in their continuities and coherences. It is in these 'subjugated', informal and symptomatic knowledges that we find out about the political constitution of society. Perhaps then, and in addition to the concern with the ‘symbolic’, by attending to the construction and iteration of meaning this type of inquiry may recover, as Foucault put it in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, ‘a thematic that is more imaginary than discursive [symbolic], more affective than rational, and less close to the concept than to desire’ (Foucault, 2002: 167).

Whereas the problematization of race and the racialization of groups was, as we saw, increasingly instrumental to how the dislocations of socio-political modernization and global transformations, were experienced and signified dominantly, the problematization of racism was a different matter. If anti-immigrant racism hardly qualified as an object of dispute the same cannot be said about what we may call 'the other's' racism: Here we see two uses during the 1990s: One where racism is identified with the right-wing

176 I find instructive here Chantal Mouffe’s analysis of pluralized forms of rationality in the realm of polity. Mouffe draws on Arendt’s claims that ‘in the political sphere one finds oneself in the realm of opinion or ‘doxa’, and not in that of truth and that each sphere has its own criteria of validity and legitimacy’. She argues for giving up the distinction between logic and rhetoric and, pace Foucault, that we cannot separate between validity and power ‘since validity is always relative to a regime of truth’, without this meaning that ‘we cannot distinguish within a given regime of truth between those who respect the strategy of argumentation and its rules, and those who simply want to impose their power’. See Chantal Mouffe (2005: 14-15).
state. The other is one where the subject of racism is the 'West' and the object the 'Greeks'. The first one re-draws the 'civil-war' frontier. It tells that it is not entirely overcome. The other, re-iterates a particular theme, the theme of the western-centric image of Greece as 'backward'. In one case, the subject is the 'left', the 'democratic' citizens or the 'Greek people' as the victim of right-wing racism. In the other, it is 'Greeks' who are the victims of 'Western' racism. As the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs put it: 'racism surfaced there, that the Greeks do not know how to work, turn everything into turmoil, and what is more that the Minister drinks, which as far as I'm concerned is totally opposite to reality'.

A third prominent problematization of racism as the 'other's racism' regards Turkey and other neighboring countries, but I will say more about this in the next section. But all of these enunciations are characteristic of how national unity was desired and produced not only by constructing and displacing frontiers but also by experiencing racism as the tool of the other's combat against the national 'self'.

**Becoming racist?**

Anti-immigrant racism started being a 'problem' in certain discourses whose subject was essentially a 'race' under threat. There, one of the problems was racism itself. For

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177 Characteristic was the statement by the Deputy Minister of Defense in 1993, who spoke of 'political racism' and by which he meant to criticize exclusionary practices in the armed forces and the broader public sector. Such statements are accidental to the archive in the sense that I was not interested in racism as socio-political division and hierarchy within Greek society and along the 'national-minded' and 'communists'. However, they are important in the way of showing the polyvalence of 'racism' and the various uses of the concept in a given historical conjuncture. This acquires more significance given the scarcity of statement on racism against immigrants.

178 Here I am referring to an 'anecdote' told by Pagkalos, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. There he takes himself personally and the Greek people as the victims of western European racism. PLDB030394: 46.

179 Pagkalos, PLDB030394: 2707. The Minister was referring to journalists of 'Figaro' newspaper.

180 The 'securitization' of racism, its framing as a source of risk, need not of course be enunciated from the position of racial subject. It can also be enunciated from the position of a liberal, cosmopolitan subject. What changes the is the 'referent object', who the security move aims at protecting.
example, in 1993, a week after the elections which saw a turnover in power after 3 years
of ND, the incumbent addressed the new PM:

Our government considered that we cannot accept the demand on the part of
Albania to legalize all *lathrometanastes*. If you retreat vis-a-vis such claim you
will accentuate the sense of insecurity that exists within Greek society, which is in
danger for that reason of developing for the first time in its history racial
prejudices.  

In this narrative, not only immigration constitutes a threat and a source of insecurity, but
also it makes possible another 'danger', namely, that of racism. A certain pattern emerges
whereby racism is persistently on the brink of emergence while, or rather, *because*
society is on the verge of extinction, right before the 'invasion'. The basic 'premise' of
this narrative is: i) there is no racism, and if there is it is new and exists as a result of the
migrants presence. This is, broadly speaking, an argument that blames the immigrants as
the cause of the existence of racism in society.

In response to this statement, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized that 'we
shouldn't be led to racism and xenophobia'. He went on designating the former
government as responsible for the 'situation' that causes anxiety to the population, for the
'hundreds of thousands' of undocumented migrants: 'your politics created the conditions
for their rapid arrival'.

We have here in a condensed form, three basic rhetorical strategies. First, a strategy of
*collectivization*. Based on essentialist and historicist grounds, portrays Greek society
as a unified whole with a unitary history that has never been acquainted with racism.
Correlatively, the second strategy, a strategy of *denial*, is *apophantic*, constative talking
that denies the existence of racism. Third, let us say that we have a strategy of

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181 Mitsotakis, PLDB241093: 9
182 PLDB241093: 62
183 See Reisigl & Wodak (2001: 48)
184 For a discussion of how this kind of talk is the opposite of performative talk in the sense that it
is about how things are and if they are, rather than about what the enunciating subject is doing,
and, further, on how this talk defines the field of truth and falsity, being from non-being, and
displacement/projection: both speakers attribute the possibility of emerging racism somewhere else: The first speaker, attributes it to migrants themselves who cause insecurity to the population, the second attributes it to the politics his opponent speaker represents.

Looking at this exemplary 'rhetorical situation' and without claiming an exhaustive analysis we can begin to formulate a typology of problematizations of racism. First, whereas immigration is a problematic fact in this discourse, racism is not. Second, if racism were to emerge that would be caused by the fact and nature of immigration. A kind of 'natural' response to an un-natural fact. Third, if it were to emerge it would represent a danger, or a problem for society – a challenge to its norms. The first two arguments were reiterated in numerous occasions, most notably in discussions about security, border control and crime. How was immigration experienced during this period and what kind of solutions were proffered so as to avoid the emergence of racism? A characteristic example we find in the words of Kontogianopoulos who spoke of the:

[...] uncontrolled penetration of criminal elements (sic) from abroad into borderland regions, [...] and their activities, not only in the cities but also in the countryside, resulting in our fellow citizens living under a regime of terror. I would also mention the appearance in our country for the first time, of phenomena of xenophobia and racism which have as their starting point precisely these causes.

A few months later in 1998, the Greek Border Police was instituted by majority vote.

One of the speakers introducing the law referred to i) the 'flood' by thousands, mostly Albanians, ii) the consequence of rise in crime, ii) the un-readiness of Greek society to

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185 The problem is that of the 'social objectivity' or 'visibility' of racism.
186 The metaphor of 'nature' is met extensively also in demographic discourse in its scientific statements about 'natural' population change.
187 Kontogianopoulos, PLDB240797: 487.
deal with the phenomenon, iv) imbalance in the labor market to the detriment of Greek workers. His conclusion was that the fortification of 'our borders' is necessary and that the institution of the border police would mean employment, growth opportunity for the borderland areas, and reduction of crime. 'We, who come from rural Greece know that in our villages the Albanians are more than us local residents.' The speaker was at that point interrupted by another speaker who said: 'this is hyperbolic!'

Here, Albanian immigrants were portrayed as the cause of demographic imbalance and crime in rural Greece, but other speakers in this debate would see them as the cause of rural desertification (since they 'terrorize the countryside, are disrespectful of our culture and the rule of law'. This latter speaker saw the purpose of the bill being that of 'confronting the evil' but he opposed it on the grounds that the army is instead supposed to guard the border: 'we suggest that we empower the army, to maintain our borders intact – now that there is exception – in order to maintain our country's integrity.' Yet, the contestation would continue by recourse to even anecdote stories:

I am not estranged now, when I remember in Drosopigi, Konitsa, that splendid village, what he told me [...] barba-Yiorgos, when I told him 'you suffer here from those who cross' [...] He told me: 'Let them come, because if they don't, we are going to die and stink. There won't be anyone to bury us.'

Those who proposed the legislation had it that lathrometanastefsi was the cause of rural desertification, whereas opposition from the Left had it that desertification was a cause of economic modernization and urbanization, a possible solution to which would indeed

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188 As I indicated in a previous chapter, immigration was repeatedly conceptualized by political representatives as 'new' and as that which 'caught us by surprise'. Correlatively, 'unreadiness' can be seen as a kind of apologetic performance. All these linguistic means served predominantly to produce an experience of reality as dislocated, in other words, they served to produce a 'crisis' to which responses had to be given.

189 PLDB040698: 138
190 Papadimopoulos, PLDB040698: 159
191 Papadimopoulos, PLDB040698: 159.
192 Tasoulas, PLDB040698: 143.

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be immigration. Yet, opposition from the right-wing disputed not the purported cause of desertification or the definition of the problem; it rather disputed whether the police rather than the army is eligible to deal with the 'given' problem. The main difference between PASOK an ND, however, was the emphasis on the Albanians' criminality: Whereas ND representatives would more indiscriminately characterize all the fugitives 'criminals', PASOK representatives would be more careful in their statements, like the following a few months later by PASOK's Minister of Public Order: 'The small minority of foreigner offenders, of course, does not justify the birth of phenomena of racism and xenophobia. I have to say that these phenomena are luckily foreign to the customs and the mentality of the Greek people [...]'.

**Racism as 'pure heterogeneity'**

I will now take a closer look at the relational meaning of racism in a plurality of arguments coming from across the political spectrum. This will allow us to get a grip of how racism came to be problematized. Take, for example, two statements, one in which racism is typically framed as an element of anti-social behaviors: '[...]unknown to Greek society such as racism, violence, criminality, drug use”**, and the other – fast forward to 2008 – from a draft Act on tackling online security and crime:

> More and more web pages intent to initiate their visitors to violent, racist, xenophobic, terrorist, para-religious, or other illegal ideologies and organizations

Here racism is inscribed on ever-expanding metonymic chains of signifiers, all of which represent illegality or *anomia*. They represent irregular and aberrant behaviors,

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193 Petsalnikos, PLOQ091298: 2259.
194 Spyrou, PLDB150399. In this discussion racism figures as one effect among others due to unemployment which was the topic of discussion.
195 PLDBCOM270608.
ideologies and organizations. Their identity is split between their 'concrete particularity' and their more universal function of signifying the impossibility of order. Any concrete particularity of racism becomes in this discourse a metaphor for the absence/presence of order. Ultimately such chains of signifiers can be seen as necessarily failing namings and representations of social heterogeneity and historical contingency. They represent this kind of outside, which, if not exactly antagonistic, it is necessary for the constitution of a 'pure', homogeneous inside and a 'history with a coherent structure'.

Of course these are not the only articulations in security discourses. The depiction of the Greek polity as a 'fenceless vineyard' during the 1990s served to denote either lack of security and order or that which the country is 'becoming' but politics should strive to prevent from happening. To put it differently, racism was problematized as one of the symptoms of a generalized disorder in discourses whose function was to differentially expand and link the different series of 'threats' to 'order'.

In a slightly inflected manner, ND's Panayiotopoulos talking about 'unemployment', among others, he claimed that 'it transfers and reinforces the germ of racism and xenophobia' (my emphasis). We see clearly in this discourse the emergence of racism as a form of radical social heterogeneity; either as a symptom of anomia, or as an illness. The meaning of racism here is equivalent to all social, modern and postmodern 'discontents', the 'waste' of production and government. Eventually a part of a social 'pathology'.

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196 Laclau (2005)
197 Whereas those who used the 'vineyard' metaphor sought to point out the lack of security, a counter-metaphor was used by those who sought to denounce the systematic violence against immigrants would talk about killings for a 'bunch of grapes'.
198 PLDB051200
199 The term 'pathology' or 'pathogeny' to describe racism is often met in the discourse of the human rights and anti-racist NGOs. See for example, Antigone 2008. 'The Greek "Pathogeny" on the occasion of the week against racism'. Such metaphors borrowed from medical discourse obscure the political nature of racism and reproduce its conception as 'illness' that infects the social body. Their use, therefore presupposes the conception of the
Criminality, and even youth criminality, drugs, the problems of the so-called third age, psychological problems, anxiety, AIDS, the constantly increasing social racism towards the under-privileged and so many problematic aspects of contemporary society, are but the tips of the iceberg, at the basis of which, lies the way the so-called modern way of life is organized.200

Along similar lines, Papadimitriou from PASOK was observing in 2007 that 'a people that has managed to survive for decades through ordeals, without ever being contaminated by the modern social illness – even epidemic – of racism and xenophobia, is showing during the last 15 years worrying trends to this direction'.201

Racism operates in this discourse as a signifier equivalent to a number of others, all of which stand for lack of order or a threat to the social body. Racism as a symptom or figure of a generalized anomie, let us say. 'The citizens demand the end of violence and illegality', said K. Karamanlis much later in 2009, saying also:

The great majority, thousands of migrants are normally integrated in the society, they work in occupations the Greeks – it is true – were not interested in, they contribute to our economy. Greece is a hospitable country. It is not characterized either by xenophobia or racist mentalities.202

'but', he continued, 'Greece also has laws, and these laws apply both to its citizens and to those who find themselves in the territory'; and the metonymical association of threats seems to be without end:

confronting extremist activities, deterrence and detection of terrorist actions, prevention and suppression of heavy crime, confronting illegal migration with an emphasis on arresting slave-drivers, combating of human trafficking, collision with the scourge of drugs

Notwithstanding differences and contradictions between all these utterances, this is a

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200 Voulgaris, PLDB160502
201 Papadimitriou, PLDB171207; see also Geitonas, PLDB170397, racism as a 'virus', a 'great threat to democracy and social peace', then next to all the other ills, pp. 4859
202 Karamanlis, PLDB080408
discourse of security struggle, which, in some of its re-inscriptions becomes a discourse of war, what PASOK’s representative from borderland Komotini had characterized as the 'low intensity invasion'. Low intensity invasion against Greece consists in Turkey's key role in and desire to smuggle Muslim migrants and drugs into Greece.\footnote{Kipouros, PLDB090797; PLDB110698. In this session, Kipouros characterized Turkey as a heroin producing country.} Turkey in this discourse is conducting war with different means. It is war, because, as far-right-wing Karatzaferis, once put it referring to Turkey: 'You sell drugs, you are conducting war against me. Every narco-maniac, a lesser possible soldier to defend the country'.\footnote{Karatzaferis said this on his daily, prime-time TV show and added that for Turkey drugs is the most effective weapon for weakening the Greek army.} Further, the meaning of racism, on this account, is very specific. Racism refers to what the enemy does not only to Greece but to immigrants themselves: slave-trade is racist. Turkey is behind this. Therefore Turkey is a racist country.

This is the theme of the 'neighbor's racism'. It is the struggle of the antagonistic 'other' against the national 'self', which puts the latter in a 'defensive' position. Hence, the abundant circulation of languages of war, invasion and contamination as a means to come to terms with foreign immigration. This is another re-inscription of the 'Turkish threat' and thus immigration is loaded with more meanings, 'borrowed' from a pre-existing antagonistic discourse. It comes to signify not only disorder but also discontinuity. Here, the 'threat' of cultural and historical discontinuity is not that of an immediate war, but that of a regular, insidious warfare conducted at the front of the demographic \textit{qua} the problem of the reproduction of the nation. It was not only that racism and illegal migration were largely dealt with as equivalent threats, along so many others, but also that all these threats were experienced as the other's forms of racism, enacted through particular strategies against the nation.
In the articulation of this racialized discourse more fronts were erected, invested with no little amount of bitterness:

When the Communist regime collapsed in Albania, we received tens of thousands of Albanians in need of food, clothing and footing. The Thesprotan people exhibited the virtues of race, showed its humane sentiments and treated them in the best way possible.

And the MP continues:

Burglaries, kidnappings, of Thesprotans, even murders of my compatriots, caused insecurity without precedent. The Thesprotans knew nothing of locking the houses, the female farmers who would come back late at night from the fields, now don’t go at all. [...] We, who wouldn’t ignore a human on the street, when we now drive by in our cars and even a human shadow, will make us speed up. Such ambience of fear and insecurity, the *topos* hasn’t previously experienced. From the land and the sea, Thesprotia felt and feels the threat against the life, honor and property of the Thesprotan people.

‘The virtues of the race’, humanitarian spontaneity and generosity, were the ‘natural’ thing to do and what they were accustomed to be doing *in the past*, that is, to respond to the strangers’ necessity. The strategy of idealizing the past, of presenting the past as harmonious and devoid of antagonism, fear and insecurity clearly serves here to dramatize the (then) present rural predicament and to underline the necessity of more security. Indeed, it seems that many of these statements are indicative and representative of local demands and frustrations with the ’Albanian problem’.

We showed how racism came to be represented as one threat among others in emerging complexes of security, demographic and migration discourses. The threat of racism would be either internal, i.e the possibility of emerging racism within Greek society, or external, i.e racism as the name for the enemy's strategies to diversify the means of war.

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205 Indicatively, we could refer to Kouloglou's documentary 'Vromoellines' (1999) in which he visits the village Palaio Kremmydi, where the local authority decided in March 1998, the imposition of a curfew for Albanians after sunset.
The 'threatened' subject in this discourse is the 'race' whose distinctive positive feature is its moral superiority. But what is the force and function of this language of *filoksenia*?

**Mythology**

Until here we have seen a number of rhetorical tropes, stories, syllogisms and antagonistic arguments by which race, migration and security discourses were re-iterated to produce the image of a country under threat of immigration and the problems it makes possible. Storytelling, ordinary language metaphors and analogical arguments have some kind of 'ethnographic' authority, bear traces of 'native wit', and make the representatives appear as 'local' and 'ordinary' people who see themselves as hospitable and morally superior. It is in being 'hospitable' that they cannot be racist like in the following excerpt from the debate on the institution of the Border Police:

> Unfortunately, many of our fellow people, especially people who occupy important positions in Greek society have distorted things and appear on TV and radio shows, but also with articles in the newspapers, and claim that – supposedly – neo-Greeks are xenophobic and racist. […] Greeks can diachronically be accused of one thing, of *xenolatreia* [worship of the foreigner]. Whenever all of us see strangers we strive to prove we are hospitable, to offer drinks and other amenities. But it would not be possible that it be otherwise, since, as it is known, in this country Xenios Zeus was born.

In an indirect response another representative of the governing majority said during his evaluation of the proposed legislation:

> We have responsibility as to how we have conducted ourselves as a people. I don’t accept [the narrative] of the chosen people, that is only hospitable and offering goods. These are views rightly describing the Greek people in history,

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206 Hegel (1975) saw 'native wit' as 'an affair of pleasantry' in the context of artistic prose. But here we can clearly see the significance of metaphorical language and storytelling in the context of political discourse, where politicians strive to appeal and appear to their voters as ordinary folks. In doing so, they also use ordinary peoples' experiences as proof for the validity of the positions they advocate. On this point and its significance from the point of view of rhetorical strategies, see Finlayson (2012: 760).

207 Papadimopoulos, PLDB040698: 10168
but we have always had *ta epimerous* [parts] which are destructive.  

If we look at these two distinct utterances we see a dispute not over whether there is or not racism but over the status of *filoksenia*. The first mobilizes a myth to explain why modern Greeks ‘worship’ foreigners, treat them hospitably and also why Greeks *cannot* be racist or xenophobic. In other words, the myth here plays the double function of naturalizing and beatifying the historical responses of modern Greeks to the coming of foreigners. The second contests the myth *qua* myth, only to re-introduce it as a historical datum; that is, it mythifies history. In both utterances the subject of 'enunciation' is a hospitable subject whose relationship to the foreigner can be accounted for by ‘what really happened’ in the course of history. In the first narrative, however, history is determined – ‘it could not be otherwise’ – because of an a-historical essence, while in the second narrative, there is some space for historical ‘accidents’, i.e racist responses. I am saying ‘accidents’ because, from the point of view of the second speaker, history is seen as a totality (that is available to him as an object of knowledge), in distinction from ‘the parts’ which are not aligned under the principle that governs the history of the relationship between the Greek people and the ‘foreigner’, that is the incorruptible value of hospitality.

So why is this all important for our analysis? Can’t we just accept this as an irrational, fictional moment of argumentation and disqualify it from further consideration? The

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**Footnotes:**

208 Lianis, PLDB040698: 10168

209 In the relevant literature Xenios Zeus is a fictitious entity of ancient Greek religion and mythology, one among many personifications of the 'Father of Gods and men' and ruler of Olympus. 'Xenios' is translated as 'protector of the strangers', a notion that speaks to ancient moral law, according to which strangers and suppliants ought to be welcomed and protected, see Otto (178: 23). In this literature it is a matter of consensus that myth is 'fundamentally a matter of ritual' (Nagy, 2007: 53) and that its function is to make a 'statement about the world and our place in it' (Dowden, 1992: 158).

210 Accident is what lies outside a purported essence. Pavlou 2004: 65 for examples, shows how immigration was perceived as a 'historical accident' by the Greek state, leaving its 'homogeneity' intact.
answer is no for a number of reasons: first, these formulations are rare but certainly not unique either to ‘idiosyncratic’ individuals or to political spaces of marginal ideological convictions. They belong more to the realm of ‘common sense’ and social ‘rationality’. Second, as I indicated above, we have to be attentive to where, when and how these formulations are uttered and to what other elements coexist with them rather than explain them away by relegating them to the ‘irrational’.

The discourse of *filoksenia* originates in mythology, it does have ‘primitive' origins, in fact, its beginnings are traced at the ‘dawn' of history where reality and fiction are indistinguishable. But this is not why the discourse of *filoksenia* may play mythical function in this conjuncture. As Laclau reminds us:

> in speaking of ‘mythical spaces' and their possible transformation into imaginary horizon, it is important to point out that we are not referring to anything 'primitive' and whose re-emergence in contemporary societies would constitute an outbreak of irrationality. On the contrary, myth is constitutive of any possible society.\(^\text{212}\)

The type of sophistic argument that we encounter with the invocation of the personification of Zeus as the protector of the strangers whose nativity in Greece makes racism impossible, we could say that it is irrational, empty rhetoric.\(^\text{213}\) We would thereby

\(^{211}\) The very next day, for example, as the discussion progressed more elements were added to the picture. For another MP who proclaimed the existence of ‘Xenios Zeus’, racism and xenophobia were described as paradoxical phenomena of the ‘organized crime’. Paradoxical because ‘Greekness [was] the light of love for the foreigner’ and because ‘the Archbishop Christodoulos […] said that xenophobia is not an element of [Christian] Orthodox beliefs’. See Kammenos, PLDB050698: 10206

\(^{212}\) See Laclau (1990: 67)

\(^{213}\) I am calling this argument ‘sophistic’ to emphasize that from the point of view of its composition it is absolutely logical (Xenios Zeus was born here, we are born here, therefore it is impossible that we are racists), but from the point of view of its referent it is irrational, metaphysical etc. It is an argument that we should not evaluate in terms of its form but rather in terms of its function or the effect it seeks to produce. A sophism, Foucault argues, finds support on the existence of the utterance itself, 'on the fact that words have been pronounced and remain there, at the centre of the discussion [...]’ (Foucault, 2011: 59). What is more, Foucault, relates a few years later, this kind of discourse to what he called the 'historico-political’, which as we said, is a discourse that finds support in mythical forms and 'in which truth functions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an an exclusively partisan victory’ (Foucault, 2004: 56-58).
subsume under the rubric of incomplete modernization, and irrationalism not only racism but also the means by which its social ‘absence’ is constructed, that is, the recourse to fantastic, mythical stories. However, there is another, more important sense in which the discourse of filoksenia played a double role: that of articulating a new space of representation, opposite to the previously dominant space of homogeneity; and, in distinction from that, that of constituting an imaginary space of fullness. I will explain what I mean by both.

In an official congress, entitled 'Migrants, racism, xenophobia' that took place in 2000, a number of high-profile politicians and human rights actors were invited to share their thoughts on the published findings of the second ECRI report on Greece.214 There, the Minister of Justice, M. Stathopoulos said the following:

Talking continually about our cultural identity and taking as an ideal our model and that of the majority to which we belong, we leave outside the social fabric all those who do not want to follow our model, who have different opinions.215

His intervention adopted a universalistic perspective on the issue of rights, claiming them to be inalienable and immanent to the nature of man. In a kind of 'immanent critique' style, he problematized the distance between 'theory' and 'praxis'. In that sense, his statement can be said to include at least two more statements: first, that liberalism is antithetical to racism and, second, that racism is a kind of problem associated with free speech and difference of opinion. He speaks a discourse of rights, or, we could say, a 'juridico-philosophical' discourse in which 'dense and multiple domination that never comes to an end' (Foucault, 2004: 111) is unintelligible. The Minister described a certain social objectivity characterized by 'homogeneity' and lack of pluralism. The lack of a modern, critical self-reflection stance is partly responsible:

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214 *The transcripts of the symposium are all collected in a volume, see: Ktistakis (2001).*
215 *Stathopoulos cited in Ktistakis (2001: 17).*
In Greece some, not few – boast that we don't have a problem of racism; that we
don't even have traces of racism. Those who make such claims are simply not
used to critical self-reflection. [...] There is a lot of talk about our traditions and
cultural identity. But when we talk about these ancient features we forget to
include that which is a basic characteristic of our history, of our people and our
culture: the concept of the stranger. Zeus had also the name Xenios. We do accept
the foreigner. This is part of our traditions. We do not merely tolerate him and
certainly we do not reject him. 216

In this example, we clearly see the attempt to articulate what Laclau calls a 'social myth'.

What the minister described is what he saw as the particularistic hegemony in Greece
which leaves no space for pluralism. His talk becomes revelatory as he uncovers a
purportedly concealed tradition: filoksenia. From the viewpoint of the rationalist
liberal-democrat and national subject position he occupies, filoksenia designates a space
of representation, of 'openness', alternative to the dominant myth of homogeneity. Such
statements of universal inclusion were by no means incompatible with statements about
'threatening' forms of heterogeneity materialized in 'illegal' immigration and racism. A
non-racialist, cosmopolitan homogeneity. A general acceptance of the foreigner could,
and did manage to be compatible with discourses of order and security:

'Every discrimination, therefore, which takes place between 'us' and 'them', the
different ones, according to any discriminatory criterion, could be named –
broadly conceived racism. Be it a non-violent, a mild racism, but racism
nevertheless. If we add to these the constantly growing problem of immigrants in
Greece, an international but Greek phenomenon too, we understand why the
problem of minorities has become one of the most thorny and intractable
problems, not only legally but also politically'.

In this case, I am more interested in the place from which the minister speaks. It is
important to understand that the speaker performs a subject whose relationship to the
dominant structure is antithetical. He speaks on behalf of a new objectivity of
universalism as a 'critical alternative' to the dominant discourse, as Laclau puts it (1990:

216 (ibid, 2001:18).
An alternative to exclusionary particularism would necessitate a different criterion or logic as to how the relationship to the 'foreigner' is regulated. His advocated liberal universalism appears as the 'inverted image' of the dislocated but dominant socio-political order. *Filoksenia* in this account is antithetical to racism, but the Minister does not say: 'we are hospitable'. He rather says: 'we should be hospitable, because this is who we essentially are'.

What renders the outcome of our interpretation undecidable, however, is the fact that the Minister equates racism with what we may call, *pace* Carl Schmitt, 'the political', in its abstracted form, the constitutive dimension of politics which involves the demarcation between 'friends' and 'enemies' and social antagonism. Re-iterating the Minister's argument we could say that in times of peace rather than all-out war racism amounts to the preservation of the war-like, friend-foe frontier. There is no particular content in the opposition thus described, racism *is* the political, the 'civil war', binary structure of society in Foucauldian, or the impossibility of society, in Laclauian terms. Racism in this account becomes a metaphor for all exclusion. But assuming that he speaks from a liberal, universalist, and thereby post-political perspective, exclusion itself is parochial. Exclusion, in his discourse is disavowed, it is *not* constitutive of the liberal democratic socio-political order. Whereas, for Laclau and Foucault, exclusion is constitutive of all societies, for the Minister it is that which the politics he advocates is going to eliminate. Thus, in one move the speaker projects racism on his political opponents (particularists) and displaces the political, constitutive dimension of politics.

We cannot ultimately determine whether the speaker speaks from the position of articulating a new myth from the exterior of the dominant structure, or whether he is speaking from the position of a 'myth of achieved fullness' (Laclau, 1990: 64). Is *filoksenia* here the signifier around which a new myth emerges, a 'perception or intuition.
of a fullness that cannot be granted by the reality of the present' (ibid: 64), or does it serve to dissipulate the dominant structure's relationship to racism?

The contextual uses of *filoksenia* tell us of a discourse whose function is that of praising. It is less a matter of a true or false description of society and more about a verbal 'convention' which does things: mitigates, defends, and denies. It could tentatively be argued that the invocation of *filoksenia* in the context of debates on immigration, security and racism serves a rather crucial purpose: that of concealing the traces of exclusion as society becomes a society, for, as Laclau argues, 'political victory is equivalent to the elimination of the specifically political nature of the victorious practice' (ibid: 68-69). This is precisely the function of *filoksenia* in this context. It articulates a myth primordial, or 'achieved fullness' and assumes the role of what Laclau calls a 'surface of inscription': 'any frustration or unsatisfied demand will be compensated for or offset by the myth of achieved fullness' (ibid: 69). Indeed, *filoksenia* appears to play a 'defensive' role, such that where there is *filoksenia*, there cannot be racism. From this point of view, *filoksenia* and its discourse can be re-interpreted as a weapon in the struggle for domination and the struggle for concealing exclusion. Therefore, *filoksenia*, contrary to the self-interpretations that we encounter, is far from being the antithesis of racism. It is rather a signifier that conditions the possible meanings of racism and structures in an a priori way the terms by which it becomes possible to speak about racism.

**Conclusion**

I have tried to show how a series of contingent historical events shaped the political terrain on which the 'problem' of contemporary immigration to Greece has emerged. I also tried to account for how racism became an object of problematization in the
discourse of the parliamentarians. Despite differences and contradictions, I sought to show that an analysis of the meaning of racism, can help us delimit a discourse that cuts across the political spectrum and ideological frontiers. In that sense it is possible to establish a continuity between the discourse of 'mainstream' and 'far-right' political parties and to show that narratives that became central in the discourse of the far-right L.A.O.S after 2005, were the crystallization of latent narratives in the discourse of the political mainstream during the 1990s.
5 ‘Chaos on Greek Islands’: the Emergence and Contestation of Administrative Detention of ‘Aliens’

Detention should be the exception rather than the rule, not vice versa.218

In the previous chapter I discussed how the deployment of security discourse was the proffered response to the 'event' of immigration after 1990 in the Greek context and how problematizations of migration, security and race were dividing and uniting disparate parliamentary forces. We also saw how the deployment of security was seen, paradoxically enough, as necessary in order to avert demographic decline and foreclose the possibility of racism emerging within society due to 'illegal' immigration and consequent problems and how 'hospitality' was extended into debates on immigration and security. Going beyond the analysis of these specific governmental calculations, arguments and stories the political class said to itself and to its voters, this chapter shifts attention to a particular practice, that of detaining 'illegal' immigrants and situates it in the broader legal and bureaucratic contexts which have made it possible in the first place and in which it has consolidated itself as an ordinary, regulated, yet 'exceptional', practice. Equally, this chapter engages the terms by which the practice is re-politicized and contested, thus becoming one specific locus of the political conflict over migration, security and racism. This chapter shows how administrative detention constitutes one of the loci where the disavowal of racism is amplified and how resistance to change

217 The Observer, September 27, 2009. The whole heading runs as following: 'Chaos on Greek islands as migrants demonstrate over detention camps'.
218 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (2007).
depends on a logic of defense

The first part reconstructs the 'origins' and the discursive – legal and practical – context of contemporary 'administrative' detention practices in Greece and makes an argument about the plausibility of seeing administrative detention as a 'practice of control' within the broader context of the securitization of immigration in the EU. More specifically, this context is described as a 'regime of practices' within which the practice of detaining immigrants is embedded and makes sense. To this effect I interpret empirical material that comprises laws, regulations and directives that govern the operation of these spaces. I suggest that the ambiguity that characterizes the regulation, the practice, and the naming of those spaces is in line with the idea that in question are practices which would best be understood in terms of a normalized 'state of emergency', which involves the drawing and dissimulation of an exclusive limit that is political rather than merely technocratic or administrative. Thus, the origin of these practices is political, but also, the re-activation of political logics in the context of policy and law as social practices, if analyzed in a genealogical fashion show us the contingency that penetrates the practices themselves and allow us to evaluate and criticize them.

The second part focuses on the struggle against the infamous detention center in Pagani, Lesvos. This former food warehouse became a detention center, and was closed down (temporarily) in October 2009 after months of struggles which involved the mobilization of local, regional and international organizations as well as a good deal of direct action. It is important to pause at this case because, as I will show, the publicity it acquired and

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219 The concept of a 'regime of practices' implies that of 'social logics' which allow us to understand and characterize the 'what', 'why', and 'how' of an ensemble of practices. See Glynos & Howarth (2007: 106).

220 This genealogical analytics emphasizes 'the role of power, exclusion and closure' in the formation and reproduction of discursive practices, policies or institutions. In other words, it allows one to show that what appears as given and necessary is the precarious effect of decontestation of meanings, practices etc. See Griggs and Howarth, 2012: 175)
the flow of discursive practices aiming at de-legitimizing, if not the practice of detention in general, at least crucial aspects of it, pose the question of control practices deployed in the context of 'securitized migration' and of how they appear as necessary and legitimate by reference to averting racism and the essential values that dictate doing so. Finally, it is an interesting case through which to rethink the whole question of the language and rhetoric of 'exceptionalism' in relation to security. The case of the Pagane detention center, I argue, rather than an exception to ordinary practice, as the government tried to persuade, is re-described as exemplary of certain social logics, 'technologies of control and strategies of exclusion' (Nyers 2003: 1069) whose naming allows us to characterize and re-problematize these practices.

The EU context of 'justification' of administrative detention

The politicization of migration as a threat is not a new phenomenon at the European level. Indeed, since the mid-seventies the then EC (European Communities), in particular the European Commission, was increasingly concerned by 'illegal' immigration. Illegal immigration appeared as a 'problem' in policy documents, however, mostly with regards to the economy ('illegal' migrant workers) as well as to public health safety: 'Naturally, clandestine migrants, not being subject to any medical control, are an additional health risk both to themselves and the local population'. In the Schengen Implementation Agreement and in its ratification illegal migration was framed so as to pose a danger for the territorial sovereignty of Member States. What this

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221 'Exceptionalism' can be thought of as a discursive strategy that dissimulates commonplace practice into exceptional or singular. As Puar argues against the reactions of many Americans to the evidence of torture of Iraqi detainees in Abu-Ghraib by American soldiers '[it] reveals itself not as the barometer of exception, a situation out of control, an unimaginable reality, but rather as a systemic, intrinsic, and pivotal module of power relations'. See Puar (2004: 522). See also Neal's (2006) argument drawing on Foucault's archaeological method in redressing the question of exceptionalism; and Hussain (2007).

222 See European Commission (1974). In the same period the TREVI intergovernmental network is deployed to deal with issues of terrorism and internal security. A decade later its scope is broadened to include illegal migration as potentially linked with other threats, Petrakou (2009)
framing made possible was the necessity for promoting the harmonization of visa regulations in view of the abolition of internal borders.²²³

Further, the Dublin Convention (1990) although tuned with the member states 'common humanitarian tradition',²²⁴ it was also in tune with the EU's increasingly restrictive policy regarding flows of population. More recently, notable developments point at Eurodac, the European Union's system of comparing the fingerprints of asylum-seekers and illegal migrants, Europol with its distinctive agenda of tackling organized transnational trafficking of people and illicit substances, as well as Frontex, the EU's agency for the control of external borders. All three equally highlight the deployment of technologies of control.²²⁵ What is witnessed then throughout the 1990s, is, effectively, a proliferation of arguments for the policing of migration through the development of security measures and, simultaneously, an endeavor to harmonize asylum policies in the European space. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997), as well as the Tampere meeting (1999) have been of crucial significance in this regard.²²⁶ But as Bigo argues, the integration of Europe into an area where 'freedom of movement' is promoted as an ideal,²²⁷ produced different subjects, certain of whom are eligible to enjoy this freedom and certain others not.²²⁸ Of course, the emergence of what certain theorists, pace Bigo, call 'security continuum' doesn't go without resistance, but this dimension shall be discussed in the second part of this chapter.²²⁹

The discourse of the European Commission emphasizes the necessity of regulating

²²⁴ See European Union (1997: 1–12)
²²⁵ Bigo (2005)
²²⁶ See Huysmans (2006: 68)
²²⁷ For an analysis that focuses on the language of freedom of movement as a source of legitimacy for policing in the EU, see Bigo & Guild (2005). The contributors to the volume justify an analysis at the European level on the basis of the de-territorialization and globalization that have forced national, territorial and territorially bound claims to recede.
²²⁸ Bigo & Guild (2005)
²²⁹ See Bigo (1994)
migration. It takes as its priority the combat against 'illegal' migration focusing on a number of specific policy areas among which border security, return and cooperation with 'third countries'. By distinguishing between 'illegal' and legal migration, the EC argues that legal, 'labor migration can contribute both to tackling the effects of demographic change in the EU and in the satisfaction of labor market needs'\textsuperscript{230}. In the previous chapter, we saw how, effectively, this discourse for which immigration, if regulated, is an asset rather than a 'problem', was officially endorsed but diverged significantly from the kinds of arguments that were prevalent among the political class in Greece irrespective of political party identities and boundaries. In the arguments I examined, the 'demographic' was an issue of the order of the continuity not of productive forces but of national and racial identity. What is mostly interesting from the point of view of questions about the relationship between racism and security is the rationale the EC adopts:

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\text{[\ldots] it would be unrealistic to believe that illegal immigration flows can be completely stopped. Public perception which tends to establish a link between societal problems and illegal immigration should also be taken into account. The EU and its Member States must promote a rational debate based on objective information in order to eradicate racism and xenophobia [\ldots].}^{231}
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We can see here the congruence with the parliamentary discourses I examined in the previous chapter: 'Illegal' migration is framed as a given problem and security practices are deemed necessary and appropriate responses. The differences seem to lie in the following: whereas the official text of the EC recognizes the complexity of the phenomenon and admits to the impossibility of ultimately resolving it, the political representatives in Greece were largely less prone to such understanding, at least in certain contexts. Further, whereas the EC hopes to 'eradicate' racism and xenophobia, the

\textsuperscript{231} European Commission (2006): 4
political representatives in Greece saw the enforcement of security measures as necessary in order to prevent racism from 'emerging'. In both cases, however, the possibility of racism as absent and therefore as non-constitutive of any social order is clearly articulated. There is in both cases the articulation of the myth of society as devoid of racial antagonism and, therefore, antagonism tout court.

The position of the practice of detention and the question of 'exceptionalism'

In 1991, a first attempt to regulate migration in Greece, although in highly restrictive ways,\(^{232}\) is introduced in the Greek legislation. Law 1975/1991, regulating matters of entry, stay, work, deportation of *allodapi* ['aliens'], as well as, recognition of refugees, can be interpreted as a twofold act.\(^{233}\) On the one hand, it meant to align Greek legislation with the Dublin Convention. This latter has been a node in setting up the basis for an integrated asylum policy in the European space with provisions about 'illegal' migration. But besides the developments at the European level, this law can be seen as a political response to the 'problem' that the Greek state, in particular, was dealing with at the time: the influx of migrants as a result of the dismantling of the Soviet Union and socio-political turbulence in the Balkans.\(^{234}\) Although it is not until the 2452/1996 Law that a provision is explicitly taken about the 'institution, administrative entry, staffing and operation of Centers of Temporary Stay of *allodapi* applicants for refugee status',\(^{235}\) it is worth noting that their deployment as control measures had already been made possible by the inaugurating Law 1975/1991. In this law there was no clear provision for spaces of detention, but what was clearly enacted through Articles 5

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\(^{234}\) See Petrakou (2001)

\(^{235}\) Law 2452/1996.
and is the category of *lathrometanastis* ("smuggled migrant"), as well as the conditions for prohibition from entry into the Greek territory. If we take into consideration that detention in borderline zones is not detention *within* the territory, we can see how the 1991 law makes possible the practice of detention: it introduces the distinction between legal and illegal entry into the country and lays out the circumstances under which prohibition of entry is imposed (non-valid travel documents, threat to public health, potential threat to public and national security etc.). In other words, prohibition from entry into the territory is not literally prohibition 'from entry'; rather, a form of repression since it is enacted for those who have already entered, though, 'illegally' so. It thus produces a grey zone, neither inside nor outside the territory, a transit zone, which, according to Article 8, 'does not [...] constitute entry into the Greek territory'. This zone is what subsequently would be designated by the 2452/1996 Law as CTS (Centers of Temporary Stay).

Is this legal enactment a unique characteristic of the Greek case? In 2006, under the supervision of Elpert Guild, Judit Tóth submitted a briefing paper to the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs under the title 'A Typology of Transit Zones'. There, a number of interesting points arose: first, it was argued that these spaces across Europe are an exception to the ordinary legal regime, and, by consequence, there is absence of publicity and transparency. This becomes clear when the author attempts to give a satisfying answer as to who stays in 'Transit Zones':

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236 The term *lathrometanastis* corresponds roughly to 'clandestine migrant'. However, I use the term 'smuggled migrant' because the prefix λάθρο- is used to connote, besides illegality, that migrants are facilitated by smugglers/traffickers.

237 For Nyers (2003: 1080), detention of 'illegals' is a kind of spatial practice, constitutive of abjection, which, simultaneously, constitutes the limit of the territorial state: 'At the limit, there are the airport 'waiting area', the immigration detention facilities, the deportation flight. These are the *mezzanine spaces of sovereignty* – that is, those spaces which are in-between the inside and the outside of the state' (ibid: 1080-1).

238 Tóth (2006)
'It is not so easy to describe the composition of detainees due to the limited information and publicity' and, referring to the practice of detention in Malta, 'excluding the media seems to be the government’s policy which suspends public control over the conditions, legality and procedure inside the centers without justified reasons'. Second, that 'it is not only rejected passengers and irregularly residing foreign nationals who are being detained in member states but also asylum applicants' and that the purpose is 'to detain rejected migrants until they are returned to a state that is obliged to receive them back, including their country of origin'. Third, that 'Transit Zones' is a 'broad term covering different domestic law in EU member states'.

The author makes also the point that 'from a sociological point of view, camps or transit zones may present the institutionalization of temporariness as a form of radical social exclusion and marginalization in modern society and a conservation of borders as dividing lines'. However, it is pointed out that '[t]ransit zones cannot be considered as an extraterritorial exception from human rights obligations'. The author devotes a whole section invoking international binding and non-binding norms that should regulate the practice of detention and expulsion. However, it is only from a normative point of view that it is claimed that 'transit zones' cannot be extraterritorial exceptions. The statement, it could be argued, is prescriptive rather than descriptive. This type of analysis and understanding of what constitutes exception is indicative of human rights discourse at large and representative of a broader 'mindset' for which that which is not right, unfounded or arbitrary is impossible. If human rights discourse operates within a broader discursive framework of managing difference, this kind of understanding implies a form of 'closure' of that framework in which contingency and, indeed, the political have no place. Beyond this, a series of questions arise here about the relationship of security/policing measures with legal norms. Isn't it the case that 'exception' or
'emergency' are precisely the terms whose enunciation constitutes/justifies the suspension of the 'norm'? Is not transparency in this context nothing but desirable yet perhaps not necessarily so?

It could be argued that there is a disjuncture between 'official' European Union texts and everyday practices, especially so, because these practices implicate different member states, agencies, laws, regulations and directives. But such line of argument is difficult to sustain, as there is ambivalence even within the 'official' level. For example in the 1547/2002 recommendation, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary assembly voices its concern about ill-treatment and violation of human rights during expulsion procedures, including that of detention:

[...]that these are not isolated events. All too often, persons awaiting expulsion are subjected, in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, to discrimination, racist verbal abuse, dangerous methods of restraint and even violence and inhuman or degrading treatment. All too often, the officials responsible for enforcing expulsion orders resort to an unjustified, improper or even dangerous use of force. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) believes that there are clear risks of inhuman treatment in the deportation of foreigners; during the preparatory phase, during expulsion (on flights or on boats) and on arrival.

(my emphasis)

And, further:

The Assembly insists that the Council of Europe's fundamental values will be threatened if nothing is done to combat the present climate of hostility towards refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants, and to encourage respect for their safety and dignity in all circumstances.

The sense one gets from this report is that the particular practice far from conforming with human rights norms, tends to be institutionalized in the opposite direction. Despite contending that 'exceptional' measures are not so exceptional in that they are normalized, the report cannot, or, indeed, should not, trace the logic that permeates the practice. It

239 Council of Europe (2005).
cannot, in other words, explain the absence of what human rights practitioners call 'good practice'. It is a normative and practical recommendation. However, the logic it fails to acknowledge is that there are 'circumstances' under which moral, juridical and other norms are de facto suspended. That the practice is constituted by political logics. There are 'circumstances' under which 'risks of inhuman treatment' are minor risks compared to other risks, and that, therefore, it is no wonder that 'respect and dignity' are within a certain world-view of secondary import. Last, one cannot but observe the use of such language that casts the problem in terms of 'threats' for 'our' fundamental values and 'risks' for human security. Isn't it by way of the same language that the practices of detention and expulsion are eventually articulated? 'Illegal' immigration is thus seen not only as posing a problem to sovereignty and territorial borders, but also as posing a problem for what we consider 'ordinary' and 'common-sense' cultural norms. But which are these circumstances which, despite the assembly's good will, legitimate the response to 'threats'?

In 2008 the European Parliament and Council officially adopted the Directive to Member States 'on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals'. This directive compiles articles on such issues as non-refoulement, best interests of the child, family life and state of health, voluntary departure, return decision, entry ban, etc. This public document is interesting in many respects, however, it is also self-contradictory; because, having laid out all the legal norms according to which all Member States should enact their practice, it goes on with the last article before the final provisions:

Article 18
Emergency Situations
1. In situations where an exceptionally large number of third-country nationals to be returned places an unforeseen heavy burden on the capacity of the detention
facilities of a Member State or on its administrative or judicial staff, such a Member State may, as long as the exceptional situation persists, decide to allow for periods for judicial review longer than those provided for under the third subparagraph of Article 15(2) and to take urgent measures in respect of the conditions of detention derogating from those set out in Articles 16(1) and 17(2).

The third subparagraph, however, notes:

3. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as allowing Member States to derogate from their general obligation to take all appropriate measures, whether general particular, to ensure fulfillment of their obligations under this Directive.\textsuperscript{240}

The provision is clear enough; nothing in the article suggests the suspension of certain obligations that derive from the directive. It is contradictory, however, that the article itself pictures a situation in which that suspension is possible. In other words, the directive clearly recognizes for the Member States the right to enact 'exceptional' and 'urgent' measures. Then, subparagraph three is actually a provision to state that exceptional measures should only be exceptional and that by no means should the obligations derived by the directive permanently cease. However, 'emergency' does not refer to an objective condition; it rather implies discursive and repetitive linguistic practices and it can well be construed as permanent. There is lack of a comprehensive definition of emergency and it is highly indeterminate what 'exceptionally large number' and 'unforeseen heavy burden' actually are. Obviously, there is plenty of space for interpretation here which, in a sense, echoes Campbell's thesis that 'danger is an effect of interpretation'.\textsuperscript{241}

There is no question whether it could be possible that such legal document could allow for violations of human rights or any other 'derogations', nor would it ever be possible for it to incorporate an inquiry into what the 'exception' or the 'emergency' is. Such

\textsuperscript{240} Council of Europe (2008).
\textsuperscript{241} Campbell (1998: 2)
vagueness is inescapable, because 'emergency', 'exception' or 'necessity' demarcates that which 'cannot have legal form'; as Agamben rightly points out, this situation to which we refer as 'emergency' cannot have a legal definition 'given its position at the limit between politics and law. An emergency, therefore, is a 'no-man's land between public law and political fact'.

How is an emergency situation related to the practice of detention and more broadly with the deportation machine in Greece from a legal/administrative point of view? The institutionalization and inscription of discourses of emergency in the law and in 'practice' play a crucial role in shaping migration policy. All subsequent laws, especially the 2910/2001 and the 3386/2005 define the criteria according to which an allodapos may be detained. If someone is implicated in a series of crimes that range from 'national treason' to 'fraud', or if someone is considered as 'danger for public health', or if someone figures in the 'unwanted' list of allodapoi, then, one may lawfully be detained. In addition, if someone enters illegally into the country, regardless of whether he/she intends to apply for asylum is equally eligible for detention up to 3 months until deportation, if possible, takes place. The 2910/2001 refers to detention centers as 'Xoroi Kratisis Allodapon' (Allodapoi Detention Centres), which is different from the 2452/1996 designation of these spaces (CTS); and both, are different from the 3386/2005 designation 'Eidikoi Xoroi Paramonis Allodapon' (Allodapon Special Stay Space). And these names are all different from what seems to be, more often than not, a euphemism: 'filoxenia centre' [hospitality center]. The latter is commonly met in

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242 Agamben (2005:1). Agamben has been criticized for over-stressing the 'logic of exceptionality' risking reducing immigrants to objects of biopolitical control stripped off any agency and capacity to resist. See Squire (2011) and Mezzadra (2011).

243 Law 2910/2001

244 Law 3386/2005
everyday language, media discourse, but also in official documents. Indeed, as I show further on, one of the points NGOs occasionally make is that these centers are not worth their name, i.e 'hospitality' or 'reception' centers.

Studying legislative documents in order to find interesting aspects about the practice of administrative detention is to be faced with constantly iterating definitions, ambiguities and unintelligible legalistic 'jargon', but nothing that relates more substantially to 'emergency' can be easily traced. A relatively more intriguing task is to spot the 'in-between' of the law and its implementation. Indeed, an official letter circulated in December 2005 by the Ministry of Interior, regarding the application of the Law 3386/2005, an otherwise petty document, is more revealing than one would normally expect. In the section 'About Article 81-Allodapon Special Stay Spaces' we read:

Finally, it is noted that custody of *lathrometanastes* [smuggled/illegal migrants] in the country takes place according to the 'Poseidonio' and 'Balkanio' plans in centers of temporary stay of *lathrometanastes*, the jurisdiction regarding their operation belongs to the Prefecture. (my emphasis)

The plans which regulate the practice of detention of 'illegals' and whose names evoke metaphorically the concept of frontiers (Greece's northern frontier is in the Balkans, whereas Poseidon – the God of the Sea in ancient Greek mythology – evokes the image of the sea as Greece's surrounding frontier) are in themselves quite extraordinary findings. Michalis Chrischooedis, ex-Minister of Public Order, responding to a question in the parliament said:

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246 The reception centres for minors under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health are usually 'open' and conventionally named 'hospitality structures'. But it is equally conventional to encounter the term 'closed hospitality centre'. See, for example, Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection (2012).
247 See Ministry of Interior 2005: 6
I was asked which kentra filoksenias [hospitality centers] the country has. Currently, we have three organized plans for the refugees' filoxenia. Poseidonio, that which concerns maritime migrants, the Balkanio, that which concerns the migrants and refugees coming from the North [...] We should not point out what is minor and fail to see the major. It is not positive for the country itself.249

In another instance, during the Iraq crisis in 2003, a conservative MP asks the Minister of Health:

Which measures has the Government, in cooperation with the Higher Commission [UNHCR] and the European Union, taken in order to deal with a potential refugee wave to our country, given that it is known that the country cannot afford a single refugee?

An excerpt from the lengthy response reads as follows:

First of all you should know that there are security and public order agencies to contain the danger at least of lathrometanastes arriving [...] You can only see how many lathrometanastes file asylum applications in each European Country and especially, in comparison to Greece, which is entry point. [...] Regarding the issue of violently displaced [...] there are classified plans that you ought to know about. [...] It is the Poseidonio, the Balkanion [...]250

To conclude here, it seems plausible to argue that these 'classified' plans are emergency plans. From the little we can know about them it would not be a mistake to infer that they designate situations such as that described in the EU directive above. However, there is clearly a 'slip' from an emergency situation to ordinary practice, or a move in which ordinary practice of dealing with the phenomenon of migration acquires emergency characteristics. It is this displacement that accounts for the ambiguity that characterizes the way in which these practices are named and organized. Repeated use of derogatory terms used interchangeably with others as well as the use of the 'idiom of filoxenia' are also important in signaling danger while dissimulating it.

There is a sense in which 'administrative' detention appears as exceptional, but the ways  

249 PLDB231101: 1713.  
250 Thanos, PLDB010403: 3601
in which this 'exceptionality' is imagined can radically differ and produce different effects. From a normative point of view, the exception takes on the meaning of a derogation from established and taken-for-granted norms. From another point of view, exception means transferring a problem from the realm of 'ordinary politics' to that of 'security' and 'existential threats'.

From our point of view, we can speak of the extension and normalization of security discourse. Exceptionalism is the language by which security practices are dissimulated, being portrayed as 'exceptional' rather than ordinary. I shall now move on to a brief description of the practice in Greece before focusing on Pagane.

The terra incognita of administrative detention in Greece

If detention of foreigners was described above as by its very nature irregular and non-transparent, it can be shown that in fact it is highly regulated. During its first visit to Greece in 1993, the CPT delegation visited the Aliens Holding Centre at Athens Airport. It noted that 'the establishment of specific centers for this category of detained person is a very positive development, provided they are properly equipped' (CPT: 1994). The CPT conducts regular visits and drafts reports to which the Greek Government is obliged to respond. The reports typically raise issues such as hygiene, access to light, outdoor activities, medical treatment, ventilation of detention facilities, bedding, food standards, heating, overcrowding, ill-treatment and so forth. These reports determine the extend to which detention conditions are humane or inhumane and degrading. From what seems to be a highly routinized practice of communication between the CPT and the competent Greek authorities, it is observed that the CPT typically decries the conditions of

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251 Although there are different approaches to securitization there is a think a minimal common ground, i.e that securitization involves the construction of an existential threat to an object. See Waever et al 1998; also, Campbell 1998[1992]. The concept of securitization implies a questioning of realist and objectivist assumptions. As Campbell argues, 'Danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat.' (1998:1-2). For a more elaborated account of securitization see chapter 3.
Internment in administrative detention, prison and psychiatric asylums and underlines the fact that inmates are and should be treated as subjects of fundamental rights and dignity: in other words, the CPT denounces the 'logic' of abjection and the 'logic' of irregularity that characterizes those spaces.\textsuperscript{252} The Greek authorities, in response, ensure that measures will be taken, that the principles guiding their practices are geared towards 'combating [of] every racist behavior',\textsuperscript{253} and rarely takes responsibility for abuse and degrading treatment. Over the course of twenty years and eleven visits, the reports and the responses reveal that, if anything, 'aliens' detention centers have multiplied and conditions have deteriorated.

The CPT as well as ECRI are in fact contesting the logic of non-transparency or concealment that governs this practice in the Greek context. Both committees by their very mode of operating, i.e publicizing details about detention, they work against the logic of concealment and denounce the practice of Greek authorities of refusing entry to human rights organizations and legal advisors into these spaces.\textsuperscript{254} Further, ECRI, in particular is equally contesting the logic of criminalization and irregularity of asylum seekers pointing out the 'need to avoid administrative detention of asylum seekers'.\textsuperscript{255} In its overall assessment in its second report, ECRI provided a diagnosis of what according to them the 'problem' of racism consists in:

\textit{[...]} problems of racism, intolerance, discrimination and exclusion persist. \textit{[...]} these problems are connected to the low level of recognition, within Greek

\textsuperscript{252} The logic of irregularity, regarding not (only) the production of 'irregular' migrants but also the operation of administrative detention, is clear in the fact that the only facilities in which foreigners are not detained are prisons. They are conventionally detained in police posts, border posts, makeshift facilities, containers and so forth. The CPT states that 'a prison is by definition not a suitable place in which to detain someone who is neither convicted nor suspected of a criminal offense.' (CPT, 2002). However, in the Greek legislation as I showed above the simple unauthorized entry entails criminal prosecution and therefore the internment is not strictly speaking 'administrative'.

\textsuperscript{253} CPT (2006).

\textsuperscript{254} European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (2004)

\textsuperscript{255} European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (2009).
society, of its multicultural reality... need to raise awareness among the general public of the multicultural reality of Greek society.  

This 'genre' of discourse, although highly technical and bureaucratic, involves no little amount of storytelling. For example, in the report of the LIBE delegation of the European Parliament, it is surprising to encounter all the common topoi and narratives about Greece belonging 'traditionally to migrant sending countries' and being 'taken-by-surprise' by the 'new and unexpected phenomenon' of immigration and so forth. Interestingly, this report re-describes a case of what we have called the 'logic of defense'. Here is the recounting of the meeting with the then minister of Public Order, M. Polidoras:

At the start of the meeting the atmosphere was a little tense. The minister reacted in a blunt way to the statement of our head of delegation that the conditions on Samos are considered deplorable and remarkably 'chastised' her for not being appropriately 'polite'. However, the minister went on by saying that he wishes to discuss the problem of what he phrased as 'uninvited visitors' openly.

The idea of a logic of defense encapsulates here two dimensions: first, it captures the modality of responses on the part of Greek officials who feel 'threatened' by critical comments. Critique might elicit 'defensive' responses but it may as well elicit a kind of 're-framing' whereby the subject will put itself in a different position from which it is possible to initiate change and perceive of reality in a different way. The second dimension of the logic of defense here lies with the framing of the 'problem' as 'problem' and with an understanding of the 'situation': 'It is an emergency situation and Greece is trying to cope with it as adequately as possible', the minister evaluated.

The mundane repetition of 'emergency' entails a politics of exception. At a practical level this appears to involve strategies of de-individuation of migrants. As it was

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256 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (2000).
257 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (2007).
258 (ibid., 2007: 8).
described by the writer of the report:

there was a palpable sense of injustice/bewilderment as to why some groups were automatically detained for 3 months (Iraqis, Palestinians and other Arabic speakers) while other groups for 15 days only (Afghans, Somalis, and Eritreans). Most of the detainees the delegation has spoken with identified themselves as Iraqis, Afghans or Palestinians, but stated that the authorities, upon reception, arbitrarily listed them as 'Lebanese'. [...] the authorities appeared to have no standard reliable procedure in place to attempt to determine the origin of undocumented aliens (i.e through the use of specialized interpreters).²⁵⁹

More broadly, these strategies rather than bespeaking a 'lack of experience', can be interpreted as part of strategies of deterrence of migrants. What was uncannily described in 2007 as 'the fear that “being too human” would act as an incentive to other potential irregular migrants',²⁶⁰ was stated clearly by a prominent member of the government in a radio interview in 2013 in which he said that the rationale of re-detaining migrants upon release, is to make clear that 'they are unwanted' and to force them to consider voluntary repatriation.²⁶¹ The 'effectiveness' of detention centers is not, he said, that all migrants can be detained, but that it becomes known in their countries that in Greece there is nothing but the threat of constant detention. It is all part of 'anti-immigration policy'.²⁶²

The spatial ordinance of detention facilities and their distribution within the territory bring us back to the idea of a logic of defense and blur shaky distinctions between migration 'management' and 'securitization'. As the collective and anonymous author of a Foucault-inspired publication on migrant detention and 'techniques of subjectification' argue, the distribution of detention centers throughout the national territory resembles lines of fortification and entrenchments against the 'invader': 'Often', it is argued, 'they

²⁵⁹ (ibid., 2007: 5)
²⁶⁰ (ibid., 2007: 7)
²⁶¹ 'Voluntary repatriation' is provisioned in the EU’s 'return directive' and is funded by the European Return Fund (ERF). The ERF as well as the EBF (External Borders Fund), the Integration Fund and the Refugee Fund are 'designed to intervene in a stable situation and not to tackle emergencies and crises' European Commission (2011). See also Appendix 5b.
²⁶² Georgiadis (2013)
manifest an operation of interceptive limit-zones, impediments for the migration flows.\textsuperscript{263}

**Pagane**

Pagane is an industrial area in Lesvos – a sizable island in the northern part of the Aegean sea off the borderline separating Turkey and Greece. The detention centre in Pagane opened its gates in 2003 after two years of inability to find itself a permanent location. The reasons for this, according to officials, volunteers and other citizens implicated in the organization of the centre, varied: The first detention centre was more like a makeshift camp located near the island's airport which then moved in the city of Mytilene in the building of the old city prison. This location was eventually abandoned, according to the Prefecture employees because it was 'miserable' but also because of locals' reactions to its establishment. Again, according to the officials, the new location was preferable because it was not in an inhabited area, and also because the building was of 'significant capacity' (Koukouriki, 2006). Koukouriki remarks that despite the poor condition of the ex-prison, the centre was more 'open'; there was more people involved to volunteer and provide all kinds of aid. By contrast, the warehouse at Pagane that was used as temporary detention centre until 2009 was located in an uninhabited industrial zone.\textsuperscript{264} The building is two-story – the two-stores are internally separated with barbed wire. There are five big halls, each having one wash-basin and one toilette. In the upper yard there are additional showers and toilettes. In the lower yard there are two

\textsuperscript{263} Ergoneksivrisi (2008). The booklet under the title 'Migrant Detention for Migrants: Techniques of Confinement and Subjectification', is collectively written and draws on a plurality of sources (including former detainees) record more than 90 different locations in which migrants are or have been detained. They offer exhaustive descriptions of how disciplinary power is exercised (and resisted) in the context of detention.

\textsuperscript{264} See CPT (2006: 35). In the course of its visit to the detention centre observed 'extremely dirty' conditions, 'dysfunctional or no heating systems, an absence of warm water and broken windows [...] defective sanitary and shower arrangements', 'decrepit and bug-infested' blankets and mattresses.
port-cabins, one for the police with additional protection, and one for the doctors. The whole yard is surrounded by 2-3 meters high barbed wire.

The organizational structure of the centre was strictly hierarchical. At the top of the hierarchy were the police officers, 2-3 per shift. The 'chief-translator' had been of a key-role in the (self-)organization of the detainees, but as separate from this role was that of the 'key-master'. He would be responsible for a number of organizational tasks and he would enjoy the privilege of wandering around in the yard throughout the day whereas this was not the case for the rest of the detainees obliged in internal confinement. In terms of management, the Ministry of Interiors had given the jurisdiction to the Prefecture which, in this particular case, had a committee assigned to run the centre as to the provision of supplies, medication, resources and so on. These institutions would co-operate closely with NGOs as well as with certain local individuals, however, the Prefecture had not been active in informing the local society about the centre, its role and so forth. In terms of both guarding and asylum related matters, the Ministry of Public Order (currently Ministry of Protection of the Citizen) and the Hellenic Police were the sole authorities. Lower-rank offices, like the aliens division would run more bureaucratic tasks. The Hellenic Police co-operates closely with the Hellenic Coast Guard that patrols the borders and detains 'boat-people' who then are held in custody by the Police. Both agencies were and still are said to co-operate occasionally with local fishermen and others in arresting 'illegals'.

Among the NGOs that have been active at the centre have been the following: The Greek Ombudsman, see www.synigoros.gr; Amnesty International – Greek section, see www.amnesty.org.gr; the Greek Refugee Council, see www.gcr.gr, and the Medecins Sans Frontieres, see www.msf.gr. The employee of the Allodapon office says that generally there is good cooperation with the NGOs except for the fact that often they are 'denunciatory' (Koukouriki, 2006). I will pick up on that further on in this chapter. Documentory sources tell of fishermen approaching inbound vessels in order to appropriate either the vessel itself or the outboard motor engine. See Dionellis (2008).
screening of 'illegal' migration, such as the Europol and the Eurodac. The major problems that had been identified by Koukouriki’s co-constructed with interviewees data were with regard to food and health, hygiene, guarding practices, incompetent to deal with culturally different people personnel, building infrastructure (sewage, heating), impediments in accessing asylum information and procedures, non-segregation of males/females/minors (there were 10 abortions reported until 2004 when detainees were segregated). The center’s demographics are quite telling especially regarding the detainees' nationalities. Amongst the 3,500 detainees held in Pagane over a period of 3 years, that is, until 2004, there were mostly people from: Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco, Egypt, Eritrea, Lebanon, and Kurds from Iraq, Turkey and Iran. From interviews with detainees it has been argued that the basic psychological symptoms amongst them have been affects of anger, anxiety, grief, fear, guilt, and less so, nostalgia.

During the period 2003-2009 media reports on the detention Centre in Pagane were scarce, evidence of the inexistence of the practice in media discourse. Yet, since 2004, Eleftherotypia – largely acknowledged as a newspaper of democratic 'sensibility' – was articulating its opposition in moral terms, denoted by such signifiers as 'shame' for 'human civilization' or 'our civilization'.267 In turn, those articles were more often than not, not the product of journalist research but reports on what NGOs 'discovered' there. Another report reads in the title 'verboten’ – forbidden or prohibited in German – to characterize the decision of the authorities to not let in the centre members of the Amnesty International.268 Simultaneously, a concern is voiced as to the impact of such practices on the image of Greece in the exoteriko [abroad], given, according to the journalist, that such non-transparent practices take place in 'third-world banana

republics'. It is also to be noted that during this period the articles, despite that they adopt a denunciatory standpoint, repeat the very terms that articulate and justify the securitization of migration. Hence, in all three stories, terms such as 'lathrometanastis', 'filoxenia' appear recurrently. Metaphors of 'vehicle/boat/ship' and 'natural disaster' are mobilized to characterize the effects of 'boat people' on the island. Thus, Mytilene is said to be 'sinking' or 'flooding'. Media reports of that period can be said to be partaking in the 'tropical construction' of a particular phenomenon.269 I Kathimerini, a liberal right-wing, widely read newspaper, is host to only two articles about Pagane during this period. The first one, in 2003, refers to a 'battle' between the different clans of detainees, quoting a police officer saying, almost ironically, about the incident that a law of omerta amongst the detainees regulates such incidents: 'Nobody knew and nobody had seen anything.'270 The second article, published in 2008, mobilizes evidence about the number of illegally entering allodapoi and reports on that 'local societies, even the most good-willing ones, are getting concerned'. Simultaneously, the article takes some distance from 'more harsh' societies, such as that of Patmos for whom migrants and refugees are 'sources of infection'.271 An equally interesting article appears in Ta Nea, in 2008, whose title reads 'Summer of Lathrometanastes' by which emphasis is drawn on the increased numbers of alien 'abjects' who reach Mytilene's shores.272 Clearly, such 'particularizing synecdoches',273 that is, tropes that designate 'the part standing for the whole', have the function of fostering insecurity by creating a sense of invasion in that they represent our 'summer' as taken over by illegal migrants.274 Solidarity to migrants has, occasionally, re-articulated some of these elements, such as the image of the

269 For an extensive discussion of the role of metaphors in practices that discriminate against particular actors, see Reislig and Wodak (2001).
270 I Kathimerini, 3 October 2003.
272 Ta Nea, 13 August 2008.
273 Reislig & Wodak (2001: 57)
274 (ibid., 2001: 57).
uninvited intruder who is cast as 'unworthy of our hospitality', in order to ironically
subvert them and, as it were, 'return the message in an inverted form'.

Such was the intention of a poster-parody of the Ministry of Tourism campaign that was
widely disseminated and 'decorated' hundreds of streets in Athens and Thessaloniki.

On the one hand, the original poster was depicting Greek islands as a utopic space where
people can enjoy and treat themselves to a 'true experience'. The intended audience to
this message was clearly the 'tourist', to whom the main motto of the campaign was
addressed. This poster can be interpreted as a 'moment' of the discourse of hospitality.

By contrast, the poster designed by the anti-deportation movement clearly iterates the
meaning of 'hospitality' and deconstructs it by showing its limits. This is because it keeps
with the background of tourists who have been invited and splash around in crystal-clear
waters, but there is in the modified image an 'intruder', right at the forefront. The
experience of the wrecked refugee, whose body lies – alive or dead – face down in the
sand, becomes more of a 'central' and real experience. The poster shows that 'we' are
inadequate in our hospitality or that 'our' hospitality is reserved for certain guests but not

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275 For an analysis of subversion of hegemonic meaning through re-articulation, see Butler
Parker explains the use of this idea in discourse theory: '...The way modes of speech call
upon a response, and the way that a response may send the message back as if in reverse,
thereby, revealing some truth that was concealed in the original message', see Parker (2005:
171).

276 Political wall posters in Greece are a very common medium among grassroots groups for the
dissemination and circulation of news, events, calls for action, dissent and demonstration,
denunciations and critiques. They are prominent means for articulating the world-views of
grassroots political groupings. The 'summer' and the whole mythology of Greek sea-side
filoxenia are nicely subverted in a wall-poster that filled the streets in Athens, Salonica, and
elsewhere, in the summer of 2007 (see Appendix Figure 5j). It is designed in mimicry of a
campaign launched by the Ministry of Tourism (see figure 5k). The poster resonates many of
the problematics that emerge in the context of securitized migration: the making visible of a
prevailing conception of a 'superior' but 'transgressive' identity. The 'symptom' that spoils the
harmonious representation of 'Greece' by official discourse as a hospitable, tourist destination.
Interestingly, it was printed both in English and in Greek, as if it intended to break with the
official logic of concealing the transgression from the 'West'. Elsewhere, I comment further on
political posters that picture solidarity to the migrants and opposition to technologies of
control.
for others. The poster was printed both in Greek and in English. It was addressed to 'us' to make clear the distance between hospitality proper an hospitality for 'sale'. It was addressed both to Greeks and to tourists from the exoteriko [abroad], breaking thus with the logic of concealment and making visible to the western 'gaze' that hospitality is not absolute, rather a sham. What for official politics is always a 'shame' to hide under the carpet, what must be concealed from the eyes of Greece's western counterparts, the anti-deportation movement would normally strive to make visible.

In the course of collecting 'data' for detention centers, one of my informants, the Deputy Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection told me that he had given permission to an NGO representative and academic to visit the borderline detention center in Venna. Presumably he knew that this person would find the premises hardly deserving the name 'hospitality', but he said to me that the person had abused the authority he was given. What the NGO person did was that he wrote a report and sent it to the media for publication. What has been taking place in the centre ought to have remain unspoken of. 'Our' reputation of hospitality should not have been impinged upon. For the Deputy Minister the issue of detention was of a practical nature, which he was eager to deal with. But he clearly did not see the publication, or, indeed, the politicization of the matter as necessary.

The period of mobilization: hunger strikes, No Border camp and the international 'other'

'Illegal migration', after the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004, became again a signifier of 'threat' during the period 2007-2009. (in)Continuous flows of people mostly from the sea (the other path on the land-border with Turkey is planted with land mines).  

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Greece is party to the Mine Ban Treaty (1997) however up to 2007 it had not destroyed any land mines. See: http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2007/greece.html. Deaths and injuries of people crossing the border are not uncommon. The international Campaign to Ban Landmines, an organization monitoring the
became a preferred subject for media discourse; detention centers were already 'packed'; while, at the same time, makeshift camp in Patras,\textsuperscript{278} people in the streets and neighborhoods in Athens, queues at the Aliens division station in P. Ralli st., 'accidents',\textsuperscript{279} sweep arrests, revival of 'citizens groups' for the protection of the city, a riot of Muslim migrants;\textsuperscript{280} were making for an 'explosive' mix. A dislocation experienced as a 'disorder' in need to enact 'zero tolerance to illegal migration', according to the Minister of Public Order.\textsuperscript{281}

It is in this context, dominated discursively by a growing sense of a general crisis, the 'problem' of Pagane started to become increasingly visible. By way of the Pagane 'case', though not exclusively, it became possible for the new government to proceed to official declarations of policy 'shift' in October 2009, regarding illegal migration, detention and asylum. Months of activism, the intervention of international human rights organizations and intergovernmental agencies, eventually forced the staging of dramatic rituals of official acknowledgement of the 'problem', repudiations of 'bad practice' and so forth.

A revised legislation and a presidential decree passed in July 2009 that allowed implementation of the Ottawa Treaty estimates the death toll to over 66 deaths and 44 injuries. See The New York Times, 6 January 2009. Available online at: \texttt{http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/world/europe/06iht-mines.4.19133102.html?pagewanted=all&rr=0}. [Accessed 10-01-2010]. In March 2012, the neo-nazi party Golden Dawn proposed the retreat from the Ottawa Treaty and the planting of more mines as a deterrent to illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{278}

For a critical redescription of the events in Patras that led to the violent dismantling of the refugee camp, see Ladas (2009).\textsuperscript{279} Between October 2008 and March 2009, three foreign immigrants lost their lives nearby the Petrou Ralli Division of Aliens chased down by police officers. See \textit{Epsilon}, 27 September 2009. [Available online at: \texttt{http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=85897}]. Petrou Ralli was one of the areas of focus in the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture in 2010, which reported ill-treatment by police officers and little forensic evidence attributed to 'the non-functioning system of police investigation and complaints mechanisms. This creates an environment of powerlessness for victims of physical abuse and may perpetuate a system of impunity for police violence.' See UN Human Rights Council (2011).\textsuperscript{280} In late May 2009 a police officer during a 'sweep' operation at the city centre of Athens was witnessed to have torn pages of the Qu'ran of a person in custody. What followed was an outburst of Muslim communities in Athens and a retaliation for their riots with the burning down of a makeshift mosque with 5 injured Bangladeshi immigrants. \textit{To Vima}, 24 May 2009.\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Eleftherotipia}, 2 September 2009.
detention for up to 6 months, had its own unintended consequences. The detention centre in Pagane was by August detaining more than a thousand people, men, women and children. During the summer of 2009 a great number of direct action protest took place in the islands, and elsewhere, including several blockings of suspected illegal deportations. Previous to that, plans by the then Minister of Interior to build new facilities remained on paper, and when the EU Commissioner Jacques Barrot visited the existing facilities, Pagane was not in the schedule. Meanwhile, minors in Agiasos, in the 'Villa Azadi' centre were increasingly active in making their existence visible by rioting, blogging, and so on. By August, and in anticipation of the 'No Border 2009' to take place in the symbolic epicenter of the antagonism over migration for that brief period of time, the practice of detention in Lesvos could no longer sustain itself either legitimately or pragmatically. In that sense, the title of Eleftherotypia on the 8th of August,

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282 Law 3772/2009 regulated forensic affairs, drugs treatment, prison reforms and other matters. Its last section contains the article 48, which amends the maximum of administrative detention of foreigners from three months (Law 3386/2005) to six-twelve months pending deportation. According to the amendment, deportation would be possible under particular conditions in which one is pronounced 'suspect of fleeing' or 'dangerous for public order' or by 'avoiding, or obstructing their departure procedure or the procedure of expulsion'. Danger for the public order constitutes according to the 3772/2009, every crime that carries a three month prison sentence. Previous Law 3386 was specifying that deportation is possible in case of conviction of one year or 'regardless of sentence' in case of a series of crimes. Presidential Decree 81/2009 abolished the right to appeal to deportation decisions.

283 Overcrowding in Pagane during the summer of 2009 resulted in adults being housed where minors were supposed to be, while pregnant women were put in containers. See the allegations of Mahmundi and Others v. Greece and ECHR Press Release 2012. 'Afghan family detained in the Pagani detention centre in inhuman and degrading conditions and without effective judicial review'. Strasbourg: CoE


285 Villa Azadi ('Freedom' in Farsi) is located in Agiasos a mountain village in Lesvos. During a research trip to the island, I was surprised to realise that the village is rather remote (40km from Mitilene) and the premises of the 'open' reception centre are even more remote (5km from Agiasos), outside the village and behind some hills. Tellingly, in the past it used to be a sanatorium.
'Asphyxia', anticipated the events to follow.

The 'No Border 2009' anti-racist camp took place in Lesvos in late August 2009. As elsewhere, the demonstrators, were represented by the authorities as 'trouble-makers', 'hostile to the cause of the detainees' and so on. The port of Mytilene was sieged by activists, the Frontex patrol ship was 'rounded-up' with plastic boats, and some skirmish with riot police were reported, enough to characterize activism as 'excessive' and 'unnecessary'. The mobilization and the activities of human rights' organizations were interpreted from the point of view of local media as a 'defamation' and a 'stain' in the image of Lesvos with clear consequences to the island's prosperity. They would suggest that the 'anarchists' and 'anti-authoritarian' activists would have better chosen the 'European decision centers' to hold their protests. Before the actual event, years of experience and networking between grassroots activist groups in Greece and beyond contributed to the successful mobilization of activists. In that respect, new media such as blogs, websites, news feeds, twitter and so on, played a crucial role in the organization of the camp, the communication and dissemination of information, the 'making visible' of the previously unseen situation in Pagane and the planning and carrying out of direct action protests. Merely a few days before the camp, Lesvos was visited by the UNHCR

286 Eleftherotypia, 8 August 2009. [Available online at: http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=71252]
287 With regard to "No Border" activism it can be generally argued that the purpose is to block deportations. One tactic used is to target private companies 'collaborating' in the detention/deportation of 'aliens', such as Codex (catering) or Lufthansa (airlines), see Nyers (2003), p. 1081. With regard to Greece, the scene of 'No Border' activism is highly heterogeneous both in its formation and in its strategies. As to the particular 'No Border' international event, see: http://w2eu.net/, http://noborder09lesvos.blogspot.com/, http://www.noborderlesvos09.gr/.
289 See for example a number of articles published in the local newspaper Dimokratis, 27 October 2009, and an articles written by the local MP Galinos (The 'legacy' of Pagane and the international image of Lesvos): Dimokratis, 10 November 2009. See also Dimokratis, 9 July 2009.
commissioner in Greece, and a KKE delegation. As quickly as Pagane turned into a point of reference for the solidarity and anti-deportation movement, so it did turn into a symbol of resistance to abjection by migrants themselves: Riots were breaking out on weekly basis, hunger strikes of minors, in turn, communicated and disseminated by activists, all that contributed to bring the 'problem' to the attention of the international 'Other'.

During the course of this discursive event a number of heterogeneous elements became moments of a single project, to shut down Pagane. For example, in the discursive practices of some activists we can trace an attempt to render commensurable past and present immigrations to Greece. References in texts, printed material like post-cards, posters, stickers, brochures, explicitly were drawing an analogy between 'our' refugees of 1922. In stark contrast to the official and even, academic discourse that presents Greece as historically a 'country of emigration', certain strands of activism would establish an equivalence that many would find hard to come to terms with (see archive). How can the coming of 'our' refugees be commensurate to those coming from 'the depths of Anatolia' the prefecture authorities wondered. On the other hand, a

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290 Dimokratis, 25 August 2009
291 Dimokratis, 25 August 2009
292 For an account of the events in 1922 see Mazower (2004).
293 It is more than often that researchers of contemporary migration to Greece in order to explain the responses to migration in the 1990s begin by taking for granted that '[f]or the most part of its modern history, Greece has been a country of emigration’, see Karyotis & Patrikios (2010). Historical research puts into question such claims, see the remarkable account of the refugees coming to Salonica from Smyrna in 1922, Mazower (2004).
294 Unexpectedly I had the opportunity to establish this reluctance when in the margins of a conference in Mytilene during a discussion with a graduate historian, I mentioned that it would be important for me to know how the Greek authorities and society received refugees from Minor Asia in 1922. The person became my ‘informant’ in this case by refusing to see any connection between contemporary immigration (my object of study) and the moment of crisis at the time. The two were for my informant incommensurable historical phenomena, while for me, the politicization of immigration and problematization of racism in the present happens partly and by some actors on the basis of comparing, making analogical arguments between the two phenomena. For the rhetorical significance of analogical arguments see Norval (2007).
great deal of campaigning was drawing attention to the humanitarian aspect of the situation by emphasizing that the whole regime of securing the borders should either cease or respect (at least) the right to life. 296 'Fundamental Human Rights', according to the international call for the No Border 2009 camp, were largely understood to be incompatible with 'Fortress Europe'.

The metaphor of the 'concentration camp' has been a prominent resource in the attempts to delegitimate Pagane, and, by extension, the politics of 'fortress Europe'. 297 The constant depiction of 'camp' signifiers is the typical stuff of 'raising-awareness' posters of difficult to count affinity groups. 298 This perhaps betrays a strong identification against the 'camp', able to grip certain social groups. If 'Apartheid' is a paradigmatic regime of oppression for post-colonial discourse, 299 in Europe the history of the 'concentration camps' is re-articulated through contemporary anxieties about such practices that evoke, albeit simplistically, the catastrophe of the Holocaust. 300 But, in addition, the 'camp' comes to signify traumatic experiences associated with the history of the 'Left' in Greece, part of which is actively engaged in activist networks of solidarity to migrants. 301 Thus, framing opposition to security politics, and especially to detention of migrants, in terms of 'concentration camps' gives an insight into the historicity of the

296 See Appendix 5e and 5f.
297 Parenthetically, the press disclosed a practice that Frontex patrols would as a matter of ordering endeavour into, which was to stamp a number on the right arm of anyone detained. To that, according to the newspaper, officials replied by saying 'it is just a numbering [...] it should not be misunderstood or compared to older numberings', see Elefterotypia, June 16, 2009.
298 See Appendix 5l.
299 Although as I show in the following chapter the mobilization of the word 'Apartheid' and of imagery associated to it was a prominent resource in problematizations of the urban politics of racism.
300 I am saying metaphor because the 'concentration camps' were different in kind and in purpose from these centres.
301 I am referring to the Greek emphylios ("civil war"), 1946-1949. Communists and other dissenters were by way of a standard procedure sent to the camps in order to 'become human'. Ironically, these camps in Greece were instituted in the aftermath of the Holocaust, thus, as it has been argued, becoming the first concentration camps in the post-war 'Western' world. See the remarkable ethnography about this subject, Panourgia (2009).
cause of anti-deportation and anti-detention movement in Greece. In this discourse it is possible to find traces of a lethal political antagonism between the State and the 'Left', that link to this contemporary struggle. An old, supposedly inexistent, political frontier is re-articulated in a new context. The acts of solidarity to the migrants have partly been struggles for the re-negotiation of this frontier, not only between the national 'self' and the 'other', but within and against the hegemonic national 'self'. The struggles around detention centers, in that sense, seem to re-activate in practice a frontier that shows the lacking and precarious character of national 'unity' and social objectivity. They are one locus or aspect of a political antagonism between the 'state' in all that it represents in the imagination of the Left, and the 'internal enemy'. Of course, this is not to say that the local struggle in Pagane is a manifestation of a broader continuous struggle. Just that a quasi-political frontier cuts across various struggles in a particular context, neither of which ever fully dominates over the other.\textsuperscript{302}

\textbf{Before the aftermath: 'Crowded migrant detention centre on the Greek island of Lesvos'}\textsuperscript{303}

The intervention of international and inter-governmental agencies,\textsuperscript{304} I would like to suggest, played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the series of events and their 'live' dissemination, captured the attention of highly regarded organizations. The first to enter the discursive arena was the UNHCR by claiming in an official report that 'the situation in Pagane is indicative of broader problems relating to irregular migration and Greece's

\textsuperscript{302} This is a complicated and hardly elaborated argument. However, I speak of quasi-political frontier having in mind the recent history and experience of the civil war in Greece and the ways in which traces of it appear in contemporary debates and politics in Greece. 'Civil-war', according to Foucault (2004), is not the Clausewitz destructive war. Rather, it is a war that produces a new type of citizen. If such war is never quite over – since peace and 'social objectivity' is the continuation of it – it seems reasonable to argue for a quasi-political frontier.

\textsuperscript{303} This telegraphic description is taken from a UNHCR report, see UNHCR (2009).

\textsuperscript{304} There is a plethora of reports, visits, intervention for the whole period. But at that time in particular, UNHCR was prominent, the U.S State Department, CPT and Human Rights Watch.
asylum system'. The document portrays 'asylum in Greece' in isolation from asylum practice within the European space. It seems that Greece is exceptionally the violator of humanitarian and moral norms, as though it were a 'cultural' question. Such perspective however is actually reproducing what it purports to just draw its attention on.

Greece, for a brief period of time, came to signify the diversion from the official, normal practice in the rest of the 'civilized world' – the 'fallen' culture, to quote Michael Herzfeld. This type of discourse resonates with media representations, and political discursive practices that would insist on the impossibility of 'such conditions' occurring in 'Civilized Europe' and so on. From this perspective, Europe is represented as a homogeneous space of tolerance, a space of 'freedom of movement', whereas Greece as the 'transgressor' whose behavior is irrational, inefficient and exceptional. This discourse is reproduced in the context of these debates in Greece, where 'Europe' is discursively constructed as the space of where tolerance and hospitality were 'born'. In this discourse Greece is equally portrayed to the beatified image of Europe. Given this and the

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305 UNHCR (2009b).

306 The recurrent language of 'crisis', 'disaster', 'special reception facilities', 'measures' is an issue that arose in a workshop I attended as a friendly 'observer' not exclusively motivated by research. There, a UNHCR representative gave a presentation about 'asylum'. The daycare Mental Health for Migrants's offices was where the workshop took place. To cut a rather long story short, the representative – whom I had interviewed the previous evening – was explaining the asylum procedures and legal obligations according to the Geneva Conventions and the New York Protocol. Often she would be interrupted by participants – among whom an Afghani migrant on a 2-year stay permit – and she would go back to a slide in the Powerpoint. The insistence on the distinction between those in need of international protection and the 'bogus' ones, sparked the reaction of the person from Afghanistan. 'Most people are economic refugees', he said, pointing at the impossible, from his own personal experience, task of finding criteria according to which to achieve such classification. From his experience, the motivation to migrate cannot be reduced to either/or. But the representative, as much as she diverted from the 'organization' official doctrine during our private communication, during the workshop showed no intention to interpret different points of view: 'No, there is not such definition as economic migrant', she came back.

307 Michael Herzfeld explains how the metaphor of the 'fall' holds a central position in the 'Western' imagination as to how modern 'Greece' is represented. For a detailed account see, Herzfeld (1998)[1987]. Indicative of this tension is the translation of the title of Herzfeld's book. While the standard English edition has a subtitle 'anthropology in the margins of Europe' (1987b), in the Greek edition it reads 'anthropology in Greece and in Europe'. This difference, captures, despite perhaps the intentions of the editors the desire of Greeks to efface the trace of the image Europe has of them.
on-going struggles around Pagane, the latter had to be framed as an anomaly, an otherworldly one, captured aptly by the description 'Dantes Inferno'. By means of this 'act of naming' the Deputy Minister symbolically closed down the detention centre which thereby served as the scapegoat for maintaining and even re-enforcing the practices of control.

With the intensification of the general 'crisis' from 2009 onwards and with 'immigration' becoming one of the standard 'problem' that 'Greece faces', struggles around immigration detention continued. But both in terms of form and content and position of enunciation of the demands made, there was a plurality of mobilizations, some of which would clearly not stem from subjects whose identity was structured around 'solidarity' to migrants. By contrast, mobilization often took the form of an opposition to detention in the name of local development, non-responsibility, law and order (detention centers as a source of criminality) etc. Therefore, opposition to detention, for example, in Korinthsos in 2012, was taken up by the far-right but also the 'mainstream' local authorities. These mobilizations at the very local level would be conventionally

308 'Dante’s Inferno' is the exact phrase used by the Deputy Minister of Protection of the Citizen to characterize the situation in Pagani. See To Vima, 23 October 2009. In uttering these words, the Deputy Minister not only literally closed down the centre, but also designated it as exceptional. Yet, exceptional, not in the sense that I alluded to earlier on in this paper ("administrative detention" as in between legal and political fact), rather, in the sense that the practice 'witnessed' there by the Minister was cast as unimaginable. The 'claim of exceptionalism' it appears, is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it may produce an exemplar name for exclusion whose force in casting other cases as illegitimate may be enormous. On the other, it may precisely allow other cases, in fact, whole regimes of practice, to be maintained intact or invisible. Eventually, the 'claim of exceptionalism' has to do with the discursive authority from which a claim derives. In this case, political authority clearly used exceptionality by way of reaffirming moral superiority.

309 For example, in June 2009 the mobilization of local groups in Drepano, Kozani against announced plans of building a 'hospitality centre' was articulated around the opposition to the 'central' government that 'displaces' the problem to the periphery. The issue was first addressed by the local committee of the far-right LA.O.S. See http://www.eiet2.gr/content/view/750/183/.

310 In August 2012, the ministry of Public Order transferred some dozens of 'alien' detainees at an old military camp in the city of Korinthsos. Golden Dawn activists, headed by the local MP of Golden Dawn, were involved in clashes with the police, for which the said MP lost his right to immunity from prosecution. The local mayor decided to cut the water supply to the camp in retaliation to the government’s intransigence by saying 'we are at war. Everything is permitted
internally 'split' between those who wanted a better management of immigration and security, i.e. a more 'rationally' planned detention, which usually meant that the authorities should detain the immigrants 'elsewhere' and 'not in our backyard', and those who would more literally be against any provision for the foreigners and who at best would argue for immediate and en masse deportations.

The consequence of this development was manifold: On the one hand, it meant that the struggle against detention became ambiguous. That is, as Laclau puts it, it received 'structural pressure from rival hegemonic projects' (Laclau, 2005: 131). A good example is that of Xanthi in 2013 where leftists and far-right were both mobilizing against the government's decision to use some military school premises for detention. A moment of 'undecidability' was that in which the demand against detention could no longer be said to be objectively an ethical demand because it would come from subjective positions characterized by the reproduction of racist, localist and 'displacement' logics. This type of 'particularistic' mobilization against detention centers could actually be compared with local struggles against waste management where particular struggles could not and did not want to articulate a broader what-is-to-be-done-with-the-waste question at the regional or national level and remained entrenched in their particularity, only to cease when having accomplished the goal of securing an annulment of the project and its displacement to another prefecture. Similarly, a plurality of local, in war'. See To Vima, 23 August 2012.

311 In August 2012 a mobilization in Xanthi against the transferral of detainees in their area brought together citizens, local authorities and councilmen from different political spaces, from leftist SYRIZA to the right-wing ANEL, and the governmental PASOK. They voiced their concern about the government considering them 'second-class' citizens, and diffusing the 'problem of immigration' into the society. See To Pontiki, 4 August 2012. [Available online at: http://topontiki.gr/article/38902/]

312 This is an argument that needs further elaboration which I cannot undertake here. However, the form and content of local mobilizations against waste-management projects, some of which took explosive proportions and were framed as struggles against the 'predator-state' bear resemblance to these mobilizations against detention centres. Notably, both types of mobilization seem to confirm the 'not-in-my-backyard' logic. But that some citizens consider garbage and immigrants as equivalent 'problems' inevitably brings to mind a Golden Dawn MP
particularistic struggles against detention would take place on the understanding of
removing or preventing a local 'problem' from emerging, and these struggles rarely, if at all, sought to differentiate themselves from the official ad hoc logic of managing immigration. Rather than being struggles for the rights of detainees or rather than taking up the cause of the immigrants and refugee seekers’ emancipation from a form of oppression, these struggles, coming from rather reactionary positions in fact operated as indicators of public disquiet over the 'problem' of immigration.\textsuperscript{313} They would, ironically, thereby, be an expression of the anti-immigrant 'public opinion' with its negative attitudes and feelings toward 'illegal' immigration whose invocation legitimated the internment of immigrants in the first place, such as in the rationale of the official discourse of the EC. Increasing racist violence in urban areas, such that I describe in the next chapter made management by detention appear as some kind of minimal protection and deportation as some kind of solution, which, the immigrants themselves would sometimes procure and others not.

Conclusion
The discourse of security is the hegemonic force in constructing migration as a threat. It is also portraying racism as that phenomenon whose eradication gives its rationale. Its success relies on its articulation with the languages of filoksenia/hospitality, a position 'naturally' anti-racist. However, the hegemony of this discourse, which articulates a superior self-identity and justifies/legitimates/dissimulates practices of radical exclusion, depends on the function of ideology, whose main work is to conceal the lack that

\footnotesize{who said in the parliament that his party 'has every right to call illegal immigrants garbage'. See PLDB230812: 115.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{313} In a public opinion survey (Public Opinion, 2009) 56\% of the respondents were in agreement with the government's plans to transfer illegal immigrants to old military barracks until their deportation and 37\% disagreed. Asking the question whether the government's immigration policy is probably more, less or as strict as it should be, 72\% responded 'probably less strict than it should be'; and to the question whether Greece has reached, topped or otherwise the 'limit' of migrants, 60\% responded that it has topped the limit.}
appears in the discourse itself. This lack is revealed both from the 'internal' fracture of the discourse and from external contestation. I would like to argue that the Pagane case functioned as a dislocation which could have disarticulated the hegemonic link between migration and security. Indeed, the mobilization that took place in 2009 showed that a wide range of discursive practices articulated notions of solidarity, cosmopolitanism, post-territorial politics. However, the mobilization was not sufficient to challenge the hegemonic discourse, although, it re-articulated/re-claimed the languages of hospitality and anti-racism. The dislocation was re-absorbed by scapegoating Pagane as a stain in 'civilized' West Europe and Greece, concealing the intensification of security and technologies of control. This highlights the role of the rhetoric of exceptionalism in maintaining practices which are not in line with hegemonic self-representations and discourses of superiority. On a different note, the struggles against the internment of immigrants and sometimes against the politics of control as such, in the Greek context post-2007 became progressively blurred as to what they meant and for whom. The proliferation of local, particularistic struggles against detention here – but for detention there, or even of more radical 'solutions' to the problem of 'illegals' – made this kind of mobilization against administrative detention more ambiguous and less clear as to its rationale and/or purpose and, for that matter, as to who is with whom in drawing the antagonistic social frontiers. However, this is a complex discussion which I cannot undertake here in more detail. What is important is to underline the ambiguous relationship between racism and security whereby racism is, or at least appears to be both the object 'cause' of security and a concrete effect or aspect of the discourse of security itself. The internment of immigrants and refugees is not, as the epigraph of this chapter may suggest, merely an area subsumed under the operation of a logic of difference where normative reasoning and institutional pressures against the way
detention is practiced in Greece deal with 'exceptional' cases. The understanding that the problem is not detention as such but rather the how of detention, for example in the case of the CPT obscures from view the struggles of immigrants themselves as well as the antagonistic politics of subverting hegemonic meanings and practices.
6 From Territorial 'Margins' to the 'Centre' of the Nation: immigration, urban 'decay' and racism

In 24 October 2010 the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection addressed the EU’s Internal Affairs Commissioner on behalf of the Greek Government, asking for the deployment of RABITs (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) along the Greek-Turkish border. In an immediate response to Greece's grievance for solidarity between EU members in the management of external frontiers, the RABITs were deployed for the first time after the creation of FRONTEX to secure the European 'border regime', and

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316 The term 'border regime' is used by Tsianos & Karakayali in their proposed conceptual machinery to tackle the question of transnational migration. The authors ground their analysis of the emerging 'European Border regime' on fieldwork, draw on various aspects of post-structuralist and constructivist takes on how to approach the 'securitization' of transnational migration in Europe, and attempt to demonstrate how this regime is simultaneously influencing 'cultural self-images and concepts of citizenship in the new Europe'. Central in their account are the concepts of 'governance', 'regime' and 'deteritorialization' and 'porosity/permeability' of borders. The state is centered and
to assist the Greek authorities with what had been described by the UNHCR as a humanitarian problem. However, the question of border permeability and the techno-political means of its management was but one aspect of a ramified issue. Not only were the 'problems' associated with migratory border pressures cast as 'European' problems rather than merely 'local' in the discourse of the government of PASOK; it was also the case that the problem of 'frontiers' and 'illegals' was disseminated in time and space in such way that it was seen to pose problems for the security of the citizens and for urban orderliness and tranquility. During the fall of 2010, the 'problem of the city centre', behind which 'there are people, misery, anxiety and dreams' was increasingly referred to in the government's discourse as inextricably linked to the question of immigration: 'Foreigners must respect Athens, its social and economic life'. Along these lines the Minister made a special reference to Agios Panteleimon (henceforth AP), a neighborhood in the centre of Athens. He asserted that 'Agios Panteleimon is not a ghetto [...], [the police] shall be present in order to prevent violence wherever it comes 

can not be approached by isolating a unit of analysis such as 'migration/security policy in Greece'. It would be unfruitful to bracket the broader European dimension of it for two reasons. First, It reflects a series of EU migration and asylum policy issues associated with the Dublin II convention. At least since 2008 the demand that the convention be reconsidered had been articulated by the Greek department of UNHCR and ECRE. According to them, the convention displaces the burden of asylum processing to new members of the EU and to those member states whose borders coincide with EU's southern borders. A considerable number of asylum-seekers is returned to Greece, the latter being the country through which the asylum seekers first entered the EU. This logic of displacement of 'burden', as well as the logics by which the asylum system operates in Greece (all asylum applications were until recently made and processed in Athens), made possible but do not entirely explain, let alone justify the emergence of racial tension in Athens. Second, the framing of the 'problem' almost invariably and across different positions of discursive enunciation, situates 'Greece' in a certain symbolic and imaginary relationship to 'Europe' and the cultural-moral laws with which the latter is associated.
from [...] and to prevent fostering racism and xenophobia [...]'.

Here, the association of security to external 'borders' slides towards a kind of symbolic 'center'. The definition of the problem centers on the capital city with its cultural life and its economic and social functions which the 'foreigners' are invited to respect. The square the minister refers to is marked by the imposing presence of a Christian Orthodox church – an object of 'cathectic' investment central to the dominant national imagination. In recent years, the square has not only become the urban 'hotbed' of social antagonisms and insecurities over and against the presence of 'foreigners', but it also emerged as a symbol of tensions between competing visions of society, culture and utopias; as part of the 'problem' that signified the lack of migration 'management', as a 'major' urban security concern, and as symptomatic of transgression or fall from 'our' cultural normative position: 'The whole situation [in AP] is a shame for our civilization/culture, whilst the area is suffocating and degrading, a fact which outrages the inhabitants', reported a human rights NGO in late 2009.

AP, as I will show, came to be a name for the local urban space as a micro-context criss-crossed by antagonisms that shaped subjectivities through signifiers of nativeness and foreignness, legality and illegality, racism and anti-racism, repression and solidarity. But it also came to represent a danger zone in need of 'dynamic' solutions. The local elections earlier that month, which preceded the Minister's public announcements, saw the election in the 6th borough of Athens, that is, in the 'endangered' urban space, of a self-acknowledged neo-nazi representative in the city council of Athens. He got


320 A cathected object is one which is invested heavily by affect.

321 Antigone (2009)

322 Only a few months later, in January 2010, during an assembly of the Municipality Council the said person whilst conflicting with a leftist councilman stood up and gave a nazi salute. The
This followed almost 'naturally' given that during the pre-election period, the agenda of almost all candidates revolved around the question of 'illegal' migrants and their adverse impact on the socio-economic life of the city.

This chapter sets out to explore the nature of this 'problem', how it emerged and what it meant to those whose discursive authority and practice permits them to re-define it. It further seeks to see how this 'problem' might be better understood in relation to a security discourse and how and with what effects the latter re-articulates 'cultural' identities. It appears that the 'problem of the city centre' is a complex one and that it has linkages to broader socio-political contexts. But what is this 'problem' really? Who defines what the 'problem' is and how different conceptualizations of the 'problem' constitute different actors and competing visions of what Greek society is or should be?

How does this problem relate to problematizations of racism, immigration and security?

I complexify conventional understandings of security by foregrounding the 'cultural' dimension, and the dispersed/heterogeneous character of security practices, while I

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323 This incident was recorded, became the object of media attention and available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCKwQMVmM74.


325 McDonald's (2008: 573) recent work on security and migration draws attention to the role that 'narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization'; Tsianos & Karakayali (2010: 373) emphasize how the 'European border regime' is simultaneously influencing 'cultural self-images and concepts of citizenship in the new Europe'. From a similar angle, the idea of 'national security cultures', 'explain[s] the subjective understanding of objective threats to national security'; see Sperling (2010: 5). Regardless of ontological or epistemological presumptions, each of these approaches to security and (migration) sees 'culture' as playing a role, as causal mechanism, condition, resource, obstacle and so on. Even as early as 1993, Waever et al (1993) made the study of security and culture commensurable in stating that societal security concerns the reproduction of the 'essential character' of a society. What could this 'essence' be other than an imagined 'cultural' trait? However, for us the specific formulation of the question is perhaps how security reproduces and iterates 'culture', how in other words, the construction of the security apparatus brings into being old and new ideas about what culture and societies 'we' are.

325 The problematic of 'heterogeneity' has also been one way or another introduced into the study of security by all of the abovementioned authors. It is important to stress that for Foucault (2008), heterogeneity 'is never a principle of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction or connection'. Security, we might add, is an apparatus of relatively dispersed practices which do not form a homogeneous whole through the resolution of contradictory
explore the role that these play in sustaining the configurations of the migration-security 'nexus'. This chapter does not tackle the question of security from the viewpoint of how state institutions deal with real threats, rather the problematization I advance aims to capture how the problem of 'foreigners' in the city centre of Athens was brought into being and articulated through security practices and demands in different contexts. These demands could be seen to emerge through political practices of contesting the instituted ways of dealing with things. They can also be said to (re)produce particular types of subjectivity as they are disseminated across contexts. In that sense, the official pleas for solidarity at the EU in the government of immigration cannot be isolated from the micro-context of urban Athens and the 'evidence' of growing 'societal' insecurities. In fact, as I will try to show, they would not have emerged unless community and racial tensions in Athens had become a 'problem' for the government of the city.

In the first part, I account for the emergence of grassroots anti-immigrant security practices in the context of urban Athens during the period 2008-2010. Second, I elaborate on what can be seen, at least partly, as the official response to the blatant principles in action (e.g. nationalist v. liberal/cosmopolitan). Foucault dismisses a 'dialectical logic', which stresses 'contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises their resolution in a unity' (2008: 42). Thus, in the conceptualization of the security apparatus in question we should accept that practices that appear as opposing each other do not necessarily preclude the possibility of their mutual meaningfulness within the objectives of the security apparatus.

Even If we accepted any notion of 'real threats' it would be too limited a perspective to treat the state as a homogeneous actor. I rather opt out for a more Gramscian/Foucauldian conceptualization of the state as potentially co-extensive to the entirety of instituted social relations; the police and the governmental state; Foucault (2008) offers a useful insight about the state as 'the correlative of a particular way of governing' that exists only 'in the plural', that is as historical states, 'specific' and 'discontinuous'. What is at issue is that security as a practice of raison d'état places itself between a a state presented as given and a state presented as having to be constructed and built. If security is a dispositif of state power it then should be taking 'as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be' (2008: 4-6). These points about the state can be thought with an eye on 'society', given that the term society is not taken as designating a given totality. For a more post-Gramscian inflexion of such conception of the state as 'integral' or extended see Howarth (2005: 11).

As I indicated the concept of 'societal (in)security' is particularly useful in allowing us to broaden the scope of research of security practices so as to include other than official/state actors. Much of the rationale of this research is derived from the research questions that Buzan et al. (1993: 2) pose: 'What will be the effect of potentially large movements on societies long used to [imagining] a fairly high degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity?'.

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securitization of foreign migrants by nationally vigilant 'citizens'. Here, I explore what AP represents for proponents of 'regulating' or managing migration, or, better, how AP made commensurable security and management concerns. I take up Foucault's ideas on governmentality to account for the more nuanced construction of security in the discourse of PASOK. Alongside the analysis of how security discourse is up to date up for hegemonization by opposing social and political subjects in the last part, I focus on those aspects of security discourse that relate to 'culture' and can best be captured by these logics that we call fantasmatic. I conclude by showing the centrality of fantasmatic logics in legitimating and securing the 'grip' of security practices aimed towards the internal 'other' – the foreign migrant in this case. It is here that the signifiers 'racism' and 'hospitality' with their modern genealogies, political uses and grammars and moral connotations, capture the imagination of Greeks qua culturally homogeneous 'people' or liberal Westerners, while doing security.

The Re-birth of 'Vigilantes'\textsuperscript{328}

In the following I will describe how a discourse that identified the 'foreigners' and in particular 'illegal migrants' – however little in everyday political language use the distinction holds firmly – as the cause of societal insecurity, emerged and was disseminated in the micro-context of Athens. Its articulation eventually made possible the election of an ultra-nationalist candidate of Xrysi Aygi and the intensification of rather aggressive, anti-immigrant actions especially after mid2010.\textsuperscript{329} I explore the

\textsuperscript{328} There is little literature on migration-security from a 'grassroots' perspective. Substantially, most of it comes from the US and deals with the city and the local as obstructing constrictive federal policies, see Wells (2004); or the opposite, namely, the local jurisdiction as enforcing policing through the back door', see Varsanyi (2008). There is practically little sociological or ethnographic research on 'community policing' as a means to tackling crime. Stövesand (2007) links the Foucauldian concept of governmentality with 'community policing' foregrounding notion of individual responsibilization.

\textsuperscript{329} Telling is the title of a newspaper article: 'Ag(r)ios Panteleimonas: War without end between Greek, mostly moustache-less children and migrants'. This is a linguistic pun substituting Agios ('saint') with Agrios ('savage'). The portrayal of hostility and violence toward
particular articulation of security discourse, which, in the case of our aganaktismenoi polites ['indignated citizens'],\textsuperscript{330} can be seen as a political, confrontational logic akin to what the concept of securitization implies. What I opt to flesh out is the way in which the logic of securitization articulates 'cultural' concepts and self-interpretations about 'society' and its 'other'. \textit{En passant}, I try to show how violence and tensions between 'locals', foreigners, anti-racists and police during the period from late 2008 until 2010, made visible 'cracks' in urban and social order that anticipated the articulation of a counter-logic of governmentality in the constitution of security discourse regarding the 'illegals' in Athens. The emerging discourse of 'management' or the 'new' discourse of regulating migration that defined itself at a more official level through the exclusion of both 'illegal' migration and 'racism' (and of certain anti-racist practices) is the subject matter of the next part.

The presence and participation of allodapoi ('non-nationals') in the December 2008 events in Athens and elsewhere in Greece has been well-documented and caused enough controversy for academic discussions to kick off.\textsuperscript{331} Just weeks before the December

\textsuperscript{330} The meaning of aganaktismenoi polites has changed throughout the years. During the 1990s, it would conventionally signify the hard-working citizens who would by stand to and facilitate the police during riots. After 2005 it came to refer more to citizens mobilizing against immigrants and, shortly after, it re-iterated into being the name of the Syntagma Square protests (the Athenian 'indignados').

\textsuperscript{331} There is growing literature on these events: see the edited volume comprising participants' public writings, brochures and so on, Schwartz et al. (2010); also the \textit{Journal of Modern Greek Studies}, 28(2), has a special issue on the events. Indicatively see Kornetis 2010; see also Andreas Kalyvas' (2010) interesting redescription of the events as having brought about a novelty in Greek politics: 'Compared with the barely existent immigrant activism in normal institutionalized politics and ordinary formal associations, the December insurrection speaks of something novel, a real rupture: a new subject appearing into the public realm, the rebellious immigrant, politicized and public, claiming a political life'. In the same vein, see Bratsis (2010). He goes on to argue that 'one of the greatest achievements of the December events are the linkages that have been formed between the current, largely immigrant and very urban, proletariat in Greece and the student, anarchist and other autonomous movements' (ibid: 2010: 194). Douzinas (2010) sees the riots too as an articulation of inchoate demands and as a struggle of exit from invisibility.
2008 extensive rioting there was a major upheaval in prisons across Greece where foreign national inmates account for more than half of the prison population. But importantly, the first assemblage of citizens in AP was formed to make their voices publicly heard.

In a letter allegedly signed by a thousand inhabitants of the 6th borough and communicated on 24 November 2008 to the parliament, political parties, Ministers, local and judicial authorities, the 'Citizens' committee of AP' came into being through the articulation of a demand for more security and crime-prevention: What accounted for their diffuse insecurity and resentment was, according to them, the clustering in their neighborhood of 40 percent of foreigners in Greece. The text is structured around the signifiers of 'crime', 'perversion', 'anti-Christianity', 'health/public hygiene', 'aesthetics', 'education', 'estates' and so on, all of which are related somehow to 'the foreigners'. The notion of 'foreignness' is constructed as a challenge to the life-world of the native, Christian-Orthodox family, which has been forced to 'displacement' from their own neighborhood. Presented as a natural consequence of the state's inadequate intervention, the letter refers to 'more and more citizens' who 'threaten to take to the streets and “clean up” the area'. The description of foreigners, far from neutral, is aggressive, but careful as well; the authors make use of the rhetorical strategy of distinguishing between the 'good' and the 'bad' migrant: 'Together with them [...] we are helping them in various ways, and being Greeks we consider everyone as fellow human

332 Indicatively in 2008 foreign nationals were 5622 (48.2%) out of a total of 11645 while in 2012, they were 7887 (58.2%) out of a total 12479 inmates across all penitentiary institutions. The meaning of these numbers, of course, is the object of controversies, with anti-immigrant discourse mobilizing them as a sign of the propensity of foreigners for crime. However, it is the case that the great majority of them are serving time for 'status' crimes, namely, non-renewals of stay permits (the state impeding the procedures in analogy to its conjectural needs), forging documents etc. The validity of this can be triangulated with the Hellenic Police statistics on serious crime which show a percentage analogous to their overall population stock. Data available online at: www.ministryofjustice.gr/

333 The letter can be found online at: http://www.politismopolitis.org/?p=1365.

334 See Appendix 6a, 6b, 6c.
beings, as our brothers. Yet, too many brothers gathered in the same house and unable to fit, we had to withdraw’. Interestingly, there is another aspect to the text, a class-related one. The committee raises its voice not only against the foreigners but also against those who are perceived to be able to retain their 'Greekness' because of their social status. The authors ask whether their neighborhood has became a 'dump', as they put it, for foreigners, in order that other areas, 'most of which constitute residence or investments of men of politics, media, entrepreneurship, and generally, those with a “name”, can retain their Greek character'.

In other words, the identity of the locals can be seen to be blocked by two interrelated phenomena. The 'occupation', as they had often characterized it, of Athens by foreigners and the hegemony of what they describe as the 'new-order' elites. It could be argued that for this assemblage of citizens the terms 'foreigners' and 'new order' substitute for each other, they are equivalent. They do not represent anything other than the homogeneous society's impossibility of being and returning to a supposedly harmonious culturally monist past.336 Their argument reduces social division to the Greek people against those who threaten it, insiders and outsiders alike. Interestingly, the prevalent 'leftist' argument is also based on such simplification of social 'frontiers'. Many leftist anti-racist organizations also take neoliberal elites to be their enemy and thus the enemy of the immigrants to whom they stand in solidarity.

The activation of political logics can be seen not only at these moments when the

335 The leader of ND and current Prime Minister, A. Samaras, during the pre-election period in May 2012 used largely war/occupation metaphors to describe how it is necessary to deal with 'illegal' immigration, for example 'we need to re-occupy our cities' or 'the lathrometanastes have became tyrants of this society'. In his speech attended by thousands, 'illegal' immigration was one of the three 'enemies' he designated alongside PASOK and its 'Memorandum', the Left and its support to the koukouloforoi ('hoodies'), who scare tourists and investors away from the country. See Samaras (2012)

336 It has been observed that while populist discourse associated to the Left articulates mythic images of future harmony, the modality of right-wing populism is more prone to articulating myths of past fullness. See Oudenampsen (2010)
'frontier' is drawn between the populus and the elites, but also at the moment when this antagonism is displaced by means of scapegoating the already oppressed. This latter can be thought in relation to a practice of security that identifies the 'foreigner' as part of a broader 'them' that prevents, in this case, Greek 'society' from being itself. At the micro-level of the neighborhood all this is inscribed on everyday practices such as using the square, taking kids to the playground, attending the church; on political and deliberative practices of mobilization around local issues with all their symbolic significance; and on civic militia policing practices of particular kinds.337

The function of re-signification or appropriation of signifiers is particularly relevant here in that it shows the liaisons of this assemblage of citizens to contemporary and past political forces. In many of their flyers and banners a familiar slogan from the 1980s appeared: 'I Ellada stous Ellines', roughly translated as 'Greece [belongs] to Greeks'.

This utterance was made famous by encapsulating the efforts of Andreas Papandreou, leader of PASOK during the 1980s, to safeguard national independence, foster national unity (national reconciliation), and draw a frontier between Greece and 'foreign' powers.

The revival of this slogan during the period 2008-2010 however was speaking to another issue and it was disseminated amongst and by far-right circles.338 Arguably, ethnic, cultural and racial homogeneity in face of growing numbers of 'foreigners' in the city of Athens in 2009, was desirable, an object already lost and simultaneously endangered, in

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337 Detailed descriptions and testimonies of how groups of self-identified as 'natives' took over the square of AP, locking down the playground to prevent immigrant children from entering are revealing. Greek activists attempted to open several times the playground and were met with Golden Dawn violence in the presence of riot police who stood by. Golden Dawn members, although their target was primarily the immigrants themselves, were shouting 'Anarchists and Bolsheviks, this land does not belong to you'. The issue became also a problem in the local Council. See Antigone 2009. Annual Report. Available online at: [http://www.antigone.gr/en/library/files/reports_on_greece/2009/index.html](http://www.antigone.gr/en/library/files/reports_on_greece/2009/index.html).

338 See the poster of L.A.O.S. Appendix 6c; G. Karatzaferis, president of the far-right L.A.O.S, said in response to the Prime Minister and the President of the opposition in 2009: 'I am with Andreas Papandreou, the great Andreas Papandreou; “Greece belongs to Greeks”. [we cannot be with G. Papandreou who says the opposite of what his father said.’. See Parliament Minutes 8 April 2009 (PLSPPM080409).
anti-immigrant discourse: 'Does Greece belong to Greeks today where we are talking about a multicultural society?' Simultaneously, by drawing on the words of the leader of PASOK whose aim was the promotion of national reconciliation, the far-right formation attempted to appeal to the broadest equivalence possible. In that sense it might be fruitful to think of explicitly anti-immigrant discourse as underpinned and shaped by, but not reduced to populist nationalistic discourse.

During the pre-election period in September 2010 all of this was adequately crystallized to make its way to the agenda of the local elections. In the printed material of Xrysi Aygi candidature, the 'problem' becomes clear:

Today the central neighborhoods of the city have became strongholds of crime and corruption, where you don't hear Greek anymore. Guilty for this are the exousiastes [those in power] of our country. [...] Let us say that we want our Polis back, we want our homeland back, we want Athens to become GREEK anew. [...] Your vote shall give us power, a power that will transform into a struggle in every square, neighborhood and street of Athens, where Greeks live under a regime of terror.\textsuperscript{340}

However, it appears that the citizen's 'taking up the arms' is not the effect of the call of Xrysi Augi. Rather, the prominence of Xrysi Aygi in the local elections of 2010 can be seen as an effect of a growing mobilization of 'native' citizens during that period and as a condensation of how for both the government of ND and LA.O.S the question of illegals was posed in a pressing and consistent manner inside and outside the parliament.\textsuperscript{341} The press during this period as well as documentary sources are absolutely revealing: Demonstrations, reclaiming the squares, physical attacks, arsons, attacks against migrants' properties, cultural and religious spaces. 'Sickness', 'Pogrom',\textsuperscript{342} 'social peace

\textsuperscript{339} Karatzaferis, PLSPPM080409
\textsuperscript{340} See Mihaloliakos (2010) candidature brochure. Appendix 6e.
\textsuperscript{341} This is a bit more complicated. See the Antifa publication on citizens' committees.
\textsuperscript{342}
endangered,' special security regime', 'privatization of Nazism' are some of the mainstream newspapers' headings during that period. They bring into attention that the police would conventionally turn a blind eye to racist violence and in a number of cases that, according to solicitors' Associations, the activity is 'para-statal'. Simultaneously, the situation in AP had attracted the attention of foreign media.\textsuperscript{344} The police itself was recurrently reported to abstain from keeping statistical data and monitoring racist crime.\textsuperscript{345}

The natives cast the 'foreigners' as the symptom of a governance whose aim is to de-Hellenize and distort the original image of the city with its 'ancient cultural heritage', according to the leaflet of Gold Dawn, which concludes with a vision of Athens as 'beautiful, safe and Greek'. Another brochure, signed by the 'Citizens of Athens' and bearing a title difficult to misunderstand ('Get out of Greece, you are not wanted here'), captures nicely the 'cultural' aspect of securitization in this case:

\begin{quote}
You came in Greece uninvited. We Greeks, being hospitable and charitable, accepted you, with affection, giving you food, clothes, hospital care, shelter. [...] You did not respect our hospitality, our principles and customs, insulting all us Greeks, all Greek Women, our Christian religion, our civilization, our pride, our LIVES. [...] We are angry with this government and all politicians that brought you and support you and defend you AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PUNISH THEM AND YOU [...] (capitals in the original).\textsuperscript{346}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{343} \textit{Eleftherotypia}, 28 November 2010.
\textsuperscript{344} For an early visual documentary representation see Journeyman Pictures 2010.
\textsuperscript{345} More generally, the lack of official statistical and scientific data on racism is attributed in the RAXEN report to the EUMC to absence of 1) public monitoring bodies, 2) absence in electronic recording, 3) inadequate co-ordination, 4) lack of interest in collecting data. Regarding the last point the authors note: 'Officials in several public authorities seemed genuinely puzzled at our insistence for reliable data [...]'. We could argue that there is a deeply rooted suspicion of "statistics" that can perhaps be explained with reference to the political use of statistics in the not too distant past. See Petrakou & Dimitrakopoulos (2003: 32). This 'cryptic' statement makes us think that the authors allude to state practices of keeping records of 'communist' citizens, the archives of which were symbolically burned during the period of national reconciliation.

\textsuperscript{346} The letter continued as follows: '[...]From now on, we will take every necessary action in order to force you and the TRAITORS-POLITICIANS that help you to GET OUT OF THIS COUNTRY (or what you left of it), YOU HAVE NO FUTURE IN GREECE, GO HOME NOW,' Capitalization as a means of emphasis is a 'tactic' with 'intertextual' dimensions. Specifically, it is commonplace that racist comments either on news websites or at the 'Open
During a research trip in Athens I had the opportunity to get a copy of this rather polemical brochure probably written by no more than an individual or two. It could be argued that it is not representative of broader trends; However, a close reading of texts by these grassroots initiatives against those by the 'official' far-right establishes a plurality of linkages in terms of both content and form. Two main aspects I wish to bring to the surface, namely the political and the cultural. The political aspect, as I mentioned above, requires a reading of how political frontiers are drawn in security discourse, that is when it becomes anti-immigrant. The identity of these protesters is threatened by the migrants and the politicians ('traitors politicians'), the latter accused of being traitors who have sold off their country, the former taken to be the Trojan Horse that threatens social coherence. The cultural aspect of anti-immigrant discourse is equally interesting. 'Culture' here is under threat but it has also been abused by the migrants. It is under threat because all that the historical centre of Athens represents (e.g ancient heritage) is overshadowed by crime and illegality. What is more, the migrants' 'culture' is seen as incompatible with Greek culture, and it, therefore, compromises its survival. But 'culture' has also been abused, in particular, the culture of filoxenia. This discourse is based on a kind of performative contradiction in that it constitutes hospitality as an inalienable characteristic of Greek culture while at the same time it is suspending it. 'We can't be hospitable anymore' the central argument appears to be.

It is this cultural feature indistinguishable from the essence of Greek-ness that the anti-racists have been consistently attempting to disprove or represent otherwise. In the streets of Athens impressive numbers of posters, political graffiti, wall newspapers and

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Gov' forum (see next chapter), use extensively capitals letters. It could be argued that the intention is to convey anger or indignation. See Appendix 6d for a print of the original brochure. Also reprinted and published by Human Rights Watch as 'Anti-Immigrant Manifesto'. See HRW (2012).
so on would provoke, sensitize, call for demonstration, denounce, express solidarity to
the migrants and hostility to the state and the far-right. These posters can be seen as part
of the anti-racist ‘text’. The terms ‘Apartheid’ and ‘Nazism’ are central terms around
which this language is articulated. The apparatus, according to them, that is responsible
for racism, is located at the intersection between the state and ‘para-state’ organizations
of the far-right, which, are often seen as mere continuation of the practices of the Nazis
and their local collaborators. Within this discourse ‘society’ is almost invariably assigned
to a privileged position – either neutral or ‘good’. The agent of racism is well identifiable
and localized, and it is represented as alien to ‘society’. These representations are
ideological insofar as they conceal ‘consent’ and represent only the domination aspect of
the state. A frontier thus is carved between the ‘fascists’ (‘state’, ‘para-state’,
‘petits-bourgeois’) and the ‘people’, where here the people means the ‘world of labor’,
including the migrants themselves. If anti-racism is articulated by reactivating past social
antagonisms and ideological divisions it also operates on the basis of forceful
comparisons. ‘Apartheid’ stands as a kind of ‘exemplar’ of racism, alluding to practices of
segregation and ghettoization.347

However, the experts would distance themselves from the over-politicizing ‘radical’
view, explaining that:

> the major cause of the particular concentration of migrants in certain urban
areas is economical and housing poverty, rather than racist exclusion’, and ‘not
only the use of the term ‘ghetto’ but also that of ‘ghettoization’, which alludes to
racist social mechanisms of segregation and exclusion of migrants into particular
zones, are misleading regarding the Athenian situation and they serve to
stigmatize social conditions and relations’.348

The director of urban and agricultural sociology of EKKE (National Centre for Social

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347 See Appendix 6g for a typical poster re-articulating the signifier ‘apartheid’.
348 ‘There is no Ghetto, but Poverty’, Eleftherotypia, 17 June 2009.
Research) is making the point that ghettoization and racism are not the appropriate categories to introduce into the analysis of contemporary 'clustering' of migrants in the city of Athens. He concludes by saying that the category of 'class' is far more relevant here as both natives and foreigners of lower social strata are faced with little housing opportunities. While this might 'objectively' be true, it remains the case that the question of racism is displaced, as (if) the author is striving to make an argument about something more objective and less politicized. The term 'ghetto' acquires different meanings in different discourses. In the locals' language it is associated with the foreigners' crime and mere presence. In the anti-racist language it designates a situation in which foreigners are discriminated and become targets of racist violence. In the discourse of a sociologist, the term 'ghetto' should not be relativized as there is no formal segregation policy. From this latter point of view, racism could only be disseminated in a 'top-down' fashion.

The 'new' discourse

[...] the essential function of security is to respond to a reality in such way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds – nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it.\(^{349}\)

In the previous section I sought to flesh out the kind of problem that 'foreigners' constitute for certain actors who identify with security discourse on migration. Indeed, it had been a clear position on their part, that, if Athens was endangered by 'foreigners' in certain respects, then this would require a certain response which involved both grievances to the state and self-organized activity on the ground. At stake there was the re-articulation of a vision of a homogeneous society which needs to survive as such and for which migration poses a series of threats. I have also hinted at how this

\(^{349}\) Foucault (2007: 47).
anti-immigrant discourse was under contestation from leftists/anarchists by means of a constant work at the grassroots level. This local antagonism over migrants – itself made possible along terms of iterating previous political frontiers – has shaped the local milieu of (in)security and it can be said to have been a problem itself from the emerging perspective of the 'new' discourse and its characterizing logic of governmentality. What I will try to show in the following is the way in which the official discourse of security on migration departed from security perceived in terms of securitization, at least in terms of rhetoric, and thus from explicit, clearcut exclusion. I am going to show, that is, how the 'new' discourse responded both to blatant racism and anti-racist direct action, and to unregulated migration from a seemingly neutral, technocratic point of view. I will thus focus on what may appear as an anomaly in the binary constitution of self/other in security discourse, that is to say, an emerging logic of governmentality as constitutive of security discourse.

During the period I focus on, three elections took place. First, the elections for the European Parliament (2009), second, the National elections (2009) and, third, the elections for the Local Councils (2010).\textsuperscript{350} The shift in what migration represents in relation to security coincided with the coming into power of PASOK. Already before PASOK forms national government in late 2009, a campaign had been launched that promised the effective 'management' of migration. As it was named to me idiosyncratically by a member of the government – the then Deputy Minister of Public Order – the 'new' discourse would do away with 'inhuman conditions' and will fight against 'racism'.\textsuperscript{351} For the 'new' discourse migration is a phenomenon that takes place anyway, it implies a reality, which cannot merely be dealt with by police measures and

\textsuperscript{350} In the European Parliament Elections in 2009, the far-right LAOS got a 7.15%. In the national elections, LA.OS got a similar percentage (5.63%).

\textsuperscript{351} The Minister characteristically said. 'now...the new discourse is prevailing...all that [you are concerned with] are already under change'.
strategies of control. However, the ordering of that reality would be necessary, in other words, the production of the city population as governable where it appears as differentiated across ethnic, cultural, ideological lines. The archive of statements before and after the election of PASOK allows us to point out key elements of the new policy: First, the reality to which it would respond was understood as a reality of 'lawlessness' which compromised the 'primary good', namely, the 'security of the citizen'. This reality was successfully represented as the outcome of ND's inefficiency and incompetence to deal with the complex phenomenon of migration, but would certainly not be reduced to it. This reality implied a series of interconnected problems for security and order in the everyday urban life, which ranged from housing and black market (para-emporio) to the mere presence of lathrometanastes and constant demonstrations, and to drug-use, crime and prostitution, which were seen as posing questions for economic and societal security. The then leader of PASOK intervened during the pre-election period in June 2009, summarizing eight points for dealing with 'the phenomenon of migration, political asylum, and illegal migration', the last of which referred to:

[A] special program for re-structuring the cities, neighborhoods, especially neighborhoods in danger of ghettoization – by means of planned and all-encompassing interventions, in collaboration with local councils, NGOs, with serious public investments, systematic housing policies for migrants, with the protection of their legal rights and the guarantee for peaceful co-existence and social coherence of our society'.352

Although the question of (in)security figured first ('zero tolerance to illegal immigration' and protection of the borders), this perspective, set also as its objective the peaceful co-existence between migrants and natives. Indeed, as opposed to several statements of the leader of ND whose view was that immigration is a problem and that 'Greece is a

state formed by a national body, similarly to the ensemble of European states, it is not a
state of immigrants', the 'new' discourse appeared to be far more inclusive in its
priorities: peaceful co-existence amongst different people, fight against xenophobia,
promotion of human and social rights: 'if we do not empower our citizens, they will look
for power elsewhere, and that is where the right will take advantage, by creating fear,
insecurity, and by offering populist, racist, or fear-mongering solutions'. The new
policy frame was articulated in opposition to the ineffective 'management' of a
phenomenon (immigration) by the previous government, and because of the unwanted
results of such ineffectiveness (racism/xenophobia): 'We see society being dragged
behind xenophobic logics [...], without there being a total plan to deal with these
phenomena, to eradicate racist syndromes [...]'. and, elsewhere, 'we understand
peoples' concerns regarding migration'. In other words, the 'new' discourse constructs
migration as a real phenomenon from which a series of possibilities exist – as it is
framed in another document migration can equally be a 'blessing' or a 'curse'. Migration
is de-securitized in that it is no longer represented as a clearcut threat. Simultaneously,
racism becomes one of the objects, equivalent to 'illegal' migration itself, against which
the security-migration nexus is articulated. Under this light, racism becomes as
problematic as 'illegal' immigration'. In fact for the 'new' discourse the incapacity to
govern the field of migration produces 'illegal' migration. 'illegal' immigration accounts
for, is seen as the condition of the possibility of, but does not justify racism, neither the

353 See Samaras (2010).
354 Address by George Papandreou at the session of the Council of the European Socialist Party in
Madrid, 1 December 2008, Auditorium Hotel, Madrid. Available online at:
http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/Document.aspx?
d=6&rd=7739474&f=1359&rf=1307755822&m=11700&rm=11847678&1=1, accessed
10/12/2010.
355 See Statement of the Social Integration, Human Rights and Welfare Section of PASOK, 18
December 2008. Available online at:
http://archive.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/id/ac046a50-b7f7-4e74-b783-0b953cb32
2e2.
reactions to it by anti-racists. All this tension in urban Athens between 'natives', migrants, anti-racists and police, during 2009 and 2010, was adequately represented as continuous and disruptive of the ordinary, social and economic life of the city. 'Anomie' and 'violence' from these three sides were portrayed as that which prevents the 'citizen' and the state from being:

policemen, injured by iron bars, rocks, marbles and molotov cocktails, are victims of the blind violence and arbitrariness of some, which is also what is experienced by the citizens of Athens who stay in AP and who are crushed between extreme activities of foreigners and certain self-appointed protectors of the residents living in those areas. In reality both cultivate the same field of bigotry and racism.  

What is particularly distinct of this 'new' discourse is the vision of society it projects: 'Greece and its society, ought to prove daily that they fight against racism, xenophobia [...] ' (my emphasis). It is clear that a conception of society is invoked, for which ethnic heterogeneity and multiculturalism do not constitute a problem, such as the following description of Athens by M. Pavlou:

Athens, one of the most diverse European metropolises, is a Mediterranean megacity, an urban complex of almost 4 million inhabitants and the capital city of a country with total 11 million residents. The cycles of history have engraved the experiences of migration on the city's identity, which has been transformed and reshaped many times as a multi-ethnic and multicultural social space of dialogue and contrasts.
I take this description of the city and its people as normative and performative, partly drawing on a given historicity of diversity and partly bringing it into being. Because for one thing it is the exact negation of the description by the minister. The point here is to delegitimate this other 'society' which insists on desiring social and cultural homogeneity. The former 'society' recognizes the problem of security in lawlessness, irregularity and racism. Its will is constructed by the bearers of the 'new' discourse. The ethno-nationalist, however, recognizes the problem in 'neoliberalism' and its 'hordes' of irregular migrants. Its will is constructed through the affirmation of the homogeneity and historical continuity of the Greek people. The symptom of the 'new' discourse is lack of order (including the 'illegals'), whereas the symptom of the ethnonationalist is more squarely the 'foreigner'.

I believe it is crucial to pause for a moment and flesh out in more detail the elements of this 'new' discourse. Were we to assign a centre to it, were we to say that this discourse is the construction of PASOK we would miss a lot. By opening up the scope of analysis so as to understand and explain this discourse, the role of civil society in dealing with the so-called 'degradation of the historical centre' of Athens should be addressed. This issue, in the way it has been addressed and became an object of political intervention, exemplify a key feature of security *qua* 'management', namely that security is a practice that articulates heterogeneous elements – demands and actors and spans across the social.

The press office of PASOK in early 2011, that is, a period of intense politicization of migration, came out with a statement that begins by foregrounding the 'challenge' that Greece and the international community are faced with, namely, 'illegal' migration. It goes on to say that 'Greek citizens are daily confronting the consequences of illegal migration. Degradation of the historical centre, shameful images of miserable migrants
in the few and inefficient reception centers, images that expose Greece in a world-wide scale'. Interestingly, the broader dimension here takes on an important inflection. That 'we' must be shameful for our 'image'. Here, we encounter once again the particular way in which the rationale for change is fleshed out: namely, that what matters is the 'image' of social relations and practices rather than the practices themselves. But, what is the 'degradation of the historical centre'? Who is a stakeholder? Who is called in to take action and how?

The commercio-historical centre and its 'anarchical' condition that calls for intervention is often represented by politicians by means of uncanny comparisons to Kabul and/or Baghdad in particular. These metaphors would be mobilized from PASOK security 'gurus' when in opposition, and by the far-right when PASOK came into government.

'Which tourist, given such image, is going to visit Athens?', asked a L.A.O.S MP, confirming that the framing of the problem was in these crucial respects common across the 'mainstream' – right-wing spectrum. The question of the government of the city centre of Athens was thus not newly posed by the government of PASOK. As we previously saw it was also concern of those who would like to retain for Athens a Hellenic facade. But for proponents of the 'new' discourse, the question was essentially a

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359 Except for metaphors of unruliness drawing on familiar images, such as the abundantly used 'fenceless vineyard', Greek politicians have consistently resorted to comparisons with what would perceived to be exemplars of 'third-world' lack of governmental knowledge. So 'Uganda', 'Zair', for example, in the mindset of ND's ex-Minister of Defense, Y. Varvitsiwtis, have stood as metaphors of the situation which is in opposition to regulation and government. See, Varvitsiotis, PLDB070201: 4605.

360 M. Chrissohoedos asked rhetorically in 2009 if Athens has become 'Kabul', after a series of bombings. He repeteated the comparison a year later claiming that foreign nationals have created 'armies' (see Eleftherotypia, 21 February 2010), and thereafter it became commonplace metaphor in media discourse for crime and disorder. Aevaliotis (L.A.O.S) claimed during the same period that 'Kabul' seems like 'Paradise' compared to Athens (see Naftemporiki, 29 March 2010). Except for the assumed (lost) superiority and the naturalization of these countries being 'third-world' and war-torn, it remains the case that such metaphors are hyperbolic and function as metaphors of 'war'.

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different one: it was one of 'modernization' with an emphasis on the better government of the capital city, in terms of policing and regulating the flow of goods and people.  

When Foucault says that 'police' deals with the urban problem of 'the circulation of men and goods in relation to each other' we should think of all that which constitutes the city, namely, its roads, the buildings, the squares, but also, the religion, the morals, health and subsistence, public peace, commerce and how these can become problematic from the point of view of sustaining urban life.

If policing is a condition for the urban space to exist, according to Foucault, then what we could call the 'logic of governmentality' is inscribed on interventions that involve the active involvement of sectors of civil society. A series of problematics hinge upon the articulation of security discourse: the empty houses and public buildings in areas of inner Athens, which, for migrants constitute temporary accommodation, for urban planners and estate agencies are potentially opportunities for gentrification; unregulated 'para'-commerce: again, a source of a minimal income for newly arrived immigrants, a cause of economic losses for the merchants in the city, an object of inadequate policing from the point of view of the regulation of commercial life, or a mere obstacle for the consumer who carves his way between shops and street vendors.

The ATA (Athens Traders Association) played a key role in bringing about the debate on the problem of paraemporio [para-commerce]. For example, when the far-Right MP Adonis Georgiadis was hosted during a visit to the association, it was 'a commonly accepted ascertainment'

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361 Here I allude to Foucault's writings on the subject of 'police' and of how it is inextricably linked to the urban question which 'concerns the whole problem of the exchange, circulation, manufacture, and marketing of goods. Coexistence of men and circulation of goods [...]’ (2007: 335).


363 Athens Municipal Police were consistently bringing up the problem of 'para'-commerce, understanding it to be a dimension of the lack of immigration policy. See, for example, an article in their blogspot entitled 'illegal street vendors and Municipal Police'.

that the lack of migration policy is a inhibiting factor in the eradication of unlawful commerce (ATA, 2009). By contrast, any reference to migration policy or the 'illegals' was missing from a following ATA press release which sums up the visit of the candidate for the local elections, G. Kaminis, supported by PASOK. The candidate according to the press release presented the ATA with a series of measures that he intended to take, which involved the screening of abandoned buildings, subsidizing young couples, in order that permanent lodgers re-inhabit and thereby revitalize and make manifest the economical, commercial and cultural life of the city; the 'splendor of the city', as Foucault would have it. Another obstacle for the orderly workings of the market was said to be the problematic arrangement of public manifestations and demonstrations, the regulation of which was seen as rational in that such events are not conducive to setting the tone for the circulation of workers, inhabitants and commercial goods. They constituted yet another problem in the government of the city and its market. The example of the ATA shows us how civil society sectors are in constant deliberation with local and state authorities and can very well forge alliances across the political spectrum, which in this case made possible bringing into being the problem of the city centre. In 2009-2010 the ATA supported and was involved in an initiative under the name 'paraemporio stop' which was directly profiling migrant street vendors and instigating direct action to resolve the pressing issue. Legal action was also a means for the commercial community of Athens to tackle the issue and render accountable the local authorities.\footnote{See \textit{Doumas and others v. Kaklamanis and others. and Antigone (2010) report on the 'pogrom' in the marketplace.}}

The question of housing in central Athens was also widely addressed by steady reference to migrants and refugees and crime during the period before the local elections in November 2010. A number of elements here came to be juxtaposed in such way that
they posed a problem for the government of the city and its growth. In the formulation of this question, statistics, house prices, crime, migrants, real estate speculators, local NGOs, and urban planners, architects, engineers and so on, have been implicated and assigned to particular positions and relationships. According to statistical research conducted by a private company and disseminated in the press, 'the increase by one percent of crime causes the decrease of the estate's value at least by 0.5 percent'. Even further, 'regarding old estates in lower storeys, the increase by one percent in crime causes up to 4 percent decrease in the price of the estate'. The less permanent inhabitants choose to live in central Athens, the more migrants have the chance to 'cluster'. The more migrants 'cluster', crime is on the rise. The more crime is on the rise, the more the prices fall, thus making estates a 'prey' for 'speculators'.

That seems to be the argument here.

On the other hand, urban reformers and city planners repeatedly brought together urban 'experts', local authorities and central government. The results of such collaboration across civil society and between civil society and the authorities, we can see in a number of hosted events and forums, reports and plans on the question of the city centre, which often touch upon broader issues than local ones, such as, the preservation of the historical identity of the city, human security, homeless refugees, persisting influx of migrants, organized crime, fascists groupings and so on. For example during a pre-election open debate between all candidates for the municipality of Athens, suggestions were reported that directly linked the problem of the city centre to that of Greece's asylum policy or the Dublin II convention.

The local civil society appeared to be divided with regard to two issues. The first issue

365 Special Permanent Committee on Environmental protection (2010).
366 See Monumenta (2010) 'This not-for-profit organization was active in organizing public discussions on the problems faced by 'residents', 'workers' and 'legal shop owners'.

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was the role assigned to migrants in the degradation of the historical centre and its rapid transformation into what was seen to be the 'historical Ghetto'. For them, the problem would be associated to the authorities' tolerance to lawlessness and, crucially, to the pervasive logic that seemed to characterize most interventions. I will call this logic a logic of displacement in line with their descriptions of what a typical response from official actors would be and what typical policing looks like. I quote two of their demands: 'We demand the immediate activation of the polity (Municipality, Prefecture, Ministries), the cooperation amongst them, without the usual justifications that 'these belong to others' jurisdiction', and 'we demand the constant and systematic policing of the area [...], not the parking of a police van that simply displaces the problem 'further down'. That gentrification and displacement – the second issue - is not a solution to the problem but rather a problem in itself is an emerging argument. This argument appears in a plurality of texts that seek to reconsider the root of the Athenian 'problem'. Where they seem to agree is that migrants are not the cause but part of the problem. Are they rather the residue of a 'cosmopolitics [consisting in] the management of life in the limit', an architect wonders.

It is such marginalized life 'sans papiers' that is a by-product of 'the quandary of administration and legislation' according to the Greek Ombudsman.

The disagreement here is not about the position of the migrant, rather it is centered

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367 For example, an assemblage of 'active' citizens' and organizations for the 'rescue of the Historical Centre' declares its openness to anyone who adheres to their manifesto which begins by stating: 'the problem of the historical centre of Athens is not a problem of migrants – it is a problem of uncontrolled operation of illegal networks'. See their official blog: [http://istorikoghetto.wordpress.com/](http://istorikoghetto.wordpress.com/).

368 The question of 'displacement' is a central one and it has been heavily described as a root problem. For instance, in another published document by the architect Eleni Tzirtzilaki (2009) this question occupies the place of the title: 'The historical centre of Athens and gentrification: Filoxenia or Dis-placement'. This is an interesting text in that it tries simultaneously to locate the current problem in gentrification which displaces rather than solves 'problems', while invoking a history of the city which has been a 'sanctuary' since always. 'Once it was refugees from M. Asia, then it was internal migrants, now the contemporary displaced in exile in the metropolis of Athens'.

369 Tzirtzilaki (2009)

370 See Greek Ombudsman (2010: 13).
around the characterization of the role of management. On the one hand, we have civil society interventions that point out the need for more technocratic and managerial interventions,\textsuperscript{371} on the other, we have interventions that are critical of management discourse insofar as the latter produces the population as governable by marginalizing and rendering life 'unworthy to live', to borrow Agamben's catch phrase. The question of who is a victim of the gentrification and desertification of the city is not entirely clear either. 'Migrants' figure invariably across texts, but in a certain number of documents on the 'historical centre', the equivalence of displaced subjects due to gentrification extends so as to include also 'artists', 'citizens' and so on.

**Babel or diversity?**

During the first months of 2010, a number of co-ordinated attempts to address the issue of the historico-commercial centre of Athens took place. One of those attempts brought together a number of civil society and governmental actors and the result was the Parliamentary Commission for Environmental Protection, 26-page conclusion on the historical centre of Athens, the aim of which was a) to record the problems, b) to have proposals submitted, c) to locate the necessary solutions, d) to organize a coordinated system, e) to device a monitoring system of application (2010: 2). Like many other documents I have discussed it posed the question of migrants and security, but also that of gentrification. The whole document presents the situation as nearly 'irreversible' in that it poses fundamental risks for societal security and coherence. The main point though it made was that the city suffered because of a 'Babel of jurisdictions' (ibid, 2010: 4). Such mismanagement and high irregularity in the government of the city was seen to have led to an emergency situation. It is then no wonder that in the fifth thesis it goes on

\textsuperscript{371} The theses of the Association of Greek Urban and Zoning Planners approximate more the technocratic model of planning the urban web.
to propose the launching of a 'social, economical and environmental' 'Xenokrates plan'.

The proceedings of this Committee have been controversial and have brought about dispute between central government and local authorities. But less controversial points are interesting to explore as well as they pose the question of how the vision of the future city of Athens is articulated and re-iterated. Thesis 16 of this document observes the 'gradual evacuation of traditional Greek businesses' (ibid, 2010: 9). Thirty per cent of businesses in a central zone of Athens, it is noted, belongs to *allo dapoi* and this figure is raised by 10% in particular in the markets of *Sophocleous, Euripidou, Sokratous* streets. The streets named after cornerstone figures of ancient Greek culture appear now to be the place of dubious commercial activity by foreigners. Often times, as I mentioned above, the names of the capitals of countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq have been invoked by official lips to describe the contemporary facade of Athens. In order for Athens to cease being 'Kabul' in terms of insecurity at all fronts, the 'Babel' of bureaucracy has to be eradicated. Only this way, it is suggested, that Athens could return to its essential character as a hospitable city: 'Immediate declaration of Euripides Street as the road of “spices and traditional shops”' (Birbili, 2010). The statement belongs to the Minister of Environment who thereby articulated her vision of the future outlook of the city from which Greek businesses are currently displaced. The vision, crystallized in the 'Athens-Attica 2014' program, is that of multicultural Athens, 'traditional' and 'exotic' but first and foremost operating 24/7, a regulated and friendly environment to the 'Western' tourist and the citizen. This program is the epitome of what we might call the

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372 Xenokrates was an ancient Greek sculptor and writer. In this context the name alludes to the operational code-name of the 'General Plan for Civil Protection' designed to deal with 'catastrophic phenomena'.

373 See Ministry of Environment 2010a. Program Athens – Attica 2014'. [www.ypeka.gr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket...tabid=37](www.ypeka.gr/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket...tabid=37). See also Appendix 6h, 6j.
governmentality logic. It comprises plans and projects of restructuring the whole city in terms of turning unregulated space into socially, culturally, economically and aesthetically productive zones. In particular, the squares that had become during 2009 up to date the epicenter of discussions about 'ghetto', 'illegals' but also the stage of violent confrontations between police, foreigners, anti-immigrant and anti-racist activists, would be changing: 'Agios Panteleimon Square in Acharn: a space of antagonisms and conflict becomes a space of reconciliation and harmonious co-existence between the diverse ethnicities of the area'.

In this part I sought to draw out the particularities of the 'new' discourse of security on migration. I addressed it in its complexity and internal heterogeneity, with the logics it attempted to de-legitimate and those that it attempted to institute. Urban insecurity became top policy priority for the new government of PASOK in 2009 and in that sense this discourse was not radically different. The logics of clearcut 'securitization' and displacement that accounted for poor migration management were targeted by the proponents of this 'new' discourse. However, what the 'new' discourse did was to contest the logic of displacement by displacing at the same time the political aspect of the 'inner city' problem. While attempting to regulate and govern by means of technocratic, administrative interventions that appeared as post-ideological in the sense that they 'transcended' the conflict between ideological 'extremes', the new discourse managed to displace the relatively autonomous political and ideological significance of the racial hostility of 'natives' against foreigners and the antagonism between the former and antiracists. The idea that harmony will prevail by fully instituting an order of diversity, by eradicating racism and lawlessness, carries traces of a utopian discourse. In this discourse, 'citizens' are interpellated as neutral subjects and 'society' is portrayed as a

374 Ministry of Environment 2010b. See also Appendix 6h, 6j.
victim of lawlessness manifested in the doings of 'illegal' immigrants and the battle between the 'two extremes'. This discourse can be seen as acknowledging racism, but as an obstacle to government and order.

One problem that emerges by scrutinizing this complex and 'wicked' case, the 'problem' of the centre of Athens as constitutive of the contemporary security-migration nexus, is that although there was a discursive shift at the 'official level', where the 'new' discourse attempted to order things, to regulate illegality and to govern the urban co-existence of natives and foreigners. at the micro-level of analysis things are different. The more, as a researcher, one is prepared to be attentive to potentially ever expanding intertextual dimensions of a 'problem' and to consider security as a contested terrain where different demands strive to become hegemonic, the more one is faced with complexity and contradictions.

This brings me to one of my central methodological arguments: that to characterize security discourse is not as straightforward a business, because of the heterogeneity of subjects involved and because of the need to avoid the bias of disentangling analytically and focusing on some levels of analysis at the expense of concealing others. Indeed, the articulation of at least two different modalities of security discourse – the ethno-nationalist-for-homogeneity and the governmentality-for-diversity – around the 'problem' of Athens presents us with difficulties. First, from a point of view it might be argued that the 'natives' are antagonistic to the 'official' position. In fact, it was shown that the 'new' discourse was only made possible in opposition to 'incidents of racism'.

Second, the representations, visions, assumptions of the 'self' and of 'society', differed

375 The term 'wicked' here captures the idea of those 'controversies [...] that galvanize multiple actors and agencies into action under conditions of policy ambiguity and sharp value conflict' (Griggs and Howarth, 2012: 196)

376 We could here also refer to conceptualizations of security which attempted to articulate beyond the binary of cultural homogeneity/diversity. Unfortunately such inquiry is beyond the scope of this research.

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significantly between the two modalities: Although both have invariably been invoking
the culture of *filoxenia*, they nevertheless projected different ideal 'pictures' of society
(homogeneity/heterogeneity). These differences internal to the constitution and
consolidation of security discourse – since both differences are only such given their
common rendering of migration as a 'problem' for security – reveal that during the
period examined, security discourse was up for grabs, open to contestation and awaiting
for hegemonic consolidation. In a period of an over-arching crisis, the meaning of
security and its relationship to migration have been questioned by various sides and from
different positions of enunciation.

Shifting the focus from the traditional emphasis on national security to societal security
not only presents us with problems regarding the characterization of a discourse, but it
also forces us to think in a historical-genealogical fashion about the nature and the
'origins' of related demands such as the demand for 'burden-sharing' of migration
pressures that the Greek Government posed in *another* context, namely, the European
Union institutional terrain. It is thus that an object such as 'urban security' in Athens is
inseparable from EU migration and security policy. The analysis of this object
introduces the dimension of struggle in what appears to be solid, top-down domains of
politics.

Further, revisiting the concept of 'societal security' from a post-structuralist perspective,
opens up the road to exploring the constitution of the 'self' in enacting security, in
problematizing migration. Society is not a given entity that needs to continue to exist
and does so in an automatic way, but rather, every time it attempts to do so, the
possibility of new signifiers coming into play is always present. For example, unless an
economic 'crisis' was looming over Greece during this period, activating discourses
around better management, effective and responsible government, it would perhaps not
have been possible to articulate the same discourse with regard to migration. Migration
was thereby contingently produced as a field in need of regulation for the 'population' to
be amenable to government. Equally, during this period migration became the terrain of
contesting ideological and political positions.

**Fantasmatic logics: racism and filoxenia as 'culture'**
The words 'racism' and 'filoxenia' are by no means essentially relevant to the concept or
the politics of security. It is much easier to approach them as cultural representations or
representations of culture. But the question remains regarding the place of 'culture' in
security discourse. What is that place? What function does 'culture' perform in the
emergence, reproduction and contestation of security discourse? By articulating the
notion of fantasmatic logics as those logics that account for the ideological dimension of
certain practices (concealment) – and security discourse is a practice – it is possible to
say something about the place of the historically and politically loaded terms 'racism'
and 'filoxenia'. But let me begin by another problematic on which light can be shed. The
function of the European/Western 'gaze'.

The European/Western 'gaze' is crucial in the production of security discourse on
migration. If the ethno-nationalist strand of security discourse simply *denies* racism and,
indeed, attempts to differentiate between 'Europe' and 'Greece', though less so than it
does in differentiating between 'Greece' and the 'Orient', the managerial-for-diversity
strand exhibits a rather different logic. The European 'gaze' is a measure for 'our' actions
that sets the threshold of what is morally and politically acceptable and what is not. For
the (neo-)liberal ideal, which provides the rationale for regulating migration, racism
constitutes a transgression, an object that ought to be situated outside the 'self'. It is
effectively repressed. To the extent that this object appears at the 'heart' of society, then
this 'society' should be seen as a remainder of an imperfectly 'modernized' society the symptom of which is the inability to separate from parochial, outdated ideals such as cultural homogeneity. The existence of the European/Western 'gaze' assigns 'Greece' to an ambiguous position at the limit of European identity, geographically, politically and morally. The 'Greeks' have 'fallen' and have failed to face the challenges of multiculturalism, modernization and so on. This very perspective is internalized by the subjects of management discourse in the field of migration, providing the rationale and underpinning the attempts to produce and govern the population. From this perspective, 'racism' exists but it is irreducible to social relations. It is displaced and projected onto the ethnonationalist 'other'; it is a 'localized' rather than a dispersed phenomenon; it is amenable to solution and eradication by means of technocratic, objectively efficient interventions; it is not an aspect of potentially every practice, but rather the irrational opinion or behavior of identifiable actors. I believe this is the way that the managerial discourse has produced a broad moral consensus on the practices it sought to establish. The securitization of racism, in other words, the making of racism a priority threat for social cohesion is what has legitimated and dissimulated the emerging discourse of migration management. To integrate all aspects then, I would argue that the 'centre' of Europe displaces anti-immigrant racism onto its 'margins'. This point was made clear in the previous chapter where I accounted for the focus of a variety of institutions on the 'Greek case'. Then, under the shadow of the European/Western gaze, the Greek modernizer in the field of regulating migration, strives to displace racism away from dominant social relations and imaginaries to a 'cultural' and societal margin; a second displacement. When the controversy regarding 'racism' involves the urban setting and not the border, the territorial and geographical limit, and when in particular it involves the capital city and its historico-commercial centre, where racism cannot be 'concealed',
it is then imperative to attribute it to a very particular agent. The 'Citizens' of AP, by scapegoating migrants, they have themselves served as the scapegoat of a seemingly anti-racist, liberal democratic politics of tackling migration.

Filoxenia. The concept of filoxenia and its invocation in the context of responses to the 'problem' of migration in the city of Athens, appears to articulate a cultural self-representation from the position of which an anti-racist utterance sounds more than natural. For the 'Citizens' it meant that an essential property of Greek identity has to be compromised vis-à-vis the exceptional situation that unregulated migration has brought about. For grassroots anti-racist collectives, hospitality is a concept that, if reversed and mocked, can 'expose' the denial of racism. For the regulation-for-diversity subjects 'filoxenia' has been the code-name for promoting security discourse in a morally superior and legitimate way. Overall, the hegemonic uses of 'filoxenia', its incorporation into the languages of security, has proved to be that element which draws its power from at least two decades of signification as part and parcel of Greek culture. Its all-encompassive 'grip' on subjects makes almost any critique stumble upon a 'cultural' cornerstone. It is this fantasmatic 'grip' that allows the representation of the 'self' in security discourse as defensible from reproach with racism and that eventually sustains the current security-migration nexus in face of growing social opposition.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown how locals' hostility towards migrants, in particular, 'illegal' ones, has operated within a logic of securitization. Societal insecurity in Athens during the period 2008-2010 was on the rise and so were practices that sought to eliminate the 'cause' of such insecurity by targeting directly and indiscriminately non-nationals. In response to a series of problems for urban government, the 'new' discourse came about to
impose 'order'. Under the general offensive against 'lawlessness' the 'new' discourse coming from a specific strand of PASOK sought to do away with urban tensions, unregulated commerce and migration, racism and violence, in short with social heterogeneity. This latter was made possible in a looming 'culture of danger' and crisis discourse. It attempted to construct security in a less exclusive way. It identified against racism and invoked a conception of Greek society as open to multiculturalism, grounded in the tradition of hospitality.

With the elaboration of this case, I hoped to open the study of security to the problematic of heterogeneity by showing how other actors than the state partake in the construction of security, and how there need not be an internal consistency amongst these elements. In fact, they may well be contradicting elements. Security discourse, conceived as articulating a variety of dispersed positions in the social amounts to a rather central nodal point of broader political discourse on immigration. I further wanted to show how societal security in the urban context articulates phenomenally distinct concerns about migration and migration policy, commercial activity, urban development and gentrification. Last, I wanted to show how 'culture' is at play within security discourse – as the representation of the dominant self-image, more often than not providing legitimacy, but also how security discourse brings into being different visions of society.
The events I reconstruct in this chapter are messy and violent. They revolve around what seems to be one of the major mobilizations of foreign immigrants in Greece and in Europe over the last decades. The hunger strike of 300 immigrants between January and March 2011 was one of most prolonged and risky, collective mobilizations, and the description that follows condenses recent historical 'facts' of struggles and repression, local battles and domination, silenced perspectives and injured bodies. It is a story that could be part of that 'historico-political discourse' that Foucault discloses – the discourse of war and antagonism – and which he links to the project of genealogy, giving it primacy over the discourses that take for granted the centrality of peace and order in politics. An investigation that foregrounds the dimension implied by the discourse of war – the primacy of the 'political', we could also say – looks at the social antagonism that runs constantly beneath the institutions of society and its legal and executive functions. It cannot but be an investigation that is partial, situated and critical, as it asks the question of how contemporary historical events and accidents can tell us something about the societies we live in.

The hunger strike created a great deal of controversy, as major mobilization by the state, civil society and grassroots organizations and other groups raised the tension in the already dislocated public sphere in Greece during the winter of 2011. During this event migration, security, racism, hospitality and citizenship, were 'problematized', to use a
Foucauldian concept; they offered themselves to adversaries who reconstituted their meaning in public discourse. Immigration to Greece became anew the object of particular political and administrative interventions while all the heterogeneity that the concepts of citizenship, racism and security imply were condensed into the image of the occupied Law School of Athens where the hunger strike was initially staged. The rest of the chapter focuses on what was, I argue, a key decision by what is symbolically the highest judicial authority in Greece, the Hellenic Council of State. With the hunger strike ongoing, the HCS resolved that the relatively progressive and rather limited immigrant-friendly law that came into effect several months before was unconstitutional. Following the 'plot' led me finally to consider the context of this law and, more specifically, an initiative of digital deliberation where citizens were invited to share their thoughts about the proposed legislation. The responses to the immigrants' struggle and to the proposed legislation on the part of the state, the media, the judiciary and the ordinary citizens who left their digital traces of deliberation all exemplify the main points about the dominance of the logic of defence, the resistance to change, and the propensity for backlash.

A Serious Threat
Let me begin by quoting a part of the laconic message by which 300 migrant workers announced publicly that they are going to submit their bodies to the discipline known as 'hunger-strike' in order to have their demands met:

Recently our lives have become even more unbearable. As salaries and pensions are cut and prices rise, migrants are blamed for the misery and harsh exploitation of Greek workers and small businesses. Far-right discourse is reproduced through

377 Foucault says 'discourse battle and not discourse reflection...Discourse-the mere fact of speaking, of employing words, of using the words of others (even if it means returning them) words that the others understand and accept (and, possibly, return from their side)- this fact is in itself a force. Discourse is, with respect to the relation of forces, not merely a surface of inscription, but something that brings about effects.' (Foucault 2004: xxii).
the media when they talk about us. On issues of migration, the propaganda of fascist and racist parties and groups has become the formal language of the State while their ‘proposals’ have already become government policy: the wall in Evros, floating detention centers and a European army in the Aegean, repression in the cities, massive deportations. They are trying to make Greek workers believe that we are suddenly a threat to them, that we are to blame for the unprecedented attack from their own governments.378

We are not interested here in questions about truth/falsity. We are interested in that discourse ‘in which truth functions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclusively partisan victory’.379 Here, the ‘social’ is represented fairly simply: hunger strikers—migrant men and women—fellow Greek workers in opposition to the State/fascist and racist parties/practices of control and security/political and economical elites. I think this is one way in which the discourse of war can be spoken. A real and material indignity, repression and social inexistence has recourse to the only perhaps discourse that it can have public access to, to reach the threshold of visibility, and to count itself as a political action that attempts to break with a socio-political regime that is productive through the repression of workers’ rights, and repressive through the production of migrants as ‘illegals’ at work, in the city, at the border, depending on how the economy plays out, by detaining, deporting, arresting, exploiting, by letting one live in considerably more ‘risk’, as they write, than formally recognized citizens.

There is a lot to be analyzed regarding how we understand and theorize the relationship between the state, racism and security; the ‘mainstreaming’ of far-right discourse; the

378 Anonymous (2011). The statement of the migrant hunger strikers, was made on 23 January 2011. It was widely disseminated publicly, in print and online on the blog associated with the hunger strike. This blog served as a hub of information on the migrants’ struggle and it hosted public statements of individuals and collectives who were in solidarity to the struggle for dignity and rights undertaken by the 300 migrants. Unions, academics, philosophers, journalists, students, from Greece and ‘abroad’, some anarchist collectives, wrote a story other than the official one, and effectively, fought a battle by organizing international solidarities and by confronting what is hegemonic in the social and political body. Thus, a local and singular struggle with regional resonances and reverberations but not one without precedent. For example, see Derrida (2002b).

relationship between the economy, security and racism, topics on which I cannot expand here. Instead, I will return to the official *response* to the decision of the migrants and those in solidarity to stage their struggle in the premises of the University of Athens.

Immediately after the entry of the 300 in the Law School, the Ministry of Education came out with the following statement: 'The transformation of the Law school into a migrants' camp is beyond toleration'.\(^{380}\) Another high-ranking member of the government said that 'the Law School is a space of education, not of hospitality to migrants'.\(^{381}\) Soon, the words of journalists and politicians were in the front pages of major newspapers signaling the threat: 'an irresponsible act', 'violent blackmail', 'provocation', an 'impasse', 'asylum of illegality'. Let's unpack this last statement because it contains certain conceptual traps.

If not familiar with contemporary political and social history of Greece, one will probably be puzzled. What does 'asylum' have to do with 300 hunger strikers seeking their rights by taking over a public building? Did they 'ask' for humanitarian or political asylum? No. But they did *claim* asylum in university estates. In Greece, according to the law,\(^{382}\) the police could not enter the university unless a crime is committed or the Dean actually invites them. 'Illegality'. Illegality or *anomía*, as I showed elsewhere, has been a key-signifier around which security concerns were articulated and the 'new' discourse was deployed. The use of the word 'illegality' here is ambiguous. It is not entirely clear if it refers to the act of taking over the building or to the socio-political status of the migrants. In the first case, the question as to why there was such mobilization of the

\(^{380}\) See (Diamantopoulou 2011). Her comment was on camera and then reproduced in a press release. It received wide broadcast coverage.

\(^{381}\) Vougias, PLDB270111: 146.

\(^{382}\) Law 1268/1982. This law established the public university as a space of 'asylum' for the safeguarding of academic freedom. It laid down the rules by which it becomes possible for the police to enter university premises, that is, only with the consent of the pertinent institutional authority (article 2). This article was abolished with Law 4009/2011.
security apparatus is important given that there have been dozens of cases where university asylum was 'abused' in much more catastrophic ways but there was no intervention. In the second case, it is clear that a subject broadly designated as 'migrants', let alone 'illegals', have never proceeded to an action like that. Hence, we may legitimately want to ask: What difference was introduced by this act with respect to all others in the past? How did a relatively peaceful act of politicization get represented as a serious threat to national security? Who has the right to use and even abuse the asylum and who does not?

The use of the word 'asylum' changes meaning depending on the circumstances. Let's see what 'asylum' means for those who sought to de-legitimize the struggle of the migrants: 'A guarantee for the possibility of free exchange of ideas' says the statement of the PASP [Panhellenic Socialist Movement's Youth] (2011).\(^ {383}\) This view represents the 'originary' meaning of asylum in the Greek public university. It denies a political dimension to it and casts all other uses of asylum as threats to its supposedly primary purpose. 'The academic asylum cannot be made once more an excuse for delinquency in the Greek Universities', said the official statement by ONNED [New Democracy Youth Organization] (2011a; 2011b).\(^ {384}\) 'The capture of the Law School', they add, 'trivializes every sense of the academic asylum and the entire university community [...], nobody has the right to occupy the premises of the most historic university in the country turning it into a bomb for public health and safety'. Along similar lines, POSDEP, the Hellenic Federation of University Teachers' Associations stated: 'flagrant violation of university asylum, abuse of property and degradation of education and research functions of the

\(^{383}\) From the statement of the secretary of PASOK Youth (2011).

\(^{384}\) ONNED (2011c) very soon provided elaborate views on what the 'problem' with 'illegal migration' is and submitted proposals for its resolution. The rationale was to 'minimize state spending taxpayers' money, restore the image of the country abroad, and release Greek citizens from the sense of daily insecurity'. They maintained that 'Greek society claims' the end of illegal immigration which is becoming an issue of 'economic survival for our very country'.

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Greek Public University'. It is clear that the battle here is displaced on a different
terrain. It concerns the outlook of the university and the logics that asylum is seen to be
associated with, namely, illegality, *anomia*. [...]. Hence, the paradoxical expression
'regime of *anomia*'.

Let's see now if the different kinds of positions assumed by the diverse actors who were
hostile to the struggle or to the means adopted, have any further common elements. A
number of prominent academics stated that the Law School is 'symbolic of the struggle
against dictatorship', a pedestal of civilization and humanism, not a warehouse of
souls' (PASP 2011). 'Our humanitarian ideals make us understand the drama of these
people, but...' (DAP 2011). Civilization, humanitarianism and 'our' struggles in the past.
Here the intrinsic values and culture of Hellenism are re-inscribed on the image of the
Law School. Further on, I will show how the same signifiers were used by those who
sought to adopt a more moderate position. So, besides the arguments about illegality and
anomia, we have arguments that protested the 'use' of a symbol of struggle (of Greeks).

I will return now to the question between racism, the far-right, security and illegality.
The statement of PASP reads '[...] such logics have turned Agios Panteleimonas into an
avaton of the far-right' (2011). A regime of *anomia*, according to PASP, is the real cause
of racism in Athens. What they imply is that actions like the capturing of the Law
School, premised on the logic of illegality inevitably turn society against the migrants.
This is why the Dean of the Law School was certain to declare 'society is with us'. In the
same vein, the Communist Youth (KNE, 2011) declares that the capturing 'had as a
result the cultivation of racist and conservative reflexes'. On this account, racism is a
direct consequence of the migrants not respecting the 'rules of the game'. By contrast, if

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385 See POSDEP (2011)
386 See Collective (2011)
we return to the initial statement of the migrants, we see that they claim that racism becomes normalized, mainstream, the 'formal language' of the State. Racism is the cause – not the effect - of antagonistic acts like that.

That these people lack formal representation, 'voice' and socio-political existence, contradicts however the fact that they proceeded to an action like that. If it were merely a question of 'illegality' and 'delinquency', how besides the mobilization of the security apparatus, was the issue elevated to an issue of such political concern? This question will help elucidate also the question of who counts as a subject and who does not, which will lead us to the question of the meaning of citizenship.

For those who led the migrants to the Law School, a prominent neo-conservative journalist says that they are 'supporters of violence'.\textsuperscript{387} From a different perspective but with the same effect the Communist Party's official newspaper writes something about 'those who led the migrants there' that could be translated like this: 'They play games on the back of migrants'.\textsuperscript{388} The Democratic Left, called for responsibility, took distance from the squatters and appealed to the 'Left that does not play with the issue of migration'. PASP was also clear in its judgment that they are not against the 'migrants' but against 'the Left that led them there'. The 'theory of the instigator', as social media commentators rightly characterized it, was the most crucial weapon for delegitimizing the struggle of migrants. But the theory of the instigator that informed most of the adversaries' interventions had a double effect. On the one hand, it displaced the battle into the terrain of constituted politics. It was thus used to profile a 'usual suspect' that nevertheless is part of the community of recognized subjects. On the other hand, it effaced all traces of agency from the migrants.

\textsuperscript{387} Papahelas, Alexis 'Οι υποστηρικτές της Βίας', I Kathimerini, 27 January 2011.
\textsuperscript{388} Rizospastis, 26 January 2011
To conclude this part of the story, we could say that the battle over the legitimacy of the act of capturing the Law School was fought over at least two lines of argumentation: First, that the function of asylum cannot deviate from its originary purpose and certainly it cannot be abused for purposes that stem from 'illegality'. This argument was used from at least two vantage points representing respectively the discourse for which asylum is a parochial institution in need of abolishment, and the discourse for which asylum is an acquit of struggles and as such it ought to remain in place.

Second, the argument coming from almost all sides of public discourse was that the migrants were led there, instrumentalized by local and recognizable political forces that seek to foster illegality and question the parameters of the existing socio-political status quo. This argument was deployed convincingly, regardless whether or not it derived from positions sympathetic to the migrants themselves. For example, the newspaper of KKE described the capturing as a conspiracy orchestrated by the enemies and 'the purported friends of migrants'. In other words, a paradox appears inasmuch as the concrete political content of the demands posed by the migrants themselves was effaced and the battle was transposed between those who already have socio-political existence: on the one hand, there is the Left and its 'discontents', namely, illegality and, consequently, racism; on the other hand, there is the forces of 'reason', 'responsibility', 'law and order'. Put differently, there is the rational 'centre' of political forces and the extremities of the political spectrum. There are 'rules of the game' and deviation from ethico-political norms (racism/illegality). By way of such representation not only the demands of the migrants were not 'registered' but the whole relationship between migration, racism and illegality was displaced to a margin against which a 'mature' and 'responsible' national discourse appeared as superior and legitimate. Accordingly, the

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389 Rizospastis, 29 January 2011.
In search of hospitality

Within three days from the capturing of the Law School of Athens, the decision was taken that the building must be evacuated peacefully or the police would invade. The government adopted a moderate position in that it did not want to resort to violence, the hunger strikers remained determined to continue the strike no matter where and there was a great deal of confusion as to who is responsible for providing shelter for this. Eventually, an individual owner of a neoclassical building on Patision street agreed to grant part of the premises – unknown why – for a limited period. At three o'clock in the morning of the 28th of January, the 'march with the sleeping bags' as it is remembered by people who attended, curved its way through downtown Athens. The migrant hunger strikers, along with those enclosed in the surrounded by the police Law School, managed to join forces with some thousand demonstrators outside the police kettle and made their way to this building, just a few miles away, in what was for many the most bizarre march.

In the days that followed mobilization continued. A huge network was set in place to propagate the cause of the struggle. In a month's time hunger strikers, one after the other were getting hospitalized. Official discourse and the media were warning those who led the migrants into the hunger strike of the consequences of 'having a dead'. Some went as far as to argue that the Left 'wants a dead' in order to instigate violence and instability. A politics of preventing death was set in place. The possible death of a migrant in this particular moment in time and space was necessary to be avoided so that there will not
be any upheaval.\textsuperscript{390}

Meanwhile, two major developments took place: first, the State Attorney called eight people for questioning as possible suspects of breaking the law regarding 'trafficking of illegal migrants', an allegation, directed against certain members of the Solidarity Committee). The attorney also called in the Dean to testify as possibly guilty of breach of duty and misconduct although he was explicitly aligned with those who judged that immediate evacuation of the Law school was necessary. The judicial authority's decision echoed the Minister's following statement:

A Prosecutor will intervene to seek for those responsible for these events [...] [there are] enormous political and especially social responsibilities of those instigating and organizing the takeover of the Law School putting in effect at incredible risk the country and Greek society.\textsuperscript{391}

That statement, in turn, was responded to by a 'performative declaration of civil disobedience' addressed to the Minister and the State Attorney.\textsuperscript{392} 'We were instigated' the (Greek) author writes and continues:

As for 'incitement', we disclaim any responsibility. Not because of fear of responsibility, but for the simple reason that the idea and the execution of this action had from the beginning to the end been that of the hunger strikers themselves. Even though this sounds inconceivable for the racist mind, non-Europeans are beings with their own discretion and ability to deliberation and collective action. They are not minors always in need of the guidance of a white man. Which is clearly demonstrated by all that promising that happens these days in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere.'

It is interesting to note that the author makes a distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans. Racism here regards the argument that implicitly acknowledges no

\textsuperscript{390} See Makedonia, 3 March 2011.
\textsuperscript{391} Eleftherotypia, 28 January 2011. Heated debates were simultaneously taking place in the parliament, especially the first few days since the taking over of the Law School. See indicatively: PLDB260111
\textsuperscript{392} See the official blog of the hunger-strike: https://hungerstrike300.espivblogs.net/2011/01/30/
agency to the migrants (because they are non-Europeans), and therefore no subjectivity
with a reasonable intention to proceed to a hunger strike.

An Act of Citizenship?

There has been recently a reinvigorated interest in 'broadening' the question of
citizenship. A number of works explore not citizenship as a status, but 'acts of
citizenship' and they focus on how subjects constitute themselves as citizens, or 'those to
whom the right to have rights is due' (Isin, 2008: 2). They draw on the work of Rancière
and are particularly interested in the question of voice: 'The relationship of voice to the
political involves a much more complicated set of issues than simply the right to vote.
What is at stake is the model by which the political community constitutes its subjects,
audiences and spaces' (Nyers, 2008: 164).

It is in this literature that the rationale for investigating this event from a genealogical
point of view came about. As Isin notes:

While the images of being political given to us by citizens are well documented,
the way strangers and outsiders constituted themselves as being political is much
less so. Being political investigates those moment of becoming political, when
strangers and outsiders question the justice adjured on them by appropriating or
overturning those same strategies and technologies of citizenship. 393

Indeed, university asylum as such had until very recently been the 'tool' for combats to
gain visibility, exclusively amongst Greeks. As the head of the Leftist Coalition had it
during the first days of the occupation 'Asylum is an organic element of Greek

393 See Isin (2002: x). This direction in historical sociology corresponds to theoretical
developments in political theory. Such acts would from the latter point of view be understood
as acts that challenge the homogeneous and universal image of Europe, thus restoring the
Enlightenment not as a regulative ideal but as a practice of critical ethos and questioning. See
Civilization. Its symbolic significance had been without major disruptions attached to the post-dictatorship democratic subjectivity. But now, those people who declared, 'we are migrants, this is our nationality', became political and claimed the asylum for themselves. In that sense, '[b]eing political, among all other ways of being, means to constitute oneself simultaneously with and against others as an agent capable of judgment about what is just and unjust'. This approach, Isin claims, is attentive to the silenced stories and perspectives of outcasts, aliens and strangers which 'make us strangers to ourselves.' This is precisely the thrust of genealogical research. Genealogical inquiry is necessary because the origins of citizenship have been known to us through the stories of dominant groups, 'who have never been inclined to give an account of their dominance' and 'have always been inclined to naturalize their 'superiority' and the 'inferiority' of the dominated.

In a matter of weeks from the beginning of the hunger strike, solidarity was coming from innumerable sources, from Greece and abroad. A number of intellectuals, including Žižek, Negri, Balibar, Wallerstein, Chomsky, Badiou and others made public statements of solidarity. For example, Negri and Mezzadra noted in their common statement: 'Your voice and your action do not come from the “margin” of Europe: they are rather the “center” of a new common European space and democracy in the making', 'and also, 'against the violence of neo-liberalism, financial capital and racism, particularly virulent in the crisis, you are embodying the power of freedom and equality'. In an entry of Znet the author underlines 'The struggle of these migrants highlight the general crisis of migrants and refugees across Greece and Europe'. Professor Etienne Balibar publicly

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394 See, Ta Nea 31 January 2011. Alavanos also stated that 'whoever seeks the abolishment of asylum is not Greek'.
395 (Isin (2002: x)
396 (ibid.: 2002: x)
397 (ibid: 2002: 5).
declared with regard to the struggle of the hunger strikers:

In addition, or rather, inseparably, it represents a crucial element of the popular movement for democracy in Europe, which crosses borders and for that reason elicits a redoubled xenophobia. The solidarity with the migrants must take form not only at a local scale, but at the continental level. This is especially important in a moment when, drawing on the effects of the capitalist crisis and the neo-liberal 'solutions' which aggravate its social effects, aggressive nationalism is raising again its Medusa head in Europe, East and West, North and South.'

In a similar letter of solidarity Slavoj Žižek addressed himself to the hunger strikers:

You are fighting for what Europe will become. Those who ignore or oppose you are a real threat to the European legacy of universal emancipation. In our times of nationalist xenophobia, movements like yours offer a hope that emancipation is not a dead word.

Finally, in a collective letter, some of the above-mentioned and others, formulated clearly their position:

We express our support to their struggle for human dignity and basic civil rights. Elementary social justice dictates to legalize migrant workers and abrogate their penal and bureaucratic persecution.

The interventions of these theorists, social scientists and philosophers are theoretico-political statements. They form part of the discourse of war but embody a certain reflection, a certain interpretation of how things are regarding the relationship between racism, security and the economy; they establish a certain continuity between the 'popular' movement and the struggle of migrants. Nationalism and xenophobia are seen as derivatives, 'drawing on the effects' of the crisis of capitalism. Neoliberal 'solutions' are interpreted as aggravating material conditions, which in turn account for the rise of nationalism and xenophobia. A question then arises as to how we can account for the relationship between nationalism, xenophobia and material prosperity in Greece, but as I have showed so far, a whole discursive infrastructure for legitimating racism
was at work before the 'crisis' and whose analysis prevents us from conceptualizing racism as 'new' or as a result of the crisis. However, the inscription of the particular struggle in a more universalistic discourse of struggle can be seen as an attempt to refuse the idea that a 'popular' movement is necessarily defined in national terms. The 'populus' in this account is that which struggles across ethnic divisions against neoliberalism.

Another issue concerns the relationship between racism and xenophobia and their respective uses. In particular, the term 'nationalist xenophobia' combined with what Žižek referred to as the 'real threat to the European legacy of universal emancipation', reduces racism to an irrational, 'populist temptation' associated to the particularity of the nation and thus obscures from view other discourses to which racism is linked. I think to elaborate on this concept can help us elucidate both the case study and in general the problem of racism in relation to contemporary politics of security. A possible line of interpretation would be to say that neoliberalism should be situated somewhere centrally in the analysis of contemporary struggles of migrants in Greece but it must also be understood as a form of governmentality that is not external to nationalism, xenophobia, or racism, and thus in a causal relationship to them.

The battlefield of the law
Law 3838/2010 on citizenship and political rights came about as a result of pressure from a number of actors, including NGOs, the Greek Ombudsman, the National Commission for Human Rights and others, months prior to the event I described in the previous section. The explanatory memorandum of the drafted law, though, recalls first off the 'Asia Minor catastrophe', an event that stressed the limits of 'the remarkable capacity of neo-Hellenic society to integrate rapidly and creatively populations with different cultures and lifestyles'. Such 'simplification' of historical conflict and

398 See Ministry of Interior and others (2010).
beatification of Greek society is understood here as a function of the purpose of the law, that is, to stress the hospitable nature of Greek society and to see to the current necessity of integrating immigrants to socio-political life. However, as it has been argued, the 'old', 'autochthonous' Greece, the socio-political establishment in the early 1920s, was not particularly receptive of newcomers, whom it saw as yet one more threat along others at the time.\textsuperscript{399} Such 'integration' had significant repercussions on the social and everyday life of refugees residing in camps in the outskirts of major Greek cities.\textsuperscript{400} Back to the present though, the analysts of the MIPEX report on the rationale of the law being the 'national interest for security and social cohesion'.\textsuperscript{401} In an interview to the leftist newspaper \textit{I Avgi}, D. Christopoulos gave a slightly different interpretation as he pointed out that the reform constituted a 'major ideological defeat for the right-wing' that came about 'unexpectedly' and as a result of a good conjuncture of 'political voluntarism and the right people managing political time'.\textsuperscript{402} The NCHR adopted the position that '[the law] moves in the right direction and is based on two pillars that ought to characterize all the measures and practices that touch upon the issue of migration'. These are the 'promotion of human rights of all those residing within the Greek territory' and 'safeguarding social coherence in conjunction with securing the borders'.\textsuperscript{403}

Besides the far from obvious as necessary link between human rights and security concerns, it is meaningful that the central slogan of the Campaign was 'Greek you are born AND you become'.\textsuperscript{404} We can see what this slogan attempts to reiterate the \textit{given}

\textsuperscript{399} See Koliopoulos & Veremis (2010).
\textsuperscript{400} See Hirschon (1989).
\textsuperscript{401} See MIPEX data on areas of integration in Greece, \url{http://www.mipex.eu/greece}, [accessed 7 March 2012].
\textsuperscript{402} See Christopoulos (2011)
\textsuperscript{403} NCHR (2010)
\textsuperscript{404} The HLHR convened in the building of the Old Parliament on 8 February, 2010, where a number of social actors including the president of the Athens Bar Association, the vice-president of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, the coordinator of the Greek Forum of Migrants, the President of GSEE (the General Workers' Confederation of Greece), the Bishop of Messinia, prominent legal scholars and experts, as well as K. Kouneva, a migrant female
and prevalent idea that 'you are born Greek, you do not become'. Such sharp formulations, however, can only be encountered in the official discourse of the 'far-right', but, be it as it may, the rationale of official state legislation and citizenship policy had been until the proposal of that law absolutely aligned with this maxim, though with certain exceptions in particular cases, as I show further on. The controversy that broke out around whether or not one can 'become Greek' tells us something about hegemony in the context of Greek politics. Democrats and leftists presented the whole campaign as a battle against the hegemony of the conservative, nationalist right-wing and the ultra-right-wing 'para-state', whereas the latter saw that campaign as yet another 'nodal point' suturing the leftist 'ideological hegemony' in Greece.405

When the law, after having been voted, was annulled by the Supreme Administrative Court of Greece (HCS),406 the slogan was debated anew at various levels and through various mediums: Human rights experts wondered whether 'eventually you are only born Greek'407, while in a more militant style, antifascist activists in Athens were widely putting up posters indicating and inverting the meaning of the original: 'you are not born malakas, you become'.408 It was thereby shown that to become Greek is to have become socialized into domination and racism.

Furthermore, one of the points of articulation of nationalist discourse is the designation

syndicalist who was ruthlessly attacked with vitriol in 2008 in the aftermath of the December riots, made short interventions on the theme 'towards a new regime of Greek Citizenship'. The convention was interrupted by a group of Chrysi Aygi supporters led by a later MP of Chrysi Aygi chanting 'patriotic' slogans.

405 These interpretations cannot be seen to derive from anywhere else other than the progressive integration of the left in the 'mainstream' of social and political life in Greece after the successive steps of 'national reconciliation' mostly during the 1980s. For the ultra right-wing, this process was translated as a progressive domination of leftist ideas and discourses in the country's public life.


408 See Appendix 7a.
of their enemies as 'ethno-nihilists' who, influenced by cosmopolitan ideals, de-naturalize the notion of the nation, 'de-construct' the nation. 'Ethno-nihilists' were seen not only to have presence in the 'streets' but also in the Greek university and 'more generally in the realm of constitutional theory'. But for the 'ethno-nihilists' themselves all the discussion about the conditions under which one may be considered 'Greek' do not particularly effect on the real course of things: the 'spirit' of the law is only oriented towards those who have already been legally in Greece, while 'anti-immigrant policy becomes more tough, increasing the distance between 'legality' and 'illegality'. In this interpretation, the whole debate on 'citizenship' constitutes a mystification of what actually happens: intensification of security practices and racism. Thus, on the one hand, one interpretation of the law as 'de-constructing' the nation, and, on the other hand, an interpretation of the law as further re-enforcing existing exclusionary categorizations.

What this rift between so diverging interpretations of a given problematic situation – one that takes security as a necessary and normatively justifiable practice that exists as commensurate to human rights concerns, and one that takes security as a discourse not immune to racism that has recourse to the 'rhetoric' of human rights and citizenship to conceal this link – does, is to confront us with the possibility of rethinking law, security and racism. We must be able to admit that law not merely reflects domination, but is the site, one site among others, where the play of domination/freedom is played out and therefore that questions about citizenship should not be thought as simply 'rhetoric' that

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409 The quote and the view that 'ethno-deconstructionists' have hegemonized are taken from a commentary published online by a website which would be articulating yet another 'opinion' if it was not for its editorial team to have been quite active in participating in politics and exert influence in the legal field. In their analysis, 'identity' means 'difference' (from others), and there are intrinsic/fundamental identity elements and extrinsic/preferences. 'National' identity falls into the first category, while 'origin' is a 'natural-intransitive' element of it. This line of thought is adopted entirely in the decision of the HCS. See the commentary reproduced on the website of Dimokratikoi, a political party founded in 2009, its members comprising mostly lawyers and solicitors: http://www.dimokratikoi.gr/d4/.

410 The same line of critique was adopted by activists of the campaign 'Oxi sto ratsismo apo kounia'[No to racism from the baby's cot].
conceals the some reality of security and racism. By the same token, we should be able to dispel normative and analytical classifications of security as a given good, ideal and necessity. We must take security to be an apparatus, a regime of discursive practices that is contingent and historical in nature. It can thereby integrate different, even, incompatible and antagonistic positions.

With the hunger-strike on-going and receiving disproportionate media attention, the HCS reached a very important decision on 2 February 2011 (350/2011). The new citizenship law that had been in effect for less than a year, was judged 'unconstitutional' in certain of its sections. The law had been under scrutiny by the Court after a number of lawyers managed to appeal to it through legal procedures. Under scrutiny were those revised sections that sought to regulate new conditions for foreigners obtaining Greek citizenship as well as to constitute the right of legally residing foreigners to vote in local elections. The rationale of the decision can be summarized along these lines: 1) there is a distinction between the nation and the 'people' from whom state power is derived, but the latter 'exists and is exercised for the benefit of the nation', 2) citizenship law institutes 'unbreakable, in the first place, bond between citizen and state' while it is not bound by claims of foreigners unless so prescribed by customary international law 3) internal law cannot contradict the Constitution, including by 'allowing entry to the community of people (the people), of aliens without substantial, real bond with it – particularly with mass naturalizations – in such way that the constituent element of the state (the people) and its supreme instrument (the people – electorate) are arbitrarily formed, eventually, distorting the notion of the nation', 4) Jurisprudence sees to the continuation of the nation, foundation and means of conservation of which is the family, and to maintaining the 'national homogeneity of the state' by citizenship law based, in the first place, on

411 The term 'national homogeneity of the state' leaves little space for ambiguity as it not only articulates the 'national' with the 'state', but also speaks of 'homogeneity' – that is, lack of
'jus sanguinis', that is, having been born to Greek parents.

The Greek legislator here is said to be opposed to mass status naturalizations by granting citizenship. The route of an 'alien allogenis' to obtaining citizenship is clearly defined and it is different from that of the 'alien homogenis', whose path to citizenship the Greek legislator has 'always regulated in favorable terms'. Let me now quote in more length the thought of the legislator as to the exceptions of the rule of not granting citizenship en masse:

“mass naturalizations”, that is, granting Greek Citizenship without individualized judgments, Greek law has only seen during periods of big rearrangements of the new nation-state, during the gradual emancipation from the Ottoman Empire and the annexation of new lands under international treaties. After the collapse of Eastern European regimes and the dismantling of the USSR, the Greek legislator, confronted with big problems [...] initiated legal arrangements and laid out conditions for legal residence and citizenship of aliens.

As to citizenship, it is argued, the criteria have been Greek origin as well as 'Greek consciousness'. As to legal residence and work permit regulations, these have been violated in practice by 'mass illegal entry into the country' and ex post facto legalization. The 'core' of the argumentation is that the new Law 3838/2010 introduced 'typical' or 'formal' conditions for citizenship, notably, 'becoming' citizen by virtue of having been born within Greek territory or having partaken of the first six classes of Greek public education. These conditions, the Greek legislator resolved, do not substantiate any real bond with the Greek state, do not prove 'Greek consciousness' and, for that matter, do not prove the claimant being 'an agent of the values of the Greek nation'. Those values are nowhere mentioned in the text. 'Citizenship', it is maintained, 'cannot be the means'

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hegemony and presence of an undifferentiated, and self-identical and contained entity. In 2008, the NCHR (2008: 2) in providing recommendations for reformulations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' response to the CERD, suggested that data on Roma, asylum applicants, illegal migrants, and applicants for residence permits, be included and that the phrase 'largely homogeneous country' should accordingly be excluded.

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of integration, rather its 'final stage'. The rationale of the Supreme Court came under heavy criticism regarding its insistence on the nation constituting a legal 'event', an interpretation, according to Christopoulos (2011b), that draws on mid-war 1930s constitutional theory and its iteration during the years of the dictatorship (1967-1974):

'In essence, the 4th section of the Supreme Court attempts to reinsert a legislation that is inscribed in this ideological continuity'. In the latter's account the law is normatively understood as being or possible to be above 'political and ideological references'.

Let me now return to the 3838/2010 law itself. One notes immediately something about the categories used. Neither this law nor the previous one (3284/2004) mention anywhere the term *allogenis*. Instead the terms used are *anithagenis* (non-native)/*homogenis* alien. Despite the absence of the precise term *allogenis*, the categorization remains into effect, as the NCHR (2010) notes on the drafted bill prior to its submission to the parliament: 'the differentiation between *allogenon* and *homogenon* constitutes a historical pillar of Greek citizenship law and of the Greek polity itself.', however, it is argued, such differentiation cannot entail differentiating rules (for example different criteria according to which one becomes eligible for citizenship), while it has been denounced by the European Commission for Racism and intolerance. In other words, the NCHR criticizes the law for not doing away thoroughly with remainders of discrimination in the law, despite the latter's clear demarcation from the previously well-established *jus sanguinis* that the Supreme Court sought to maintain in its integrity.

What we have here is a struggle over the meaning of words and history that goes well beyond the immediacy of the present. This struggle is inscribed in the text of the law, in the very language used by different subjects like judges at different times to articulate from an authoritative position a conception of what Greek 'society' should be like. A

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413 (ibid: 2011)
genealogy of the law would have to be attentive to the small iterations of terms, to their re-activation and to the uses these terms could lend themselves to: *Itha-genis*, *homo-genis, allo-genis*. In the 3284/2004 the term *anithagenis* (non-autochtonous) is opposed to the term *homogenis*. In the 3838/2010 the term *anithagenis* is abandoned altogether; the term *homogenis* is maintained but rather than acquiring positive meaning by specific opposition to another term, it merely designates a 'special' category of aliens.

What we are called to interpret here is the gradual disappearance of the opposition *homogenis/allogenis* as well as its forceful re-activation in the language of the HSC. The term *allogenis* ceased to exist in citizenship law since 1998 at least as signifying the conditions under which one can be deprived of the formal status of citizen;\(^\text{414}\) it had served, it is argued, for nearly 40 years to allow the state to distinguish between Greek citizens and citizens 'of non-Greek descent, without Greek consciousness, who do not behave like Greeks (and consequently), which is evidence of the person's loose and fragile bond with the Greek nation'.\(^\text{415}\) This is citizenship law 3370/1955 which also stated that an *allogenis* who deserts Greek territory without intent to return, could be declared non-citizen, in other words, he/she could lose her citizenship. It is estimated that around 60,000 people were deprived citizenship status in effect of this law since the 1950s.\(^\text{416}\)

That the law is not abstract, or better, that the origins of the law are not 'juridico-philosophical' but rather 'historico-political' cannot be more evident. The 1955 legislation reflects the particular problems and solutions to these problems that the post civil-war state had to face. It had to forge a strong national identity geared towards the

\(^{414}\) Law 2638/1998  
\(^{415}\) Law 3370/1955  
\(^{416}\) See NCHR (2003) The plenary session resolved that although the abolition of the articles that made possible the loss of citizenship is plausible, there have not been adequate specification of procedures by which to regain it.
'West' and make sure that these citizens who had a different idea about what the Greek polity and society ought to be like, be displaced and remain 'outside' Greek society and territory. In a sense, what we see in the 1955 law is a clear demarcation between political opponents and between Greek society and its 'enemies'. Thousands of dissidents, communists and democrats faced exile, 'rehabilitation' and punishment during the civil war and thereafter. This formulation in the 1955 law is a crystallization of the battle and a strong assertion on the part of the 'nationally-minded' hegemonic subject.

It took decades for the civil war to come to a symbolic end and the 1998 abolition of the term *allogenis*, except for responding to the (then) present necessities of the Greek state to manage new coming migrant populations, returnees or otherwise, it appears as a turn towards a more permanent 'ceasefire' within Greek society. What by different tactical moves – the legalization of the Greek Communist Party in the mid-70s, the burning of the state security archives in the late 80s, the whole process of 'national reconciliation' - had only provisionally seemed to become history, namely, the 'national dispute', the Supreme Court managed to bring into life anew: it interpreted the law and recovered these distinctions that put forth the national subject that maintains an organic bond to the Greek nation-state and which is in a battle with those forces that undermine the national character of the state. Thus, what in 1998 was achieved with the mediation of the CERD and the ECRI – steps towards the abolishment of institutionalized discrimination – the Supreme Court managed to put into question. It was not alone in that effort as a number of ultra-nationalist actors were in 2010 increasingly alert and intensifying their own struggle to maintain the clearcut boundaries of the community. In the jargon of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court iterated and resignified along with LA.O.S and other political and social actors, the words of the leader of Socialists of PASOK, A. Papandreou: 'Greece belongs to Greeks' (Greece-for-Greeks).
By reading the Supreme Court's resolution one is given the impression that the law in question is a threat to the integrity of the nation-state. However, if we look at it from the point of view of the conditions for eligibility to citizenship it becomes clear that the conditions are so restrictive that, as it has been pointed out, the actual number of people who would be able to become eligible alone for citizenship is rather slim. Despite the recommendations of the NCHR the published law describes all these crimes for which if someone has been convicted in the last ten years automatically becomes ineligible and for good. These vary from derogation of the regime and national treason and include almost all crimes in the penal law: forgery, illegal commerce, false statement, migrant trafficking into the country and facilitation of movement of undocumented migrants as well as providing shelter to the latter as a hideout, to name but the relevant 'crimes'. The one last mentioned is the notorious crime of hospitality. The NCHR suggested that only lack of conviction for felonies should be taken into consideration, whereas others saw it that this list of crimes makes it virtually impossible for migrants to become eligible for citizenship. The first set of severe political crimes, which in the past served to designate who is to lose the right to citizenship, are of less importance in the present context of managing newcomer migrant populations. Amongst the second set of crimes though we find a careful elaboration of a disciplinary 'net' whose purpose is to strengthen the division between legality and illegality, to maintain the illegals in a...

2653 minors (the so-called '2nd generation migrants') benefited from the new law, 1.358 of which by virtue of being born in Greece, and 1.295 by virtue of accomplishing primary education attendance in the public educational system. In 2010, 6.537 individuals were granted Greek citizenship, 375 of whom being foreign nationals (not homogenēs). In 2011, the number was increased to 707 in a total of 5.863. He also pointed out the number of those who made use of the right to sign up in electorate catalogues (9.927). See 'Ο νόμος για την ιθαγένεια αριθμός', I Kathimerini, 18/12/2011. I Kathimerini, welcomed the law, which it characterized as one of the two worth-cited achievements of the short-lived Papandreou government, the other being the law about Higher Education Reform that abolished the 'university asylum'. The same newspaper was leading the campaign for the abolition of asylum on university premises and decried the breaking of the 'rule of law' when the migrants claimed their rights by 'abusing' the asylum.
condition of captivity: Thus, if one entered illegally (because there is no other means), is
to be disqualified straightaway and permanently from citizenship eligibility; if one
forged a document or declared statelessness or fake nationality shall not be eligible;
neither deportation nor naturalization. If one migrant gave shelter to one's family or
friends, if one has committed the crime of hospitality, then one is not eligible for
citizenship. How can it be that if one practices the primordial value that gives Greek
identity its purported distinctiveness, then one is to permanently stay outside the bounds
of this community?

'Public' opinion and the 'open-gov' initiative
The means by which the 'public' communicates its opinions to the governments have
become pluralized in recent years and the 'practice of public opinion poll' is merely one
of them. The government of 2009-2011 of PASOK instituted another one, a public on
line space of 'electronic deliberation' named, The Greek Open Government Initiative,
where '[...] Almost every piece of draft legislation or even policy initiative by the
government, are posted in a blog like platform prior to their submission to parliament.
Citizens and organizations can post their comments, suggestions and criticisms
article-by-article418. The idea resonates political sociology's skepticism towards the
practice of opinion polls that tend to eliminate a 'set of conditions' conducive to
democratic participation419. One of the very first legislation to have been thrown out for
discussion was the Law 3838/2010. It went on line on the 28th of December 2009 until
the 7th of January 2010 and, according to the numbers, 3403 citizens had the opportunity
to suggest their opinions on the whole legislation or on individual articles.

418 See http://www.opengov.gr/types/?p=327
419 See Champagne (2004: 74). Champagne argues that 'democracy presupposes spaces of debate,
time for reflection, and the diffusion of useful information so that citizens can make up their
minds with full knowledge of the facts' (ibid: 74). It is precisely these conditions that are not
met with the practice of polling and whose fulfillment the opengov project, at least officially,
claimed to aim at.
This textual material of opinions that come about not as a result of an opinion poll question that has been formulated in particular ways and makes possible only a limited set of answers, but rather in the rather different context of mundane everyday activity like posting on websites and contributing to discussion groups of one's 'preference' and at one's own time and privacy. These opinions, therefore, are not treated as of the same kind as those that yield results for a large cross-section of the population, but they are not to be disregarded either by virtue of their non-representative character; as Walsh rightly points out, an ethnographic approach to 'public opinion' can and should focus attention on how people 'interpret current affairs through informal discussions'\(^\text{420}\).

Without saying that to study these comments constitutes an ethnography, I argue that to draw attention both to the content and to the context of these comments gives us a better understanding of the terms and 'rules' of this particular political controversy around citizenship. Besides, the analysis of the sets of problems and ways of 'framing' problematizations in the discourse of the commentators can produce 'evidence' relevant to assembling a genealogical account of citizenship in relation to migration, racism and security discourses. On a different level, understanding the interpretations of the \textit{fact of these particular responses} to the legislation by members of the 'public' is also plausible. There was indeed a good deal of discussion on the deliberative process itself, on the content of the comments and more. How certain interpretations saw the 'public' that commented on the legislation tells us about the on-going struggle around the meaning of racism and its relation to Greek identity and therefore about hegemony and the conditions that secure ideological hegemony. For if that particular 'public' is identified as an 'organized minority' then racism becomes an affair that concerns exclusively this minority. All this though adds to its political significance: 'a much more real “public

\(^{420}\) Walsh (2009: 171).
opinion”", as Champagne puts it, 'constructed by the public action of interest groups traditional political science knows very well and refers to under the notion of “lobbies” or “pressure groups”'.

Here, I focus my cursory analysis on the use of the category of 'racism'. In particular on one argument prevalent amongst the responses, namely, that the victim of racism is the local, autochthonous population, understood as 'the Greeks'. In this 'framing' the proposed legislation is part of a 'broader' offensive. How can we then make sense of this argument in the context of the discussion about citizenship?

The re-iteration of the argument that the local population is the victim of racism finds discursive support in the framing of 'migrants' as enjoying the privilege of having a number of actors advocating their rights and the upper class 'on their side'. Hence, migrants are portrayed as instruments of 'plutocrats', since the latter 'opened' the borders, allowed the 'intruder' in, as they have a vested interest in distorting the ethnological composition of the population, in de-hellenizing the local population. Here, again, we see an opposition between the 'Greek people' and 'foreigners', where 'foreigners' means an equivalence of 'migrants' and 'elites'. Migrants are also metaphorically represented as a 'Trojan Horse' in the service of 'Islamization'. So, class and cultural/civilizational threat. Turkey here is seen as having an interest in causing harm to Greece by permitting and even fostering illicit border-crossing. The 'conspiracy' here amounts to nothing less than the elimination of the Greek element, since 'objectively' and according to the national statistics the Greek population is under demographic threat, as many of the commentators seem to point out. Racism thus, in the discourse of the commentators appears predominantly as a strategy whose aim is to eliminate the Greek population,

421 This public opinion, Champagne claims, 'cannot be reduced to a simple percentage in abstraction from the tensions that permeate the social structure' Champagne (2004: 64-65).
demographically but also morally: as many commentators have it, incidents against foreigners are nothing more than pretexts of supposedly anti-racists in order 'to prove that the Greek society is racist'. The Greek population appears as an innocent victim of economical, social and political elites who are responsible for having created a 'massive' problem with 'importing illegal migrants'. The Greek population then appears as legitimately in 'defense' of its historical and social existence, as well as its moral one. This is a way in which the discourse of war can be spoken, to use Foucault's terminology.

The trope of *filoksenia* appears once again. The commentators speak of how hospitable Greeks are with tourists, and with foreigners in general, however, the nature and the size of immigration is 'beyond the capacities and resistance of Greek society'. This last argument is not uncommon – with the president of the far-right party LA.O.S insisting on rhetorically posing the question 'how many of them can we absorb?'. 'Anti-racists who are so eager to accept foreigners in, should take each some 20 of them at home for hospitality'. Now, this argument, which in a sense appeals to the 'original' meaning of hospitality is a rhetorical argument that follows on from the dubious and unfounded assumption that 'we can't all fit in that place'. How many are 'all' though? Some commentators say that 'we can't solve half of humanity's problems [...] this is not racism, it is common sense'. Others though, in a less than hyperbolic manner, refute implicitly

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422 A commentator described two significant events as 'causes for anti-Hellenic propaganda'. In the first incident, a police officer in Athens sparked a 2-days riot that was extensively discussed in the parliament as well as in social and mainstream media, when, during a stop-and-search routine operation he is said to have ripped apart pages of the Q'uran that a suspect had in his pocket. The other event was quite different in nature. A migrant girl was raped and filmed by classmates of hers and when she pressed charges against them a series of events were triggered: the local society stood on the side of the accused (male Greeks some of whose parents prominent members of the local society); there was an outbreak of racist and discriminatory language and practice against the girl and her single mother who eventually had to abandon the village; the case in the Court House was turned against the girl, where the accused also pressed charges; an antiracist demonstration took place at the village in solidarity to the migrant family. The demonstration was deemed illegitimate as 'imported activists from urban centers', while the demonstrators were physically abused by local crowds.
such claims by saying that what is necessary is 'to know' first; that there is a need for governance and governmental knowledge because, it is argued, it is unknown how many foreigners reside within Greek territory. This 'ordering' is not further specified as what range of governmental interventions are plausible, legitimate, and, indeed, necessary to take place. In other arguments the question of 'illegal migrants' is portrayed as equivalent to the question about citizenship. The more easily you give citizenship, the argument goes, the more 'illegal migration' is intensified. This 'causal' argument is not rare in lay discourse on migration in the Greek context neither in the context of migration policy/politics research assumptions.

What we find inscribed in the 'text' of the commentators is different, conflicting and aligned problematizations: we have problematizations of Greek identity by Greeks who situate themselves at one front of the battle against the 'foreigners'. We have problematizations that put into question the very logic of opposition arguing for the necessity to respond to the demand for security and order by establishing at the level of the state technologies and knowledges necessary for the government of the phenomenon of migration. We have yet problematizations that put into question both the logic of equivalence as portrayed above and the logic of difference in varying degrees and intensity. These last problematizations redraw the main social frontier designating as 'opponents' in the social antagonism both the far-right and the mainstream, 'necessary' logics of control and government. What links the two into a common designation as the enemy is 'racism'.

The 'opinions' expressed on line, the government said would be taken under consideration, except for the 'extreme' ones. Kampylis (2010) expresses in an HLHR article concerns about how the 'debate' took place. He expressed the opinion that the opengov. initiative is inadequate because 'in such case the access of organized groups is
favored, giving in many cases a mistaken view of the 'public sentiment'. Thus, the
diffuse demand found in the comments for a referendum specifically, is re-described by
Kampylis as a demand associated with the 'far-right', or the 'deep-state' as Christopoulos
has it. So, the problematization of the proposed law as a weapon of the opponent to
eliminate Greeks and the associated demand for a referendum by being identified as
'extreme' are constituted as not qualifying into the deliberation process. But this does not
mean that these problematizations do not exist: the far-right was not born overnight,
neither during the crisis, nor as a response to the 'problem of migration'. That official
discourse disavows this dimension and attempts to represent itself as the only available
discourse by saying that because an 'organized', *particular* social group that disavows
its own racism (We are not racists, we are patriots), it means that Greek society as a
whole desires otherwise, and that this group is in no relation of representation to society.
The point here is who will represent successfully 'society', the 'silent majority' as being
on one's part and not the other's. In the discourse of pluralists here the interpretations of
hostile to the law and to migrants comments, the comments of the 'organized minority'
are reified into the category and block the meaning of the 'organized minority' from
connections to the dominant, supposedly unorganized social structure, or 'body' to refer
to Greece. They thus fail to understand the complex interchanges and connections
between the 'mainstream' and the 'extreme', let alone what makes possible the existence
of or the political dimensions of such 'organized minority'. This understanding first
identifies racism with a tiny minority, an organized social actor essentially outside
society and then fails in recognizing the continuities between the discourse of control
and government and the discourse of racism. It therefore does not examine the
fabrication of the entire social fabric as such despite its internal tensions.

I have been describing the struggle of migrants, trying to show how it can, and has, been
thought as a struggle for citizenship, not in a legal, statist sense, but in a more political and antagonistic sense. I tried to show what the ‘public’ thought about the proposed legislation and what other ‘publics’ thought of the ‘public’ that expressed its opinions in the open deliberation platform.

Before that I gave an account of the controversy between different actors occupying different positions of discursive authority in relation to defining the meaning of Greek citizenship. The struggle around citizenship is not only between contending ‘subject’ positions, but also between broad socio-political perspectives that attempt to pacify the terrain of politics and portray it as devoid of social antagonism and war, by concealing their own position in the reshaping of this antagonistic field, and perspectives that endorse symbolically and materially more ‘equivalential’ forms of politics through sharper oppositions like locals/foreigners, migrants workers/state-racists. If all that happens in relation to the figure of the foreigner and the limits of society are multiple and historically unstable, then the struggle of the migrants can be said to be re-founding, or, at least, putting into question the host’s identity. On the other hand, this chapter showed the resistance in political discourse and by the state apparatuses to adopt a different perspective on the question of immigration and, more generally, the question of the ‘foreigner’. Indeed, what admittedly has been the ‘cause’ of the migrants struggle was successfully registered in public consciousness as its ‘effect’. Again, here, we encounter the same inability to admit to a different conceptualization of racism – one that does not reduce racism to an aspect of lawlessness but instead is ready to confront it in its own right and unsettle our certainties about who we are.
Conclusion

This thesis has sought to lay the foundations for addressing the question of racism in Greek political discourse. Turning attention away from immigration and from “what seems to be the problem” onto responses to and problematizations of immigration in contemporary political discourse in Greece, its aim was to explain the role racism has played in these problematizations. This aim involved a dual task: tracing racism as a signifier within the different sites of political discourse on immigration, as well as re-framing racism in order to explain the nature and dominant character of the responses themselves.

Following the iterations of the meaning of racism in this context enabled me to understand how and in what domains of political discourse racism predominantly acquired its meaning. This, in turn, enabled me to make sense of a series of interconnected self-interpretations, arguments and narratives about racism and follow their use in crucial sites of broad public and state discourse. To summarize: despite the potentially endless nuances in framing racism, this thesis has discovered a stability and recurrence of meanings (racism as 'alien', 'threatening', 'aberrant', 'absent', an 'effect' of immigration, the 'other's' racism). All of these problematizations, I argue, share something of a quality of *disavowal* and are representative of a generalized resistance to unambiguously register racism as a problematic phenomenon of the order of dominant social relations. Disavowal is exemplified in logics of defense, displacement and concealment as well as in rhetorics of denial. Not unlike to reasoning found in psychoanalytic discourse, it could be argued that just as what is most innermost to the
subject is concealed and experienced as threatening – the subject's own unconscious – here too racism may be considered as 'constitutive', running through society, structuring social relations and yet also appearing as an external obstacle to society's efforts to constitute itself. By this I do not mean to make a general claim about racism being constitutive of all societies. Rather, I would like to argue that racism has a political dimension. Rather than an aberrant phenomenon, it can only be one way of constituting the 'social', one way in which hegemonic exclusion can be cashed out.

These problematizations of racism are also ideological in that they were articulated on the basis of what we called fantasmatic narratives which converged on the idea that racism 'did not exist' and that Greece was a homogeneous country, prior to contemporary immigrations. My argument is that this 'common-sense' knowledge in the Greek context is attributable to the workings and dominance of security discourse. It is in this discursive context that the myth of filoxenia was re-invented as a social 'imaginary'. This thesis discovered that in national fantasy filoxenia occupies the place of an 'essence' while racism, at best, occupies the place of an 'accident'. My argument here would be: against dominant self-interpretations that portray filoxenia as the condition of impossibility of racism, I would argue that filoxenia as a powerful and gripping imaginary plays the role of dissimulating racism, in other words, it is the condition of the disavowal of racism.

More positively, this thesis has also sought to show that racism is not simply an aberrant, dissimulated or disavowed object in political language in Greece. Moving between the strictly 'linguistic' and the 'social', this thesis delineated an analytical framework in which racism can be re-framed as a political strategy that is irreducible to and exceeds both state rationality and dichotomic, antagonistic, 'irrational', political tactics. Combining these two dimensions, it has been argued that racism fundamentally turns on
the question of socio-political hegemony. But the condition for hegemony is not only exclusion, but also the dissimulation of exclusion. As genealogical thinking prompts us to think, the disavowal or the forgetting of exclusion is the most effective means of maintaining it intact. It is also what allows a dominant social (or racial) majority to portray itself as superior, a dominant way of instituting social relations as irreproachable and not in need of change. Thus, this thesis also contributes to and can be read as a study not of exclusion but of how exclusion is experienced and symbolized from the point of view of a victorious social formation.

Yet, this thesis simultaneously sought to make visible how competing interpretations of what constitutes racism, what immigration represents, what is security and what Greek society should be like, inhabit Greek political discourse and are manifest in ongoing struggles. This was the rationale behind analyzing the deployment and contestation of a broad security apparatus at the borders and in the city during the period 2008-2012 (Chapters 5 and 6). This is also why I addressed the fierce struggle between the state and the immigrants when the latter took autonomous action in defense of their rights in 2011 (Chapter 7). Again, what became clear was the resistance to change and the force of the filoxenia imaginary, able not only to displace the question of racism from public agenda but also to project an inverted image of social relations: “the only racism in Greece is that against Greeks”. If these chapters oriented us to the deconstruction of what purports to be the 'solution' to racism, namely, security, the previous chapters attempted to show how security became the dominant policy response to immigration in the 1990s by focusing on the discourse of parliamentarians which, although not without inherent tensions and contradictions, was found to be underpinned by the rhetoric of filoxenia (Chapter 4). Regarding the dominance of security discourse, I showed how its fabrication exceeds the context of Greek political discourse and how a concern about
racism gives security its impetus and rationale (Chapter 2). Equally, I showed how social scientists in Greece or those who write about Greece and immigration have only marginally put into question the dominant narratives and languages through which immigration has become available for problematization and how their discourse, to a certain degree, is inhabited by the same metaphors and figures of speech that one finds in security discourse (Chapter 1).

This thesis has thus contributed to showing the resonance in the language of social scientists and other socio-political actors, in scholarly and lay discourse, proving the claim that scholars in those fields do not do anything essentially different from the rest of 'immersed' social actors in that they too respond to what they perceive as pressing questions. Often times, their possibilities for critical perception are contingent upon and circumscribed by state/intergovernmental funding. In that sense, these scientists may partake in the re-construction of 'problems' but are unavoidably drawing on 'problem-defining' discourses: the overwhelming impression this thesis has conveyed is that racism and questions of race have been meticulously avoided thus leaving key national fantasies, practices and relationships intact.

As this thesis has drawn on and combined diverse scholarly literatures it would be useful to explain what it could give back to them. First, re-framing racism as a political phenomenon amounts to designating how and why political studies ought to approach racism, that is, not as a peripheral or aberrant phenomenon in the margins of the 'social', but as a complex discourse articulating official and unofficial practices (social logics), subject positions, as well as political and fantasmatic logics. Second, this thesis opens up a debate about the ambiguous relationship of security to racism. A lot of systematic work is simply absent and this thesis has taken a first step towards addressing historical, theoretical and methodological aspects of this relationship. For, as Chapter 2 has shown,
although the link between security and migration designates a domain to be examined in its own right, its relationship to racism is far from being one of exteriority. Third, critical race, migration and post-colonial studies, may all have something to gain from the detailed exploration of the Greek case, which has either been left unexamined or approached in problematic ways with pre-established theoretical paradigms and abstractions in mind (‘the west’/‘the rest’, ‘developed’/‘underdeveloped’). The Greek case is a good case for questioning these stringent oppositions and the terms of their employment in making sense of ‘parochial’ problems like violence, racism etc. Instead of considering racism as an ‘archaic’ trait to disappear with the extension of administration and state/police logics of government, with modernization and rationalization, I have emphasized its political and ideological dimensions. Either we are looking at the ‘political’, that is, the dimension of antagonism or contestation inherent in all social relations, or we are looking at the specific problematic phenomenon of racism we are confronted with the the exact same defense mechanisms (described in terms of logics of displacement and fantasmatic narratives), in short, with ideological closure. Such ideological closure can only overlook, exorcise or defer engaging with the problem, but it cannot really suppress it, as it claims it does; quite the contrary, it sustains it.

I conclude by engaging in some reflection on the course this thesis has taken: My initial problem was with lay rhetoric about racism ‘not being a problem’ in Greece. I was confronted with it both as a researcher and as someone for whom racism had become an object of near obsession because of autobiographical reasons, most notably the discovery of my home town’s concealed history of obliterating all traces of cultural diversity about which there was hardly ever any mention in school, family, monuments, or street signs. It was an experience of a fundamental contradiction between my perception of how the foreign migrant and other socio-political minorities were dealt with in Greek society and
reigning social perception. Questions soon started accumulating: What accounts for such divergence between interpretations of social reality? Is there a ‘reality’ out there that different people interpret differently, and why does ‘reasonable’ argument reach a limit where the mobilization of counter-factuals simply does not work?

When I was drafting my first research proposal back in 2007 the political landscape in Greece was arguably different from its present predicament. Neither had the ‘crisis’ set in, nor had Golden Dawn yet emerged on the public scene. Yet they were both ‘in the making’. This was reflected in the problematizations of immigration explored in Chapters 6 and 7. Particularly, as chapter 6 shows, one of the many ‘births’ of Golden Dawn in the context of the streets and the Municipal Council of Athens in 2009-2010, and its rapid ascent to the ‘mainstream’ (until its equally rapid descent), depended on maintaining a frontier that excluded two interchangeable entities: ‘the elites’ and the ‘immigrants’, in short, those ‘foreign’ to the Greek ‘people’. Seeing GD from the point of view of its anti-immigrant discourse allowed me to examine not its opposition to the ‘mainstream’ or the ‘establishment’, but its tensions and points of convergence, despite, that is, their self-interpretations. Or, to state it better: seeing GD as one element of a broader anti-immigrant discourse, or one of its articulations, allows us to pose the question of racism in a more concrete and a more general manner without the necessity of overcoming contradictions. Indeed, in terms of considering the modalities of enunciation of security discourse, we saw how a formation like Golden Dawn is both an agent of security and a threat to security.

But with the latter’s breakthrough in the last three years this research acquires new meanings and new questions become possible: How was the emergence and rapid increase in popularity of such extremely racist political formation possible, particularly in a country that claims racism to be alien to its ‘essence’? There are two
routes to answering such questions whose form is identical in numerous studies of phenomena that seem to contradict our 'moral' intuitions. The first might be to argue that Golden Dawn is a product, effect or symptom of the 'crisis' and that as soon as the crisis dissipates then Golden Dawn will recede too. In this account, the emergence of Golden Dawn would be a historical 'accident'. It would not contradict the purported, inherently anti-racist political culture in Greece. There would be then no paradox. The second route of making sense comes from looking at how the political 'mainstream' – what their opponents call the 'democratic arrow' – opposes GD and names it as the political force which alone is responsible for racism. Then, again, there would be no paradox because GD would be seen as representing a very particular fraction of the population. Down this line of interpretation, the implicit argument is that GD may constitute reason for concern but it does not invite contextualization into and more general questioning of political discourse in the state and society. This is roughly the effect of framing GD as a 'criminal organization'. However, if we were to approach GD as occupying a position within Greek political discourse we would have to account for the divergence in interpretation between what GD says it is and what its political opponents say it is. For Golden Dawn not only systematically denies any relationship to racism, but it has also popularized the assertion that the only racism that exists in Greece is that against the Greek.

Taking seriously, yet not at face value, this assertion, makes the paradox appear less enigmatic. Going down this second route entails that the emergence of GD does not contradict the purported 'essence' of Greekness because GD is not, as it claims, a racist party. It does not represent a broader racist trend within Greek society. From this perspective, the emergence of GD would not be indicative of growing racism within Greek society. It would rather be a response to racism 'against Greeks'.

Clearly, neither of these argumentative strategies can explain how this happened in a
country priding itself to love the foreigner. But they do make more intelligible the
disavowal of racism. As they both appear to be integral moments of it. Both seem to
downplay racism – either by positing an ‘essence’ in opposition to a historical anomaly
or by portraying GD as a historically necessary means of defense against and in
opposition to racism (against Greeks). Both arguments clearly contradict my intuition
that racism does exist and that its dimensions escape the specificity or temporality of
GD. Rather than directly ‘proving’ that racism does exist this thesis has sought to discern
the meaning and conditions of possibility of such arguments, their rhetorical rather than
their referential truth, their affective grip. Rather than explaining them away as
misrepresentations of reality, this thesis has sought to show how the circulation of such
arguments is constitutive of socio-political reality itself. Hence, the central question of
this thesis was how has racism been problematized in contemporary Greece? Not simply
why it persists but how it persists.

Paradoxically, the articulation of security practices with the language of hospitality and
in opposition to racism seemed to become more tightly woven the more these practices
of control acquired a racist outlook. The ongoing police operation of ‘Xenios Zeus’
testifies to this argument. Between August 2012 and February 2013, eighty-five
thousand foreigners were taken into police custody while only six percent of them were
found to be ‘illegally’ in the country (HRW 2013). Such ‘mainstream’ practices of racial
profiling blur the limits between the threatening ‘outside’ of Golden Dawn, and the
disavowed racial hegemony in state apparatuses like the police, the army or the
judiciary. GD emerges in and feeds off this context rather than as a response to
overwhelming migratory pressures or, simply, economic crises.

In retrospect, the question of the emergence of Golden Dawn can be reformulated. The
rumor that the only racism that exists in Greece is that against Greeks is not new. It may
be that Golden Dawn has crystallized it and pronounced it, but in the discourse of LA.O.S during the early stages of the crisis this idea was already prominent. But neither did LA.O.S represent anything new at that level. LA.O.S 'borrowed' and re-articulated a number of elements that were present in the discourse of 'mainstream', governing political parties (PA.S.O.K; ND) if only at their fringes. The arguments I examined in chapter 4 about Turkey being racist and conducting demographic struggle against Greeks were implicit and often more explicit in 'mainstream' political discourses.

Golden Dawn and its racism might be represented in 'mainstream' discourse as 'threats' but I have shown instead how the widespread securitization of immigration made possible the emergence of Golden Dawn. Golden Dawn is more like a 'symptom' rather than a 'threat to security discourse. To put it simply: if for twenty years immigration is largely represented as a 'problem', it is possible that when the 'mainstream' will be seen as having failed to deal with the problem, or even having created the problem, a political force appearing as competent to address it and the anxieties of the population will become prominent. In that sense, I believe I have shown a certain continuity between the 'mainstream' and the 'extreme', or even between the 'inside' and the threatening 'outside'.

Given the scope of this thesis it only makes sense that there are plenty of 'gaps' as well as a tendency to gloss over diachronic dimensions of particular discourses I examine. However, this does not mean that such object as 'political discourse' is not a legitimate one. It is simply the case that when one opts to say something about a whole society, it is likely that one will have to concede attentiveness to detail in particular elements that make up such entity. Thus, media discourse, parliamentary discourse, as well as ordinary, social rhetoric, do merit their own detailed examination. Yet, even in that case, it would be necessary to exclude, to generalize and to abstract. For instance, if we take
parliamentary discourse as such, it would again be to the detriment of analyzing in more
detail more specific formations. At the very least, this thesis gives an idea to the reader
of what these gaps are and provides the broad framework by which questions of racism
can be critically addressed. Recent studies of more 'particular' topics, for instance, on the
relationship between the far-right and visual media in Greece (Psarras 2010), or on the
discourse and (the Neo-Nazi) history of Golden Dawn (Psarras 2012), although
empirically rich, do not provide an adequate understanding of the conditions of
possibility of these discourses nor do they provide adequate clues as to their 'mainstream'
origins. This thesis opens up a number of issues that deserve further attention such as,
for example, the appeal of the language of hospitality in various contexts outside Greece
or, the links between racism, psychopathology and representation, as well as issue with
regards to the Golden Dawn phenomenon, its presence and activity in new, digital and
social media.

A final remark by way of conclusion. This thesis has not been explicitly normative even
though there are underlying normative ideals at play, privileging openness, contingency
and difference over closure, ideology and homogeneity. Regarding openness, although
pure transparency is impossible, it is crucial to accept the possibility of a more 'open'
relationship to ourselves and to others. This is the first condition of addressing racism
and related phenomena. As Glynos and Howarth (2007:156) point out there is quite a
difference between denying, registering and confronting. Although they refer to
contingency in general, I would like to specify it with regard to the objects of this thesis.
It should be acknowledged that unless the nostalgia for a supposed lost unity and
homogeneity withers away, there cannot be any coming to terms and productive
confrontation with the realities of cross-border mobilities and the politics of racism.
Again, refraining from making my own normative claims, I would say that the discourse
of some anti-racist activism aiming to subvert foundational narratives and myths constitutive of Greek identity has a crucial role to play. Not only does it contest the securitization of immigration but it is also more eager to accept responsibility, acknowledge that racism runs through society, and re-work social relations on the basis of appreciating difference. It is in these grassroots micro-politics that any change could originate. Further, there are political forces eager to take up these issues but they remain marginal. It would not be wise to say that they are marginal because they cannot represent the Greek people, because this would suggest that the Greek 'people' is a static entity. By contrast, these forces are not only representatives of some of the 'people', but also form its will. Some initiatives of the centre/centre-left I examined showed that this is actually possible. All it would take for minimal changes to be implemented is political organization, a fortunate conjuncture (that is, not a crisis-ridden one) as well as a re-invention of anti-racism as a discourse that could grip broader categories of social subjects without however becoming an empty letter. In other words, anti-racism has to occupy a central position in a counter-hegemonic project whose aim would be to re-structure Greek society and politics.
Appendix

Chronology

1925
The first law on settlement and movement of non-nationals (*allodapoi*) is introduced (N.3275/1925), in effect from 1927

1929
A revised law is passed (N.4310/1929) to stay in effect until 1991

1950
Adoption of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention of Human Rights ECHR)

1975
The Prime Minister asserts that Greece belongs to the West (“*Anikomen eis tin Dysi*”)

1979
The first anti-racist Law 927/1979 is voted

1987
Adoption of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and creation of the relevant committee (CPT)

1989

*December*
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs wishes to Greek minority in Albania ‘free Christmas’
Pontiac Greeks and return migrants from the USSR are received

1990

*December*
Student demonstrations in Albania. Alia responds by lifting restrictions on political parties activities
Clashes between the army and citizens in Skodra (Albania)

1991

*January*
Mr. Sevastianos, local Bishop and Papathelemis urge the fugitives to remain where they are because they only serve Alia’s plans for homogenizing Albania
Agreements between Albania and Greece for restricting borders cause new waves of fleeing
The Soviet Union disintegrates
The much-criticized law that for the first time distinguishes between 'legal'/'illegal' immigration is passed (Law 1975/1991)

1996
Law 2452/1996 comes to address specifically refugee issues

1997
Albania descends into anarchy with the 'Lottery Uprising' which leaves 2000 dead and is followed by flows of migration to neighboring countries
By Presidential Decrees (358/1997, 359/1997) temporary residence permits are issued for those non-nationals who entered Greece before 1997
European Year Against Racism
Ratification by Greece of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

1998
Institution of Border Guard Corps by Law 2622/1998
Repeal of article 19 of the Constitution which allowed revoking citizenship on grounds of national interest

1999
Presidential Decree 61/1999 regulating matters of asylum according to which the procedure of recognition of refugees lies within the responsibility of police authorities

2000
January
Readmission Agreement between Turkey and Greece to combat organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration. Ratified by Law 2926/01

2001
Revised migration law 2910/2001 aims at containing illegal migration
November
Tensions and demonstration against repression in central Athens after police officer shoots dead 20 year old Sentgak Setkinu

2002
The Greek Helsinki and the OMCT demand inquiry regarding allegations of inhuman treatment of Nigerian into custody
June
The Protocol of co-operation between Turkey and Greece on illegal migration and other transnational illicit activities is voted in the parliament.

2003
Somali dies from mine explosion while crossing the Greco-Turkish borders. Controversy around the implementation of the Ottawa Mine Treaty

2005
Law 3386/2005 amends previous legal arrangements regarding 'third-country nationals'. Provisions for social integration and against discrimination. Law 3304/2005 against discrimination establishes forms of 'affirmative action'

2007
Law 3536/2007 requires that migrant entrepreneurs invest 60000 euros in order to renew their 2-year residence permits.

2008
November
The Citizens' Committee of AP comes into being with a communication to the authorities and the media. Anti-immigrant demonstration is called and supported by LA.O.S and Xrysi Aygi. The demonstration is blocked by antifascist activists.

2009

June
After the elections for the European parliament which saw LA.O.S with increased percentages (7.15% nationwide), a wave of anti-immigrant violence spread in Agios Panteleimon.

October

2011

January
300 migrant workers start collective hunger strike (23-1-2011)
The government gives an ultimatum for the evacuation of the Law School (26-1-2011)
The Government plans the evacuation of the Law school building (27-1-2011)
Occupation and sit-in at the IOM branch in Athens in solidarity to the 300 migrants (28-1-2011)
The State Attorney interpellates 7 for illegal trafficking of migrants and the Dean of the University of Athens (31-1-2011)
The Supreme Administrative Court of Greece (350/2011) blocks a proposed Law (3838/2010) that would give the right to allodapoi to vote at local elections. It was judged as contravening the constitution (2-2-2011)
A revision of the previous 927/1979 sparks controversy around issues of racism and xenophobia
The Racist Violence Recording Network is founded

2012

Samaras becomes Prime Minister of a coalition government (June). One of the main slogans of the campaign was calling for 'reoccupation of our cities'. In August, permanent police operation 'Xenios Zeus' is launched.
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423 Political Parties abbreviations: (ND) Nea Dimokratia; (PA) PASOK; (DHK) DHKKI; (SY) Synaspismos/SY.RIZ.A; LA. O.S Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos
Racism as insidious

Greek people as hospitable/ emerging racism/xenophobia

Racism as a global problem

Racism and LA.O.S

Greeks as immigrants/ impossibility of racism

Racism as top-down/elites phenomenon

Xenios Zeus/illegal immigration number games/ Muslim elements

Skyllakos (KKE)

Racist logic/’hospitality’

Racism, terrorism, moral decline as symptom of globalization

Denial of racism/ territorial security/sovereignty

Racism as unconscious/ problematization of unemployment/power

Racism as a non-problem

Greece as 'fenceless vineyard'

Racism as possible if fear substitutes social cohesion

Racism as emerging; killing foreigners for a 'bunch of grapes'

Denial of racism/ Thessaloniki as hospitable/mother' of refugees

Neo-racism/fascism/ Antiracist law.

Racism and xenophobia in Europe/ anti-democratic drives

Hospitality/human rights/tradition and security/ illegal immigration

Migration/security, deportations, schools

Public order, anomia, illegals

Greece as 'fenceless vineyard'

Imported crime, image of Greece, racism undercurrent

Markogiannakis (ND) and others

Imported crime, image of Greece, racism undercurrent

Markogiannakis (ND)

Denial of racism; hospitality, ghetto

Hospitability Centres, national emergency plans

Denial of racism

Racism as viral/threat to social cohesion

Migrants as garbage

Emergency/classified plans

Schengen Agreement/ Turkey as cause of illegal immigration

Racism as a symptom of the lack of the rule law

Danger of racist prejudice/Albanian illegals

Danger of racism/ hundreds of thousands of illegals
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</table>
Denial of racism/ illegals as a burden to health services

Tackling the problem (illegal immigration) without racism/xenophobia

Anti-terrorism and racism

Crime, illegal naturalizations, insecurity of citizens

Racism and repressive policing

Racism and other Web-stemming threats/cyber-crime

Denial of racism/hospitality, demographic problem and births of foreigners, foreign students

Racism as allegation/ immigrants burning Greek flags

Segregating prisoners along cultures

Denial of racism, unemployment/ illegal immigration as substance of the question of labor relations.

Denial of racism/crime statistics, illegality

Racism as slogans against Greece/para-commerce

Citizens of AP accused of racism/suffering from para-commerce

Muslims not eligible for the armed forces

Racism as NGO accusation against Greeks

Racism as cause of fear (of being accused of racism)/illegals, restaurants, drugs, public health

The 'indignados' as ambiguous (nationalists, racists, communists, modernizers, enterpreneurs)

Racism as social, abnormality, homogeneity

Athens Ghetto, failure of multiculturalism, terrorist muslims

Racism as inevitable given the problem

Illegals as 'wound'; racism as false accusation

The 'indignados' as ambiguous (nationalists, racists, communists, modernizers, enterpreneurs)

Denial of racism/against citizenship Law

Class hate, immigrants as equivalent to lower social strata

Denial of racism/kindergartens and immigrant kids, family and the nation

Prison reforms, releasing illegals as cause of racism

Denial of racism/anti-racist law as useless

Hospitality, racism, migration, war, military threat
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<td>Session C, 26 January 2011</td>
<td>v.s</td>
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Figures and Illustrations


Figure 2b: Components of Population change

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Source: EUPOP2004-natural and regional level © EuroGeographics Association, for the administrative boundaries

Figure 5a: Local newspaper of Alexandroupoli, ‘Eparchias Typos’. The main headline reads: ‘Police in Hospitality Centres for lathrometanastes in Kyprinos declare... being indignant’.

Figures and Illustrations

Figure 5c: Map of detention centres in Europe. Source: Migreurop 2008.

Figure 5d: Postcard contrasts visually the reception of refugees in 1922 to the

Figure 5e: No Border Camp poster.

Figure 5f: Frontex illustration by No Border Camp activists.

Figure 5g: No Border Camp Poster
**Figures and Illustrations**

Figure 5h: Handwritten demands of inmates, Pagani.

Figure 5i: Makeshift grave of Afghani refugee.

Figure 5j: Mobilization in Pagani.

Figure 5j: activist poster reiterating the official beautifying campaign

Figure 5k: The poster of the Ministry of Tourism official campaign.
Figures and Illustrations

Figure 5l: An anarchist collective poster against detention depicting a concentration camp

Figure 6a: Folklore representation of locals' displacement from Athens in a street poster calling for a demonstration against crime and unemployment. It also calls for national resistance against the ‘occupation’ of Athens by foreigners.

Figure 6b: Flyer calling on demonstration against the ‘foreign invasion’ and ‘occupation’ of neighborhoods

Figure 6c: Poster calling on demonstration against *lathrometanastefsi*. Indicating ‘Greece [belongs] to Greeks’
GET OUT OF GREECE
YOU ARE NOT WANTED HERE

You came in Greece uninvited.
We Greeks, being hospitable and charitable, accepted you, with affection, giving you food, clothes, hospital care, shelter.
BUT NOT FOR EVER AND NOT FOR ALL THE POPULATION OF YOUR COUNTRIES.

You in return, in order to thank us, you gave us shop robberies, house robberies, murders of old people for 10 euros, killings for drug dealing, assassinations contracts, rapes of women and our grandmothers, beating of old people, abuse of children, dirt and diseases.

You did not respect our hospitality, our principles and customs, insulting all us Greeks, all Greek Women, our Christian religion, our civilization, our pride our LIVES.

You live here with OUR MONEY, WITHOUT WORKING, WITHOUT DOING ANYTHING AT ALL, JUST SELLING DRUGS AND PROSTITUTION,
This country has no money TO LIVE US GREEKS,
We are forced to accept you in our hospitals that can not serve us, and take your children to our schools that WE PAY.
WE DON'T WANT TO FEED YOU, we do not want to give you not 1 euro

RETURN TO YOUR COUNTRY NOW, TO FIGHT FOR IT. YOU ARE NOT WANTED HERE

More than 90% of Greek people, want you to go away and never come back and is angry with you and hate you for insulting our dignity.
We are angry with this government and all politicians that brought you and support you and defend you AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PUNISH THEM AND YOU.
From now on, we will take every necessary action. In order to force you and the TRAITORS-POLITICIANS that help you to GET OUT OF THIS COUNTRY (or what you left of it)

YOU HAVE NO FUTURE IN GREECE. GO HOME NOW.

Citizens of Athens

Figure 6d: Brochure signed by the 'Citizens of Athens' (personal archive)
**Figure 6e**: Local elections material of N. Michalokiakos entitled 'Greek Dawn For Athens.'

**Figure 6g**: Poster printed by the Autonomous assembly of Zografou saying 'no to Apartheid' in the city.

**Figure 6h**: Illustration taken from the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change official Programme 'Athens-Attiki 2014'

**Figure 6i**: map of 'anomia'. Source: http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=163357.
Figure 6j: Slide taken from the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change official programme ‘Athens-Attiki 2014’. It envisions the transformation of AP from a ‘space of contradictions and conflict’ to a ‘space of harmonious co-existence of a plurality of ethnicities’.

Figure 7a: Antifascist poster reiterating the far-right slogan ‘You are born Greek, you don't become’. It reads ‘You are not born malakas, you become’.

Figure 7b: Antifascist poster ‘Quiz for beginners’ invites a reflection on the similarities between a Nazi regime and a democratic regime. Source: http://www.autonomia.gr/autonomia/antifa_str/a_str_af/a_str_af.html.