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How Governments Strategically Time Welfare State Legislation: Empirical Evidence From Five European Countries

Wenzelburger, Georg and Jensen, Carsten and Lee, Seonghui and Arndt, Christoph (2020) 'How Governments Strategically Time Welfare State Legislation: Empirical Evidence From Five European Countries.' West European Politics, 43 (6). 1285 - 1314. ISSN 0140-2382

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Abstract

Building on studies on the political business cycle, the literature on welfare state retrenchment has argued that governments which cut the welfare state try to avoid blame by implementing painful measures in the beginning of the mandate and expanding benefits as elections approach. In contrast to this linear relationship, this article argues that governments often feel pressured to fulfil (mostly expansionary) campaign promises during the first months in office. Consequently, cutting right away is not what should be expected. Instead, a more nuanced, U-shaped timing trajectory is probable with a period in the beginning characterised by both cuts and fulfilment of expansionary pledges, followed by a period of cutbacks, and finally an expansive phase towards the end of a mandate. This argument is tested on our new original dataset of legislative changes in five European countries – Britain, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany – during the last four decades.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Electoral pledges, electioneering, political business cycle, welfare state
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 07 Oct 2019 11:38
Last Modified: 11 Dec 2020 12:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/25559

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