Essays on Ethnic Party Competition and Public Goods Provision in South Asia

Thesis by

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I have been the luckiest person in the world when it comes to academic role models. It would be fruitless to spend much words to sense of gratitude. The best I could say is that I learned a lot from my supervisor, Rob, who took a chance on me, and he was always there. I hope to carry on the lessons in my academic career that I learned through his example.

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3Center for Studies in Developing Societies, New Delhi
4Mississippi State University, University of California - Riverside, University College London, and Florida International University, respectively.
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ABSTRACT

The thesis simultaneously builds on and challenges the conventional wisdom on causal factors behind the rise of ethnic political parties in multiethnic democracies. The thesis contends that ethnic party success is primarily driven by insecurities borne from ethnic violence. Original data from fieldwork in India provides evidence that demand for security from ethnic violence stimulates bloc voting and remains a stronger motivator driving ethnic voting than economic incentives like public goods or economic clientelism. Economic patronage is found to be only relevant in peaceful societies with little modern history of ethnic violence, and towards building cross-cutting ethnic coalitions. The findings are moderated by ethnic affiliation of voters who trust their own co-ethnics more than out-groups. Nominating candidates with conspicuous ethnic heuristics is an efficient strategy for political parties to signal low information voters in their targeted voting bases.

In the second part of the thesis, I lay down the conditions and mechanisms under which public goods distribution is optimised in a multiethnic democracy. In a party system featuring ethnic parties, public goods provisions are made efficient under conditions of intermediate levels of party competition and party stability.

Furthermore, using a quasi-natural research design, the thesis finds causal evidence that ethnic electoral quotas reduce ethnic violence. Findings from the thesis establish that ethnic security remains the main driver of political behaviour above economic incentives. The papers together provide evidence that in an ethnically diverse society, efficient public goods distribution is possible through a concerted institutional setup to reduce ethnic violence. It is achieved through improvement in representation for the ethnically marginalised, which forces state institutions to be more efficient and accessible to those whom they previously ignored.
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1.1 Motivations: A Background of the Indian Society

Arguably, the cardinal sin of an independent India, - (and of greater South Asia), was its failure to address the deep-rooted inequalities, oppression and violence within its social structure. In the fervour to boast of India’s new democratic ideals, and in the aftermath of religious violence that descended around the time of the Partition, political elites overlooked the inherent divisions in the complex hierarchical caste system, which transcends religious boundaries. The Indian National Congress, in its triumphant optimism post-Independence to be the "party of the people", ignored the warning signs while its party structure was captured by the upper caste elite that perpetuated and supported crimes against the downtrodden. The civil service and judiciary were similarly dominated by the privileged ethnicities that enjoyed the patronage of the British Raj towards access to education and employment.

It would take three decades for the grand ethnic coalition of the Indian National Congress (subsequently referred to as the Congress or INC) to finally show its cracks from the late 1970s after the disastrous and undemocratic Emergency Period imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. The second and third generation of the political elite, more ethnically diverse than before, gave voices to their coethnic constituents who were not being heard by the Congress when it came to prevention and redress of ethnic violence. The Mandal Commission, or the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission, was set up in 1979 by the Janata Party government (the first non-Congress party in power) as a culmination of the pressures from the ethnic constituencies whose security and economic well-being Congress had neglected for decades. By the time the Commission's recommendations were
implemented in 1990, again by a non-Congress led government, the breakup of India’s one-party dominant politics, with the rise of ethnic parties, was already in full effect. The Commission’s aim and major policy directives strived to redress violence against India’s ethnic downtrodden (the lower castes) through hate crime legislation, and on the economic front - through affirmative action policies in public sector jobs and higher education.

Little attention has been paid by social scientists, especially within modern political science, towards ethnic diversity in South Asia and its pitfalls. Scholarship has largely focused on Hindu-Muslim violence, and its causes and effects on electoral politics and development outcomes (Van der Veer 1994, Nussbaum 2009). Ethnic identity (caste, used interchangeably) in South Asia is the single biggest social constant across the entire sub-continent. Caste is not only a feature of Hindu society, in fact, it is a characteristic of all major religions in South Asia. Castes are hierarchical occupation-based ethnic identities in South Asian society. There is no set order to the hierarchy, which also varies by geography. There are numerous sub-castes or *jatis* within a single caste, the order of which is nebulous and often open to individual perception.

Scholarship on political behaviour in India have been largely and continues to be seen through the lens of clientelism (Ziegfeld, 2016). Attention is finally being paid to caste, its relationship with societal inequalities, conflict and clientelism, and their implications on politics. One of the earliest insights on India’s party system and caste eluded to the myriad social cleavages in India’s society that led to the failure of a robust two-party system that would oppose the dominant Indian National Congress (Chhibber and Petrocik, 1989). Lately, scholars have provided insight on how political parties use ethnic (or caste) violence as mobilisation tool (Wilkinson 2006) and ways seat reservations improve inter-caste relations (Chauchard, 2014). Others have focused on the market implications of the rigid caste system
in India (Mosse, 2018)[111]. Only recently, Jaffrelot (2016, 2017)[78; 79], among others, have began to dig into how India’s vaste subordinate castes (categorised under Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Castes, Extremely Backward Castes by different state governments) in the hierarchical social structure have began to strategically align with political parties to increase their political representation. The discourse in the literature has largely been from the institutional supply side - i.e. incentives provided by parties to win over castes towards forming an ethnic vote base. To that end, clientelism is the dominant explanatory variable that defines success of political parties (Chandra 2004, Anderson et al 2015, Elliot 2016)[4; 50]. This thesis complements the literature by providing a demand-side narrative. In other words, the thesis seeks to answer ‘what do voters want from political parties?’ In answering that puzzle, the thesis looks into the interplay of widespread insecurities due to caste violence and coercion and civil rights violations and their effect on political behaviour.

Historically, coercion, and violence in South Asia have revolved around three broad streams. There has been religious violence, between Hindus and Buddhists in the Antiquity, between Hindus and Muslims, as well as Muslims and Sikhs in the Middle Ages and beyond. In light of the rise of the Hindu nationalist BJP[1] a lot of attention has been paid to the concerted effort by the BJP to create a religious Hindu identity. Indeed, the BJP have used violence as a path towards electoral gains through identity formation and by manufacturing an artificial demand for security (Wilkinson 2006)[156]. But that does not mesh with the fact that Hinduism is not a monolithic religious identity[2]. To this day, ethnic violence involving Muslims has been often characterised as against one Hindu caste or another.

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1Bharatiya Janata Party
2In fact, the word ‘Hindu’ comes from the Farsi for the river Indus, as inhabitants living on its banks and eastwards were called Hindu by the numerous foreign invaders throughout the history of South Asia. The term predates Islamic rule in South Asia. Hindu identity formation is also fairly recent, and largely attributed to the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British Raj.
Violence between different Muslim subcastes is not uncommon. Ethnic violence has also involved different linguistic ethnic groups, of which there are many. One of the most recent incidents is the conflict between Assamese and Bengali speaking residents in the northeastern state of Assam. In Maharashtra, resentment over internal migration has also spilled over into violence between Hindi speaking northern Indians (mostly from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) and native Marathis. This conflict has been cleverly utilised by all major regional political parties, in particular by the Shiva Sena - the Marathi right wing ethnic party.

Overall, despite having 39,048 cases of ethnic hate crimes and civil rights violations across India, ethnic violence has garnered the least attention from scholars and the media. The violence is a product of conflict among different ethnic identities as they struggle over economic means of production, social status, or more trivial concerns, such as sports or marriage between lovers from different castes. Perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of attention has been the nature of the violence itself. Unlike Hindu-Muslim religious riots which have often been large scale and, high-profile - attracting the glare of media and government alike, with geographical spillover effects, caste violence is usually geographically isolated with its causes being tied to local factors. Rarely have such conflict had large spillover effects. Of late, the most high profile of such conflicts has been the vicious violence between the upper caste (Rajputs, Bhumihars) and a conglomerate of jatis in the lower end of the caste spectrum that plagued Bihar throughout the 1990s and Jharkhand in the following decade. Instead of studying the ethnic roots of the violence, most scholarship of the violence in Bihar has focused on the economic theories behind the conflict, and the ultra left-wing Naxalite guerrillas who co-opted the lower castes towards a largely
failed effort at gaining prominence throughout eastern India.

Which brings us to the centrepiece of the thesis - ethnic (caste) violence, which is the most pervasive form of conflict in India. The thesis attempts to focus on ethnic security (or insecurity) derived from caste conflicts - the dominant form of violence in India, towards understanding its causal effects on political behaviour, party system and good governance. The thesis seeks to answer the big question - what do voters in ethnically divided and violent societies want from political parties? Do they want security? Or is it public goods they seek? Are voters motivated by clientelist incentives? Through the first two papers, the thesis attempts to uncover the first order preference of Indian voters in ethnically divided societies. It contends that ethnic security trumps economic incentives like public goods and clientelist offerings in violent societies. Ethnic political parties succeed through providing security first and foremost, followed by public goods and clientelist incentives. However, in societies with peaceful ethnic relations, voters are motivated by public goods more than ethnic security and clientelist goods from political parties.

1.2 Consequences of Violence: Ethnic Security, Institutions and Politics

The root cause of ethnic (in)security is inter-group violence, coercion and civil rights violations. The thesis aims to uncover the effects of ethnic violence on political behaviour. Whenever there is violence, people are expected to vote to mitigate future violence. Voters may also take out their anger on the incumbent political party for failing to maintain law and order (Wilksinson, 2006) [155]. In an ethnically fractured society, the impetus would be to circle the wagons and stimulate in-group voting since violence is a reliable indicator of inter-group mistrust and a breakdown in social capital (Bratton, 2008) [24]. Violence may also lead to the social construction of ethnic identity (Fearon & Laitin, 2000) [51]. But identity the 1960s. They have loosely affiliated political units which participate in the electoral process, it had modest success up until the late 1990s.
formation is taken ex-ante to this study. On the other hand, the creation of artificial ethnic identities by the state leads to inter-group conflict over power (Lieberman et al, 2012) [102].

Finally, violence leads to demand for ethnic security where security is not only defined in its raw physical terms, but in addition also means access to institutions that ensure justice is delivered for past violence, and that mechanisms are in place that would dissuade further violence. Institutional structures in India have largely failed to do anything about assuring that downtrodden castes have access to justice. Most administrative law and order institutions, from police inspectors to local court judges are from privileged ethnicities (upper castes) who are hostile, or at best indifferent towards the plight of Dalits and jatis in the lower end of the caste pyramid. It is quite common for upper caste police inspectors to not even register the first information report of atrocities perpetrated against a low caste individual, especially if the perpetrator is an upper caste, more so if the perpetrator is wealthy and politically connected. Even if cases are registered, investigations are shoddy and apathetic India’s judicial system is famously a bureaucratic nightmare with not enough judges and a long backlog of cases. Not to mention, court cases are expensive. Even if convictions are made, the accused can get away by circling the cases in the appeals courts which only makes the cost of ensuring justice greater for victims, who often do not have the means to pay mounting legal bills. If these institutions had worked the way they should, it is likely that potential perpetrators of violence would have lower incentives to follow through on their intention to carry out the crimes. In addition, the vulnerable would feel safe, leading to higher trust in the institutional machinery and elected representatives, and allowing them to focus on economic well-being.

In essence, this project leads back to the idea that violence creates longterm emotional responses (Blattman, 2009), [23] and attempts to find the consequences of
violence on electoral behaviour and governance outcomes. I propose that violence creates demand for security which ethnic parties are happy to supply to win elections. Indeed, it is in their interest to do so as fear responses are likely to lead to bloc voting from their targeted ethnic voting groups. Bloc voting remains the easiest strategy to win elections by exercising minimum campaign efforts. Electoral strategies that rely on attracting a diverse set of constituents are strategically trickier and more challenging to maintain in the long run.

**Party System and Good Governance**

Moving on from the behavioural factors behind party competition in a system with ethnic parties, the thesis takes a broader look towards the institutional conditions that determines public goods provision. Using sub-national data from India, the thesis finds that party competition and party system stability influence good governance, where, governance is a function of public goods provision. In this case, public goods are defined broadly, as goods that are not only non-rival and non-excludable (Olson, 1971) [121], but also that benefit the whole citizenry instead of a narrow constituency. Keeping India as the platform, Chapters 4 and 5 provide a more comprehensive picture of party competition in ethnically diverse, single-member parliamentarian systems. The scholarship sets out further avenues for generalisation of the results on public goods provision involving democracies with proportional representation systems. In addition, Chapter 4 sets out further evidence that public goods distribution is suboptimal when voters live in a hostile society, under threat of ethnic violence. The results support the behavioural outcomes seen in Chapters 1 and 2, - that under clouds of ethnic violence, voters prioritise safety and justice above economic incentives.
1.3 The Big Picture

In the following three chapters, I lay out a comprehensive case for ethnic security being the driver of political behaviour in India. The first two chapters provide evidence that on the demand side - voters are most concerned with good governance, which they equate with ethnic security over economic incentives, forming their vote choice. Candidates who promise security are more likely to win over rivals who promise public goods and ethnically targeted private goods. In Chapter 4, I tackle the issue of good governance from the institutional side, where I show that public goods provision is maximised under intermediate levels of party competition and party stability. The chapter expands on scholarship by Teitelbaum & Thachil[146] and Nooruddin & Simmons[113], complementing their claim that lowering ethnic violence leads to better public goods distribution and a more stable party system.

Chapter 2 approaches the contention from a demand-side political behaviour angle where I provide causal evidence that voters prefer ethnic security from electoral candidates over public goods and as well as clientelist private goods. When violence is insignificant, voters put public goods at a premium over ethnic security in their voting decisions. In Chapter 2, I provide further evidence to the claim that ethnic violence, and the lack of access to redress violence and civil rights violations from out-groups, lead voters to prefer ethnic security over economic incentives (public, or particularistic - in other words, economic patronage). The demand side effect allows ethnic parties to win elections to create loyal voting blocs by offering ethnic security.

Furthermore, both Chapters 2 and 3 provide strong evidence that voters trust their own coethnics more than out-groups when it comes to delivering security or particularistic goods directed towards them. Voters are more open to candidates from ethnic out-groups when the candidate offers public goods which benefit the whole citizenry instead of one ethnic identity or another. The chapters bolster recent research show-
ing that candidate surnames act as a signalling strategy to voters in an ethnically diverse electorate. Political parties would be wise to nominate candidates with the 'right' surname, which signals loudly to their targeted castes (or ethnic identities) that their interests are being served by the party. This is especially tricky for parties with ethnic bases that are in the minority as alienating the numerically stronger ethnicity would be a surefire way to failure in the ballot box. By doing so, the thesis adds to a growing literature in the political communication sub-field that highlights the importance of ethnic signalling strategies towards candidate nomination to gain allegiance of low information voters in the ballot box.

Last but not the least, Chapter 4 sets the institutional parameters that leads to robust public goods provision in multiparty democracies with first-past-the-post system. Equipped with an original dataset prepared from India’s sub-national metrics, the paper provides evidence that too much party competition and turnover is harmful for good governance. Contrary to simple intuition, public goods distribution is maximised under a stable party system, characterised by intermediate levels of party competition and seat turnover. The three papers provide a two-way united front to what is characterised as good governance in an ethnically diverse democracy such as India. The first two papers explore the demand-side behavioural variables that voters prioritise as good governance, and ultimately uses them to judge candidates and ethnic parties. The final paper explores the institutional factors, specifically party system, that determines good governance through bolstering public goods provision.
ETHNIC PARTY COMPETITION: VIOLENCE, PATRONAGE & PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION

Abstract

How does campaign information involving economic incentives perform against institutional incentives in a multiethnic democracy? When presented with new information about electoral promises, do voters change their normal voting attitudes in an ethnically divided society? This paper tests those propositions using original data from India. The paper addresses the causal effect of ethnic violence relative to economic clientelism towards influencing voting attitudes. Conclusions are drawn from survey experiments in three Indian states, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal - interviewing 750 eligible voters.

The experiments find evidence that the institutional incentive of security from ethnic violence is the prime motivator behind bloc voting. Moreover, ethnically targeted economic incentives offer inferior rewards for parties in the ballot box vis-a-vis offers of security, especially in areas that have witnessed high levels of targeted ethnic hate crimes and civil rights violations. Furthermore, results show that clearly identifiable ethnic surnames act as heuristics for voters who trust their coethnics more to deliver on electoral promises.


2.1 Introduction

The study examines whether campaign information involving institutional and economic incentives influences voter attitudes towards candidates in a multiethnic society with a history of ethnic violence. In such an electorate, identity politics rules supreme, and normal voting (Converse, 1966) is to stick with coethnic candidates irrespective of new incentives or information in electoral campaigns. Established literature in this field have concentrated on American politics. Voters are shown to adjust their initial evaluation of candidates when presented with new information (Lodge, Steenberg and Brau, 1995). However, voters are saddled with prior beliefs which affect their decision making, whereby they make vote choices which do not appear to be rational (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001).

Recent work on determinants of political preference formation have focused on framing effects (Druckman, 2004), misperceptions (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010) and confirmation bias influences vote choice through selective intake of information (Jerit and Barabas, 2012). The ‘irrational’ voting phenomenon rears its head beyond the confines of the United States. In India, for instance, voters routinely elect candidates with criminal records possessing limited information about the candidates themselves (Banerjee et al, 2014). Voters stick to ethnic voting by voting for candidates sharing the same ethnic background even when the candidate is clearly flawed relative to the competition.

Ethnic parties have been the beneficiary of such irrational voting behaviour. In this work, ethnic parties are broadly defined as any party that targets one or more ethnic identity while at the same time excluding the rest of the electorate (Chandra, 2007). Ethnic parties make no effort to appeal to all of the electorate. Strategically, they do not need to in a first-past-the-post system with an ethnically fractured electorate. The typology casts a wide net and thus makes the classification of a political party as ethnic or not changeable over time and space. For example, the Indian National
Congress (henceforth, Congress or INC), the party behind India’s independence movement was historically not an ethnic party as it strived to represent a broad coalition of citizens, but could now be classified as an ethnic party in some Indian states due to its exclusive focus on attracting Muslim and Brahmin voters. On the other hand, the newly formed phenomenon of the Aam Aadmi Party which has enjoyed considerable success in two Indian states can be categorised as a non-ethnic party as it runs on a development and anti-corruption platform and seeks votes from all ethnic identities. Neutral co-ethnics are defined as ethnic identities (or castes, used interchangeably) that are (1) not part of a given ethnic party’s base; and; (2) not directly involved in the violence between local ethnic identities and their rivals.

2.2 Ethnic Parties and Identity Politics: The Indian Case

One of the most striking features of modern Indian politics has been the disintegration of the Indian National Congress coupled with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and numerous regional parties. Indian voters blessed the Congress with a one-party dominant status for almost 40 years from the first post-independence elections till 1989. However, the last two decades have seen massive change in the Indian electorate’s voting behaviour with the rise of ethnic parties. The regional ethnic parties are almost all cocooned to one or a few states and derive their power base from a specific linguistic ethnic identity or caste-based ethnic identity or a

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1 One of India’s major castes, usually on the top-end of the social pyramid.
2 The party won majorities in state legislative elections in the state of Delhi in 2013 and 2015. It also won 4 of 11 parliamentary seats in the state of Punjab. Source: Election Commission of India; www.eci.nic.in.
3 India’s well-defined caste and religious groups are treated as distinct ethnic identities in this study. Castes are hierarchical social groups based on thousands of years of occupational prestige rankings in India’s society. Castes are not exclusive to Hindus but cross religious barriers, including followers of Islam and other religions in India’s diverse religious landscape. Caste classifications (Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Castes etc.), however, are not arbitrary - they vary from state to state, and are based on politically motivated policy laid out by the government.
4 There are strong arguments to be made, as noted by discussants and the audience in conference presentations that ethnic parties should rather be called ‘identity parties’.
5 (For example, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, Assam Gana Parishad in Assam, among others.)
mélange of castes.

The most glaring consequence of India’s breaking down from a one-party dominant system to a competitive multi-party democracy has been the rise of coalition politics. Since 1991, national parties like the BJP or the INC have been unable to form a solo government. The BJP was successful in being the first party to have a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament) for the first time in 30 years in 2014, yet, they chose to form a coalition government. What explains the voting behaviour of the Indian electorate?

Ethnic diversity and social integration of political parties into India’s complex social hierarchy are both crucial towards understanding party competition in India (Adeney and Wyatt, 2004)[3]. While economic patronage has been an established rationale towards answering party competition in India, recent studies have focused on the structural issues of ethnic diversity and ethnic relations, especially in regards to public goods provision. Ethnic inequalities between castes cause worse outcomes in public goods distributions (Lee, 2017)[101]. Indeed, other studies suggest the relationships between ethnic diversity and good governance are historically robust (Singh and vom Hau, 2016)[140]. If providing particularistic goods to ethnic bases were the answer towards long-term electoral success, with frequent government turnover and strong electoral volatility (see Chapter 3), ethnic parties have clearly failed to build on the use of economic patronage as a tool for governance.

Scholarship to understanding the Indian electorate’s voter choice has mostly been macro level, that is, structural and institutional. One constant has been the ethnic diversity of the country which drives voter preference. Indeed, castes are arguably more salient in driving party competition in India - caste certainly has a strong interactive and moderating effect (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015)[29] as lower caste members are biased towards out-groups. The complex relationship between
ethnic identities (which include and transcends the boundary of religion) is often termed *caste politics* in India’s political parlance. Witsoe (2008)[157], drawing from his fieldwork in Bihar, defines caste politics as the influence of local relations of dominance and insubordination on electoral practice, resulting in what he terms territorial democracy. In a subsequent work, Witsoe (2013)[158] examines the lower castes in Bihar and concludes that the increase in ethnic parties fielding crime-tainted strong arm candidates is an electoral outcome where state institutions are unable to enforce rights, especially those of the lower castes. Golden & Tiwari (2009)[62] in their preliminary findings conclude that increasing criminality in India’s politics is a result of increasing electoral volatility, which is supported by findings from Vaishnav (2017)[150].

If one surveys the unequal relationship between the higher and lower castes in Indian society, it shows the way historically oppressed lower caste categories have been able to break the hegemony of upper caste peers in the stage of electoral democracy. By the early 1980s, the lower castes reached the point where for them to further move up the socio-economic chain in rural and urban areas, they had to disturb the social hierarchy set for centuries (Joshi, 1982)[88]. Joshi’s argument is that long-standing social cleavages and the rise of democratic institutions led to the demise of the INC and accelerated the rise of regional parties catering to their own ethnic group(s). In Chandra (2005)[27], ethnic parties were introduced under a new framework of *patronage democracy* whereby parties use economic clientelist promises to gain and retain political office. Voters use ethnic head counts of their own coethnic caste elites among the ethnic party structure to determine their voting preference. I borrow Chandra’s typology of ethnic parties since it is an excellent frame of reference. For parties, if it is a competition for patronage, Eliot (2011)[49] argues with evidence from Andhra Pradesh that economic growth and increasing government revenue have only increased the dominant castes’ appetite for patronage.
Despite advances made by ethnic parties in allocating social justice and economic benefits to their caste bases, the voter’s rationale for preferring ethnic parties is unclear, especially when, according to studies like Jeffrey, Jeffrey & Jeffrey (2008)[83], Dalit lower castes in northern India have not been able to win substantially increased leverage and political power at the grassroots level. Is economic patronage the glue that keeps lower castes voting for their preferred ethnic party or do ethnic parties make them more secure by reducing the risk of ethnic violence and facilitating access to law enforcement and judicial institutions? I argue in the next section that the latter takes precedence. The persistent violence that ethnic identities lower in India’s social structure face from competing groups, reinforced by institutional barriers and apathy which disregards the security issues of these disadvantaged castes, makes for a stronger incentive than narrow, clientelist economic goods.

### 2.3 Why Ethnic Security Outweighs Economic Patronage

The main theoretical expectation is that voters prefer ethnic security - an institutional incentive as a parameter of good governance over particularistic economic goods (i.e economic patronage) in an unequal, violent society. Putting it another way, when voters feel insecure due to ethnic violence, they would rather seek institutional access to security rather than government jobs or free televisions. When ethnic violence is consistently low, voter demand for security diminishes and parties providing public goods would be successful over ones providing security. At the same time, parties would need to offer ethnically targeted clientelism to build ethnic coalitions. How do the voters trust which candidate would deliver on their promises? Voters operating in a low information environment tend to vote for their coethnics as candidates, since having the same ethnic identity as the voter, they are perceived to be more receptive to the voter’s security and economic needs. This is not an unreasonable expectation as shown in recent scholarly works (Vaishnav 2017; Acharya et al 2015)[2][150].
To summarise the theoretical mechanisms:

- At macro level, ethnic parties are successful through employing 'bloc voting' where they seek to maximise the vote from their core ethnic identities. Bloc voting is the easiest way to gain a large share of votes, and a critical mechanism through which ethnic parties create loyal ethnic 'vote banks'. In ethnically fragmented democracies with a first-past-the-post system, the creation of loyal vote banks, even if they are not the majority of the population, is critical to electoral success.

- Ethnic security as a public good triumphs over economic clientelism in the ballot box in a divided, multiethnic society. When ethnic violence is consistently low, bloc voting becomes a less effective mechanism, as herding an electoral bloc becomes a more difficult and likely expensive proposition. Nonetheless, bloc voting remains salient for electoral success, prompting ethnic parties to change electoral strategy towards building an ethnic coalition through offering economic patronage or public goods.

- Using ethnic heuristics in candidate nomination strategies in a low information environment is an important mechanism to build informed targeted ethnic voters about the ethnic identity of the candidates. Without this, ethnic parties would fail to win elections.

That being said, identities and social cleavages can form through various means - competition over natural resources (Otite, 1975)[123] or economic resources (Olzak, 1992)[122] or violence itself (Fearon & Laitin, 2000)[51]. Ethnic identity formation and ethnic violence are considered exogenous and a priori to this investigation.[7]

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6 Here, success is defined as the share of votes won by a political party in an election.

7 The paper is invested in ethnic identities, not ethnic groups which have different meanings and connotations among academic disciplines.
2.4 Demand and Supply: Incentive Structure for Voters & Ethnic Parties

The central question behind why voters prioritise an institutional incentive like ethnic security over economic benefits rests on answering what ethnic parties offer on the supply side, and, on the demand side what kind of a policy vacuum for the constituents they fill. The demand side from voters can be described thus - voters in a violent society will prefer ethnic security and security of their economic interests, including contracts, over short-term economic gain. In other words, if there is no security to your own life or your family members and you expect to suffer injury or death, benefits from a particularistic good appear less attractive. In effect, the political motivations derive from base physiological and safety needs (Maslow, 1943) [106].

In India, lower castes find themselves in constant pressure to sell their land (agricultural or otherwise) to more powerful upper caste ethnic rivals. Since the institutions - political, legal and administrative are dominated by officeholders from these same upper castes, finding redress against such unlawful capture of their fixed economic assets becomes next to impossible. The vacuum created by non-ethnic parties, which are often dominated by more powerful ethnic identities and, which ignore the security demands of castes further down the social ladder, creates an opening for politicians from the marginalised ethnic identities to create ethnic parties and represent their voices in the legislature. Indeed, as is contended by multiple scholars (Kohli, 1990; Chhibber, 2010) [37][94], the inability of the INC to represent interests of any but the powerful upper castes caused the demise of the party from the late 1970s on, which eventually led to the creation of India’s modern, chaotic multi-party democracy from what had been a single-party-dominant system.

The ethnic party, then, exists to provide the following services to its loyal ethnic identities, in other words, their base. They provide non-violent means of arbitration, whenever there is the threat of violence, ethnic parties represent their loyal ethnic
identities - ensuring the situation does not escalate to violence. Counter-intuitively, the criminal politicians - 'strongmen' who are likely to play part in manufacturing ethnic violence, are trusted by their ethnic members to provide and arbitrate access to state institutions where the rule of law is weak (Vaishnav, 2017). Elected representatives liaise with the police, local administration, officials from rival parties and civic leaders of rival ethnicities to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.

In the case of disputes that escalate to violence, ethnic parties provide access to state institutions which might have been captured by by rival ethnicities. This is critical, and one of the primary functions that the base asks from the party representing them. For instance, if the Thakurs attacks the Dalits from a neighbouring village, the local elected official from Bahujan Samajwadi Party would be in a position to put political pressure on the Thakur police inspector to register the police report and carry out an impartial investigation which he would not have done in the absence of such political pressure.

Once in power, ethnic parties facilitate the socio-economic uplifting of loyal castes

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8Thakur - powerful upper caste landowners in northern India.
Dalits - Broad ethnic identity, lowest in the hierarchy of India’s caste structure, better known as 'The Untouchables'.
Bahujan Samajwadi Party - ethnic party largely representing Dalits in most Indian states.
by providing them access to state institutions. This is largely achieved through legislation that improves the security and civil rights standing of their caste base. Affirmative action policies are critical weapons for ethnic parties towards achieving such ends. Exemplifying this, under the recommendations of the Mandal Commission - one of the biggest affirmative action laws in India was passed in 1990 under Prime Minister Chandrashekhar who was leading a coalition government of largely ethnic parties. In Kerala, the Communist parties, who are in principle non-ethnic parties, gained prominence by attacking the highly rigid feudal structure and ensuring the economic rights of lower castes (Heller, 1995).

Laws punishing ethnic violence, and intimidation and ensuring the fair treatment of marginalised castes in the public space increase the social standing of the downtrodden. Meanwhile, non-discrimination lead to better education and employment opportunities and consequently increased income contributing to the higher socio-economic status of historically poor and marginalised ethnicities. This is what they hope to achieve and why they would rather vote for an ethnic party that represents their issues. As both the demands from the voter side and supply of security from the party side align, ethnic parties can expect to be successful. Where this paper diverges from established literature is by establishing that the demand and supply of ethnic security as a public good takes precedence over economic demands, which have decreased salience in a contentious society where ethnically marginalised groups have unequal opportunity and access to state institutions.

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9Mandal Commission was formed in 1979 under the Janata Party government, the first proto-ethnic parties coalition to come to power in New Delhi

10Although the commission recommended creating the laws in 1983, the central government led by the non-ethnic 'we-represent-all-Indians' INC did not heed its reports for the next six years it was in power.
2.5 Identification Mechanism: Ethnic Surnames

Cognitive heuristics is an important factor in decision making by voters. Lau & Redlawsk (2001)\(^9\) find that cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters, and that they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is complex. This is especially pertinent in our case where Indian voters are faced with a choice of multiple candidates from different parties. Moreover, they are liable to use such heuristics in the low information environment (Chandra, 2004) that most Indian voters typically operate.

A common finding in the literature is that voter behaviour is malleable and that information about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. The limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractice in low-income democracies. Pandey (2011)\(^12\) argues that voters in low-income settings are receptive to new information about politician performance and are willing to vote on the basis of this information. Credible information can help voters influence choice of politicians even in settings with weak institutions and electoral malpractice. The idea that voters in an otherwise well-functioning democracy might be severely constrained by information about their candidate qualifications and past record is both striking and important. Banerjee, Pandey & Su (2011)\(^8\) find that voters move quite substantially when given this information. Their results suggest that if this information had reached the entire jurisdiction, electoral outcomes in the two closest elections would have changed.

However, evidence from large-scale natural experiments, such as Ferraz and Finan (2008)\(^5\) and Beaman et al. (2009)\(^1\), suggests that politicians and parties are not able to completely undo the effect of new information (through disinformation campaigns or electoral malpractice). Thus, changes in voting patterns translate into electoral penalties for worse performers.
For this study, I use ethnic surnames of candidates as heuristic ‘ethnic markers’ that guide voters. While a candidate’s surname may not initially appear to be a cognitively important heuristic for voting decision, recent work has shown them to be an essential cue for voters across multiple countries (Ben-Bassat & Dahan, 2012; Contreras & Morales, 2018; Fukomoto & Miwa, 2018). In ethnically diverse democracies like India with deep societal and cultural cleavages between ethnic identities, and where inter-ethnic marriages are still at rare\(^\text{11}\) surnames serve as an important marker for identifying a candidate’s ethnicity. This is more so in low information environments where the candidate’s party identification or issue positions are fuzzy.

In light of the two main hypotheses on ethnicity and patronage, ethnic surnames of candidates is an ideal heuristic marker for studying voter attitudes. The surnames carry not only the ethnic identities of the candidates (allowing us to test the ethnic politics character of the electorate), but also information for voters, who base their preference on patronage. Indeed, according to Chandra (2004, 2009), a voter would rather vote for a candidate who would more likely to provide her with patronage, and voters would use the candidate’s surnames to figure out the more ethnically "close" candidate who would do so. This identification strategy confirms findings that clearly identifiable ethnic cues have large treatment effects (Abrajano et al, 2018).

### 2.6 Data and Empirical Strategy

Survey experiments were conducted in three northern and eastern Indian states, including Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar and West Bengal. Two state legislative constituencies were selected for the surveys in each state. Both constituencies were from

\(^{11}\)Only 5\% of marriages are inter-ethnic. Source: The Hindu. November 13, 2014
a single district, based on the district’s recent history of ethnic violence.\textsuperscript{12} Bihar and UP were the high ethnic violence cases, and the Bengal seats were comparatively peaceful with much lower instances of ethnic crimes. Moreover, the research design follows a natural experiment on the efficacy of quotas (Bhavnani, 2013) by pairing each state legislative constituency with another that is reserved for an ethnic identity (Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes).\textsuperscript{13} Besides ethnic violence and ethnic electoral quotas, two additional constraints were considered for the sampling strategy - the ethnic diversity of the district and legislator incumbency in the constituency.

The seats in Bihar, Rajnagar and Jhanjharpur, belong to the Madhubani district in northern section of the state. Madhubani, a rural district adjacent to the Nepal border has consistently been in the top decile for ethnic violence over the past two decades.\textsuperscript{14} The surveyed areas in the seat of Jhanjharpur were a mix of urban areas in Jhanjharpur town and nearby villages. Meanwhile, Rajnagar is a reserved, rural constituency, poorer and more diverse. Sitapur district was the site for the surveys experiments in Uttar Pradesh. Sitapur is a largely nondescript district two hours west of Lucknow, the state capital. Most male residents work either in agriculture or migrate to Lucknow and bigger cities such as New Delhi, which is eight hours bus ride away. Sitapur, just like Madhubani, resides in the top decile for violent ethnic crimes in UP over better part of the past decade. An urban and rural balance is maintained as Sitapur is an urban constituency encompassing the district administrative headquarters of Sitapur city while Sidhauli is more rural and remote, with a majority of its population from the backward castes.

In contrast to the more contentious areas in UP and Bihar, West Bengal historically

\textsuperscript{12}For UP and Bihar, both Sitapur and Madhubani districts were in the top decile for ethnic hate crimes for the past decade

\textsuperscript{13}The advantage of this strategy is that it allows us to compare within and between-districts, thereby increasing validity of the results. The within-district results between the reserved and general constituency is not theoretically relevant for this chapter but its advantage becomes apparent in chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{14}Source: National Crime Records Bureau of India.
has seen much lower levels of ethnic hate crimes and civil rights violations. Most districts in Bengal show strikingly low numbers of ethnic crimes compared to its neighbouring states. That being said, the seats of Kalchini and Alipurduar, both in the newly formed Alipurduar district in the foothills of the Himalayas experience violent ethnic crimes in line with the state average. Nevertheless, targeted ethnic hate crime numbers are substantially lower than average districts in Bihar and UP. The Alipurduar seat covers the district seat of Alipurduar town and nearby suburban areas. Kalchini is more rural, where residents are employed in the tea plantations and agriculture among the dense foothill forests.

All three districts are ethnically diverse. No exact criteria were considered for measuring diversity except the condition that no single caste category represent more than 60% of the district (Table 2.1). Out of the six constituencies, three were unreserved and the rest were part of a quota, reserved for Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe candidates. In these seats - Kalchini (Scheduled Tribes quota), Rajnagar and Sidhauli (reserved for SC candidates), Scheduled Castes, OBC and Scheduled Tribes are the majority of the population but below the 60% threshold\textsuperscript{15}.

The purpose of the design is to investigate plausible correlation between ethnic electoral quotas, demand for security and economic clientelism. Previous research in India has shown that ethnic quotas have a weak effect on public goods provisions (Dunning & Nilekani, 2013). Meanwhile, villages under reserved constituencies show a reduction in political violence (Pasquale, 2014). More about this design is explained in Chapter 3.

The survey experiments interviewed 747 respondents divided between a control group and two treatment groups. The sampling strategy in Bihar and UP took advantage of the diversity by replacing non-respondents with voters of the same ethnicity. Due to non-response issues, investigators were unable to properly im-

\textsuperscript{15}Source: Census of India, 2010.
Table 2.1: Ethnic Affiliation of Respondents by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic affiliation</th>
<th>Sitapur</th>
<th>Madhubani</th>
<th>Alipurduar</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Caste</td>
<td>46 (18.55)</td>
<td>28 (11.16)</td>
<td>129 (52.22)</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmin</td>
<td>21 (8.47)</td>
<td>58 (23.11)</td>
<td>55 (20.07)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Caste</td>
<td>51 (20.56)</td>
<td>19 (7.57)</td>
<td>3 (1.21)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Tribe</td>
<td>2 (.8)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>8 (3.24)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>83 (33.47)</td>
<td>125 (49.8)</td>
<td>7 (2.83)</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>45 (18.15)</td>
<td>21 (8.37)</td>
<td>45 (18.22)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages in each district are in parentheses.

plement it to the desired effect in West Bengal, leading to oversampling of Upper Caste, including Brahmin voters. Being the low violence case, oversampling is not expected to alter outcomes concerning theoretical expectations. Non-response rates for women in Uttar Pradesh were similarly a challenge experienced by enumerators. The issue was especially pronounced for middle aged and elderly women who are socially more conservative than new generations; they were hesitant to talk to strangers without supervision from a male member of the family. Consequently, men were oversampled in UP (Figure 2.2).

Operationally, the experiments placed a premium on privacy in regards to the interview setting. The treatments involved sensitive questions on ethnic voting, views on social issues and explicit party choice. It was expected that answers given in the audible vicinity of neighbours and extended family members would contaminate the responses. Hence, utmost care was taken to conduct the surveys with privacy afforded to the respondent. Family members and curious onlookers were requested to give privacy to the respondent.

Other major demographic indicators in the sample are representative of the district population. Muslims constitute 23% of the sample in UP, mirroring the district and the average in central UP where Sitapur is located. In Bihar and West Bengal,
Muslims form 9% and 16% of the sample respectively (Figure 2.3).

In terms of economic class, respondents from Bihar and UP were overwhelmingly poor or from the lower-middle tier, reflecting the largely rural and impoverished nature of the districts (Figure 4). Respondents in West Bengal were better educated, and consequently, enjoyed marginally higher family income; 11% of the sample can be grouped into the middle class with monthly family income higher than 10,000 Rupees.

Additionally, seats with long-time incumbents in both high and low violence cases were excluded from the study. This strategy was taken to minimise biased responses as incumbents with considerable tenure have a greater chance of being in contact with the respondent and engender partisan loyalties. Furthermore, their tenure has the potential to distort the demand for clientelism in responses. A minor factor that played into the selection of constituencies was logistics and the local law and order
situation in traditionally high violence areas. Districts with ongoing ethnic riots, such as Muzzafarnagar in UP were not considered: surveys with sensitive ethnic questions would have attracted negative attention from locals and authorities. Not to mention, responses could have been further biased towards provision of security due to ethnic riots which were ongoing in Muzzafarnagar during the timeframe of the surveys.

In each state, approximately 250 respondents were surveyed (Table 2.2). Each constituency was allotted 125 respondents. Investigators were spread out to four randomly selected precincts. Each precinct had 30 to 32 respondents; out of this, 41% of respondents were slotted into the control group, while the rest were evenly divided between the two treatment groups. The control group registered 309 respondents overall over three states.

The survey instrument was divided into four parts. The first section collected
demographic information, including ethnic affiliation and a measure for social views that is operationalised by respondent attitudes towards inter-ethnic marriage. The Likert Scale is extensively used as it does a better job of receiving a larger set of information on respondent attitudes than binary up-or-down voter choice questions. It also delivers higher reliability coefficients (Jamieson et al, 2004)[81].

The second section tests voter demands for ethnic security. For the first question in this section, respondents in the control group are given a choice between two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>Bihar</th>
<th>West Bengal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16A five point scale was used. Where 5 was coded as 'most likely' (preference), 1 was coded as 'not at all likely', 2 and 4 were labeled as 'somewhat likely' and 'somewhat unlikely' in preference. More on this is revealed in the Appendices with the survey instrument.
generic candidates (i.e. without revealing their ethnic backgrounds) - both offering a generic public good as campaign promises. The generic public good (visualised as 'generic offer' in the figures) was worded as 'development' without being specific in most cases; this is a term Indian politicians employ abundantly. The two treatment groups featured the same design, except that a candidate offers security from ethnic violence in lieu of a specific public good.

Six subsequent questions followed the same format, with candidate heuristics revealed. Each of these questions offered respondents a choice between two candidates from different ethnicities. In the control group, both candidates offer a non-specific public good. Meanwhile, in treatment group 1, the candidate from 'Ethnicity A' offers security while the 'Ethnicity B' candidate promises a generic public good. Respondents from treatment group 2 are exposed to a reverse stimulus where 'Ethnicity B' candidate offers security instead (Table 2.3). Both candidate ethnicities are marked with a heuristic marker using ethnic surnames, easily recognisable by the lowest information voter.

The third section followed a similar pattern while testing for voter demand to economic patronage. The first question in the treatment group replaced offers of security with economic patronage where the stimulus was government jobs to the respondent’s family members (Table 2.4).[[17]

17Please refer to Appendix C for the final section of the survey instrument which is only relevant for Chapter 3.
To sum up the treatments (see Appendix A for further clarity), they were in form of questions comparing between two hypothetical candidates. Except in three instances where respondent’s preference to incentives were tested, caste identity of the hypothetical candidates were marked by clearly identifiable ethnic surnames. For the ethnic security treatment, one of the candidates offered security to the respondent and their family. For the economic patronage treatment, one of the candidates offered government job for the respondent or a member of his/her family. Similarly, for the public good treatment, a candidate offered a generic public good - termed as ’development’ (a common electoral promise in Indian election campaigns). If prompted for more information, metalled roads for the community was provided as an example of a public good.

2.7 Main Findings

The dependent variable is voter choice. Following a design based inference approach, outcomes are analysed using a difference of means t-test. The advantage of such a strategy is that randomisation eliminates extraneous factors that may influence potential outcomes (Morton & Williams, 2008). The control group establishes a baseline showing the ethnic preferences of respondents. The treatment groups provide a contrast to their normal baseline ethnic affinities as the stimulus in form of ethnic security or economic patronage is introduced. Treatment effects shows a substantive rise in absolute support for ethnic security in both high violence (Table 2.5) and low violence cases (Table 2.6). Relative to the rival candidate offering campaign promises involving generic public goods, candidates (without their ethnic surnames revealed) who offer security perform better than competitors with an offer of economic patronage in high violence areas. Meeting the theoretical expectations, demand for patronage is 10% higher than demand for security in peaceful West
Table 2.5: Demand for Security - UP & Bihar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Stimulus</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Public good</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.0778)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

t = -3.15
P (||T|| > ||t||) = 0.002

Voter attitude gaps between candidates within the control group stand at 1.385 in high violence areas of northern India compared to 1.13 in more peaceful West Bengal (Tables 2.5 and 2.6). In the treatment group, the attitude differences for security and patronage offers are at 1.915 and 1.87 respectively in violent areas (Tables 2.5 and 2.8), 2.08 and 2.12 respectively in peaceful West Bengal (Tables 2.6 and 2.7), reflecting the contrast and salience of demands for security vis-a-vis economic patronage.

Bengal (Table 2.7)\[18\] The results are significant and hold up to a Kruscal-Wallis test. The effects are stark as shown in the box plot (Figures 2.5 to 2.8).
Table 2.6: Demand for security - West Bengal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Stimulus</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Public good</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>3.74 (.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>4.4 (.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- .66 (.145)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[t = -4.57\]  \[\text{Welch's degree of freedom} = 180.59\]

\[P (\|T\| > \|t\|) = 0\]

On the other hand, offers of economic patronage record an impressive increase of 18% in candidate support in high violence areas (Table 2.8) and a comparatively modest increase of 2% in Bengal (Table 2.7). When compared with a rival candidate’s offer of generic campaign promises, clientelist economic goods are more effective in creating separation between candidates - to the extent of 2.12 in Bengal and 1.87 in UP and Bihar. The attitudes of voters towards patronage and generic public goods are clear (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). That being said, overall, offers of security from ethnic violence are superior to economic clientelism as established by mean scores in the treatment groups for each stimulus. The results hold up for generic candidates (i.e. candidate ethnicity not revealed), as well as for candidates from all ethnic identities except Muslims which is a curious case discussed below. Results agree to the theoretical expectations that in an ethnically divided society, voters prefer institutional assurances to security and access to state institutions that redress ethnic violence and prevent future conflict. 

\[\text{Fig. 2.11 to 2.15 in the Appendices provide further insight to voter attitudes when caste affiliation of the dueling candidates is revealed. Voters defect from the upper caste to the SC candidate offering economic patronage in the treatment group when compared to the control group where both candidates offer non-specified public goods (figs. 2.15). Same thing happens for Muslim candidates (fig. 2.14) but the defection is comparatively more modest. For security offers (figs. 2.11-2.13), Upper caste candidates gain at the expense of SC candidates when the former security and the latter promise public goods. The effect is reversed, as attitudes of voters towards SC candidates improve when they offer security instead (Fig.2.13).}\]
Figure 2.6: Demand for security - West Bengal

![Confidence Interval Graph]

Table 2.7: Demand for Economic Patronage - West Bengal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Stimulus</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Public good</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Economic patronage</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.122)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

t = - 0.81      Welch’s degree of freedom = 221.16
P (||T|| > ||t||) = 0.418
Table 2.8: Demand for Economic Patronage - UP & Bihar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Stimulus</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Public good</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>Economic patronage</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- .69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.087)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ t = -7.89 \]

Welch’s degree of freedom \( = 470.97 \)

\[ P (\|T\| > |t|) = 0 \]

Figure 2.7: Demand for patronage - UP & Bihar
2.8 Conclusion

In line with theoretical expectations, voters prefer institutional incentives of ethnic security over economic incentives - clientelist private goods and public goods in violent societies. Given a choice between two candidates (whose ethnic backgrounds are undisclosed), treatment effects reveal a higher affinity for security relative to generic public goods in ethnically violent areas. In peaceful locales of West Bengal, economic patronage performs better than offers of security in absolute value. The real advantage of ethnic security over economic clientelist goods comes when the offer stands up against a rival candidate’s offer of public goods provision.

While voters show a higher affinity for ethnic security than patronage, when they are asked to make the choice between two candidates whose explicit ethnic backgrounds are revealed, candidate ethnicities reveal a moderating effect on voter attitudes via traditional normal voting or in-group attitudes. Voters still prefer ethnic security over economic patronage between candidates from all other ethnicities - the lone
exception is when Muslim candidates offer clientelist economic incentives (relative to offers of generic public goods from Scheduled Caste and Other Backward Caste candidates). In this scenario, economic clientelism gets the upper hand over offers of security from Scheduled Caste and OBC candidates.

The results suggest that even though ethnic priors are formidable, new campaign information coupled with strategic candidate nomination strategies that speaks to existing priors, and misperceptions of voters go a long way towards electoral coalition building in a multiethnic democracy. Offers of public goods and particularistic private economic goods break in-group voting habits. The task is easier for ethnic parties in peaceful societies where lack of violence decreases people’s focus on institutional access to ethnic security as a measure of governance, thereby boosting inter-group social capital. This makes the ethnic priors and misperceptions less influential towards voter preference when presented with public goods or particularistic economic incentives.

The results hold significant lessons for Indian political parties in terms of party programmes and candidate nomination strategies. Ethnic heuristics play a major role towards decision making for low information voters. Selecting candidates with clearly identifiable heuristic markers is crucial as it helps low information voters to identify their coethnics in the ballot instrument. It is not only imperative that parties nominate candidates who are coethnics to targeted caste vote banks, candidates need to be easily identifiable for low information voters who rely on ethnic cues more than programmatic incentives. Moreover, to form a loyal base, ethnic parties in historically contentious areas need to provide security and facilitate access to law enforcement and judicial institutions to affected ethnic identities. Depending on the ethnic fractionalisation of the constituency, that may be enough to win elections by winning a plurality of votes. Only Muslim candidates do not stand to benefit substantially from offers of security unless the constituency has a dominant Muslim
population.

The findings hold further implications for ethnic parties with a smaller caste base. For minor parties, ethnic security would not be enough to win elections. They need to build ethnic coalitions which is where offers of economic patronage becomes useful to attract defection from other castes. Muslim candidates, in particular, would benefit by offering clientelist economic goods in ethnically fractured constituencies. This all speaks well for the democratic nature of the system as it shifts voters away from in-group voting, leading to less partisanship and legislative gridlock. Indeed, unlike the US, party preferences in India are fluid\textsuperscript{20}

\footnote{Moving ahead, there is much potential for future research that looks at micro level ethnic crimes and link them with voter demand and candidate ethnicities for causal inference. Last but not least, owing to the limited budget of the study, sub-samples testing ethnic heuristics are not big enough to find statistically significant attitude differences between candidates from some of the caste pairs. While the mean differences remain stark (0.2 to 0.45, at least a greater than 5% increase over control groups), small sub-samples (anywhere between 30 to 120) dampen the results. Systemically, mean differences of 0.5 are observed to be necessary to have statistically significant results. Future studies would benefit from a sample size of at least 2000 respondents.}
Figure 2.9: Demand for Security - upper caste (security) vs. Muslim (generic offer) candidate

Figure 2.10: Demand for Security - SC (generic offer) vs. upper caste (security) candidate
Figure 2.11: Demand for Security - SC (security) vs. upper caste (generic offer) candidate

Figure 2.12: Demand for Patronage - Muslim (patronage) vs. upper caste (generic offer) candidate
Figure 2.13: Demand for Patronage - SC (patronage) vs. upper caste (generic offer) candidate
Chapter 3

DO ELECTORAL QUOTAS REDUCE ETHNIC VIOLENCE?

Abstract

Do electoral quotas improve ethnic relations? The paper addresses a gap in the literature by establishing a causal link between ethnic electoral quotas and ethnic violence. Utilizing a quasi-natural experimental design from electoral data, complemented with survey experiments in northern and eastern India, the study finds that implementation of electoral quotas for ethnic categories reduce long term ethnic violence in high violence areas. While presence of a single reserved seat in a district does not necessarily lead to reduction in ethnic violence, districts having larger number of seats with ethnic quotas show marked reduction in ethnic violence. The improvement is a result of demand side effect from voters in reserved constituencies who prefer ethnic security more than economic incentives such as public goods or particularistic doles. Crucially, improved representation of marginalised ethnic categories (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes) at the receiving end of violence also leads to reduction in ethnic violence. However, election year ethnic violence surges with implementation of ethnic quotas. Results show that institutional preferences have serious consequences on ethnic violence. Ethnic (in)security is the primary causal factor behind political behaviour in ethnically diverse societies, more so than economic incentives like public goods, bribes or redistribution.
3.1 Introduction

Ethnic or caste violence is a reflection of the most dominant form of inter-group cleavage in India. Normative discourse on social and political cleavages in South Asia till recently have largely focused on either religious violence between Hindus and Muslims, (See Van der Veer 1994, Nussbaum 2009, Ghassem-Fachandi 2012), [60, 114, 151] or economic class[1]. There are good reasons for the nature of this discourse. India’s Partition from the British Empire unleashed a wave of religious riots whose effects are still felt today. Religious violence in modern times, although intermittent, is not uncommon. The wounds were majorly re-opened by the Babri Masjid demolition which the previously fringe Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) used to gain prominence in India’s political playground (Singh 2017, Ghadyalpatil 2017)[59, 141].

More importantly, there was no reliable data on ethnic violence before the Indian parliament decided to implement a ethnic hate crime law and further address the societal inequalities by institutionalising the recommendations of the Mandal Commission report in 1990[2]. Under the hate crime law - Prevention of Atrocities Against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, atrocities were defined as not only violent hate crimes (murder, rape etc.), in addition, it included denial of civil rights, intimidation, coercion, or economic offences like forcible occupation of land of Scheduled Castes Tribes (SCs and STs)[3][4].

Even though official records of hate crimes and civil rights violations against the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes began to trickle in from 1995, the data

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2Mandal Commission was an independent parliamentary commission set up to improve economic and social status of India’s historically backward castes who are at the bottom of South Asia’s complex social hierarchy. The decision of implementation was unpopular, leading to civil protests and its recommendations were formally implemented later in 1992.
3Interestingly, the bill was spearheaded by the Janata Party government - a conglomeration of proto-ethnic parties.
4For more, refer to Human Rights Watch report (1999) [153].
was not reliable due to massive under-reporting. Part of the problem was that the historically marginalised castes initially had little to no information of this new law which is par for the course for any major public initiative in India. Moreover, incumbent political parties at federal and state governments had perverse incentives to encourage under-reporting of hate crimes. Reports of lawlessness and hate crimes publicised in the media are seldom rosy stories that would benefit re-election prospects, especially for ethnic parties that claim to represent the disadvantaged caste.\(^5\)

Third, India’s police and courts have historically been dominated by the upper and middle castes, many of whom are at best indifferent to the plight of the marginalised castes and, at times, hostile.\(^6\)\(^7\) Resentment against discriminatory treatment from the state institutions is widespread amongst Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Case in point, a Dalit family in the outskirts of Delhi protested naked in public after the police refused to register their case of an alleged robbery (Times of India, 2015).\(^\text{[120]}\) Instead of arresting the perpetrator, the Dalit family was arrested for public obscenity. Representation of lower castes in the administrative services have only recently started changing as affirmative action policies following the Mandal Commission report have increased representation of the disadvantaged castes in India’s administration. Bhavnani & Lee (2018)\(^\text{[21]}\) find that the increased diversity have not sacrificed efficiency of the civil services. This paper seizes on ethnic violence and the discontent within India’s historically marginalised castes who experience little access to (and biased treatment from) the state machinery to address

\(^5\) Ethnic parties gained power in the first place by promising security to their ethnic base. Voters would not look kindly on them if they have conclusive "official" evidence of the party failing to keep their electoral promise Banerjee (2018).

\(^6\) In many ways, the situation is not so different than post-Reconstruction Era "Deep South" in the US.

\(^7\) Till only recently, India’s Supreme Court had no Dalit judges in its bench, and no Scheduled Caste judge have been elevated to the court since 2011. A comparative study of the US and Israel by Grossman et al (2016) shows that racial minorities receive lower sentences when the judicial panel is racially diverse.\(^\text{[64]}\).
their plight.

With time, the hate crime law has been institutionalised with much greater awareness of its existence among the public\footnote{When India’s Supreme Court in March 2018 issued an advisory ruling that the Prevention of Atrocities Act should not be misused for settling political or ethnic vendettas, there was panic among India’s lower castes. Large scale riots and strikes ensued in multiple states leading to the central government taking steps to assure the minorities that the law would not be diluted (Al Jazeera 2018)\cite{8}.} and cases of under-reporting have been steadily decreasing. In 2013, 39,048 cases of ethnic violence were recorded against Scheduled Castes. This is in contrast to 1997, when 9078 instances of violence against Scheduled Castes were reported\footnote{Source: Data.gov.in}. As the records show, ethnic violence centred around caste have been the largest form of violence, indeed more prevalent than religious violence. One curious aspect of ethnic violence in India is that most of it is low-level, and accepted by the society as business as usual. Only sparingly, the violence attracts the attention of national and international media. For instance, in Bihar, the entire 1990s witnessed vicious caste violence between Scheduled Castes and upper caste landlords leading to mass killings that was widely reported at that time and later (New York Times, 2013)\cite{148}. For the most part, though, ethnic violence including intimidation and civil rights violations are 'low-scale', not considered worthy of visibility unlike media-friendly religious riots.

How do institutional preferences affect ethnic violence and what are the implications of such everyday violence in the ballot box? Electoral quotas have been used to increase the representation of minority groups in developed nations and they have been found to be effective (Krook 2009)\cite{96}. Scholarly research shows that temporary quotas have positive effects on representation of women (Bhavnani 2009; Deininger et al 2015)\cite{19, 42}. That being said, ethnicity effects works differently than gender (Htun 2004)\cite{73} and ethnic quotas may have unique effects depending on the regime type (Bird 2014)\cite{22}.\footnote{9}
Previous work on the effectiveness of ethnic electoral quotas have studied its public goods (Jensenius 2015) or redistributive effects (Dunning & Nilekani 2013). More recently, Chauchard (2014, 2017), utilising extensive fieldwork in northern India, finds that ethnic relations improve when ethnic quotas are put in place. Upper castes treat lower castes with more respect when local elected officials are from lower castes. There is further evidence that ethnic quotas can be useful as elected officials have control over fiscal resources (Khemani 2003) and the bureaucratic machinery (Iyer & Mani 2012).

This paper focuses on the benefits of representation through bureaucratic control that ultimately reduces ethnic violence by making the state machinery more accessible to the disadvantaged ethnic groups. It moves forward the discussion of the impact of quotas beyond redistribution (Pande 2003) to inter-group relations (Dunning 2010; Jensenius 2017).

3.2 Mechanism

What is the relationship between ethnic electoral quotas, ethnic violence, and poor representation of historically marginalised ethnic categories in state institutions? Ethnic electoral quotas assure representation to the disadvantaged ethnic groups whose interests since the Independence has been overlooked by the major Indian parties, whose elites have been dominated by the rival castes higher in the social totem pole. Better representation of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in elected office allow the marginalised castes to put political pressure on the state machinery towards widening access and fair treatment, thus leading to lower hate crimes.

From a behavioural standpoint, the expectation is thus - when individuals and their coethnics are under the threat of violence from out-groups, the first order of preference in voting decisions will be security. After all, for instance, how would a paved road (public good) or colour television (clientelist dole) benefit a Dalit family
whose daughter is harassed daily (on the way to the school) by upper caste men with impunity? (CNN, Indian Express, Times of India) Violence, coercion and the state authorities turning the other way when it comes to redressing the atrocities is an all too common occurrence in India.

Maslow (1943) states that voting preferences come from our base psychological needs. Security is at the bottom of the needs pyramid once the basics for sustenance (food, water etc.) have been achieved. In an ethnically diverse and divided society where violence is a common feature, it is a reasonable expectation that voters will demand security from ethnic violence. How does that preference rank against other needs of public goods, particularistic goods, or any other public policy priorities that voters may have? Banerjee (2018) finds that voters do prefer security over economic incentives from candidates for electoral office. This paper attempts to find further nuances to the results and investigate if the findings hold for voters between general seats and ethnically reserved constituencies.

As long as voters demand benefits from electoral candidates, political parties would be willing to satisfy that demand. The easiest way for political parties (ethnic or otherwise) to win election is to generate bloc voting from a dedicated group of voters. For ethnic parties, blocs can be made of single or multiple sub-castes (jatis) forming the ethnic base for the party. For instance, Dalits constitute the base for Bahujan Samajwadi Party. In recent elections where BSP have suffered disappointing results, that base has shrunken to include Jatavs, the largest jati of Dalits (DNA India 2018, CNN-IBN 2012). It is critical that ethnic parties turn out their base voters on election day. A most useful incentive in their arsenal is the offer of security from ethnic violence. Here, security does not necessarily mean only physical security from violence. It goes beyond to conflict mediation between rival ethnic groups.
before the conflicting parties resort to violence\textsuperscript{11}

Chauchard (2017)\textsuperscript{31} suggests that when Scheduled Castes are elected to local offices, upper castes treat lower castes with a deference that was otherwise lacking before. It is very likely that the improved ethnic relations have spillover effects on caste violence. Moreover, with a MLA (member of state legislative assembly) from the lower castes, troublemakers from upper castes would be less likely to assault Scheduled Castes and Tribes knowing that the local state machinery is under the influence of a member from the disadvantaged caste, which nail downs the final piece of the mechanism - improved access for SCs and STs to state institutions. For the historically disadvantaged castes, having their 'own man' in a local political office puts institutional force on police and courts to treat them fairly, who normally would pay little attention to redress violence against the SCs and STs. When ethnic electoral quotas are introduced in a district, guaranteeing that a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe member is represented in the assembly, the demand for security from voters translates into better ethnic relations and improved institutional behaviour from the state machinery, therefore leading to reduced ethnic violence in the district.

\textsuperscript{11}As noted conflict scholar Kristian Skrede Gleditsch is fond of saying - "it is fine to have conflict in a society. The trick is to prevent civil conflict degenerating into violence."
In India’s ethnically fragmented constituencies where there are numerous parties vying to build rapport with different ethnic identities, it is often not possible to win with the support of a single caste or jati. Parties have to build ethnic coalitions with multiple ethnic identities to win elections. To attract votes from other ethnic identities, parties have the policy ‘carrot’ of public goods and clientelist economic doles at their disposal (Fig. 1).

Economic incentives may not be as effective as the offer of ethnic security, but they are effective in breaking normal voting (Converse 1966) habits of ethnic voters who would otherwise vote for their own co-ethnics (Banerjee 2018). For instance, the BSP came to power in Uttar Pradesh state assembly in 2007 by building a coalition of Dalits and upper caste Brahmins, two castes that are not historical allies in either social or electoral terms. Since then, the BSP struggled to hold on to the coalition that has fallen apart with the resurgence of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh (Brahmins are usually base BJP or Indian National Congress voters). The SP and BSP both have used promises of ‘development’ or public goods, and economic doles - famously, laptops in 2013 (Times of India, 2013) to win over castes that are not natural base of the party. Having said that, ethnic parties also dangle security incentives to attract ethnic groups outside of their ethnic base when the opportunity arises. For instance, the BSP appealed for Brahmin votes in 2013 (DNA India, 2013) by exploiting an egregious incident where a Brahmin couple had their faces blackened, shoes garlanded around their necks and paraded in the streets in Etawah district.

Additionally in the behavioural component, voters use

---

12 Effective number of parties - a measure of party competition formulated by Laakso & Taagepera (1979) stands at respectable 3.53.

13 It was a curious social experiment, as the BSP came to prominence by giving a voice to the Dalits and the Scheduled Castes who have suffered atrocities in the hands of the upper castes (India Today, 2007).

14 One of the noteworthy campaign slogans of the BSP was tilak, tarazu aur talwar, inko maro jute chaar, which railed for throwing shoes against the dominant upper castes - Brahmins (tilak is a common Brahmin surname and societal symbol), Bania traders (tarazu) and upper caste Thakurs (talwar).

15 A traditional bastion of Samajwadi Party with their Yadav-Muslim electoral coalition.
ethnic headcounts of their coethnics in the party structure to judge whether the party can be trusted to represent their interests (Chandra 2004)[27].

3.3 Research Design and Data

I leverage a quasi-natural experimental approach from electoral data, complemented with survey experiments to find the causal effects of ethnic electoral quotas on ethnic violence. First, I inspect random assignment of ethnic quotas on single member constituencies among India’s state legislative constituencies. Second, to analyse the behavioural component of quotas on ethnic violence, the survey experiments are carried out in districts which have stark contrast in ethnic violence in recent history. District boundaries have remained unchanged since their conception, which is important, as even though constituency borders can be changed by delimitation, they always fall under the same district whose constant lines rule out any administrative spillover effects of ethnic violence from nearby districts. Furthermore, within each district, respondents of the survey experiments are divided equally between an unreserved and a reserved constituency, thus setting up a balanced line of enquiry for comparing public opinion towards security incentives from voters regardless of the history of violence in the district.

How are constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes? India’s parliament first mandated independent electoral redistricting commission in 1962. Similar delimitation exercises were conducted in 1972 and 2002. Scholars have generally agreed that these commissions, operated by the Election Commission of India are independent (Iyer & Shivakumar 2013)[77], hence removing any issue of structural bias in the delimitation process. Following the recommendation of the commissions, for elections following 2008, parliamentary (lok sabha) and state legislative seats (vidhan sabha) were redrawn, with quotas randomly assigned or
The assignment of ethnic quotas to vidhan sabha constituencies is theoretically supposed to be systematic but it is random in practice. Recent works by Jensenius (2017)[85] and Bhavnani (2017)[20] encapsulates the process with excellence. The number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes or Tribes is dependent on the SC or ST population in the state. Each constituency within a district is drawn to have equal populations. The number of reserved seats within a district is determined by multiplying the number of reserved seats in the state with the proportion of SCs and STs in the state, and rounding off the fractional seats using the largest remainder method[20]. Subsequently, the last step of the process is to determine which seat in the district is allotted the ethnic quota, and this where randomness is inserted due to the large amount of discretion used by civil servants in the final allotment[17].

Obviously, the entire process opens up the possibility of unaccounted for political interference on the civil servants affecting the selection of quota seats. The results therefore needs to be taken into context with the spectre of endogeneity infecting the outcomes. From a behavioural point of view, the survey experiments (see below) work as a force multiplier to nullify the effect of endogeneity in the observational data.

The instructions in reference to having equal populations between constituencies or some of the geographic requirements are followed diligently by the authorities in the delimitation process, however, it is quite evident from even a cursory look that the final assignment of quotas is random[18]. It is even doubtful that assignment of

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[85] The delimitation is supposed to take place every decade following report of the decadal census. However, it was suspended from 1974 to 2002 so as not to award high population growth areas with more seats, an issue that has certainly given rural areas more influence in India’s legislatures than they merited.

[20] There are indeed some instructions in drawing the districts. For more information, refer to eci.nic.in/delim/Procedure/DelimitationofConstituencies.pdf.

[17] Jensenius (2017) further confirms this in her book on redistributive effects of quotas. In the 1970s, the constituency within a district which had the highest number of SC population was supposed to be allotted the quota. However, the constituency that was selected may have had only a
SC/ST electoral quotas in the district level follows the regulation that requires the number of quotas in the district to be in proportion of the state’s Scheduled Caste (or Tribe) population.

For instance, the district of Kolkata which encompasses core metropolitan Kolkata featured no reserved seats for Scheduled Castes in the 2011 Vidhan Sabha election. South Dinajpur district’s Scheduled Caste population is roughly twice that of Kolkata\(^\text{19}\) and it was granted two SC quota seats. Burdwan district, 40 miles north of Kolkata had six seats reserved for Scheduled Castes despite its SC population being nine times that of Kolkata\(^\text{20}\). Either Kolkata had to have at least one SC quota constituency or Burdwan had to have nine seats reserved for SCs. Clearly, while civil servants do create reserved seats in Indian provinces proportional to the population of the SCs and STs at a systematic manner, randomness exists towards assigning quotas going down to the level of district administration, thus bringing the spectre of randomisation that is exploited in this study.

Ethnic violence data at the district level from UP, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal is collated from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Why These four states? For one, they are meant to support the survey experiments which were conducted in three of the same states. Second, further work is in order for the nationwide massive dataset that needs to be cleaned of errors and coded appropriately\(^\text{21}\). Previous years were ignored as data was either unavailable or heavily under-reported. Uttar Pradesh, for instance, did not effectively compile its data at the district level before 2011. Nevertheless, the results show that concerns about validity of data does not compromise the results.

Electoral data is compiled from the Election Commission of India. Caste affiliation percentage point or so difference in its SC population than a neighbouring constituency, making the selection ‘as if’ random.

\(^{19}\)Source: Census of India 2001.

\(^{20}\)Source: Election Commission of India

\(^{21}\)A forthcoming paper will replicate the results from these four states and look at the effect of quotas on party competition.
Table 3.1: Sampling Distribution by state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>UP</th>
<th>Bihar</th>
<th>West Bengal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of election winners have been sourced from an existing dataset\[^{22}\]. Short term ethnic violence is coded as caste violence 1-3 years after the election. Long term violence is coded as violence 4 years after the election (or in other words, 1 year before the next state assembly elections)\[^{23}\].

**Survey Experiment in General and Quota Seats**

The aim of the survey experiments is to not only understand the political behaviour of voters under different constituency types, but also to remove any latent or confounding variables that might have affected the observational data. The survey experiments were carried out with a random sample of 747 eligible voters from three states - Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal, to connect the observational data from electoral records to actual voter attitudes. The fieldwork respondents were from six *vidhan sabha* constituencies, two each in state, and one of the two featuring an ethnic quota. Both seats in each state were under a single administrative district. The advantage of the design is that it allows us to inspect variations in voter attitudes towards institutional or economic incentives in voting within and across the administrative district level.

The districts in both UP and Bihar, Sitapur and Madhubani respectively, have been in the top decile for violence against Scheduled Castes over this decade. There were other districts in UP where the surveys could have been conducted, for example, Muzaffarnagar and similar districts in western UP. However, major ethnic

\[^{22}\] Created by Jensenius and now managed by Gilles Verniers and Ashoka University.

\[^{23}\] In cases, where there was a midterm election due to the fall of coalition government, as is the case in 2006 Bihar, previous election was considered to be the one at 2001.
riots between Jats and Muslims were still ongoing in the summer of 2017, and spillover effects of the violence towards participant responses was a concern that had to be eliminated. Sitapur and Madhubani, in contrast, had plenty of low-level ethnic violence, most of which gain no recognition even from the local newspaper.

Besides, there was further concern that field workers might have faced administrative roadblocks in case local authorities got wind of surveyors asking sensitive questions on ethnic relations and voting attitudes in light of the high visibility ethnic violence nearby.

Alipurduars district, nestled in the foothills of the Himalayas among forest and lush tea gardens, was the site for fieldwork in West Bengal. Parts of the district had recently faced ethnic tensions between the local upper castes and Scheduled Tribes, a situation complicated by presence of domestic refugees in the eastern part of the district who have fled ethnic violence from neighbouring Assam. Nevertheless, as is the norm in Bengal, hate crimes against Scheduled Castes/Tribes are dwarfed by Sitapur and Madhubani, thereby making Alipurduars our low violence natural case.

Survey respondents were evenly divided between the districts and the vidhan sabha constituencies. Respondents were further divided between a control and two treatment groups in each state down to the constituency level (table 1). Ethnic constitution
of the samples in all three districts were close mirrors of the district population (table 2). This was achieved through random sampling at the precinct level from publicly available voter list.\textsuperscript{24}

Religious component of the sample in all three states also matched closely with the district’s religious distribution. However, the survey experiments faced unique challenges in the field in the gender department. The surveys over-sampled women in Bihar and Bengal (fig. 2.) by small margins. It is not unnatural - men of the household are out for work during the day and female labour participation is lower than that of men. In UP, women had much larger dropout rates which made

\textsuperscript{24}Thanks to the Election Commission of India.
balancing gender in the sample difficult. Muslim women, especially, were not willing to be interviewed. In any case, the gender unbalanced sample in the UP is not theoretically expected to alter the outcomes.

Sample respondents in the control group were asked to choose between two candidates offering generic public goods. Indian politicians use the word ‘development’ widely for promises of public goods, and this word was the stimulus for the control group. Besides the demographic questions, respondents were asked seven questions comparing candidates when testing for security (table 3). Out of which, in six questions, candidate ethnic identities were revealed. In treatment group 1, candidate A offered security while candidate B offered same generic public good as candidate B in the control group. In treatment group 2, candidate A (ethnic identity unchanged) offered generic public good instead, while candidate B promised security from ethnic violence to the respondent’s family and coethnics. The contrast between control and treatment group offers from candidates sets up the experimental manipulation that reveals voter attitudes towards institutional and economic incentives.

**Surnames as Ethnic Heuristics**

Surnames are used as an identification mechanism for relaying information to low information voters. Cognitive heuristics play an important role in voting behaviour (Lau & Redlawsk 2001). While surnames may not be a particularly useful mechanism for voters in ethnically homogeneous societies, they are a cognitively credible heuristic for voter decision (Ben-Bassat & Dahan 2012; Fukomoto & Miwa

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25 Even in the cases they were, they insisted to be interviewed from other side of the room’s door, and invariably chaperoned by a male member of the family dictating the answers. In Bihar as well, ‘prompting’ of answers was an issue faced by the survey team. Many of these women have never been asked of their political opinions and they likely vote the way their husbands or male members of the family tell them to vote. In any case, in all these instances, the responses were discarded and another respondent was sought out from the voter list.

26 Note: these were not real candidates, and every precaution was taken that the surnames of the candidates did not match prominent local politicians holding or running for electoral office.

27 Clarification was provided in form of examples (roads, sewers etc.) to respondents who needed more information
Indian voters use ethnic headcount of their own coethnics in the party leadership to identify which political party serves their interests (Chandra 2004, 2007). In behavioural terms for low information voters, the signalling mechanism for ethnic headcounts work through surnames of candidates (Banerjee 2018). I use highly visible ethnic surnames for the candidate-pair choices offered to respondents. The surnames chosen were designed to be instantly identifiable even to the lowest information voter. For instance, *Chamar* was one of the few surnames used for the Scheduled Caste candidate in UP and Bihar. For West Bengal, where Chamar surnames are not typically found, *Bagdi* was used instead. Similarly, Banerjee - a common and visible Brahmin surname represented upper castes in West Bengal portion of the survey instrument. In Bihar and UP, Trivedi (Brahmin) or Thakur (warrior caste, traditionally landlords) represented the upper castes, and so on.

### 3.4 Results

In districts where seats have not been randomly reserved or unreserved from the previous election, the quasi-natural experiment from electoral records show that districts with electoral quota have marginally higher level of mean ethnic violence than districts without quota (Fig. 3.3). This is expected due to the electoral violence that ensues as parties that traditionally does not consider Scheduled Castes and Tribes as part of their ethnic base compete to create a new ethnic base with SC and ST voters, often employing strongmen candidate with criminal records.

The benefits of representation from quotas becomes apparent in the subsequent years after the election (Fig. 3.4). In the short term, 1-3 years after the state assembly election, ethnic violence is 11.69% lower in districts featuring ethnic electoral quotas.

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28 Chamars are Dalits - one of the `untouchable` castes at the lowest rung of India’s caste hierarchy
29 A forthcoming paper will inspect the effect of `musclemen` candidates in seats with ethnic quotas have on electoral outcomes
than districts without quotas. In the long term, 4 years after the election, benefits of representation is larger as ethnic violence is 31.32% lower in districts with quotas compared to districts with only general seats.

What happens to ethnic violence after the Election Commission randomly assigns a quota to a general seat, or, removes quota from a constituency? How does violence compare to districts where there have been no random switch of seats to or from quota? There is hardly any difference in election year violence in districts where there is a new random assignment or removal of quota (fig 3.4). However, short term violence in districts with new random assignment of quota is almost 1/4th of districts where quota was randomly removed from a constituency. The long term violence effects are even more stark. Mean ethnic violence is nearly 1/10th in districts with new quotas than districts where reservation(s) were removed. Overall, violence in districts which experience random removal of quota show much lower violence than
Figure 3.4: Ethnic violence in districts before random assignment of quota

![Ethnic Violence When Seat Type is Switched](chart-image)

districts where there have been no random switch or districts with random gain of quota. Note that in column 2, the switch to quota does not only necessarily mean that these districts did *not* have reserved seats. It also signals that, additionally, a previously general seat have been assigned a quota in lieu of another reserved seat in the district, or, additional seat(s) have been assigned quota. Therefore, the combined results point to possible spillover effect of quota seats beyond the constituency on to the whole district.

**Quotas and Short Term Violence**

**INSERT TABLE 3.4**

Benefits of representation for the marginalised castes reveal themselves quickly after the elections. Ethnic violence in the short term violence decreases by 10.99 (model
1, table 4) with imposition of quota, without controlling for other factors, Similar to election year violence, when controlling for ancillary factors, mere presence of a single reserved seat (as is the case in most districts that do feature electoral quotas) does not guarantee reduction ethnic violence, it is quite the contrary.

The real difference-maker is having multiple ethnically reserved seats in the district (fig. 3.5). The results are strong, substantive\textsuperscript{30} and hold up when controlling for caste of winner, ethnic fragmentation and voter turnout. Model 6 gives the most substantive evidence to the benefits of quota on short term violence, as we see a 58.75 decrease in caste violence under this model with random assignment of electoral quotas in a district.

\textsuperscript{30}p-value < 0.01 and r-squared of .20 or greater in models 3 to 6.
Quotas and Long-Term Violence

INSERT TABLE 3.5

Four years after the election, ethnic quotas continue to have strong positive impact on ethnic violence (fig. 3.3). Following the same pattern as above, greater number of reserved seats in a district lower long-term ethnic violence (fig. 3.6). Furthermore, the results hold accounting for ethnic fragmentation and lower caste (SC, ST or OBC) members winning elections continue to deliver benefits on ethnic violence (table 3.3, model 3 to 6).

While increased citizen participation itself leads to modest decrease in ethnic violence, the models show a more complicated picture in regards to turnout when other control variables are taken into account. Four years after the election, or in other words 1 year before the next assembly elections, increased turnout leads to a
2.47 units increase in violence (model 5, table 6). In the intervening years, violence decreases by 0.63 units (model 5, table 5). This is not out of the ordinary as parties fire up their social engineering machines manufacturing violence before the next election.\footnote{Again, under this research design we can only speculate how much of the violence on and before election year is manufactured and how much of it is organic.}

The defining issue here is representation of marginalised castes (SC, ST, OBCs etc.) in the legislature leading to improvement in ethnic relations. This is nowhere more apparent than in districts which does not feature any ethnic electoral quota (fig. 3.7). Long term violence falls precipitously as the electorate vote for lower caste candidates.\footnote{In this case, 1 is upper caste, and 2 to 5 are coded as SC, ST, OBC and ST respectively.} The results show that lower caste representation benefits leads to a more peaceful society even without the help of ethnic quotas. Political parties would do well to nominate more candidates from the marginalised castes, a lesson that appears to be slowly taking hold among the major political parties in India.
Quotas and Election Year Violence

INSERT TABLE 3.6

As Table 6 confirms, election year violence increases for districts with ethnic quotas. There is wide variation, however, as statistical models show the relationship between quotas and election year violence is not statistically significant by itself. However, when accounting for number of reserved seats in the district, violence does increase by 3.81 units with imposition of a single quota seat in a district (Model 2, table 6). What is interesting, and seals the case for benefits of quotas towards ameliorating ethnic violence is that violence decreases by 2.07 units\textsuperscript{33} even in election year, and the relationship holds accounting for the lower caste status of the winning candidate (model 3, table 6). In the full model (model 6) however, when there is a switch to quota, accounting for reserved seat count, caste of winning candidate, ethnic fragmentation and voter turnout, election year violence does decrease with imposition of ethnic reservation.

The results of surge in election year violence in reserved constituencies validate recent research (Vaishnav 2017; Golden & Tiwari 2009)\textsuperscript{[62, 150]} that nominating Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe politicians lead to toxic competition between parties who vie to show that they only can protect the marginalised castes better than rival parties. Furthermore, Vaishnav (2017) contends that the criminality of candidates act as a marker that they can provide buffer from coercion, intimidation, and violence. This leads to an unfortunate condition where parties nominate ethnic strongmen who can be trusted by their coethnic voters to provide security, thus leading to rise in electoral violence. Similar to the thesis of Wilkinson (2006)\textsuperscript{[155]}, parties exploit the new political space created by the change in electoral institutions to manufacture ethnic violence in order to trigger the demand for security incentives.

\textsuperscript{33}Significant to 99\% or greater level of confidence
Demand for Security: Results from the Field

INSERT TABLE 3.7

The quasi-natural approach with observational data paint a convincing picture of the importance of representation and effectiveness of temporary ethnic electoral quotas towards improving ethnic relations. But what is the behavioural mechanism driving the change in statistical and electoral records? Results from the survey experiments in UP, Bihar and Bengal complement the observational data by delivering the behavioural missing link in the above results. In UP and Bihar, treatment group voter attitudes towards security in seats with electoral quotas is 4.46\% more than treatment group voters in general seats (table 7\[^{34}\]. The attitude scores towards security are marginally lower in Bengal where ethnic violence is negligible compared to UP and Bihar. Still, the pattern of having greater preference for security in the reserved constituency holds, albeit the difference is much smaller at 0.9\%\[^{35}\].

The top line numbers are the most relevant in this case as statistical power is reduced due to the low sample size in sub-samples when comparing between two candidates from different castes. Nevertheless, in high violence districts of Sitapur and Madhubani, voter attitudes consistently prefer the candidate offering security regardless of their ethnicity. Only when a Scheduled Caste candidate is against an OBC rival, voters in the non-reserved seat prefer the Other Backward Caste (OBC) candidate in contrast to the seat reserved for Scheduled Castes - where the SC candidate wins the upper hand.

The results are further confirmed by the attitude score confidence intervals (figs. 3.8 to 3.11) where security offers in the treatment consistently win out over generic public good. The margin is higher and response variation is tighter in ethnically

\[^{34}\] Attitude scores are in 1-5 Likert scale, with five being the highest score. Voters in treatment groups are asked to choose between two generic candidates, one offering security, the other promising generic public goods. Candidate ethnicities are not revealed to voters.

\[^{35}\] all results are significant at p<0.01
Figure 3.8: Demand for security in general seats (UP and Bihar)

Figure 3.9: Demand for security in quota seats (UP and Bihar)
Figure 3.10: Demand for security in general seats (Bengal)

Figure 3.11: Demand for security in quota seats (Bengal)
reserved constituencies (Sidhauli and Rajanagar) than non-reserved seats (Sitapur and Madhubani). Taken together, the quasi-natural experiment and the survey experiment data answers the "chicken or egg" dilemma - "did voters prefer security before imposition of quotas or only after they benefited from the fruits of representation?", decisively in favour of the former (fig. 3.4). Once the voters, especially members from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, started experiencing the improvement in ethnic relations, they continue to prefer security over economic incentives.

3.5 Discussions

The results provide causal evidence that in an ethnically divided electorate, improved representation of marginalised ethnicities reduces ethnic violence. The improvement comes from two sides - institutional, and behavioural demand side effects. It is undeniable that India’s ‘Grand Old Party’ - Indian National Congress failed to address the ethnic violence and coercion the lower castes face on a daily basis. Regional ethnic parties exploited the growing demand for security and justice, along with the large economic inequities between the upper castes and the larger group of lower castes - including Dalits, towards electoral success. Banerjee (2018) provides causal evidence that voters prioritise security over public goods or clientelist doles. In this paper, there is further proof that that the voters in districts with ethnic electoral quotas prefer security more than economic incentives.

The most significant insight from the paper may be that just the mere presence of a constituency with ethnic quota does not lead to reduction in ethnic violence. In fact, it may be quite the opposite, as political parties employ corrupt politicians - 'muscle men' or bahubalis, to signal voters that the strongmen can provide security to them and their coethnics. Real improvement in ethnic violence comes with a conscious institutional decision to have more reserved constituencies in a district,
and nominating more candidates from ethnic categories lower down the social hierarchy. In fact, when more lower-ranked (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe) ethnic politicians get elected, regardless of whether the district have reserved seats or not, ethnic violence decreases. The results provide causal support to findings that when upper castes live in districts with ethnic quotas, they are more wary of perpetrating violence on the marginalised and oppressed ethnic groups. This is a direct result of the institutional improvement that comes as Scheduled Caste (or Scheduled Tribe) members of legislatures influence the state machinery of courts and police to treat their coethnics with fairness and urgency, thereby preventing future hate crimes or civil rights violations.

Furthermore, much have been said about negative effects of ethnic diversity on redistribution and public goods provisions. The paper presents evidence that more ethnic fragmentation does not lead to more violence. In fact, it forces political parties to play an integrating role in the society by broadening their own ethnic bases through offers of public goods and particularistic doles. Perhaps, it is a silver lining for the future of democracies in a globalising world, as more and more democratic nations grapple with ethnic diversity and its consequences. The evidence in the paper further suggests that the normative discourse in the discipline should pay more attention towards ethnic cleavages that are the driving force for political behaviour in South Asia.
Table 3.4: Effect of electoral quota on election year ethnic violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year Violence (without UP)</th>
<th>Model 1 (n = 586)</th>
<th>Model 2 (n = 586)</th>
<th>Model 3 (n = 451)</th>
<th>Model 4 (n = 451)</th>
<th>Model 5 (n = 451)</th>
<th>Model 6 (n = 466)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>quota</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>3.81**</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.97*</td>
<td>-3.98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reserved seat count</td>
<td>-2.07***</td>
<td>-1.19***</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caste of winner</td>
<td>3.89***</td>
<td>2.17***</td>
<td>1.93***</td>
<td>1.95***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fragmentation</td>
<td>529.78***</td>
<td>558.67***</td>
<td>558.04***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voter turnout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>switch to quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5: Effect of electoral quota on short term ethnic violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short term violence</th>
<th>Model 1 (n = 1207)</th>
<th>Model 2 (n = 1627)</th>
<th>Model 3 (n = 1045)</th>
<th>Model 4 (n = 1045)</th>
<th>Model 5 (n = 1045)</th>
<th>Model 6 (n = 1065)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>quota</td>
<td>-10.99**</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>20.85***</td>
<td>26.47**</td>
<td>23.76**</td>
<td>22.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reserved seat count</td>
<td></td>
<td>-19.57***</td>
<td>-27.87***</td>
<td>-27.10***</td>
<td>-34.42***</td>
<td>-33.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caste of winner</td>
<td>-17.64***</td>
<td>-14.22***</td>
<td>-14.08***</td>
<td>-15.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1938.956***</td>
<td>-1619.08***</td>
<td>-1644.93***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voter turnout</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.36***</td>
<td>2.33***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-58.75***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>switch to quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-58.75***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Effect of electoral quota on long term ethnic violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long Term Violence (without UP)</th>
<th>Model 1 (n = 755)</th>
<th>Model 2 (n = 755)</th>
<th>Model 3 (n = 505)</th>
<th>Model 4 (n = 505)</th>
<th>Model 5 (n = 505)</th>
<th>Model 6 (n = 514)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>caste of winner</td>
<td>-11.80***</td>
<td>-6.94***</td>
<td>-6.77***</td>
<td>-6.74***</td>
<td>-6.74***</td>
<td>-6.74***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1502.03***</td>
<td>-1514.55***</td>
<td>-1511.72***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voter turnout</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>switch to quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.7: Demand for Security & Electoral Quotas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate ethnicity</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>General seats</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>General seats</th>
<th>Quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UP &amp; Bihar (high violence)</td>
<td>4.48 ***</td>
<td>4.68 ***</td>
<td>4.38 ***</td>
<td>4.42 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Upper caste vs. OBC</td>
<td>3.97 ***</td>
<td>4.28 ***</td>
<td>3.89 ***</td>
<td>4.26 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper caste vs. OBC</td>
<td>OBC vs. Upper Caste</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.92 ***</td>
<td>2.17 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC vs. Upper Caste</td>
<td>Upper caste vs. SC</td>
<td>4.17 ***</td>
<td>4.21 ***</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper caste vs. SC</td>
<td>SC vs. Upper Caste</td>
<td>2.97 ***</td>
<td>2.99 ***</td>
<td>3.17 ***</td>
<td>2.81 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC vs. Upper Caste</td>
<td>OBC vs. SC</td>
<td>4.29 ***</td>
<td>4.05 ***</td>
<td>3.27 ***</td>
<td>2.83 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC vs. SC</td>
<td>SC vs. OBC</td>
<td>2.61 ***</td>
<td>2.88 ***</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PARTY SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC GOODS: THE DYNAMICS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE INDIAN STATES

*Sayan Banerjee and Charles Hankla

Abstract

We argue that two key party system characteristics – the effective number of parties and electoral volatility – have a curvilinear, inverted-U shaped, influence on public goods provision. Rejecting the linear pattern generally assumed in the literature, we contend that optimal governance outcomes will be observed at intermediate levels of party system size and stability. Only under these conditions will the benefits of competition be balanced against the risks of fragmentation. We find support for our arguments by employing new data and estimating panel models of public goods provision in 29 Indian states and territories. In addition, we present a series of brief, heuristic case studies of selected Indian states. We hope that our findings will contribute to understanding how party systems function, particularly those at the burgeoning subnational level, and will better inform how they can be leveraged for development and good governance. Key Words: Party Systems, India, Sub-National Governance, Public Goods.

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4.1 Introduction

A better understanding of which political institutions encourage good governance and which generate perverse incentives is of obvious value. Nevertheless, much work remains to be done before we have a full picture of how one influential, if informal and fluid, institution – the party system – mediates the provision of public goods. This is nowhere truer than in the developing world, where scholars and donors alike have pointed to a variety of institutional mechanisms as potential solutions to the problem of “good governance.”

Party systems, of course, structure contestation in democratic countries and can be characterized in various dimensions. At the moment, most research finds that higher levels of party fragmentation can reduce incentives to provide public goods. But scholarship on electoral competition seems to indicate that highly consolidated systems may also impair public goods delivery by reducing the risk of losing seats at election time. Moreover, while party system size has received a fair amount of attention in past research, the temporal stability of party systems has received considerably less. And rare is the scholar who has analyzed both of these issues together.

We seek to address these weaknesses in our paper. First, we focus on two of the key elements of party systems – the effective number of parties and electoral volatility. These two characteristics are interrelated but should also have distinct impacts on public goods provision. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we argue that the influence of party system on the provision of public goods is curvilinear rather than linear, as has generally been supposed in past research. More specifically, we contend that intermediate levels of party system size and stability are ideal for

\(^2\) For example, see World Bank 2002.
\(^3\) Note that we use the terms “party system size,” “party system fragmentation,” and “effective number of parties,” interchangeably here. We also use the terms “party system stability” and “electoral volatility” to mean the same phenomenon. The data and code used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
public goods provision; when these levels are too low, the system is not competitive enough to incentivize service provision, but when they are too high, the system is too fragmented and unstable to produce long-run beneficial outcomes. As a result, we expect the relationship between party number and volatility, on the one hand, and public goods provision, on the other, to take an inverted-U shape with a “sweet spot” in the middle. The best outcomes will be observed, we argue, when the benefits of competition are balanced against the risks of fragmentation and instability.

We test our arguments with a panel model of public goods provision in twenty-nine Indian states and territories, measured by social finance, education spending, and food grain distribution. This approach has several advantages. First, it allows us to control for much of the heterogeneity found in cross-national panels. This is not to say, of course, that India’s states are all the same. It is only to highlight that the differences among Indian states are less troublesome than the national differences found in global panel data, not least in the similarity of their formal institutions.

More to the point, our analysis allows us to help extend the debate to the sub-national level, something that has been done by a small but growing number of previous scholars. With more public goods provided below the national level than ever before, it is vital that the policy behavior of regional authorities be better understood. Finally, we hope that our findings will help shed light on India, especially given its importance as the world’s largest democracy and home to one-sixth of the world’s population. In particular, if our argument is correct, the slow consolidation of competitive, non-fragmented party systems in many parts of the country should make us cautiously optimistic about the future of governance in the Indian states.

For more on the potential benefits of sub-national comparative studies in general, see Snyder 2001.
4.2 The Literature on Party Systems and Public Goods

Scholars have long taken an interest in the relationship between party systems and the provision of public goods. This is especially true with respect to the number of parties in a system, with most scholars associating higher party fragmentation with inferior policy outcomes. Fewer scholars have considered a party system’s temporal stability, its “electoral volatility,” as a determinant of public goods provision, though there is some work here too. Most of it emphasizes the benefits of low volatility levels for good governance, arguing that stable party systems extend the time horizons of politicians and encourage them to think beyond transfers to their constituents.

To take a few examples, many researchers link sustained fiscal deficits to fragmented party systems (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999) [66; 135; 152]. When more parties have access to the fiscal pie, these scholars contend, they will share the blame for deficits but reap all of the rewards for channeling resources to their constituents.

Along the same lines, political economists often connect party fragmentation with inferior governance. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002)[108], for example, find that countries using proportional representation (associated with fragmented party systems) are more likely to spend on particularistic goods, while those with first-past-the-post elections are more likely to provide public goods. The logic behind this argument relates to the differing mobilization strategies of parties under these two types of systems, with parties in proportional systems being more beholden to specific social groups. Bagashka and Clark (2016)[6] extend this finding to American state legislatures, showing that those with high district magnitude also tend to be more oriented towards the provision of particularistic goods.

More broadly, Mukherjee (2003)[112] uses cross-national panel data to conclude that party fragmentation reduces total spending on public goods. And in the trade
literature, Ehrlich (2007)\[48\] contends that countries with more parties in their coalition governments generally choose more particularistic trade policies. All of these findings are consistent in emphasizing the tendency of party system fragmentation to encourage particularism, and this is clearly the dominant view in the literature.

While the connection between party number and budgets has been explored by a number of scholars, party system stability has received much less attention. A few researchers have drawn a connection between electoral volatility and overspending, primarily through the mechanism of time horizons (Roubini and Sachs 1989, Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991, Franzese 2002) \[56; 63; 135\]. Their argument is that a high turnover in parties incentivizes them to leverage their temporary access to power as much as possible by directing public resources to their supporters.

Hankla (2006a, 2006b)\[67; 68\] makes such an argument with respect to trade policy, both cross-nationally and within India. Robbins (2010) finds that more institutionalized parties, which are associated with lower levels of electoral volatility, are likely to spend more on public goods like education and less on particularistic goods like transfers. Finally, and perhaps most relevant to our own theory, Wilkinson (2006)\[154\] connects high levels of electoral volatility in the Indian states with inefficient road spending, reflecting the short time horizons of the politicians who undertake it.

Most scholars would agree, then, that higher party system fragmentation and more elevated levels of electoral volatility are both detrimental to the provision of public goods. There is another strand of research, however, that might cause us to reconsider these straightforward relationships. This research focuses on the benefits of competition for public goods outcomes, and generally highlights the role of electoral sanctions in encouraging good public policy. If politicians have no fear of being removed from office, these scholars assert, they are more likely to use public office
to distribute benefits to their narrow constituents.

To take some examples from this school of research, Hecock (2006)\cite{70} shows that sub-national governments in Mexico with more competitive elections spend more on education, and Arvate (2013)\cite{5} finds that greater competition in Brazil’s local elections improves education and health provision. Similarly, Hallerberg (2004)\cite{65} connects electoral competition with lower budget deficits in Europe, and Wibbels (2003) links low competition in US state elections with greater demand for bailouts from the federal government. Along the same lines, Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010)\cite{15} show that dominant parties are less likely to adopt growth enhancing policies in the American states.

While this strand of research does not generally adopt the language of party fragmentation, it clearly calls into question the benefits of less competitive, single party dominant systems. Part of our purpose in this paper is to reconcile these literatures by developing a theory that merges the benefits of party system coherence and stability with the positive incentives produced by robust competition. A particularly instructive comparison highlights why this reconciliation is so important. Two of the most rigorous studies of sub-national service provision in India’s states – Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004)\cite{36} and Sáez and Sinha (2009)\cite{136} – use the two contrasting logics discussed above to research disparate conclusions. More specifically, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004), pointing to the harmful effects of party fragmentation, find that two-party competition produces better outcomes than multiparty competition. Sáez and Sinha (2009), emphasizing the centrality of competition, suggest that a higher number of effective parties will increase public goods provision. In the next section, we take a step towards bringing these two important findings together by positing a non-linear relationship between public goods provision and the size and stability of party systems.
4.3 Our Theory

Drawing on insights from the existing literature, we argue that party system size and stability will each have a curvilinear, inverted-U shaped, impact on public goods provision in parliamentary democracies. What do we mean by public goods? Much of the technical literature adopts a two-part definition, considering a public good to be one that is both non-rival and non-excludable (see Olson 1971)[121]. Our definition, however, like that found in most of the literature, is broader. For our purposes, a public good is one that is provided for the benefit of the citizenry at large rather than for a smaller constituency, as would be the case with a particularistic good. Our interest here is on the question of when governments have the incentive to think about the needs of the citizenry as a whole and when they are focused on transfers to their specific constituents, whether class, ideological, geographical, or ethnic. It is, at bottom, a question about when public authorities will provide what has often been termed “good governance.”

Our concept of party system size has to do with the number of parties that hold seats in the elected legislature. We are, of course, concerned not only with the total number of parties in power, but also with the relative seat share that each party possesses. As a result, our interest is in the “effective” number of parties in the legislature, a concept that weights the number of parties by their size (see Laasko and Taagepera 1979)[98].

Some scholars focus their attention on the number of parties competing in elections and in the spread of votes by party, but our interest is in the parties that actually win seats. Of course, there is a direct connection between the number of votes won by a party and the number of seats it wins in the legislature, but different electoral rules can lead to substantially different ways of translating the one into the other (see Cox 1997)[41]. Theoretically, we sidestep that issue by devoting our attention to the party system as represented in the legislature, whatever the electoral rule.
Empirically, as we discuss below, we focus on sub-national governments in a large federation, all of which employ the same voting system.

Much the same is true about institutions of legislative-executive relations. To the extent that the executive has different powers in presidential versus parliamentary systems, we can expect that these distinctions will impact how party systems translate preferences into policy. For that reason, we limit our theory to parliamentary democracies where the translation of legislative seats into executive power is more or less direct. To be sure, future studies using the same theory to explain outcomes transnationally would also need to control for electoral systems and for differences in legislative power.

As to the stability of party systems, we are concerned with what has been termed “electoral volatility” (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995)[104]. This concept can be measured as the partisan change either in seats or votes from election to election. As before, we are interested in policy making rather than voting behavior, and so stability for our purposes relates to the change in the number of seats held by each party from one election to the next. A volatile legislature is one in which the power and identity of parties is constantly in flux, whereas a stable legislature is one in which the same party or parties nearly always win a similar number of seats.

How, then, do we expect party system size to impact the provision of public goods? And why should this impact take an inverted-U shape? When democratic systems are dominated by a single party, we argue, members of that party should have little incentive to provide public goods. As noted above, scholars such as Sáez and Sinha (2009) have found that more competitive elections tend to be linked to improved public goods provision. The logic behind this association is at the core of arguments in favor of democracy. The fear of being replaced by another party in free elections helps motivate politicians to ensure that the electorate is well satisfied with policies...
that they want. And, if citizens rationally reward parties that provide public goods and punish those which do not, competitive elections should generate public goods provision. When a single party dominates, however, there is little fear among its leaders that it will be replaced, regardless of whether it satisfies voters with public goods. Its incentives, rather, are to consume the spoils of government. Of course, when elections are free, there is always the possibility of another party coming to the fore if too many voters blame the dominant party for poor governance, but that possibility will look remote from the perspective of politicians who control a large majority of legislative seats.

In the inverse case, however, when the party system is highly fragmented and numerous parties hold seats in the legislature, public goods should also fall by the wayside, but for a different reason. In this case, following the logic already well developed by Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004), each party will have an incentive to provide particularistic goods only to its supporters rather than public goods to all citizens. The reasons are straightforward. In fragmented party parliamentary systems, no party can expect to govern alone. Under these conditions, the blame for a failure of government to provide public services will be shared by all, but the rewards from directing resources to constituents will be internalized by the individual party alone. Put another way, when the largest parties in a system win only a small percentage of the total, they are able to mobilize support with particularistic goods. For these reasons, then, we expect that the intermediate case, when the party system is competitive but not fragmented, should, other things equal, lead to the greatest provision of public goods. At what size will the happy medium, the “sweet spot,” be reached? This question is, in some sense, empirical, but we believe that a competitive two to three party system should be ideal. When there are fewer effective parties, the system risks single-party domination and stasis, but when there are more, fragmentation and unwieldy coalitions can destabilize the polity.
Put differently, this intermediate system should, we expect, incentivize good governance with the risk of replacement in the next election, but at the same time require winning parties to mobilize a broad swath of the populace. In some intermediate cases, a single party will hold a bare majority of seats in the legislature, while in others it will be just shy of such a majority. In either case, however, leading parties in intermediate systems will be large enough to dis-incentivize particularistic strategies of mobilization (by making it too expensive), but not so large that they can take office for granted. Along these lines, Thachil and Teitelbaum (2015)[147], in their study of the Indian states, show that more encompassing ethnic parties have a better governance track-record than more particularistic ones.

Our arguments for party system stability are similar, though distinct. We contend that when party systems are so stable that the composition of legislatures rarely changes between elections, the lack of competition will fail to incentivize parties to deliver public goods. The logic is quite similar to that discussed above. The risk of losing an election motivates political leaders in democratic systems to deliver goods that matter to citizens. When that risk is eliminated or reduced, so are the incentives for good governance. Of course, a small number of swing districts may still be hotly contested in lower volatility systems, but competition would be greater if multiple districts were up for grabs. Moreover, very low volatility will likely rule out much competition even in swing districts, and when such districts are indeed contested, they can be bought with particularistic rather than public goods.

On the other extreme, when the party system is so unstable that new parties are rising up and old parties are disappearing between every election, there is likewise little motivation to provide public goods. The reason has to do with the time horizons of party leaders. When there is little prospect for reelection whether a party provides good governance or not, the incentive for parties is either to enjoy the spoils of victory while possible, or to use those spoils in an effort to shore up their shallow
support bases before being eliminated in the next election.

As before, then, it is our contention that an intermediate level of party system stability is ideal for encouraging the provision of public goods. As this level, the “sweet spot,” there is enough turnover in the legislature to incentivize responsiveness to the public will, but not so much that parties despair of reelection regardless of what they do. We summarize our theory in Figure 4.1.

**Insert Figure 4.1**

In summary, we draw on previous arguments linking greater competitiveness and more parties with positive outcomes, and also on contentions that stability and mass mobilization by a small number of parties are the keys to good governance. Both of these things can be true under certain circumstances. We will observe the best outcomes, we contend, when the benefits of competition balance the risks of fragmentation and instability. These considerations, then, lead us to test two hypotheses:

- **H1:** Other things equal, an intermediate number of effective legislative parties will maximize the provision of public goods in parliamentary democracies.

- **H2:** Other things equal, an intermediate level of legislative electoral volatility will maximize the provision of public goods in parliamentary democracies.

The relationships we examine, of course, are part of a complex and interconnected causal process. Some scholars, for example, have pointed to a causal connection between our two independent variables. When more parties are present, they argue, party systems may be less stable and there may be more turnover from election to election (see Heath 2005)[69]. The two variables may also be related through a country’s electoral system. More proportional systems are linked to a larger number
of effective parties by Duverger (1954), and electoral proportionality, by making it easier for small parties to win seats, may also encourage higher levels of volatility.

Non-institutional determinants of public goods provision could potentially be linked to party system indicators as well. Indeed, a large literature investigates the origins of party system size and stability. This literature has associated party system structures with, among other things, ethnic fragmentation (Heath 2005), the strategies of political entrepreneurs (Tavits 2008, Wyatt 2010), the extent of civil society (Chhibber 1999), the centralization of parties (Chhibber, Jensenius, and Suryanarayan 2012), the power of political dynasties (Chhibber 2011), the timing of elections (Sáez and Sinha 2010), the age of democracy (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), the ideological polarization of parties (Roberts and Wibbels 1999), the extent of party aggregation (Chhibber and Kollman 2004, Diwakar 2010), and institutional change (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Finally, there is the potential of reverse causality. It may be that the ability of parties to provide public goods is a cause of party system stability and size (see Nooruddin and Chhibber 2008). This ability could be influenced by a variety of exogenous factors such as institutional capacity or sub-nationalist sentiment (Singh 2015).

Our primary concern here is not to elucidate or theorize all of these potential relationships, but rather to isolate the link between party system structure and public goods provision. Our argument is that, even if size and stability are interrelated causally, they have an independent and additive impact on public policy, and so including them in the same empirical model should allow us to tease out their individual effects. In addition, our empirical strategy of focusing on sub-national politics within an individual country – India – allows us to control for all manner of potentially confounding factors. Those that do vary across the states we have endeavored to include as controls, and we also lag each of our independent variables as a first step to dealing with any endogeneity. For an additional check against this
potential problem, we estimate Arellano-Bond System GMM models with some of our dependent variables.

4.4 Empirical Research Design


India is currently divided into a total of twenty-nine states and seven territories; all of the states and some of the territories are governed by a Westminster-style parliamentary system. The head of government in an Indian state is known as the chief minister, and she and her cabinet are selected by and answerable to the state assembly, or Vidhan Sabha. Members of this assembly are, in turn, elected by the people of the state or territory under a first-past-the-post electoral system.

If these institutions were entirely deterministic, we might expect there to be little variation in the party systems of the Indian states. In that assumption, however, we would be wrong. In fact, due in part to a proliferation of regional parties, there is tremendous variation in both the size and stability of the party systems in the Indian states, making them an excellent laboratory in which to test our contentions. Table 2 provides a summary of each of our independent and dependent variables. A cursory look at these statistics reveals that, between 1993 and 2014 and across the twenty-nine Indian states and territories that we consider, the effective number
of parties varied between one and more than six, and the electoral volatility varied between a 1.67% replacement rate and replacement rate of nearly 100%\textsuperscript{5}. We also present, in Table 3, the effective number of parties and the electoral volatility for each of the states, averaged over the years for which we have data, as well as the names of primary parties competing in each state.

\textbf{Insert Table 4.1}

\textbf{Insert Table 4.2}

To operationalize our dependent variable, the provision of public goods, we make use of three indicators, each of which comes from Indiastat, a statistics portal drawing from official data produced by the Government of India. The first of our indicators is social funding by the states, expressed in billions of current rupees. This variable includes spending on both social service provision and rural development, an important responsibility of states. As our second indicator, we use educational funding, coded here as a percentage of the total state budget. Education, especially at the primary and secondary level, is a classic public good, and in India the states play the most significant role in providing it. For our final measure of the dependent variable, we make use of the total food grain distribution by each state in thousands of tons. This indicator measures the amount of grain lifted by each state from a central pool for allocation to the poor as part of India’s Public Distribution System (PDS), a joint initiative between the Centre and states.

Our key independent variables, of course, are the effective number of parties and the electoral volatility in the Indian states. These variables take on new values with each

\textsuperscript{5}Note that we do not include the state of Telangana in our models because it was created only in 2014. On the other hand, we do include the national capital territory of Delhi because it possesses an elected parliament and a chief minister. Three new states (Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh) were carved out of existing states in 2000, and so only appear in our data beginning in 2001. The area, GDP, and population data of the parent states (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh, respectively) is coded for the portions of the states that remained after the split, even during the 1990s.
state election, and then hold those values until the next election, usually five years later. The underlying data used to compute the variables, namely the list of parties that won seats in each state election and the number of seats they won, comes from the India Votes Database, which is primarily sourced from the Election Commission of India. These are the data we use to calculate both independent variables.

The first of these variables, the effective number of parties, was developed by Laasko and Taagepera (1979) and is calculated as the reciprocal of the summed squares of each party’s proportion of seats in the Vidhan Sabha of that state. As such, it measures the number of parties in the state assemblies weighed by their seat share. The electoral volatility measure, by contrast, comes from Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and measures the average turnover in Vidhan Sabha seats by party from election to election. It is calculated as the sum of the differences between the number of seats won by each party in election \( t \) compared to election \( t-1 \), divided by two. After computing each of these variables and lagging them by one year, we include them in our models along with their squared values in order to test for non-linearity. Consistent with our hypothesis of an inverted-U shaped relationship, we expect the squared term to be negative and the level term to be positive.

We introduce fourteen control variables into our models. Together, these hold

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6As is well known, the effective number of parties indicator, at intermediate codings, can sometimes conflate evenly divided party systems with those characterized by a dominant party and a highly fragmented opposition. Despite this drawback, the indicator is the best available for measuring party fragmentation and is used very frequently in legislative studies. Moreover, in our dataset, there is only one case (Bihar in the 1995 election) where a state is coded above 3.0 but still has a single party with majority control of its Vidhan Sabha.

7In measuring electoral volatility in the way we do, there is a potential risk that low volatility in party seat share may mask higher turnover at the constituency level. Despite these potential objections, however, the link between very low electoral volatility and reduced levels of competition is quite tight. It is unlikely that a system will look falsely stable because its parties lose a large number of old constituencies but simultaneously gain an equal number of new ones. Much more probably, a system’s volatility will be low when its parties are firmly entrenched in particular constituencies and unable to make inroads in others.

8Note that, in an effort to avoid judgment calls and achieve consistent coding, we treat party name changes, splits, and mergers as creating new parties. We also group all independents together and treat them as a separate party.
constant factors that vary significantly across the Indian states and that could be correlated with our variables of interest. First, we use two dummy variables to control for the ideology of the largest party in each state-year, one for centrist and one for leftist, with the reference category as rightist. We code the INC as centrist, the CPI (Marxist) as leftist, and the BJP as rightist. We follow Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) in coding most regional parties as centrist, but when these parties are in coalition with a more extreme party and depend on that party to govern, we code them as rightist or leftist based on the ideology of their coalition partner.

To control for political-business cycles, we include a dummy for whether there was a general (Union) election in a particular year. We also introduce three more dummies measuring the relationship between the party in power at the state level and the party or parties holding power at the Centre; these variables are taken from India Votes and official Government of India data sources and are summarized in Table 2. We expect that service delivery will tend to be higher in states governed by parties with influence at the Centre, as these parties may be in a better position to acquire Union funding.

In addition, we run our models with the subnationalism index developed by Singh (2015). This index ranges from one to four, with higher numbers indicating a stronger degree of subnational identity, solidarity, and mobilization in the state, characteristics that Singh convincingly associates with better welfare outcomes. Because the subnationalism index is not coded for all of our state-years, we include it only for the model where it has a statistically significant impact.

Finally, we take data from Indiastat and the Ministry of Home Affairs to control for a number of more fundamental economic, demographic, and geographical characteristics of the states. We also make use of decade dummies to deal with time effects. We summarize all of these variables in Table 2. We estimate our primary
models using regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and a correction for the AR (1) autocorrelation present in the models (see Stata 2014, Baltagi and Wu 1999). A Fisher test reveals that the education spending state panels are generally stationary, but that some of the social spending and food grain distribution panels may have a unit root. The presence of non-stationarity in such a short time-series is not likely to be seriously problematic, but, for robustness, we also present Arellano-Bond models for these two dependent variables. This approach uses system GMM to deal with the non-stationarity that may be present in the models, and so is very robust to data irregularities (see Roodman 2009). It also effectively deals with any endogeneity in the models by using lags of the independent variables as instruments.

4.5 Results

We present our results in Table 4.3. Our primary prediction, of course, is that the relationship between the party system variables and public goods distribution is characterized by an inverted-U with a “sweet spot” in the middle. If this is the case, we would expect the squared terms to be negatively signed, the non-squared to be positively signed, and the two to be individually and jointly significant. Joint significance, in this case, would indicate that the relationship is non-linear, and the signs would indicate its shape.

Five of our six models show joint significance for the squared and unsquared terms of either effective number of parties, electoral volatility, or both. Furthermore, in all cases where the terms are statistically significant, they are in the expected direction. These results provide strong support for our hypotheses.

Insert Table 4.3

9 Note that we considered using fixed effects regression as well, but the primary independent variables, because they are constant between elections, change only rarely across time. Most of the interesting variation in the models is therefore across the states.
To better understand the data, it is helpful to graph the predicted values of the dependent variables at different levels of the key independent variables. This approach allows us to see the strength and significance of the inverted-U relationship at each value of the effective number of parties and electoral volatility. It also allows us to undertake a more rigorous test of our theory by examining whether the predicted values for Y are significantly different in the middle of the distribution of X than at either end. It is important to remember, however, that overlapping confidence intervals should not be taken to imply an insignificant difference between the effect of party system characteristics at the “sweet spot” and at the extremes.\(^{10}\)

All of the graphs for the significant relationships identified in our six models show an inverted-U relationship. The four graphs in Figure 4.2 provide illustrations of the predicted relationships (at the 90% level). In two cases (effective number of parties for social funding and electoral volatility for food grains), the sweet spot is statistically better than both the minimum and maximum points of the distribution.

**Insert Figure 4.2**

Let us turn first to the upper left quadrant, which graphs the relationship between electoral volatility and social funding estimated in Model 1 of Table 4. The predicted values in this graph show that social funding will generally peak when the electoral volatility is around 40%, a level that indicates competitiveness but not fragmentation. The model predicts that social funding at the sweet spot will be about 18 billion rupees ($279 million) better than in minimum volatility systems and about 40 billion rupees ($620 million) better than in maximum volatility systems.

To take a second example, the graph on the bottom right, which shows the impact of the effective number of parties on public food grain distribution, is calculated from Model 8 in Table 4. In this graph, the “sweet spot” lies between three and four

\(^{10}\) For more on this point, see Knezevic 2008.\(^{93}\)
effective parties. States with this level of competition will, on average, distribute 200,000 more tons of grain than those with a single dominant party, and 225,000 more tons of grain than those with a highly fragmented party system.

An estimation problem that we confront is that, because there are fewer observations at low and high values of the key independent variables, our confidence intervals here tend to be wider. Nevertheless, the jointly significant squared and unsquared coefficients, along with their signs, provide clear evidence for the curvilinear relationships that we predict. From a more fine-grained perspective, however, it appears that educational funding is more seriously impaired by low numbers of effective parties than by high, while the opposite holds true for social funding. In addition, while both party system size and stability matter for social funding, only party system size seems to impact educational expenditures. For space reasons, we will not spend too much time interpreting the control variables. It is, however, worth noting a few of the most interesting results. First, there is strong evidence that centrist and leftist parties are more effective at public goods distribution than rightist parties. Likewise, there is some reason to believe that links to the ruling party at the Centre can improve access to benefits. Subnationalism, for its part, is strongly associated with increased provision of food grains.

4.6 Examples from the Indian States

We use this section to highlight how our arguments might play out in specific Indian states. In doing this, we are well aware of the complex conjunction of factors that are no doubt responsible for policy outcomes in specific cases. Our purpose here is not to carry out a systematic qualitative test, but rather to use the cases heuristically to make our theoretical propositions clearer and to examine the plausibility of our large-N results.

The experiences of two of India’s most prosperous states –Karnataka and Himachal
Pradesh – are broadly in line with our arguments. Contestation in Karnataka is mostly between three major parties: the INC, the rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the locally based Janata Dal (Secular). This three-way system, with the INC and the BJP generally the two top parties, has produced healthy competition and a measure of political stability in the state, though an inability to maintain a governing coalition did lead to a period of President’s Rule in 2007. More recently, there is evidence that, during the assembly election of 2013, voters handed the BJP a severe defeat due to its mismanagement of the state economy (Shastri and Devi 2014). If true, this would indicate a political system that incentivizes responsiveness to voters. Politics in Himachal Pradesh represent a contest between India’s two major national parties, the INC and the BJP. Competition in the state is vigorous and seems to be based primarily on state rather than national issues. For example, in 2007, the BJP took power in the state at a time when the Congress was popular and in power nationally. Positive perceptions of the party’s performance then led the BJP to capture the state’s seats in the national parliament during the 2009 general election. However, in the 2012 assembly elections, voters bucked the national anti-INC tide to hand the Congress Party power in the state (Sardesai 2014).

What these two states have in common, then, are competitive but not fragmented party systems that incentivize good governance. Politicians in these states seem to know that poor performance could result in the loss of an election and that a reputation for service delivery could help them stay in power. A contrasting case is Chhattisgarh. Carved out of Madhya Pradesh in 2000, the state’s politics have been dominated by the BJP, though with some competition from the INC and the Bahujan Samaj Party. Its effective number of parties has stayed steady at the medium-low end of about 2.0, while its electoral volatility is extremely low, very near zero. Consonant perhaps with the state’s relatively uncompetitive party system, Chhattisgarh is one
of the most underdeveloped states in India, and, more to the point, the BJP-led state
government over the last 11 years has done a relatively poor job at public goods
distribution, particularly in education (Indian Express 2014).

Another poor state, Bihar, sits at the opposite end of the fragmentation spectrum.
The state has a highly complex and fluid party system, though one that is slowly
consolidating. Bihar has traditionally been regarded as among India’s worst gov-
erned states, particularly under the leadership of Lalu Prasad Yadav, leader of the
Rashtriya Janata Dal. Lalu Prasad represented a new form of politics in much of
the Hindi belt, one relying on the mobilization of lower caste Indians who formerly
played little political role (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009)[80]. Moreover, according to
Witsoe (2013)[158], Lalu Prasad’s new populism was decidedly anti-developmental,
rejecting the use of elite dominated state power to spur growth. Whatever the case,
Bihar’s economic performance was generally poor prior to the 2005 election of
Nitish Kumar of the Janata Dal (United). Bihar has since accomplished an extraor-
dinary turnaround; still among India’s poorest states, Bihar is now among its fastest
growing (Kumar 2013, Ghatak and Roy 2014)[61, 97]. While the more develop-
mental focus of Nitish Kumar undoubtedly accounts for some of this success, it is
also worth noting that Bihar’s effective number of parties and its electoral volatility
have dropped into or close to the “sweet spot” since 2005. The slow consolidation
of Bihar’s party system, and especially the willingness of Bihari voters to reward
Kumar for good performance, could therefore be another reason for its improved
performance.

Of course, we would certainly not claim that party systems are the only factors
that matter for governance. There are, indeed, at least two counter-cases that do not
conform as clearly to our argument. Perhaps the most obvious is the state of Gujarat.
The home and political launching pad of India’s current prime minister, Gujarat, a
state whose economy has grown significantly over the past decades, is often held
up as an example of rapid development. Contrary to our expectations, however, the
state is also among India’s least competitive and has for a number of years been a
key bastion of the BJP. As a result, Gujarat has very low electoral volatility and an
effective number of parties under 2.0. How then can we explain the state’s apparent
success? There are some who argue that, while Gujarat may be a model of economic
development, its growth has been the result of close government-business relations
and has primarily benefited the elite (Kohli 2012). And, going further, others
make the case that Gujarat’s economic performance has not been as spectacular as
is often believed (Ghatak and Roy 2014, Indian Express 2011) But even if Gujarat
is seen as a success, its good governance could potentially be attributed to the
dynamism of its former chief minister, Modi, or to its advantageous geography.
Party systems are important, we argue, but not determinative.

Another seemingly contrary case is the prosperous southern state of Tamil Nadu.
While the state enjoys an effective number of parties near the “sweet spot,” it has
sometimes experienced high levels of volatility. The primary cause of this volatility,
however, is not the constant creation and disappearance of new parties, but rather
a fluctuation in support for the two major Dravidian parties, the DMK and the
AIADMK. For some time, these parties have served as the poles around which
Tamil Nadu’s party system coalesces (Wyatt 2010, Racine 2009). As a
result, while support for these two parties has tended to vary significantly, the state’s
politics represent a fairly stable competition between them. To conclude, a common
thread running through Indian politics is that, after a tumultuous period following the
gradual weakening of the dominant INC in the 1980s, state-level party systems have
begun to stabilize (Palshikar, Suri, and Yadav 2014). If our argument is right,
then, there is some reason for optimism about the future of public goods provision
in India. The early period of Congress dominance surely dis-incentivized good
governance by eliminating serious competition, while the fragmented and unstable
party systems of the 1990s and 2000s undoubtedly had a similar effect by reducing the time horizons of victorious parties. As we begin to see competitive, stable party systems consolidating in many Indian states, we can hope for increasingly accountable state government in the coming years.

4.7 Conclusion

In this paper, we contend that party system size and stability can have a substantial impact on the provision of public goods in parliamentary democracies. We develop a new theory arguing that intermediate numbers of legislative parties, combined with intermediate levels of seat turnover, tend to incentivize good governance by balancing the benefits of competition with the risks of fragmentation and instability. We hypothesize that the relationship between party number and stability, one the hand, and public goods provision one the other, should take the shape of an inverted-U. Our empirical results, which examine educational spending, social finance, and food grain distribution in India’s states and territories, largely confirm our expectations. More specifically, we find that the good governance “sweet spot” for the effective number of parties lies in the middle of the distribution, between 2.5 and 4.5 effective parties, depending on the service delivery outcome. Likewise, we identify an intermediate level of electoral volatility as that variable’s “sweet spot,” with seat turnover rates of between 30% and about 50%.

While future studies will need to test our argument cross-nationally to ensure its broad applicability, we believe the relationships that we identify are likely to be generalizable. The curvilinear logic of the theory should hold in a variety of democratic settings, and the Indian test case has allowed us to isolate its impact relatively clearly. More broadly, our hope is that this paper will contribute to a sustained effort to think systematically about how party systems impact policy. We believe that our theory can point the way to merging seemingly contradictory
arguments in the literature, some that emphasize the benefits of competition and others that point to the dangers of instability. Finally, on a more practical level, we hope that the paper helps illuminate how party systems, especially at the sub-national level, can be structured to encourage development and poverty alleviation.
Figure 4.1: Summary of the Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party System Characteristic</th>
<th>Effective Number of Parties</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Single party dominance and low competition = No electoral incentive to provide public goods</td>
<td>Very low seat turnover = Little risk of losing office and no electoral incentive to provide public goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Competitive but not fragmented party system and single party or small coalition government = Electoral incentive to satisfy voters with public goods</td>
<td>Intermediate seat turnover = Risk of electoral punishment for poor governance and electoral reward for good governance, producing an incentive to provide public goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Fragmented party system and large coalition governments = Incentive to provide private goods only to supporters and blame coalition partners for poor governance</td>
<td>Very high seat turnover = Party system instability and short time horizons, incentivizing the accumulation of spoils rather than public goods provision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 4.1: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Computation Method</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Expected Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Funding</td>
<td>Social Spending in Billions of Current Rupees</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>757.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Funding</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Food Grain Distribution</td>
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<td>Centrist Ideology</td>
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<td>Subnationalism</td>
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<td>State Revenue Receipt</td>
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<td>Subnationalism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Table 4.2: Party Systems in the Indian States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Mean Effective Number of Parties</th>
<th>Mean Electoral Volatility</th>
<th>Major Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>TDP, CPI, JD(S), INC, BJD, JD(U), AIADMK, DMK, Nationalist Congress Party, Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arunachal Pradesh</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>Congress, BJP, JD(U), AIADMK, DMK, Nationalist Congress Party, Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>Assam Congress Party, BJP, JD(U), AIADMK, DMK, Nationalist Congress Party, Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chhattisgarh</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi (NCT)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>AAP, BJP, INC, BDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>BJP, INC, Independents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haryana</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>BJP, INC, Indian National Lok Dal, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himachal Pradesh</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>BJP, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>Janta Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, BJD, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jharkhand</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>BJP, Rashtriya Janata Dal, Rashtriya Janta Dal, Bahujan Samaj Party, Biju Janata Dal, BDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>INC, Janata Dal (Secular), BJP, JD(U), AIADMK, DMK, Nationalist Congress Party, Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, BDD, INC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>INC, Communist Party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India, Indian Union Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>INC, BJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharastra</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>BJP, INC, Shiv Sena, Nationalist Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipur</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>INC, All India Trinamool Congress, Manipuri Janata Congress, People's Democratic Party, Congress, Biju Janata Dal, BDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>INC, Independent, United Democratic Party (Meghalaya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizoram</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>INC, National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagaland</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>Nagaland People's Front, INC, Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odisha</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>Biju Janata Dal, INC, BJP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>Shiromani Akali Dal, INC, BJP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>INC, BJP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sikkim</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>Sikkim Democratic Front, Sikkim Krantikari Morcha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>AIADMK, DMK, BDD, CPI, Independent, Congress, Biju Janata Dal, BDD, INC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telangana</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>Communist Party of India, Communist Party, BDD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, BDD, INC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttarakhand</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>BDD, INC, BDD</td>
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<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>All India Trinamool Congress, Communist Party of India (Marxist), INC</td>
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</table>

## Table 4.3: Main Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Social Funding</td>
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<td>Educational Funding</td>
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<td>Food Grain Distribution</td>
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<td>Squared Effective Number of Parties</td>
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<td>Effective Number of Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Significance?</td>
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<td>Yes (***</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (p=.104)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squared Electoral Volatility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Significance?</td>
<td>Yes (**)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (**)</td>
<td>Yes (**)</td>
<td>Yes (**)</td>
<td>No (p=.136)</td>
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<td>Centrist Ideology</td>
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<td>Leftist Ideology</td>
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<td>Election Year</td>
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<td>Same Party in State &amp; Centre</td>
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<td>Same Party in State &amp; Delegation</td>
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<td>Same Party in State &amp; Centre Coalition</td>
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<td>Subnationalism</td>
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</table>

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**Table 4.1:** Summary Statistics

**Table 4.2:** Party Systems in the Indian States

**Table 4.3:** Main Results
Figure 4.2: Party Systems & Public Goods Provision
Chapter 5

IN CLOSING

5.1 The Takeaway

The thesis has taken a rigorous approach towards understanding party competition from the institutional side and through the lens of political behaviour. Conclusions are based on quantitative analysis, and primary data collected through survey experiments across three north Indian states representative of the diversity among the Indian citizenry. Chapters 2 and 3 present evidence that voters in ethnically divided and violent societies prefer ethnic security over economic incentives from electoral candidates. The data affirms the trend in experimental political science literature that when it comes to vote choice, people decide based on factors that are directly tied to their identity, which is (in our case) - ethnic security. The thesis does not downplay the importance of economic incentives - they clearly are, especially when there is a large external economic shock (e.g. an economic depression or hyperinflation in prices of primary products). That being said, incentives such as bribing before election day, ethnically targeted economic patronage (e.g. bicycle, laptops, government jobs for family members or co-ethnics) only have a limited ‘sugar high’ when initially introduced but in the long-term, the carrots become ‘baked in’ as opposed to structural issues like identity, and ethnic security which includes access to law enforcement and judicial institutions.

It is surprising that Indian political parties have not picked up on the implications of doling out private goods as economic patronage. The picture emerging through this work, and recent literature is that their efforts appears to have unintended consequences that are a mix of both positive and negative. Parties expect that by distributing doles to their ethnic voter base, they would increase voter turnout among
low propensity voters and also stimulate bloc voting in their favour. But chapters 2 and 3 show that such efforts have modest benefits in peaceful societies, and even less where ethnic violence including hate crimes are prevalent. The impetus for parties to still carry out this inefficient tactic is perhaps nothing more than a blocking maneuver to prevent competitors from gaining those votes [32]. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the promise of distributing public goods to the wider population have better appeal than narrow, ethnically targeted clientelism.

One of the key measures voters rely for their vote choice is the delivery of public goods. What are the governance outcomes now that ethnic parties have established themselves in India’s political system? Going beyond the experimental evidence behind ethnic party success, Chapter 4 explores the institutional conditions that optimizes public goods distribution in a party system featuring ethnic parties. Chapter 4 confirms the old adage that “too much of anything” is bad for governance - moderate levels of party competition and party stability provide the best outcomes for development. Political business cycles are crucial as most public goods cannot be provisioned within a limited time frame. Indeed, building bridges, sewers, or even distributing foodgrains to the poor efficiently takes a joint effort from the administration and local party functionaries. Frequent elections (before the usual intended period - 5 years as is the case in India) only make politicians more averse to putting effort to public goods.

Voters intrinsically demand good governance. Together, the three papers provide evidence of behavioural demands and institutional conditions that lead to good governance. The first two papers of the thesis show that voters equate ethnic security as the first and foremost parameter of governance. Voters in ethnically violent districts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh demand ethnic security over public or private economic benefits. When ethnic security is not a cause for concern, people base their vote choice over public goods provision or economic patronage. The
findings challenge the ongoing scholarly narrative in South Asian politics focused
on the delivery of urban public goods or clientelist private goods behind explaining
success of ethnic parties. Chapter 4 complements the behavioural side of the thesis
by establishing characteristics of an ethnic party system that lead to good governance.
The paper provides evidence with a subnational dataset spanning 25 years that public
goods provision - a key measure of governance, is maximised by intermediate levels
of party competition and party stability in a multiparty first-past-the-post system.

5.2 The Way Forward
It has been my privilege to work under the blessings of my coauthor and supervisors,
and having been able to engage on personal interactions with survey respondents
on the field. Supported by new insight from scholars on whose shoulders we stand,
the experience have opened new avenues towards my emerging research agenda.
Going forward, my research would expand on the themes of security and ethnic
identity in this thesis, and shine light on their causal implications on political
behaviour, representation and good governance in ethnically diverse developing
countries. In addition, below I will highlight ongoing work from colleagues working
on issues related to ethnicity, public goods provision and clientelism in South Asia
and beyond that puts the thesis in context with existing and upcoming scholarship
in the discipline. The way forward appears to be taking shape under four substantial
categories - female political participation, Misinformation and political behaviour,
ethnic diversity and public goods provision, and comparative public law scholarship
on attitudes towards systematic police and judicial discrimination.

Ethnicity, Violence & Female Political Participation
Women’s representation across parliaments and state legislatures in an ethnically
diverse democracies are pitiful. Consequently, public goods delivery outcomes
vary widely throughout India with different levels of female representation across
states. The cultural explanations for the phenomenon focus on patriarchy, and the traditional roles women have to overcome in such societies ([109]). Recent institutional literature have factored in demand and supply side mechanisms behind variations in women’s representation ([128]). Factors such as quota provisions and maturity level of a country’s democracy are cited as conditions influencing women’s representation in parliaments and legislatures ([144]). To be sure, this is an issue that needs a multi-faceted approach to study addressing intersectionality, agency, institutions and behavioral aspects. This study will approach the problem from the perspective of political behaviour and public opinion.

In India, the Women’s Reservation Bill, which has been mired in legislative deadlock over the last two decades, proposes to amend the Constitution to reserve 33% of all seats for women in the Indian parliament (Lok Sabha) and all legislative assemblies. Against this policy backdrop, one of my ongoing research projects, in partnership with Charles Hankla (Georgia State University) and Anjali Thomas (Georgia Institute of Technology) intends to examine four substantive questions for empirical investigation.

1. Do women candidates fare better (or worse) when they offer security from ethnic violence, and why?

2. Do women candidates perform better (or worse) when they offer public goods, and why?

3. Do women candidates fare better/worse against male candidates from same ethnic backgrounds, and why?

4. Does public goods provisioning improve when more women are elected as public representatives, and do constituents judge elected women representatives based on delivery of public goods?
Following a similar line of inquiry a la Chapters 2 and 3, the endeavour aims to deliver insights that would be beneficial for political parties, policy makers and academics alike. This investigation would bring together separate strands of scholarship in gender, ethnicity, public opinion and political economy of development. Particularly, the project would attempt to reveal the incentives voters demand from female political candidates in both peaceful and ethnically contentious societies with ethnic violence. In doing so, the project takes forwards the substantive work already done on female legislators and public goods delivery (Prillaman 2017, Bhalotra et al 2019) ([16][130]) and provides nuances on the interplay of structural social issues like ethnic identity and ethnic violence. Essentially, the project seeks to reconcile what voters want from female political candidates (especially from marginalised ethnic identities), and what programmatic and clientelist party officials on the supply side expect voter demands.

The scholarship on women’s political representation in South Asia is one of the most exciting yet underplayed areas of scholarship. The literature have largely focused on the effects of gender quotas on representation (Bhavnani 2009, Beaman et al 2009, Francheshet et al 2012)[13][19][55]. Scholars have pointed out that parties tend to nominate wealthy women and those from political legacy families. Particular attention needs to be paid to the demand side effects from voters and how political parties react by tweaking their candidate nomination strategies. Equally importantly, women from marginalised ethnic and religious identities are thoroughly underrepresented in India and other democratic nations in South Asia. How do we increase economic well-being and political representation from women who represent ethnic groups that are typically the most disadvantaged? What are the factors challenging women from being represented in local and national legislatures? Scholars are rising up to these challenges using innovative research designs towards studying matrilineal societies in Meghalaya (Brule and Gaikwad, 2019)[25]. Carpena and Jensenius
(2019) finds that early marriage of women, especially child marriage - a feature of Indian society, as one of the critical reasons behind the political gender gap. Systematic challenges remain an impediment towards women’s political representation (Iyer and Mani, 2019)[76]. Lack of female politicians in elected positions leads to absence of role models for aspiring women politicians, particularly in rural areas. Combined with other systematic issues in a largely patriarchal society, scholarship and evidence-based policy positions need to go beyond quotas to reduce the gender gap in South Asia.

Ethnicity, Misinformation & Political Behaviour

The other major line of enquiry addresses the emerging field of Misinformation or 'fake news' and its consequences in shaping political outcomes in developing countries. So far, studies on Misinformation have focused on developed, post-industrial countries where application of social network platforms are widespread ([100, 116, 117]) but little on developing countries where usage of social media (Whatsapp, Facebook etc.) is emerging but fast. Less is understood of the implications of misinformation on social trust and demand for public policy in ethnically and religiously diverse, politically stable developing countries. Even more gaps remain in our understanding of how misinformation affects political behaviour and violence in post-conflict and unstable but democratizing countries. To that effect, my current endeavour - recently bestowed with a generous funding from Facebook, aims to plug that gap in scholarship based on the ideas explored in chapters 2 and 3.

Utilizing a field experiment with WhatsApp, and multi-wave survey experiments on the ground in India, supported by generalization studies in Afghanistan, the project aims to establish causal relationship between misinformation spread through social networks and public opinion on ethnic relations and public policy choices. Moreover, the project attempts to investigate contrasting effects between positive and
negative misinformation on attitudes toward public policy. In light of the extensive and exponentially increasing use of social media by political parties and influence groups in India and other developing countries, the project would provide valuable lessons for policy makers, political parties, WhatsApp Inc., and the academic world of the substantive ways social networking mediums are influencing public policy choices and outlook towards societal relations in a diverse society.

The work falls under a nascent but emerging field where an interdisciplinary group of scholars, from political science, communications to computer science, are trying to understand how information technology is creating ripple effects on politics, public policy and inter-group relations in developing nations. As the world becomes more interconnected through data aided by accessible information technology, interconnectedness is affecting policy decisions. Policymakers in their quest to expand (or restrict) access to information is in turn changing political behaviour (Burnett and Jaeger, 2008)[26]. Mobile phones have especially played a large part in changing how people access information and form political and policy decisions (Srivastava 2005)[142]. The world woke up to the new powers of digital social media when it played a large role in organising political protests and revolutions in the Middle East, collectively known as the Arab Spring (Khondker, 2011, Howard and Hussein 2013)[72, 92]. The next step lies in understanding how digital social media is affecting political behaviour and policy positions in democracies with diverse societies. This is especially pertinent as political parties and interest groups have started harnessing the power of information technology to spread disinformation that benefits their electoral prospects (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018). The explosion of scholarship in this regard is imminent as of this writing, indeed by early 2020, as multiple projects by scholars are in the data collection or fieldwork stage across the world in developing countries.
Does Diversity Lead to Better Governance?

There are two emerging trends in advanced industrial democracies and developing countries that we, as social scientists, need to tackle better. This is the first. Democracies in the Global South are mostly ethnically diverse nation-states, in contrast to the traditionally homogeneous countries in the developed world. The demographic dividend of a homogeneous population is that policy decisions are much less contentious owing to lower fragmentation among stakeholders with different backgrounds and histories, and hence, different priorities. Now that global capital flows are being matched by freedom in international labor markets, be it the free labor movement in the European Union, individual country immigration laws designed to bring in agricultural workers and engineers alike, developed nations will now have to learn to make structural changes in their democratic apparatus. Academic literature is divided on whether more diversity leads to better development outcomes. Traditionally, diversity has been seen as an unwelcome factor leading to sub-optimal governance outcomes. But recent works have provided more nuance to the big picture, albeit arguing divergent opinions from local level segregation to social contact theory in favor of more mixing of people from different backgrounds.

When it comes to South Asia, emerging scholarship is focused on diversity in urban settings and its interplay with public goods provisions. Urban ethnic segregation is found as an intervening variable in multiple studies in an emerging series of works (Bharathi et al 2018, Rahman et al 2018) without any clear causal linkage. In her ongoing project, Erum Haider (2018) finds that electricity distribution from private providers in Karachi can increase political uncertainty through exit of low income groups who cannot afford to subscribe to the privatised public goods. As political scientists, the challenge is to unite provide a clear causal answer to the question that has the potential to remake everyday politics of immigration and redistribution sweeping across the developed world from the US, European Union
to Australia.

**Comparative Public Law: How Does Systematic Discrimination Influence Political Behaviour?**

There is a wide range of scholarship in the American Politics context where differential treatments of racial minorities by police and judicial system have been exposed. There is emerging evidence from the Comparative Politics subfield that we see similar trends in other countries as well. For instance, Grossman et al (2016)[64] finds that multiethnic judicial benches in Israel, having at least one Arab judge, leads to substantially lower rates of incarceration and prison sentencing for ethnic minorities. Chapters 2 and 3 provides an opening for a new wave of public law investigations in South Asia. A typical Supreme Court judge in India is an upper caste male from an educated, relatively wealthy background (Gadbois, 1968)[58]. That picture have not changed since the Independence from British Raj and the data have been sparse (Chandrachud, 2011)[28]. India’s Supreme Court have been devoid of a Dalit judge since 2007[1]. That lower castes and Muslims in India have differential access and treatment meted out to them by the police and the courts is widely known in India. How does having a largely homogeneous judicial and law enforcement system impact criminal and civil suits and in turn, political behaviour in India? Empirical studies have been scant to these regards. Future studies would do well to investigate the causal effect of an ethnically homogeneous judiciary and law enforcement agencies on political behaviour.

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5.3 Questions and Challenges for Future Research

Researchers have four pathways uniting ethnic politics, political behaviour, and good governance, especially within the context of South Asia. Major theme of which revolves around the idea of *ethnic resentment* - why it forms, how it is fanned by political agents, and its implication on elections and good governance. It is possible that a reverse causal mechanism where selective provision of public goods is tinder to the flame of ethnic tensions. Resentment may brew when state coffers are used for clientelist benefits for some of the ethnic identities. Denial of government benefits is plausibly cause for unhappiness that makes itself apparent in the ballot box. But what motivates voters more - underprovisions of public programs, or the fact that out-groups are recipients of same programs? Voters are often acutely aware of their position in the social hierarchy and may judge out-groups to be undeserving of public funds. More work is needed to understand whether status seeking, or threat to their status, plays a crucial role in party competition.

Out group resentment is perilous ethnically diverse democracies. As an offspring to the above research agenda, further work would be welcome to understand whether distribution of public goods, aka ‘development’, is a remedy for out-group resentment that threatens to create hardline partisanship and conflict. Moreover, we should further examine the wave of scholarship that portrays a simplistic view in the domain of political behaviour: money, or economic benefits buys votes. When viewed in isolation, experimental work identifies positive causal effects of bribes (money or alcohol prior to election day) on voting. I propose that such explanations see the trees but miss the forest. People vote for a wide variety of reasons, and small-time bribes or clientelist offers only move the little, and in unintended ways. Scholarship in political behaviour would be ideally suited in understanding the prime motivations towards voting when presented with such economic incentives in an environment that is fraught with a history of inequality, coercion and violence. Furthermore,
given the poor participation of women in politics, future researchers need to identify the causal factors behind lagging representation of women in the political realm, and its causal interplay with violence, social norms and political institutions. Moreover, data from the thesis suggests that it is overdue that the normative discourse on South Asian social cleavages and political behavior change from religion to ethnicity, which includes sub-castes (*jatis*). There is much that we do not know, and a demographically diverse South Asia, given its wide range of institutional structure from stable democracies, autocracies to struggling democracies with active insurgencies provide an ideal playground for scholars to uncover new horizons on ethnicity, party competition, political behaviour and good governance.


[74] Deepak Gidwani (DNA India). Mayawati out to woo brahmins again, apr 2013.


[119] Times of India. Laptops to be Samajwadi party’s anniversary gift to students, Feb 2013.

[120] Times of India. Dalit family bares it all after Greater Noida police fails to register their FIR, Oct 2015.


Sanjay Singh. 25 years since Babri Masjid demolition: BJP, Congress give Ayodhya issue new political twist before Gujarat polls, Dec 2017.


CNN Staff, Jul 2016.


SURVEY EXPERIMENT INSTRUMENT

The following list of multiple choice (single answer) questions are to be asked in the survey are provided along with the list of answers that respondents would choose in each question. For questions marked 'CONTROL' and 'TREATMENT', respondents will choose the answers on a 1-5 Likert Scale, where 1 is 'least likely' and 5 is 'most likely'. There are two treatment groups. Questions marked as TREATMENT GROUP 1 may NOT be asked to respondents in TREATMENT GROUP 2. For sake of simplicity, surnames are not provided in this questionnaire.

A.1 Demographic Questions

1. What is your sex?
   Answer:
   1. Male 2. Female 3. No response

2. What is your marital status?
   Answer:
   1. Not married 2. Married 3. No answer

3. What is your educational Section?
   Answer:

4. What is your monthly income Section (in Indian Rupees)? 1. 0 - 5,000 2. 5,001 - 10,000 3. 10,001 - 25,000 4. 25,001 - 50,000 5. 50,001 and above
Section 1B: Ethnicity questions

1. What is your religion?
   Answer:
   6. Sikh 7. Other 8. No answer

2. What is your Caste category? Answer:

3. What is your *jati*?
   Answer: Variety of options from the survey company inserted.

4. On a scale of 1-5, with 5 being the most supportive, what are your opinions on marrying outside your own caste?
   Answer:
   1. Strong support (5) 2. Support (4) 3. Indifferent (3) 4. Against 5. Strongly Against

1. Who are you likely to vote for? [ETHNIC IDENTITY QUESTION]
   Answer:
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) 3. Mr. (insert Scheduled Tribe surname) 4. Mr. (insert OBC surname) 5. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) 6. Mr. (insert Brahmin surname) 7. No answer

Who are you likely to vote for? [PARTISANSHIP QUESTION]

Answer:
A.2 Section 2: Testing for Security

1. Who are you likely to vote for (without knowing Party ID of candidates)?

[CONTROL QUESTION]

Answer:


2. Who are you likely to vote for (without knowing Party ID of candidates)?

[TREATMENT QUESTION]

Answer:

1. Candidate A [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Candidate B [does NOT promise security against ethnic violence for you and your family/generic promise] 3. No answer

3. Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

4. Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

5. Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer
6. Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

7. Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

8. Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

9. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert OBCs surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

10. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
    1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert OBCs surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

11. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
    1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

12. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

13. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

14. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

15. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

16. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

17. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

18. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

19. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

20. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

A.3 Section 3: Testing for Patronage questions

a) Who are you likely to vote for (without knowing Party ID of candidates)? [CONTROL]

Answer:

b) Who are you likely to vote for (without knowing Party ID of candidates)? [TREATMENT]

Answer:
1. Candidate A [promises government job to your family member] 2. Candidate B [does NOT promise government job to your family member] 3. No answer

c) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

d) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

e) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

f) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

g) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

h) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
   1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

  —

i) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert OBCs surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer
j) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert OBCs surname) [promises government job for you and your family] 3. No answer

k) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise]
   3. No answer

l) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job for you or your family]
   3. No answer

m) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise]
   3. No answer

n) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
   1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job for you or your family]
   3. No answer

o) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise]
   3. No answer

p) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 3. No answer

q) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises government job for you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

r) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 3. No answer

s) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job for you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [generic promise] 3. No answer

t) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [generic promise] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job for you or your family member] 3. No answer

A.4 Section 4: Testing for Patronage & Security questions

a) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL, TREATMENTS]

1. Mr. (insert generic surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. ((insert generic surname) [promises government bicycle to your family member]

b) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]
1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [promises government job to your family member] 3. No answer

c) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job to your family member] 3. No answer

d) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job to your family member] 3. No answer

e) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job to your family member] 3. No answer

f) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert OBC surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job to your family member] 3. No answer

g) Who are you likely to vote for? [CONTROL]

1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job to your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job to your family member] 3. No answer

h) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert OBCs surname) [promises security
against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

i) Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 2. Mr. (insert OBCs surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

21. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

22. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 3. No answer

23. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

24. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]

1. Mr. (insert Upper Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 3. No answer

25. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]

1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer
26. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 3. No answer

27. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

28. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
   1. Mr. (insert OBC Caste surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job for you or your family] 3. No answer

29. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 1]
   1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 3. No answer

30. Who are you likely to vote for? [TREATMENT GROUP 2]
   1. Mr. (insert SC surname) [promises security against ethnic violence for you and your family] 2. Mr. (insert Muslim surname) [promises government job to you or your family member] 3. No answer
Informed Consent Form

My name is (fill in), and I have come from Cicero, a polling firm. We are conducting a survey on the opinions of people on politics in the state of (fill in). We are interviewing hundreds of people across the state. The findings from this survey will be used in academic research. Every person over the age of 18 has an equal chance of being included in this study. You have been selected by chance. There is no risk and also no benefit to participating in this survey. But, if you answer our questions, you will help us in understanding how the public votes in elections. This survey is an independent study conducted on behalf of Sayan Banerjee, a PhD Candidate at University of Essex, a university in the United Kingdom. This survey is not linked to any political party or to the government. Any information or opinions that you provide will be kept strictly confidential.

Participation in this survey is voluntary. If you choose to participate you may refuse to answer any question that I ask, and you are free to stop the survey whenever you choose. We hope that you will take part in this survey because your participation is important. Participation will take about 30 minutes.

If you have any questions about the survey, you may ask me. Or, I can provide the contact details for the research scholar running the survey.

Q1. Are you willing to participate?

1. Yes

2. No
In the final section of the survey instrument (data from which is not included in this thesis), the design tests for demand to security and patronage between high and low violence areas. The design differs slightly from the other two sections since any one of the treatment groups can be considered a control group while the 'naturally' occurring variable is the level of ethnic violence. The first question in both control and treatment groups here tests demand to two kinds of economic clientelism from two generic candidates (i.e. without ethnic heuristic markers) with different levels of gratification. The first stimulus - a government job, which has bigger economic value but harder to receive in reality despite electoral promises. The second stimulus - bicycle, lower value but presumably with a better chance for receipt and quicker gratification. Meanwhile, the rest of the questions in the control group asks voters attitudes to candidates from two different castes, both offering clientelist goods (government jobs). In contrast, treatment group respondents are given a choice where one of the candidates offer security instead of economic clientelist goods (Table C.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment design</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment group 1</th>
<th>Treatment group 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate (ethnicity A)</td>
<td>government job (patronage - long term benefit)</td>
<td>Government job to family member (patronage)</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate (ethnicity B)</td>
<td>bicycle (patronage - immediate benefit)</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Government job to family member (patronage)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>