Khurana, Thomas (2019) '‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant.' Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 49 (7). pp. 956-979. ISSN 0045-5091

Preview

Text I_do_not_cognize_myself_through_being_c.pdf - Accepted Version Download (310kB) | Preview

Abstract

The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apper- ception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self- knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Kant; Apperception; Inner Sense; Intellectual Intuition; Self-Knowledge; Self-Objectification; Moran; Boyle; Practical Knowledge; Self-consciousness; Fichte
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy and Art History, School of Faculty of Humanities
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	24 Oct 2019 09:13
Last Modified:	06 Jan 2022 13:59
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/25682

Actions (login required)

View Item