Illiberal Peacebuilding in Asia: A Comparative Overview

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Abstract

Over the past 20 years, there have been significant and historic breakthroughs in resolving protracted ethnic conflicts in restive regions of several states in South and South-East Asia. After decades of violence, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand have all witnessed periods of reduced conflict and increased stability. Peacebuilding as practiced in these states departs markedly from the liberal and post-liberal models in which Western actors and liberal norms play a key role. Here, by contrast, peacebuilding is driven by domestic actors applying illiberal norms and practices. In this introductory article, we trace the shift from liberal to post-liberal to illiberal peacebuilding, define illiberal peacebuilding, discuss the case studies presented in this special issue, and finally draw out common themes and policy implications.

Keywords: Asia, ethnic conflict, illiberal peacebuilding, political settlements, sub-national

Word count: 6090

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, there have been historic breakthroughs in many of the protracted internal wars that have affected South and South-East Asia. Armed insurgencies and civil wars in Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and elsewhere in the region have subsided, and those states are now in the process of making difficult and inconsistent transitions to security and stability.[1] These transitions have been mostly managed by domestic actors through national and sub-national processes of cooption and repression, which diverge dramatically from the prevailing models of liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding.

The study of comparative peacebuilding remains dominated by iconic cases of attempted liberal peacebuilding in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), West Africa (Sierra Leone and Liberia), and West Asia (Afghanistan and Iraq). These cases are characterised by Western-led interventions that promoted a liberal model of conflict transformation through multi-party democracy, market capitalism, and justice and security sector reform. Liberal peacebuilding has been subjected to sustained theoretical and policy critiques. The main critical alternative, post-liberal peacebuilding, emphasises how local actors appropriate or subvert internationally-driven, liberal peacebuilding to create context-dependent forms of hybrid peace. However, there is still relatively little attention paid to domestically-driven, illiberal peacebuilding – and what exists has focused mostly on Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. This lack of attention is surprising given the increasingly global diffusion of illiberal norms (authoritarianism, crony capitalism, nationalism, populism and xenophobia), which is spurred on by Putin's Russia, Trump's America, and social media. It is even more surprising given how UK policy on so-called fragile states currently embraces aspects of illiberal peacebuilding pioneered by highly authoritarian states such as Rwanda.

In this special issue, we present eight case studies from across South and South-East Asia. Illiberal peacebuilding in this region can be distinguished from that in Central Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Most Asian cases have not experienced collapsing state institutions, internationalised armed conflict, or international/regional peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. Also, many Asian cases involve semi-democratic or democratising regimes. Finally, illiberal peacebuilding in Asia does not confront a robust regional human rights system as exists for Africa and Latin America. By focusing on Asia, this special issue expands the comparative study of peacebuilding, using the term 'illiberal peacebuilding' as a way to connect similar phenomena that are underway across the region and the larger globe. As such, it relates to recent special issues of *Conflict, Security & Development* on security beyond the state (2016),[2] political settlements and violence (2017),[3] and domestic-external interactions in peacebuilding (2018).[4]

These articles arise from a series of conferences and workshops held between 2015 and 2018 in Myanmar, Colombo, Yogyakarta, and London. Those conferences and workshops brought together academics, policymakers, and practitioners working on peacebuilding across the region, as well as scholars working in adjacent areas.[5] Generous funding came from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council, the Independent Social Research Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the University of York.

This introduction begins by sketching the trajectory from liberal to post-liberal to illiberal peacebuilding. It then outlines the benefits and limits of the concept of illiberal peacebuilding for understanding the Asian cases presented here. The next section situates illiberal

peacebuilding within the wider literatures on political settlements and borderland brokers. The introduction goes on to summarise the articles in this collection before discussing some emergent themes. Finally, it raises several policy implications.

Shifting from liberal to post-liberal to illiberal peacebuilding

Liberal peacebuilding seeks to turn fragile, war-torn countries into stable, democratic states.[6] It is generally defined by a set of normative commitments to democracy, rule of law, human rights, free markets, property rights, and inter-group reconciliation. Mainstream liberal peacebuilding practice focuses on top-down processes to build state authority, capacity, and (eventually) legitimacy.[7] International actors are dominant and set the agenda, timeline, and processes.

There have been two main critiques of liberal peacebuilding. The policy critique argues that the rush to hold multi-party elections, create market economies, and reform the justice and security sectors is destabilising and can prompt relapses into violent conflict. It advocates a technocratic fix: sequencing, or as Paris famously put it, 'institutionalisation before liberalisation.'[8] The more radical critique argues that a 'liberal peace' imposed in neo-colonial and hegemonic ways serves to hollow out (rather than deepen) state capacity, frequently increasing violence as a result.[9] Critical scholars advocate post-liberal or hybrid peacebuilding, which pays greater attention to how local actors coopt or resist the liberal norms and practices of international peacebuilders.[10] Some of these scholars contend that post-liberal peacebuilding can be emancipatory.[11] These two critiques of liberal peacebuilding, in turn, have been subject to considerable debate and critique.[12] Despite important differences, what liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding approaches have in common is a focus on international interventions by the UN and Western liberal democracies.

In recent years, there has been growing scholarly attention to domestically-driven peacebuilding that deviates from liberal norms. Soares De Oliveira describes illiberal peacebuilding as 'a process of post-war reconstruction managed by local elites in defiance of liberal peace precepts on civil liberties, the rule of law, the expansion of economic freedoms and poverty alleviation, with a view to constructing a hegemonic order and an elite stranglehold over the political economy'.[13] Smith sees illiberal peacebuilding more generally as the use of illiberal institutions, such as predation and corruption, to minimise violent conflict and assure stability within a 'hybrid political order' (i.e. where states are governed by a mix of state and non-state political elements).[14] Owen et al. use the term illiberal peace somewhat interchangeably with 'authoritarian conflict management,' which they define as 'a distinct set of norms and practices employed by political elites across three social levels – discourse, space, and the economy – with the aim of establishing "sustained hegemonic control" over a part of society perceived to be unstable or engaged in conflict'.[15] Scholars have produced individual case-studies of illiberal peacebuilding in Angola[16] and Rwanda.[17] There has also been important comparative work focused on victor's peace[18], sub-Saharan Africa[19], and Central Asia.[20] Until this special issue, there had not been much attention paid to illiberal peacebuilding in South and South-East Asia, with the exception of Indonesia[21] and post-war Sri Lanka.[22]

Defining illiberal peacebuilding

This special issue employs the term 'illiberal peacebuilding' although the authors here hold different views as to its meaning, theoretical purchase, and practical utility. In the workshops

that led to this special issue, there was considerable debate about the term. One concern was that *il*-liberal peacebuilding presents itself as the antonym of *liberal* peacebuilding and so appears based on what it is *not*. It relies thus on the definition of liberal peacebuilding, which itself is a somewhat fluid term subject to considerable scholarly interrogation.[23] Another concern was whether illiberal peace, really deserves to be called peace – even negative peace.[24] An additional concern was that the terms 'illiberal' and 'peace' are inherently normative and so illiberal peacebuilding risks conflating *what is* with *what ought to be* – just as liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding have been criticised for doing. A final concern was that liberal peacebuilding, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, was itself highly illiberal. We are mindful of these concerns but do not have space to explore them here. For purposes of this special issue, illiberal peacebuilding provides a useful way to cluster similar phenomena, thus enabling comparative research across our cases and those in other regions.

We should also explain why we chose not to use the closely related concept of 'authoritarian conflict management.'[25] For one thing, that concept is based on the norms and practices of several authoritarian regimes in central Asia. By contrast, most of our Asian case studies involve democratising or semi-democratic regimes, such as Indonesia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. For another thing, the term 'conflict management' suggests a precarious order of 'no war, no peace,' whereas some of our case studies are stable peacetime orders, such as Aceh and Sri Lanka. That said, it is possible to view authoritarian conflict management as a sub-set of illiberal peacebuilding. Indeed, two of the articles here, one on Sri Lanka and the other on Thailand, also draw on the concept of authoritarian conflict management.

As an entry point, we can see illiberal peacebuilding as distinct from liberal peacebuilding in three key aspects. In place of Western powers, illiberal peacebuilding is dominated by domestic actors. In place of economic neo-liberalism, illiberal peacebuilding runs on clientelism, cronyism, and corruption. In place of liberal ideals of equality and liberty, illiberal peacebuilding emphasises illiberal norms of inequality and order. While these three aspects vary considerably across our cases, what characterises the core of illiberal peacebuilding is the prioritisation of regime security and stability over accountability, human rights, and social inclusion.

Even within this broad definition, we find it important to distinguish between 'thin', 'medium', and 'thick' versions of illiberal peacebuilding. The thin form uses short-term illiberal means in the service of avowedly liberal ends. One expression of this is when domestic actors apply Paris's influential prescription of 'institutionalisation before liberalisation.' The medium version is when domestic actors engaged in illiberal peacebuilding are agnostic as to the end-state – as long as it keeps the peace and does not challenge territorial integrity. Finally, the thick version uses illiberal means for avowedly illiberal ends. The ultimate objective is to enshrine an authoritarian and/or ethnocratic regime that protects the security, influence, and wealth of powerful elites. This paramount goal frequently generates predatory and repressive forms of governance, weak and corrupt institutions, unequal treatment of minorities, and poor public services. Yet, by containing conflict, it can allow the state to function at a reasonable level of capacity.[26]

Thin, medium, and thick versions may be difficult to distinguish as means often shape ends. Thin illiberal peacebuilding inevitably generates its own set of patrons and clients, as well as its own modes of governance, that replicate and sustain themselves over time. As there are often few incentives for elites to give up security and power once these are established, a narrow elite arrangement emerges that may deliver 'stability' while offering few socially

inclusive solutions to the original sources of conflict. The modes of order created by such arrangements can be highly successful at securing order in the short- and medium-term. However, they frequently become more rather than less illiberal over time as negotiations over key issues underpinning conflict are perpetually deferred, rather than comprehensively addressed. As elites evade more inclusive institutional reforms, development processes mediated through illiberal political orders are conveniently reframed as the core element of sustainable peace, rather than a way-station towards more inclusive political arrangements.

Situating illiberal peacebuilding

Our formulation of illiberal peacebuilding links to two adjacent concepts in the literature on stabilisation and development of so-called 'fragile states': political settlements and borderland brokers. Several of the articles in this special issue invoke one or both of these concepts. Given space constraints in this Introduction, we can only briefly refer to these linkages.

Our understanding of illiberal peacebuilding is influenced by work on how elites craft 'political settlements' that produce seemingly stable forms of order in contexts of conflict and fragility. A political settlement is usually conceptualised as the underlying elite arrangement for distributing power and rents without resort to violent conflict.[27] It can thus be seen as the meta-rules for processes of elite contestation and bargaining within states. While political settlement analysis has been critiqued for being too reductionist, rationalistic, and materialistic,[28] it has been helpful in shifting attention from the technocratic to the political.

More recently, various scholars have reworked the concept of political settlement in four key ways. First, political settlements 'unsettle' as much as they settle.[29] Second, they do not end violence; rather, they may be intrinsically violent, may involve instrumental uses of violence, or may prompt violent contestation.[30] Third, political settlements are also critically shaped by non-elites and contestation over inclusion.[31] Finally, and relatedly, they can take place at the sub-national level.[32] As thus reconceptualised, political settlements have far more relevance to the Asian case studies presented here.

Our understanding of elite bargaining at the sub-national level is also informed by research on borderlands. Earlier political settlement analysis was critiqued for its 'methodological nationalism.'[33] Instead of focusing on state elites in capital cities, several scholars have turned their focus to borderland regions.[34] Borderland brokers are local administrators, community elites, business figures, and militia leaders who help navigate the flow of ideas, power, and goods across borders and between the peripheries and central state.[35] In our cases, central elites bargain with local elites to secure order and to extend particular modes of state control into restive areas. These sub-national political orders, which serve the personal and institutional interests of central and local elites, reduce violence but usually fail to address the root causes of conflict. In Nepal, for example, the financing of local patronage networks has played a key role in reducing violence in post-conflict areas by building economic and political links between local and sub-national armed elites (see Jarvis article in this special issue). Similar patterns have worked to secure particular modes of political order in contested parts of Indonesia (see Diprose and Azca, and Lee articles) and facilitated 'peri-conflict' development in ceasefire regions of Myanmar (see McCarthy and Farrelly article).

Articles

The first four articles in this special issue use case studies to develop the concept of illiberal peacebuilding. The first re-examines post-war politics in Sri Lanka, a paradigmatic case of victor's peace that contributed to early theorising on illiberal peacebuilding. The second explores sub-national variation in Indonesia's illiberal peacebuilding processes to illustrate the distinction between, and rationale for, thin and thick versions. The third uses the Thai state's shifting responses to the southern insurgency to expand the notion of authoritarian conflict management. The final article uses Thailand and especially Sri Lanka to explore a key feature of illiberal peacebuilding: the state's attempt to monopolise memory politics.

In Sri Lanka, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa used a mix of repression, discrimination, and development between 2009 and 2015 to build security in the northern and eastern regions recaptured from the Tamil Tigers. Lewis analyses this illiberal peacebuilding through the lens of Carl Schmitt's political theory and, in the process, extends earlier conceptual work on 'authoritarian conflict management.' He shows how Schmitt's three principles of anti-liberalism can be identified in Sri Lanka's illiberal peacebuilding: the assertion of sovereign power; the discursive construction of the enemy; and a particularistic understanding of space that was counterposed to liberal ideas of post-spatiality. He also situates this 'Schmittian peace' within the global wave of anti-liberalism. The Sri Lanka example acquired renewed salience with the attempted return of Rajapaksa to the prime ministership in the final months of 2018[36] and the responses to the Easter 2019 bombings.[37]

Exploring sub-national variation in Indonesia's peacebuilding during the early years of democratisation, Smith compares the complex mix of militarised and negotiated approaches in East Timor with the semi-illiberal containment policy applied in Papua. She finds that the contrasting management of these two ethno-nationalist self-determination conflicts can be explained through two factors: shifting power dynamics within different branches of the regime and external pressures. These findings then prompt her to argue for greater attention to these factors in theorising about illiberal peacebuilding – especially in democratising contexts.

Chalermsripinyorat uses the concept of authoritarian conflict management to analyse Thailand's forceful response to separatist insurgencies in the predominantly Malay-Muslim south since 2004. In applying that concept, she refines it in two important ways. First, she shows how authoritarian conflict management may be path-dependent, pointing out how the Thai state's conflict management grew out of Cold War doctrines of counter-insurgency. Second, she argues that there is an important but overlooked legal dimension to authoritarian conflict management. The Thai government has offered two forms of legal amnesties since 2012, though they have enticed only a small number of insurgents to surrender. Towards the end of the article, Chalermsripinyorat shows how the 2014 military coup affected, but did not fundamentally change, the state's authoritarian conflict management approach.

Whereas liberal peacebuilding can tolerate a plurality of memory discourses about war, illiberal peacebuilding often seeks to impose a singular narrative. McCargo and Senaratne examine state efforts at ethnicised and exclusionary memorialisation in southern Thailand and northern Sri Lanka. They compare how the Sri Lankan state has tolerated some forms of memorialisation by victims' groups but not others. Overall, they argue that 'the range of memorials permitted can serve as a litmus test concerning the quality or indeed the character of peace that has been achieved, or that may be imagined.'

The next four articles in this special issue examine how different combinations of elite bargains, neo-patrimonialism, and corruption have created sub-national political orders in restive regions of Indonesia, Myanmar, and Nepal. The Aceh article uses secondary research to build theory around the transition from wartime to peacetime orders, while the Myanmar, Nepal, and Riau articles are based on recent, in-depth fieldwork.

Lee demonstrates that the internationally-mediated peace in post-tsunami Aceh has held thanks to its underlying, illiberal elements. He argues that the successful shift from a wartime to peacetime order was accomplished by the central government assuring that the wartime elites maintained control over Aceh's political economy through rent-seeking privileges and patrimonial relationships. That meant ignoring the liberal peacebuilding prescription to dismantle the rebels' wartime structure. Keeping the rebel group intact helped channel them into the political system, transforming potential spoilers into stakeholders.

McCarthy and Farrelly find similar dynamics at work in Myanmar's ethnic borderlands. They focus on how the central state created 'peri-conflict' orders in Kachin State (1994-2011) and Karen State (2012-2018) through extractive commercial ceasefires – a form of 'joint extraction pacts' – with the elite in non-state armed groups. However, these orders prove unstable over the long-term because such rent-seeking behaviour undermines the symbolic authority and social orders cultivated by armed groups over decades. That is, the ethnic minorities see their leadership enriching themselves instead of addressing minority grievances. In contrast to Lee's article on Aceh, McCarthy and Farrelly point out the tensions between materialist and ideational factors that complicate transitions from wartime to stable peacetime orders.

Jarvis takes a more micro-level approach to rent-seeking and peacetime order by honing in on corruption in one Nepalese city 11 years after the end of the war. Whereas liberal peacebuilding views corruption as inherently destabilising, this empirical study shows how corruption can be inadvertently stabilising in some contexts. First, post-war corruption among Maoist elites smoothed the way for the social reintegration of rank and file ex-combatants. Second, a corrupt elite bargain in local government promoted cooperation among political parties – including the emergent Maoist party.

Finally, Diprose and Azca look at how violent conflict has been prevented in Riau (Indonesia) through a combination of national and sub-national political settlements between narrow but adaptive coalitions of political and private sector elites. They show how these coalitions have maintained control over resource rents in Riau's three key sectors: oil and gas, timber, and palm oil. Brokers have been instrumental in maintaining the influence of these coalitions, helping to co-opt households into industry supply chains, which then leads these households to support aligned political elites. While this has produced relative stability, space for contestation is limited and social interests tend to acquiesce for small gains, thereby entrenching a highly extractive and unequal political and economic order.

Some emergent themes

An interesting finding from our cases is that sub-national dynamics of illiberal peacebuilding can play out differently to each other even within the same nation-state, and are often in tension with national democratisation and reform processes. In some cases, ensuring a more liberal, negotiated, and conciliatory peace settlement in one region necessitated a more

illiberal settlement elsewhere, in order to pacify particular sections of the elite. This was seen in Indonesia in the early phase of democratisation, where a liberal settlement in East Timor ensured an illiberal settlement in Papua was the only satisfactory outcome for the majority of political elites. Similar tensions have played out in Myanmar's complex peace process, where attempts to advance dialogue about a more inclusive political system have occurred in tandem with illiberal sub-national commercial extraction and state expansion. Further tensions are observed between a highly illiberal political economy in Riau that directly competes for legitimacy with nationally-driven democratisation processes.

The key question for illiberal peacebuilding is how sustainable it is.[38] In the Myanmar and Indonesia cases in particular, we observe that deals that work effectively at some points regarding keeping rebels and wider independence organisations in check, via the control of local and sub-national economies, can begin to unravel later as demands change, or transparency increases, or non-state actors vie for control of resources. This emerging dynamic provokes a further question as to how long a democratising regime can hold illiberal sub-national peace deals together, in the long run, while at the same time deepening democracy in other key national arenas, such as the justice and electoral sectors. There is some evidence from our cases that suggests these two processes eventually come into tension.

Policy implications

Over the past decade, the UK government has moved away from liberal peacebuilding towards a thin version of illiberal peacebuilding.[39] The priority is now on promoting domestic 'stabilisation' – enabling political settlements among elites to end violent conflict[40] – though with a gesture towards eventually achieving more inclusive settlements. This policy shift was reaffirmed in three successive reports in 2018.

In April 2018, the LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development issued a report titled 'Escaping the fragility trap.' While the Commission was fronted by former UK Prime Minister David Cameron, the report bears the stamp of his co-chair, the former Rwandan Finance Minister Donald Kaberuka. The report repeatedly invokes Rwanda as an exemplar, hailing it as a state "moving decisively from instability to stability."[41] One critic noted that the report "look[s] for lessons from ... nation-building authoritarian government[s]" in Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda.[42]

In the same month, a synthesis report commissioned for the UK's Stabilisation Unit discussed how elite bargains underpinned by rent-sharing arrangements could end violent conflict and produce stability. The report, *Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict*, acknowledged that such bargains were far more likely to result in elite capture than an inclusive liberal peace.[43]

In December 2018, the Stabilisation Unit issued a revised version of 'The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation' that adopts much of the commissioned report's thinking around elite bargains and rent-seeking, while retaining a long-term commitment to a more liberal peace. As the Stabilisation Unit's Director writes:

> Political deals, forged between local elites, are based on their common
> understanding about how power and resources are organised and executed
> reflecting the realities of political power on the ground. In pursuing them, we

are confronted with the inherent tensions and trade-offs with wider national security objectives: promotion of a rules based international order, human rights, gender equality, good governance, a desire for justice, and more. The goals are not contradictory but do require sequencing with a clear understanding of our relative priorities.[44]

In essence, this statement adds a further step to Paris's prescription for liberal peacebuilding: elite bargains before institutionalisation before liberalisation. However, sequencing does not resolve the inherent contradiction between illiberal means and liberal ends. Sequencing also creates its own path dependent institutions and norms.

The prescriptions of the Cameron-Kaberuka Commission and the Stabilisation Unit clearly rank elite bargains above democratisation, rent-sharing arrangements over anti-corruption efforts, and stabilisation ahead of peace in the short- to medium-term. Both offer little guidance on how to nudge initial elite bargains towards greater inclusion or early rent-sharing arrangements towards more equitable or developmental outcomes. The overall result is what we have termed thin illiberal peacebuilding.[45]

In some ways, this special issue strengthens part of the case for the UK's shift to illiberal peacebuilding. After all, illiberal mixtures of coercion, cooptation, clientelism, and corruption have maintained peace over the short-term (Myanmar, Papua, and Sri Lanka) and medium-term (Aceh and Nepal). That said, some cases (Myanmar, Papua, and Sri Lanka) suggest that illiberal peacebuilding may not lead to long-term, sustainable peace if it does not create the conditions for a more inclusive social contract.

The special issue also raises some important implications for UK policy. First, the Aceh and Nepal articles illuminate how opting for stability can create path dependencies that foreclose longer-term goals of equity.[46] This points to the need for UK government policy to be more honest about the real trade-offs that no amount of sequencing can finesse. Second, the Indonesia and Myanmar articles underscore the importance of sub-national elite bargains for maintaining peace. By contrast, the Stabilisation Unit's policy guidance remains resolutely state-centric, ignoring the recommendations of its commissioned report to move beyond the state and look at sub-national and regional dynamics (which converge in borderlands).[47] Similarly, the Cameron-Kaberuka Commission adopts a centralised approach, derived in part from Rwanda's statebuilding experience. Third, the Sri Lanka and Myanmar articles highlight normative dimensions of illiberal peacebuilding that are often neglected by overly rationalist and materialist accounts of elite bargains. Fourth, the South and South-East Asian case studies in this special issue highlight the need to consider the means and ends of illiberal peacebuilding in semi-democratic and democratising states with relatively robust institutions. The Stabilisation Unit's policy guidance is skewed by an over-emphasis on cases involving UN and UK interventions in fragile states – Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen[48] – which do not reflect the political experiences of many developing states in Asia and beyond. Thus, this special issue contributes to a more nuanced and empirically representative understanding of peacebuilding experiences in the wider world.

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Notes

[1] Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Timor Leste made earlier transitions from war to peace. There are still long-running insurgencies in northern India and the Philippines.

[2] Wilson and Bakker, 'Cutting off the King's head.'

[3] Tadros and Allouche, 'Introduction.'

[4] Grimm and Weiffen, 'Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratization.'

[5] More information about these conferences and the resulting research network is available at http://peacebuildingasia.org.

[6] See, e.g., Doyle and Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding'.

[7] See, e.g., Call, *Building States to Build Peace*; Paris and Sisk, *Dilemmas of State Building*.

[8] Paris, *At War's End*, 159.

[9] See, e.g., Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam, *A Liberal Peace?*; Chandler, *International Statebuilding*; Richmond, *A Post-Liberal Peace*.

[10] See, e.g., Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance.*

[11] See, e.g., Richmond and Mitchell, *Hybrid Forms of Peace*.

[12] See, e.g., Millar, *Ethnographic Peace Research*; Nadarajah and Rampton, 'The limits of hybridity'; Newman, Paris, and Richmond, *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding*; Paffenholz, 'Unpacking the local turn'; Paris, 'Saving liberal peacebuilding'; Zaum, 'Beyond the Liberal Peace'..

[13] Soares, 'Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola', 288.

[14] Smith, 'Illiberal peace-building in hybrid political orders', 1510-1512. See Belloni, 'Hybrid Peace Governance', 25-26; Boege, 'Building Peace'.

[15] Owen et al., *Interrogating Illiberal Peace in Eurasia*, 2.

[16] Soares, 'Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola'.

[17] Samset, 'Building a Repressive Peace'; Waldorf, 'Rwanda's illiberal peacebuilding'.

[18] Piccolino, 'Winning wars, building (illiberal) peace?'.

[19] Jones, Soares, and Verhoeven, 'Africa's illiberal statebuilders'.

[20] Lewis, 'Central Asia'; Owen, et al., *Interrogating Illiberal Peace in Eurasia*.

[21] Smith, 'Illiberal peace-building in hybrid political orders'.

[22] Goodhand, 'Stabilising a Victor's Peace?'; Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, *Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka*; Höglund and Orjuela, 'Hybrid Peace Governance and Illiberal Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka'.

[23] Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*; Paris, *At War's End*.

[24] For a useful interrogation of the concept of peace, see Klem, 'The problem of peace'.

[25] Lewis, 'The Myopic Foucauldian Gaze'; Lewis, Heathershaw and Megoran, 'Illiberal Peace?'; Owen, et al., *Interrogating Illiberal Peace in Eurasia*.

[26] Mukherjee, 'Why Are the Longest Insurgencies Low Violence?'.

[27] See, e.g., Di John and Putzel, 'Political Settlements'; Bell '*What we talk about when we talk about Political Settlements*'.

[28] See, e.g., Meehan, 'What are the key factors', 28-31.

[29] Bell and Pospisil, 'Navigating Inclusions in Transitions from Conflict'.

[30] Tadros and Allouche, 'Political settlements as a violent process', 193-195; Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 'Synthesis Paper', 26-31.

[31] Bell and Pospisil, 'Navigating Inclusions in Transitions from Conflict'; Rocha 'Inclusive Political Settlements'; Tadros and Allouche, 'Political settlements as a violent process', 195-197.

[32] Tadros and Allouche, 'Political settlements as a violent process', 197-99.

[33] Meehan, 'What are the key factors?', 29-30.

[34] See, e.g., Goodhand, 'Te Centrality of Margins'; Plonski, 'Borderlands and Peacebuilding'.

[35] See, e.g., Goodhand, Klem, and Walton, 'Mediating the Margins'.

[36] See for example Venugopal, 'The second coming of Sri Lanka's Mahinda Rajapaksa'.

[37] See for example Keenan, 'Sri Lanka's Easter Bombings'.

[38] For a recent attempt at measuring peace consolidation, see Caplan, *Measuring Peace*.

[39] See Stabilisation Unit, 'The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation', 2-3.

[40] Stabilisation Unit, 'The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation', 3.

[41] Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 'Escaping the fragility trap', 4.

[42] Green, 'Escaping the Fragility Trap?'.

[43] Cheng, Goodhand, and Meehan, *Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains*.

[44] Stabilisation Unit, 'The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation', 2.

[45] Some critics have also noted this authoritarian shift. See, e.g. Chernova, 'Should the UK?'; de Waal, 'Fragility in the Paradigm'; de Waal, 'Fragile Paradigm'.

[46] See Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 'Synthesis Paper', 5; Addison et al., 'Needs versus Expediency'.

[47] Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 'Synthesis Paper', 5, 22, 23, 29-30.

[48] The one exception is Tajikistan. There was a more diverse array of 20 case studies produced as part of the commissioned report. Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan, 'Synthesis Paper', 85.