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Coordination games and local interactions: A survey of the game theoretic literature

Weidenholzer, S (2010) 'Coordination games and local interactions: A survey of the game theoretic literature.' Games, 1 (4). 551 - 585. ISSN 2073-4336

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Abstract

We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflict between risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use Ellison's [1] Radius-Coradius Theorem to present prominent results on local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning in a localand in a global- interactions setting. © 2010 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Switzerland.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2012 15:11
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:17
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2630

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