Research Repository

Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions

Weidenholzer, Simon Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The present note revisits a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as a long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions the selection of 1/2 -dominant strategies remains when adding strictly dominated strategies if interaction is decentral". Conversely, if the local interaction structure is central" by adding properly suited dominated strategies any equilibrium strategy of the original game can be supported as long run equilibrium. Classification- JEL: C72, D83

Item Type: ["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2012 15:12
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 00:40
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2631

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item