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Contagion and efficiency

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2008) 'Contagion and efficiency.' Journal of Economic Theory, 143 (1). pp. 251-274. ISSN 0022-0531

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We consider a population of agents, either finite or countably infinite, located on an arbitrary network. Agents interact directly only with their immediate neighbors, but are able to observe the behavior of (some) other agents beyond their interaction neighborhood, and learn from that behavior by imitating successful actions. If interactions are not "too global" but information is fluid enough, we show that the efficient action is the only one which can spread contagiously to the whole population from an initially small, finite subgroup. This result holds even in the presence of an alternative, frac(1, 2)-dominant action. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Local interaction games; Learning; Imitation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2012 15:11
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2022 11:33

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