UNSPECIFIED (2007) 'Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions.' Games and Economic Behavior, 61 (2). 179 - 197. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We consider partial bandwagon properties in the context of coordination games to capture the idea of weak network externalities. We then study a local interactions model where agents play a coordination game following a noisy best-reply process. We show that globally pairwise risk dominant strategies are selected in arbitrary 3 × 3 coordination games, but not necessarily in larger games. A comparison with the global interactions benchmark shows that the nature of interactions might alter the long-run results themselves, and not only the speed of convergence. We also illustrate that the simultaneous coexistence of conventions is possible for games with at least 5 strategies. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	27 Jun 2012 15:10
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2019 15:16
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2638

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