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Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency

UNSPECIFIED (2006) 'Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency.' Economics Letters, 93 (2). 163 - 168. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We consider a circular city model as in Ellison [Ellison, G., 1993. Learning, local interaction, and coordination, Econometrica 61, 1047-1071], where agents follow imitation rules rather than myopic best-response. If interactions are neither global nor limited to the immediate neighbors, payoff-efficient equilibria, and not risk-dominant ones, can be uniquely selected. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 27 Jun 2012 15:10
Last Modified: 10 Jan 2019 15:16
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2641

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