Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos and Menzio, Guido and Smith, Eric (2011) 'JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES*.' International Economic Review, 52 (3). pp. 639-655. ISSN 0020-6598
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds. © (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | J24; J42; J64; Job search; recall; wage determination; Diamond paradox |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Elements |
Depositing User: | Elements |
Date Deposited: | 03 Jul 2012 10:37 |
Last Modified: | 15 Jan 2022 00:51 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2663 |
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