Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos and Menzio, Guido and Smith, Eric (2011) 'JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES*.' International Economic Review, 52 (3). pp. 639-655. ISSN 0020-6598

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds. © (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	J24; J42; J64; Job search; recall; wage determination; Diamond paradox
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	03 Jul 2012 10:37
Last Modified:	15 Jan 2022 00:51
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2663

Actions (login required)

View Item