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Job Search with Bidder Memories

Carrillo-Tudela, C and Menzio, G and Smith, E (2009) Job Search with Bidder Memories. UNSPECIFIED. Institute for the Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Papers, 4319.

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This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Additional Information: Source info: PIER Working Paper No. 09-027
Uncontrolled Keywords: wage determination; recall; job search; Diamond paradox
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2012 10:59
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2022 10:06

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