Research Repository

Seniority Seating at the Royal Opera House

Frank, J and Smith, E (1996) 'Seniority Seating at the Royal Opera House.' Oxford Economic Papers, 48 (3). 492 - 98. ISSN 0030-7653

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper examines lotteries and seniority queues as forms of commodity bundling price discrimination. There are good and bad seats, and two types of potential purchasers. Offered the choice of a high-priced good seat and a moderately-priced bundle of good and bad seats, customers self-select into high and low valuation types. For single-period purchases, the bundle is a lottery over good and bad seats. For repeated purchases, monopolists such as the Royal Opera House can do better by setting up a seniority allocation system.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2012 12:38
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:11
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2691

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item