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Marketplaces and Matching

Coles, M and Smith, E (1994) Marketplaces and Matching. UNSPECIFIED. C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1048.

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Abstract

This paper models equilibrium trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated. When first visiting the market, a buyer samples a stock of goods. If fortunate, the buyer matches with and purchases one of these goods and then exits the market. If an initial match does not exist, the buyer can now only match with the flow of new goods for sale. The previous stock has been sampled and rejected. In a steady state, the current stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side. It is shown that this market behaviour describes matching patterns between unemployed job seekers and vacancies in UK Job Centres.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Marketplaces; Matching; Unemployment Hazards
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2012 11:05
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:11
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2695

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