Park, JY (2017) 'A Lab Experiment on Committee Hearings: Preferences, Power, and a Quest for Information.' Legislative Studies Quarterly, 42 (1). 3 - 31. ISSN 0362-9805

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Abstract

In principle, committees hold hearings to gather and provide information to their principals, but some hearings are characterized as political showcases. This article investigates conditions that moderate committee members' incentives to hold an informative hearing by presenting a game-theoretic model and a lab experiment. Specifically, it studies when committees hold hearings and which types of hearing they hold by varying policy preferences of committee members and the principal and political gains from posturing. Findings provide new insights to how preferences and power distribution affect individuals' incentives to be informed when they make decisions as members of a committee in many contexts.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	17 Jun 2020 15:35
Last Modified:	06 Apr 2021 02:15
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/27766

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