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Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars and Cseh, Agnes and Erlanson, Albin (2020) 'Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets.' American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. ISSN 1945-7669 (In Press)

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Abstract

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: market design; time balance; priority mechanism; non-manipulability.
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 09 Jun 2020 11:24
Last Modified: 09 Jun 2020 12:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/27839

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