Khurana, Thomas (2020) '‘I do not cognize myself through being conscious of myself as thinking’: Self-knowledge and the irreducibility of self-objectification in Kant.' In: Land, Thomas and Hennig, Boris and Hunter, David, (eds.) Transparency and Apperception: Exploring the Kantian Roots of a Contemporary Debate. Routledge. ISBN 9780367478650, 036747865X

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Abstract

The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apper- ception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self- knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.

Item Type:	Book Section
Additional Information:	Originally published in a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, see http://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2019.1610325 and http://repository.essex.ac.uk/25682/
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Kant, Apperception, Transparency, Self-Knowledge, Practical Knowledge
Divisions:	Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy and Art History, School of
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	13 Aug 2020 11:26
Last Modified:	13 Aug 2020 11:26
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/28346

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