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Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing

Rockett, Katharine E (1990) 'Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing.' The RAND Journal of Economics, 21 (1). p. 161. ISSN 0741-6261

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This article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee-monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires. The queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative "strengths" as competitors (for example, by size or level of marginal cost). By structuring the industry to be composed of "weak" competitors, the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires. Examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that "choosing the competition" was an important motivation of the licensor's behavior.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2012 22:49
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 00:48

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