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Bounding the inefficiency of compromise

Caragiannis, Ioannis and Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Voudouris, Alexandros A (2017) Bounding the inefficiency of compromise. In: Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17), 2017-08-19 - 2017-08-25, Melbourne, Australia.

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Abstract

Social networks on the Internet have seen an enormous growth recently and play a crucial role in different aspects of today's life. They have facilitated information dissemination in ways that have been beneficial for their users but they are often used strategically in order to spread information that only serves the objectives of particular users. These properties have inspired a revision of classical opinion formation models from sociology using game-theoretic notions and tools. We follow the same modeling approach, focusing on scenarios where the opinion expressed by each user is a compromise between her internal belief and the opinions of a small number of neighbors among her social acquaintances. We formulate simple games that capture this behavior and quantify the inefficiency of equilibria using the well-known notion of the price of anarchy. Our results indicate that compromise comes at a cost that strongly depends on the neighborhood size.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information: Published proceedings: Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17)
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2020 08:46
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2020 08:46
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/28512

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