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(A)Political Constituency Development Funds: Evidence from Pakistan

Malik, Rabia (2019) '(A)Political Constituency Development Funds: Evidence from Pakistan.' British Journal of Political Science. ISSN 0007-1234

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Abstract

Most of the distributive politics literature focuses on how incumbent politicians allocate development resources in the absence of spending rules, and on the politicization of rules when they do determine distribution. What is less clear is whether politically neutral spending rules lead to neutral spending. Using new data on a long-running federal development fund and elections from Pakistan in a regression discontinuity design, the author presents strong evidence that the ruling party manipulated fund distribution to disproportionately benefit its co-partisans and punish the weakest opposition. Considering various factors, partisan bias is the most plausible explanation. These findings are important not only because the purpose of rules-based funds is to prevent politicized distribution but also because they have implications for development patterns and for using such funds to address questions about legislator effort and patronage patterns within constituencies, which requires assuming that legislators do receive their share of funds in the first place.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: distributive politics; Pakistan; regression discontinuity design; developing countries; electoral incentives
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 12 Nov 2020 14:58
Last Modified: 12 Nov 2020 14:58
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/29068

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