Research Repository

Awareness as an Equilibrium Notion: Normal-Form Games

Copic, Jernej and Galeotti, Andrea (2006) Awareness as an Equilibrium Notion: Normal-Form Games. [UNSPECIFIED]

[img]
Preview
Text
dp614.pdf

Download (280kB) | Preview

Abstract

We study normal-form games where parts of the games may not be common knowledge. Agents may be aware only of some facts describing the game. An awareness architecture is given by agents' awareness, and an infinite regress of conjectures about other agents and their conjectures. The problem is specified by the true underlying normal-form game, and by the set of possible awareness architectures. Awareness equilibrium is given by a feasible awareness architecture for each agent, strategies that are played and these strategies have to be consistent with the awareness architectures and agents' rationality. We first study games with complete information, where each player may be aware of a subset of the set of possible actions. We then study games with incomplete information, where each player may be aware of a subset of the set of types and probability over types. Our results illustrate how a departure from the assumption of common knowledge alters equilibium predictions.

Item Type: UNSPECIFIED
Uncontrolled Keywords: HB;
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 16 Jul 2012 14:42
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:10
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2985

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item