Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev and Kamphorst, Jurjen (2006) Network formation with heterogeneous players. Games and Economic Behavior, 54 (2). pp. 353-372. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003
Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev and Kamphorst, Jurjen (2006) Network formation with heterogeneous players. Games and Economic Behavior, 54 (2). pp. 353-372. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003
Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev and Kamphorst, Jurjen (2006) Network formation with heterogeneous players. Games and Economic Behavior, 54 (2). pp. 353-372. DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003
Abstract
This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks. © 2005 Elsevier inc. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | network; heterogeneity; insider-outsider; non-cooperative game |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2012 14:33 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Aug 2022 10:57 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2987 |