Galeotti, Andrea and Goyal, Sanjeev (2002) Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players. [["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]]

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within groups as compared to across groups, strategic play by individuals leads to a network architecture in which there is a core group which is entirely internally connected while all the other groups are entirely externally linked and hence completely fragmented. Since internal/within group links are cheaper to form, this implies that individual incentives may generate a significant waste of valuable social resources.

Item Type:	["eprint_typename_scholarly-edition" not defined]
Uncontrolled Keywords:	C72; C79; Noncooperative games; Network formation; Heterogeneity
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	16 Jul 2012 14:32
Last Modified:	15 Jan 2022 00:40
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/2998

Actions (login required)

View Item