# **Appendix**

Winzen, Thomas. 2021. 'The European Semester and Parliamentary Oversight Institutions inside and Outside of the Euro Area'. *Politics and Governance*.

### Appendix 1

To measure parliamentary budget rights, all relevant questions from the OECD International Database of Parliamentary Budgeting Practices were selected (OECD, 2018). These were grouped into the categories listed below. An aggregate score for each category was formed. Then all categories were standardized to range between 0 and 1 and summed up. The table below provides an overview, followed by the wording of the questions in the OECD database.

Category	Aggregation
Early involvement	+ Pre-budget debate
	+ Medium-term budget framework
	+ Long-term sustainability analysis
Sectoral committee	+ Budget committee coordination
involvement	+ Sectoral committee attendance
	+ sector specific appropriations
	- no budget committee
	– no formal committee involvement
Opposition committee	Budget committee chaired by opposition
chair	
Summon	+ Executive papers
	+ ministers/political appointees
	+ other executive officials
	+ persons not employed by government
Staff/resources	+ Parliamentary budget office
	+ specialized staff
	+ budget committee staff
	+ party and individual staff
Consultation	Budget committee has the right to consult outside experts
Overall index	Step 1: All categories standardized to range from 0-1.
	Step 2: Sum of all standardized categories.

#### Early involvement (sum of r11, r13, r14):

- Does the legislature hold a pre-budget debate on budgetary priorities and trade-offs that allows for views from the legislature to inform the preparation of the executive's budget proposal? (R11)
- Does the legislature approve the medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF)? (R13)
- Does the legislature receive and scrutinise long-term sustainability analysis (typically 10-50 years)? (R14)

### Sectoral committee involvement (sum of r35-r37 minus r38 and r39):

Which process best describes committees' role in the budget approval process in the unicameral or lower chamber?

- A single Budget/Finance Committee coordinates a process in which sectoral committees make recommendations to the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee then reviews and accepts or rejects these recommendations and formally considers all budget-related matters. (R35)
- A single Budget/Finance Committee formally considers the budget, but members of sectoral committees attend meetings of the Budget Committee to provide their view when expenditures in their specific areas are discussed. (R36)
- A single Budget/Finance Committee formally considers budget aggregates (total level of revenue and spending and their allocation to each sector) and sectoral committees formally consider spending for sector specific appropriations. (R37)
- There is no Budget/Finance Committee. Sectoral committees formally consider appropriations for each respective sector. (R38)
- No formal committee involvement, but committees may choose to consider aspects of the budget. (R39)

#### Opposition committee chair (takes the value of '1' if r42 or 43 answered positively):

The Budget/Finance Committee of the lower house or single chamber is typically chaired by:

- A member of the opposition this is enshrined in law or the parliamentary rules (R42)
- A member of the opposition this is by convention (R43)

#### Powers to summon (sum of r58-r61):

Do committees have the power to summon:

- Papers and records from the executive branch (R58)
- Ministers/Political Appointees (R59)
- Other officials from the executive branch (R60)
- Persons not employed by government (R61)

#### **Staff/resources (sum of the categories below):**

#### **Budget office:**

- 14. What types of support are available to parliament/parliamentarians for specialised information/advice on the budgetary issues (please check all that apply):
  - \_Indpendent Parliamentary Budget Office (e.g. US Congressional Budget Office, Korea National Assembly Budget Office) (R70)

Other specialized staff (sum of staff reported in r77 and r78, divided by maximum observed staff across countries):

- You have indicated that your parliament has an in-house specialized research unit. Please indicate how many staff (full time equivalent) are in that unit: (R77)
- You have indicated that there is no in-house specialised research unit but specialised staff on budget issues are part of the larger research services. Please indicate how many staff are specialized on budget issues (full time equivalent): (R78)

#### Budget committee staff, divided by maximum observed committee staff

 How many committee staff (full time equivalent) serve the Budget/Finance
Committee in the unicameral or lower chamber in undertaking specialized analysis of budgetary matters? (R79)

#### Existence of party and individual staff (maximum of R74 and r75).

 What types of support are available to parliament/parliamentarians for specialised information/advice on the budgetary issues (please check all that apply): \_Specialised staff in political party Secretariats (R74)  What types of support are available to parliament/parliamentarians for specialised information/advice on the budgetary issues (please check all that apply): \_Individual member's staff (R75)

# Consultation (takes the value of '1' if r80 or 83 answered positively):

Does the Budget/Finance Committee have the right to:\_

- Consult outside experts?\_\_Yes (R80)
- Employ outside experts?\_\_Yes (R83)

### Appendix 2

Table A1 to Table A4 show parliamentary rights in the European Semester in 2019 in relation to dichotomized versions of the continuous explanatory variables shown in Figure 3. The thresholds for dichotomization are discussed in the manuscript.

Table A1. Semester rights and EU oversight institutions (dichotomous)

	Weak EU oversight institutions	Strong oversight institutions
No European Semester rights	6	10
European Semester rights	4	8

### Table A2. Semester rights and budget rights (dichotomous)

	Weak budget rights	Strong budget rights	
No European Semester rights	8	4	
European Semester rights	5	5	

#### Table A3. Semester rights and government EU support (dichotomous)

	Less government EU support	More government EU support
No European Semester rights	7	9
European Semester rights	5	7

### Table A4. Semester rights and debt (dichotomous)

	Debt below 60 percent on average	Debt above 60 percent on average
No European Semester rights	8	8
European Semester rights	5	7

# Appendix 3

Table A5 shows QCA results with past participation in an ESM program as additional condition.

Table A5. QCA results with ESM program participation as additional condition

Positive outcome:	Cases:
Oversight * ~budget * Pro-EU govt * ~ESM	EE, LV, SI
Oversight * ~pro-EU govt * Debt * ~ESM	IT, NL
~oversight * Budget * Pro-EU govt * Debt	AT, FR, PT. Inconsistent: ES.
~oversight * Budget * Debt * ESM	EL, PT
Negative outcome:	<u>Cases:</u>
~oversight * ~budget * <b>Pro-EU govt *</b> ~ESM	BE, LU
~oversight * ~budget * Pro-EU govt * Debt	IE
Oversight * ~budget * ~pro-EU govt * ~debt * ~ESM	FI, SK. Inconsistent: DK.
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Note: Bold font denotes that a condition is present. The '~' symbol and italics denote the absence of a condition