

The Cultural Memory of Britain's Cold War

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Abstract

In recent years the Cold War has increasingly become a popular topic for museums, films, and television series. The sustained popularity of Cold War characters and events continue to bring the Cold War back into the contemporary world and to contemporary audiences. Films, series, and exhibitions which capture the Cold War serve to recall, reflect, and shape Britain's cultural memory of the period. This thesis assesses a number of post-1989 cultural portrayals of the Cold War to explore how Britain remembers the conflict. It will demonstrate that the ambiguous nature of the Cold War and Britain's role within it has caused challenges for constructing a British Cold War narrative. This thesis argues that this ambiguity raises questions of how to remember the conflict; this uncertainty leading to variations in portrayals. The ambiguity is reflected in portrayals focusing on key events and often dramatizing and exaggerating high points of the conflict, creating this sense of a dark and troubled period. The cultural memory of a troubled period is further enhanced by comparisons between the Cold War and the Second World War, demonstrating the influences of wartime memory on that of the Cold War. Wartime Britain is often contrasted as a time of victory in comparison to the Cold War as a period of decline for Britain and a difficult past to acknowledge. Equally, today's world is also shown to shape Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War, creating a sense of nostalgia for the certainty of the past. Through this exploration, this thesis contributes to the growing literature on Cold War memory and contributes to an understanding of the impact and legacy of the Cold War in Britain.

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Abbreviations

AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
C100	Committee of 100
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
EDL	English Defence League
EU	European Union
FAU	Friends Ambulance Unit
FSB	Federal Security Bureau
IWM	Imperial War Museum
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MI5	Military Intelligence, Section 5
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCANWT	National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests
NCF	No-Conscription Fellowship
NMWM	No More War Movement
PPU	Peace Pledge Union
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAGE	Ratepayers Against the Greenham Encampment
ROC	Royal Observer Corps
TNA	The National Archives
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WLM	Women's Liberation Movement
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
YCND	Young Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

1 Introduction

In April 2019, The National Archives launched their Cold War Season, beginning on the seventieth anniversary of the formation of NATO and culminating with a celebration thirty years after the Berlin Wall's collapse.¹ This celebration, 'Fall of the Wall Late: Pop culture and the Cold War', invited visitors to 'an evening of music, dancing, retro videogames, exhibition tours and expert talks on the culture of this momentous Cold War era'.² Designed to immerse visitors in the era, the event offered a nostalgic step-back in time to mark the ending of a conflict which lasted over forty years. The season of events included talks, activities, and workshops and The National Archives even created a Spotify playlist, which they declared on Twitter was designed 'to set the mood for our new #ColdWarSeason.'³ Alongside this nostalgic submersion in Cold War culture, however, was The National Archives' promotion of the season's central exhibition, *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed*; an interactive and immersive exhibition which revealed Britain's own unique experience of the Cold War through examples of government 'War Gaming', espionage scandals, civil defence and culture. The National Archives painted the exhibition as an insight into 'this turbulent era of secrets and paranoia'.⁴ The language used was carefully selected to promote intrigue, mystery and a notion of a dark and troubled period, almost in complete contrast to the nostalgic celebration of popular culture. The National Archives' Cold War Season and exhibition is but one example

¹ The National Archives, 'The National Archives announces Cold War season launching April 2019', *The National Archives*, 6 December 2018 <<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/news/the-national-archives-announces-cold-war-season-launching-april-2019/>> [Accessed 31 October 2019].

² 'Fall of the Wall Late: Pop Culture and the Cold War', *Eventbrite* <<https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/69416240845?aff=efbneb>> [Accessed 24 October 2019].

³ The National Archives, 'We've Put Together a Cold War Playlist to Set the Mood for Our New #ColdWarSeason Listen Now on Spotify: <https://spoti.fi/2Tbj8dS> Iron Maiden, Duran Duran, Blondie...What's Your Favourite #BunkerDisc? #FridayFeelingpic.Twitter.Com/ZYl5f54jbl', (@uknatarchives, 15 March 2019).

⁴ The National Archives, 'Keeper's Gallery: Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed', *The National Archives* <<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/visit-us/whats-on/keepers-gallery/>> [accessed 24 October 2019].

of the rise in looking back to the Cold War and remembering the period; and one example of a Cold War narrative that could be found in British museums and popular culture in 2019. Narratives of the Cold War period vary across modern cultural reflections. However, each deal with the fundamental question of how to remember the Cold War and *how* to strike a balance between nostalgia and celebration and conveying a period of looming apocalyptic fear. The National Archive exhibition, in particular, epitomises this balance and the different approaches towards Cold War memory.

1.1 Britain's Cold War

The Cold War was a prolonged and complex conflict which engulfed all aspects of life across the globe, from politics and warfare to economic and technological growth and cultural competition, all in the pursuit of establishing whether communism or capitalism was the stronger system. Memories of the conflict are therefore complex, each nation experiencing the conflict differently. In Britain, the Cold War has often been associated with Britain's decline. As David Reynolds argues, despite some retaining of power through 'imperial outposts and networks', by the 1960s Britain's "'fall" [was] clearly apparent' and much scholarship since has focused on the Cold War as a backdrop to Britain's changing role.⁵ This difference in focus, particularly when compared to other European countries which had a much more obvious role or direct experience of the Cold War through occupation or conflict, may account for a somewhat vague cultural memory of the period in Britain. Instead, the memory of the Second World War continues to hold prime position, not only in cultural and national memory, but crucially, in Britain's national identity. Through an exploration of British dominant cultural portrayals of the Cold War this thesis argues that the vagueness surrounding Britain's Cold

⁵ David Reynolds, 'Probing the Cold War Narrative since 1945: The Case of Western Europe' in *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 67 - 82 (pp. 69 - 71).

War experience has resulted in challenges for how to remember the conflict. In cultural reflections of the Cold War today a struggle to produce a single narrative is prominent. As a result, various narratives of the period have emerged, often with differing attempts to convey nostalgia alongside the image of a paranoid era. The continued influence of the memory of the Second World War helps to convey this sense of a turbulent era through constant comparisons between a victorious wartime Britain and a declining Cold War Britain.

However, this is not to deny the impact and legacy of the Cold War which continues to shape our lives today. Depictions and narratives of the Cold War in academia, popular culture and museums continue to shape understandings and influence current political debates. Recent events including nuclear testing and fears of proliferation in Iran and North Korea, as well as the 2018 poisoning of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, harp back to the Cold War era and understandings and perceptions of these events are undoubtedly grounded in the memories and legacy of the conflict. Yet despite this, our understanding of the legacy and memory of the Cold War in Britain is limited. Whilst scholarship on the memory of the Cold War in general is a developing area of study, it remains in its infancy.

There is still much to be understood about how the Cold War is remembered across the globe. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the limited work on Cold War memory studies by assessing the cultural memory of the conflict in Britain. It will explore the complexity of assessing the cultural memory of an extended period such as that of the Cold War and how memory operates, emphasising its fluid and developmental nature. This enables an analysis of *how* the Cold War is remembered in areas of modern British culture, namely film, television, and museum exhibitions. Common and repeated themes in Cold War narratives will be identified and questions as to *why* the particular themes of espionage, nuclear war and activism hold central positions within British cultural memory will be explored. What is it about these themes that people engage and connect with? How are these narratives told and what omissions

are made to create a narrative that audiences can relate to? These questions form the basis of this research. Yet, this thesis also seeks to demonstrate the complex and indeterminate place of the Cold War in British cultural memory, in particular its intertwined relationship with Britain's memory of, and identity with, the Second World War. The strict periodisation of the two conflicts will be challenged by highlighting the need to explore Second World War and Cold War memory in connection to fully understand the legacy and impact of each on Britain.

1.2 Cold War Historiography

Cold War historical scholarship has primarily focussed on political and diplomatic history, with three main schools of thought framing debates; traditionalist, revisionist, and post-revisionist.⁶ Much of this scholarship has explored the origins and collapse of the conflict, the ambiguity of the conflict's beginning and end, and who was responsible.⁷ Further to this, historical research has tended to prioritise the roles of the USA and Soviet Union during the conflict. However, more recent scholarship has examined the roles of other European actors, including Britain.⁸ Federico Romero argues for more research into Europe's role in the global Cold War as it was 'a conflict spawned in and about Europe'.⁹ This thesis thus in part contributes to this need for a growing understanding of European Cold War history and Britain's experience of the conflict. In addition to Europe, increasingly work on Africa, Asia, and Latin America is

⁶ See Odd Arne Westad, 'The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. I, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1 – 19 (pp. 3 - 8) for a detailed analysis of the development of Cold War historiography; See also Rosanna Farbøl, 'Commemoration of a Cold War: The Politics of History and Heritage at Cold War Memory Sites in Denmark', *Cold War History*, 15. 4 (2015), pp. 471 – 490 (p. 472) <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1028532>> [Accessed 21 November 2016]; Holger Nehring, 'What Was the Cold War?', *The English Historical Review*, 127. 527 (2012) pp. 920 – 949 (pp. 920 - 921) <<https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ces176>> [Accessed 22 January 2020].

⁷ See Farbøl, 'Commemoration of a Cold War', p.472; Nehring, 'What Was the Cold War?', p. 920.

⁸ See Anne Deighton, 'Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. I, ed. By Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 112 - 32; David Reynolds, 'Great Britain', in *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* ed. by David Reynolds (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 77 - 95.

⁹ Federico Romero, 'Cold War historiography at the crossroads', *Cold War History*, 14. 4 (2014) pp. 685 – 703 (p. 701), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.950249>> [Accessed 20 July 2021].

emerging.¹⁰ Odd Arne Westad's book, *The Global Cold War*, particularly argued the centrality of the global south to the Cold War, demonstrating that especially from the perspective of the South, East-West competition during the Cold War saw a 'continuation of colonialism through slightly different means'.¹¹ However, as will become apparent throughout this thesis, British involvement in the global south during the Cold War is often only mentioned in passing in cultural productions, its role in empire and decolonisation often omitted. Whilst the Cold War past of nuclear holocaust, activism and espionage is acknowledged, Britain's colonial past and involvement in other countries is more destabilising and thus omitted. For example, Graham Dawson and Stephen Hopkins have highlighted that British engagement with the conflict in Northern Ireland has 'been limited, lacking, frequently problematic, often troubled'.¹² They argued that this is partly the result of the UK State denying its 'role (...) as a protagonist in the conflict'.¹³ Britain's relationship with its colonial past often being actively forgotten. The Cold War in contrast is more easily recalled even as a time of Britain finding a new role in the world, claiming a role through espionage and nuclear power. Decolonisation remains a troubled memory of controversy and blame and is thus often omitted from representations of the Cold War. The Second World War instead offers a narrative of glory and bravery for British memory and national identity. Paul Gilroy, in *Postcolonial Melancholia*, argued that the unfaltering

¹⁰ See Farbøl, 'Commemoration of a Cold War', p. 472; For examples of work on the Cold War in Latin America, Africa, and Asia

see: Christopher N. Darnton, *Rivalry and alliance politics in cold war Latin America* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2014); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign intervention in Africa: from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Tsuyoshi Hasegwa (ed.) *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2011).

¹¹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 396.

¹² Graham Dawson and Stephen Hopkins, 'Introduction The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: impacts, engagements, legacies and memories' in *The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: Impacts, engagements, legacies and memories* ed. by Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), pp.1 – 18 (p. 1).

¹³ Dawson and Hopkins, 'Introduction The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain', p. 3, 6, see also footnote 23 on p.6.

memory of wartime Britain ‘reflects Britain’s inability to mourn its loss of empire’.¹⁴ The troubled past of decolonisation being neglected in favour of wartime memories of bravery and unity, and even Cold War memories of nuclear fear and espionage.¹⁵

The Cambridge History of the Cold War series, equally expanded study of the Cold War beyond the usual diplomatic and military boundaries.¹⁶ The diplomatic focus of Cold War studies has been increasingly matched by cultural and social histories of the Cold War, looking at culture during the conflict itself.¹⁷ British cultural Cold War studies have increased, including Matthew Grant’s, ‘Images of Survival, Stories of Destruction: Nuclear War on British Screens from 1945 to the Early 1960s’, and Tony Shaw’s, *British Cinema and the Cold War*.¹⁸ Yet despite the development and expansion of Cold War scholarship, there has been a limited focus on the Cold War in regard to memory studies.

Existing Cold War memory studies have tended to approach the topic from varying perspectives and sources. This scholarship includes that of Igor Torbakov, who looked at the

¹⁴ Paul Gilroy, *Postcolonial Melancholia*, (Columbia, Columbia University Press, 2005) <EBSCOhost, 0-search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=224606&site=ehost-live.> [Accessed 14 June 2021], pp. 79, 91.

¹⁵ I will later turn to considering Gilroy’s notion of Britain’s unwavering wartime memory in the context of how the Cold War conflict is not able to provide the same stability and pride, or national identity. This is particularly raised in Grace Huxford’s work on the forgotten war in Korea. (see later discussion on p.9)

¹⁶ See, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); See also, Matthew Grant, and Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Introduction: the Cold War as an imaginary war’, in *Understanding The Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 1 - 29 (pp. 10 - 11); Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 921.

¹⁷ Jonathan G. Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Tony Shaw, *Hollywood’s Cold War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).

¹⁸ Matthew Grant, ‘Images of Survival, Stories of Destruction: Nuclear War on British Screens from 1945 to the Early 1960s’, *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, 10. 1 (2013), pp. 7 - 26 <<https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0119>> [Accessed 22 January 2020]; Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The state, propaganda and consensus* (London: I.B Tauris, 2001); see also Tony Shaw, *Cinematic Terror: A Global History of Terrorism on Film* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

memory and legacy of the Cold War from an Eastern-European regional perspective,¹⁹ whilst other studies, including those of Jon Wiener and Rosanna Farbøl, have taken a national focus.²⁰ Each study however drew strongly on the significance and use of memory for national history, identity, and even modern political decisions. Whilst this thesis will focus more on cultural memory and less on political debate, the significance of modern politics in influencing memory will be acknowledged. These examples not only provide evidence of a move towards exploring the memory of Cold War experiences, and the importance of doing so on a regional or national basis; they are also highly indicative of the importance of looking at post-Cold War memory in order to gain an understanding of how memory is used in today's world and the social and cultural legacy of the period, an aim shared with this study on British cultural memory of the Cold War.

A far wider approach to Cold War memory has been utilised in David Lowe and Tony Joel's work, *Remembering the Cold War: Global contest and national stories*, which undoubtedly provided a basis on which to develop future Cold War memory studies.²¹ As they stated the contemporaneity of the Cold War and the expectation of new sources means there is unlikely to be a definitive account of Cold War memory.²² What their work established however, was an overview of acts and sites of Cold War remembrance in various parts of the world, demonstrating the vast and often conflicting messages depicted both within and between nations. The study also provided a framework on which to build future studies. The 'broad-brush' approach of their work gave vast coverage of Cold War memory, but also left significant

¹⁹ Igor Torbakov, 'History, Memory and National Identity: Understanding the Politics of History and Memory Wars in Post-Soviet Lands', *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 19. 3 (2011) pp. 209 – 232.

²⁰ Jon Wiener, *How We Forgot the Cold War: A Historical Journey across America* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2012); Farbøl, 'Commemoration of a Cold War'.

²¹ David Lowe and Tony Joel, *Remembering the Cold War: Global Contest and National Stories* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

²² Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 4.

gaps which need further development. Indeed this, they argued, was the anticipated outcome of their work. Lowe and Joel hope that other scholars will explore different avenues of memory of the period, specifically through film, museums, literature, and newspapers, for instance.²³

More recently, Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges published an edited collection of essays which explored aspects of ‘history, memory, and representation of the Cold War’ in various countries, capturing again an international perspective of Cold War memory using a cultural approach.²⁴ The subjects addressed varied from how the Cold War is conveyed in history text-books across Germany, France and Britain, to essays on espionage in fiction and cinema, Vietnamese memories of the American War and chapters relating to the Berlin Wall, among others. Unlike Lowe and Joel’s ‘broad brush’ approach, the edited collection, *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, provided focused essays written by various experts on the topics covered. This allowed for more detail on specific sites and themes than was possible in Lowe and Joel’s work, whilst still providing a broad overview of how the Cold War affected different parts of the world.

Literature on aspects of Britain’s Cold War is gradually emerging. Within Lowe and Joel’s work, references to British memory looked briefly at sites such as Greenham Common, Kelvedon Hatch Nuclear Bunker, and *The National Cold War Exhibition*, amid other sites.²⁵ These were, however, discussed briefly and in a framework of global remembering. Further to this, Wayne D. Cocroft’s chapter, ‘Protect and Survive: Preserving and Presenting the Built Cold War Heritage’ in *The Cold War*, explored the existence of and preservation of Cold War

²³ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, pp. xvii, 10, 224.

²⁴ Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges, ‘Rethinking, Representing, and Remembering the Cold War: Some Cultural Perspectives’, in *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 1 - 18 (pp. 4, 15 - 16).

²⁵ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, pp. 47 - 48, 58 - 59, 170 - 171.

sites and objects. Whilst this looked primarily at the UK, comparisons were drawn with Germany and the Baltic countries.²⁶ Cocroft has written extensively on Cold War sites and the preservation of such sites, taking an archaeological approach to the remembering of the Cold War.²⁷ Lastly, Grace Huxford's work *The Korean War in Britain*, addressed the 'forgotten' memory of the Korean War. Huxford addressed how the Korean War moved from generating moments of panic and interest to a largely forgotten war by the armistice in 1953. Through analysing life writing and other sources, Huxford explored notions of citizenship, selfhood and forgetting, demonstrating that despite its forgotten status, the Korean War was central to notions of selfhood, citizenship, and understandings of conflict in the post-1945 period. However, Huxford argued that the prevailing memory of the 'long Second World War' meant that the Korean War did not provide the same usable narrative of good vs. evil, memories of the Second World War having been ingrained in national identity. The Cold War could not provide such a narrative. Huxford thus placed the memory of the Korean War within that of a wider British Cold War memory.²⁸ In an earlier article, Huxford described the lack of analysis of Britain's experience of the Korean War being due, in part, to the 'difficulty in mapping the Cold War's impact on Britain, oscillating as it did between short-lived panics and longer-term low-level anxieties'.²⁹ Consequently, Huxford drew conclusions on the ambiguity of Britain's remembering of the Cold War. This thesis builds on and develops this existing literature on

²⁶ Wayne D. Cocroft, 'Protect and Survive: Preserving and Presenting the Built Cold War Heritage', in *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 215 - 238.

²⁷ See for example Wayne D. Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas, *Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989*, ed. by P. S. Barnwell (Swindon: Historic England, 2003).

²⁸ Grace Huxford, *The Korean War in Britain: Citizenship, Selfhood and Forgetting* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), p. 5.

²⁹ Grace Huxford, 'The Korean War Never Happened: Forgetting a Conflict in British Culture and Society', *Twentieth Century British History*, 27: 2 (2016), pp. 195 – 219 (p. 199).

Britain, focusing on a range of cultural media to assess Britain's cultural memory of the conflict and the development of this memory.

This analysis therefore meets the need for continued exploration into Cold War memory by using a cultural memory approach, combining the use of film with the analysis of museums and historical sites. In particular this enables a far more in-depth and extensive study of the increasing presence and significance of the Cold War in modern Britain. The thesis will demonstrate the changing nature of this memory, how it has developed since during the Cold War itself and continues to be reshaped and reworked, building on our understanding of the impact and significance of the Cold War for Britain. In addition, the study will provide a nation-specific investigation of Britain's Cold War memory, adding to national studies and the emerging literature on Britain and the memory of the Cold War and its legacy.

1.3 Sources and Methodology

This assessment of Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War is conducted through an exploration of British cultural sources, specifically a selection of post-1989 British films and television series, in addition to British museum exhibitions depicting the Cold War period, or a specific aspect of the conflict. Some attention will also be given to Cold War themed novels such as John le Carré's original *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* novel and his more recent *A Legacy of Spies*.³⁰ Whilst cultural portrayals from the Cold War itself are also acknowledged, the focus of this research is how memory has developed and how the Cold War is remembered in British culture today. A British focus enables the concentration of this thesis on how Britain's experience and memory of the Cold War is imagined, reflected, and communicated, for primarily British audiences. This allows for crucial considerations of the modern influences on

³⁰ John le Carré, *A Legacy of Spies*, (London: Viking, 2017).

these portrayals and why the Cold War is remembered in a particular way. The sources have been selected based on their focus on Cold War themes and narratives from an exclusively British perspective. Analysis is limited to British films and television series, and some novels, to concentrate on the British understandings and memories behind the creation of these cultural reflections, as well as the reviews and consumption of these by primarily, though not limited to, British audiences. It must of course be acknowledged that cultural products from other countries, especially from Hollywood in the USA, also provide significant contributions to cultural memory of the Cold War in Britain. In particular, recent years have seen the popular release of *Bridge of Spies* (2015) and *The Man From U.N.C.L.E* (2015). Equally, the German television series *Deutschland 83* proved popular in Britain, with a sequel released in the UK in March 2019.³¹ It must also be noted that whilst this thesis explores British cultural memory, the museum exhibitions and sites used are based in England. This is largely a result of the selected sites being popular and well-known sites or key national museums such as the Imperial War Museum and The National Archives. The sources used are thus specifically chosen for their wide-reach and the narratives they portray, in order to provide detailed comparisons. The cultural portrayals which are consulted in the thesis include adaptations of Cold War popular fiction such as the *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* film remake in 2011 and recent television dramas which sought to capture the aesthetics and paranoia of the Cold War world, such as *The Game* and *The Hour*.³² In addition to these, numerous Cold War museum exhibitions are analysed including those at The National Archives, RAF Cosford Museum, the Imperial War Museum London and those located in various nuclear bunkers. The prominence of these cultural forms

³¹ *Bridge of Spies*, dir. Steven Spielberg (20th Century Fox, 2015) [Motion picture]; *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.*, dir. Guy Ritchie (Warner Bros., 2015) [Motion picture]; *Deutschland 83*, Channel 4, 3 January 2016 - 14 February 2016 (release date for the UK, first released in the U.S, followed by Germany in 2015); *Deutschland 86*, Channel 4, 8 March 2019, 21:00.

³² *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. by Tomas Alfredson (StudioCanal, 2011) [Motion picture]; *The Game*, BBC Two, 30 April – 4 June 2015, 21:00; *The Hour* (Series 1), BBC Two, 19 July 2011- 23 August 2011; *The Hour* (Series 2), BBC Two, 14 November 2012 - 13 December 2012, 21:00.

in society, both as instruments of education and entertainment, provides a window into how such cultural depictions reflect, but also shape or even distort, how the Cold War is remembered and understood. In particular, the visual nature of these sources provides insight into how the Cold War period is recollected. Aesthetics and mise-en-scène can be analysed to understand how the visitor or audience can be immersed in the Cold War period and how they engage with these visual recollections. The use of these cultural forms also enables assessment of whether developments and concerns since the end of the Cold War have shaped how the period is portrayed and perceived. This can especially be gauged from what is included and omitted from selected Cold War narratives.

The exploration of these sources aids a cultural history and cultural memory approach to assess how the Cold War is remembered in Britain today. This thesis is a work of cultural history with a focus on representations. Peter Mandler has criticised a focus on representations in cultural history, stressing instead the need to explore and demonstrate the ‘throw’ of cultural sources, looking at ‘the conditions not only of its production but also of its distribution and reception’.³³ This thesis makes brief observations of the reception of films, television series and exhibitions through reviews, however, the prime focus is on representation and what the production and narrative of these representations demonstrate about the memory of the Cold War in Britain. Christine Grandy and others,³⁴ have defended the significance of representation, Grandy raising the challenge of how we explore the ‘throw’ of such cultural sources as Mandler suggests.³⁵ As Grandy highlights, there is often an absent audience in cultural history, providing a

³³ Peter Mandler, ‘The Problem with Cultural History’, *Cultural and Social History*, 1. 1 (2004), pp. 94 – 117 (p. 96) <<https://doi.org/10.1191/1478003804cs0002df>> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

³⁴ Geoff Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War: Film, British Collective Memory, and World War II’, *The American Historical Review*, 106. 3 (2001), pp. 818 – 838 <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2692326>> [Accessed 22 January 2020].

³⁵ Christine Grandy, ‘Cultural history’s absent audience’, *Cultural and Social History*, 16. 5 (2019), pp. 643 – 663 (p. 658) <<https://doi.org/10.1080/14780038.2019.1680226>> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

challenge for historians. Whilst culture is constantly consumed in the modern age, Grandy points to the fact that very few people note the effect of their response to that culture. Instead, Grandy makes the case that perhaps ‘the silences of majority audiences (. . .) also point to the complacency of pleased acceptance and privilege’.³⁶ In this case, the lack of audience response or opposition could simply indicate the acceptance and normality of the representations witnessed by audiences. Grandy further highlights that ‘The vast industry that measures audience response tells us that culture matters’, referring to data collection from social media companies.³⁷ As a result, this thesis focuses on and argues the significance of Cold War cultural representations over a focus on reception. The fact that Cold War themed films, television series and exhibitions continue to increase and be produced and consumed, demonstrates an appeal and significance to exploring the draw to these sources and what they demonstrate about British cultural memory of the Cold War.

Jan and Aleida Assmann’s framework of cultural memory being ‘founded on (. . .) material representations’ is essential to this study.³⁸ This thesis utilises film, television series, novels and exhibitions to consider how the Cold War is portrayed, imagined and understood. These sources are not literal reconstructions but representations of the Cold War and are significant as they shed insight not only into the time portrayed but also the time in which they are produced. Geoff Eley employs a similar methodology in his article, *Finding the People’s War*. In analysing Second World War themed films in post-war Britain, Eley demonstrates how the films highlight sentiments in the post-war period. Eley’s work shows that cultural sources such as film enable a ‘close reading’ of social and everyday life, through how they are constructed

³⁶ Grandy, ‘Cultural history’s absent audience’. p. 649, 658.

³⁷ Grandy, ‘Cultural history’s absent audience’. p. 659.

³⁸ Aleida Assmann, “‘Re-Framing Memory: Between Individual and Collective Forms of Constructing the Past’”, in *Performing the Past: Memory, History and Identity in Modern Europe*, ed. by Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree, Jay M. Winter (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010) pp. 35 – 50 (pp. 41 – 42).

and through contextualising their production, enabling an ‘anthropological analysis’.³⁹ In this instance, cultural representations are significant as they can be read as texts which inform on the topic reflected as well as the time in which it was created, and highlight sentiments, thought and notions of how events such as the Cold War are remembered in the post-1989 world. Equally, as Rhiannon Mason demonstrates, museums too can be read as cultural texts. As Mason states, the textual approach ‘involves reading an object of analysis like a text for its narrative structures and strategies’.⁴⁰ This thesis equally focuses on cultural texts and representations, what they demonstrate about the Cold War narratives that dominate, what is forgotten and how the sources reflect contemporary thought, understanding, and in turn, memory. Pierre Nora too, in his argument that history has supplanted true memory, points to history as a ‘representation of the past’; the fear of forgetting causing modern society to archive and seek an organised history to remember the past and form identities and understandings. These representations being a ‘reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete’.⁴¹ Material representations thus identify the history and “memory” individuals, groups and nations have chosen to remember and what has been forgotten, a key focus for this exploration of Britain’s memory of the Cold War.

Whilst this thesis does not focus primarily on the audience reception of these cultural representations, they are analysed on the basis that each one is produced with an imagined audience in mind and it is this audience, imagined by curators and directors, which is included in this analysis. It is thus necessary here to consider who is remembering the Cold War in post-1989 Britain and the intended audiences of cultural productions and material representations

³⁹ Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War’, p. 829.

⁴⁰ Rhiannon Mason, ‘Cultural Theory and Museum Studies’, in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. by Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Oxford Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 17 – 32 (p. 26).

⁴¹ Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire’, *Representations*, 26 (1989), pp. 7 – 24 (p. 8), < <https://doi.org/10.2307/2928520> > [Accessed 20 July 2021].

of the conflict. For many generations, looking back on the Cold War today, means looking back at their own personal history, those who grew up during aspects of the Cold War. Whilst some may remember the high points of the 1960s, younger generations would have grown up during Détente or the Second Cold War of the 1980s. For these generations, memories of the conflict will be shaped and influenced by their own experiences, particularly if they experienced events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the fear of Pershing II Missiles being located in Britain. However, alongside these audiences are those who grew up post-Cold War, born in the late 1980s or 1990s, having no lived experience of the conflict or fear of nuclear holocaust. For these generations, cultural productions will be their source of knowledge and understanding about the conflict, shaping the memory that is produced and shared. It is these audiences that writers, directors and curators are creating and tailoring representations of the Cold War to. Consequently, whilst focussing on representation over reception, this thesis acknowledges the intended audiences of Cold War cultural representations and how this may impact the shaping and communicating of Cold War memory.

Part of the cultural consumption around the Cold War period is the adaptation, reinterpretation and visitation of nuclear sites and nuclear bunkers; Cold War tourism in many ways being a form of dark tourism through revisiting the fears of nuclear holocaust. The appeal and attraction to Cold War cultural representations can itself be indicative of how the Cold War is remembered. In chapter four, the literature of dark tourism is employed to consider the appeal to Cold War and nuclear narratives. Dark tourism studies vary in their definitions. Whilst A. V. Seaton, in 1996, used the term thanatourism, relating to a reflection on death, Thomas Blom, in 2000, used the term morbid tourism to define an attraction to the unknown.⁴² John Lennon

⁴² A. V. Seaton, 'Guided by the dark: From thanatopsis to thanatourism', *International journal of heritage studies*, 2. 4 (1996), pp. 234 - 244 (p. 235), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13527259608722178>> [Accessed 23 March 2020]; Thomas Blom, 'Morbid tourism - a postmodern market niche with an example from Althorp', *Norsk*

and Malcolm Foley also used the term dark tourism yet argued that it is a product of post-modern society.⁴³ However, Avital Biran and Yaniv Poria subsequently argued that the application of dark tourism is too broad and varied and that the word ‘dark’ can have different scales. They instead argued for a focus on how visitors perceive sites.⁴⁴ In exploring and acknowledging the literature on dark tourism, this thesis seeks to explore the appeal to Cold War and, in particular, nuclear sites and narratives.

The cultural memory approach employed throughout this thesis focuses on the work of Jan and Aleida Assmann. Their work has contributed to a growing literature and debate surrounding approaches to memory studies. In particular, their focus on cultural memory built on one much debated concept in the literature, that of ‘collective memory’ or ‘la memoire collective’, established by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in 1925. Halbwachs argued that individuals recall their own memories in society through conversing with others or within ‘social frameworks’, referring to the various groups an individual may belong to such as class and family.⁴⁵ As part of this sharing of memories Halbwachs argued that memory was not solely individual but ‘collective’, as the views and perspectives of others, as well as existing social thoughts and discourse, alter and influence individual memories. Halbwachs however made clear that it is only individuals who are capable of remembering.⁴⁶ Halbwachs’ work therefore moved considerations of memory into a social perspective, its significance lying in

Geografisk Tidsskrift, 54. 1 (2000), pp. 29 - 36 (p. 29), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/002919500423564>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

⁴³ John Lennon and Malcolm Foley, *Dark Tourism: The Attraction of Death and Disaster*, (Andover: Cengage Learning EMEA, 2010 [originally published 2000]), p. 11.

⁴⁴ Avital Biran and Yaniv Poria, ‘Reconceptualising dark tourism’, in *Contemporary Tourist Experience: Concepts and consequences*, ed. By Richard Sharpley and Philip R. Stone (Abingdon, Routledge: 2012), pp. 59 – 70 (p. 70).

⁴⁵ Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, ed., and trans. by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 38.

⁴⁶ Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, pp. 39-40, 51, 188-189.

the acknowledgement that individual memories are not formed irrespective of external social influences.

J. Assmann and A. Assmann have specifically added to the literature on cultural memory. J. Assmann looked at the distinction between ‘communicative memory’, meaning ‘everyday interaction’, and ‘cultural memory’, which is established in objects and artefacts forming representations of the past. J. Assmann identifies that these material representations reflect past events which are remembered differently in each contemporary context.⁴⁷ This expanded on Halbwachs’ work and emphasised the separate ‘cultural memory’.⁴⁸ Both J. and A. Assmann favour a clearer delineation of collective memory, A. Assmann suggested that whilst Halbwachs’ work is crucial, it needs to be further broken down to avoid ‘vagueness’, and offered three alternative formats: social, political and cultural memory. Social memory meaning ‘the past as experienced and communicated’, with political memory and cultural memory being ‘founded on durable carriers of symbols and material representations’, political memory helping to create national histories and identities.⁴⁹ Finally, A. Assmann divided cultural memory into canon or active memory, which keeps the ‘past as present’, such as a museum, and the archive or passive memory, which keeps the ‘past as past’, such as an archive or warehouse.⁵⁰ The idea of canon or active memory is most relevant for this study, with museums and audiovisual representations choosing which aspects of the Cold War to preserve for cultural memory. This more acutely defined description of cultural memory benefits this

⁴⁷ Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, *New German Critique*, 65 (1995), pp. 125 – 133 (pp. 129 – 130), < <https://doi.org/10.2307/488538> > [Accessed 20 July 2021].

⁴⁸ Jan Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, in *A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies*, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning in collaboration with Sara B. Young (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2010) pp. 109 -118 (p. 110); See also Alexandre Dessingué, ‘From Collectivity to Collectiveness: Reflections (with Halbwachs and Bakhtin) on the Concept of Collective Memory’, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Memory Studies*, ed. by Siobhan Kattago (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2015) pp.89 - 101 (p. 92).

⁴⁹ Assmann, “‘Re-Framing Memory’”, pp. 41-42.

⁵⁰ Assmann, “‘Re-Framing Memory’”, p. 43; Aleida Assmann, ‘Canon and Archive’ in *A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies*, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning in collaboration with Sara B. Young (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2010), pp. 97 - 107 (p. 98).

study, highlighting the significance of objects and institutions as carrying memory in a collective or wider society. As J. Assmann has stated, cultural memory is simply another ‘form of collective memory’ as it is shared and presents ‘a collective, that is, cultural, identity’.⁵¹ It is this collective cultural memory and identity with the Cold War which this thesis is interested in.

Popular culture, and film in particular, has often been utilised in assessing cultural memory of previous conflicts. For example, Geoff Eley’s work on depictions of the Second World War in post-war Britain, employed film to assess how contemporary culture re-shaped and presented narratives of the war.⁵² Both Marco Ferro in *Cinema and History* and Pierre Sorlin in *The Film in History* also advocated the ability of film to inform about the time in which they were produced, as well as the time depicted.⁵³ Academics increasingly justify the study of film and television as being crucial in the twenty-first century, where a ‘media-dependence’ is escalating.⁵⁴ Robert A. Rosenstone’s argument, that the importance of film for historical study lay in the fact that it is through this medium that the majority of people learn about the past, is particularly significant for the study of popular culture in evaluating cultural memory.⁵⁵ In assessing cultural memory of a historic event such as the Cold War, it would therefore be neglectful not to evaluate the key media which form cultural understandings and in turn memories of events. The increasing number of Cold War dramas and films produced is itself

⁵¹ J. Assmann, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, p. 110.

⁵² Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War’.

⁵³ Marco Ferro, *Cinema and History*, trans. by Naomi Greene (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), p. 161; Pierre Sorlin, *The Film in History: Restaging the Past* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1980), pp. 16-17; See also Marnie Hughes-Warrington, *History Goes to the Movies: Studying History on Film* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 4.

⁵⁴ Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture*, trans. by Sara B. Young (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 116.

⁵⁵ Robert A. Rosenstone, *History on Film/ Film on History*, Second Edition (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd., 2012), p.4.

indicative of a public interest in these narratives and thus their role in shaping cultural memory of the conflict cannot be ignored.

As Astrid Erll has termed it, ‘the medium is the memory’ meaning each form of media would present the past in different ways, which in turn would shape understandings and memories of the past.⁵⁶ Film and television for example, not only present a narrative of history, but also make the audience feel emotionally involved,⁵⁷ inevitably shaping the viewer’s response and understanding of the historical narrative presented to them. This thesis consequently assesses film and television, with consideration given to their creative boundaries and ability to elicit emotional connections to the past, and the effect this can have on memory. This is achieved both through analysis of how the narratives are selected and portrayed in these media, but also reviews, to gauge the effects of these narratives on their viewers, and how they have been received and understood. This relationship between the audiovisual media and audiences was emphasised by Stuart Hall on the analysis of television and his ‘encoding-decoding’ model.⁵⁸ Hall proposed that whilst the producers may create or encode a drama with a specific message in mind, the viewer’s decoding of that drama may differ due to new and existing knowledge, background, and other influences; this can also be applied to film.⁵⁹ The viewer is thus not passive but rather critical to how television programmes, and equally film, are decoded and understood. Contextualisation and exploration of the influences surrounding production and reception are therefore key to assessing cultural memory.

⁵⁶ Erll, *Memory in Culture*, p. 115.

⁵⁷ See Rosenstone, *History on Film/ Film on History*, p.18; Alison Landsberg, *Engaging the Past: Mass Culture and the Production of Historical Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 10.

⁵⁸ Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, *Paper for the Council of Europe Colloquy on “Training in The Critical Reading of Television Language”*, September 1973, <<http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-artslaw/history/cccs/stencilled-occasionalpapers/1to8and11to24and38to48/SOP07.pdf>>, [Accessed 30 August 2016].

⁵⁹ Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, pp. 2-4.

Eley has similarly defended this view in his remark that film ‘provides a screen for contemporary anxieties and dilemmas’.⁶⁰ As Eley’s argument highlights, audiovisual media are an ideal source for exploring how the contemporary world may have affected depictions and understandings of past events, such as the Cold War. As has been widely acknowledged, film and television, just like written history or museum exhibitions, are selected reconstructions of the past, and not simply reflections of history.⁶¹ In this sense films and television productions are very much products of their own time. However, this is part of a wider process, and Marnie Hughes-Warrington has argued the need for clarity in that such media representations are not simply about the present in which they were produced but argued for the acknowledgment of their ‘temporal heterogeneity’. This approach suggested that analysis needs to collectively consider the past depicted, the time in which the film or drama was produced, and the time in which it is viewed.⁶² Whilst determining the time of the film or drama’s viewing may be difficult, the period of its release can be contextualised. Overall, this provides a more detailed analytical approach for film and television, which explores the various influences on the production of both the history it attempts to recreate, and the influences of the contemporary world on production and reception.

The approaches to assessing film and television share some similarities with the assessment of museum exhibitions. Museology, the study of the history, role and classification of museums,⁶³ has in recent decades progressed from a focus merely on collecting and preserving artefacts, to exploring the purpose and role of the institutions, the study of which is known as ‘new

⁶⁰ Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War’, p. 837.

⁶¹ Erll, *Memory in Culture*, p. 114; Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War’, p. 838; Rosenstone, *History on Film/ Film on History*, p. 182; Hughes-Warrington, *History Goes to the Movies*, p. 187; Landsberg, *Engaging the Past*, p. 30.

⁶² Hughes-Warrington, *History Goes to the Movies*, pp.10, 76.

⁶³ International Council of Museums, *Professional Training of Museum Personnel in the World* (Paris: ICOM, 1972) quoted in Peter Woodhead and Geoffrey Stansfield, *Keyguide to Information Sources in Museum Studies*, Second Edition (London: Mansell Publishing, 1994), p. 14.

museology'.⁶⁴ This also coincided with a rise in the establishment and attendance of museums.⁶⁵ Peter Vergo's *New Museology*, provided a basis of this new outlook and assessment of museums, arguing that issues were found with the previous focus of the discipline on 'museum methods'.⁶⁶ Instead, Vergo's edited collection of articles offered varied ways of exploring and understanding museums, and importantly, understanding the relationship between museums, curators and visitors.⁶⁷ Scholars advocating 'new museology' have pointed to the significant role of the visitor, and the emphasis of this new scholarship on benefitting and appealing to the needs of communities.⁶⁸

However, museums are increasingly seen as commodities and leisure institutions, and visitors as customers. This has significantly altered perceptions as to the role of such institutions and what is expected from them.⁶⁹ Whilst still very much viewed as places of education, museums are increasingly sought as sources of entertainment. This development has placed new demands on museums and historical sites and could be seen to influence historical representations, either through the use of modern technology, or to the extent of dramatising history to meet entertainment demands.⁷⁰ In addition to this, a recent memory boom, following trends in family and public history, has resulted in museums also being seen as places for people to find an

⁶⁴ Roger Silverstone, "The Medium Is the Museum: On Objects and Logics in Times and Spaces", in *Museums and the Public Understanding of Science*, ed. by John Durant (London: Science Museum in association with the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science, 1992), pp. 34 - 42, (p. 34); see also, Peter Vergo, 'Introduction', in *The New Museology*, ed. by P. Vergo (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1997) pp. 8 - 12, (p. 10) *VLeBooks* <<https://r2.vlereader.com/Reader?ean=9781861896704>> [Accessed 13 December 2020].

⁶⁵ Susan A. Crane, 'Introduction: Of Museums and Memory', in *Museums and Memory*, ed. by Susan A. Crane (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 1 - 13 (p. 1).

⁶⁶ Vergo, 'Introduction', p. 10.

⁶⁷ Vergo (ed.) *The New Museology*; See Ludmilla Jordanova, 'Objects of Knowledge: A Historical Perspective on Museums', in *The New Museology* ed. by Peter Vergo (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1997) pp.31-52 (p.34). *VLeBooks* <<https://r2.vlereader.com/Reader?ean=9781861896704>> [Accessed 13 December 2020].

⁶⁸ Sheila Watson, 'Museums and Their Communities' in *Museums and Their Communities*, ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1 - 23 (pp. 1, 13).

⁶⁹ Stephen Weil, 'The Museum and the Public', in *Museums and Their Communities*, ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 32 - 46 (p. 33); Barbara Misztal, 'Memory Experience: The Forms and Functions of Memory' in *Museums and Their Communities*, ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 379 - 396 (pp. 389 - 390).

⁷⁰ See Misztal, 'Memory Experience', pp. 389 - 390.

understanding of their past and their identities.⁷¹ These new perceived roles for museums, based on the needs of society, highlight the increasing influence of the visitor in determining what museums display and how, and the significance of museums in shaping people's cultural identities and memories, highlighting their significance.

Sharon Macdonald and Sir William Henry Flower have remarked that the methods and techniques of display are of great significance in how the visitor interacts with an exhibition, advocating that scholars take into consideration the aesthetics of display, the artefacts used, and the use of reconstructions, when assessing the process behind museums.⁷² Much like the ways *mise-en-scène* and camera shots shape how film and television is received and decoded, the display of museums is of equal importance. In addition to this, both Ludmilla Jordanova and Patricia Gillard have explored the visitor's experience. Jordanova has argued that what is displayed and how it is presented is only part of what visitors take from the experience, instead she added that the imagination of the individual further translates the 'knowledge' offered by the museum.⁷³ Equally, Gillard remarked on the development in scholarship of looking at the visitor as having an 'active' as opposed to 'passive' role, and that individuals will interpret exhibitions and sites on the basis of personal knowledge and experience.⁷⁴ Similarly to Hall's methodology for analysing television programmes, this perspective follows much the same encoding-decoding principle - that the institution and curator have aims and particular

⁷¹ Annette van den Bosch, 'Museums: Constructing a Public Culture in the Global Age' in *Museums and Their Communities*, ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 501 – 509 (p. 506).

⁷² Sharon Macdonald, 'Exhibitions of Power and Powers of Exhibition: An Introduction to the Politics of Display', in *Museums and Their Communities*, ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 176 – 196 (p. 179); Sir. William Henry Flower, 'Local Museums' in *Memory Studies: An Anthology of Contexts*, ed. by Bettina M. Carbonell (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), pp. 315 - 317 (p. 316).

⁷³ Jordanova, 'Objects of Knowledge', p. 34.

⁷⁴ Patricia Gillard, 'Shaping Audiences Online: Principles of Audience Development for Cultural Institutions', *Media International Australia incorporating Culture and Policy*, 94. 1 (2000), pp. 117 - 130 (p. 122) < <http://mia.sagepub.com/content/94/1/117> > [Accessed 21 October 2016]; See also Kenneth Hudson, 'The Museum Refuses to Stand Still', in *Memory Studies: An Anthology of Contexts*, ed. by Bettina M. Carbonell (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), pp. 85 – 91 (p. 91).

messages to provide, yet the individual will interact with these concepts based on their own knowledge and experience.⁷⁵

Further challenges discussed by academics of ‘new museology’ are drawn from the emphasis on communities, namely, how to define them. Most academics have agreed that globalisation and multi-culturalism have brought new challenges to museums and historical sites; whilst museums tended in the past to offer a national history or memory, this has become fragmented by the complexity of modern society.⁷⁶ The increasing diversity and looking to public history has led academics and museum professionals alike to look at methods such as co-production and co-curation, to work with communities and create reflective and diverse narratives.⁷⁷ It is crucial to acknowledge that communities visiting museums and historical sites have grown, and continue to become, more complex and heterogeneous.⁷⁸ Consequently, such institutions now, more than ever, have to balance differing generational, social or cultural perspectives and memories of events, and even ‘rival histories’ are produced, for various groups and needs in society.⁷⁹ For example, rather than attempt an overall or national history of the Cold War, many museums seem instead to focus on certain themes and events in order to, either appeal to specific groups, or focus on more general audiences who may be able to relate to certain themes and aspects of the Cold War period. How exhibitions are designed to appeal thus influences the history depicted.

⁷⁵ Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, pp. 2 – 4.

⁷⁶ Misztal, ‘Memory Experience’, p. 387; Watson, ‘Museums and Their Communities’, pp. 6 - 7.

⁷⁷ Sarah Lloyd and Julie Moore, ‘Sedimented Histories: Connections, Collaborations and Co-production in Regional History’, *History Workshop Journal*, 80. 1 (2015) pp. 234 – 248 <<https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbv017>> [Accessed 22 January 2020]; Tim Boon, ‘Co-Curation and the Public History of Science and Technology’, *Curator: The Museum Journal*, 54. 4 (2011), pp. 383 – 387 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2151-6952.2011.00102.x>> [Accessed 22 January 2020].

⁷⁸ Watson, ‘Museums and Their Communities’, pp. 6 - 7.

⁷⁹ See Gaynor Kavanagh, ‘Melodrama, Pantomime or Portrayal?: Representing Ourselves and the British Past through Exhibitions in History Museums’, in *Memory Studies: An Anthology of Contexts*, ed. by Bettina M. Carbonell (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), pp. 348 - 355 (p. 349); Watson, ‘Museums and Their Communities’, pp. 6 - 7.

Particularly in regard to exploring the Cold War themed exhibitions there is a degree of visitor observation in acknowledging how audiences may respond or relate to the curated cultural productions of the Cold War. Whilst the focus of this work is representations of the Cold War, there are some observations of how audiences and visitors are guided and how they may respond to the representations. Observation is an ethnographic research method, stemming from anthropological and sociological studies and is used and defended as a technique by a range of fields.⁸⁰ For instance, Simon During points to the work of Ien Ang in analysing audience responses to *Dallas* by placing herself as a fan of the show to ‘encourage engaged replies’ in the form of letters.⁸¹ Equally, David Morley in attempting to provide a better model for understanding media audiences and their responses, used research subjects to evaluate the programme *Nationwide*, Morley acting as a ‘neutral narrator’.⁸² Furthermore, in war and culture and bunker studies, Sean L. Kinnear employed an ethnographic observation approach by volunteering to restore a bunker in order to observe volunteers and the efforts to protect and restore nuclear bunkers.⁸³ In this thesis, much focus is placed on how curators and directors depict the Cold War, how they select and shape the narrative and guide audiences, acknowledging the fact that each cultural production was created with an audience in mind. However, in visiting museum exhibitions and immersive events such as that at Greenham Common, I too am part of the audience, engaged in responding to these cultural productions and observing how visitors and audiences navigate and respond to the narratives depicted.

⁸⁰ Simon During, ‘Introduction’, in *The Cultural Studies Reader [Second Edition]*, ed. by Simon During (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1 – 28 (p. 18.).

⁸¹ During, ‘Introduction’, p. 18; see also Ien Ang, *Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic imagination*, (London: Methuen, 1985).

⁸² During, ‘Introduction’, p. 18; see also David Morley, *The ‘Nationwide’ Audience: Structure and Decoding*, BFI Television Monographs, 11 (London: BFI, 1980).

⁸³ Sean L. Kinnear, ‘Reopening the Bunker: An Architectural Investigation of the Post-war Fate of Four Scottish Nuclear Bunkers’, *Journal of War and Culture Studies*, 13. 1 (2020), pp. 75 – 96 (p. 85) <<https://doi.org/10.1080/17526272.2019.1688987>> [Accessed 20 July 2021].

A final point for consideration when assessing museum exhibitions and historical sites can be found in the work of Ashplant, Dawson and Roper. They offer a method for analysis of sites of memory, exploring what they have called the ‘articulation of memory’ through ‘agencies’ and ‘arenas’ of articulation. ‘Agencies of articulation’ are those behind or promoting the remembering of an event, including the state, civil society and local groups; and ‘arenas of articulation’ can vary from the family, national, or even international, and is where the remembering takes place.⁸⁴ This thesis explores such sites, arenas or spaces in museums and popular culture, looking at British cultural memory of the Cold War, and will focus on the agencies behind such cultural representations, whether that is individuals, the state or particular organisations, in order to gauge the process and influences surrounding a specific memory or representation of the Cold War.

1.4 Post-1989 History

In looking at post-1989 cultural portrayals, it is important to acknowledge post-1989 history and the events which led to a revisiting of the Cold War past. The era of post-1989 in which British cultural memory of the Cold War is explored is now itself a period spanning over thirty years. This section briefly examines the history of the post-Cold War world and how this has shaped memory of the conflict in Britain. The era will be addressed as two periods: the first from 1989 to September 2001 and the second from post-9/11 to present day. This distinction enables emphasis on the events of 9/11 as a potential key turning point in memory of the Cold War.

⁸⁴ Ashplant, T. G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, “The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics”, in *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* ed. by T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3 - 85 (pp. 16 – 17).

1.4.1 1989-2001

Immediately post-Cold War, there was a readjustment period as the world moved out of the east-west conflict that had divided the world for forty-five years. Many looked on this as a unipolar world order with the USA as the sole military, economic and cultural superpower. Michael Cox, in *The Post Cold War World*, states that many Western commentators immediately post-Cold War were ‘self-confident’ and ‘buoyant’.⁸⁵ During Clinton’s Presidency (1993-2001) several attempts were made to partner with the successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation. John Major, Prime Minister from 1990-1997, was also quick to establish good relations with the new Russian Federation. In November 1992, during a visit by Boris Yeltsin to the UK, the two leaders signed ‘the first friendship treaty between their two countries since 1766’ leading Major to state “‘We are consigning the Cold War to history’”.⁸⁶

Rebuilding relations with Russia was not without tensions, including Ukraine, Chechnya and the 1993 Russian elections, in which ‘opposition to economic change’ gained more power in the State Duma.⁸⁷ In 2000, Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin as the leader of the Russian Federation. Unlike Yeltsin who rejected the Soviet past from Russian history, Putin sought to revive it, seeing success and glory in Russia’s Soviet past. Within the wider context of a gradual shift toward right-wing and identity politics towards the end of the twentieth century, a nostalgic focus on national pride and heritage through anniversaries and commemoration,

⁸⁵ Michael Cox, *The Post Cold War World: Turbulence and Change in World Politics Since the Fall* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 165 – 166.

⁸⁶ ‘How Yeltsin Helped Thaw the Big Freeze with Britain’, *The Guardian*, Monday 23 April 2007 <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/23/russia.uk>> [Accessed 28 June 2021].

⁸⁷ Cox, *The Post Cold War World*, pp. 103 – 105.

served rising political needs.⁸⁸ As a result, the Cold War period re-entered national language, rhetoric, attitudes, and policies.⁸⁹

In the early-2000s, Communism and the Cold War re-entered European memory and language. Previously, European and British memory had heavily focussed on the Second World War. In the 1990s, particularly in 1995 the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War saw commemorative events mark the war as a unifying moment in British national and European memory. In commenting on the 40th and 50th anniversaries of the conflict, Janet Watson stated that key events ‘were marked in a wide variety of ways, including newspaper, radio, and television coverage (...) Parliamentary debate and government reports; museum exhibitions; and a plethora of material commemorative objects’.⁹⁰ The Second World War was thus alive and present in news, culture, and society between 1989 and 1995. The Cold War instead faded into the past.

Further to this, as the European Parliament 2015 study on ‘European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives’ shows, throughout the 1990s and in the early-2000s, the European Union (EU) sought to unite European citizens around a collective memory of the Second World War, specifically National Socialism and the Holocaust, and later also Stalinism and Communism.⁹¹ The study states that this focus centred on the notion that an understanding of European and EU ‘principles such as freedom, democracy and respect of human rights’, could be emphasised by acknowledging ‘breaches of those very principles by 20th Century

⁸⁸ Francis Fukuyama, ‘30 Years of World Politics: What has Changed’, *Journal of Democracy*, 31. 1 (2020), pp. 11 – 21 (p. 4), <<https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0001>> [Accessed 20 July 2021].

⁸⁹ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 196.

⁹⁰ Janet Watson, ‘The material culture of Second World War Commemoration in Britain’, in *British Cultural Memory and the Second World War*, ed. by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), pp. 171 - 188 (p, 172).

⁹¹ Markus J. Prutsch, *European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives – Study* (Brussels: European Parliament, 2015), p. 6 <<https://openarchive.icomos.org/id/eprint/2320/>> [Accessed 28 June 2021].

totalitarianism'.⁹² Once again, these memories served a political need to establish a European identity amid the expansion of the European Union and the European project, adding legitimacy.⁹³ The Second World War memory has thus been highlighted across EU states from the 1990s (of which Britain was a member until 2020).

However, as the study demonstrates, the inclusion of Stalinist totalitarianism and Communism in the EU framework of European memory, largely resulted from the EU's Eastern expansion, which began with the integration of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004.⁹⁴ The more recent experience of Soviet occupation and suffering for Eastern European countries meant expanding European identity beyond the evil of National Socialism and the Holocaust to acknowledging 'National Socialism and Stalinism as equally evil'. This differing experience but also the fact that several Eastern European countries were complicit in the Holocaust and concentration camps, led to this readjustment of European memory.⁹⁵ The Eastern expansion of the EU and inclusion of Stalinism and Communism in EU memory could account, in part, for a resurgence in looking to the Cold War and the effects of the Western fight against Communism, as EU members actively communicated this collective European memory.

A further key turning point in Cold War memory post-1989 was the 9/11 attacks. The attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001 shook not only the USA but the world. The scale and devastation of the attacks brought the new threat of global terrorism starkly to the forefront of politics and the news. In the USA, the attacks saw a return to rhetoric from both the Second World War, particularly the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the Cold War. As

⁹² Prutsch, *European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives – Study*, p. 16.

⁹³ Prutsch, *European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives – Study*, p. 6.

⁹⁴ Prutsch, *European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives – Study*, p. 23.

⁹⁵ Prutsch, *European Historical Memory: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives – Study*, p. 23

Lowe and Joel stated, George Bush's 'administration's later references to the Cold War as instructive in the war on al-Qaeda left commentators wondering whether Bush intended to 'contain' America's enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan or engage in 'roll-back'.⁹⁶ An article in the *Times* in June 2004 equally remarked that Bush, in 'comparing America's brand of liberty with the totalitarianism of the terrorists, evoked the West's victory over the Soviet Union'.⁹⁷ 9/11 and its aftermath therefore not only saw a turning point in policies and global threats, it also reignited Cold War rhetoric and understanding, bringing the Cold War back into the present, driven by a new relevance to modern events.

In contrast, in the UK, as Lowe and Joel highlight, Tony Blair declared 9/11 as 'the dawn of an era in which there were no guidance markers, a complete break from the past'.⁹⁸ John Tosh has remarked on the absence of historical awareness of previous British intervention in Iraq in the early twentieth century, which would have provided key insights on the risks and impacts of British intervention in Iraq in 2003. The lack of awareness of this in the public domain in the lead up to British intervention supported Blair's declaration of an unprecedented threat, instead news centred on the horrors of Saddam Hussein's regime and at the most acknowledged lessons of appeasement in the 1930s.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, in painting 9/11 and the War on Terror as a new era, space was left for the Cold War to be looked on nostalgically. In the face of a new threat where the enemy and cause of the conflict was unclear, the previous conflict between East and West, could increasingly be looked on as a time of certainty, and even stability. Indeed

⁹⁶ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, pp. 192 – 193; see also footnote 106, *Remembering the Cold War*, p.207; Jan Angstrom, 'Mapping the Competing Historical Analogies of the War on Terrorism: The Bush Presidency', *International Relations*, 25. 2 (2011), 224 – 242, <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117811404448>> [Accessed 20 July 2021].

⁹⁷ Reid Watson and Tim Roland, 'Fight against terror 'like World War Two'', *Times* 3 June 2004, p.19, *The Times Digital Archive*, <link.gale.com/apps/doc/IF0502562745/TTDA?u=essex&sid=bookmark-TTDA&xid=40ced2cf> [Accessed 26 June 2021].

⁹⁸ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 193; John Tosh, *Why History Matters* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) <<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/universityofessex-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4762929>> [Accessed 13 July 2021] p. 5.

⁹⁹ Tosh, *Why History Matters*, p. 3.

Paul Boyer, in remarking on the anniversary of *Dr Strangelove* in 2004, stated that 9/11 and the new War on Terror enabled a nostalgic look back on the Cold War with a sense of clear world order and stable governments.¹⁰⁰

1.4.2 Post-9/11- Today

Following 9/11, the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan and later Iraq caused increasing lack of faith in the British government. This arose with the controversy surrounding the Iraq war. Despite one of the largest protests at the time prior to the UK's entry into Iraq, the Blair government committed British troops to the conflict in 2003 in support of the US, on the grounds that the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction. The later failure to find these weapons led to allegations that government reports had been "sexed up" to justify the conflict. The moral outcry over the UK's commitment to the war led to the Chilcot Inquiry and questions of the morality and worth of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq became commonplace.¹⁰¹ The financial crash in 2008 and MP expenses scandal further damaged any trust.¹⁰² As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the new conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, the War on Terror and later in Syria have enabled a rose-tinted view of the Cold War. The Cold War in contrast to the present can be seen as more stable and certain. As such, memory of the Cold War has developed and altered in relation to current events.

The increasing tensions between the West and countries including Iran and North Korea over nuclear proliferation have also worked to draw the Cold War and nuclear fears back into

¹⁰⁰ Paul S. Boyer, 'Looking Back: "Dr. Strangelove" at 40: The Continuing Relevance of a Cold War Cultural Icon', *Arms Control Today*, 34. 10 (2004), 46 – 48 (p. 46), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23627447>> [Accessed 19 April 2018].

¹⁰¹ Rosemary Hollis, 'The United Kingdom: Fateful Decision, Divided Nation', in Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds.) *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 37-48 (pp. 40, 42 - 43).

¹⁰² James Slack, 'Britain 'is suffering a huge loss of faith in its institutions': Trust in all politicians has slumped to an all-time low, say researchers', *Mail Online*, 20 March 2013, <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2296085/Britain-suffering-huge-loss-faith-institutions-Trust-politicians-slumped-time-low-say-researchers.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

significance. Similarly, a series of espionage scandals including the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in 2006, the discovery of Russian spy Anna Chapman, and the more recent poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter, harp back to notions of Cold War espionage and clandestine warfare. Toby Whithouse, writer of *The Game*, even noted Anna Chapman as part of the inspiration for his Cold War espionage drama.¹⁰³

The continued impact of the Cold War and its increasing significance in the world today due to nuclear proliferation and espionage scandals thus help to explain the gradual increase in cultural representations of the conflict. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the present and undefined enemies in the War on Terror enable the Cold War to be looked on nostalgically. It is this increasing fascination and rise in cultural representations of the Cold War that this thesis is interested in, and how this shapes British cultural memory of the conflict.

1.5 Themes in Britain's Cultural Memory

Shaping this analysis of cultural memory there are three key influences. The first being the challenge of how to define the Cold War period and issues with strict periodisation of the conflict. The challenges of how to define the Cold War begin with the term 'Cold War' itself. The term first being used by George Orwell in 1945, was used to define the developing hostility between the USA and Soviet Union at the time, a conflict not just, or even primarily, based on military warfare but on a new system of power, with the atomic bomb at the centre.¹⁰⁴ The term 'Cold War' is a complex concept, which has become synonymous with a wide range of issues and events, and indeed has been used to define the entire period between the end of the Second

¹⁰³ 'The Game Media Pack', BBC, retrieved from *thewaybackmachine*, <web.archive.org/web/20150421014702/http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/the-game-media-pack.pdf> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹⁰⁴ Westad, 'The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century', p. 3; See also Grant and Ziemann, 'Introduction: the Cold War as an imaginary war', pp. 1 – 2.

World War and 1989 to 1991.¹⁰⁵ As Holger Nehring has argued, the term has increasingly been applied vaguely with little analysis or explanation of what in fact the ‘Cold War’ was or what it meant.¹⁰⁶ Highly debated is the period of the conflict itself as well as the nature of the conflict. The complexity of the term is highlighted in the work of John Lewis Gaddis. In 1986 Gaddis defined the Cold War as a ‘long peace’, though this has since been acknowledged as a result of his writing in the post-détente period, and rightly criticised by some as being largely inaccurate, particularly for countries which witnessed mass violence and because the fear of nuclear war was always present.¹⁰⁷ After the Cold War, Gaddis shifted his stance to a more traditionalist one, seeing the Cold War as a conflict of ‘good vs. evil’ with America incapable of diplomacy when faced with Stalin’s paranoia and the Soviet Union’s ideological drive.¹⁰⁸ Thus time affects perspectives of the conflict - how it is seen and defined is open to differing interpretations.

Arne Westad has pointed to the significance of regional differences in defining the ‘Cold War’, each side having their own set of values, experiences and understandings.¹⁰⁹ Romero agrees with ‘Arne Westad’ s plea for a ‘pluralist approach’ to Cold War history; Romero arguing that other ‘broad dynamics’ held greater significance in the global south than the Cold War, instead various spheres of research would provide a greater understanding of the conflict in different parts of the world.¹¹⁰ This need to acknowledge regional differences has also been posed in Heonik Kwon’s work. Kwon moved away from a Eurocentric approach to a more global one,

¹⁰⁵ Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, pp. 923 – 924.

¹⁰⁶ Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, pp. 923, 931.

¹⁰⁷ Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 925; Grant and Ziemann, ‘Introduction: the Cold War as an imaginary war’, p. 25.

¹⁰⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); See also Anders Stephanson, ‘Review: Rethinking Cold War History’, *Review of International Studies*, 24. 1 (1998), pp. 119 - 124 (pp. 119 - 120) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097509>> [Accessed 22 January 2020].

¹⁰⁹ Westad, ‘The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century’, p. 6.

¹¹⁰ Romero, ‘Cold War historiography at the crossroads’, pp. 690, 693.

arguing that whilst the Cold War may never have escalated to a full military conflict, or was, as some have labelled it an ‘imaginary war’ in the West, it was real for other places of the world; Kwon’s particular focus being that of Korea and Vietnam, where military force caused devastation.¹¹¹ The ‘Cold War’ has different meanings for different parts of the world, as such Nehring and Westad argued that the Cold War cannot be seen as an all-encompassing concept.¹¹²

Considering the concept of the ‘Cold War’ from a primarily western or British perspective, as is necessary for this study, it is useful to look at the existing scholarship on the idea of the ‘imaginary war’. Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann’s recent work looked at the ‘Cold War’ as an ‘imaginary war’ and how the Cold War, and at its centre the bomb, symbolic of nuclear war, was imagined in popular culture, society and in government. It explored how these ‘assumptions’ influenced understandings, politics and strategy during the period. Their work proposed that whilst a full-scale military conflict never fully materialised, the fear of war and nuclear devastation was real, resulting in a mind-set of the need of defence and nuclear deterrence, or for others the removal of nuclear weapons.¹¹³ With the subsiding, or at least decreasing, of this fear with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict was in this sense at an end, providing a frame for the period of the Cold War.¹¹⁴ This is particularly interesting when combined with Nehring’s suggestion that we look at previous scholarship on war in order to define the ‘Cold War’.¹¹⁵ Nehring stated that wars have two dominant aspects, including a collapse in diplomacy, and a build-up of violence, both in arms

¹¹¹ Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

¹¹² Westad, ‘The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century’, p. 6; Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 923.

¹¹³ Grant and Ziemann, ‘Introduction: the Cold War as an imaginary war’, pp. 2 - 4.

¹¹⁴ See, Grant and Ziemann, ‘Introduction: the Cold War as an imaginary war’, p. 24 for a further explanation.

¹¹⁵ Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 934.

production and the ‘socialisation of violence’, allowing for a wartime mind-set.¹¹⁶ Nehring thus demonstrated a framework to conceptualise the nature of the ‘Cold War’ as these elements are evident during the period. Despite its difference to conventional wars, several exhibitions and narratives presented today do convey the Cold War as a military conflict.

However, while it is possible to define the Cold War as a conflict, it can equally be seen as a period which penetrated everyday life. Some have criticised the broad application of the term “Cold War”. Nehring urges more clarity on ‘what the Cold War was (and what it was not)’, in order to delineate the direct correlations between the Cold War and post-1945 events.¹¹⁷ Similarly, Lawrence D. Freedman has stated that the all-encompassing nature of the Cold War meant that ‘the term “cold war” became a convenient label for more than four decades of international history’.¹¹⁸ Despite these critiques, the Cold War is often defined and presented as a period in cultural depictions and cultural memory, though this often centres on particular ‘hot points’. The *Protect and Survive* exhibition in The National Archives demonstrates this in its divided presentation between a military conflict captured in displays of war games, intelligence and global conflicts, and its emphasis on Cold War culture and everyday life in the reconstruction of a Cold War home, from Civil Defence guidance and experiences to popular culture taking hold of everyday life. Both the Cold War as conflict and as a prolonged period which seeped into daily life, politics, and culture, need to be acknowledged to assess how the Cold War is remembered today. As will be demonstrated, cultural depictions often have varied

¹¹⁶ M. Geyer, ‘Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden’, in K.-J. Müller and E. Opitz, (eds.) *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf, 1978), pp. 15–100, see p. 99; id., *Deutsche Rüstungspolitik 1860–1980* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), p. 9 referenced in Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 935.

¹¹⁷ Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 948.

¹¹⁸ Lawrence D. Freedman, ‘Frostbitten: Decoding the Cold War, 20 Years Later’, *Foreign Affairs*, 89. 2 (2010), pp. 136 - 144 (p. 137) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699856>> [Accessed 28 April 2020].

emphases on the military or cultural nature of the period; the lack of clear definition providing yet more ambiguity for Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War.

1.6 Historical Time and Memory

The complexity of the Cold War itself leads to a complex cultural memory of the conflict. As a period spanning nearly fifty years, the conflict provides challenges to memory studies. As Lowe and Joel have remarked, unlike studies of the Great War, which analyse how 'a single event lasting the comparatively short time frame of 1914-18 has been and continues to be remembered', the Cold War was an extended period.¹¹⁹ This included nearly fifty years of politics, military commitments, and social and cultural developments, all issues which were either directly related to, influenced by, or parallel to the ongoing Cold War. In addition to this, the start and end dates of the Cold War are highly debated, providing no clear guidelines through which to analyse the event or its legacy. This combined with the fact that the Cold War is not often seen as a war in the 'conventional' sense, as a 'hot war' never emerged between the two superpowers, raises the question of what is being remembered.¹²⁰ This sets out the breadth and complexity of the topic being explored and the numerous legacies of the period. It is because of the length and reach of the Cold War that a study of the period must also acknowledge the complexity of its legacy and memory. Consequently, an understanding of how memory operates is required. It would be too simplistic to declare that the Cold War ended in 1989 or 1991 and thus memories of the conflict formed subsequent to this. Instead it must be made clear that memories of the Cold War were forming during the period itself, continuing to develop throughout and after the conflict.

¹¹⁹ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 1.

¹²⁰ See, Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 1.

The way in which memory operates causes issues with looking at the Cold War as a separate historical period with a defined beginning and end. Doing so ignores the complex nature of memory and how it operates and suggests that the Cold War was experienced as a separate event, without any influence from prior experiences and understanding. The work of Reinhart Koselleck, however, enables a reassessment of this. Koselleck's focus on the influence of the past and future in a given present helps to convey how the influence of memories of the Second World War and concerns for the future have each shaped and continue to shape how the Cold War is remembered in Britain and why.¹²¹ Therefore, while it may be argued that the Cold War began in 1945 or the post-war years and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of communism in 1989 to 1991, previous memories and discourses from wartime Britain, as well as contemporary concerns, influenced and shaped how the Cold War was seen and understood at various stages of the conflict.

Koselleck's work on 'Zeitschichten (layers of time)', analysed by John Zammito, offered an alternative theory to the strict periodisation of events. Layers of time were described by Koselleck as "several layers of time of differing duration and differentiable origin, which are nonetheless present and effectual at the same time".¹²² Consequently, as opposed to strict periodisation, different strands of time link and overlap to form multiple temporalities within a given moment. As a result, different layers of the past flow into the present at 'varying

¹²¹ Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. by Todd Samuel Presner and Others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 198.

¹²² Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien Zur Historik (Mit Einem Beitrag Von Hans-Georg Gadamer)*, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), p. 9, referenced in John Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History', *History and Theory*, 43. 1 (2004), pp. 124 - 135 (p. 125) <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2004.00269.x>> [Accessed 9 May 2017]; See also Helge Jordheim, 'Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities', *History and Theory*, 51. 2 (2012), pp. 151 - 171 (p. 157) <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2012.00619.x>> [Accessed 4 April 2017].

velocities', meaning that different pasts flow into, influence and shape the present, and equally the present opens up to the future.¹²³

As a result of this theory of time layers, Helge Jordheim has declared that Koselleck's work rather than encourage periodisation, actually tried to 'defy' it. Jordheim concluded that:

The fact that historical time is not linear and homogeneous but complex and multi-layered accounts for the futility of all efforts to freeze history in order to delimit and define breaks, discontinuities, time spans, beginnings and endings. Indeed, it accounts for the futility of periodization itself.¹²⁴

Whilst periodisation is useful for historians in defining a specific area of exploration, it imposes limits on the actual flow of history and time, as causes and impacts can be felt a long time prior to or after an event.

It is the 'futility of periodization' which is particularly important for the study of Cold War memory. Memories of the Cold War have formed from the early stages of the conflict and have continually been re-shaped throughout the conflict and after. However, even beyond this we can use Koselleck's theory of time layers and the relationship between past and future in a given present, to understand that memories of the Cold War are framed based on past experiences and knowledge as well as contemporary and future concerns. The complexities of exploring Cold War memory thus unfold and the limits of periodisation become more acute. For example, the film *Philby, Burgess and Maclean* (1977) depicted the unveiling of Maclean and his and Burgess' escape in 1951, ending with Philby's public denial that he was also part of the spy ring in 1955.¹²⁵ The film emphasised the spies' treachery, particularly in the disgust of Maclean's and Philby's wives when they learnt of Maclean's past. The treachery of the Cambridge Spy Ring, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, is often connected to the post-war

¹²³ Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s)', pp. 127, 133; Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, p. 198.

¹²⁴ Jordheim, 'Against Periodization', p. 170.

¹²⁵ *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, dir. by Gordon Flemying (Granada Television, 1977) [On DVD].

decline of Britain. The release of the film in the 1970s with events such as the 1972 Miner's Strike and much discontent, equally reflect this sense of turmoil and crisis, the conditions of the present influencing and aiding portrayals and memories of a 1950s narrative. In recent years much scholarship has sought to assess and revise the memory of the 1970s as a 'crisis' period. Whilst some have argued that specific events and strikes were used and played upon for political rhetoric and a discourse of 'crisis', particularly by the New Right ahead of Thatcher's election; others have argued that the period actually saw much improvement.¹²⁶ For example, Lynne Segal argues that the women's movement in the 1970s was stronger and more improved than previous years.¹²⁷ As Lawrence Black states 'Amid terrorists, strikers, streakers, scroungers, muggers, punks, and soccer hooligans, the 1970s were the apogee of decline'. However, in his assessment of the rising new literature of 1970s Britain, Black argues that this literature can enlighten the complexities of the decade as well as how decades can take on their own meanings and identities.¹²⁸ Whilst scholarship is beginning to explore the more nuanced reality of the 1970s as a decade, popular memory and even popular culture during the 1970s itself played on this motif of crisis. Consequently, the narrative of the Cambridge spies, though recent past, was brought into the present of the 1970s and portrayed through this perspective of decline. We can therefore see how the present is influential in shaping views and portrayals of the past, as well as how the past flows into and shapes the present. The narrative of the spies

¹²⁶ Richard Toye, 'From 'Consensus' to 'Common Ground': The Rhetoric of the Postwar Settlement and its Collapse', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 48: 1 (2015), pp. 3 - 23 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009412461816>> [Accessed 12 December 2020]; Colin Hay, 'Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the 'Winter of Discontent'', *Sociology*, 30: 2 (1996), pp. 253 - 277 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038596030002004>> [Accessed 12 December 2020]; Joe Moran, "'Stand Up and Be Counted': Hughie Green, the 1970s and Popular Memory', *History Workshop Journal*, 70: 1 (2010), pp.172-198 <<https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbq025>> [Accessed 12 December 2020].

¹²⁷ Lynne Segal, 'Today, yesterday, & tomorrow: between rebellion and coalition building', in *Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism*, ed. by Sheila Rowbotham, Lynne Segal and Hilary Wainwright (Pontypool: Merlin Press, 2013), pp. 65 – 102 (p. 82).

¹²⁸ Lawrence Black, 'An Enlightening Decade? New Histories of 1970s' Britain', *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 82 (2012), pp. 174 - 186 (p. 174, 184).

from the early Cold War is seen to shape the later Cold War period, indicating how memories developed throughout the Cold War itself and continue to do so today.

Martin Heidegger's work offered similar explanations that history is always taking place.¹²⁹ Heidegger argued that moments are not 'timeless' or 'of determinate length'; pointing to the idea that whilst an event may have a chronological beginning and end, and therefore an event is seen to be "over and done with", historical time can actually be stretched out. This is evident in short, mid, and long-term causes which lead to and provide meaning for historical events. Further to this, due to the fact that historical time is ongoing and alters with the changing relationship between the past and future, Koselleck stated that 'the truth of history changes with time, or to be more exact, that historical truth can become outdated'.¹³⁰ In other words, the conditions of a given present create a new perspective through which to analyse and understand the past, the past is therefore brought into the present and is 'articulate[d] (...) anew'.¹³¹ Though it must also be added that periods of history can fluctuate in importance for any given present, and though may be insignificant at one moment can become relevant again and vice versa.¹³²

These points are particularly relevant for the Cold War, as the 'lingering contemporaneity', to borrow the phrase of Lowe and Joel,¹³³ means the legacy and impact of the conflict is still being felt today. The conflict continues to have much prominence in the present, and in modern

¹²⁹ Tom Greaves, *Starting with Heidegger* (London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), pp. 104 – 105; See also, Jordheim, 'Against Periodization', p. 170.

¹³⁰ Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, p. 120; See also Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s)', p. 127.

¹³¹ Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. and with an introduction by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 208.

¹³² See Rodney Harrison, 'Forgetting to Remember, Remembering to Forget: Late Modern Heritage Practices, Sustainability and the "crisis" of Accumulation of the Past', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 19.6 (2013), pp. 579 - 595 (pp. 587, 590 – 591) <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2012.678371>> [Accessed 29 March 2017].

¹³³ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 7.

memory, as well as influencing ideas of the future, particularly in regard to international relations. We can see the significance of this in the work of Heonik Kwon on Cold War memory, focussing on Korea and Vietnam. Kwon points to the Cold War's 'decomposition', the fact that the Cold War is still, in some places and in certain aspects, coming to an end.¹³⁴ The Cold War's impact and legacy is still very much present in the world today. Therefore, it can be argued that the idea of the event being chronologically over, yet still coming to an end in regard to historical time, links to this. In addition, contemporary events are seeing increasing references to the Cold War, both in the events and the rhetoric used to describe them. For example, recent tensions between America and North Korea over nuclear weapons, brought the nuclear aspect of the Cold War firmly into the present, as the only basis on which to draw comparisons and understandings of the event. This, along with an increasing number of cultural representations and exhibitions, means the past of the Cold War is being brought into the present, possibly due to its relevance and significance, and as such the Cold War has been given new meaning by events in the post-1989 world. The application of Koselleck's time layers enables a far more detailed and wider analysis of the many influences shaping Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War today. The second and third influences on Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War are a result of this operation of memory and shape the content of the cultural memories created and portrayed.

1.7 Memory of the Second World War

Through acknowledging the complex nature of memory and the overlapping of various layers of time, it is possible to analyse and understand the significant influence of the memory of the Second World War on the cultural memory of the Cold War. As the second key influence on the analysis of cultural memory of the conflict, the Second World War, in particular, the strong

¹³⁴ Kwon, *The Other Cold War*, pp. 8 - 9.

national memory and identity which has emerged from wartime Britain, consistently frames cultural representations of the Cold War. In the same way that stating Cold War memory formed post-1989 would oversimplify our understanding, as would the omission of the influence of Second World War memory. The two conflicts and the memories of those conflicts cannot be seen as entirely exclusive of one another.

It has long been acknowledged that the Second World War holds a significant place in British national identity. Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson have even stated that ‘few historical events have resonated as fully in modern British culture as the Second World War’.¹³⁵ Whilst the Second World War witnessed allied victory and the defeat of fascism, the Cold War, in contrast, offered little in regard to British glory and triumph. Instead, the post-war world saw Britain decline; both the cost of war and increasing wave of decolonisation causing Britain’s role in the world to alter significantly. These notions of decline, in contrast to a victorious wartime Britain, result in the Cold War’s place in British national and cultural memory being less celebrated and defined. As a result, the memory of the Second World War continues to dominate in British society. This is highlighted in Huxford’s work on *The Korean War in Britain*. Huxford argued that Cold War moments and conflicts such as the Korean War are often ‘forgotten’. Unlike the victory over fascism in the Second World War, they did not ‘fit within the prescribed narratives of British history’, or specifically the clear and victorious narrative of the Second World War.¹³⁶ The Cold War instead is seen as too complex and thus memories tend to be less defined and less present in British national and cultural memory.

¹³⁵ Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson, ‘Introduction: ‘Keep calm and carry on’ The cultural memory of the Second World War in Britain’, in *British Cultural Memory and the Second World War*, ed. by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), pp. 1 - 24 (p. 2).

¹³⁶ Huxford, *The Korean War in Britain*, p. 181.

However, as stated, memory is ever changing and developing. Ashplant, Dawson and Roper have argued, in regard to war memory, how discourses and images of previous wars can be used to make sense of new or contemporary conflicts.¹³⁷ Numerous war memory studies have pointed to this idea, including the work of Mark Connelly, who proposed that the Second World War may act as a guide for future and current conflicts, drawing on references made to the war, especially during the Falklands war, 1982, which drew numerous parallels in rhetoric.¹³⁸ Equally, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper stated that each new conflict provides a new lens through which memory of previous wars is then re-shaped, viewed and understood. This is demonstrated in the work of Geoff Eley, which explored the changing memory of the Second World War in post-war film and found an increasing emphasis on post-1945 failures and issues in British society. The post-war world shaped and reframed the Second World War, demonstrating the significance of the present in reflecting on the past. War memory is therefore fluid, as is all memory, and previous discourses as well as contemporary events and understandings can influence the way wars are viewed, remembered and commemorated.¹³⁹ The analysis of Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War in this thesis thus acknowledges and explores the influence of Second World War memory on how the Cold War is framed and depicted, and demonstrates the intertwined relationship between the two memories, rejecting strict periodisation.

1.8 Modern Day and Nostalgia

In addition to the influence of the memory of the Second World War on the cultural memory of the Cold War, the third key influence is the impact of recent events. As discussed, the context

¹³⁷ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, "The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration", pp. 22, 36.

¹³⁸ Mark Connelly, *We Can Take It!: Britain and the Memory of the Second World War* (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004), p. 2.

¹³⁹ Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, "The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration", p. 60.

of a given present influences how the past is revisited and understood in that present. In order to understand modern cultural memory of the Cold War today, it is crucial to acknowledge how post-1989 events have shaped perceptions and understandings, and how they influence both the production and consumption of cultural portrayals of the conflict.

Following Ashplant, Dawson and Roper's argument that new conflicts provide a lens through which to view previous conflicts, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to the War on Terror, can be seen to have strongly influenced memories of the Cold War. These wars, without the world order of the superpower divide, have resulted in complex and multi-powered conflicts. Furthermore, terrorism provides new enemies, ones often without nation states and which are not always easy to identify. The complexity and uncertainty of such wars provide an uncertain present and future. The past of the Cold War, with its sense of order and rules, may in contrast seem much quaint, even peaceful in comparison. These recent events reshaping and moulding memories of the Cold War period.

Halbwachs in his work on 'collective memory' also addressed what he called 'contemplative (...) or dreamlike memory', which enables an escape from today's world and society. Halbwachs argued that the modern world shapes our memories of the past, and consequently we may produce a past which we yearn for, and not necessarily the past as it was.¹⁴⁰ Linda Hutcheon, David Lowenthal, and others have since advocated much the same idea.¹⁴¹ Hutcheon has argued that it is an 'idealized' past we long for, that the very '*irrecoverable* nature of the

¹⁴⁰ Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, pp. 49, 51.

¹⁴¹ Linda Hutcheon, 'Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern', in *The History on Film Reader*, ed. by Marnie Hughes-Warrington (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 249 – 259 (p. 250); David Lowenthal, 'Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't' in *The Imagined Past, History and Nostalgia*, ed. by Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 18 – 32 (pp. 21, 29); Andrew Higson, 'Re-presenting the National Past: Nostalgia and Pastiche in the Heritage Film', in Lester D. Friedman (ed.) *Fires were Started: British Cinema and Thatcherism*, Second Edition (London: Wallflower Press, 2006) pp. 91 - 109 (p. 100); Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw, 'The dimensions of nostalgia', in *The Imagined Past, History and Nostalgia*, ed. by Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 1 - 17 (pp. 3, 9).

past' is precisely its appeal.¹⁴² Lowenthal has similarly added the argument that the past offers a 'completeness lacking in any present'; being in the past we know what happened, whereas the future offers no such security and certainty, and thus we look to the past for some stability.¹⁴³ A nostalgia for the Cold War can be seen to be emerging in today's world and distortions of Cold War memory which result from this are explored in this thesis.

There has also been an increase in recent years in turning toward the past more generally. In his work on the transition to modernity, Koselleck argued that modernity saw an emphasis on the future and on progress. His work enables us to map how experiences of historical time have developed in recent years. As stated, Koselleck declared that historical time can be found in the relationship between the past and the future in a given present.¹⁴⁴ In regards to modernity, Koselleck saw the Enlightenment period as the turning-point at which the pre-modern experience and understanding of time altered.¹⁴⁵ This transition saw the move from a pre-modern experience of time based on reliance on the past and a predictable future - with the end focused on the Apocalypse - to an unknown future which was no longer dependent on lessons of the past.¹⁴⁶ This change resulted in the divergence of the past and future. Koselleck captured this divergence in the phrases 'space of experience', which indicated the past that is recorded and remembered or the present past, and 'horizon of expectation', which indicated future possibilities or the present future.¹⁴⁷ Koselleck's main point was that historical time exists in

¹⁴² Hutcheon, 'Irony, Nostalgia, and the Postmodern', p. 250.

¹⁴³ Lowenthal, 'Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't', p. 29.

¹⁴⁴ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 22; See also Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s)', p. 126.

¹⁴⁶ Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, pp. 111 - 112; See also David Carr, 'Review: Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time by Reinhart Koselleck and Keith Tribe', *History and Theory*, 26. 2 (1987), pp. 197 - 204, (p. 200) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2505122>> [Accessed 22 January 2020]; Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s)', pp. 126 - 127; Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 22.

¹⁴⁷ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, pp. 21 - 22; Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s)', p. 127; Jordheim, 'Against Periodization', p. 153; Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen, *Discursive Analytical Strategies: Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, Luhmann* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2003), p. 44.

the tension and constantly changing relationship between the two. The growing distance between the two became characteristic of modernity and more emphasis became placed on the future in regard to progress and a process of acceleration, which shortened “the space of experience”¹⁴⁸.

However, the focus on the future which Koselleck and others saw as a characteristic of modernity, has been seen by some as no longer entirely applicable.¹⁴⁹ Instead, academics have argued that people are now looking to the past, or as Andreas Huyssen stated, ‘the focus has shifted from present futures to present pasts’.¹⁵⁰ As a result, Koselleck’s theory of acceleration needs extending in order to understand this shift. In fact, what we are now seeing has been argued as the next stage of Koselleck’s modernity.¹⁵¹

Huyssen has specifically considered this changing temporality, drawing the issues of temporality and memory together. In assessing the rapid memory boom since the late twentieth century, Huyssen questioned whether there was something more to this bringing the past into the present, ‘something (...) specific to the structuring of memory and temporality today.’ Huyssen pointed to the idea that new technology has caused change in our understanding and experience of temporality, compressing ‘time and space’.¹⁵² Consequently, there is now a sense of moving faster towards an uncertain future. Amy Elias has added that the modern perception

¹⁴⁸ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 22; See also Zammito, ‘Review: Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s)’, p. 127.

¹⁴⁹ See, Andreas Huyssen, ‘Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia’, *Public Culture*, 12. 1 (2000), pp. 21 – 38 (pp. 21 – 22) < <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/26184> > [Accessed 21 October 2016]; Amy J. Elias, ‘Past/ Future’, in *Time: A Vocabulary of the Present*, ed. by Joel Burges and Amy J. Elias (New York: New York University Press, 2016), pp. 35 - 50; María Inés Mudrovic, ‘Time, History, and Philosophy of History’, *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 8. 2 (2014), pp. 217 – 242 <<https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341272>> [Accessed 22 January 2020]; François Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time*, trans. by Saskia Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

¹⁵⁰ Huyssen, ‘Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia’, p. 21.

¹⁵¹ Elias, ‘Past/ Future’, p. 38.

¹⁵² Huyssen, ‘Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia’, p. 25, 31, 34; Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 4.

of progress has ‘nearly [been] abandoned’ as the future is now looked to ‘with anxiety’, as such we turn away from the uncertainty of the future. Elias follows the idea of Walter Benjamin’s ‘Angel of History’ that we move toward the future whilst looking to the past or as she refers to it, ‘we are (...) caught in its [the future’s] slipstream’, the angel therefore represents the present.¹⁵³

In addition to this change in temporal understanding, and as a result of this process of acceleration, new technologies enable the storage of vast amounts of information, so much so that we are actually ‘in danger of forgetting’.¹⁵⁴ As Rodney Harrison noted, it is impossible to ‘form new memories and attach value to them without selecting some things to forget’. Consequently, Harrison declared, we are in danger of ‘being overwhelmed by memory’.¹⁵⁵ Huyssen highlighted this paradox - that the technology which enables us to store and remember so much, is also responsible for a fear of forgetting, as we risk being overloaded with information and memories. This fear of forgetting, Huyssen suggested, is the cause of focussing on ‘public and private memorialization’, as we attempt to find stability in the past and slow down the increasing process of acceleration. This therefore partly helps to explain why the recent past, including that of the Cold War, is increasingly turned to and brought into the present.

This fear of forgetting and a turning towards the past points to a further key influence on Cold War memory today. There are concerns for the acceleration to an unknown future, in particular one with terrorist threats, the threat of new biological warfare and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The cultural memory of the Cold War is therefore shaped by experiences of recent

¹⁵³ Elias, ‘Past/ Future’, p. 41; See also Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 259 - 260.

¹⁵⁴ Huyssen, ‘Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia’, p. 28.

¹⁵⁵ Harrison, ‘Forgetting to Remember’, p. 580.

conflicts and events, in addition to anxieties for the unknown future, helping to create a more nostalgic memory of the Cold War with its sense of rules and superpower divide. The cultural memory of Britain's Cold War thus becomes more complex and ambiguous when there is a need to consider both the portrayal of the period as one of decline and fear, alongside the fact that films, television dramas, and exhibits are increasingly looking back to the Cold War in an uncertain present.

These broad themes form a framework through which the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War can be examined. Koselleck's theory of time layers aids an exploration of how memory operates and the numerous influences on Britain's Cold War memory and how this has developed. In order to address the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War today, Chapter Two provides an overview of how this memory has developed since the news that the Cold War was ending in 1989 to 1991 to recent exhibitions in 2019. The chapter draws out some of the key themes which emerge across portrayals of the conflict post-1989, finding similarities in matters of dramatisation, the topics focused on and some of the challenges of creating a Cold War narrative, in particular the lack of a definitive end to the conflict or a clear role for Britain. The discussion within this chapter provides an overview of Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War, whilst the following chapters focus on specific themes which form central aspects of this memory. Chapter Three addresses the recurring theme of espionage throughout cultural portrayals of the conflict, particularly present in films and television dramas. The chapter traces the popularity of the espionage genre from the Cold War itself to the present day, and how espionage has become synonymous with the conflict. It explores the attraction of espionage for modern viewers and visitors to exhibitions for entertainment, and how this drama and intrigue captures not only a troubled period of betrayal and secrecy, but also a sense of nostalgia. This nostalgia is particularly reflected in references to the Second World War, demonstrating the intrinsic relationship between the two memories. Equally, if not more, synonymous with the

Cold War is the theme of nuclear war. Chapter Four looks at the portrayal of the nuclear threat and how a memory of fear and looming apocalypse has developed since the early-Cold War. Yet, it also addresses the recurrence of discussions of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and deterrence in Cold War portrayals and how this helps to create a strange sense of nostalgia in contrast to the unpredictable nature of the world today. Lastly, Chapter Five notes the dependence of the memory of Cold War activism on that of the nuclear threat. This chapter analyses post-1989 reflections of Cold War activism, which draw on the debate between the successes and failures of activism in the period and why there may be more recognition and understanding for Cold War protest in today's world.

This thesis enables the centrality of these themes to the British cultural memory of the Cold War to be explored in detail. It argues that the ambiguous nature of the conflict, in particular Britain's role, causes challenges in creating a British Cold War narrative. The thesis will argue that this ambiguity results in a lack of certainty in how to remember the period, leading to varying emphases and interpretations. As will be demonstrated, this uncertainty often results in depictions of the Cold War focused on key events, resulting in episodic narratives, and are often simplified or sometimes portrayed to be dramatic as opposed to a background to daily life. It also suggests that the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War is heavily influenced by the strong national memory and identity associated with the Second World War, the Cold War often framed as a contrast to the unity and strength of wartime Britain. Emphasis is often placed on creating dark and troubled images of the period, adding to the drama yet also contrasting victorious wartime Britain with the Cold War. However, the impact of today's world equally continues to reshape the memory of the conflict, with an increasing desire to look back and understand Britain's experience of the period. This looking back is at times nostalgic, and questions arise as to whether aspects of the Cold War should be celebrated, highlighting the

complex memory that has developed. In doing so it adds to the growing field of Cold War memory studies and our understanding of the impact and legacy of the Cold War in Britain.

2 The Development of Britain's Cultural Memory of the Cold War.

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the symbol of a world divided by East and West collapsed. In its wake and following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, people looked towards a world void of ideological divisions, on the basis of communism versus capitalism, and the looming threat of nuclear war. The Cold War was uniquely experienced in each continent and nation in the world, and the experience of its collapse and legacy was no different. Whilst in Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War brought waves of new independence and, for many, freedom from Soviet occupation, Britain's experience was less defined. The challenge of how to remember Britain's Cold War emanates from during the conflict itself and continues to shape the narratives of the conflict presented today. This chapter explores how Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War has developed from the final years of the conflict to the present day. In order to demonstrate this, the chapter will assess the narratives created in the 1998 *Cold War* television documentary, followed by an assessment of press reactions to the final years of the conflict from 1989 to 1991. Lastly, these will be explored alongside three 2019 Cold War exhibitions. The analysis and comparison of these portrayals enables an assessment of how Cold War memory has developed. These examples have been selected to provide a wider picture of how the Cold War has been imagined and reflected in cultural sources since 1989, and how these portrayals may have altered based on the given present, such as a gradual move from seeing the Cold War as a superpower conflict, to recognising the Cold War's impact on everyday life in Britain. In mapping this development, the sources also enable an exploration of key challenges facing a cultural memory of Britain's Cold War and how cultural portrayals have navigated these challenges to find a narrative and framework. One challenge is defining the conflict, the period being defined and framed differently throughout, either as a conflict, context or as a period as a whole. Within these various narratives and frameworks, however,

some similarities and continuities are evident. In particular, the complexity of the Cold War and the challenges this creates in forming a Cold War narrative often results in a focus on specific 'hot points', such as themes of nuclear war and events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis; providing a way to explore a largely non-conventional war for Britain. The chapter will also demonstrate the influence of the given present on Britain's cultural memory of the conflict. Following Koselleck's argument that the given present is shaped by past events and future concerns, this chapter will demonstrate how memories of the Second World War and concerns of an uncertain future have shaped the cultural memory of the Cold War.¹ The influence of Britain's national memory of the Second World War can be seen as having a significant influence on memory of the Cold War. Unlike the narratives of glory and bravery associated with wartime Britain, the Cold War is associated with Britain's changing position in the world. The impact of decolonisation as a period of decline for Britain, but also often one of violence and controversy creates a difficult past for Britain to acknowledge. This chapter will thus explore how Britain's difficult past results in an ambiguous memory and a largely absent narrative of decolonisation. Equally, the tendency to focus on the superpowers of the Cold War further reduces Britain's role in the conflict, adding to this challenging and unclear memory. Exploring these case studies in turn will thus highlight that, despite the difference in years and narrative frameworks, there is a continuity of themes as well as challenges in capturing a Cold War narrative.

¹ John Zammito, 'Review: Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History', *History and Theory*, 43. 1 (2004), pp. 124 - 135 (p. 122, 133) <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2004.00269.x>> [Accessed 9 May 2017]; Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. by Todd Samuel Presner and Others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 198.

2.1 Cold War Series and Book

The challenges of how to portray and how to remember the Cold War have existed from during the conflict itself and particularly in reflections in the years following the end of the conflict. The television documentary, *Cold War*, was produced and aired in the UK and USA in 1998-1999.² This was a landmark documentary on the conflict, capturing the complex story of the Cold War from its beginning in the post-war years up to its end in 1991. The series was funded by Ted Turner of Turner Original Productions who wanted the producer of *The World at War*, Jeremy Isaacs, to produce a Cold War series.³ Isaacs had ‘a distinguished career in British Television’, following *The World at War* series Isaacs was director at Thames Television and later founded Channel 4, before becoming General Director of the Royal Opera House. Downing, himself a historian and television producer, teamed with Isaacs and Turner Original Productions to produce the series, with the support of three leading Cold War historians, John Lewis Gaddis, Vladislav Zubok and Lawrence Freedman.⁴ The series made use of the opening of archives on both sides to produce approximately ‘500 interviews’ of eye-witness accounts and collected various other footage from world film archives, to create a narrative of the Cold War which provided both East and West perspectives. This was a particular focus for Turner who wanted to present ‘a history with two sides to it’ and avoid a triumphalist narrative.⁵ In many ways the documentary did achieve this as interviews from politicians, intelligence officers and “ordinary people”, on both sides of the Cold War, were consulted for their accounts of events. In his article on the production of the series, Taylor Downing discussed the enthusiasm of all those behind the series to make a Cold War history that would be

² *Cold War*, BBC Two, 19 September 1998 – 9 May 1999, 20:05 and 20:00.

³ Taylor Downing, ‘A Personal View’, *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, 10.1 (2013), 93–105 (pp. 94-95). <<https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0123>>. [Accessed 2 June 2020].

⁴ Taylor Downing, ‘History on television: the making of ‘Cold War’’, *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 18. 3 (1998), pp. 325 – 332 (pp. 329 – 330) <<https://doi.org/10.1080/01439689800260211>> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

⁵ Downing, ‘A Personal View’, pp.97, 96.

communicated with the public.⁶ As Downing states in an article from 1998, it was an ‘irresistible’ challenge for Isaacs to create a series of the ‘history that we have all just lived through’. Isaacs, Downing and the team behind the series all of generations who grew up during the Cold War.⁷ As one review of the series noted, the significance of the series was that it would influence ‘the man-in-the-street’s beliefs about forty years of important, dangerous and in the end successful policy-making’.⁸ The legacy of the documentary is thus important to consider, at the time of its release the documentary presented a full-length narrative of a forty-five year period, and the way this narrative was presented would help to shape viewers’ perspectives of the Cold War.

Of particular importance was the fact that the documentary makers decided to follow a chronological structure, however this structure was framed around particular themes and ‘hot points’ of the Cold War. In presenting the documentary in a chronological format, the series very much gave the impression of the Cold War as a continuous period from the end of the Second World War to the start of the 1990s. The series thus provided more of a coherent narrative of the entire period than perhaps other cultural depictions have attempted since. In focusing this narrative around particular ‘hot points’ of the Cold War, however, it portrayed a series of significant events and themes. The focus on the two superpowers in the documentary resulted in ideology forming a central theme in explaining the causes behind these events. One theme in particular which has come to define the Cold War era since during the conflict is that of nuclear war. The very first episode of the television series opened with footage of a nuclear

⁶ Downing, ‘A Personal View’, p.99.

⁷ Downing, ‘History on television’, p. 330.

⁸ Peter Unwin, ‘Book Reviews: Cold War by Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing. Published by Bantam Press, London 1998. £25.00 (ISBN 6385 406 916) This Blessed Plot. Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair by Hugo Young. Published by Macmillan, London 1998. Pp.558. Cloth £20.00 (ISBN 0 333 57992 5)’, *International Relations*, 14.4 (1999), 68–69 (p. 68), <<https://doi.org/10.1177/004711789901400408>> [Accessed 14 November 2019].

explosion and a rising mushroom cloud, setting the scene for a conflict with a looming nuclear threat. The words narrated by actor Kenneth Branagh, opened the series, declaring that ‘A cloud hides the sky, a nuclear shadow falls across the human future’.⁹ This opening scene generated a sense of awe and fear for the audience and set the tone of the series as being one that presented the drama and terror of the Cold War period. The book to accompany the series which was published in 1998, written by Isaacs and Downing, equally set this tone, as the book’s front cover was an image of a mushroom cloud and the subtitle read: ‘For 45 years the world held its breath’.¹⁰ The series and book thus both provided a dramatic introduction. The series followed the nuclear threat and arms developments throughout, with particular episodes covering the arms race in ‘Sputnik 1949-1961’; ‘Cuba 1959-1962’ narrating how the world came close to nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; ‘MAD 1960-1972’ detailing the increasing arms race and reliance on deterrence; and ‘Star Wars 1981-1988’ which followed Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative and the renewed arms race tensions in the 1980s, along with nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl.¹¹ The threat of nuclear war and the increasing arms race therefore ran continually throughout the series, the audience was reminded that this threat always loomed in the background. With the development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons during the Cold War, and their significance to international relations throughout the conflict, as well as their very visual depiction of the conflict which threatened Armageddon, it is not surprising that nuclear war forms a key and recurring theme in Cold War memory, both during the conflict itself and today.

⁹ ‘Comrades 1917-1945’, *Cold War*, BBC Two, 19 September 1998, 20:05.

¹⁰ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: For 45 Years the World Held its Breath*, (London: Bantam Press, 1998).

¹¹ ‘Sputnik 1949-1961’, *Cold War*, BBC Two, 14 November 1998, 20:10; ‘Cuba 1959-1962’, *Cold War*, BBC Two, 28 November 1988, 20:10; ‘MAD 1960-1972’, *Cold War*, BBC Two, 6 February 1999, 20:10.

In addition to a focus on nuclear war, a key, and perhaps the greatest ‘hot point’ of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both the 1998 *Cold War* series and cultural portrayals in exhibitions or dramas since, have used the Cuban Missile Crisis to demonstrate the reality of the nuclear arms race, and how close each side came to nuclear conflict. The Crisis was also presented dramatically to emphasise the tension and concerns of those at the time. The build-up of the Crisis, the enforcement of the blockade and attempts to avert nuclear war presented the audience with an intense narrative. Again, the language and statements selected for the series emphasised the drama and the fear. An American news broadcast following the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev was included, declaring that ‘This is the day we have every reason to believe when the world came out from under the most terrible threat of nuclear holocaust since the end of World War Two’,¹² giving the audience a sense of how close the world had been to nuclear conflict. One review of the series and book by John L. Harper highlighted the criticism of the episode on Cuba, one criticism being that the episode suggested ‘that the crisis suddenly erupted on 14 October 1962’, adding that intelligence had been collected as early as August.¹³ This may partly have been the result of fitting the narrative into a forty-six-minute episode. However, in presenting the narrative this way, as a sudden eruption of Cold War tension, the series reflected but also built on the drama of the event, creating a memory of intensity and fear during the Cold War.

Alongside the tension of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the series placed emphasis on the fact that diplomacy averted the crisis and that both Kennedy and Khrushchev recognised the need to avoid nuclear war. Throughout the series there was a great deal of emphasis on the issue of deterrence. The episode ‘MAD 1960-1972’ in particular, focused on the growing belief in

¹² ‘Cuba 1959-1962’.

¹³ Various, ‘Review Essays and Book Reviews’, *Survival*, 41. 1, (2010), 136-146 (p. 138). <<https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/41.1.136>>.[Accessed 14 November 2019].

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), leading to the stockpiling of weapons on either side to maintain a balance.¹⁴ The episode 'Star Wars 1981-1988' also noted the resistance to Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, including from Margaret Thatcher, as there was a strong belief among many that this would upset the balance of capabilities and thus threaten the effectiveness of MAD.¹⁵ The closing summary of the series reiterated this point further, stating that, 'Statesmen on both sides who had the power to push the nuclear button, in crisis after crisis, put humanity's interest first. Nuclear deterrence kept the peace'.¹⁶ The series therefore did much to highlight and even celebrate the role of deterrence and MAD in maintaining peace throughout the Cold War. The nuclear threat and deterrence can thus be seen to form key themes within the documentary's Cold War narrative.

Other 'hot points' emphasised in the series included a specific focus on Berlin. Berlin was focused on in three separate episodes throughout the series, including 'Berlin 1948-1949', 'The Wall 1958-1963' and 'The Wall Comes Down 1989'.¹⁷ Harper's review stated that the 'series is Euro-centric and, within Europe, Berlin-centric'.¹⁸ That there were three episodes which focused on Berlin, highlights the centrality of the city to the Cold War, and the city continues to serve as both a focal point and symbol of the Cold War in portrayals today. In the *Cold War* series, two of the episodes concentrated on the Berlin Wall. Episode nine which narrated the construction of the Wall opened with the statement, 'It started as a barbed wire fence; dividing a city; imprisoning its people. The very image of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall'. Equally, the episode closed with the words, 'The Wall was the supreme symbol of the Cold War's cruelty,

¹⁴ 'MAD 1960-1972'.

¹⁵ 'Star Wars 1981-1988', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 25 April 1999, 20:00.

¹⁶ 'Conclusions 1989-1991', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 9 May 1999, 20:00.

¹⁷ 'Berlin 1948-1949', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 10 October 1998, 20:05; 'The Wall 1958-1963', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 21 November 1998, 20:10; 'The Wall Comes Down 1989', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 2 May 1999, 19:10.

¹⁸ Various, 'Review Essays and Book Reviews', p. 138.

and Europe's division'.¹⁹ Berlin, and in particular the Wall, served during the Cold War and continues to serve as an ultimate symbol of the Iron Curtain and the divide across Europe. As such its centrality to the conflict was emphasised in the series' focus on the Wall and its symbolism. Both the episodes on the construction and the fall of the Berlin Wall were very moving, and marked key moments in the development and latterly, ending of the Cold War. The latter episode of the fall of the Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany signalled the ending of the Cold War for many and as such the Wall has been a constant and key theme in cultural portrayals and Cold War memory.

While there was not a great focus on East Asia in the series, both the Korean and Vietnam Wars had an episode each dedicated to them. The series continued to focus on a very US-Soviet perspective of the events and captured how the two wars influenced US-Soviet relations and the development of the Cold War. The two wars can be seen to form key 'hot points' in Cold War narratives dating from the late 1990s to present day. The two wars were fundamental turning points in the Cold War and provide devastating examples of when the Cold War became 'a hot war'.²⁰

The series also dedicated whole episodes to protest and espionage during the Cold War in 'Make Love Not War in The Sixties' and 'Spies 1944-1994'.²¹ These also form central topics and themes that continue to run throughout portrayals of the Cold War and Cold War memory. The focus on protest in the series concentrated on protest in the USA. Remarkably little was said throughout the series regarding the British peace movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Committee of 100 (C100) or the women's protest at Greenham

¹⁹ 'The Wall 1958-1963'.

²⁰ 'Korea 1949-1953', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 17 October 1998, 20:05.

²¹ 'Make Love Not War The Sixties', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 13 February 1999, 20:05; 'Spies', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 18 April 1999, 20:00.

Common. Mention of peace movements in other episodes tended to focus on German peace movements, again providing an emphasis on Berlin. The episode 'Make Love Not War in The Sixties', however, centred on the US Civil Rights Movement and anti-war demonstrations against the Vietnam War. The counterculture of the 1960s was drawn upon in this episode to provide a cultural perspective of the conflict. Further controversy was shown in the episode 'Thaw 1969-1975' which captured the devastating consequences of police force against student anti-war protests at Kent State University in 1970.²² Protest and the use of violence against those protests were also concentrated on in the episode 'Red Spring The Sixties'²³. The episode focused on the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, to put a stop to the cultural reforms and freedoms being introduced by Alexander Dubček. Protest thus formed a further key theme in the series, with each episode highlighting both the power of protest but also the devastation of its suppression during the Cold War.

The theme of spies and espionage featured in a whole episode in the series and a separate dedicated section in the accompanying book, highlighting the centrality of espionage to the Cold War. The episode did much to focus on the reality of intelligence warfare and the human cost of betrayal and shared intelligence. Details on the deaths of agents caused by others naming them were made explicit, with some acting under a belief of duty and others sharing information for monetary gain. In the book, a quote from Markus Wolf, part of the East German secret service, was used in which he 'denies that spying is romantic. "It is dirty; people suffer"'.²⁴ Several well-known spies including Kim Philby, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, as well as Klaus Fuchs, George Blake and Dimitri Polyakov were discussed. Whilst a James Bond trailer was integrated into the episode, this was shown to represent the British 'spy

²² 'Thaw 1969-1975', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 6 March 1999, 20:15.

²³ 'Red Spring The Sixties', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 20 February 1999, 20:05.

²⁴ Isaacs and Downing, *Cold War*, p. 353.

mania', in contrast to the dark reality of Cold War espionage and the betrayal and humiliation that later shook Britain. Espionage was an integral part of the Cold War conflict and was how both East and West gathered vital information about their enemy for both use in proxy wars but also diplomacy. The cultural boom in the espionage genre alongside this with the likes of James Bond and John Le Carré's George Smiley have resulted in espionage becoming synonymous with the Cold War. The drama and intrigue that espionage lends is easily incorporated into a Cold War narrative to emphasise the dark, threatening, and sometimes secret, conflict that dominated for over forty years. As well as providing a vital piece of the Cold War narrative, the inclusion of espionage in the series added excitement and entertainment. As a result, espionage, like nuclear conflict and the symbol of the Berlin Wall, continually forms a key feature in most Cold War cultural portrayals.

The series thus ensured it included and focused on specific 'hot points' of the Cold War. In the new introduction for the 2008 paperback edition of the book, Peter Hennessy remarked that, 'Cuba was but one of a series of punctuation marks to the Cold War, which delineated its greatest crises from Berlin in 1948-9, Korea 1950-3, Suez and Hungary 1956, Berlin, once more, 1958-61, Prague 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979'.²⁵ We can therefore see that these 'hot points' were emphasised throughout the series, highlighting the key and often decisive moments of the Cold War conflict. It is these same 'hot points' which continue to form the focal points and central themes for cultural portrayals of the Cold War, and as such the portrayal of these events shapes people's memories of the conflict. These events become the defining moments for Cold War memory and, as 'hot points', they highlight the most dangerous and dramatic moments from 1945 to 1991.

²⁵ Peter Hennessy, 'Introduction' in Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: For Forty-Five Years the World Held its Breath*, Second Edition (London: Abacus, 2008), pp. xv-xx (p. xix).

With an emphasis on ‘hot points’ and narratives of danger, comes a sense of drama, even sensationalism, in portrayals of the Cold War. The series in particular did much to evoke the drama of the conflict. The series’ music score produced by Carl Davis, as one review by Harper stated, ‘augments the sense, variously, of tension, drama and pathos’.²⁶ The music drew the audience into a sense of intrigue and investigation, both thrilling and unnerving. The title sequence which accompanied it enhanced the dark and secret nature of the Cold War conflict by following a tunnel with projected Cold War footage on the tunnel walls, moving ever closer to a white light at the end when the screen fades white and then reappears with ‘Cold War’ written on the screen. The series producers therefore worked to both reflect and perpetuate this sense of a dark, ominous Cold War period, emphasising drama. Similarly, the narrative language used throughout the episodes enhanced this further. As discussed above, the opening words of the series created an immediate sense of drama for the audience and was echoed throughout. Often the episodes would end on an ominous tone, closing statements such as ‘Preparations for global annihilation continued’ and ‘The fires of rebellion burned on’, worked to dramatise the documentary.²⁷ Therefore, whilst a factual documentary, a degree of entertainment and dramatisation were evident, and in doing so the series perpetuated this sense of looming fear and danger throughout the Cold War period. Lastly, the series was closed effectively with the use of President George Bush Senior’s Christmas broadcast in 1991, following Gorbachev’s resignation and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bush declared:

“For over forty years the United States led the West in the struggle against communism and the threat it posed to our most precious values. This struggle shaped the lives of all Americans. It forced all nations to live under the spectre of nuclear destruction. That confrontation is now over”.²⁸

²⁶ Various, ‘Review Essays and Book Reviews’, p. 136.

²⁷ ‘MAD 1960-1972’; ‘Freeze 1977-1981’, *Cold War*, BBC Two, 27 March 1999, 20:15.

²⁸ ‘Conclusions 1989-1991’.

By ending the series on this declaration, a sense of finality and conclusion was provided for the audience. A narrative of dramatic conflict which lasted over forty years was brought to a close and the audience was left to contemplate both the end of the Cold War and the post-Cold War world.

The series has been argued to have placed too much emphasis on the Cold War ‘as a time of unmitigated troubles for humanity, a long parenthesis of terror from which we have been lucky to escape’.²⁹ As discussed above, this was evident in the use of a dramatic music score and dramatic language, creating an atmosphere of doom and terror, with the looming shadow of the bomb ever present. However, as Harper pointed out the period also witnessed ‘unprecedented prosperity’ in the West for the reunification of Germany, the increasing unity of European countries and ultimately the fact that the superpowers avoided nuclear confrontation through diplomacy. Here, Harper emphasised John Lewis Gaddis’ argument that the Cold War was in fact ‘a long peace’.³⁰ The Cold War was, in reality, not one constant, tumultuous period. For many, day-to-day life continued with the Cold War in the background. This of course was not the case for every country as those in the East, Africa and Latin America had far different experiences to much of the Western World. Yet, especially from a British perspective, life mostly continued as normal. Despite this fact, every cultural portrayal of the Cold War and Britain’s Cold War, emphasises this atmosphere of doom and terror, through the use of music, language, large images of the mushroom cloud, and dark narratives of secrecy and betrayal. This continued emphasis from the end of the Cold War itself has worked to create a memory of the Cold War and Britain’s Cold War as a tumultuous time, which continues today. This not only works to create a specific cultural memory but also provides entertainment and a

²⁹ Various, ‘Review Essays and Book Reviews’, p. 140.

³⁰ Various, ‘Review Essays and Book Reviews’, p. 140.

dramatised narrative for audiences. The focus on this sense of endless turmoil and dramatic ‘hot points’, however, may equally account for a feeling of detachment from the Cold War in cultural memory. The dramatisation instead creates an abstract idea of the conflict, and not the reality that many in Britain may remember, thus, in part, accounting for an ambiguous memory of the Cold War.

One final narrative challenge faced by the *Cold War* series and book was the lack of a definitive moment at which the Cold War ended. As discussed previously, the end of the Cold War is heavily debated among scholars, and as such the series and accompanying book reflected this. In the final chapter of the book, ‘Endings’, it stated:

Some say the Cold War ended when the Berlin Wall came down; others say it was when Gorbachev, at Malta, told Bush, “We don’t consider you as an enemy any more”. Now the Soviet Union had reconciled itself to seeing Germany (...) in military alliance with the West. Since Germany had always been at the epicentre of the Cold War in Europe, this has a strong claim to be considered the decisive moment of the Cold War’s ending.³¹

This demonstrates that there was no clear or decisive ending moment provided by the series or book and this continues to be a key aspect and issue for Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War. Without a clear and definite ending, it is difficult for people to know *what* to remember, and *how* to remember the Cold War. However, the fact that both the book and the series took the narrative to the end of 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, provided at least an indication that the gradual slowing down of the Cold War finally culminated in the end of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. A series of key events helped to form a narrative and a sense of a highly complex conflict, but there remains a confusion of *how* to remember the Cold War.

³¹ Isaacs and Downing, *Cold War*, p. 402.

There were several omissions in the series and accompanying book. In particular, the series presented a very US-Soviet Union, superpower focus, with little attention played to the roles of other countries during the Cold War. For example, the roles of Britain and France were mentioned sparingly throughout, often only to provide context for key events between the USA and Soviet Union. Interestingly, whilst mentioned briefly in the series, and with slightly more detail provided in the book, the Suez Crisis featured only to highlight the world's distraction from the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. The Suez Crisis was, however, a crucial turning-point in the Cold War for Britain when its role as a global power diminished. Equally, the resentment from the USA against Britain and France which resulted from the crisis affected US-European relations in the period. The lack of dedicated time to the topic is therefore surprising. This may consequently both reflect and shape a sense of uncertainty over Britain's role in the Cold War. If Britain's role during the conflict was only briefly mentioned on occasion, it provided a sense that Britain, and indeed other nations, were not as involved in, or affected by, the Cold War. The superpower focus of the series and book thus evoked a particular memory of the Cold War being a conflict fought between the USA and the Soviet Union, while other countries remained on the side-lines.

Further to this, reviews of the series stated that there was little attention paid to events in the Far East, with the exception of the obvious 'hot points' in Korea and Vietnam.³² The impact of the Vietnam War on Cambodia and Laos was mentioned briefly, although there was again slightly more detail provided in the book. Equally, whilst Cuba was given its own episode and Latin America was fairly well covered in the episode 'Backyard 1954-1990',³³ the impact of the Cold War in Africa was extremely brief. The episode 'Good Guys Bad Guys 1967-1978'

³² Various, 'Review Essays and Book Reviews', p. 138.

³³ 'Backyard 1954-1990', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 20 March 1999, 20:15.

covered the wars in the Middle East, as well as some conflicts in Africa.³⁴ The focus here was on superpower proxy wars in Angola and between Ethiopia and Somalia. Each conflict highlighted the role played by the USA and Soviet Union in funding and arming conflicts to empower governments who would back their system against the other. The impact of the Cold War in Africa, however, was devastating. Once again, a superpower focus detracted from emphasising the global nature of the Cold War and the wide-reaching impact it had. In particular, the wave of decolonisation following the Second World War was largely omitted, removing a vital Cold War narrative of changing power balances and the widespread human cost throughout Africa. This narrative would have a significant impact on the memory created for British audiences seeking to understand the Cold War, and in particular Britain's own role and changing position during decolonisation. A focus on the superpowers omitted the complexity of the Cold War but also the impact the conflict had on other countries. As will become evident, the narrative of decolonisation is often omitted or only mentioned briefly in cultural portrayals, demonstrating both a superpower focus but also a difficult past for Britain to acknowledge. That these countries did not form a central focus, distorted memory of the conflict and its widespread impact.

Omissions such as these also prompted reviews to declare that the series and book captured a simplified narrative, with one stating that 'it lacks penetration and complex analysis',³⁵ whilst another, by Harper, argued that 'The minimalist narrative inevitably ignores some events, oversimplifies others and tends to gloss over long-standing controversies'.³⁶ This simplification, however, may be symptomatic of the complexity of the Cold War narrative. The *Cold War* series attempted to present the Cold War in its entirety. In order to cover the Cold War in

³⁴ 'Good Guys Bad Guys 1967-1978', *Cold War*, BBC Two, 13 March 1999, 20:15.

³⁵ Unwin, 'Book Reviews', p. 68.

³⁶ Various, 'Review Essays and Book Reviews', p. 138.

twenty-four, forty-six-minute episodes it is not surprising that some content was prioritised over others. This was also inevitable when framing the narrative through a US-Soviet perspective. It would seem a challenge for portrayals of the Cold War to fully capture a forty-five-year conflict, from all perspectives. Instead, alternative focuses narrow a large and complex conflict to create a simplified but more digestible narrative for audiences and visitors. The cultural memory of the Cold War, and specifically, Britain's Cold War, is therefore shaped by this challenge.

In 2013, Downing reflected on the series in 'A Personal View'. Within this article, Downing noted the fact that the *Cold War* series did not share the success of Isaacs' *The World at War* documentary series. This is a particularly interesting point as the Second World War continues to hold more significance and thus garner more interest from the public than the Cold War.

Downing stated that:

Put simply, there was and still is a sense that the Second World War had been a war worth fighting, that the destruction of fascism in Europe and of militarism in Asia were noble aims, and that the good guys had won the war. By comparison, the Cold War looked extraordinarily complicated, sprawling and long-winded.³⁷

This comparison between the Second World War and the Cold War is a constant theme throughout this thesis. The significance of wartime Britain to the British national identity contrasts to Britain's decline in the Cold War period. The Second World War thus holds a vital place in Britain's cultural memory, whilst the complexity of the Cold War is often relegated. Downing added that, unlike *The World at War* series, *Cold War* had only been repeated once at the time of his writing in 2013; stating that whilst the Cold War did not seem to attract producers and broadcasters for factual documentaries, the Cold War was a great deal more

³⁷ Downing, 'A Personal View', p. 100.

popular in ‘the world of drama’.³⁸ As stated previously, the potential for drama in the Cold War narrative is great and provides a key background for thrillers and narratives of fear, intrigue and betrayal. This may be indicative of what attracts people to the Cold War and the influences on cultural memory of the conflict.

In 2008, the *Cold War* book was republished in a paperback edition. The new Preface in the book did, however, acknowledge an increased interest in the Cold War, noting its inclusion in university and school curriculums and an increased number of films and exhibitions with a Cold War theme.³⁹ From the early twenty-first century an increased interest in the topic is evident and is demonstrated in the number of British Cold War films and museum exhibitions analysed in this thesis. In an introduction for the second edition, Peter Hennessy outlined the significance and legacy of the book for new and Cold War generations, to understand and remember the Cold War and the legacy it has left behind. As Hennessy stated, ‘without a feel for the Cold War (. . .) it is impossible to understand what we are living through in the early twenty-first century’.⁴⁰ The significance of the book and the series was thus argued to be its encompassing narrative of the Cold War and how it successfully outlined the context behind contemporary issues, particularly in the Middle East. The Afterword by Isaacs and Downing is also insightful for the development of Cold War memory since the original series. At the end of the original series and book, a sense of hope was provided for a new world devoid of Cold War divisions. However, in the Afterword of the 2008 edition, today’s world was labelled as a world in ‘dangerous disorder’ with no ‘new world order’ to fill the gap left by the Cold War.⁴¹ A review of the second edition in the *Guardian* also outlined this point, stating that ‘From

³⁸ Downing, ‘A Personal View’, pp. 101, 103.

³⁹ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, ‘Preface to the Paperback Edition’, *Cold War: For Forty-Five Years the World Held its Breath*, Second Edition (London: Abacus, 2008), p. xiii.

⁴⁰ Hennessy, ‘Introduction’, p. xix.

⁴¹ Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, ‘Afterword’, in Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, *Cold War: For Forty-Five Years the World Held its Breath*, Second Edition (London: Abacus, 2008) pp. 482-495 (p. 495).

where we are now, it is possible to look back with a certain nostalgia to the cold war, a period of immobility in world affairs that brought with it “a strange sort of peace”.⁴² In the ten years following the *Cold War* series, hope for peace was increasingly replaced by a nostalgia for a conflict that had supposedly been engulfed with fear and terror. The rise of terrorism and nuclear proliferation in other countries has created an unpredictable world and a nostalgia for the bipolarity and certainty of the Cold War. It is therefore possible to see this nostalgic element of the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War develop.

2.2 Press Reaction to the End of the Cold War (1989-1991)

In the press reactions and headlines from 1989 through to 1991 and the ending of the Cold War, similarities can be seen with subsequent cultural reflections on the conflict, offering a sense of continuity, but also helping to demonstrate the development of a British cultural memory of the Cold War. Much like the *Cold War* series, there was an emphasis on dramatic and emotive language surrounding ‘hot points’ and key events in press reactions. This was particularly evident in reflecting on the nuclear threat and following the key moments of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Malta Summit and in reflections on the new post-Cold War world. These were undoubtedly crucial Cold War moments and were naturally dramatic and momentous for many people across the world. However, in the language used there is a clear sense of continuity with cultural portrayals since, which have seemingly adopted or reflected this language and the atmosphere created.

In particular, in several reflections of the Cold War throughout 1989 to 1991, a common and repeated theme of the ‘shadow’ of the Cold War and of nuclear war was repeated throughout the press. As early as January 1989, comments were made on the diminishing nuclear threat.

⁴² Ian Pindar, ‘Review: Cold War by Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing’, *The Guardian*, 22 August 2008, section Books <<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/aug/23/politics.roundupreviews>> [Accessed 14 November 2019]

This followed several steps towards more diplomacy in 1988, including the successful INF Treaty in December 1987 - which agreed to eliminate intermediate-range missiles - an agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in April 1988, and a speech by Gorbachev to the UN General Assembly that December in which he pushed for humanity and not ideology to drive international relations. As Adam Roberts argued this was seen as an indication that the Soviet Union would not use force over Eastern Europe.⁴³ Both an article in *The Times* which looked back on Reagan's career, and an article in the *Sunday Telegraph* marking the new year, referred to the ending of a nuclear threat, a new year 'the first since 1950 (...) not to be celebrated under the shadow of the dreaded mushroom cloud'.⁴⁴ This *Sunday Telegraph* article, however, was written by Peregrine Worsthorpe, a 'high Tory' and anti-communist who believed in 'hierarchy, empire and aristocracy'.⁴⁵ Journalist Jason Cowley even described Worsthorpe as having been 'a pantomime villain for the left'.⁴⁶ As such, Worsthorpe was likely to use dramatic language to celebrate the supposed victory for capitalism and the West at the end of the Cold War. Other articles did not use the word shadow, but used similar emotive language of struggle and suffering, one article in *The Times* reporting the Washington Summit in 1990, quoted Gorbachev as saying "The trenches of the Cold War are disappearing. The fog of prejudice, mistrust and animosity is vanishing".⁴⁷ The inclusion

⁴³ Adam Roberts, 'An 'incredibly swift transition': reflecting on the end of the Cold War', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III: Endings*, ed. by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 520-521 (pp. 513-534).

⁴⁴ Peregrine Worsthorpe, 'Rejoice and tremble', *Sunday Telegraph*, 1 January 1989, p. 26. *The Telegraph Historical Archive*, <<https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/IO0701737386/TGRH?u=essex&sid=TGRH&xid=4e238126>> [Accessed 30 December 2019]; 'Reagan: failed revolutionary', *The Times*, 17 January 1989, p. 16. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CALYCX>> [Accessed 7 November 2019].

⁴⁵ Stephen Bates, 'Sir Peregrine Worsthorpe obituary', *The Guardian*, Monday 5 October 2020, <the-guardian.com/media/2020/oct/05/sir-peregrine-worsthorpe-obituary> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

⁴⁶ Jason Cowley, "The Lost Magic of England", *New Statesman*, 143. 5301 (2016) pp. 32 – 35 (p. 32), *EBSCOhost*, <0-search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edo&AN=112935685&site=eds-live.> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

⁴⁷ Peter Stothard, 'Summit makes progress on German unity', *The Times*, 1 June 1990, p. 1. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CXpzM9>> [Accessed 17 December 2019].

of Gorbachev's words here and the language used echoed this sense of a conflict ending and peace slowly emerging.

Further to this, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was naturally much language which emphasised 'freedom'. In an article by *The Times* published the morning after the Berlin Wall was opened, the caption of a photo of the events read 'Dance of freedom'.⁴⁸ Written by Anne McElvoy, a foreign correspondent in Eastern Europe,⁴⁹ the caption emphasised the impact of the Berlin Wall and the confinement and division it had caused. Another article by foreign correspondent for *the Times*, Michael Binyon, was entitled 'Day trip to freedom for thousands', detailing the flood of people across the border and from East to West.⁵⁰ Those reporting from Berlin itself at the time the wall fell would have witnessed the celebrations and embrace of divided families, these sights contributing to the language of freedom. Margaret Thatcher was also reported as saying that the fall of the wall 'was "a great day for freedom"'.⁵¹ The opening of the border also saw statements of western victory. One article was titled 'Victory for Democracy' and provided much emotive language. It stated:

The Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain between East and West Germany were built to imprison the people of the Communist East, within a tyrannical political system from which they had been fleeing in their thousands. The gates of this grim and brutal barrier have now been thrown open because the Communist system has broken down from the inside.⁵²

⁴⁸ Anne McElvoy and Our Foreign Staff, 'The Iron Curtain torn open', *The Times*, 10 November 1989, pp. 1-24. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CXqWw1>> [Accessed 17 December 2019].

⁴⁹ 'Anne McElvoy', *Economist* <<http://mediadirectory.economist.com/people/anne-mcelvoy/>> [Accessed 14 June 2021]

⁵⁰ Michael Binyon, 'Day trip to freedom for thousands', *The Times*, 11 November 1989, pp. 1-16. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/IF0500559721/TTDA?u=essex&sid=TTDA&xid=076146dd>> [Accessed 12 January 2020]; See also, 'Journalism Advisory Board | Binyon' <<https://publishing.brookes.ac.uk/industrylinks/jbmember/binyon/>> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

⁵¹ Murray McElvoy and Anne Ian, 'Hammering down the Wall', *The Times*, 11 November 1989, pp. 1-16. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CXqXk0>> [Accessed 17 December 2019].

⁵² 'Victory for Democracy', *The Times*, 11 November 1989, p. 11. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CAMDpX>> [Accessed 7 November 2019].

The use of language such as ‘imprison’ ‘tyrannical’ and ‘fleeing’ all emphasise this theme of Cold War terror. The rest of the article proceeded to look back on the Cold War from a perspective of Soviet aggression and expansionism, with an underlying sense that Soviet communism was doomed to fail.⁵³ Equally, a review of the 1980s in the *Daily Mail* in December 1989 followed a series of articles in a pull-out titled ‘The decade that smashed barriers’. In particular it remarked that ‘in a breath-taking rush at the end of the Eighties, the people of eastern Europe began to smash down their own barriers (...) The most potent symbol of oppression, the Berlin Wall, was brought crashing down by the people of East Germany’.⁵⁴ Again this echoed a sense of fighting oppression and entering freedom. Events leading to the end of the Cold War thus triggered emotive reflections on both the forty-five-year conflict and its ending from 1989 to 1991. However, it must also be noted that this language of freedom and victory over Soviet ‘aggression’, as well as signifying an ending of the Cold War, reflected, and was conducive to, the political rhetoric and aims of western right-wing governments at the time. Dramatic language and a sense of victory and freedom from a period of terror can be seen to be echoed in the *Cold War* series as described above.

However, as well as hope and enthusiasm for a world without barriers and the nuclear threat, some articles noted as early as 1989 that a nostalgia for the security and understanding of the Cold War and nuclear arms race may soon emerge. One article in *The Times* noted that the removal of ‘the shadow of superpower war’ makes way for new threats. Another article, again by Peregrine Worsthorne, in the *Daily Telegraph* explicitly stated that, ‘Young people, having never known anything worse, used to complain about living under the shadow of the mushroom

⁵³ ‘Victory for Democracy’, p. 11.

⁵⁴ ‘The decade that smashed barriers’, *Daily Mail*, 29 December 1989, p. 21. *Daily Mail Historical Archive, 1896-2004*, <<https://0-link-gale-com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/apps/doc/EE1861382185/DMHA?u=essex&sid=DMHA&xid=53d31a17>> [Accessed 18 January 2020].

cloud. It could be that they will soon come to look back at that shadow with a certain nostalgia', the article proceeds to list the numerous economic concerns and other threats in the post-Cold War world.⁵⁵ The communist enemy had at least been a clear enemy, whilst the post-Cold War world order brought uncertainty. It is interesting that as early as 1989 and 1990, a sense of a new complicated post-Cold War world was on the horizon and already a sense of nostalgia for the Cold War and MAD were emerging. This nostalgia for the East-West conflict in today's world is a key theme which runs throughout cultural portrayals. Indeed, the rising production of Cold War museum exhibitions, films, and television dramas, demonstrate this desire to look back at the Cold War, and despite its terror, to look back with a sense of certainty and understanding.

Following the Malta Summit and throughout 1990 there was also much reflection on the new post-Cold War world. Many sentiments echoed hopes for peace after the Cold War conflict. In articles relating to the 1990 Washington Summit and 1990 Paris Summit, articles discussed the prospect of peace and cooperation in Europe. In particular an article, following the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, noted that Thatcher had called the document a 'new Magna Carta', whilst President Mitterrand declared that, "We 34 states share from now on a common vision of the world and a common heritage of values".⁵⁶ A new sense of hope and peace was thus captured in these articles, the language contrasting to other reflections of the 'shadow' and 'terror' of the Cold War years. Further to this, however, was speculation as to the world which would replace that of the Cold War. One article in the *Daily Mail*, discussing the reunification of Germany, remarked that 'some already hanker for the old confrontational

⁵⁵ Peregrine Worsthorne, 'A Cold look back and forward', *Daily Telegraph*, 21 December 1989, p.16. *The Telegraph Historical Archive*, <<https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/IO0703569751/TGRH?u=essex&sid=TGRH&xid=e1ee596d>> [Accessed 30 December 2019].

⁵⁶ Michael Evans, 'East and West agree for mankind's future', *The Times*, 22 November 1990, p.8. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CXqCE1>> [Accessed 17 December 2019].

certainties between the free West and the communist East. The sheer size of a ‘big’ Germany frightens them’.⁵⁷ It is also now widely acknowledged that Thatcher herself was paranoid about German reunification.⁵⁸ Even by the end of 1990, there was therefore a sense that the superpower confrontation during the Cold War had provided a sense of security which had now collapsed. A further article by Norman Tebbit in *The Times*, stated ‘as the shadow of superpower war is lifting, the darkness of international crime, drugs, civil unrest, civil war and terrorism will spread widely through the world’. The article suggests hope for cooperation with Cold War enemies to face these new threats.⁵⁹ The new world discussed in this article very much mirrors the threats facing the world today. As well as hope there was thus also a sense of the uncertainty that would come with a world not dominated by the balance of East and West. This uncertainty is reflected in exhibitions depicting the Cold War and the challenges of *how* to remember the conflict.

As explored with the later 1998 *Cold War* documentary, a common challenge with establishing and understanding a cultural memory of the Cold War is the lack of an agreed and clear end to the conflict. Unlike the end of the Second World War for Britain, there was no VE Day for the Cold War. The reporting during the years 1989 to 1991 instead seemed to document a series of events which gradually saw the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, some articles made hints to the inevitable collapse of communism, however, perhaps one of the most decisive moments for the end of the Cold War hinted at by the press was the reporting of the Malta Summit between George Bush Senior and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1989. On 4

⁵⁷ ‘A great day for all of Europe’, *Daily Mail*, 3 October 1990, p.6. *Daily Mail Historical Archive, 1896-2004*, <<https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/EE1862088900/DMHA?u=essex&sid=DMHA&xid=e39102e3>> [Accessed 29 December 2019].

⁵⁸ Jonathan Aitken, *Margaret Thatcher: Power and Personality* (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2013), p. 593, *ECBSOhost*, <<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=637356&site=ehost-live>> [Accessed 10 December 2020].

⁵⁹ Norman Tebbit, ‘New wars to be won – with Moscow our ally’, *The Times*, 20 February 1990, p.12. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CXpWd9>> [Accessed 17 December 2019].

December 1989, the front-page headline of *The Times* read: ‘Malta summit declares: Cold War is over’.⁶⁰ The article outlined the discussions of the summit, reporting Bush’s statement that “‘Tonight, we stand at the cross-roads of history on the way to a Europe whole and free’”.⁶¹ A further article in the *Daily Mail* similarly reflected this, titled ‘Partners in Peace’.⁶² Once again, the sentiments of freedom and peace were echoed in the reporting of the meeting. However, whilst this summit proclaimed the end of the Cold War, reporting continued to outline the ongoing developments and agreements that would gradually bring the Cold War to an end, culminating with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Just prior to the Malta summit, in late November, Thatcher was reported to have said that ‘the cold war would not be over until the end of the century’ discussing the need to maintain an American presence in Europe.⁶³ Amid the celebrations of events toward the end of the Cold War, caution was thus still urged by some. In this sense there was still no definitive end to the Cold War, rather a series of multiple endings throughout 1989 and 1991, and across different countries, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union. We therefore see similarities to the challenges faced by the *Cold War* documentary and framing a cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War.

There is limited literature on British reactions to the end of the Cold War beyond the political, the lack of a definitive end may in part account for this. Grace Huxford’s current oral history research into the experiences of British military personnel and civilians on British bases in West Germany, has highlighted that the collapse of the Berlin Wall was ‘bittersweet’ for those

⁶⁰ Peter Stothard, ‘Malta summit declares: Cold War is over’, *The Times*, 4 December 1989, pp.1, 24. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CXpqPX>> [Accessed 17 December 2019].

⁶¹ Stothard, ‘Malta summit declares: Cold War is over’, p. 1.

⁶² John Dickie, ‘Partners in Peace’, *Daily Mail*, 4 December 1989, pp. 1- 2. *Daily Mail Historical Archive, 1896-2004*, <<https://0-link-gale-com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/apps/doc/EE1861298522/DMHA?u=essex&sid=DMHA&xid=2fd5df06>> [Accessed 18 January 2020].

⁶³ Philip Webster, ‘Cold War ‘will last until 2000’’, *The Times*, 25 November 1989, p.1. *The Times Digital Archive*, <<http://tinyurl.gale.com/tinyurl/CAMZ24>> [Accessed 7 November 2019].

who had built lives there, however, knowledge of reactions in Britain is limited.⁶⁴ Furthermore, in an article for the *Economist* in 1999, on the ten-year anniversary of the fall of the wall, and for some the end of the conflict, Thatcher's absence from Berlin was remarked upon. The article stated that her absence 'captured the insouciance with which Britain is commemorating the end of the Cold War'.⁶⁵ The limited commemoration further highlights the lack of a clear end to the Cold War and the ambivalent relationship with Britain's Cold War past; perhaps the feeling that it was something that happened elsewhere, the impact on Britain seemingly less clear.

The press reactions to the ending of the Cold War thus share the dramatisation which was evident in the *Cold War* series. Specific events and 'hot points' of the Cold War lend themselves to dramatic narratives and thus may partly explain the increasing appeal and nostalgia for the period. However, this continued emphasis on drama from the end of the conflict can be seen to have been a crucial influence on the cultural memory of the period, the reporting likely shaping memories and later portrayals. In particular, the emphasis on nuclear war and the end of the nuclear threat at the end of the conflict present a constant theme for Britain's cultural memory, the 'shadow' of the bomb epitomising the conflict, the fear and the drama. Yet it is interesting that a suggestion of nostalgia for the conflict was made as early as 1989. Whilst there was much hope at the end of the Cold War, it was clear that the post-Cold War world would provide less order and less certainty. This would seem to have increasingly developed over the years as new threats unfolded and escalated. Recent events form a key influence on how we look back on and understand the Cold War today.

⁶⁴ Grace Huxford, 'The Fall of the Berlin Wall: British Residents Remember November 1989', *Arts & Minds*, 8 November 2019, <<https://ahrc-blog.com/2019/11/08/the-fall-of-the-berlin-wall-british-residents-remember-november-1989>> [Accessed 3 September 2020].

⁶⁵ 'Britain and the Cold War: The forgotten war', *The Economist*, 11 November 1999, <<https://www.economist.com/britain/1999/11/11/the-forgotten-war>> [Accessed 3 September 2020].

2.3 Exhibitions & Present Memory

The developing reflections on the Cold War from the end of the conflict onwards have shaped understandings and portrayals today. In 2019, thirty years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there were three key museum exhibitions you could visit in Britain on the Cold War and Britain's experience of the conflict. These were *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* at the Imperial War Museum (2014), the *National Cold War Exhibition* at RAF Cosford (2007) and *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* in The National Archives (2019).⁶⁶ Each exhibition told varied narratives and differed in their portrayal of the Cold War. The military nature of the Imperial War Museum (IWM) and RAF Cosford led to more of a military focus in their exhibitions on the Cold War; whilst The National Archives (TNA) made a concentrated effort to balance a military narrative with the wider social and cultural impacts of the Cold War. The military focus in the IWM's *Peace and Security* exhibition was centred on British military experiences, especially in Northern Ireland, the Falklands War, and more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. the *National Cold War Exhibition* at RAF Cosford similarly projected a military focus. This was again largely captured through the display of military aircraft, vehicles, and weapons, including an old Polaris missile. The military narrative was, however, merged with some cultural aspects, particularly displays relating to the Cold War's influence on society and culture including art, sport, film and television, which helped to present the wide reach and impact of the conflict on both the East and West.

In contrast, the *Protect and Survive* exhibition at TNA balanced the military planning of the Cold War through displays on 'war gaming' and nuclear weapons with displays of the Cold

⁶⁶*Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum, London: - 2020), visited on 10 October 2019; *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition] (RAF Museum, Cosford: 7 February 2007 - Present), visited on 4 February 2018; *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition] (The National Archives, London: 4 April 2019 – 9 November 2019), visited on 10 October 2019.

War in everyday life and the civilian experience, reflected in Civil Defence but also popular culture and board games. In the exhibition, emphasis was placed on the fact that military preparations and developments took place in the background to daily life. Each of these exhibitions therefore had a particular focus and in turn told differing narratives and created different atmospheres and memories of the Cold War. In these varying approaches, the challenge of how to remember the Cold War is evident. In particular, the exhibitions highlight the debate surrounding whether to define the Cold War as a conflict or a period as a whole. Whilst the *Cold War* series presented the Cold War in its entirety, both as an ideological and military conflict and a period which influenced society and culture, it will be demonstrated that portrayals today explore the narrative via themes. Each exhibition either projected the Cold War as a conflict, series of events, or a period as a whole. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, it is necessary to acknowledge these various definitions to understand the challenges faced by museums today and their choices in how to construct a narrative of Britain's Cold War.

As stated, the exhibitions differed in their framing of the Cold War. The IWM's *Peace and Security* exhibition provided the most military narrative of the three exhibitions. The exhibition, however, was not Cold War specific and had the role of capturing a seventy-year period from 1945 to 2015. The layout of the museum is such that each floor and exhibition surround the atrium which forms a central feature of the museum. The result of this was that the *Peace and Security* exhibition on the third floor was in a u-shape, with stairs to it opening into the middle of this space. Consequently, the layout did not lend itself easily to a chronological narrative and as such relied on different sections which focused on a particular aspect or theme. In addition to this, with just one floor and a seventy-year period to cover, particular sections were carefully selected so as to cover a broad range of topics. The Cold War was not used as a framework for the exhibition's narrative; instead the Cold War served as

context for a series of events, conflicts and themes and formed one part of an exhibition on post-1945 conflict. The exhibition's focus was instead on the continuation of conflict from the post-war period. The opening text read, 'In 1945 the newly formed United Nations offered the hope of world peace and security. Yet war and violent conflict, fuelled by local tensions and global rivalries, still show no sign of ending'.⁶⁷ There was thus no defining Cold War framework. This is particularly interesting for how visitors engaged with the exhibition and the memory of the Cold War, portrayed as a series of defining moments in the latter half of the twentieth century, such as nuclear development, and conflicts in Kenya, Aden, Northern Ireland and the Falklands. Despite this, however, with an extended timeline presented, Cold War themes and events were framed by the impact of the Second World War and recent conflicts. This captures two key influences on Cold War memory, both the enduring legacy of wartime Britain, and the comparison of Cold War and post-1989 conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In framing the exhibition within this extended period, a sense of continuity was captured through the themes and events displayed, helping to provide a demonstration of how conflict has evolved. Rather than seeing the Cold War as a period in itself, late twentieth and early twenty-first century conflicts were portrayed as interconnected.

As with IWM, RAF Cosford's *National Cold War Exhibition* had a strong military emphasis. This being the remit of the museum due to it being an RAF airfield. The military emphasis was echoed in the exhibition's housing a hangar with aircraft, vehicles, missiles, and weapons from the Cold War era. A viewing platform, accessible by lift, also enabled visitors to see and engage with the vast number of military artefacts on display. The platform allowed visitors to be close

⁶⁷ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

to aircraft hanging above their heads, providing a true submersion into the Cold War's military narrative.

The military narrative, much like the IWM exhibition, was evidenced in the displays relating to the development of nuclear technology, surveillance with the U2 operations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and information regarding the development and use of various US, Soviet and British missiles, including the Polaris missile. Unlike the IWM, however, the exhibition in RAF Cosford had an entire hangar to utilise for their Cold War narrative and a purely Cold War focus, devoid of needing to include more recent conflict. As a result, the *National Cold War Exhibition*, whilst also portraying Britain's experience, provided a far more global narrative of the conflict. This was most evident in the 'Global Conflicts' silo, several silos throughout the exhibition captured specific themes and topics. Around the outside of the silo, the introductory text read:

It is often said that the Cold War was a conflict without casualties. This is far from the truth. War may not have broken out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces but the war was fought throughout the globe and millions died. This display is that story of more than forty six years of conflict.⁶⁸

This display therefore provided two messages for visitors. The first message was the emphasis that the Cold War was not always "cold" and that it was instead a truly global conflict which impacted countries all over the world and which cost millions of lives. The second message leading from this was that the Cold War *was* a military conflict. Evidence of conflicts and military engagements by Western and Eastern powers suggested that the Cold War can be remembered as a military conflict and not simply a "cold" or 'imaginary war'.

Alongside a military and nuclear narrative was also an acknowledgment of how the Cold War impacted on culture and everyday life. Several displays, designed as sections of the Berlin Wall

⁶⁸ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

with the West on the left and the East on the right, captured aspects relating to lifestyle, freedom, arts, sport, and espionage. Featured artefacts of Cold War board games such as ‘Spy Ring’ and ‘Radar Search’, Private Eye magazines, Olympic posters, film posters and espionage books helped to demonstrate how the Cold War was ever-present in the everyday lives of individuals and how the promotion of each system as being superior led to vast propaganda.⁶⁹ These themes were, however, framed as an extension of the conflict; the competing systems waging cultural wars to win “hearts and minds”. Further to this, the exhibition featured displays on the Berlin Wall, economic competition, and the Space Race, once again capturing the wide reach and influence of the Cold War in all aspects of life. Whilst capturing the social and cultural impact and legacy of the conflict, this remained part of a conflict narrative.

Unlike the exhibitions at IWM and RAF Cosford, the *Protect and Survive* exhibition at TNA presented a very specific narrative of nuclear threat and military planning but balanced this equally with a narrative of the lived experience of the period. The small exhibition in the Keepers Gallery was designed to resemble two juxtaposed environments, one being a nuclear bunker room and the other being a home environment.

Following a brief introduction, the visitor entered what was labelled as the ‘Government Command Centre’ or the bunker room. The room ahead was very much set up as a working bunker with plotting maps and desks surrounding a central table. To the left-hand side of the room was a display on ‘War Gaming’, this moved the narrative onto specific government preparations and plans for a nuclear attack. The display text explained ‘Transition to war exercises’, with books in a cabinet providing evidence of these government plans. This room therefore set a military narrative of a conflict being planned and fought.

⁶⁹ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

However, as the visitor left the environment of the nuclear bunker they entered an entirely different scene, one resembling a family home. This section 'Cold War in the Home' paid attention to 'ordinary citizens' and their experiences of living under the threat of the bomb. In particular the exhibition stated:

For some, the Cold War was about protest, focused on revulsion at nuclear weaponry. Artists, authors, songwriters and filmmakers channelled their fears too, reacting to the threat of nuclear war across many media.

But you didn't have to be an activist or artist to be affected by the Cold War. Just by living through it, and absorbing popular culture in a consumer society, everyone took part in this global conflict.⁷⁰

Whilst other exhibitions tend to focus on key events and themes including anti-nuclear activism and other social and cultural impacts of the Cold War, the *Protect and Survive* exhibition paid particular attention to the lived experience of the Cold War and its place in the background of everyday life. This worked to create a less dramatic and sensationalised narrative and yet engaged visitors through how they remember living in the Cold War, or for younger generations, how everyday life continued despite threats of nuclear annihilation.

This section of the exhibition, designed like an ordinary home, began with a detailed display of Civil Defence. This was depicted by several Civil Defence posters on display as well as the Strath Report (1955) detailing British preparations for a nuclear attack. An interactive screen also enabled the visitor to engage with two short videos. The first was footage of *Protect and Survive*, enabling visitors to see and understand the advice available to people during the Cold War for trying to survive a nuclear attack. The second video was an interview with Dr Matthew Grant who discussed the plans for Civil Defence but most importantly its shortcomings and its eventual use as a façade for propaganda, to convince people to accept the nuclear deterrent.

⁷⁰ *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition].

Once more the narrative presented was one of government preparations in the face of nuclear threat, yet alongside this, the acknowledgement that it was impossible to prepare for such an attack, knowledge that the public, particularly in the latter Cold War, would have lived with whilst they went on with their daily lives.

Along from the section on Civil Defence was one on Cold War culture. This area was set up like a living room with a sofa, television and a cabinet used as a display. The display text declared that:

In a cultural battle for hearts and minds, Western values of democracy, individualism and consumerism were brought to life in fictional heroes. Alternatively, darker stories of espionage played on themes of paranoia and distrust. Science fiction authors explored apocalyptic themes, whilst a huge number of folk and pop songs referenced Cold War tensions.⁷¹

These themes were captured in the artefacts on display containing newspaper clippings relating to the controversial film by Peter Watkins, *The War Game*, and a press release for *Threads*, representing the apocalyptic theme. In an additional display cabinet featured objects included Cold War games such as ‘Spy Ring’ and ‘Radar Search’, espionage novels, and music by The Jam and Frankie Goes to Hollywood, which referenced Cold War divisions, capturing Cold War paranoia, western consumer values and tensions between East and West.⁷² The variety of these objects helped to emphasise the fact that the Cold War infiltrated all aspects of life, and the living room scenery stressed this sense of the “ordinary”, that people lived with the Cold War constantly in the background.

Towards the end of the exhibition, was a table with paper, pencils, and typewriters. Visitors were invited to write or type out any memories of, or reflections on, the Cold War and put them on the ‘Cold War Witness’ board. Again, visitors were able to actively engage, the activity

⁷¹ *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition].

⁷² *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition].

acknowledged that many visitors would have lived through the Cold War themselves and have their own Cold War memories to share, adding to the narrative of ‘ordinary citizens’ experiences. The activity also, however, enabled others to read people’s memories and recollections, helping to form their own cultural memories of the period. From reading the comments it became very clear that the Cold War was a part of daily life, yet these fears and concerns discussed were still very much present, particularly at high points in the conflict.

Each exhibition therefore framed the Cold War in a myriad of ways. The IWM focused on key military themes, from specific conflicts to nuclear developments and military borders. The lack of a specific Cold War framework relegated the significance of the conflict. Instead, rather than a defined conflict or period as a whole, the Cold War period was narrated via numerous conflicts and themes. The exhibition at RAF Cosford similarly had a military narrative yet presented the Cold War as a defined and global conflict, fought in military, political and cultural spheres. The most recent exhibition at TNA, in contrast, placed the most emphasis on the fact that for nearly fifty years the Cold War formed a background to, and infiltrated, daily life, whilst military and government plans were made behind closed doors. The exhibition emphasised how people “lived” the Cold War, inviting visitors to reflect on their own memories. Despite these differences in framing the conflict or period, each exhibition included an aspect of a military narrative, often looking at similar events or ‘hot points’.

In the IWM, the need to order the exhibition by themes saw the focus on topics such as conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Falklands, nuclear warfare and recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is thus evident that the exhibition was specifically designed to draw on themes and events, often those that were particular ‘hot points’ in post-war Britain. In the limited space to present these topics, narratives were told through selected objects, making much of the exhibition quite visual, with visitors able to picture moments of the Cold War and modern conflict through the items on display. This choice of display was explained in the exhibition’s opening text:

It is a complicated story. To explore it, we have chosen objects that offer insights into some of the key and often controversial episodes of recent history. We have grouped them to show the many ways in which modern conflicts have been fought, experienced, resolved, or left unfinished.⁷³

The exhibition therefore openly confronted the difficulty of capturing such a vast period. There was an acknowledgement of the complexity of trying to present a single post-war narrative, resulting primarily in a lack of a Cold War framework. This highlights that museums will each approach this in a myriad of ways. Similarly, to the *Cold War* series, the breadth and complexity of post-1945 and recent conflict results in particular themes being focused on, which in turn become central to memories of the Cold War and post-1945 period.

The predominantly military narrative was told in several areas, the first key one focused on the collapse of Britain's empire and decolonisation in 'News from Abroad'. Interestingly, this highly complex and controversial aspect of Britain's Cold War was somewhat brief but focused the telling of this narrative through films and newsreels which informed people at home of global events. The introductory text to this section explained that post-war,

Britain's position in the world changed. The Empire became the Commonwealth, as countries demanded independence. Often this process was peaceful, but violence broke out in places such as India and the newly created Pakistan, as well as in Malaya and Aden.⁷⁴

This text pointed to violence taking place in some fights for independence but provided little indication of Britain's actions and the levels of controversy surrounding these conflicts. Whilst there was mention of the Mau Mau in Kenya being 'Harshly dealt with by the ruling British authorities', there were few explicit mentions of British violence in places like Kenya and Malaya.⁷⁵ Instead, the exhibition allowed the visitor to engage with some of the films and

⁷³ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁷⁴ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁷⁵ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

footage which captured these conflicts. In particular, *Witness to the Partition of India* (1947) was a home movie used to capture events following the division of India and Pakistan. *The Malayan Emergency at first hand* (1948) showed more amateur footage to capture operations in Malaya and *Hospital and Off Duty Services in Aden* (1964-1966) revealed events and daily life in a hospital during the conflict.⁷⁶ The exhibition thus offered very visual glimpses via these films to events in the decolonisation period and the films, in particular *Witness to the Partition of India*, provided glimpses of violence and the aftermath of conflict. However, it is notable that whilst the films mentioned were taken by individuals caught up in the conflicts, many were serving in or aiding the British military and government. This is likely due to the museum's focus on British experiences, however, the voices or perspective of inhabitants and those either fighting for, or caught up in the struggle for, independence was limited. In other words, whilst the footage enabled these issues to be addressed, a narrative of British fighting and violence was not made explicit in the display. In contrast, the British were portrayed as peacekeepers, operating in defence of the empire. As Erik Linstrum highlights, even during the conflict with Kenya, people in Britain were quietly aware of some of the violence taking place, but doubt was often cast over this through pointing to stories as gossip, portrayals of fiction, or even discrediting journalists who did publish the violence and controversy. In particular, Linstrum noted how the professionalisation of journalism led to such rigour over objectivity that journalists often did not publish what they knew if sufficient evidence was unavailable.⁷⁷ The suppression of narratives documenting British violence highlights Britain's difficult relationship with this aspect of its history. Indeed, the Cold War and decolonisation cannot be considered separately. The proxy wars which ensued as a result of decolonisation shaped the

⁷⁶ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁷⁷ Erik Linstrum, 'Facts about Atrocity: Reporting Colonial Violence in Postwar Britain', *History Workshop Journal*, 84 (2017), pp.108-127.(pp. 115 -116, 122) <<https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbx032>> [Accessed 16 December 2020].

Cold War conflict and left their legacy in today's world. As Kennetta Hammond Perry argues in their article "‘Little Rock’ in Britain" - which explores the influence of Little Rock Arkansas on British notions of racism, citizenship and Britishness - the international context of the Cold War, empire and decolonisation cannot be considered separately from domestic events.⁷⁸ Equally, here, Britain's international role in decolonisation is key to understanding Britain's domestic experience of the Cold War. However, Britain's difficult relationship with this aspect of its past results in a largely absent decolonisation narrative. This complex and controversial past is thus not captured in IWM and may demonstrate the simplification of post-war narratives in order to focus on a British perspective. The exhibition therefore offered a fairly specific British narrative of 'hot points' during decolonisation. In doing so cultural memories generated by this exhibition would likely be very much from a British perspective of defence during the collapse of empire and Britain's experience in these conflicts.

Similarly, in the 'War on the Doorstep' section which addressed the 'hot points' of The Troubles in Northern Ireland and the Falklands War, the narrative was again very focussed on the experience of British soldiers. Part of the section on Northern Ireland used a speaker by a Humber 'Pig' vehicle on display. If stood directly beneath the speaker, visitors could hear voice recordings of British soldiers and their experiences. Many of the comments made focussed on attitudes towards them and how they were treated by locals, including abuse towards them, stones being thrown at them and how riots escalated. While some comments were made regarding the fact that some people would approach them normally and ask questions, there was a particular emphasis on negative experiences and relations between the soldiers and locals. Further to this, a display board for objects relating to Northern Ireland provided context

⁷⁸ Kennetta Hammond Perry, "‘Little Rock’ in Britain: Jim Crow's Transatlantic Topographies", *Journal of British Studies*, 51. 1 (2012), pp. 155 – 177 (p. 159) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/23265262>> [Accessed 12 December 2020].

for The Troubles and stated, ‘The British soldiers sent to Northern Ireland as peacekeepers found themselves in the middle of a conflict with a long history. Many would have found it hard to understand who they were fighting and why’.⁷⁹ There was thus a particular focus on the struggles and difficulties of the British soldiers, perhaps more so than the impact of the conflict on Northern Ireland itself and the locals it affected.

Much like ‘News from Abroad’ controversial moments or British actions tended to be omitted or merely mentioned in passing. For instance, Bloody Sunday, January 1972, which saw British paratroopers open fire on unarmed protesters, killing 13 and injuring others, was only mentioned in passing in relation to the use of the Humber ‘Pig’. From these examples, it would seem that the exhibition’s narratives focused primarily on the British experience, as it is a British war museum, but also paid far less attention to controversial moments in Britain’s own history.

The section on the Falklands War was very much the same, little seemed to be mentioned about the devastating casualties or controversy surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano in which an estimated 400 Argentinians were killed, although figures differ.⁸⁰ Instead, a speaker, like that for the Northern Ireland section, played the statements of soldiers who described their relief at the Belgrano being hit before they had to intervene and the justification of it as a target. However, the sinking of British warships and casualties were noted in the displays. Once again the projected narrative was of British wartime service. That the exhibition focused primarily on a British perspective and the duties and roles of active service in these conflicts reflects the

⁷⁹ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁸⁰ David George Boyce, *The Falklands War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 104; Peter Foster, ‘Margaret Thatcher and the Falklands War: Doubts and Fears in a Far-off Conflict That Changed Britain’, *The Telegraph*, 8 April 2013, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/9980046/Margaret-Thatcher-and-the-Falklands-War-doubts-and-fears-in-a-far-off-conflict-that-changed-Britain.html>> [Accessed, 3 November 2017].

remit of the IWM. However, in its omissions it also highlights the difficulty in capturing key post-1945 events in a relatively short space. The result being that the narrative chosen was far more of a Britain defending territory that at the time was, or still is, theirs, and peacekeeping, as opposed to Britain's own controversial and violent actions.

The *National Cold War Exhibition* at RAF Cosford also focussed on several 'hot points' of the Cold War. For example, a silo was specifically designated to explain and capture the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin blockade and construction and fall of the wall also served as a predominant feature, much like in the *Cold War* series. The Global Conflicts silo, mentioned above, provided examples of several 'hot points' of the conflict. Conflicts discussed included those in China, South America, South East Asia, in particular Vietnam and Central and South Asia including conflict between India and Pakistan following the withdrawal of British influence. Africa was noted as having been 'particularly tragic' with '7.06 million killed in war'.⁸¹ Specifically for the British narrative, the use of Lincoln bombers against the Mau Mau in Kenya was highlighted. Also mentioned was Britain's contribution to Korea, British involvement against communist guerrillas in Malaysia, controversial action in Suez and their role in Greece. Whilst these conflicts were noted, much like the IWM, details of British controversies or violence were omitted, instead basic facts and details made up the narrative. Whilst this may have been to avoid over-complication, it provided a somewhat simplified narrative. The only conflict explored in detail here was that of the Vietnam War, which was detailed throughout the inside of the silo, covering key events such as the Tet Offensive and the My Lai Massacre.

⁸¹ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

Similarly, TNA's exhibition captured some key conflicts, although quite briefly. To the left of the central desk was a map of the world labelled 'Cold War World', the text beside it introduced the fact that conflicts were fought across the globe and stated that 'This map shows some of the key developments and flashpoints', emphasising again particular 'hot points' of the conflict. The map covered several events including those conflicts in Korea, Malaya, Aden, and Indonesia, as well as noting the Berlin Wall, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, and other key conflicts. In regard to those relating to British involvement, once more general key facts about the conflicts were provided and details of tragedies and controversial moments were less focussed on or omitted entirely. This has been seen throughout the three exhibitions, creating a simplified narrative regarding decolonisation and proxy wars, not making this a central focus in British cultural portrayals of the Cold War. Instead, the 'hot points' focussed on include those such as Vietnam, Cuba and Berlin. The continued emphasis on these events and countries ensures that they continue to hold central positions in the cultural memory of the Cold War. Britain's own experiences of decolonisation are side-lined. This may be for several reasons, much like the *Cold War* series it could be the result of a tendency to focus on the superpowers, although this tendency is decreasing with the rise in knowledge of other countries and their involvement in the Cold War. Equally, the relative decline of Britain's role in the world is not a widely taught or popular topic in British history and it is a difficult past for Britain to come to terms with, thus it is likely relegated for more dramatic or global narratives in the period. Whatever the reason, this lack of emphasis on the significance of Britain's involvement and actions in these conflicts further adds to the uncertainty of Britain's role in the Cold War and how to remember it.

As was also the case in the *Cold War* series, each exhibition paid significant attention to the development of nuclear warfare throughout the Cold War years, the nuclear theme forming a central focus for portrayals of the Cold War. In *Peace and Security*, further to the exhibition's

military narrative were the sections on nuclear war. Under the titles ‘Shadow of the Bomb 1945-’ and ‘War That Never Was 1945-1989’, the very military based narrative was partly juxtaposed with the sense of the ‘imaginary war’,⁸² which the exhibition text echoed, stating ‘But the cataclysmic ‘Cold War’ never fully ignited’.⁸³ This is an interesting point and one which indicates the challenges of how to remember the Cold War and explore its memory, which were discussed in the introduction. The fact that, for the superpowers, there was no direct or “hot” conflict and a nuclear proliferation that never materialised as a nuclear war, captures the struggle of what is being remembered and how to portray this. The IWM exhibition thus relied on the narrative of the threat of war and in doing so used emotive and dramatic language to capture the fear and the danger. This was particularly evident in the text for ‘Shadow of the Bomb’ which read: ‘Their [Nuclear weapons] potential was horrific. If they were ever used, the consequences could be devastating. They might lead not just to a calamitous war, but to the end of humanity itself’.⁸⁴ The emphasis on the language ‘horrific’, ‘devastating’, ‘calamitous’ and ‘end of humanity’, echoed this threat and therefore in turn projected and shaped a cultural memory of the Cold War as a period ridden with total fear. Here we see the same use of dramatisation that was evident in the press at the end of the conflict and in the *Cold War* series.

The nuclear sections of the exhibition were largely captured in the military objects on display such as a case for the ‘Little Boy’ bomb, lance missiles and warning equipment among others. However, there were some cultural features including Colin Self’s *Beach Girl* sculpture, a place for the book *When the Wind Blows* and a CND poster. These items, though far fewer than the military objects, added the voice of opposition to the nuclear conflict and the government’s

⁸² See Grant, Matthew, and Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Introduction: the Cold War as an imaginary war’, in *Understanding The Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp.1-29, see pp.2-4.

⁸³ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁸⁴ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

preparations for such an attack; the military narrative being combined with some of the social and cultural fallout of nuclear proliferation.

The nuclear narrative in the *National Cold War Exhibition* was similarly dotted throughout the exhibition, however, one of the first focal points was a board standing isolated with a large image of a nuclear explosion and mushroom cloud covering it. Text next to the image, titled '4 minutes' explained the concept of the four-minute warning and how 'The image of a nuclear mushroom cloud and the fear of a four minute warning were engrained in the minds of all those who lived through the Cold War in the United Kingdom'.⁸⁵ This threatening image alongside the text once again created the sense that the nuclear threat was an integral aspect of everyday life during the Cold War and one that generated an all-encompassing fear. Further immersive silos capturing the Cuban Missile Crisis and anti-nuclear activism in the Cold War reiterated the all-encompassing nature of this fear, creating drama and excitement to convey the threat of nuclear war.

In the *Protect and Survive* exhibition, a narrative of nuclear fear was created through immersing the visitor in 'war gaming'. In the centre of the bunker room was a single desk with a red telephone at one end. This telephone rang on a circuit, signalling the start of a video which was projected onto the desk. This video was a 'transition to war' exercise called WINTEX-CIMEX (1979-1989), based on a 1983 scenario. However, the video was presented almost as a 1980s video game with 'Get Ready' and later 'Game Over' flashing in the centre of the desk. The video took the visitor through details of an escalation towards war and nuclear attacks. This was very visual with footage of a nuclear mushroom cloud when bombs were targeted against the East, or in this case known as the 'ORANGE bloc'. The mushroom cloud filled the desk,

⁸⁵ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

escalating until the image became white. Following this, the screen turned multi-coloured and crackled as signal was lost and the sound of white noise lingered. This dramatic use of footage for a 'transition to war' exercise video helped to create drama and the sense of impending doom throughout the Cold War as a result of the nuclear threat. This was only made more ominous by the ringing red phone in between screenings of the video. The phone rang in the centre of the room with no answer, adding to an unnerving feeling which further perpetuated a memory of the Cold War as shrouded in nuclear fear. Much like in the press reactions and previous portrayals, the narrative of nuclear fear was created and exaggerated through dramatic language and immersive experiences.

A further common theme found in the exhibitions and other cultural portrayals was that of espionage. Whilst it did not feature strongly in *Peace and Security*, espionage formed a key topic in both the *National Cold War Exhibition* and *Protect and Survive* exhibition. In the *National Cold War Exhibition* espionage formed one display and within the exhibition, interactive screens enabled visitors to access additional information on weapons, events, key people, and espionage. These interactive screens provided key details about the individual Cambridge spies and the fictional character of James Bond. Equally, the dedicated display on spies featured stories on Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Klaus Fuchs, Colonel Rudolph Abel, and others, whilst espionage in the East was depicted via the stories of spies Oleg Penkovsky, Oleg Gordievsky and Berlin as a hub of intelligence operations. Items on display included a James Bond board game and novels by Ian Fleming and John le Carré, capturing both intrigue and nostalgia. The text on the West side of the display stated that 'spies and spying came to epitomise the Cold War', thus justifying a separate display. Whilst espionage did not feature in the IWM exhibition, the display in RAF Cosford's exhibition placed espionage as a key aspect of the Cold War alongside its influence on culture and lifestyle.

The *Protect and Survive* exhibition also had dedicated a large display to the theme of espionage. On the opposite side of the room to the display on world conflicts, was a section on espionage and subversion. In one corner, there was a pin board with connections and facts between the five Cambridge spies plotted out, imitating an investigation, emphasising the search for the spies throughout the Cold War. This enabled the exhibition not only to set the scene of betrayal and intrigue but was also an effective way to tell the spies' story. This board was next to a desk with several files marked 'Top Secret' on it, each one containing documents relating to various spies including the Cambridge spies, Klaus Fuchs and others. Visitors were free to conduct their own secret investigation by searching through copies of files held by TNA. To add to the scenery of an MI5 or MI6 office, above the desk hung a portrait of the Queen, not only emphasising British values and a British experience, but also carefully juxtaposing patriotism with the spies' betrayal of their country.

The display to the left of this featured cabinets of artefacts including the last page of Klaus Fuchs' confession and newspaper articles relating to Blunt's 'treachery' amongst other items.⁸⁶ Collectively, these sources captured betrayal, the danger and the intrigue of espionage. However, a video above the display cabinet featured Dame Stella Rimington, the former Director General of MI5. In this video visitors were told the realities of espionage. The video enabled the visitor to consider the realities of spying, the lack of action, the slow thinking process, the need for honesty. However, the points of danger, betrayal and values are themes which continue to be stressed in both portrayals of the realities of espionage and the fictional fantasy.

⁸⁶ *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition].

The inclusion of a large section on espionage in a nuclear-bunker themed exhibition emphasised secrecy and intrigue. The introductory text to the bunker-room highlighted several questions that would be explored, one being ‘who was leaking our secrets?’.⁸⁷ Secrets surrounding nuclear war and espionage were combined here to provide a narrative of key Cold War threats. Both nuclear preparations and the passing on of government secrets were serious and recurring issues facing Britain throughout the Cold War. The exhibition thus shaped and reflected a cultural memory of secrecy and danger, yet the intrigue also added drama and a sense of excitement for visitors to the exhibition; engaging them and immersing them in a secret environment where they could feel part of the narrative and part of the intrigue.

All three of the exhibitions discussed therefore had a different focus. Each approached the Cold War narrative in a different way depending on the remit and space of the museum. A key variation between the exhibitions was the emphasis placed on the Cold War as a defined conflict or as a period spanning nearly fifty years. To varying extents each exhibition addressed the military conflict or government preparations for conventional, nuclear and cultural conflict. The IWM’s *Peace and Security* exhibition presented a British perspective of post-1945 conflicts, focussing its narrative on particular events and themes as opposed to a specific Cold War framework; whilst the *National Cold War Exhibition* at RAF Cosford captured a more global interpretation of the Cold War conflict. Alongside the military narrative, however, were key themes to express the wide influence of the Cold War into all areas of life, this being used to demonstrate the cultural conflict for hearts and minds. Lastly, TNA’s *Protect and Survive* exhibition presented a very British experience of the everyday nature of the Cold War. It did this by recreating the Cold War era through immersing visitors in a nuclear bunker and Cold War house setting, enabling them to engage with the period, and for those that lived through

⁸⁷ *Protect and Survive: Britain’s Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition].

the Cold War, perhaps trigger memories whether they be of fear or nostalgia. The various portrayals demonstrate the uncertainty as to how to remember and how to define Britain's experience of the Cold War.

Despite these factors influencing the narrative produced and, in turn, the cultural memory created, particular themes emerged across all three of the exhibitions. In particular the themes of nuclear conflict and espionage formed central focuses in the exhibitions. Each theme was portrayed in visual and immersive ways. The creation of tense, dramatic environments and the submersion of visitors in this experience is thus a common trend and a theme that is repeated throughout different cultural media portraying the Cold War. A final key focus was the reach of the Cold War into everyday life and culture. The *Protect and Survive* exhibition specifically emphasised this. The inclusion of a cultural narrative alongside one of military conflict, nuclear threat and espionage provided a memory of the Cold War as a conflict which invaded all aspects of life.

There was, however, a limit to how much detail each exhibition provided on decolonisation and other proxy wars across the world. The vast number of such conflicts and their complexity may account for this, yet mostly basic facts were provided to capture either the global nature of the conflict or Britain's changing role in the Cold War world. Britain's own difficulty in confronting this controversial part of its history may equally account for a limited narrative. Therefore, whilst each exhibition dedicated some space to addressing this topic, it was often limited and did not serve as a key focus. The production of each exhibition may have influenced this, RAF Cosford exhibition opened in 2007, having been established for the longest period of time, followed by the IWM exhibition which opened in 2014, and then the temporary exhibition at TNA during 2019. The dates of their establishment may indicate the gradual development of knowledge and understanding about both the Cold War and the various conflicts which comprised it. However, the dates of establishment also demonstrate an

increasing understanding of the cultural and social impact and legacy of the conflict, possibly at times in place of a military narrative. Equally, as museums increasingly have to balance education and entertainment, we see evidence of dramatised narratives, focusing on those 'hot points' which are likely to entertain and appeal to visitors.

The three exhibitions therefore provided a broad overview of the specific themes in Britain's Cold War cultural memory, often themes which have continued from the Cold War itself, which this thesis will explore. They demonstrate that particular themes are repeated throughout exhibitions providing a specific cultural memory of a dark period of fear, threats and subversion but also that this narrative is in no means presented uniformly across portrayals. The differentiation between presenting the Cold War as a defined military conflict or a framework for a period which spanned nearly fifty years captures the challenge and lack of clarity in the British cultural memory of the Cold War. There is a struggle to present a clear, detailed, single Cold War narrative and the juxtaposition of dark and nostalgic memories partly captures this.

2.4 Conclusion

From the end of the Cold War in 1989 to 1991 right up to present day, there are clear themes which have continued and developed to form central aspects of Britain's cultural memory of the conflict. During the conflict and since, the 'shadow' and looming threat of nuclear war has served as both a symbol for the Cold War and a central, recurring theme in cultural portrayals and reflections. The development of nuclear weapons during the conflict made it the first era of nuclear threat, and the unimaginable destruction of such weapons would undoubtedly shape fears during the conflict and memories since. However, the centrality of this theme in portrayals and the language and imagery used to capture this part of the Cold War is often dramatised and the threat exaggerated. As seen in both the post-Cold War documentary series, *Cold War*, and the 2019 exhibitions, the image of the mushroom cloud is used extensively, alongside dramatic language and narration of terror and apocalypse. The drama offered by this theme adds

excitement and entertainment to cultural reflections, helping to draw audiences in. Similarly, the recurring fascination with, and focus on, espionage equally attracts people. The intrigue, secrecy and darkness of espionage is reiterated throughout the *Cold War* series and two of the 2019 exhibitions. The choice to dedicate whole episodes or displays to the topic indicate its centrality to the Cold War, and thus memory of the conflict. Yet, again the excitement of espionage helps to add a level of entertainment.

Other similarities include a lack of clear end to the conflict and lack of a clear role for Britain in the conflict. These challenges would seem to emerge from the very end of, and even during, the period. The difficulty in capturing a conflict for which there is no agreed end provides a challenge for producers of cultural depictions of the Cold War. It sparks questions of what is being remembered and how people should remember the Cold War. Equally, for Britain's cultural memory of the conflict, the *Cold War* series did not focus on Britain's role, this was often only mentioned in passing to aid the US-Soviet narrative. This could be a reflection of the tendency of a superpower focus immediately post-Cold War. What is interesting is that the increasing number of British exhibitions and films and dramas today demonstrate not only a heightened interest in looking back to the Cold War, but also attempts to provide a narrative for Britain's role and experience, though displays on Britain's decline are often still limited. This however, as we have seen, is by no means unitary and attempted in various ways with numerous approaches.

Additional influences on Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War are the Second World War and recent conflicts. Both the *Cold War* series and exhibitions, in particular *Peace and Security*, frame the start of the Cold War with the Second World War. As Downing acknowledges in 'A Personal View', *Cold War* never had the same impact on audiences as *The World At War*. The significance of the Second World War to British memory and identity results in less interest in the Cold War but also less significance placed on its memory; the memory of the Cold War

battling for its place in British national memory. In framing the Cold War conflict with wartime Britain, the impact of the war and its memory on the Cold War are reflected and reiterated. Equally, more recent conflicts impact the way we look back on the Cold War today. As early as 1989 suggestions of a nostalgia for the conflict when faced with a new unknown world were made. This nostalgia has indeed emerged and would seem to be increasing. The multi-polar world of nation states and terror groups, and fears of nuclear proliferation among more countries presents a less balanced, more uncertain world. In contrast to the almost peaceful balance of East and West and MAD, this development of nostalgia is perhaps the most changed aspect of Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War. Audiences and museum visitors would seem increasingly interested in and drawn to a "quaint" narrative of spies and the 'shadow' of the bomb, to escape the uncertain threats in the world today. It is possible that this nostalgia will increase in coming years or that world events, such as those in North Korea and Iran, will pull the Cold War further into national significance.

The key themes and challenges of Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War discussed here will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. The chapters will assess how the Cold War is remembered in Britain today, why these themes continue to form the focus of Cold War memory, and how perspectives and reflections of the Cold War have and continue to develop. In particular, the impact of memories of the Second World War and recent world events on the memory of the Cold War will be explored.

3 Cold War Espionage in British Cultural Memory

The Cold War employed a new form of warfare, one not fought in the trenches but one where the front-line troops were spies.¹ As Eva Horn has remarked, ‘Secret war *replace[d] actual combat*’.² It is thus no surprise that the period itself saw a surge in espionage novels and dramas and a fascination with this secret world. It is, after all, from the Cold War that the infamous, though infinitely different, characters of James Bond and George Smiley emerged. Despite the end of the Cold War these characters remain strong in British culture. Indeed, Bond, despite narratives adapting to the new threats, continues to dominate the cultural scene with each new film. Smiley himself was reborn in 2011 with the remake of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, and more recently was revived in Le Carré’s novel, *A Legacy of Spies*, which brought the Circus’ well-known characters back into the frame after years in retirement.³ Espionage continues to capture people’s imagination in museum exhibitions. However, exhibition portrayals are far less common than those in film and television, and reasons for this are explored in the chapter. Yet what exactly is it about these characters and about Cold War espionage, which continue to capture the public’s imagination? Simon Willmetts and Christopher Moran state that the Cold War saw a transformation in the espionage genre, one which was both reflected and influenced by the likes of the infamous Cambridge spies, George Blake and John Vassall.⁴ As opposed to the traditional patriotic hero of early espionage literature, Cold War spies and the genre itself

¹ See *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson (StudioCanal, 2011) [Motion picture].

² Eva Horn, *The Secret War: Treason, Espionage, and Modern Fiction*, trans. by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2013) p. 230.

³ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson; John le Carré, *A Legacy of Spies* (London: Viking, Penguin, 2017).

⁴ Simon Willmetts, and Christopher Moran, ‘Filming Treachery: British Cinema and Television’s Fascination with the Cambridge Five’, *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, 10. 1 (2013), 49–70 (p. 53), <<https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0121>> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

became increasingly sordid and lacking in morality. Joseph Oldham states that the espionage genre re-emerged in the 1950s ‘[r]esponding to the mass professionalisation of society in the Second World War, these reworked the protagonist from the gentlemanly amateur of early twentieth-century spy thrillers to a licensed professional agent’.⁵ British secret agents who had traditionally been patriotic, acting out of duty, transformed to spies who, as Horn has stated, were ‘no longer fervent ideologues who willingly submit to the “dirty ethics” of revolution’.⁶ This transformation of the espionage genre thus increasingly focused on reality. The Cold War and espionage have, as a result, become synonymous, and many people’s perceptions of espionage are formed by these cultural representations.⁷

A balance of portraying the Cold War as a turbulent era but also portraying a sense of nostalgia is apparent in depictions of Cold War espionage. On the one hand, cultural portrayals, particularly in film and television, place great emphasis on depicting a dark and troubled period. However, the genre of Cold War espionage is also able to offer the audience or visitor an odd sense of nostalgia. This chapter will first address a particular focus on both recreating aspects of the Cold War era and emphasising its “cold” and dark nature. This is followed by an exploration of what draws audiences and visitors to narratives of Cold War espionage and what causes a nostalgia for the period. What do Cold War spies and the espionage genre provide for the audience? The chapter will draw on these two conflicting narratives of Cold War espionage which are portrayed today, to demonstrate the ambiguous memory of the Cold War in Britain.

⁵ Joseph Oldham, *Paranoid Visions: Spies, Conspiracies and the Secret State in British Television Drama* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), p. 4.

⁶ Horn, *The Secret War*, p. 251; See also David A. T. Stafford, ‘Spies and Gentleman: The Birth of the British Spy Novel, 1893-1914’, *Victorian Studies*, 24. 4 (1981), pp. 489-509, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/3827226>> [Accessed 18 March 2020]; John Atkins, *The British Spy Novel: Styles in Treachery* (London: John Calder, 2010), pp. 16, 25, 140.

⁷ Tony Shaw, ‘Cinema and the Cold War: An International Perspective’, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Warfare*, ed. by George Kassimeris and John Buckley (Surrey and Burlingham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2010), pp. 365-382 (p. 378).

It will suggest that the confusion in whether to remember the Cold War as a turbulent or peaceful and quaint era is the result of the given present and events in the early twenty-first century.

The chapter explores various espionage films and dramas which have been released during and after the Cold War, it being crucial to examine how portrayals have changed, in order to engage with the memory of the conflict. These include Cold War films such as *Philby, Burgess and Maclean* (1977),⁸ and *An Englishman Abroad* (1983),⁹ as well as recent adaptations and dramas including *Cambridge Spies* (2003),¹⁰ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (1974, 1979, 2011),¹¹ and *The Game* (2015), among others.¹² In addition to this, the Imperial War Museum's (IWM) *Secret War* exhibition is examined.¹³ The espionage theme seems far more prominent in film and television in comparison to museums, however, this may be a result, simply of the ability of film and television to depict complex narratives and plots. Cinema and television are also able to elicit emotional responses. Erll has stated that the 'medium is the memory', that film and television are able to portray strong emotions of betrayal and divided loyalties and capture complex psychologies, make it not only an ideal medium through which to explore espionage, but also helps to capture and shape the memories of espionage as being dominated by these themes.¹⁴ It is also worth noting that many exhibitions, especially of specific topics, are often temporary and therefore finding record of these may be far more difficult. The *Secret War* exhibition, however, was a permanent exhibition at the Imperial War Museum from 1995 until

⁸ *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, dir. by Gordon Fleming (Granada Television, 1977) [On DVD].

⁹ *An Englishman Abroad*, dir. by John Schlesinger (BBC, 1983).

¹⁰ *Cambridge Spies*, BBC Two, 9 May 2003- 30 May 2003, 21:00.

¹¹ John le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* (London: Sceptre, 2011, [originally published London, 1974]); *Tinker Tailor Solider Spy*, BBC Two, 10 September 1979- 22 October 1979, 21:00; *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

¹² *The Game*, BBC Two, 30 April – 4 June 2015, 21:00.

¹³ *Secret War* [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum London, 5 July 1995-Present), visited September 2017.

¹⁴ Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture*, trans. by Sara B. Young (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 116.

it closed recently, thus providing evidence not only of how the narrative is depicted, but also the popularity and longevity of the exhibition.

It is important to consider why espionage is a dominant theme in the memory and portrayals of the Cold War. The Cambridge spy ring and other double agents such as George Blake and John Vassall, were often present in the news throughout the Cold War. These incidents equally matched and influenced a wide genre of espionage fiction, including numerous works by the writers and ex-Secret Service agents John le Carré and Graham Greene. This is not to forget the widely popular James Bond series which first began in 1953 with Ian Fleming's book *Casino Royal*.¹⁵ In both reality and culture, espionage thus became emblematic of the conflict. This may partially account for why the theme is one continually returned to in portrayals of the period.

3.1 Cambridge Spies

It is impossible to discuss the popular memory of Cold War espionage without delving into the narrative and legacy of the Cambridge spies. The story of the spies continues to fascinate the public, despite it being nearly thirty years since the 'fifth man' was revealed, that being John Cairncross. Cairncross was revealed publicly by Oleg Gordievsky, a former KGB agent and British spy, in 1990, following intelligence confirming Cairncross' treachery in the late 1970s and Cairncross actually confessing in 1964.¹⁶ The Cambridge spy ring was a group of men recruited by the Soviet Union's KGB during their student years at Cambridge. The men went on to achieve high-ranking positions within the British establishment. Harold 'Kim' Philby, ironically, became head of Soviet Counterespionage, whilst Donald Maclean held a position in the Foreign Office and British embassy in Washington and Guy Burgess worked for the BBC

¹⁵ le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*.

¹⁶ Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 438, 440-441, 707.

and MI5. Anthony Blunt worked for MI5 and later held the title of Surveyor of the King's, later the Queen's, Pictures, as well as holding a prestigious position at the Courtauld Institute of Art. Cairncross most notably worked in Bletchley Park, passing on information to the Soviet Union.¹⁷

Their story continued to unravel throughout, and even post-Cold War, resulting in the story being revisited time and time again. Consequently, their treachery was 'articulate[d] (...) anew' with each revelation,¹⁸ returning to knowledge of previous spies and playing on fears that more spies may yet be discovered. Burgess and Maclean fled to Moscow in 1951, in anticipation of Maclean being discovered. Following the Burgess-Maclean revelation, much doubt was cast over Philby. Philby publicly denied being a spy in 1955 yet had been forced to retire from the SIS and went to Beirut to work as a journalist, from there he later defected to Moscow in 1963.¹⁹ In 1964, Blunt was also discovered, however he gained immunity in return for providing information. Blunt was publicly revealed in 1979 by Thatcher and following Andrew Boyle's book, *The Climate of Treason*, which claimed to know the fourth- and fifth-men's identities.²⁰ Finally, Cairncross was revealed in 1990, the spies by this point being infamous and symbols of deceit and government failure. It is partly this continual unravelling which inspires so much fascination about the spies. Willmetts and Moran remark that 'Few intelligence failures have been more enduring (...) than the treachery of the Cambridge Five'.²¹ Since the end of the Cold War, popular culture continues to retell the spies' story. For

¹⁷ Chris Hastings, 'Former KGB colonel attacks BBC's 'Cambridge spy lies'', *The Telegraph*, 13 April 2003, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1427405/Former-KGB-colonel-attacks-BBCs-Cambridge-spy-lies.html>> [Accessed 1 November 2017].

¹⁸ Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. and with an introduction by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 208.

¹⁹ Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, pp. 426-427, 433, 435-436.

²⁰ 'The World at One - Andrew Boyle' *The World at One*, BBC Radio 4, 1 November 1979, 13:00. *BBC Archive* <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/cambridgespies/7803.shtml>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

²¹ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 49.

example, in 2003 a four-part BBC drama *Cambridge Spies*, was the first drama to portray the lives of the spies from their years at Cambridge to the fleeing of Burgess and Maclean to Moscow in 1951.²² Equally, numerous biographies and books about the men continue to be published, such as Andrew Lownie's, *Stalin's Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess*.²³ Consequently, it is clear that the spies' legacy continues into modern British cultural memory. This fascination and the legacy of the spies is evident in that traits of their story can be found in numerous Cold War and post-Cold War dramas, films, and exhibitions. The spies themselves influenced the espionage genre and themes of 'treachery (...) Englishness, class and post-imperial decline', Willmetts and Moran stating that their story is one of core British values.²⁴ Indeed many dominant themes evident in the cultural memory of Cold War espionage can be seen to stem from the Cambridge spies and their legacy. These include notions of betrayal in challenges to deemed sexual and gender norms and betrayals of class. Furthermore, the spies capture a sense of disillusionment and decline. Consequently, it is in these themes that we can explore a key part of the British cultural memory of the Cold War as a turbulent period. The chapter will explore how these themes capture turbulence, through the analysis of mise-en-scène and aesthetics.

3.2 The Cold War as a Turbulent Era

In many cultural portrayals of Britain's Cold War, there is a focus on presenting a dark and troubled period, one constantly overshadowed by the threat of nuclear war and attack from the Soviet enemy. We see this as a continuation from the language used in the press itself during and at the end of the conflict. Espionage in particular, with its narratives of betrayal and

²² Matt Wells, 'BBC drama high on sex and espionage', *The Guardian*, 8 April 2003, <<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/apr/08/bbc.highereducation>> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

²³ Andrew Lownie, *Stalin's Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 2015).

²⁴ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', pp. 51-52.

secrecy, aids producers in capturing this image and in doing so shape cultural memories of the Cold War in Britain. To enhance a sense of a declining period, alongside aesthetics and mise-en-scène, comparisons to the Second World War serve to emphasise and exaggerate the turbulence of the Cold War.

3.2.1 Aesthetics and mise-en-scène

The aesthetics and mise-en-scène used in both popular culture and museum exhibitions are crucial to understand the atmospheres and memories these images create. It is notable that post-1989 films and dramas set in the Cold War, have made a conscious effort to recreate Cold War Britain. *The Hour*, for example, set in the late-1950s, allowed for a visual recreation of the period, to immerse the audience in a 1950s British newsroom. The series follows three main characters, producer Bel, friend and reporter Freddie and news host Hector, as they report on domestic and international challenges whilst, in the first series, trying to untangle a Soviet intelligence operation known as Brightstone.²⁵ Though not obviously an espionage drama, the series has been aptly referred to as a ‘spy thriller that happened to have a newsroom setting’.²⁶ From the BBC newsroom and offices themselves right down to the fashion, the series’ designers paid great attention to detail. The series also captures several shots of a grey, concrete, 1950s London.²⁷ These images matched the narrative of the chaos surrounding the impending Suez Crisis, bringing fears of another war and which has ultimately become viewed as a turning-point which confirmed Britain’s decline. As well as capturing the period, the mise-en-scène therefore also works to compliment the narratives of decline explored. This is further

²⁵ *The Hour* (Series 1), BBC Two, 19 July 2011- 23 August 2011 (21:00).

²⁶ Julia Raeside, ‘Have you been watching ... The Hour?’, *The Guardian*, 23 August 2011, <<https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2011/aug/23/the-hour-bbc-finale>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

²⁷ Matt Zoller Seitz, ‘Seitz on Season Two of BBC’s *The Hour*: A Classy Potboiler With Oh-So-Attractive People’, *Vulture*, 28 November 2012, <www.vulture.com/2012/11/tv-review-season-two-of-bbcs-the-hour.html> [Accessed 4 November 2017].

evident in the second series, which portrays an increase in crime, alongside growing racism.²⁸ In the series, Hector's old friend, high in the police service, seeks to rid London of the moral decay which has taken hold; frequent shots of a rainy, dull London and stale images of cigarette smoke and whisky, all add to this atmosphere of decay and corruption.²⁹ The mise-en-scène therefore works to support and create memories of a struggling post-war Britain.

The Game and *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* film, each set in the 1970s, equally pay attention to the details of fashion and décor. *The Game* follows the investigation of an MI5 team inspecting a Soviet operation, yet the series becomes mired in plots of dubious loyalties, betrayal and disillusionment as each member of the team is suspected of being a Soviet mole.³⁰ Similarly, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* is the latest adaptation of le Carré's 1974 novel, and follows the complex plot of the Circus and the divided loyalties of the men within it, as protagonist George Smiley is brought out of forced retirement to investigate a potential mole within the service.³¹ Each drama is saturated with brown and grey colours, one review regarded this as 'the colour palette (...) of top-rank Cold War despair'.³² The colours create dark, decaying scenes of Cold War Britain. This of course reflects the relative decline of Britain post-war. The cost of the Second World War had meant that Britain struggled, and mostly failed, to retain its Empire. The "Greatness" of Great Britain seemed consigned to history and to the Second World War in particular. By the early 1970s, when both *The Game* and *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, are set, numerous domestic challenges faced Britain, including rising inflation and several unpopular attempts to improve the economy. Indeed, the unpopularity of the Industrial

²⁸ *The Hour* (Series 2), BBC Two, 14 November 2012 - 13 December 2012, 21:00, 23:20; Seitz, 'Seitz on Season Two of BBC's *The Hour*'.

²⁹ *The Hour* (Series 2), BBC Two.

³⁰ *The Game*, BBC Two.

³¹ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

³² Rob Smedley, "'The Game' Preview: Our Verdict on Toby Whithouse's New Spy Drama', *Cultbox*, 22 April 2015, <<http://www.cultbox.co.uk/features/previews/the-game-preview>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

Relations Act, 1971, led to opposition from the Trade Union Congress, and tensions increased with the 1972 Miner's Strike over issues of pay.³³ The strike lasted for most of January and February and resulted in blackouts to conserve energy.³⁴ The Miner's Strike provides a backdrop to *The Game*. In the first episode, one of the earliest scenes is of protagonist Joe Lambe and colleague Sarah Montag watching the news, which declares the Miner's Strike is now in its fifth week, resulting in the introduction of restrictions and the 'darkening of city centres'.³⁵ This sets the domestic scene of a Britain in turmoil and literal darkness. The series plays on the Miner's Strike further, for example, in episode three, Sarah and her husband Alan, another agent, are sitting in a car in darkness waiting for the Russian Kasimir to leave his house. In the scene, Sarah states, 'I'll say this for blackouts, they make shadowing easier'.³⁶ To use the term of Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, as 'agencies of articulation', the series producer's played on this image of British domestic distress, portraying it alongside espionage and in doing so suggest that this distress and darkness go hand in hand with this secret world.³⁷ The visual nature of television is therefore pivotal in creating this atmosphere and excitement. The series clearly attempts to recreate the 1970s period, bringing the past into the present, yet choosing to emphasise the distress and decline of the era, to set the scene for conspiracy and treachery.

Tomas Alfredson's *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* similarly creates scenes of decline. One review of the film placed emphasis on the grey tones which engulfed many of the scenes, noting, 'the

³³ Alan Fox, *History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations System* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985) pp. 392-393; See also Sid Kessler and Fred Bayliss, *Contemporary British Industrial Relations: Third Edition*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 20 - 21.

³⁴ Kessler and Bayliss, *Contemporary British Industrial Relations*, p. 21.

³⁵ 'Episode 1', *The Game*, BBC Two, 30 April 2015, 21:00

³⁶ 'Episode 3', *The Game*, BBC Two, 14 May 2015, 21:00.

³⁷ T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, "The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics", in *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* ed. by T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3-85 (pp. 16-17).

side trips to Budapest (gray) and Istanbul (not quite as gray)'.³⁸ In addition to this, Alfredson noted that they attempted to 'create images with the scent of damp tweed', which conveys a sense of a stale, dismal atmosphere.³⁹ Despite the fact that some, including Mark Fisher, have criticised the film for being too glamorous and lacking 'the *grain* of the 1970s',⁴⁰ the fact that the film attempts to recreate the 1970s through images of grey and damp, provides useful indications for the cultural memory of the period. The period is seen to be remembered as one of decay and 'moral decrepitude',⁴¹ and in creating these scenes, the film serves to further perpetuate these ideas of the 1970s and influence memories of this period of the Cold War. As Darragh O'Donoghue remarked, when the novel of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, was released, Edward Heath's government was coming to an end after being dominated by issues of inflation, strikes and unemployment.⁴² The Watergate scandal, 1972, involved the break in of the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, and resulted in Nixon's forced resignation in August 1974.⁴³ As Dobson argued, the scandal raised questions of the 'imperious use of executive power and constitutional integrity'.⁴⁴ The scandal acted as a further backdrop, matched by the unfolding narrative of the Cambridge spy ring. All of this therefore created a context for both the narrative itself, set in 1973, and when the narrative was first released, influencing this idea and memory of the period as one of corruption. Eric J. Morgan declared

³⁸ Steven Rea, 'Cold War shivers', *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 22 December 2011, <http://www.philly.com/philly/entertainment/movies/20111223_Cold_War_shivers.html> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

³⁹ Matt Singer, "'Tomas Alfredson Talks 'Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy'", *Independent Film Channel*, 12 August 2011, <<http://www.ifc.com/2011/12/tomas-alfredson-interview-tinker-tailor-soldier-spy>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

⁴⁰ Mark Fisher, "'The Smiley Factor'", *Film Quarterly*, 65. 2 (2011), pp. 37–42 (p. 41), <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fq.2011.65.2.37>> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

⁴¹ Darragh O'Donoghue, 'Review of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy', *Cinéaste*, 37. 1 (2011), pp. 59–60 (p. 60), <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41691098>> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

⁴² O'Donoghue, 'Review of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy', p. 59.

⁴³ Robert D. Schulzinger, 'Détente in the Nixon-Ford years, 1969-1976', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II: Crisis and Détente*, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 373 - 394, (pp. 385 - 388).

⁴⁴ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 140.

that in regards to economic struggle and government scandal, the 1970s and the world today share some similarities.⁴⁵ O ‘Donoghue has further highlighted that the narrative has remained largely topical, stating that the 1979 television series coincided with the rise of Thatcher and the conclusions of the Winter of Discontent (1978-79), and the 2011 film followed the scandal of the Iraq War and questions over the intelligence reports used, as well as the financial crash of 2008.⁴⁶ Consequently, although Alfredson inherited ‘a 70s period piece’ from le Carré, the portrayal of ‘physical and moral decay’ arguably remained relevant.⁴⁷ In regards to cultural memory, contemporary audiences view each portrayal through the specific lens of a given present. In 2011, despite the narrative being set in the Cold War, the audience may have been able to decode the narrative in some ways, similarly to audiences in the 1970s, through this lens of scandal and crisis. The continued popularity of the narrative may partly be due to its continued relevance. This, combined with the aesthetics, further enhances a memory of the 1970s Cold War as a period of demise and corruption. *The Game* and *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* therefore have this atmosphere as their backdrop, playing on it and in turn emphasising dark images. As a result, the fashion and mise-en-scène of these 1970s dramas can be said to create a world of darkness, decay, and ‘decrepitude’, setting the scene for Cold War espionage. The visual element, however, is also pivotal in museum exhibitions, as how the narrative and artefacts are displayed influence how the visitor engages with the exhibition and the memory it creates.⁴⁸ The IWM’s *Secret War* exhibition was particularly interesting for exploring the use

⁴⁵ Eric J. Morgan, ‘Whores and Angels of Our Striving Selves: The Cold War Films of John Le Carré, Then and Now’, *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 36. 1 (2016), pp. 88–103, (p. 98), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/01439685.2015.1134111>> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

⁴⁶ O ‘Donoghue, ‘Review of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy’, p. 59.

⁴⁷ Peter Bradshaw, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy – Review’, *The Guardian*, 15 September 2011, <<http://www.theguardian.com/film/2011/sep/15/tinker-tailor-soldier-spy-film-review>> [Accessed 2 November 2017]; O ‘Donoghue, ‘Review of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy’, p. 59.

⁴⁸ See Sharon Macdonald, ‘Exhibitions of Power and Powers of Exhibition: An Introduction to the Politics of Display’, in *Museums and Their Communities* ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 176–196 (p. 179); Sir. William Henry Flower, ‘Local Museums’ in *Memory Studies: An Anthology of Contexts* ed. by Bettina Messias Carbonell (Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004), pp. 315–317 (p.

of aesthetics and the process behind displays. The exhibition was originally created in 1995, shortly after the end of the Cold War. One document on the creation and production of the exhibition claimed that ‘We are now able to appreciate that victory in both the World Wars and the Cold War owed much to Britain’s special talents in clandestine warfare’.⁴⁹ The emphasis on ‘Britain’s special talents’ points to the more positive depiction of British intelligence, noting the successes as opposed to the failings or challenges. That the refurbishment was supported by The Gerry Holdsworth Special Forces Trust, which offers grants for ‘commemorative projects’ on the history of British special forces,⁵⁰ also attests to the more positive portrayal and may highlight one of the many influences on the exhibition, which shaped the narrative portrayed and therefore the memory produced. However, despite this, in its portrayal of the Second World War to Cold War operations of ‘Secret Soldiers’, the exhibition echoed the same dark and mysterious atmosphere as portrayed in the dramas above. The designers of the exhibition wanted to create ‘environmental narratives’ that would tell the story of the themes and artefacts in the exhibition.⁵¹ When designed, it was anticipated that members of the public would already have ideas about espionage prior to visiting the exhibition, acknowledging the active role of the visitor, and thus the aim of the exhibition was to ‘contrast (...) fact and fiction’.⁵² Although the exhibition achieved this, there were notable similarities between the aesthetics used for Cold War espionage fiction and those used in the exhibition.

316): See also Ludmilla Jordanova, ‘Objects of Knowledge: A Historical Perspective on Museums’, in *The New Museology* ed. by Peter Vergo (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1997) pp.31–52, (p. 32 - 33) *VLeBooks* <<https://r2.vlereader.com/Reader?ean=9781861896704>> [Accessed 13 December 2020].

⁴⁹ Imperial War Museum: EXPA 0346, Mark Seaman, *A Glimpse into The Secret War: Case Studies*, p. 44.

⁵⁰ *Gerry Holdsworth Special Forces Charitable Trust*, <<http://holdsworthtrust.org/>> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

⁵¹ Imperial War Museum: EXPA 0346, James Dibble, ‘The Designer’s Point of View’, in Seaman, *A Glimpse into The Secret War*, p. 45.

⁵² IWM: EXPA 0346, Seaman, *A Glimpse into The Secret Wars*, p.44; See also Patricia Gillard, ‘Shaping Audiences Online: Principles of Audience Development for Cultural Institutions’, *Media International Australia incorporating Culture and Policy*, 94. 1 (2000), pp. 117–130 (p. 122), <<http://mia.sagepub.com/content/94/1/117>> [Accessed 21 October 2020].

The exhibition was not Cold War specific but followed espionage from the First World War to the present day. The third main area of the exhibition dealt with some aspects of the Cold War period, in particular, this included ‘the Reformation of the SAS’ in the late 1940s and early 1950s, operations in Southern Arabia in 1958, 1964 and later in 1970, and the Falklands War.⁵³ As you entered this section, the rooms were dimly lit and the walls of the exhibition turned to cold, grey, concrete, evoking similar images of 1950s to 1970s Britain captured in the above dramas. A beam of concrete, damaged and crumbled hung overhead. As you walked through this section a partition wall of the same look was displayed with a hole through it, as if it had been knocked through, revealing the metal structural rods beneath, adding to the feeling of damage and decay.⁵⁴ The designers referred to these aesthetics as ‘robust, brutalist finishes’,⁵⁵ capturing the concept of post-war Brutalism in architecture. Alexander Clement has stated that with Brutalist architecture, ‘where concrete was used it was usually unadorned and rough-cast, adding to its unfortunate reputation for evoking a bleak dystopian future’.⁵⁶ The exhibition, despite its positive perspective of the secret services, therefore seemed to echo this post-war concrete and dark image of Britain.

The first sections of the exhibition on MI5 and MI6, where incidentally you found a brief mention of the Cambridge spies, created a different, although still cold ‘environmental narrative’. The use of ‘polished hardwood and stainless steel’ along with white walls and bright lighting created a cold, clinical feel, almost like an interrogation room.⁵⁷ It was also an aim that

⁵³ ‘Secret War’, *Imperial War Museum*, <<http://www.iwm.org.uk/exhibitions/iwm-london/secret-war>> [Accessed 2 November 2017]; *Secret War* [Exhibition].

⁵⁴ *Secret War* [Exhibition].

⁵⁵ IWM: EXPA 0346, Dibble, ‘The Designer’s Point of View’, in Seaman, *A Glimpse into The Secret War*, p.45.

⁵⁶ Alexander Clement, *Brutalism: Post-War British Architecture* (New York: Crowood, 2012), p. 7, *ECBSCOhost*, <http://0-search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=709595&site=ehost-live&ebv=EK&ppid=Page-__-1> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

⁵⁷ IWM: EXPA 0346, Dibble, ‘The Designer’s Point of View’, in Seaman, *A Glimpse into The Secret War*, p.45; See also, Juliette Pattinson, ‘‘A story that will thrill you and make you proud’ The cultural memory of Britain’s

the exhibition ‘intentionally disorientates the visitor’, as part of this, ramps were included in each section so that the rising and sloping of the floor created ‘psychological tension’.⁵⁸ Consequently, although it did not follow the idea of darkness and decay, it still created a jarring and cold environment. The designers and creators of the exhibition did well to create different environments and atmospheres. However, as we can see many of the aesthetics used, particularly of cold, dark, and concrete environments echoed the *mise-en-scène* of the films and dramas. As a result, despite the exhibition contrasting between fact and fiction, certain themes and tropes of espionage are strong in people’s imaginations and the exhibition both played on these but also further influenced these perceptions and memories of espionage, and in turn the Cold War period. That the visitor was taken on this visual and sensory, as well as informative, journey, demonstrates the ‘memory production’ function of museums,⁵⁹ the exhibition creating an image of espionage through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

3.2.2 Notions of Betrayal

The notion of divided loyalties and betrayal are at the heart of Cold War espionage. As a result, popular culture during the Cold War and since has focused on these themes. Both events and popular culture during the Cold War centred on British values and the betrayal of these values. The Cambridge spies often serve as an example for this. In particular, the betrayal of what were deemed sexual and class norms have been continually emphasised both in cultural portrayals during the Cold War and after.

Secret War in Occupied France’, in *British Cultural Memory and the Second World War*, ed. by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson, (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), pp. 133 - 154 (pp. 146 - 147).

⁵⁸ IWM: EXPA 0346, Dibble, ‘The Designer’s Point of View’, in Seaman, *A Glimpse into The Secret War*, p. 45.

⁵⁹ Susan A. Crane, ‘Introduction: Of Museums and Memory’, in *Museums and Memory*, ed. by Susan A. Crane (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000) pp. 1-13, (p. 3); Barbara Misztal, ‘Memory Experience: The Forms and Functions of Memory’ in *Museums and Their Communities*, ed. by Sheila Watson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 379–396, (p. 389); Pattinson, ‘‘A story that will thrill you and make you proud’’, p. 146.

There is much emphasis on sexuality in the cultural memory of the Cambridge spies, and espionage more widely. From the origins of the Cold War, homosexuality was linked with ideas of betrayal and treason. As Willmetts and Moran stated, ‘homosexuality had long been used as a character trait of enemy agents’ in popular culture, and this belief seemed to be all but confirmed by Burgess and Maclean’s escape to Moscow.⁶⁰ Burgess himself had always been open about his sexuality and was regarded as extravagant and reckless; in an interview, *Cambridge Spies* writer, Peter Moffat, stated that Burgess “‘was very noisy about his gayness’”.⁶¹ Maclean’s sexuality was rather more ambiguous, yet despite his marriage there are numerous opinions that Maclean was bisexual.⁶² Notably at the time of their escape in 1951, homosexuality was still illegal and would remain so until 1967. Matt Houlbrook has particularly noted that post-war concerns over homosexuality ‘acquired a particularly electric resonance’, especially as Britain’s decline threw into question the notions of ‘masculinity (...) and nationhood’ among others. Homosexuality was thus viewed as increasingly dangerous to British society and ideas of citizenship.⁶³ Despite the Wolfendon Report (1957) and the Sexual Offences Act (1967), which decriminalised private homosexual acts between consenting adults, as Houlbrook remarked, ‘the boundaries between public and private were regulated with increasing vigour’, and thus much of the stigma against homosexuality remained.⁶⁴ The views at the time of Burgess and Maclean’s escape would therefore undoubtedly reflect that both the spies’ sexuality and treason were crimes against the state. For as Allan Hepburn remarked, ‘Queer spies in the Cold War compound illegalities: treason and homosexuality were both

⁶⁰ Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p. 54; Allan Hepburn, *Intrigue: espionage and culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 196.

⁶¹ Hepburn, *Intrigue*, p. 196; Wells, ‘BBC drama high on sex and espionage’.

⁶² Jon Kelly, ‘The era when gay spies were feared’, *BBC News Magazine*, 20 January 2016, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35360172>> [Accessed 1 November 2017].

⁶³ Matt Houlbrook, *Queer London: Perils and Pleasures in the Sexual Metropolis, 1918-1957* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 236, 262-263.

⁶⁴ Houlbrook, *Queer London.*, pp. 262-263.

punishable by law'.⁶⁵ Early views and memories of the spies therefore originated in this setting, with past values of sexuality and masculinity being challenged and resulting in unclear ideas of British values in the future. Even in 1979, over ten years after the Sexual Offences Act, when Blunt was publicly revealed, an interviewer asked Blunt if a homosexual affair with Burgess was the “leverage” that caused him to join the spy ring, as if homosexuality was a key cause of his betrayal. Blunt clearly denied this stating his actions were not linked to his sexuality.⁶⁶ Homosexuality thus became and continued to be intrinsically linked to espionage and betrayal in society during the Cold War and, consequently, the spies influenced the espionage genre, indoctrinating many of these traits.⁶⁷ It was not only the Cambridge spies, however, that shaped this view. Other double agents including the civil servant John Vassall, who worked for the Soviet Union after blackmail threats, was also homosexual. These numerous scandals involving homosexual men, linked this ‘in many people’s minds with espionage and betrayal’.⁶⁸ Evidently, in the USA the McCarthy hunt for Communists also targeted homosexuals, demonstrating the strength of this connection with Communist or Soviet sympathies and homosexuality.

Further to the Cambridge spies and others challenging sexual “norms” in post-war Britain, they also ‘challenged the conventional notion of the British spy as a heroic and patriotic, heteronormative agent’.⁶⁹ Not long after the revelation of Burgess and Maclean, Ian Fleming’s first book *Casino Royale* was published (1953). Bond presented the ideal of masculinity, working to defend Britain, a ‘fantasy figure of sexual and political potency’.⁷⁰ Bond served as

⁶⁵ Hepburn, *Intrigue*, p. 197.

⁶⁶ ‘News - Anthony Blunt Spy Case’, BBC One, 20 November 1979, 21:00, *BBC Archive*, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/cambridgespies/7806.shtml>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

⁶⁷ Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p. 53; See also, Hepburn, *Intrigue*, p. 187.

⁶⁸ Kelly, ‘The era when gay spies were feared’.

⁶⁹ Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, pp. 54 - 55.

⁷⁰ Brian Baker, *Masculinity in Fiction and Film: Representing Men in Popular Genres, 1945-2000* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 2006), p. 34.

a nostalgic ideal of Britain and masculinity without ambiguities of either treason or homosexuality, and therefore, as Jeremy Black argues, was partly an escape from the decline of Britain and the challenge to values. Whereas the Cambridge spies, with their challenges to masculinity and their treason, were the ‘antithesis of Bond’.⁷¹ As a result, whilst Bond seemed to offer an escape, the likes of the Cambridge spies and other double agents both matched and influenced Britain’s decline. In Michael Denning’s words, ‘the spy novel is (...) the war novel of the Cold War, the cover story of (...) the definitive loss of Britain’s world power’.⁷² This is further pointed to by Baker, who employed gendered language to explain Britain’s position in the Cold War stating that the period meant the loss of ‘the soldierly prowess which made Britain ‘Great’. Britain instead became “emasculated” or feminized by the dominance of the superpowers’.⁷³ The emasculation of Britain can be said to match the challenge to values of masculinity and sexuality that the spies caused. This, Willmetts and Moran have added, partly meant that the spies’ story was popular among writers and producers as the downfall of the spies seemed to reflect that of Britain.⁷⁴ The memory of the Second World War and empire would undoubtedly have shaped opinions of the spies in the period. That the spies were seen to match Britain’s decline post-war, also likely heightened animosity towards them, the memory of the spies in transgressing both values of masculinity and sexuality thus developed in this atmosphere of post-war decline and changing values, shaping opinions and memories of the men.

⁷¹ Jeremy Black, *The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming’s Novels to the Big Screen*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 106-107, 213.

⁷² Michael Denning, ‘Licensed to look: James Bond and the heroism of consumption’ in *The James Bond Phenomenon: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Christoph Linder (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 56-75 (p. 57).

⁷³ Baker, *Masculinity in Fiction and Film*, p. 32.

⁷⁴ Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p. 59.

Portrayals of espionage during the Cold War itself highlight this theme. According to John L. Cobbs, le Carré often linked homosexuality to betrayal, and included this in the relationship between Bill Haydon and Jim Prideaux in *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*.⁷⁵ Le Carré's Bill Haydon, the villain of the narrative, was portrayed as highly-sexual, having relationships with both men and women, including an affair with his colleague's wife, Ann Smiley.⁷⁶ As Willmetts and Moran have argued, Haydon's 'sex appeal is (...) associated with betrayal'.⁷⁷ However, throughout the novel, references were made to the relationship between Haydon and Prideaux, a fellow agent and friend from Oxford. Lacon, a civil servant, remarked to Smiley, 'Prideaux and Haydon were really very close indeed, you know'.⁷⁸ Further to this, not merely was Haydon's betrayal of his country linked to his homosexuality, there was also his betrayal of Prideaux.⁷⁹ The mission Prideaux was sent on by Control, was devised by Haydon and Karla, Smiley's Soviet adversary, as they knew Control was beginning to sense a mole. Haydon knew Prideaux would be chosen for the mission, yet things did not go to plan and Prideaux was shot. Haydon had therefore set up and betrayed the man he cared for. It was this betrayal that led Prideaux to kill Haydon at the close of the narrative, Haydon's sexuality and betrayal seen to lead to his ultimate demise.⁸⁰

The television adaptation of the novel in 1979 also dealt with the relationship between Haydon and Prideaux, yet it was extremely subtle with mere remarks by others hinting towards the closeness between the two men, such as 'it was perhaps the most famous Partnership the Circus

⁷⁵ John L. Cobbs, *Understanding John le Carré* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1998) p. 105; See also Baker, *Masculinity in Fiction and Film*, p. 37.

⁷⁶ le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*.

⁷⁷ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 62.

⁷⁸ le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 257.

⁷⁹ Baker, *Masculinity in Fiction and Film*, p. 37.

⁸⁰ See le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, pp. 413-414, 416; 'Part 7', *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, BBC Two, 22 October 1979, 21:00; *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

ever had'.⁸¹ However, Willmetts and Moran remark, that the producers were 'clearly uneasy with this subject'.⁸² The subtlety in the series may partly have been a reflection of the time of its release, following the period of Mary Whitehouse's campaign against permissive society from 1964, which 'targeted sex and violence' on television.⁸³ The most open discussion of their relationship was at the end of the series when Prideaux goes to the holding camp to kill Haydon. Prideaux asked why Karla did not kill him, 'was that out of delicacy to you?'. In the book these were Smiley's words, by giving them to Prideaux in the series it gave him a voice for the betrayal he felt from the man he loved and admired. When Haydon remarked that 'the shooting wasn't part of the plan', Jim added, 'no not the shooting-but everything else', at which point he struck Haydon and killed him.⁸⁴ The closeness in this scene identified the relationship but more obviously, the betrayal Prideaux felt, linking these themes of homosexuality and treachery.

The subtle portrayals of homosexuality in the television series were contrasted with the 2011 film. As one review read, Haydon and Prideaux's relationship, 'is so explicit in the movie that one gets the impression that the director was afraid viewers would miss it'.⁸⁵ This is again most likely a factor of the times in which the versions were released, indicating the changing attitudes to homosexuality, influencing the way the narrative is interpreted. Interestingly, in the film, the character of Peter Guillam, played by Benedict Cumberbatch, is portrayed as homosexual, despite being heterosexual in the original versions.⁸⁶ In an interview, Cumberbatch remarked

⁸¹ 'Part 7', *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, BBC Two.

⁸² Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 62.

⁸³ Lawrence Black, 'Whose finger on the button? British television and the politics of cultural control', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 25. 4 (2005), pp. 547-575 (p. 560). <<https://doi.org/10.1080/01439680500262926>> [Accessed 16 December 2020].

⁸⁴ 'Part 7', *Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy*, BBC Two.

⁸⁵ Michael Bradford and James Burrige, 'Intelligence in Public Literature: Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy: the Movie: Review', *CSI Publications*, 56. 3 (2011) <<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/tinker-tailor-soldier-spy-the-movie.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

⁸⁶ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

that he keeps his “character’s homosexuality secret because you’re open to blackmail. It necessitates a certain amount of secretiveness, which goes hand in hand with spying’.⁸⁷ In addition to this, Cumberbatch added, “the absence of women isn’t just a mark of the workplace in the early Seventies, it’s also very much to do with how emotionally retarded these men are (...) a mark of the many sacrifices I think they made’.⁸⁸ Consequently, Cumberbatch’s portrayal of Guillam suggests that the idea of homosexuality captures this world of secret and disjointed loyalties, having to remain secret to protect themselves and loved ones. This could be said to provide a different interpretation of homosexuality in regard to espionage, rather than betrayal and treason, it can now be seen to emphasise the secrecy which engulfed the lives of the spies, and the complexity of the double-lives they led. The passing of time and changes in perspectives have consequently influenced memory and portrayals of the Cold War. Whilst the theme of homosexuality remains in Cold War espionage dramas, modern perspectives have slightly altered the way this theme is interpreted, so as opposed to homosexuality serving as an indicator of betrayal and decline, it now further highlights the secret lives and world of the spies, adding a deeper psychological understanding of the characters.

Sexuality is also a key aspect to the narrative of *Cambridge Spies*. One review remarked that whilst other depictions of the spies had ‘tiptoed discreetly round the more salacious elements of the story’, *Cambridge Spies* portrays the men’s sexuality openly. The overt sexuality of the men, and the homosexuality of Blunt and Burgess, continues the connection between homosexuality and espionage. However, despite Burgess often getting caught by the law in terms of homosexual behaviour, a contemporary audience is unlikely to interpret his

⁸⁷ Martyn Palmer, ‘I’ve always wanted to play a spy... You are never what you seem’: Benedict Cumberbatch on fulfilling his acting dream’, *Mail Online*, 13 July 2011, <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-2012212/Tinker-Tailor-Soldier-Spy-Benedict-Cumberbatch-fulfilling-acting-dream.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

⁸⁸ Palmer, ‘I’ve always wanted to play a spy... You are never what you seem’: Benedict Cumberbatch on fulfilling his acting dream’.

homosexuality as a treasonous attribute. Instead, the relationships between the spies and their relationships with other men, including Blunt's and Burgess' individual relationships with Julian Bell, highlight the complexity of the men's lives and their inability to form lasting commitments due to the nature of their work and their double-lives. The aim of writer Peter Moffat was subsequently achieved as he hoped to convey the complexity of the men's lives and the personal sacrifices they made.⁸⁹ Burgess' own antics of 'cruising public toilets for sex' instead add humour to the series and heighten the sense of Burgess' eccentric character.⁹⁰ The series therefore does much to focus on the personalities of the men, taking a different approach to le Carré's narratives of linking homosexuality to betrayal, and in turn these new perspectives have shaped today's memories of the men and the period.

We can therefore see how memories of the spies, espionage and the Cold War are shaped by the contemporary environment of such portrayals. That the Cambridge spies confirmed and influenced ideas in 1950s Britain that homosexuality was linked to betrayal and treason, led to a basic understanding and memory of the spies as transgressing both sexual and patriotic values. The resonance of this memory continued, taking some time for homosexuality to be viewed any differently, even after the Sexual Offences Act. However, post-Cold War portrayals, such as those in *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* and *Cambridge Spies*, indicate how perspectives have changed with time, enabling new understandings and therefore different portrayals of the spies and homosexuality during the Cold War. Though it remains a common theme, continued portrayals of homosexual spies are likely due to the legacy of the Cambridge

⁸⁹ 'BBC Press Release: Cambridge Spies', *BBC Press Office*, p. 3
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2003/04_april/22/bbc2_whole_pack.pdf> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

⁹⁰ Wells, 'BBC drama high on sex and espionage'.

spies' narrative reaching into many espionage dramas, as opposed to the perspective of homosexuality and treason remaining.

In conjunction with ideas of sexuality and masculinity, the use and emphasis of gender is also a noticeable feature of some Cold War espionage portrayals. Three examples, including *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, *An Englishman Abroad*, and *A Question of Attribution* (1991),⁹¹ highlighted how gender has been used to emphasise the Cambridge spies' transgressions both in sexuality and treason. In *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, we were presented with a rather unsympathetic portrayal of the men. The film began with the 'Volkov incident' of 1945, where a Soviet agent claimed to have information regarding spies being placed in the British intelligence services and government positions. It then followed the incidents leading to the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951 and ended with Philby's denial of being a spy himself in 1955.⁹² The film focused on creating feelings of treachery, yet there were one or two brief moments where a reasoning for the men's actions was portrayed. When Maclean's wife was informed, she condemned Burgess for his and Maclean's actions. However, Burgess responded with his justification, that 'the entire West is rotting away' making it 'the responsibility of every civilised man to sweep away the whole (...) mess'.⁹³ Their treachery however was emphasised by Maclean's wife's unwavering shock, the female voice used to highlight the spies' treachery. Equally, when Philby's wife hears the news, not aware of her own husband's involvement, she too deplored their actions. Philby, known to the audience to be expressing his own justification, suggested to his wife that 'Those days it was a different world - Europe was about to collapse in front of the Nazis – the only option seemed to be Soviet Russia'.⁹⁴ However, again Philby's wife remarked that his statement was 'nonsense'. As a

⁹¹ *A Question of Attribution*, dir. John Schlesinger (BBC, 1992).

⁹² *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, dir. by Gordon Flemying.

⁹³ *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, dir. by Gordon Flemying.

⁹⁴ *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, dir. by Gordon Flemying.

result, any attempts to provide a justification for the men's actions in the film were disregarded. It is perhaps possible here to explore the use of gender with the female voice acting as a moral compass.

Slightly more sympathy was evident in Alan Bennett's and John Schlesinger's *An Englishman Abroad* and *A Question of Attribution*. However, in each, similarly to *Philby*, *Burgess and Maclean*, there were reminders of the spies' treason. This again seemed to be through the employment of female voice, being used to draw attention to 'the moral dilemma of defection'.⁹⁵ Coral Browne in *An Englishman Abroad*, confronted Burgess and in doing so reminded him and the audience of his treachery, stating, 'we're sat here (...) pretending that spying – which is what you did my darling – was just a minor social misdemeanour'.⁹⁶ Similarly, in *A Question of Attribution*, the female voice was projected through the role of the Queen. In perhaps the most famous scene of the film, the Queen and Blunt discussed forgeries, a fake Titian painting being central to the plot. The painting throughout the film served as a metaphor for the Cambridge spy ring; perceived to be a Titian, the painting was later deemed to be fake and behind each layer of paint a new portrait lurked. The numerous 'double entendre' throughout the conversation pointed to Blunt's dual identity, both a respectable academic and Surveyor of the Queen's pictures and yet also a spy.⁹⁷ The use of gender in the above examples point to a specific voice being projected, one which highlights the immorality of the spies. As has been discussed, the spies influenced and reflected a crisis of masculinity in post-war Britain. As traitors to class and the rules of gentlemen, and particularly Burgess, Blunt and to some degree Maclean, transcending heterosexual "norms", the spies epitomised this crisis and changing British values. In employing the use of feminine voice to condemn the men's actions,

⁹⁵ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 66.

⁹⁶ *An Englishman Abroad*, dir. by John Schlesinger.

⁹⁷ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 66.

the crisis of masculinity could be emphasised. Consequently, the female voice acts as a moral compass and a reminder of the spies' numerous transgressions.

It is worth noting however, that this use of female voice and emphasis on gender roles would seem more prominent in portrayals of the spies during, or just after, the Cold War, *A Question of Attribution* being released in 1991 for television, yet the narrative being employed in a 1988 play *Single Spies*. This would suggest that the female voice being used to highlight the crisis in masculinity and treason of the men, was likely a response to the proximity of the portrayals to the events unravelling. *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, being released in 1977, was amid the unfolding events, conspiracy theories about who the 'fourth man' was were increasingly discussed and indeed Blunt was publicly revealed two years later. This was similarly the case with *An Englishman Abroad* in 1983, four years after the revelation of Blunt and also Blunt's death earlier that same year. The topic was therefore still recent in people's memory. *A Question of Attribution* was released just after the end of the Cold War; however, this also followed the revelation of Cairncross. Again, previous questions asked of the spies and the fact that each new revelation raised concerns of more spies yet to be discovered, likely shaped perspectives in the present of the men's betrayal and transgressions. However, as time passed, and although the spies have remained a point of fascination, perspectives of the spies were able to change, as did perspectives of gender and homosexuality. Consequently, this may account for why later adaptations express the crisis of masculinity caused by the men less, or at least less overtly.

Further betrayals were found in the changing values of the class system in society. John Beynon's work has explored the connection between class and masculinity, arguing that masculinity in Britain's imperial era was reliant on male institutions and public schools. However, the realities of the First World War began to challenge the image of war as 'a glorious game played by gentlemen' and with the gradual collapse of empire following the Second

World War, this ideal had all but vanished.⁹⁸ The Cambridge spies, having been part of this public school system which bred imperial men, betrayed the ideals of masculinity and of gentlemen being incapable of betraying their country.

A great deal of the shock and disbelief surrounding the Cambridge spies was their betrayal of their own class and the British establishment. Indeed, Willmetts and Moran have stated that more emphasis is placed on their betrayal of class than country.⁹⁹ This stemmed from a fundamental belief in, and understanding of, the British class system. Following Beynon's argument that men from backgrounds of public school and equivalent 'all-male organizations' were trained for empire and were therefore deemed patriots, to be trusted and above suspicion;¹⁰⁰ the news of the spies' betrayal caused a great deal of shock, but also a drastic challenge to these crucial British traditions and values. At a time when Britain was decreasing in global status and power, it would appear that the British image was undergoing a drastic transition. The views of the given present in the 1950s, when the first spies were revealed, were therefore caught between past ideals of class and future uncertainty as to British values. Ideas of class and British gentlemen in the post-war period continued to draw on ideas of class and masculinity in the era of empire. However, the public transgression of these ideals by the spies from the 1950s onwards shattered these previous notions. In the words of Willmetts and Moran, much fascination around the spies is that they appeared to hold the values of gentleman but 'perverted' them.¹⁰¹ Horn has argued, that despite all the spies belonging to and working within the establishment, the greatest challenge to these values came with the revelation of Philby, and later Blunt, who both epitomised the British gentleman. Horn goes as far to say that 'The

⁹⁸ John Beynon, *Masculinities and Culture* (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002), pp. 32, 50.

⁹⁹ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 54.

¹⁰⁰ Beynon, *Masculinities and Culture*, pp. 27- 28.

¹⁰¹ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', p. 54.

Philby case was the trauma of Western intelligence: treason on the highest level committed by a civil servant whose loyalty was deemed unshakeable',¹⁰² the British gentleman ideal being irrevocably damaged. It is not surprising that both during the Cold War and after, there continues to be a great emphasis on class in portrayals of espionage.

The emphasis on class is especially strong in depictions of the Cambridge spies. The *Secret War* exhibition at the IWM London, enabled visitors to engage with stories of spies. These included profiles and recorded statements from those that knew them, profiles were available for both Blunt and Philby.¹⁰³ Blunt's profile particularly captured this idea of class and British gentlemen. A statement from Barbara Price-Smith, who was a MI5 secretary between 1940 and 1944, provided her views of Blunt, stating:

He always opened the door for you and touched his cap good morning. He was the perfect English gentleman we thought, didn't we. But he was, he was well mannered, he was always smartly dressed. Nothing in the world to suggest, to us anyway (...) that he was suspected.¹⁰⁴

The use of this statement for the exhibition directs the visitor to the fact that the spies challenged values of class. The fact that Barbara Price-Smith could not equate 'the perfect English gentleman' as a suspect of treason, captures the shock at the betrayal of the ideals of gentlemen. In continuing to portray this challenge of ideals, the exhibition enhanced memories of the spies as traitors to their class and the Cold War period as being a time when British values were challenged.

An Englishman Abroad is particularly interesting for exploring Cold War portrayals of class. Bennett and Schlesinger's more sympathetic approach to the spies meant that rather than class

¹⁰² Horn, *The Secret War*, pp. 263-265.

¹⁰³ 'Spy or Double Agent?' [Interactive screen], *Secret War* [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum London, 5 July 1995-Present), visited September 2017.

¹⁰⁴ 'Spy or Double Agent?' [Interactive screen].

being portrayed critically, they showed it as being ‘uprooted’ and displaced. The film portrayed the meeting between actress Coral Browne (played by herself) and Burgess in Moscow in 1958. Burgess was depicted exiled and isolated, with the dreams of the communist society appearing somewhat disappointing. In his isolation, Burgess missed England, his allegiance to Communism existing side by side his love for his English identity. In his meetings with Browne, Burgess revealed that he wanted her to measure him for a suit from Savile Row which he asked her to order and get sent to him. This attempt to cling onto his former identity followed his rejection and isolation from his English ‘citizenship (...) and class status’; his betrayal of his class and his exile thus left him no option but ‘to act out his former identity’.¹⁰⁵ However, as Michael Brooke notes, despite a ‘strangely triumphant’ tone to the final scene, in wearing the attire of his class again, Burgess’ identity as an Englishman amid Russian citizens merely highlighted his exclusion and isolation from both societies.¹⁰⁶ That he was only able to ‘act out’ his identity, demonstrated, according to Willmetts and Moran, that Bennett and Schlesinger were suggesting ‘that these once concrete categories have been stripped of their authenticity and exist in contemporary society merely as reproductions’.¹⁰⁷ As agents of articulation, Bennett and Schlesinger’s own interests, particularly critiques of patriotism and their focus on the betrayal and collapse of identities rather than treason, shaped this portrayal of Burgess and in turn the portrayal of British class in the period.¹⁰⁸ They therefore created and further perpetuated this idea and memory of the spies transgressing established class ideals and boundaries.

¹⁰⁵ Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p.67

¹⁰⁶ Michael Brooke, ‘An Englishman Abroad (1983)’, *BFI Screenonline*, <<http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/id/453093/index.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017]; Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p. 67.

¹⁰⁷ Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p. 67.

¹⁰⁸ Alan Bennett, *Plays Two: introduced by the author*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1998) p. ix; Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, pp. 65-67.

This cultural memory of the challenge to ideals of class during the Cold War continues to be found in modern portrayals and particularly the *Cambridge Spies* series, which draws heavily on the spies' class and establishment membership. The spies' connection to the establishment is often portrayed in a critical way, with even the spies shown to mock and manipulate it. In the first episode, after being caught in bed with a waiter at the university, Burgess is called in and told that the waiter has been asked to leave. Although Burgess protests, the reasons they give him point to class ties and a 'membership', making statements such as 'we shouldn't imagine that we're like them because we're not. Us and them don't mix' and 'this is a club here (...) the club makes allowances for the mistakes of its members'.¹⁰⁹ The ironic nature of these comments however, is expressed in Burgess' later statement to Blunt that he would 'have to bugger the Dean to get sent down', ridiculing the strength of the 'ties' in belonging to the establishment.¹¹⁰ In creating the series, the producers and writers used the hindsight of the audience, knowing that men of class and prestige betrayed their country, to convey irony and a notion of ridicule that such men were above suspicion. This further highlights how the spies' story changed views and values - the upper-classes and members of the establishment are not above suspicion and this perspective remains today. Particularly at the time of the series' release in 2003, the Iraq War highlighted much discontent with the establishment. Consequently, ideas that such members were once above suspicion added irony when stories of scandals like Iraq were often making headlines. Notions of class and betrayal were emphasised throughout the series, continuing a theme and memory of the Cold War which originated with the spies themselves and continues into the present.

¹⁰⁹ 'Episode 1', *Cambridge Spies*, BBC Two, 9 May 2003, 21:00.

¹¹⁰ 'Episode 1', *Cambridge Spies*, BBC Two.

Not only are challenges to class portrayed in relation to the spies, there are also more general displays of the British ideals of class and the establishment being challenged in modern Cold War dramas. A notable example is that of the character Hector in *The Hour*. Throughout the first series, Hector is portrayed as the ideal British upper-class gentleman and wartime hero. The second series challenges this image of Hector, portraying, in stark contrast, his self-destruction. In the series, Hector's image as a gentleman and a hero are contrasted to his excessive drinking and numerous affairs.¹¹¹ The memory of wartime British gallantry and bravery were thus played upon, these ideals being challenged by Hector's downfall. That these wartime values and British ideals were seen to be disintegrating echoed the notion of Britain's decline, both the nation and its values entering an era of change and transition. The memory of the Second World War was carefully played on in the series, serving to frame the Cold War and act as a contrast. The Cold War was portrayed as the anti-wartime image; rather than bravery and pride, there was decline and the uprooting of British values. Not only does this demonstrate the continued significance of memory of the Second World War in British society, but that memory of the Cold War is heavily shaped by memories and ideals of wartime Britain as a time of strength, bravery, and stoicism. The comparisons serving to emphasise and exaggerate the turbulence of the Cold War era.

The memory of the Cold War in relation to ideas of class and changing values can therefore be seen to have developed throughout the Cold War period and continued into the present day. That the Cambridge spies are central to this theme also adds to the ongoing memory of the spies as transgressing the values and expectations placed on them. It is interesting, that much like notions of sexuality, the ideals of class and establishment were rooted in ideals of gentlemen in the era of empire and even the Second World War period. This enhanced the

¹¹¹ *The Hour* (Series 1), BBC Two; *The Hour* (Series 2), BBC Two.

shock caused by the spies' betrayal, which continued throughout the Cold War, especially with the later revelations of Philby and Blunt. The challenge to these values shapes memories of the spies and Cold War today. Yet, with modern events such as the Iraq War challenging faith and trust in the establishment, there is also an argument for why such narratives are returned to, as people can relate to the sentiments explored. In order to fully understand the memory and legacy of the conflict, it is necessary to consider the origins of such memories, how they have developed and how they shape perspectives and memories today. These current sentiments in turn shape the narratives and aspects of the Cold War which are returned to and which remain popular in television, film, and exhibitions.

3.3 Disillusionment

As a result of these depictions of betrayals, a sense of disillusionment with the establishment and society is often created. In particular the challenges made by the spies to ideals of the English upper-classes and establishment caused further public outcry, in the sense that there was a questioning of how the government and intelligence services had failed to identify the spies and their treachery. Following the defection of Burgess and Maclean, there were constant questions as to why they were not suspected. In a *Sunday Times* article, the lives and careers of the two spies were detailed. It stated that Maclean was not suspected until his disappearance and in regards to Burgess, the article detailed his recruitment to MI5 during the war 'when it may be necessary to pass over disagreeable aspects of personality'.¹¹² The article added that Burgess' life was 'reckless' and that he was open about his socialist political views yet again was not suspected. The article concluded that 'two errors were made both of which with greater care or stricter standards could have been avoided'.¹¹³ Such criticisms and the scandal

¹¹² TNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers (FCO): FCO 158/221, 'The Missing Diplomats', *Sunday Times*, 2 November 1952.

¹¹³ TNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers (FCO): FCO 158/221, 'The Missing Diplomats'.

surrounding the spies caused a review of those working in the Government, especially in intelligence or atomic energy.¹¹⁴ Consequently, it is clear that failures to identify the spies formed a focus in the press and further fuelled the scandal. As a result, alongside portrayals of class, there are also numerous references to the failures of the establishment and Government, adding to this tone of disillusionment which is echoed throughout. This is, however, primarily evident in television dramas and films.

Blunt's revelation is particularly interesting for looking at these ideas of class and a corrupt establishment. Following Thatcher's unmasking of Blunt in 1979, Blunt was portrayed as a 'villain', or as Miranda Carter stated in her biography of Blunt, 'a villain who had not only betrayed his country, but had embarrassed the Queen'.¹¹⁵ Both Blunt's class and sexuality were central to the scandal. Carter and Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman in their biographies of Blunt, emphasised the questions surrounding Blunt's revelation; in particular, why had Blunt been given immunity? Issues of class were raised here given the arrest and imprisonment of several other spies who had not shared the same position or background as Blunt.¹¹⁶ Oldham equally states that Blunt's immunity 'seemed to indicate for many that the old-boy network was as alive as ever'.¹¹⁷ Further to this each biography made a point to note that following Blunt's public statement, he attended a lunch hosted by *The Times* of 'smoked trout, veal, fruit salad and wine, with coffee and cigars to follow'. Penrose and Freeman stated that the lunch 'seemed to symbolise the attitude of the Establishment to Blunt the Traitor'.¹¹⁸ Blunt therefore had not only transgressed the ideals of class and gentlemen but continued to be treated as

¹¹⁴ TNA: Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers (FCO): FCO 158/221, 'Press Statement', 8 January 1952.

¹¹⁵ Miranda Carter, *Anthony Blunt: His Lives* (London: Pan Books, 2002[originally published 2001]), p. 473.

¹¹⁶ Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman, *Conspiracy of Silence: The Secret Life of Anthony Blunt* (London: Grafton Books, 1986), p. 506; Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, p. 475.

¹¹⁷ Oldham, *Paranoid Visions*, p. 98.

¹¹⁸ Penrose and Simon Freeman, *Conspiracy of Silence*, pp. 514 - 515; Carter, *Anthony Blunt*, p. 481.

superior despite his treachery. The corruption and failure of the establishment was therefore reiterated during the Blunt scandal.

We have seen above in *Philby, Burgess and Maclean*, that the spies expressed the decline and failures of the Western system, using this disenchantment to justify their betrayal. Post-1989 dramas and films have highlighted this lack of faith and trust in the establishment. In *A Question of Attribution* for example, and in many similar ways, *Cambridge Spies*, the government and intelligence service's failures to identify and investigate an infiltration were portrayed critically. *A Question of Attribution* followed the imagined events between Blunt being discovered as a spy in 1964 and his later unveiling in 1979. Despite offering Blunt immunity in exchange for useful information, it becomes apparent early in the film that the intelligence service has failed in this investigation. Detective Chubb becomes the next employed to get information from Blunt, however, Chubb himself was rather unsuccessful, despite the film following his numerous attempts. These failures on the part of the service were epitomised in the closing scenes of the film in which the audience viewed Blunt talking to Donleavy, Chubb's Chief, stating 'you're in the clear' and therefore revealing that Donleavy was the much searched for 'fifth man'.¹¹⁹ This high level of infiltration further pointed to the intelligence service's incompetency in identifying traitors, and as such created this idea of a hopeless service, in whom the public could have little faith.

This lack of faith created by the film was heightened by events surrounding the film's release. The film's release in 1991 followed the recent unveiling of Cairncross as the real 'fifth Man'. The hunt for the fifth spy in the film thus captured the atmosphere of contemporary Britain. This was combined with the fact that at the end of the film Blunt discussed the painting with

¹¹⁹ *A Question of Attribution*, dir. John Schlesinger.

Chubb, which had been at the centre of the plot. At the end of the film Blunt explained the faces in the painting to Chubb, ‘behind them lurk other presences (...) it is never going to end’.¹²⁰ Cairncross’ recent revelation would add credibility to this statement. The audience was likely to decode the film in the present circumstances where a ‘fifth Man’ had been revealed after a gradual revelation of the spy ring throughout the years, bringing back into the present the narrative of the spies and the questions of government failure. The audience’s decoding in the given present was also likely to be influenced by questions of whether there were more spies yet to be discovered, Blunt’s statement in the film echoing this and perpetuating the idea of further treachery. The memory created by the film was therefore likely to be influenced by circumstances in that given present, echoing the failures of government and the services in identifying the spies.

Similarly, in *Cambridge Spies*, criticisms are made of the government’s failure, even deliberate refusal, to investigate any infiltration. This mirrored numerous debates which had been sparked by the spies as to whether they were helped by others in the service due to class loyalties.¹²¹ The *Cambridge Spies* series portrays this idea, most obviously through the character of Angleton in the CIA. When it becomes known that there is a spy in the British Embassy, Angleton informs Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, and suggests an investigation of all embassy staff. Halifax’s reply to this is that it is likely one of the kitchen staff, or a cleaner. When Angleton asks Halifax if he would also be investigating “upstairs”, Halifax replies, ‘Well why should we do that? Upstairs is beyond reproach’. This again plays on the belief that the upper-classes and members of the establishment could be trusted, drawing on the British ideals of class and gentlemen’s honour. Later in the episode when enquiring as to the progress of the

¹²⁰ A Question of Attribution, dir. John Schlesinger.

¹²¹ Myron Joel Aronoff, *The Spy Novels of John Le Carré: Balancing Ethics and Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 11.

investigation, Angleton is shocked that still no one from “upstairs” has been investigated, Halifax simply declares, ‘Traitors don’t come from the top, not in England’.¹²² The audience is in a position of knowledge, the Cambridge spies did ‘come from the top’ and this in turn emphasised the failure and refusal to acknowledge that the upper-classes could be traitors. Thus, the portrayal evokes a memory of a failed establishment during the Cold War, heavily flawed, and which matched and added to the image of a declining Britain. Indeed, in 1979, Thatcher’s public unveiling of Blunt was said to partly be the result of her rejection of the old establishment,¹²³ demonstrating the impact the spies had on changing values and modern portrayals continue to reflect this attitude and reinforce it in modern cultural memory. The continued reference to the unshakeable trust placed in members of the establishment sets up the fall both of the spies and the service in failing to acknowledge them.

The American perspective conveyed by Angleton can be said to reflect American views of the time. An article in the *New York Herald Tribune* in December 1952 criticised the British Government, stating it ‘has been caught with another failure that emphasizes its laxity’, referring to the escape of Burgess and Maclean.¹²⁴ The ‘other’ failure referred to is that of Alan Nunn May who was arrested in 1946 for providing nuclear information to the Soviet Union. The article remarked that:

One need not wonder (...) why Stalin considers the Western democracies so soft that he can start Korean wars and inflict casualties on American boys without fear that his agents in Britain and America will get any harsher punishment than a life in a jail for a few years with plenty of food to eat.¹²⁵

¹²² ‘Episode 4’, *Cambridge Spies*, BBC Two, 30 May 2003, 21:00.

¹²³ Joseph Oldham, ‘Disappointed romantics: Troubled Heritage in the BBC’s John le Carré Adaptations’, *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, 10. 4 (2013) pp. 727-745 (p. 739), <<https://www.eupublishing.com/doi/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0172>> [Accessed 19 March 2020].

¹²⁴ TNA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers (FCO): FCO 158/221, ‘Today in Washington: Nunn May’s Release Held Sign of British ‘Softness’ to Reds’, *New York Herald Tribune*, 30 December 1952.

¹²⁵ TNA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Papers (FCO): FCO 158/221, ‘Today in Washington: Nunn May’s Release Held Sign of British ‘Softness’ to Reds’.

This criticism captures the spy scandal in the wider context of the Cold War. It highlights that the British failures to detect these spies meant they were viewed as weak, enforcing the idea of British decline and loss of power. In addition to this, the article also blamed British failures and weakness for directly impacting on ‘American boys’ and therefore Britain’s status was viewed, even by its allies, as flawed. The statement pointed directly to the state of affairs in the Korean War, at that time in a drawn-out stalemate, the war had taken its toll on all sides.¹²⁶ The strain of the Korean War likely enhanced criticisms and condemnations of Britain’s apparent weakness. The cultural memory of the Cold War period, and espionage, therefore further the atmosphere of decline, reflecting and reinforcing it in British memory of the Cold War. It is therefore necessary to question why this lack of faith in the establishment and government failures continues to be central to Cold War dramas and why these Cold War narratives are being returned to. In one instance, it is possible that the failures of the government which the Cambridge spies highlighted have remained a key part of British memory and perspective, as the spies were revealed gradually over the years and therefore questions and doubts as to government capabilities were continually revisited.

Equally, the continued presence of this theme could be that it reflects current views and therefore people find a connection to Cold War dramas because they can relate to these notions of distrust and disillusionment. The Iraq War can be looked to as having a key influence on the decoding of the *Cambridge Spies* series, being released just prior to Britain’s entry into the war against Iraq in 2003. The Iraq War and the actions of Tony Blair and the Government, captured these same feelings of disillusionment and lack of faith. Protest and debate surrounded the Iraq War, the most notable was a protest against the war in February 2003, ‘part of a worldwide

¹²⁶ William Stueck, ‘The Korean War’, in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1: Origins* ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 266-287 (p. 279).

protest' against the war and noted 'as the largest protest march in British history',¹²⁷ with some estimating over a million marchers involved. The war sparked further controversy when reports declared that no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) had been found. The subsequent condemnation and accusations that intelligence reports and assessments had been "sexed up" to convince people that military action was necessary, evidenced feelings of outrage and distrust.¹²⁸ An article in the *Guardian*, on the work of le Carré, noted how since the end of the Cold War, le Carré has continued to reflect current concerns and the Iraq War was undoubtedly one of them, feeding into his book, *Absolute Friends*.¹²⁹ With such a high lack of trust in the government, it is unsurprising that narratives portray the establishment critically and the Cold War narrative of the Cambridge spies provides a suitable backdrop to express these sentiments, enabling the exploration of moral ambivalence and disillusionment. The return to the period in much popular culture as well as novels and dramas about modern crises has been pointed to by novelist Simon Conway, as it being 'easier to write comfortable period pieces than to try to understand what's going on' in the modern world.¹³⁰ It is therefore perhaps less jarring to follow tales of disillusionment that are set in the past, if only recently, than it is to face today's uncertainties.

The failures of government and the establishment that were so condemned during the Cold War period, and which arose again and again with the revelation of each spy, are thus repeated in modern portrayals, shaping memories of the Cold War as an era which lacked trust and faith in

¹²⁷ Adam Sisman, 'From cold war spy to angry old man: the politics of John le Carré', *The Guardian*, 24 October 2015, <<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/oct/24/john-le-Carré-lefty-adam-sisman>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹²⁸ Rosemary Hollis, 'The United Kingdom: Fateful Decision, Divided Nation', in Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds.) *The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 37-48 (pp. 40, 42-43).

¹²⁹ Sisman, 'From cold war spy to angry old man: the politics of John le Carré'.

¹³⁰ Sarah Hughes, 'From Spooks to The Game, why the bleak world of spy thrillers is back', *The Guardian*, 10 May 2015, <<https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2015/may/10/spooks-the-game-spy-thrillers-back>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

its leaders. However, recent events may also influence the memory of the Cold War, post-1989 wars like Iraq and Afghanistan raised numerous questions as to worth and morality. In looking at the Cold War through the lens of these more recent conflicts, the themes and questions explored may be framed by current concerns. The Chilcot enquiry into the Iraq War for example, and similar calls for an enquiry into the war in Afghanistan,¹³¹ raised questions of failures and flaws within the establishment as well as questions of morality. In this respect, it is perhaps not surprising that Cold War dramas continue to reflect this sentiment, a modern audience being able to relate to such questions. It may simply be less unnerving returning to past narratives where the same issues are portrayed without having to face the unknown of the present and the future.

Modern disillusionment may help to account for the controversial sympathetic portrayal in the *Cambridge Spies* series. The series takes both a new and controversial perspective of the spies. Director Tim Fywell has said of the writer Peter Moffat's script, that it "balance[s] history with the human side of these men (...) It explores how they justified their treachery and how it impacted on their personal lives"¹³². One scene which was particularly remarked upon by viewers and critics was the invented scene of the spies defending a Jewish girl in a student bar. When a bully, by the name of Givens, knocks into a girl and spills her drink, Philby remarks that Givens should buy her a new one, to which Givens replies, 'she's a Jew. I don't buy drinks for Jews'.¹³³ Here, Moffat played on sensitive memories of the Second World War, of genocide

¹³¹ Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Chilcot inquiry into Iraq war may be delayed beyond 2015' *The Guardian*, 21 April 2015, <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/21/chilcot-inquiry-iraq-war-delay-2015-newsnight> [Accessed 2 November 2017]; 'Chilcot: Hague hopes for 2015 date for Iraq Inquiry', *BBC News*, 16 October 2014, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29646705> [Accessed 1 November 2017]; See also, Theo Farrell, 'Britain's war in Afghanistan: was it worth it?', *The Telegraph*, 30 January 2015, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11377817/Britains-war-in-Afghanistan-was-it-worth-it.html> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹³² 'BBC Press Release: Cambridge Spies', p. 3.

¹³³ 'Episode 1', *Cambridge Spies*, BBC Two.

against Jews, to create this shock and disgust at Givens' comment. So much so, that when Philby and Burgess defend her, they are presented as pro-Semitic heroes. Mark Lawson, in a review for the *Guardian*, argued that what Moffat was trying to achieve was an understanding for the men's allegiance to Communism. Lawson further remarked that the understanding of supporting Communism as a way to oppose Fascism 'has little impact on a modern audience', the notion of the Communist "enemy" being firmly entrenched from the Cold War years.¹³⁴ Consequently, Moffat's invented scene creates a justification for their cause. This in turn helps to evoke sympathy for opposing an evil regime. From this it is clear that several memories were in play, overlapping one another to create this new perspective of the spies. Moffat's use of the strong memory of the Second World War to counter Cold War memories of the Communist enemy helped to convey an understanding for the spies' actions. Furthermore, we can again see how understandings of the Cold War period, and the spies themselves, are continually framed by memories of the Second World War. The two conflicts must therefore be considered together for the sake of memory, as the comparison between them aids understanding of both periods in British cultural memory.

As stated above, disillusionment today may partially account for this sympathetic portrayal, although a degree of sympathy for the characters is necessary for the audience to engage in the narrative. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe stated, the passing of time enables new perspectives of past events and contemporary environments influence this.¹³⁵ For example, the contemporary debates over Iraq, surrounding the release of the *Cambridge Spies* series, likely enabled viewers to understand the sentiment expressed by the spies in their loyalty to England

¹³⁴ Mark Lawson, 'The Cambridge Spies', *The Guardian*, 28 April 2003, <<http://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/apr/28/bbc.broadcasting>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹³⁵ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre, Werke* 14:93, p. 93, referenced in Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. by and with an introduction by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 240.

but not their government. When Bennett wrote *An Englishman Abroad*, he stated that controversies in the Falklands War, which included the British sinking of the General Belgrano, which killed an estimated 400 Argentinians, caused him to challenge his faith in the government, providing him with an understanding of the spies' dual loyalties.¹³⁶ As a result, Anthony Gardner has argued that 'it is likely the Iraqi crisis will do the same for at least part of the *Cambridge Spies*' audience'.¹³⁷ Consequently, it may be possible that, like Bennett and the Falklands War, the Iraq War provided a modern audience with a new perspective and if not a sympathy for the spies, at least a potential understanding of their love for country but contempt for Government. *Cambridge Spies* actor Toby Stephens who played Philby added that he felt this "duality" was a symptom many people now share. Therefore, modern perspectives enable us to look at the past 'anew' and recent events can reshape or influence our perspectives and memories. Modern understandings of lacking faith in the government can therefore change and shape how people view the spies' actions. Cold War espionage enables us to see how memories of the period have developed throughout the years, leading to the cultural memory expressed today.

Further disillusionment is conveyed via comparisons and contrasts to the Second World War. The theme of British decline and continued notions of disillusionment are certainly at the centre of many Cold War espionage dramas, both those released during the Cold War and after 1989. These notions of disillusionment are emphasised not only by moles and double agents, but even the "heroes" of Cold War espionage, who feel detached from and disenchanted with the world

¹³⁶ Bennett, *Plays Two*, p. ix; David George Boyce, *The Falklands War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 104; Peter Foster, 'Margaret Thatcher and the Falklands War: Doubts and Fears in a Far-off Conflict That Changed Britain', *The Telegraph*, 8 April 2013, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/9980046/Margaret-Thatcher-and-the-Falklands-War-doubts-and-fears-in-a-far-off-conflict-that-changed-Britain.html>> [Accessed, 3 November 2017].

¹³⁷ Anthony Gardner, 'Features: Cambridge Spies', *Anthony Gardner*, 2002, <http://www.anthonygardner.co.uk/features/cambridge_spies.html> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

around them. It is in these themes that we see the most reference to memories of the Second World War, and the contrast shown between the two periods ultimately shapes memories of both wars.

The *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* narrative perhaps captures this the most. Indeed, Oldham argues that the narrative and series ‘serves as a portrait of Smiley’s generation. These were the senior intelligence officers who had fought the espionage side of the Second World War only for their victory to be lost to (...) post-imperial disillusion’.¹³⁸ Several references throughout the narrative refer to disenchantment; one being Smiley’s re-enacted interrogation of Karla. When telling Guillam of how he tried to “turn” Karla, Smiley resorted to finding fault in both East and West. In the novel, Smiley stated that he said to Karla, ‘I can see through Eastern values, just as you can through our Western ones (...) Don’t you think it’s time to recognise that there is as little worth on your side as there is on mine?’¹³⁹ In the novel and television series, Smiley was saying this to Karla in an Indian prison. However, in the film, Gary Oldman, as Smiley, delivers this as a monologue to the camera, re-enacting his conversation with Karla.¹⁴⁰ This technique has the impact of making Smiley’s comments far more chilling. That Oldman delivers this speech directly to the camera gives the impression of a confession, a suggestion of Smiley’s own disenchantment. It also gives the effect of interaction with the audience, making the audience question their system and the lack of ‘worth’ in all systems. Despite the audience not viewing the film in the context of the East-West Cold War divide, similar questions of worth and morality are present in today’s society. Notably, in 2010, the year prior to the film’s release, the *Daily Mail* published an article, by James Slack, a political journalist and editor who later became the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesperson and Director

¹³⁸ Oldham, *Paranoid Visions*, p. 91.

¹³⁹ le Carré, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, p. 243; See also, *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

¹⁴⁰ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

of Communications, reporting on a survey which declared that Britain was ‘in the grip of a ‘deep institutional crisis’’.¹⁴¹ The article detailed the report’s findings that recent scandals such as Iraq and the expenses scandal, led to a severe lack of trust in British institutions.¹⁴² Smiley’s questions of the worth of the system could arguably resonate strongly with current sentiments, the film playing on this and again demonstrating its continued relevance in contemporary society.¹⁴³ In addition to this, the much more chilling depiction of Smiley’s words in this scene can be said to reflect an overall far bleaker view of the world today. Post- 9/11, it would appear that society, and in turn popular culture, resorted to far bleaker and grittier narratives, this is particularly the case with the espionage genre. Tobias Hochscherf, in his study of Bond, for example, explored how the Bond character in the era of Daniel Craig has seen a far darker portrayal, stating that ‘there has never been as much emphasis on Bond’s psyche as there is now with the general paranoid state of affairs after 9/11’.¹⁴⁴ This grittier, darker image is present in many of the recent Cold War espionage dramas, and thus a shift in perspective and state of affairs in today’s world can influence not only the narratives explored but how they are presented; in this case a much colder and chilling portrayal of Smiley and his thoughts. Therefore, the audience may be able to relate to these feelings of doubt and disenchantment that Smiley conveys, with the conditions of the present shaping the lens through which such questions are explored.

¹⁴¹ James Slack, ‘Britain ‘is suffering a huge loss of faith in its institutions’: Trust in all politicians has slumped to an all-time low, say researchers’, *Mail Online*, 20 March 2013, <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2296085/Britain-suffering-huge-loss-faith-institutions-Trust-politicians-slumped-time-low-say-researchers.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹⁴² Slack, ‘Britain ‘is suffering a huge loss of faith in its institutions’: Trust in all politicians has slumped to an all-time low, say researchers’.

¹⁴³ O ‘Donoghue, ‘Review of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy’, p. 59.

¹⁴⁴ Tobias Hochscherf, ‘Bond for the Age of Global Crises: 007 in the Daniel Craig Era’, *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, 10. 2 (2013), pp. 298-320 (p. 306), <<https://www.eupublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0136>> [Accessed 19 March 2020].

The Game also highlights feelings of disillusionment in both the traitors and the protagonists. The mole, Sarah, when finally caught and questioned by Joe Lambe, declares that ‘the establishment is rotten. Democracy is a confidence trick’.¹⁴⁵ Yet Daddy, head of MI5, also displays some disillusionment with the state of the Cold War. Daddy states, ‘I thought my work would be a privilege (...) but instead we shovel shit. And when we get home, clothes are stiff with blood and sweat and grease. I miss the war. The other one. Chap knew where he stood’.¹⁴⁶ Disillusionment is evident here in the failures of Daddy’s expectations. The fact that he misses the ‘other’ war again points to the Cold War as the anti-wartime image. The confused state of play of the Cold War contrasts to the clarity of the Second World War. Consequently, there is much evidence of disillusionment and decline in these portrayals, creating this sinister image of the period in modern cultural memory. It is interesting to note, especially in Daddy’s comments, a similarity to the views of Cold War agents and writers themselves. Several of the well-known authors of Cold War espionage fiction were once part of the British Intelligence Services, including, Le Carré and Graham Greene. Le Carré has openly discussed his own disillusionment in the service. In an interview, Le Carré noted that he was born into ‘great dreams of England’, of British pride and greatness during the war. However, to this he added that ‘Because I bought the whole wartime package, it took years to unlearn its chauvinism and simplicities’.¹⁴⁷ We can see this reflected in Daddy’s comments above and therefore there is a sense that throughout its development, the memory of the Cold War has continued to express disappointment and a lack of faith in the West or in the war being fought. These feelings of disenchantment also capture the contemporary sentiments explored above regarding a lack of

¹⁴⁵ ‘Episode 6’, *The Game*, BBC Two, 4 June 2015, 21:00.

¹⁴⁶ ‘Episode 2’, *The Game*, BBC Two, 7 May 2015, 21:00.

¹⁴⁷ Pip Ayers, ‘In My Day, MI6 – Which I Called the Circus in the Books – Stank of Wartime Nostalgia’: John Le Carré Reflects: John Le Carré Interviewed by Pip Ayers’, *Mail Online* 15 July 2011, <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-2011951/John-Le-Carré-In-day-MI6--I-called-Circus-books--stank-wartime-nostalgia.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

faith in the establishment and the wars being fought. The theme of disillusionment is therefore an incredibly dominant theme in Cold War espionage dramas. This is created using the Second World War memory to create a contrast and portray the Cold War as a turbulent period of corruption and decline. However, we can see that the Cold War can equally be looked to nostalgically in comparison to today's world. As a result, modern concerns can be seen to influence the Cold War narratives that are returned to.

3.4 The Appeal and Nostalgia for Cold War Espionage

The cultural memory of Cold War espionage captured post-1989 is far from being uniform. Whilst the discussion above demonstrates a continued desire and emphasis to create and absorb narratives of a Britain in decline under the Cold War shadow, audiences and visitors are also continually drawn to narratives of Cold War espionage and spies. The appeal of Cold War espionage reflects a fascination with the genre and an increasing nostalgia and longing for the Cold War in British culture. Equally, the genre and characters represent a sense of British values and provide reassurance of Britain's role and ability to act, while at the same time inhabiting an environment of corruption and betrayal.

3.4.1 Appeal of Cold War Espionage

The films and dramas used in this chapter highlight an ongoing fascination with espionage and this is further evident in more recent productions including, *Bridge of Spies* (2015),¹⁴⁸ the remake of *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.* (2015),¹⁴⁹ and the adaptations of le Carré's *Our Kind of Traitor* and *The Night Manager* (2016).¹⁵⁰ In the wake of this 'revival', as some have referred to it,¹⁵¹ people are questioning why espionage and in particular in this case, Cold War

¹⁴⁸ *Bridge of Spies*, dir. Steven Spielberg (20th Century Fox, 2015) [Motion picture].

¹⁴⁹ *The Man from U.N.C.L.E.*, dir. Guy Ritchie (Warner Bros., 2015) [Motion picture].

¹⁵⁰ *Our Kind of Traitor*, dir. Susanna White (StudioCanal, 2016) [Motion picture]; *Night Manager*, BBC, 21 February 2016- 27 March 2016.

¹⁵¹ Hughes, 'From Spooks to The Game, why the bleak world of spy thrillers is back'.

espionage, is continually revisited. Jeremy Duns has remarked that we may be drawn to these narratives because ‘the Cold War era provides an interesting counterpoint to our own turbulent times’.¹⁵² That the espionage genre became so dominant in and synonymous with the Cold War, means that many of the tropes which developed in the genre during the Cold War have remained.¹⁵³ Author, Olen Steinhauer, for example, has remarked that as a result of Cold War spy fiction, people ‘have become accustomed to seeing the flaws in our own system, and in ourselves’, however he added that the clear enemy of the Cold War has been replaced by the ‘ambiguity of today’.¹⁵⁴ Consequently, it is possible that Cold War espionage is popular because it offers a more clearly defined background for espionage and a clarity that is lacking in the world today. Although Cold War espionage is often portrayed as complex, this is made in comparison to the Second World War, whereas a modern audience watches Cold War portrayals through the lens of a turbulent present. As a result, there may also be a nostalgic element to returning to Cold War espionage.

However, in addition to this, espionage dramas also remain popular because intelligence remains a part of modern life. The poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in 2018 and the poisoning of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 sparked much widespread scandal, the Litvinenko story often being returned to, particularly most recently in 2015-2016, when a public inquiry into his death took place.¹⁵⁵ Further to this, in 2010, Russian agent Anna Chapman, was arrested after reports that she had belonged to a spy ring responsible for passing

¹⁵² Hughes, ‘From Spooks to The Game, why the bleak world of spy thrillers is back’.

¹⁵³ Shaw, ‘Cinema and the Cold War’, p. 378.

¹⁵⁴ Jane Ciabattari, ‘How the end of the Cold War changed spy fiction’, *BBC Culture*, 7 November 2014, <<http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20141107-spies-who-came-in-from-the-cold>> [Accessed 19 March 2020].

¹⁵⁵ Edward Malnick, Claire Newell and Lyndsey Telford, ‘Alexander Litvinenko: the long journey from inquest to public inquiry’, *The Telegraph*, 24 January 2015, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11366611/Alexander-Litvinenko-the-long-journey-from-inquest-to-public-inquiry.html>> [Accessed 2 November 2017]; Esther Addley, Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, ‘Litvinenko ‘probably murdered on personal orders of Putin’’, *The Guardian*, 21 January 2016, <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/21/alexander-litvinenko-was-probably-murdered-on-personal-orders-of-putin>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

information to the Russian Federation.¹⁵⁶ The popularity of espionage in popular culture may partly be a result of the continuation of spy stories in the news, providing intrigue into a secret world. That the above stories mirror Cold War tensions with Russia may also add to this return to the Cold War. Indeed, Whithouse, writer of *The Game*, remarked that Anna Chapman's story reignited memories of the Cold War which he wished to explore, stating that her 'story seemed to be beamed straight from the 1970s'.¹⁵⁷ As such, modern stories such as this can have the effect of drawing the recent past into the present. It is therefore not surprising that Horn noted the popularity of spy stories in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, claiming that such stories 'embody a social life that cannot do without secrecy and betrayal'.¹⁵⁸ The interests and news in society therefore have an influence on which stories and memories are returned to, and with the Cold War being so synonymous with espionage, it is an ideal setting. The Cold War provides an ideal backdrop to explore scandals, moral ambiguities and conspiracies, as such themes were prominent during the period, and it also provides a way to explore similar concerns today, without having to face current anxieties.

3.4.2 Nostalgia

Much like the Cold War is influenced by memories of the Second World War, modern conflicts provide a further lens through which to view the Cold War. As a result, modern events can create a nostalgic sentiment for the period. In *Casino Royale* (2006) this is evident in M's words, 'Christ I miss the Cold War', having suggested there was some sense of proper

¹⁵⁶ 'The Secrets of Anna Chapman', *BBC News*, 28 March 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12876927>> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹⁵⁷ 'The Game Media Pack', *BBC*, retrieved from *thewaybackmachine*, <web.archive.org/web/20150421014702/http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/the-game-media-pack.pdf> [Accessed 2 November 2017].

¹⁵⁸ Horn, *The Secret War*, p. 37.

behaviour then.¹⁵⁹ The complex conflicts of Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror, help to shape views of the Cold War as a simpler, at least more understandable, conflict.

Whilst during the Cold War the world was divided and nuclear threats and proxy wars engulfed the globe, the division provided a clear world order, one primarily divided between two camps. Consequently, the Cold War provided a clear enemy, one based on ideological differences. Both Whithouse when discussing *The Game* and Colin Firth when discussing *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, remarked on the clarity and simplicity of the enemy. Whithouse stated, ‘remember when the bogey man wasn’t the suicide bomber or the EDL thug, but glamorous and ruthless Russian spies’.¹⁶⁰ Here, Whithouse demonstrates his own nostalgia for the Cold War era, one not necessarily the past as it was but a distorted version of the Cold War past, influenced by the fears and uncertainties of suicide bombers and extremists. The fact that Whithouse paints the Russian enemy as ‘glamorous and ruthless’ suggests a sense of admiration for their work, despite them being the feared enemy of the West. Equally, Firth, when playing Haydon in the 2011 version of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier Spy*, declared that the Cold War was ‘somehow ideologically (...) so simple’.¹⁶¹ A review for the film reiterated this with the statement that ‘a red flag with a hammer and sickle made the ideological and political stakes clear’ during the Cold War and similarly in cultural portrayals of the period. The Soviet flag and its meaning having been entrenched in society throughout the Cold War means that its significance continues to be recognised and understood. The ideological divide is thus generally perceived as simple and obvious, whereas today conflicts and alliances seem far less clear. As Max Hastings argued on *Question Time* in 2015, ‘we’re still coming to terms with the problem of

¹⁵⁹ *Casino Royale*, dir. Martin Campbell (Sony Pictures Releasing, 2006) [Motion picture].

¹⁶⁰ ‘The Game Media Pack’, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶¹ Mick Brown, ‘On set of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy’, *The Telegraph*, 3 September 2011, <www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/8735266/On-the-set-of-Tinker-Tailor-Soldier-Spy.html> [Accessed 19 March 2020].

non-state enemies (...) In the old days we knew who the enemy was'.¹⁶² The complexity of the modern world therefore creates a nostalgic lens through which to view the simpler times of the Cold War.

In part, the appeal of British Cold War espionage narratives reflects a nostalgia for old British values. As stated above, Willmetts and Moran have addressed how the Cambridge spies in particular convey a narrative of British values, including Englishness and class, alongside treachery and decline.¹⁶³ The same can be said for most of the post-1989 Cold War espionage films and dramas discussed. Significant attention is paid to the recreation of a British, or often typically English, setting to these narratives. In turn they capture a sense of quintessentially British values. This is primarily captured in the portrayal of class. Whilst the class narrative has been discussed above to capture betrayal and a resentment for establishment failings, this discussion will highlight that there is also an allure and charm to upper-class behaviours and notions of gentlemen, emphasising once more the ambiguous and conflicting memories of the Cold War. The post-1989 dramas and films focused on in this chapter capture different characters from differing backgrounds. On the one hand there is a focus on the aristocratic upper-class, or gentleman, spy, found in the treachery of the Cambridge spies but also in the endearing character of George Smiley. With the Cambridge spies, aristocracy is shown to be corrupt and ideals of class are broken. Yet there is also a portrayal of the men's charm, and an unwavering love for their country, despite their espionage. The depiction of Burgess in *An Englishman Abroad* and his desperation to cling to his English class and identity despite his exile capture this. His incapability to belong in either England or Russia evoked a sympathy, a loss of identity to national heritage. Burgess' love for England and English values continues

¹⁶² Max Hastings, Comment on *Question Time*, BBC, 19 November 2015, 22:40.

¹⁶³ Willmetts and Moran, 'Filming Treachery', pp. 51-52.

to be captured post-Cold War in the *Cambridge Spies* series, depicting Burgess looking back at England as he and Maclean board the ship to defect to Moscow.

George Smiley represents the English gentleman and class quite differently. Though often depicted ambiguously, Smiley represents gentlemanly values. Toby Manning argues that Smiley serves as ‘the avatar of the national, the paradigm of Britishness’ in le Carré’s novels. Described as ‘a notably gentlemanly – and politically powerful – national everyman. Decent, compassionate, cultured, devilishly clever, perpetually modest and polite, Smiley is as reassuring a representative of Britain as James Bond’.¹⁶⁴ However, whilst a gentleman and Oxford man, Smiley, John L. Cobbs argues, is ‘amorphous, declaring that ‘he often relates to working-class psychologies (...) and rebellious rejectors of their upper-class roots’. It is these character traits which distinguish Smiley from the others, ‘pigeonholed’ in clear class divides.¹⁶⁵ Smiley’s troubled marriage to ‘Lady Ann’ and betrayal by Bill Haydon, a cousin to Ann and thus aristocratic himself, highlight Smiley’s ambiguous and awkward position in terms of class. This awkwardness in turn helps to capture the sense of a ‘national everyman’. Indeed, in each version of the narrative, Smiley is seen to operate distinct from the Circus as he seeks the mole. Despite the stark differences between the flamboyant, womanising Bond and the quiet and calculating Smiley, each offers an archetypal image of Britain. Atkins has suggested that there is a strange nostalgia for the aristocrat, declaring that they ‘established a code of good manners, or decent behaviour, among equals’, resulting in a ‘soft spot in our hearts for them’. Atkins added that these spies and their gentlemanly values are often more ‘attractive’ than the spies that have since followed.¹⁶⁶ The appeal of these characteristics is also evident in non-Cold War films such as *Kingsman* (2015), which though satirical, played up to the Savile Row

¹⁶⁴ Toby Manning, *John le Carré and the Cold War* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), p. 16.

¹⁶⁵ Cobbs, *Understanding John le Carré*, p. 98.

¹⁶⁶ Atkins, *The British Spy Novel*, pp. 173-174, 221.

adorned, well-mannered gentleman spy, capturing a nostalgia for this character. While the Cambridge spies often highlight issues with class and the establishment, it is their betrayal of class and the ideals of gentleman which is highlighted. The allure of the gentleman spy may thus not represent a nostalgia for the days of empire or imperial masculinity but may offer an escape into a time where there was a distinct sense of Britishness and a British role in the world. As the rise in globalisation and increased interests in family history capture a diminishing sense of identity, the attraction of the British gentleman secret agent may too be symptomatic of the same struggle for identity. The allure of spies and Cold War espionage genre thus both capture the lack of trust in the establishment and present a nostalgic image of gentlemanly values.

The espionage genre can also be seen to provide reassurance in the form of the hero. Much like the anti-hero, the spies in Cold War espionage are inherently flawed or face many challenges. Shadi Neimneh has argued that the anti-hero in the twentieth century resulted from challenges to 'traditional values', the two World Wars also damaging notions of the traditional hero. These anti-heroes instead face challenges and crises yet are also capable of doing good.¹⁶⁷ In his discussion of le Carré's Smiley, Steven M. Neuse declared that, 'Smiley appears an ambiguous hero. He solves murders and uncovers spies, both at home and abroad; and yet he is betrayed and rejected constantly by his wife, his organization, and his adversaries'.¹⁶⁸ Unlike the traditional narrative of Bond, Smiley conveys a more realistic and tragic hero. In the film adaptation of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, Smiley is seen living in isolation. This is particularly captured in the sequence of shots during the opening credits, where Smiley is seen swimming and walking through the park alone, before returning to an empty house with a pile of letters

¹⁶⁷ Shadi Neimneh, 'The Anti-Hero in Modernist Fiction: From Irony to Cultural Renewal', *An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal*, 46. 4 (2013), pp. 75-90 (pp. 75, 77, 78). <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/44030709>> [Accessed 14 December 2020].

¹⁶⁸ Steven M. Neuse, 'Bureaucratic Malaise in the Modern Spy Novel: Deighton, Greene, and LeCarré' *Public Administration*, 60. (1982), pp. 293-306 (p. 298) <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1982.tb00481.x>> [Accessed 14 December 2020].

for his wife Ann, waiting to be opened.¹⁶⁹ The betrayals on the part of his wife and Haydon work to create a lone hero, facing life's struggles. However, Smiley ultimately solves the case, identifying Haydon as the mole and bringing about both order and justice. As Manning argues, 'Le Carré's Cold War protagonists serve the British state in every novel and, after a period of denial and decrial, restore the state and the status quo'.¹⁷⁰

Similarly, in *The Game*, Joe Lambe is left hurt and isolated by his failure to save the woman he loves, Yulia, from being captured by the Russian spy Odin, later learning that she in fact betrayed him by working for the Russians. Much like Smiley, Joe is pictured as the lone hero, frustrated by his orders to work with DC Jim Fenchurch, we see his desire for isolation. However, whilst not belonging to the upper-classes or establishment, Joe too is the hero of the narrative, he identifies Sarah as the mole and the series ends with the MI5 team returning to their work, order restored. The spies, as heroes in this sense can be argued to offer the audience a reassurance. They provide a feeling of action being taken and justice delivered. Whilst the traditional portrayal of Bond during the Cold War also offered this, the likes of Smiley and Joe Lambe offer a more realistic hero, one flawed yet ultimately the victor of the narrative. The era of the Daniel Craig Bond demonstrates this further, the audience now witness Bond's weaknesses, yet he continues to serve and capture the villains which threaten Britain.

3.5 Conclusion

The exploration of Cold War espionage through the films, dramas and exhibition discussed, has enabled an analysis of a range of Cold War memories. The espionage genre is suited to exploring issues of moral ambiguities and disenchantment, capturing the sense of decline and lack of trust in the establishment which grew throughout the Cold War period itself. The use

¹⁶⁹ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson.

¹⁷⁰ Manning, *John le Carré and the Cold War*, p. 13.

of *mise-en-scène* and museum design adds to this, emphasising scenes of distress to accompany the narratives of espionage and treachery. The selection and popularity of these narratives, however, has as much to say about the era they were produced in, revealing and relating to similar modern concerns. For the post-1989 portrayals, this would particularly seem to be the case post-Iraq War, which led to significant hostility towards the Government, and subsequent scandals seem to have further eroded any trust in the establishment. Modern issues can consequently be seen to influence which Cold War narratives are returned to and this subsequently shapes the memories that are created of the period. Memories of decline and change are further perpetuated in the depiction of shattered values of sexuality, masculinity and class, the era being portrayed as one where Britain's role and values were fundamentally reassessed. That many of these themes are captured by the numerous retellings and adaptations of the Cambridge spy narrative, points to their centrality to both the espionage genre, as it developed during the Cold War, and the period in general. The spies embody immorality, treason, transgressions, and disenchantment and as such memories of them and the Cold War almost seem synonymous.

The portrayal of these sentiments, however, is only possible via the overlapping memories of the Second World War, and the continual development of memory throughout the Cold War itself. The cultural memory of the period is thus complex, it feeds off comparisons to the "glory" of the Second World War, producing images and sentiments of decline and the loss of British dominance and values. As the Cold War progressed, these memories developed, the continual revelations of spies and double agents, not only highlighted betrayal and corruption but also Government failures. That the Cambridge spies' narrative unravelled over forty years meant these failures were returned to, shattering trust in the establishment. The ability of modern audiences to relate to similar sentiments today both highlights the legacy of the Cold War, in fundamentally shaping the way today's world is perceived, but also suggests that the

period is returned to and popular in culture, due to its similarities to the world today. The cultural memory of the Cold War is therefore not simply a memory constructed after the conflict but one which feeds off the gradual unravelling of events throughout the period itself, and the legacy of these events.

Despite repeated depictions of decline, today's world equally provides a new, more nostalgic lens through which to view the Cold War. Its rules and certainty, alongside ideas of British values and heroic figures contrast to the uncertainty and chaos of the world today. The complex and ambiguous cultural memory of the Cold War being positioned between this nostalgia and notions of decline.

4 Awaiting Apocalypse: Remembering the Nuclear Threat in the Cold War

The most symbolic image of the Cold War is arguably that of the nuclear mushroom cloud. The image pervades cultural portrayals of the conflict, instantly recognisable as a symbol of the threat which hung over the Cold War. As David Lowe and Tony Joel have stated, ‘It acts as a visual mnemonic thread from 1945 (...) to the end of the Cold War’.¹ The image captures the East-West divide and the dangerous arms race which was carried out between them. However, alongside capturing the dangers and fears of the Cold War, Jonathan Hogg comments that ‘While new types of nuclear threat emerged, older motifs such as the nuclear mushroom cloud dissolved into a harmless and kitsch icon of popular culture’.² The mushroom cloud thus echoes this ambiguous memory of the Cold War and the consistent divide between remembering the Cold War as a dangerous and turbulent era and as a period which can be looked on nostalgically. As with espionage, the nuclear threat serves as a repeated theme and narrative throughout the films, dramas, and exhibitions assessed. This chapter explores the ways in which the Cold War nuclear threat is captured in cultural portrayals and how this reflects and shapes memories of the period. Similarly to espionage, there is not a definitive memory of the nuclear threat. On the one hand there is a narrative of terror, hinting once again to a turbulent era. Yet, on the other hand, questions must be raised as to what it is about nuclear narratives and sites that appeals to audiences and visitors. What do nuclear narratives provide or capture? These questions are explored through the analysis of modern exhibitions and nuclear bunkers which are open to the public, as well as films and dramas which address the

¹ David Lowe and Tony Joel, *Remembering the Cold War: Global Contest and National Stories* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 23.

² Jonathan G. Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 161.

nuclear threat, such as *Ginger and Rosa* (2012) and *The Game*. Initially, the continued emphasis on apocalyptic images will be explored, analysing the atmospheres and memories created, in particular through the focus on 'hot points' to convey a narrative of crisis. The image of the mushroom cloud itself and how it is used will also be assessed. An acknowledgment of the many influences on these narratives, from their creators to the inherited memories and popular culture from the Cold War, will help to explore why the nuclear threat is remembered in a particular way and why attempts to convey the narrative may result in simplification. The chapter will subsequently move onto an exploration of why Cold War and nuclear narratives appeal to audiences and visitors. This will take into consideration both notions of nostalgia and literature on dark and nuclear tourism to suggest several reasons as to why these narratives hold such appeal.

Following the Manhattan Project and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world entered the nuclear age, the development of which monopolised the Cold War. The arms race between the USA and the Soviet Union caused the world to come close to nuclear confrontation on more than one occasion, providing 'hot points' such as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), but also necessitating a series of arms limitation talks and agreements throughout the conflict. Britain, originally a partner on the Manhattan Project, was forced to develop its own atomic weapons programme when they were excluded by the USA through the McMahon Act (1946) which restricted the sharing of information. Britain detonated its first atomic bomb in 1952, however, they were already far behind the USA who detonated their first thermonuclear bomb in the same year. With the entrance into the post-thermonuclear age, the devastating potential of the weapons resulted in an outpour of imaginings and cultural explorations as to what these new Cold War weapons meant for the world.

As with Cold War literature in general, the cultural history of the nuclear threat has increased in recent years. Paul Boyer's 1985 book, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, was the first, and an

influential cultural study of America's nuclear experience.³ Other works by Kirk Willis, Jeff Hughes, Jonathan Hogg, and Christoph Laucht, have sought to define what is meant by nuclear culture. In 1995, Willis, commenting on the neglected topic of British nuclear culture, defined the concept as 'the knowledge, imagery, and artifacts of applied nuclear physics'.⁴ Willis argued that nuclear culture and imagery pre-dated the 1945 attacks on Japan, stating that the development of nuclear technology entered press and culture through novels, comics and films. The British nuclear culture, Willis argued, was far more pessimistic than that in America.⁵ Others, including Hogg and Laucht, have highlighted the complexity of the topic and need for further definition,⁶ while Hughes argued for a more critical and nuanced approach to the study of 'nuclear culture', stating that 'There are many nuclear cultures, in many contexts'.⁷ There is far from one definition or method of analysis for nuclear culture, however in these works, British cultural responses to the Cold War, during the period, have provided an increased understanding of attitudes to nuclear conflict.

Equally, the works of Tony Shaw and Jonathan Hogg have assessed cultural responses to the conflict and nuclear threat respectively. Hogg provided a detailed account of how British cultural responses to the development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear state changed over the twentieth century. In particular, Hogg argued that British nuclear culture was formed by

³ Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994 [originally published 1985]).

⁴ Kirk Willis, 'The Origins of British Nuclear Culture, 1895-1939', *Journal of British Studies*, 34. 1 (1995), pp. 59 – 89, (p. 60) <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/175809>> [Accessed 27 February 2020].

⁵ Willis, 'The Origins of British Nuclear Culture', pp. 60, 82.

⁶ Jonathan Hogg and Christoph Laucht, 'Introduction: British Nuclear Culture', *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 45. 4 (2012), 479 – 93 (p. 488) <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41809786>> [Accessed 27 February 2020]; Christoph Laucht, *Elemental Germans: Klaus Fuchs, Rudolph Peierls and the Making of British Nuclear Culture 1939-1959* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 5.

⁷ Jeff Hughes, 'What is British nuclear culture? Understanding *Uranium 235*', *British Society for the History of Science*, 45. 4 (2013), pp. 495 - 518 (p. 517). <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/41809787>> [Accessed 14 December].

official and unofficial narratives, which increasingly clashed towards the end of the Cold War as state narratives were challenged more and more.⁸

Other works have addressed responses to the threat and possibility of nuclear war. For instance, Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann's edited collection of essays, explored the ways in which nuclear war was imagined and anticipated, and how this influenced culture, as well as government strategies and policies.⁹ Grant's chapter specifically focused on how nuclear war was imagined in Britain, noting the USA's Pacific tests in 1954 and the entrance into the thermonuclear era as the moment 'when the imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain changed forever'.¹⁰ The recent work by Jessica Douthwaite and Matthew Grant on the experiences of Civil Defence volunteers also demonstrates how volunteers viewed the work of Civil Defence and their view on the nuclear threat. These works detail the façade of Civil Defence or a difficulty in conveying experiences and the usefulness of the training.¹¹

These works collectively demonstrate the varied approaches to exploring the British nuclear experience and in turn the various responses to the nuclear threat which occurred throughout the Cold War. In regard to memory studies, Lowe and Joel's chapter on the 'Nuclear World' provided an overview of several sites and practices of remembering the Cold War's nuclear threat, from Hiroshima's Peace Memorial Museum to museums and the restoration of nuclear bunkers. The sites highlight the many challenges in creating a narrative of the Cold War and

⁸ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, pp. 8 - 11.

⁹ Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, eds., *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture Thought and Nuclear Conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

¹⁰ Matthew Grant, 'The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65' in , *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 92 - 115 (p. 111)

¹¹ Jessica Douthwaite, "... what in the hell's this?' Rehearsing nuclear war in Britain's Civil Defence Corps', *Contemporary British History*, 33. 2 (2019), pp. 187 - 207 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2018.1519421>> [Accessed 14 December 2020]; Matthew Grant, 'Making sense of nuclear war: narratives of voluntary civil defence and the memory of Britain's Cold War', *Social History*, 44. 2 (2019), pp. 229 - 254 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071022.2019.1579981>> [Accessed 14 December 2020].

remembering the conflict.¹² Equally, the work of Wayne D. Cocroft and Inge Hermann provides insight into the physical remnants of the nuclear threat and the afterlife and attraction of these sites in the post-Cold War world.¹³

This chapter will provide a detailed exploration of Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War's nuclear threat, building on studies of culture during the Cold War itself and the limited work on Cold War memory. Yet, it also aims to provide suggestions and open discussion as to *how* and *why* these memories of Britain's Cold War and nuclear experience have developed, how these are dependent on the given present of today's world, and what this means for a more general cultural memory of Britain's Cold War.

4.1 Images of Apocalypse

Despite the end of the Cold War, the rhetoric of apocalypse and images of nuclear annihilation have not left us. The nuclear threat is often in the background of modern depictions of the Cold War, dealing with fears of the bomb or moments of activism and protest, rather than actually imagining a nuclear attack itself. This is perhaps an indication that whilst still an existing threat, it is not as imminent as it used to be. Modern apocalyptic films tend to deal more with the effects of climate change or the takeover by advanced technologies. Karen A. Ritzenhoff and Angela Krewani have stated that since 9/11, apocalyptic films have dealt with terrorism, technology and 'ecological disasters'.¹⁴ Consequently, we can see how modern, more relevant,

¹² Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*.

¹³ Wayne D. Cocroft, 'Protect and Survive: Preserving and Presenting the Built Cold War Heritage', in *The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation*, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 215 - 238; Inge Hermann, 'Cold War heritage (and) tourism: exploring heritage processes within Cold War sites in Britain' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Bedfordshire, 2012).

¹⁴ Karen A. Ritzenhoff and Angela Krewani, 'Introduction' in *The apocalypse in film: dystopias, disasters, and other visions about the end of the world*, ed. by Karen A. Ritzenhoff and Angela Krewani (Latham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), pp. xi - xxii (p. xiii).

fears of the future, have replaced ideas of nuclear war. However, in the increasing number of cultural representations of nuclear war, there are recurring dark images of apocalypse.

The idea of apocalypse finds its roots in the bible. Kim Newman argues, most cultures have ‘a vision of Apocalypse’,¹⁵ with shared language and imagery providing a collective understanding of what the apocalypse means. Ritzenhoff and Krewani have discussed the biblical roots of apocalypse and the story of the final judgement, in which God destroys the earth, punishing sinners, whilst the ‘good people are united with God’. This understanding and imagery, they argued, ‘provides a structure to express our fear of an ending and to give expression to politically threatening situations’.¹⁶ The concept of apocalypse therefore provides a way to understand and process threats. The threat of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and the struggle to imagine their devastating effects, resulted in many apocalyptic images. There is, however, one crucial difference between the biblical story of apocalypse and the modern understanding of the concept. This, Ritzenhoff and Krewani argued, lies in the loss of ‘the building for the New Jerusalem’, the saving of the good.¹⁷ In contrast, the modern understanding of apocalypse denotes mere destruction, providing a much darker image, where all hope is lost. It is this imagery that we find connected to the nuclear threat.

In *Ginger and Rosa*, we see these themes of apocalypse, the narrative being imposed on the background of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the escalating fears and tensions which play out through radio broadcasts and discussions. *Ginger and Rosa* follows the story of two teenage girls, best friends, born in August 1945, with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The film opens with the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima and flashes to the birth of the girls, contrasting ideas and images of life and death, and setting the tone for the nuclear threat. The

¹⁵ Kim Newman, *Apocalypse Movies: End of The World Cinema* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2000), p. 18.

¹⁶ Ritzenhoff and Krewani, ‘Introduction’, p. xii.

¹⁷ Ritzenhoff and Krewani, ‘Introduction’, p. xiii.

narrative follows the two friends through the struggles of adolescence and coming to terms with the threat of nuclear war. The girls, however, find inherently different ways to deal with these struggles. The main character, Ginger, finds comfort in protest, joining the Young Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (YCND), whilst Rosa seeks romance, and with none other than Ginger's Romantic, idealistic father, Roland. Director Sally Potter allows the viewer to watch the unfolding events from Ginger's perspective. As a result, much of the imagery and language conveyed to the audience is of apocalypse and impending doom – both from the destruction of the bomb and the destruction caused by Rosa and Roland's relationship.¹⁸ Consequently, we see scenes of wasteland, bomb-sites left from the war, yet symbolic of the apocalyptic ideas of the “nothingness” which nuclear war would bring. The scene is barren, void of life except the youthful children who play amid the ruins. In weaving the narrative of the nuclear bomb with the lives of two young girls, we are reminded that it is the future which is threatened.

The imagery of apocalypse is further echoed throughout the film via Ginger's reading and poetry. One excerpt is as follows:

I dreamed there was a wall of flame,
I screamed because I was to blame.
I looked around, no night, no day,
No sky, no ground, nothing to say.¹⁹

The language used, the emphasis of ‘no night, no day’, evokes an idea of emptiness. We see here how Ginger imagined nuclear annihilation and these imaginings fuelled her need for action. Potter employs the universal language and understandings of apocalypse to convey this idea to the audience. The film, released in 2012, followed the ongoing debates over the renewal

¹⁸ Sophie Mayer, *Political Animals: The New Feminist Cinema* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), p. 95.

¹⁹ *Ginger and Rosa*, dir. Sally Potter (Artificial Eye, 2012).

of Trident, bringing a connection between the Cold War narrative and modern events. The Cold War and CND echo of justified and necessary activism, which is present within the film, therefore have continued relevance in today's society. The film, according to Potter, represents a relatable uncertainty about the future, in regard to the 'slow catastrophe' of climate change'.²⁰ Additionally, the film followed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, which witnessed a severe nuclear accident, raising debates over faults made by the plant operator. *Ginger and Rosa* was therefore also released amid debates surrounding the ongoing risk and dangers of nuclear accidents. Images of barren wasteland tap into the imagery of apocalypse be that the result of climate change, nuclear accidents or nuclear war. Modern audiences can therefore also see their own fears reflected on the Cold War past. Narratives of fear and apocalypse during the conflict may consequently serve as an ideal backdrop for similar concerns today, even if that be from new and different threats. Using historical narratives to reflect on current concerns may provide a sense of security as opposed to confronting today's concerns directly.

The Game similarly taps into apocalyptic language and sentiment. In episode five of the series the viewer is taken back to 'one year ago' when Joe and Yulia were walking in London. A man preaching of Armageddon, wearing a sandwich board reading 'the end is nigh', is visible in the background creating an ominous sense for the episode, amid fears that Soviet Operation Glass is a nuclear attack on the UK. At the end of the episode, having returned to the current time of the narrative, a bomb explosion results in scenes of bodies on the street floor, amid these is the body of the same preacher, with the sandwich board cracked and broken, emphasising this

²⁰ Sophie Mayer, 'Bomb Culture', *Sight and Sound* (2012), pp. 34 - 35 (p. 35)
<http://sallypotter.com/uploads/websites/774/wysiwyg/Sophie_Mayer_Bomb_Culture_Sight_and_Sound_PDF.pdf>, [Accessed 19 April 2018].

message of “the end”.²¹ *The Game* ties in the plot of espionage and a mole within MI6, with fears of nuclear attack. Consequently, modern audiences through television and films, like *The Game* and *Ginger and Rosa*, get a sense of the Cold War as ridden with fear. As a result, the Cold War is often portrayed in this regard as an intense period where the world, as it was known, could end at any moment.

This very much follows experiences, memories, and popular culture during the Cold War itself, though this memory took some time to develop. The bombing of Japan by America in 1945, brought to life the power and devastation nuclear technology and weapons could bring, ideas which up until then had only been imagined and hypothesised. However, despite the destruction and horrors following the bombings, both Shaw and Grant have argued that the British public’s response to the attacks was not a straightforward one of fear and concern. Indeed, as Shaw stated, the attacks on Japan by America both brought uncertainty about this new weaponry and technology, but were also seen by some to herald the end of the war and bring peace.²² Similarly, Adrian Bingham’s work on the press’ response and portrayal of nuclear war in the early Cold War period, demonstrates that both the *Daily Express* and *Daily Mirror*, praised the achievements of Britain in being a part of the Manhattan Project as well as labelling the new weapon “the most fearful device of war yet produced”.²³ It is clear that there were therefore varied feelings about the bomb immediately post-1945. Grant has discussed the fact that following the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was difficult to imagine the impact of an atomic bomb, particularly the effects of such an attack on Britain. Grant argued that this difficulty to imagine nuclear war meant many attempts to do so were based on recent

²¹ ‘Episode 5’, *The Game*, BBC Two, 7 May 2015, 21:00.

²² Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The state, propaganda and consensus* (London: I.B Tauris, 2001), p. 116.

²³ Adrian Bingham, “‘The Monster’? The British Popular Press and Nuclear Culture, 1945–early 1960s”, *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 45. 4 (2012), pp. 609 – 624 (pp. 609, 621), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41809793>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

experiences of the Second World War and the Blitz.²⁴ Both Grant and Shaw have highlighted that the anxiety post-Hiroshima and Nagasaki was relatively short-lived. Shaw even remarked that between 1945 and 1950, ‘only four British films touched on the subject’.²⁵ Grant explained this decrease in anxiety via both international attempts to control atomic energy and the establishment of the Civil Defence Corps in 1949.²⁶ Contemporary British attitudes to the bomb in the immediate post-war period can thus be located in the recent past experiences of the ‘Blitz spirit’ and future ideas of survivability, based both on these past experiences and the creation of the Civil Defence Corps. Whilst concerns about nuclear technology remained in the background, the immediate post-war period helped to diffuse feelings of an immediate threat. However, as Grant argues, this changed dramatically with the introduction of the hydrogen bomb. In particular, Grant points to the USA’s Pacific tests of the hydrogen bomb in 1954 which brought to light the devastating effects of radioactive fallout. This became evident from the radiation induced illness and burns contracted by Japanese fishermen 82 miles away from the tests. The new known destructive power of the hydrogen bomb, ‘shattered the link between the experience of the Second World War and contemporary nuclear reality’, as asserted by Grant.²⁷ Consequently, anxieties this time remained, and in the 1950s and 1960s there were increasingly apocalyptic imaginings of thermonuclear war in popular culture. Interestingly, in this period, both Grant and Shaw remark on an ‘imaginative void’, an inability to imagine the reality of a nuclear attack and its aftermath. As such, numerous films in the 1950s and 1960s that addressed nuclear war, focused on apocalypse and the end of the world, drawing on the

²⁴ Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, pp. 94 - 96, 98 - 99.

²⁵ Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War*, p. 117.

²⁶ Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, pp. 96 – 97.

²⁷ Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, p. 101, 103; See also, From our own correspondent, ‘Radioactive fish alarm in Japan’, *The Times*, 20 March 1954, p.5, *The Times Digital Archive*, <<https://0-link-gale-com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/apps/doc/CS85414516/TTDA?u=essex&sid=TTDA&xid=c5741995>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

imagery of destruction and nothingness.²⁸ Indeed, *Dr Strangelove* (1964) left it to the audience to imagine the effect of nuclear war, as the audience were merely left with the image of Major 'King' Kong riding off with the bomb and the sequence of mushroom clouds after the activation of the Doomsday machine.²⁹ Instead the film focused on the precarious nature of MAD and how easily the arms race could escalate to the point of producing the ultimate deterrent, in the form of the Doomsday machine which cannot be deactivated.³⁰ As such it is clear, as Grant argues, that 1954 fundamentally shaped both how nuclear war was imagined and understood.³¹ Whilst imaginings and understandings were still reasonably situated in the recent experiences of the Second World War and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the new understandings altered on the basis of the expectations of the future and the prospect of survivability. It is thus this inability to imagine a future or world post-nuclear attack that drastically altered contemporary nuclear perspectives post-1954. Though, as Grant has pointed out, this did not mean there were not people who continued to argue the survivability of thermonuclear war; indeed, the Civil Defence Corps was not officially 'scrapped' until 1968.³² The imagery and language of the nuclear apocalyptic threat during the Cold War has thus developed from throughout the period and explains its central role in post-1989 Cold War narratives.

However, post-1989 depictions of the Cold War nuclear threat differ in that the threat, while still present, is far less than it once was. Hogg has argued that modern cultural portrayals of the Cold War have become depoliticised.³³ Peter Watkins' *The War Game* (1965) a documentary-drama which sought to envisage life after a nuclear attack on Kent, was overtly critical of

²⁸ Grant, 'The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65', p. 94, 102; Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War*, p. 132.

²⁹ *Dr Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, dir. Stanley Kubrick (Columbia Pictures, 1964) [Motion picture]; Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War*, pp. 132 - 133.

³⁰ *Dr Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, dir. Stanley Kubrick).

³¹ Grant, 'The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65', p. 111.

³² Grant, 'The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65', pp. 94, 106.

³³ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, p. 161.

government responses to the nuclear threat and the continuation of Civil Defence, this criticism an act of activism in itself. The film was highly critical of the Civil Defence Corps and government plans for survival, to the extent of depicting interviews with Civil Defence members in the film. One of which stated ‘I think extra numbers would have made no difference at all to this’, while another remarked, ‘It was a title they had all wrong-call this defence?’.³⁴ Particularly significant in the post-thermonuclear era, the film tapped into this increased distrust and disbelief in Civil Defence and government assurances that thermonuclear war could be survived. Indeed, the Civil Defence Corps was disbanded only a few years after the film was produced. In contrast, *Ginger and Rosa*, as a post-1989 portrayal, follows a teenager’s attempts to come to terms with the possibility of nuclear apocalypse and does not depict an apocalyptic scenario playing out. Equally, the inclusion of a nuclear narrative in *The Game* serves more to contextualise and frame it as a Cold War drama, the fear of nuclear threat today not being at the same level as in 1965. The knowledge that the Cold War nuclear apocalypse never emerged has removed fear as well as much of the political imperative to fight against government nuclear policy. Despite this, in *Ginger and Rosa*, Ginger’s activism does capture a refusal to believe government Civil Defence measures. The release of the film following the Trident renewal debates and Fukushima crisis, makes it far from depoliticised. These debates highlight that the nuclear threat still exists in the post-Cold War world, although somewhat diminished. The impact of the Cold War thus continues to influence present day in the existence of these weapons and technology, and the release of *Ginger and Rosa* coincided with renewed debates as to deterrence, non-proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear technology. However, the difference rests in the lack of proximity to the Cold War. Nuclear attack is no longer the same looming threat it was during the conflict. Ginger’s activism instead

³⁴ *The War Game*, dir. Peter Watkins (BBC, 1965).

can be seen to fight against the remnants of the Cold War and new threats such as the apocalypse which is threatened by climate change. As a result of perspectives following 1954 and early Cold War popular culture such as *The War Game*, we can see why modern portrayals place the nuclear threat in Cold War narratives. Yet we can also understand how distance from the Cold War alters memories, fear of the nuclear threat no longer as present and thus narratives focus less on an apocalypse and more on framing the Cold War and fighting modern threats in a Cold War context.

Whilst the cultural reflections and memories of nuclear war may have become less political or full of fear, some similarities and continuities remain. Both *The War Game* and *Ginger and Rosa* were set within the post-thermonuclear era with increasing questions over the possibilities of survivability and the struggle to imagine life post-nuclear attack. As Grant argues, early attempts to imagine nuclear war were heavily influenced by memories of and experiences in the Second World War.³⁵ Despite its release in the post-thermonuclear world, *The War Game* demonstrated the continued reliance on memories and understandings of the Second World War. Comparisons to the war were made throughout, for example, portrayals of armed police, the burning of bodies and the collection of wedding rings as a way to identify victims, was followed by the narrative voiceover declaring that, ‘Everything which you are now seeing happened in Germany after the heavy bombing in the last war. It would almost certainly have to happen in Britain after a nuclear war’. Equally, at the end of the film, a statement appeared on the screen stating that ‘Much of the film that you have just seen was based on information obtained from the bombings of Dresden, Darmstadt, Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki’.³⁶ That Watkins and those behind the film drew on research of these events and used these to

³⁵ Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain’.

³⁶ *The War Game*, dir. by Peter Watkins.

forge imaginings of nuclear war, indicates that portrayals and imaginings of nuclear attack in the early Cold War period still drew on memories and images of wartime. This is likely because these wartime events were people's only or most recent memories of war and devastation, thus understandings were inevitably based on these ideas. Similar comparisons can be seen in cultural portrayals today. However, this now serves more to exaggerate the terror and decline of the Cold War years in comparison to the 'glory' of the Second World War. *Ginger and Rosa* relies on images and a memory of wartime Britain; the narrative framed by the end of the war. In contrast to the nuclear threat Ginger seeks to survive, the wartime experiences of the older generations seemed survivable. As Ginger's fear radicalises her to take further action, she begins to condemn Roland for being a Conscientious Objector in the war, and not contributing to the war effort. Ginger's defiance regarding the need for action suggests an idealism of the Second World War, in that a refusal to fight or act was a luxury which could not be afforded in the nuclear age. Once again, this idyllic memory of the Second World War aids a portrayal and memory of the Cold War as a more threatening era. The Second World War thus continues to shape Cold War memory today, yet rather than a basis of understanding the impact of a nuclear attack, it serves to heighten drama and sense of a tumultuous period. Perhaps the lack of proximity to the Cold War and diminished fear of a nuclear threat results in the need to exaggerate and emphasise the Cold War as an era of terror. The use of Second World War memory aids this.

Towards the end of the 1960s, as the Cold War headed toward a period of détente nuclear anxieties seemed to decrease. In 1963, the year following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev and Kennedy agreed to the Limited Test-Ban Treaty. This limited the testing of nuclear

weapons to underground.³⁷ Francis J. Gavin has argued that whilst the nature and success of this treaty was limited, it was a move towards greater non-proliferation agreements. Subsequent progress was made with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the fears of proliferation among non-nuclear countries being a growing concern of both the USA and the Soviet Union.³⁸ This coincided with a decline in the CND's popularity, Grant arguing this was 'perhaps as a result of Cuba' and the successful negotiation and de-escalation of the crisis which, for many, demonstrated the effectiveness of deterrence. Subsequently, less people shared the CND's call to 'ban the bomb'.³⁹ As a result, leading into the period of détente there was a lessening of tensions, subsequently resulting in a lesser focus on the idea of an imminent nuclear attack.

Following the period of détente, the late-1970s and 1980s witnessed renewed tensions between East and West. This was reflected in Cold War, and particularly nuclear, culture. As Daniel Cordle has demonstrated, a series of events and rising international tensions created 'a resurgence of nuclear-themed literature', which was also present in film and television.⁴⁰ It was in this period that *Threads* (1984), *The War Game* (produced in 1965 but not broadcast until 1985) and *When The Wind Blows* (1987) were all broadcast,⁴¹ demonstrating direct responses to the growing fears and debates surrounding nuclear war. Both *The War Game* and *Threads*, each publicly broadcast in the 1980s, provided chilling imaginings of what would happen in the event of a nuclear attack. Each provided a documentary style film, detailing the effects of

³⁷ William Burr and David Alan Rosenberg, 'Nuclear competition in an era of stalemate, 1963-1975', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente*, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 88 - 111 (p. 106).

³⁸ Francis J. Gavin, 'Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II Crises and Détente*, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 395 - 416 (pp. 405, 408 - 412).

³⁹ Grant, 'The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65', p. 107.

⁴⁰ Daniel Cordle, 'Protect/Protest: British Nuclear Fiction of the 1980s', *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 45 (2012), pp. 653 - 669 (pp. 655, 657 - 658, 665, 667), < <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41809796> > [Accessed 15 March 2018].

⁴¹ *The War Game*, dir. by Peter Watkins; *Threads*, dir. by Mick Jackson (BBC, 1984); *When the Wind Blows*, dir. Jimmy T. Murakami (Recorded Releasing, 1987).

a nuclear attack on Kent and Sheffield respectively;⁴² Cordle arguing that *The War Game* was an influence on the creation of *Threads*.⁴³ As noted earlier, whilst *The War Game* made some attempts at the end of the film to imagine life four months post-nuclear attack, *Threads* took this further. *Threads* attempted to imagine life up to thirteen years after a nuclear attack on Sheffield. Equally, *When The Wind Blows* followed the sad and terrifying effects of a nuclear attack, this time on a loving, elderly couple, James and Hilda Bloggs.⁴⁴ The film was very much a criticism of the government and council advice in the form of videos and leaflets such as *Protect and Survive*, produced in 1980 under the Thatcher administration. Despite James' attempts to follow the often-contradictory instructions, the couple still fell victim to radiation sickness. Their lack of awareness of the severity of a nuclear war highlighted their ignorance and innocence, their ideas of war shown to be rooted in their childhood experiences of the Second World War. It was this failed understanding of the bomb which made the film so tragic, providing an emotional insight into how ordinary people would be affected. These programmes were broadcast in a climate of renewed and increasing tensions. In 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a new proxy war between the superpowers and indicated increased tensions and hostilities. Olav Njolstad emphasises that détente 'received the fatal blow with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan'.⁴⁵ Equally important to the renewed animosity of the 1980s was the election, first, of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and then of Ronald Reagan in 1980, both of whom had campaigned on the basis of tough stances against the Soviet Union, particularly in the early 1980s.⁴⁶ Beth A. Fischer has argued that the early 1980s saw a 'confrontational

⁴² *The War Game*, dir. by Peter Watkins; *Threads*, dir. by Mick Jackson.

⁴³ Daniel Cordle, "'That's Going to Happen to Us. It Is'": *Threads* and the Imagination of Nuclear Disaster on 1980s Television', *Journal of British Cinema and Television*, 10.1 (2012), 71 – 92 (p. 73) <<https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0122>> [Accessed 16 December 2020].

⁴⁴ *When the Wind Blows*, dir. Jimmy T. Murakami.

⁴⁵ Olav Njolstad, 'The collapse of superpower détente, 1975-1980', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings*, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 135 - 155 (p. 151).

⁴⁶ See Cordle, 'Protect/Protest', p. 655.

policy toward the USSR' on the part of the USA, this particularly surfaced with the 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defence Initiative.⁴⁷ As Fischer remarked, whilst the President saw this as a defensive measure, others saw it as confrontational and that if the system were successful it would upset the balance of the deterrent of MAD.⁴⁸ The period thus saw a new peak in the arms race. This combined with the placing of US missiles in Europe, for example those at Greenham Common, sparked a revitalisation of anti-nuclear protest; the CND's membership drastically increasing in the early 1980s.⁴⁹ It is thus unsurprising that Cold War and nuclear culture resurged in this period. In particular, imaginings of life during and following a nuclear attack conveyed further criticisms of government policy.

Post-1989 portrayals of the later Cold War often focus on the criticism of government preparations. In both TNA's *Protect and Survive* and the IWM's *People Power: Fighting for Peace* exhibitions, criticisms of government advice were central features of the narrative. As discussed in Chapter Two, the *Protect and Survive* exhibition captured this in an interview with Dr Matthew Grant who discussed the façade of Civil Defence. Equally, the constructed shelter displayed under the stairs within the exhibition demonstrated the rudimentary nature of government suggestions in their *Protect and Survive* leaflets and their limited effectiveness in the event of a nuclear attack. The *People Power* exhibition similarly captured criticism in protest against government advice, by including the publication of E. P. Thompson's *Protest and Survive* in response to the government's guidance.⁵⁰ In addition to this, screenings of *The War Game* in the exhibition helped to emphasise this criticism, particularly as a result of its

⁴⁷ Beth A. Fischer, 'US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume III Endings*, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 267 - 288 (pp. 269 - 270).

⁴⁸ Fischer, 'US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush', p. 270.

⁴⁹ Cordle, 'Protect/Protest', pp. 655, 657; See also Fischer, 'US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush', p. 271.

⁵⁰ *Protect and Survive: Britain's Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition] (The National Archives, London: 4 April 2019 – 9 November 2019), visited on 10 October 2019.; *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum, London: 23 March- 28 August 2017), visited on 19 August 2017.

delayed broadcasting due to its graphic nature. Furthermore, IWM's *Peace and Security* exhibition also provided a space to display the *When The Wind Blows* book, once more emphasising its central role as a criticism of government nuclear policy in the 1980s.⁵¹ These criticisms and perceptions have become engrained from Cold War popular culture and people's memories of the conflict. Post-1989 cultural portrayals therefore reflect many of these themes and criticisms about the survivability of nuclear war, continuing the use of apocalyptic images and reinforcing a narrative of a turbulent era.

Cultural portrayals today which capture this latter period of the Cold War can be seen to reflect the criticism and questioning of government promises and guidance in the 1980s. We can therefore see how perceptions of the nuclear threat developed and changed from 1945, through the tensions of the 1960s and 1980s, and up to present day. As a result of cultural imaginings during the Cold War itself, many images and themes have been adopted by post-1989 portrayals. As Hogg has argued, the increasing criticism of the state's official narratives by the 1980s explains the more graphic imaginings of the nuclear war. The more graphic portrayals in the 1980s attest to the growing awareness of the destruction of the bomb. From the cultural portrayals discussed, images of barren wasteland, notions of Armageddon and criticisms of government defence strategies continue to be reflected today. These criticisms and graphic portrayals emphasise the fear of a nuclear threat for modern audiences, now more distant from these fears. These are however also influenced by modern concerns. Current fears of apocalypse caused by climate change, technology or terrorism can be equally reflected onto this Cold War background, imposing current concerns on a more secure background of the past, as opposed to facing these fears in the present. Similarly, the legacy of Cold War nuclear weapons results in continued debates and criticisms of government reliance on the deterrent

⁵¹ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition].

and fears of nuclear proliferation. These debates in recent years have thus brought the Cold War and the nuclear threat back into significance.

4.2 Images of Apocalypse in Nuclear Bunkers

The imagery of apocalypse can also be found in Cold War nuclear bunkers which are scattered across the British landscape. These physical spaces offer a tangible aspect of Britain's Cold War narrative, structures which shed light on an ambiguous history and memory. Whilst *Ginger and Rosa* and exhibitions convey the fears of an imagined war, the bunkers themselves are physical reminders that this imagined war was deemed a very real threat, the official preparations for apocalypse.⁵² It is this sense of threat which is often conveyed in the nuclear bunkers open to the public. Three are explored here, including Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker, Kelvedon Hatch Secret Nuclear Bunker and York Cold War Bunker. Hack Green bunker was purchased in 1995 by Rodney Siebert and is run by his family.⁵³ Similarly, Kelvedon Hatch, located on a farm, was returned to the family from which it was originally purchased, and is now largely overseen by the original farmer's grandson, Mike Parrish.⁵⁴ In contrast, the third bunker, York Cold War Bunker, is owned and protected by English Heritage, now a registered monument.⁵⁵ Due to their different owners the narratives and experiences created in each vary. However, their different Cold War roles and designs equally affect the narrative and memory each bunker conveys. Each of the three bunkers explored here have been transformed into museums and/ or registered heritage monuments. Recently, a special issue in the *Journal of War and Culture Studies*, explored 'The Bunker's Afterlife', with authors

⁵² Lowe, and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 61.

⁵³ 'Behind the scenes: The Bunker People', *Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker*, <<http://www.hackgreen.co.uk/behind-the-scenes/meet-the-bunker-people/>> [Accessed 19 April 2018].

⁵⁴ Phillip Deery, 'Heritage Report: The Cold War Goes Underground: The Kelvedon Hatch Nuclear Bunker, 1952-92', *Labour History*, 78 (2000), pp. 198 – 200 (p. 200), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27516706>> [Accessed 16 April 2018].

⁵⁵ Wayne D. Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas, *Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989*, ed. by P. S. Barnwell (Swindon: Historic England, 2003), p. 267

exploring the various states and uses of bunkers post-Cold War. As Luke Bennett in the introduction stated, the journal's focus was 'the cultural production and circulation of both symbols and artefacts of conflict' and how groups, whether small or the wider public, produced a shared meaning from these artefacts.⁵⁶ This thesis equally reflects on the creation of shared cultural memory and meaning generated through these bunkers and how they are presented in popular culture post-Cold War.

The external appearances of the bunkers are very different. Hack Green bunker resembles a military building, with aged concrete, metal fencing and barbed wire surrounding it, creating a feeling of the site being secret and forbidden.⁵⁷ This mirrors the stark, grey environments created in the espionage narratives, continuing the focus on dark and discomfiting atmospheres. Hack Green was a Rotor surface design built in the 1950s, becoming a Regional Government Headquarters in the 1980s.⁵⁸ As Wayne D. Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas highlight, despite attempts not to scar the countryside with military buildings and building bungalow structures instead, places including Hack Green 'were dwarfed by massive R6 operations blocks (...) destroying any pretence of concealment or aesthetics'.⁵⁹ Kelvedon Hatch is also a surface structure, taking the form of the guardroom 'bungalow-like buildings' which had a hidden tunnel leading into the underground structure. The bungalow structure means there is not the same obvious feeling of it being a forbidden site. However, the secret entrance being a long tunnel underground, equally provides this idea of secrecy and trespassing.⁶⁰ Kelvedon Hatch had also been a Rotor design structure from the 1950s period of

⁵⁶ Luke Bennett, 'The Bunker's After-Life: Cultural Production in the Ruins of the Cold War', *Journal of the War and Culture Studies*, 13. 1 (2020), pp. 1 – 10 (p. 5) < <https://doi.org/10.1080/17526272.2019.1698845> > [Accessed 14 June 2021].

⁵⁷ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker, 3 February 2018.

⁵⁸ Cocroft and Thomas, *Cold War*, p. 209.

⁵⁹ Cocroft and Thomas, *Cold War*, p. 92.

⁶⁰ Visit to Kelvedon Hatch Secret Nuclear Bunker, 25 March 2018.

construction, however in 1961 it became a Regional Seat of Government.⁶¹ York Cold War Bunker is similar to that of Hack Green in that it resembles a military building, with metal fencing around it. However, in one crucial difference to both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch, the York Bunker is not secret or hidden in the countryside like the others. It is instead near the centre of the city, ‘behind Shelley House on Acomb Road’.⁶² The York Bunker is a semi-sunken structure, meaning that while the main structure is underground visible ‘in the surface as a rectangular earth mound’, there is also ‘a projecting two-storey blockhouse’ above the mound.⁶³ York bunker was built in 1961 as a Royal Observer Corps (ROC) Headquarters, and remained so until the ROC was disbanded in 1991.

Despite their variations in ownership and appearance, each bunker, to varying degrees, play on a cultural memory of apocalypse and terror. The nuclear threat for many during the Cold War was an ever-present danger, a threat which loomed in the background to everyday life. The level of protest at high points during the Cold War demonstrates this level of fear and concern, driving people to take action. The building of a network of nuclear bunkers and monitoring posts equally highlights the very real potential of a nuclear attack that was felt, as the government sought to defend themselves and govern society from bunkers. As a result, a narrative of fear is inevitable. However, the bunkers both reflect, shape, and even exaggerate this memory of apocalyptic fear. The nature of the bunkers gives visitors a unique experience and memory of life prepared for nuclear apocalypse. The idea of authenticity provided by such heritage sites may, in part, be sought by visitors in their desire to understand the past. Ludmilla Jordanova discusses ‘the search for the authentic’ and notes a recreation of ‘Viking-age Jorvik’

⁶¹ Cocroft and Thomas, *Cold War*, p. 203.

⁶² Nick McCamley, *Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers: The Passive Defence of the Western World During the Cold War* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2016 [originally published 2002]), p. 142; Visit to York Cold War Bunker, 4 August 2018.

⁶³ Cocroft and Thomas, *Cold War*, p. 189.

in the Jorvik Viking Centre in York, which recreates the ‘sight, sound and smell’ of the era. Jordanova uses this to demonstrate that the past cannot in reality be relived but that there is this illusion of the authentic, despite the selection process behind museums.⁶⁴ Hermann also acknowledges the role of these physical sites in shaping experiences and memories ‘despite being governed by an authorised discourse’.⁶⁵ The very nature of the bunkers, being real, surviving heritage sites of the Cold War means that they too play on the senses, and whilst visitors cannot fully experience what life would be like in an operational bunker, the play on the senses appeals to this desire for an authentic experience of a life underground in preparation for nuclear attack. Internally, the bunkers have largely white walls, with a somewhat clinical and regimental feel, reflecting their military and governmental role; and being underground there is also a strong damp smell, creating a discomfoting experience. Another sense played on is sound, this is mainly focused on in Hack Green bunker, recreated for the purpose of the museum, many rooms have added soundscapes, often the whirring of machines and incoming communications. The play on the senses creates this authentic experience for the visitor, within which they can become part of the experience themselves, learning about and in turn receiving or forming memories of the Cold War. In the surveys and interviews Hermann conducted with visitors to nuclear sites, questions as to their ‘experience of ‘being’ at the Cold War site’, revealed focuses on the site offering insight into government secrecy. In addition to this, the sounds, appearance, and smells of the site were noted. These ‘physical discomforts’, Hermann argues were matched by ‘social discomforts’, primarily from the inequality that bunkers represented that some would be saved whilst others would perish.⁶⁶ These responses led

⁶⁴ Ludmilla Jordanova, ‘Objects of Knowledge: A Historical Perspective on Museums’, in *The New Museology* ed. by Peter Vergo (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1997) pp.31 – 52 (pp. 34 - 35), *VLeBooks* <<https://r2.vlereader.com/Reader?ean=9781861896704>> [Accessed 13 December 2020]; See also Sheila Alcock, ed., *Museums and Galleries in Great Britain and Ireland* (East Grinstead: British Leisure Publications, 1988), p. 113, quoted in Jordanova, ‘Objects of Knowledge’, p. 35.

⁶⁵ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 246.

⁶⁶ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, pp. 242, 244, 246.

Hermann to conclude that the ‘process of passing on and receiving memories and knowledge within, and through, the physical reality of the place helped visitors to arrange, shape and negotiate a range of links and associations about who they ‘are’ and their ‘place’ in this world’.⁶⁷ The experiences of the bunkers thus help to either recall memories of the nuclear threat for those who remember or help to construct memories for those who do not; the sights, sounds, smells and inequalities that the bunkers represent, creating a dark memory.

That you are guided through each bunker also influences the visitor’s participation. Each bunker attempts to direct the visitor around the site. In Hack Green, the numbering of the rooms means that you start on the top floor of the bunker, gradually getting lower until you are in the heart of the bunker itself and return to the top on your way out.⁶⁸ In contrast, at Kelvedon Hatch bunker you are guided from the bottom to the top, with the aid of an audio guide for information, the entrance to the bunker being via a disguised underground tunnel.⁶⁹ York Cold War Bunker is the only one of the three in which you are part of a guided tour, allocated a time and shown round by a member of English Heritage staff.⁷⁰ As some, such as Roger Silverstone, have acknowledged, the display, space and directions of museums all help to shape visitor experience.⁷¹ The nature of the bunkers being previously operational military sites, with each room and level having specific purposes, makes the control of visitor movement more logical, with the narrative of the bunker’s function unravelling as the visitor descends or ascends the bunker. However, the fact that the bunkers are heritage sites of previous secret operations, a fact which is focused upon in Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch’s marketing in particular, also

⁶⁷ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 246.

⁶⁸ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁶⁹ Visit to Kelvedon Hatch Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁷⁰ Visit to York Cold War Bunker.

⁷¹ Roger Silverstone, “‘The Medium Is the Museum: On Objects and Logics in Times and Spaces’”, in *Museums and the Public Understanding of Science*, ed. by John Durant (London: Science Museum in association with the Committee on the Public Understanding of Science, 1992), pp. 34 – 42 (p. 39).

gives the idea that the visitor must be carefully and strictly guided through what would have been the government operations in the event of nuclear attack. The experience of being guided thus almost adds to the prohibited nature of the bunkers, some areas also remaining off-limits. Despite these differences, in being able to visit and enter the bunkers you get a different experience to watching a film or attending a museum, instead you become part of the experience, imagining life underground during a nuclear threat. As a result, strong memories of the fact that the nuclear threat felt very real are created, or for those who experienced and remember the Cold War, relived.

In acknowledging the active role and experience of the visitor, Jordanova has remarked on the visitor's sometimes conscious and subconscious identification with objects on display, either through finding associations with that object or that object provoking 'memories' or 'fantasies'.⁷² Whilst the numerous individual objects on display in the bunkers, whether that be nuclear weapons, radios or communication equipment, may not generate memories themselves, collectively, the objects held within a real and authentic heritage site, can offer this same interaction and identification. We can particularly see this in the memory project at Hack Green, with a space provided for leaving comments and recollections of the conflict. Those who lived through the conflict, or Cold War "survivors", noted their memories, stating that the tour of the bunker had caused a recollection of these memories and reminiscences. Many of the memories recount the fear the individuals used to feel, many being young or even children during the Cold War.⁷³ As the bunker is a physical reminder of the real threat and war that was anticipated, the bunker as a heritage site and museum can also trigger identifications and memories of Cold War experience and that same fear and threat that was so real at the time.

⁷² Jordanova, 'Objects of Knowledge', p. 34.

⁷³ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

This demonstrates the ability of museums and sites to recall and shape memories, acknowledging the active and interactive role of the visitor, based on their own knowledge and experiences.

The Hack Green ‘Nuclear Shelter Experience’, affords visitors the opportunity to imagine what a nuclear attack may feel like underground. The experience takes place in a small, narrow room, filled with a bright and ominous red flashing light, and sounds of blasts vibrate and bounce off the walls.⁷⁴ The experience helps to create fear and terror, that sense of danger which cultural representations of the nuclear Cold War are keen to emphasise. In providing experiences such as this, the bunker is shaping and creating memories for visitors by trying to get them to imagine and engage with what was, during the Cold War, a very real threat. The effort taken to emphasise and recreate this atmosphere, even at times exaggerate the fear, could again be an indication that there is an ambiguous memory of Cold War Britain. This may even extend to a lack of memory. The need to emphasise the fear and terror suggests a need to explain the purpose and the presence of the bunkers, particularly as a nuclear war never emerged. Yet it also provides a level of interaction and entertainment for the visitor, adding to the ‘family day out’. Andrea Witcomb, in her work on interactivity within museums, added however, that interactives are about more than mere entertainment, interactives also enable the visitor to be active in their experiences; though entertainment may be a factor with the bunker, it relying on admissions costs to run.⁷⁵ This is equally evident in Hack Green’s inclusion of interactives such as sending your own Morse code message or sounding the warning alarm, which are dotted about the museum, allowing the visitor to shape their experience.⁷⁶ These added experiences

⁷⁴ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁷⁵ Andrea Witcomb, ‘Interactivity: Thinking Beyond’, in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. by Sharon Macdonald (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), pp. 353 – 61 (p. 354).

⁷⁶ Witcomb, ‘Interactivity: Thinking Beyond’, p. 355; See also Sharon Macdonald, *Behind the Scenes at the Science Museum* (Oxford, 2002).

therefore both allow the visitor to become engaged and active, yet also add entertainment value, to heighten notions of drama, and the thrill of being in the bunker, sending messages or experiencing a nuclear shelter.

Further to providing thrills, both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch tend to focus on the macabre and some of the more chilling aspects of government planning. In each there is a medical room, in Hack Green, this is a relatively small first-aid room, whereas Kelvedon Hatch portrays a much larger room and operating theatre. In Hack Green, the first-aid room is one of the most disturbing for visitors, with children discouraged from entering, and is the last room of the tour. Inside is a hospital set up. A disturbing soundscape plays overhead of a woman, seen laying in a hospital bed, screaming in agony and the nurse standing next to her reading out the woman's symptoms and condition, declaring that death was likely. The room also provides images and information of the horrifying medical effects of a nuclear explosion, burns and the effects of radiation sickness.⁷⁷ That this is the last room visitors enter undeniably shapes memories and ideas of the Cold War and threat of nuclear war being very real and horrifying. Similarly, the operating theatre at Kelvedon Hatch also reflects sombre details of preparations including information on the audio tour regarding the cardboard coffins.⁷⁸ As Phillip Deery remarked in his review of the bunker these coffins were 'a chilling reminder of administrative resourcefulness during the hostilities', the coffins designed to be 'ejected' outside when needed, yet when not needed could be tidily folded and tucked away.⁷⁹ The focus of the bunkers is thus firmly centred on the horrors of nuclear war, again adding to the traditional British memory of the bomb as the harbinger of apocalypse. In contrast, York, being a ROC

⁷⁷ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁷⁸ Visit to Kelvedon Hatch Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁷⁹ Deery, 'Heritage Report', pp. 199 - 200.

Headquarters, did not have a medical room, only a first aid box in the canteen. As a result, York does not have or provide this same focus on the macabre.⁸⁰

In addition to this, both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch show screenings of Cold War nuclear films, adding to the experience and the creation of memories. Hack Green Nuclear Bunker for instance has a screening of *The War Game*, again young children are discouraged from entering.⁸¹ Undoubtedly, the bunker's showing of *The War Game* adds to these memories and attempts to imagine a potential nuclear attack, cultural products of the Cold War themselves becoming the cultural memory today, as fiction and reality become merged in these sites. Equally, at Kelvedon Hatch, Lowe and Joel, on their visit, remarked on two video screenings of *The Hole in The Ground* and *The Brink of Apocalypse*, which are regularly shown within the bunker. When Deery visited in 2000, Kelvedon Hatch bunker was also showing *The War Game*.⁸² These imaginings of nuclear war build on the experience of the bunker, the feeling that everything you see would be going on above you. Whilst York Bunker does not show any films from the Cold War, it does screen an introductory video at the beginning of the tour. This video introduces the bunker and the roles of those who worked there, the purpose of the bunkers captured in the inevitable use of mushroom cloud footage, setting both the context but also setting the scene of nuclear threat. Whilst this video also contained some information on the effects of a nuclear bomb, its documentary-style did not create the same harrowing or personalised narrative.⁸³ Whilst Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch employ fictional narratives to create an atmosphere of fear, York bunker relies on a documentary-style introductory film to set out basic knowledge on the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. Despite their different approaches, however, it is clear that each bunker ensures that the nuclear threat is well

⁸⁰ Visit to York Cold War Bunker.

⁸¹ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁸² Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 59; Deery, 'Heritage Report', p. 200.

⁸³ Visit to York Cold War Bunker.

explained and clear, if not dramatised. Again, an emphasis on creating an atmosphere of terror may be indicative of the lack of proximity to the nuclear threat today and a need to demonstrate that it was a real threat despite a nuclear war never taking place. Furthermore, the need to explain the threat posed suggests an ambiguous, if not lack of, memory of Britain's Cold War, helping to explain Britain's uncertain relationship with its Cold War past.

4.3 Influences on Apocalyptic Narratives

We should, however, consider who is behind these portrayals of the Cold War period and nuclear war. The fact that Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch are privately owned influences the narratives emphasised and created. Whilst each sets out to educate the visitor and provide information on the roles of these secret bunkers, we have also seen many attempts to emphasise the thrill and drama of the bunkers, adding elements for entertainment. For instance, both draw on the secrecy of the sites in their marketing to attract visitors. The Hack Green guidebook provides a good example of this. The guidebook is presented as a file with stamps of 'declassified', 'For your eyes only do not copy' and 'top secret' stamped across the front.⁸⁴ The idea of being able to see a part of history which would have occurred behind closed doors is thus focused on. Both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch also host additional activities which entice visitors and in some cases serve as further sources of income. In Hack Green, a 'Soviet Spy Mouse Trail' is offered to children. This is advertised as a secret mission to detect and count the number of Soviet spy mice working for the Russian secret service E.E.K (Eastern European Kremlin) who are attempting to steal secret plans from the bunker.⁸⁵ Again, the combination of a bunker narrative with activities of espionage is indicative of the appeal of secrecy, danger and intrigue of secret war plans and conspiracy. Equally, Kelvedon Hatch has

⁸⁴ *Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker* [Guidebook], 2018.

⁸⁵ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

an adventure ‘High ropes’ course and hosts ‘nuclear’ races, playing on themes of action, danger, and thrills, attracting visitors and providing income.⁸⁶ These additional narratives and activities work to shape visitors’ perceptions of the Cold War site.

In contrast, York bunker is a designated monument owned by English Heritage, as such the reconstruction of the site and the availability of resources creates a very different experience. The site was carefully reconstructed with the aid of ex-ROC volunteers who had worked there, a resource that would not be available for every site. The majority of equipment in the bunker is also from the same year of 1961.⁸⁷ That the equipment is of the correct period and that the plotted markings in the ops room are left from the last ROC volunteer exercise, creates greater authenticity for the visitor, the narrative more reliable, authentic and less flattened into a general Cold War narrative or one of terror.

Hermann argues that a ‘relative lack of interest by dominant institutions such as the National Trust (NT) and English Heritage (EH)’, has resulted in ‘an impression of ‘accepted neglect’ of Cold War remains’.⁸⁸ As a result, many Cold War remains and artefacts have, Hermann argues, been ‘‘collected’ and exploited by private owners and trusts for various and overlapping reasons’, including tourism. Hack Green provided as an example of both tourist site and ‘a facility for telecommunications purposes’.⁸⁹ Hack Green in particular focuses on its museum. Over the years, the owners have collected a wide range of artefacts, including numerous Cold War weapons which are now on display.⁹⁰ At times, however, these artefacts are grouped together, with little information as to their significance to the Cold War or the bunker, the bunker consequently offers an odd collection of ephemera and artefacts ranging from weapons

⁸⁶ Visit to Kelvedon Hatch Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁸⁷ Visit to York Cold War Bunker.

⁸⁸ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 23.

⁸⁹ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 24.

⁹⁰ ‘Behind the scenes: The Bunker People’.

to Civil Defence badges and pamphlets.⁹¹ Kelvedon Hatch bunker instead has collected mainly equipment that would have been used in the bunker, focusing on the role and function of each room. However, some have remarked on a similar disjointed collection and portrayal of the bunker. Hermann has remarked that Kelvedon Hatch is ‘ambiguous’ in its representation of the different periods and uses of the bunker, which range from a RAF Rotor station, later becoming a civil defence base and then the Regional Government Headquarters. Lowe and Joel have also commented on the figure of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher among communications equipment from the 1960s.⁹² Hermann states that ‘this ambiguity seems to reflect a desire to turn away from the ‘official’ or ‘national’ representation and towards a more ‘personal’ and ‘private’ proprietor explanation’. Subsequently, the focus of the bunker is on the narrative of the very real nature and anticipation of the threat of nuclear war.⁹³

Equally, the apocalyptic images in films and dramas are shaped by their creators. Director of *Ginger and Rosa*, Sally Potter, was very open, following the release of the film, of her own experiences and influence on the narrative. As Anthony Quinn, in a review for *The Independent* remarked, ‘Potter (...) is partially reliving her own back pages’.⁹⁴ In several interviews, Potter remarked on her awareness of the nuclear threat from a young age, being born four years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and learning of the devastation.⁹⁵ In another interview with Catherine Shoard for the *Guardian*, Potter mentioned her growing up during the Cuban Missile Crisis and attending ‘Aldermaston marches from the age of 10’. Within this environment, Potter

⁹¹ Visit to Hack Green Secret Nuclear Bunker.

⁹² Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 59.

⁹³ Inge Hermann, ‘Battleless Battlefields: A Discussion of Cold War Tourism in Britain’, in *Sustainability of Tourism: Cultural and Environmental Perspectives*, ed. by Metin Kozak and Naomi Kozak (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp. 314 - 329 (pp.324 - 325).

⁹⁴ Anthony Quinn, ‘Frankenweenie (PG) *** Ginger and Rosa (12A) ***’, *The Independent*, 19 October 2012, <<http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/films/reviews/frankenweenie-pg-ginger-and-rosa-12a-8217249.html>> [Accessed 20 April 2018].

⁹⁵ ‘Sally Potter Interview - Ginger and Rosa - Time Out Film’, *Time Out London* <<http://www.timeout.com/london/film/sally-potter-interview>> [Accessed 20 April 2018].

touched on her fears of nuclear war; “‘I dreamed about it most nights’, says Potter, ‘I had recurring nightmares’”.⁹⁶ In growing up during the Cold War, especially the tumultuous period of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Potter’s understandable fears in her youth were reflected in her film. We see the fear and threat of nuclear war through the eyes of a teenage girl, fearful for her future. It is perhaps not surprising that we receive these very apocalyptic, barren images and scenes of post-war austerity London, as Potter drew on her memories and fears of the time. Similarly, writer of *The Game*, Toby Whithouse, also remarked on his childhood memories of the Cold War. In a blog, remarking on his inspiration for the series, Whithouse stated that having grown ‘up in the 70s and 80s (...) we all assumed that sooner or later – probably sooner – we’d be obliterated by a nuclear bomb (...) at the time the threat seemed so great, so constant’.⁹⁷ Again, although growing up in a later period to Potter, the late 1970s and 1980s saw the resurgence of Cold War hostilities, the arms race and nuclear fears. It is therefore evident how the writer’s own memories and fears can be seen to influence the portrayal of the Cold War and the nuclear threat, largely as apocalyptic.

Following, Marnie Hughes-Warrington’s argument that we must look beyond the portrayal of the film or series itself, to consider the publicity and writers or director’s influence,⁹⁸ the above indicates that it is Cold War “survivors” that are helping to create and shape modern memories of the conflict and the nuclear threat which dominated it. It is also interesting to note that both Potter and Whithouse discuss the memory of their fear of the bomb whilst they were growing up, suggesting the formative experiences this had. Ritzenhoff and Krewani have commented

⁹⁶ Catherine Shoard, ‘Sally Potter: “I Dreamed about the Nuclear Threat Most Nights”’, *The Guardian*, 4 October 2012 <<http://www.theguardian.com/film/2012/oct/04/sally-potter-nuclear-threat-ginger-rosa>> [Accessed 20 April 2018].

⁹⁷ Toby Whithouse, ‘Writing ‘The Game’ for BBC Two’, *BBC Writers Room*, 24 April 2015, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/writersroom/entries/3584e0cb-e99f-42fa-8253-ec35f2f5b345>> [Accessed 19 April 2018].

⁹⁸ Marnie Hughes-Warrington, *History Goes to the Movies: Studying History on Film* (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 7 - 9.

on a rise in apocalyptic films over recent years, particularly in regard to these films reflecting ‘social anxieties’.⁹⁹ Peter Kramer specifically remarks on director James Cameron. Cameron, who has also commented on the effect of the nuclear threat on him growing up, went on to make several popular apocalyptic films including the *Terminator* films (1984 and 1991), *Alien* (1986) *True Lies* (1994) and *Avatar* (2009).¹⁰⁰ Cameron’s films have been highly popular and successful, his case once again demonstrates the influence of the Cold War on these generations, who then go onto create and mould modern ideas of nuclear weapons, Armageddon and apocalypse. Kramer adds, that the popularity of Cameron’s films suggest ‘that the concerns of his films resonated with those of cinema audiences at home and abroad, perhaps because they too had grown with the fear of nuclear war’.¹⁰¹ If we use these ideas to suggest that the current owners of Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch in particular are also of a generation that “survived” the Cold War, it would seem that the generations of Cold War “survivors” both reflect and shape these representations of the nuclear threat during the conflict. We cannot consider modern memory of the conflict without acknowledging, first, that memories of nuclear war have formed throughout the conflict and second, that the generations who grew up during the conflict, reflect on past events and memories and also shape modern perspectives and memories of the period.

4.4 Nuclear ‘Hot Points’

Apocalyptic images and atmospheres are often created by a focus on narratives of crisis, using ‘hot points’ from the Cold War, particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis. This focus makes the memory of the Cold War and nuclear threat often appear centred on particular moments. As

⁹⁹ Ritzenhoff and Krewani, ‘Introduction’, p. xiii.

¹⁰⁰ Peter Kramer, ‘The Legacy of *Dr. Strangelove*: Stanley Kubrick, Science Fiction Blockbusters and the Future of Humanity’, in *The apocalypse in film: dystopias, disasters, and other visions about the end of the world*, ed. by Karen A. Ritzenhoff and Angela Krewani (Latham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), pp. 45 - 61 (p. 50).

¹⁰¹ Kramer, ‘The Legacy of *Dr. Strangelove*’, p. 50.

Lowe and Joel question, ‘To what extent do the contours of the Cold War fall away, so that remembering becomes more episodic and necessarily grounded in localized circumstances...?’¹⁰² It is perhaps difficult for those generations who lived through the Cold War to see the conflict in its entirety as opposed to a series of particularly tense moments and specific threats. In looking at popular culture and museums, it would seem that many focal points for representations of nuclear war focus on specific events, the Cuban Missile Crisis perhaps being the most prominent among them.

As previously mentioned, the Cuban Missile Crisis, provides the background to *Ginger and Rosa*. It is the rising tensions of the crisis that are used to reflect the crisis in Ginger’s own life, her friendship with Rosa and transition to adulthood. The narrative of the crisis presents the period of the Cold War as a tumultuous one, in which there were rising fears, particularly among younger generations. This combined with Ginger’s narrative, her transition from teen to adult, further notes the period and crisis as a point of change, one which it is uncertain whether it will be survived. Potter has spoken about her aims of the film in depicting this transformative period, stating that 1962 was not quite the ‘swinging 60s’ but had also moved on from the 1950s, claiming, “‘It’s almost like an adolescence of the decade – a transitional point’”.¹⁰³ Ginger’s growing fears of nuclear weapons inspire her activism, that Ginger survives the metaphorical bomb of revealing Rosa and Roland’s relationship, provides a further celebratory message of protest.¹⁰⁴ The focus on the hot point of the Cuban Missile Crisis is thus used to demonstrate the threat and fear, justifying Ginger’s activism, but also works to mirror Ginger’s own personal crisis.

¹⁰² Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 24.

¹⁰³ Mayer, ‘Bomb Culture’, p. 34.

¹⁰⁴ Mayer, *Political Animals*, p. 96

The Cuban Missile Crisis was equally focused on in the *National Cold War Exhibition*. One kiosk focused solely on the event and exuded feelings of danger and drama. This kiosk presented its narrative using real news footage and speeches from the unfolding events in the USA and Cuba. Visitors sat round a table in the centre of the kiosk, with news screens circled above. As the narrative began, an image of a bomb, with numbers counting down, followed by flashing red lights, immediately triggered the drama and ideas of a threat. The voiceover narrated the unfolding events of October 1962, the language used particularly being interesting for looking at how memory is formed in creating these ideas of danger. For example, the narrative used statements such as ‘the world trembled on the brink of nuclear war’ and ‘every nation looks on in fear - is it peace or is it the most horrifying war imaginable?’¹⁰⁵ The use of this impending and apocalyptic language, combined with the use of real news footage, situated the visitor in the past, as if these events were unravelling around them, allowing the visitor to become part of the experience and engage with the exhibition. In doing so it aided the creation of memories of the event for visitors, as one where nuclear apocalypse was very nearly realised. This played on existing memories and ideas of visitors, largely depending on generation. For those with memories of the event it may have triggered past fears and memories, for those who grew up during the Cold War but in the aftermath of the crisis it may have recalled later fears of the 1980s arms race or added context to a fear that remained in the background of the Cold War; and for younger generations it portrayed a dangerous and fragile period, yet also in many ways, the depiction provided a sense of drama, even excitement. We see the use of similar language used in recent exhibitions as well as the 1998 *Cold War* series, emanating from press

¹⁰⁵*National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition] (RAF Museum, Cosford: 7 February 2007 - Present), visited on 4 February 2018.

reports and attitudes during the Cold War itself; demonstrating continuity as well as a persistent emphasis on the crises of the conflict.

Throughout the narrative then, we see this persistent negative image of the bomb and its capabilities. With many post-1989 narratives focusing on ‘hot points’, the memory of the Cold War becomes flattened and simplified into a period of uneasiness with episodes of crisis which teetered on nuclear war. Instead, in Britain, the nuclear threat, though very present and though imagined by many, existed in the background of everyday life. Yet, ‘hot points’ and popular themes and motifs of apocalyptic images serve to create a cultural memory of a turbulent period. This is equally demonstrated in the consistent use of the mushroom cloud image.

4.5 The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud

The symbol of nuclear war, the mushroom cloud, is by far one of the most iconic images of the period. Despite the fact that, for Britain, nuclear war remained a largely ‘imaginary war’, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided a reality on which the imaginary was based. The rising mushroom clouds provided images of power, devastation, and obliteration. As Horn has noted, ‘The vision [of apocalypse] found its expression in a single image: the nuclear explosion’.¹⁰⁶ Peggy Rosenthal has also stated that even years after ‘the nuclear mushroom cloud has been seen in real life, it remains the unchallenged symbol of the nuclear age’.¹⁰⁷ Rosenthal’s article explored the many meanings and messages connected to the image and why the mushroom cloud has remained such an iconic symbol. Although the research centred on American relationships with the bomb, it is intriguing both for the inherently

¹⁰⁶ Eva Horn, ‘The apocalyptic fiction: shaping the future in the Cold War’, in *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 30 - 50 (p. 30).

¹⁰⁷ Peggy Rosenthal, ‘The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image’, *American Literary History*, 3. 1 (1991), pp. 63 – 92, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/489733>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

national memories of nuclear war and the Cold War, as well as exploring potential meanings which the image is used to promote.

Rosenthal categorised these different meanings and memories under categories of 'Procreational', 'Adolescent', 'Marketable', 'Mass Murderous', 'Military' and 'Aesthetic' mushroom clouds. Whilst this is not the place to recount all these details here, Rosenthal summarised these aptly in declaring that the mushroom cloud can be seen as an image of 'science's power over nature', of the American achievement of being the first to create the bomb, it is also a 'sign of military might'. Perhaps most significant to British ideas of the bomb, is that its destructive power means the image is also, a 'symbol for our secular age's placing in human hands the judgement once assumed to be in God's'.¹⁰⁸ This mirrors ideas of apocalypse and Armageddon, yet the idea perhaps that in human hands this power is purely destructive, lacking the saviour of the good and the awaiting utopia.

The image of the mushroom cloud is a dominant feature of many cultural representations of the Cold War and its nuclear threat. In the *National Cold War Exhibition*, the mushroom cloud was used to convey the perceived Cold War threat as well as in some ways to convey the futility of survival in such an attack. In the *National Cold War Exhibition*, the image was printed on a large board and required little introduction or explanation and therefore the image stood more or less on its own. This version of the image was portrayed in colour, the central explosion being a mix of fiery red and yellow with a halo of red above, the surround was merely black. The contrast of colour not only served to emphasise the danger and fear reflected in the colour red, but the surrounding darkness equally tapped into the imagery of apocalypse, a sense of darkness and nothingness surrounding the destruction of the bomb. The limited writing which

¹⁰⁸ Rosenthal, 'The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image', p. 88.

accompanied the image, under the title '4 minutes', declared that, 'the image of a nuclear mushroom cloud and the fear of a four-minute warning were engrained in the minds of all those who lived through the Cold War in the United Kingdom'.¹⁰⁹ This dramatic text reflected the idea that nuclear war forever lingered in the background of the Cold War and the fear of it was inescapable. For those generations who lived through the Cold War, particularly 'hot points' like the Cuban Missile Crisis or the renewed arms race of the 1980s, the image and accompanying text may spark memories of such fears, the post-1989 representation serving to both reflect and further shape and emphasise memories of fears and danger. For younger generations, the image carries forward this knowledge of fear, even if the threat of nuclear war is deemed no longer as prominent today. However, recent international relations between America and North Korea and Iran respectively could alter this, as we observe a slight return to Cold War rhetoric in the face of new nuclear threats and proliferation. The image for younger generations, however, also conveys a more distant and therefore dramatic and exciting period of history.

In contrast, the images of the mushroom cloud which were used in both of the Imperial War Museum's exhibitions *People Power* and *Peter Kennard: Unofficial War Artist* (2015-2016), as well as the film *Ginger and Rosa*, provoked clear memories and perspectives of anti-nuclear sentiments. This was largely a result of the aims of these representations and the influence of their creators. As discussed above, the footage of the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima which opens *Ginger and Rosa* set the scene for Ginger's fear and her fight against the nuclear threat, channelling her fear into active protest.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

¹¹⁰ *Ginger and Rosa*, dir. by Sally Potter.

The *People Power* exhibition followed narratives of protest from the First World War to present day. The section on the Cold War, which was the largest section of the exhibition, opened the Cold War narrative of protest with a large poster of the mushroom cloud and the title 'Ban the Bomb'. This again was a fiery image surrounded by darkness, continuing this idea of nothingness and apocalypse which we see from the early Cold War period. After a brief outline of Cold War anti-nuclear protest and activism, the text accompanying the image ended with the statement: 'The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signalled an end to the Cold War, but not of nuclear weapons'.¹¹¹ The exhibition's focus on the narrative of protest up to modern day thus chose to emphasise the continued nuclear threat. This in turn helped to shape memories by viewing Cold War protests through more recent examples of activism, including protests against the Iraq War and the march against the renewal of Trident. The continued action to ban the bomb and protests against unpredictable wars, find similarities to Cold War causes and thus the past both shapes and is shaped by modern events. The image set the scene for narratives of protest and anti-nuclear demonstrations. As the IWM Press Release for the exhibition stated, the Cold War was 'a new age, dominated by the fear of a nuclear apocalypse',¹¹² the exhibition therefore tapped into this memory of apocalypse and protest and further shaped these memories through its displays. The exhibition balanced the fears and horrors of nuclear war with a celebratory message of protest, which is explored further in the following chapter.

The IWM's 2015-2016 *Peter Kennard: Unofficial War Artist* exhibition, similarly used images of mushroom clouds for the purpose of activism, many used by groups such as the CND.¹¹³

¹¹¹*People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum, London: 23 March- 28 August 2017), visited on 19 August 2017

¹¹² *People Power Fighting for Peace* (IWM London: Press Release), pp. 1-3
<https://www.iwm.org.uk/sites/default/files/press-release/People%20Power%20Fighting%20for%20Peace_Press%20Release.pdf> [Accessed 11 July 2018]

¹¹³ Richard Slocombe, 'Introduction', in *Unofficial War Artist: Peter Kennard* (London: Imperial War Museum, 2015).

Kennard produced several iconic images during the Cold War through the use of photomontage, often containing mushroom clouds and nuclear missiles, frequently overlaid with skeletons and images of destruction; one of his more iconic images is a nuclear missile cut in half by the CND symbol.¹¹⁴ Kennard's work spans from the Cold War to the present day, with many pieces depicting the atrocities of the war in Iraq. Again, Kennard's activist background and the very purpose of the art means that these images of missiles and the mushroom cloud, and its connections to death and destruction, emit messages of anti-nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. In fact, as displayed in the later *People Power* exhibition, Kennard's artwork was featured on placards from the recent 2016 Trident march.¹¹⁵ The continued use of such images and indeed the continued significance of debates surrounding nuclear weapons, as well as weapons of mass destruction following the Iraq War, demonstrates how the memories of the Cold War nuclear threat and Cold War activism continue to shape and inform the world today. Cold War memories will continue to be drawn upon whilst they remain relevant to current concerns. Kennard, as both an activist during the Cold War and part of the generation of "survivors", is again shaping modern views of the nuclear threat and the Cold War through his artistic portrayals of the bomb's destruction.

Following Rosenthal's work, we can therefore see the different meanings emitted by the use of the mushroom cloud image. Primarily, depictions of the mushroom cloud present the horror and devastation, as well as the power, of a nuclear bomb. These images of the bomb can also be used to portray different messages of either the effectiveness of deterrence or messages of non-proliferation. We can particularly see the influence of activists, such as Kennard and Potter, as influencing their portrayals of the Cold War and nuclear threat. However, despite the

¹¹⁴ *Peter Kennard: Unofficial War Artist* [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum, London: 14 May 2015 – 30 May 2016); *Unofficial War Artist: Peter Kennard* (London: Imperial War Museum, 2015).

¹¹⁵ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

horrors conveyed in the portrayals and uses of the mushroom cloud image, Rosenthal has also remarked on a possible nostalgia. Rosenthal stated that despite the negative aspects of the image, ‘the mushroom cloud at least projects its meanings loud and clear’, there is therefore an awareness about it, an understanding of all that it entails.¹¹⁶ She added further that as a result we may come to look on the image of the cloud with some sort of ‘nostalgia for what we could configure’; unlike perhaps, the invisibility of biological weapons from which Rosenthal drew a comparison.¹¹⁷ There is thus an echo of a complex memory, one of both horror and a period verging on annihilation, combined with a strange sense of nostalgia for what was certain or known in comparison to the lack of certainty or clarity today.

4.6 Appeal and Nostalgia of the Cold War Nuclear Threat

Whilst the previous section focused on the emphasis on apocalypse and turbulence in modern portrayals of the Cold War, there remains the underlying question of why people are increasingly drawn to the Cold War nuclear threat narrative. What is it that appeals to visitors and audiences? Does the narrative provide something they need? As Rosenthal remarked, in today’s world with the development of new deadly and sophisticated weapons, we may begin to feel a sense of nostalgia for the mushroom cloud and the Cold War, their reliability and predictability. We may equally see this nostalgia for the Cold War more generally, despite its nuclear threat, as we survived it against the uncertainty of today.

The Cold War and its nuclear threat are not obvious moments to feel nostalgic about. However, the fluidity and overlapping of memories creates a complex cultural memory and relationship with the Cold War in Britain. Paul Boyer, in an article reflecting on the fortieth anniversary of *Dr Strangelove*, remarked on the complexity of the nuclear threat being both something in the

¹¹⁶ Rosenthal, ‘The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image’, p. 89.

¹¹⁷ Rosenthal, ‘The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image’, p. 89.

past, a feature of the Cold War, as well as a continued and present danger.¹¹⁸ Whilst Boyer focused on the American memory and relationship with the Cold War, he touched on aspects which can equally be applied to British memory of the period. 9/11, for example, is noted by Boyer as a pivotal moment in which nuclear and annihilation fears resurged.¹¹⁹ Despite being an attack on America, the event was felt with shocks and repercussions around the world, most notably for America and Britain, the invasion of Afghanistan. The threat of terrorism, and the extremes terrorists were willing to go to, created new fears in a post-Cold War world. As Boyer remarked, such new threats created almost a nostalgic appeal to the Cold War and the nuclear age. Fears of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons, reignited fears of potential nuclear threats. However, the nostalgic sentiment comes into play with the fact that there were rules and understandings during the Cold War, which in many ways seem to be lacking now. For example, as Boyer noted, the ‘Soviet Union (...) at least had a stable government’, which he contrasted to the regimes of Iran and North Korea.¹²⁰ Interestingly, over fifteen years after Boyer’s article, the threat from North Korea and Iran have once again been in the headlines and we see increasing concerns and fears surrounding nuclear threats; fears that draw from those of the Cold War period. The difference with North Korea, and indeed now US President Donald Trump, is the unpredictable nature of the two leaders, forever taunting one another. In this then, and in Boyer’s comments, we see two issues in relation to modern views of nuclear war. In one instance we see renewed fears, and the use of nuclear rhetoric that harps back to the Cold War; memories and understandings of the bomb and the possible nuclear threat firmly entrenched in the Cold War mentality of nuclear apocalypse and annihilation. Yet, in another

¹¹⁸ Paul S. Boyer, ‘Looking Back: “Dr. Strangelove” at 40: The Continuing Relevance of a Cold War Cultural Icon’, *Arms Control Today*, 34. 10 (2004), 46 – 48 (p. 48), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23627447>> [Accessed 19 April 2018].

¹¹⁹ Boyer, ‘Looking Back’, p. 46.

¹²⁰ Boyer, ‘Looking Back’, p. 46.

instance, we can see glimpses of a Cold War and even nuclear nostalgia; the Cold War, with supposedly stable governments and the rules of MAD, appears almost as a safe haven in comparison with today. As a result of such complex feelings towards the bomb, Boyer noted that we are ‘torn between the temptation to relegate the bomb to the past and the recognition that a host of nuclear related issues, no less dangerous than those of earlier times, still confront us’.¹²¹ The continued relevance of the bomb, as well as the Cold War providing a suitable background to represent current fears and threats, may partly explain why these themes are returned to.

Recent diplomatic relations between the USA and North Korea, have also seen an interesting reawakening of Cold War rhetoric and images in the press and the media. For example, in 2017 there were headlines such as ‘Nuclear War has become thinkable again’ and straplines such as ‘World holds its breath’.¹²² These followed the nuclear tests by North Korea and the very public feud between Kim-Jong un and Donald Trump; culminating in the infamous ‘I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is much bigger and more powerful’ tweet by Trump in January 2018.¹²³ Much of the concern around these tense relations has focused on the unpredictable nature of the two leaders. Indeed, in an article for the *Guardian* on 17 April 2017, Paul Mason made a somewhat nostalgic statement: ‘From the 50s to the 00s, we had – in all nuclear powers-military/industrial complex politicians who understood the values of multilateralism. All around us high politics is becoming emotion driven, unilateral, crowd-pleasing’.¹²⁴ Whilst

¹²¹ Boyer, ‘Looking Back’, p. 46.

¹²² Paul Mason, ‘Nuclear War Has Become Thinkable Again – We Need a Reminder of What It Means’, *The Guardian*, 17 April 2017 <<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/17/nuclear-war-has-become-thinkable-again-we-need-a-reminder-of-what-it-means>> [Accessed 19 April 2018]; Larisa Brown, ‘UK Relations with Russia at an All-Time Low: Ambassador Attacks No 10’, *Mail Online*, 16 April 2017 <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/~/article-4417086/index.html>> [Accessed 19 April 2018].

¹²³ ‘Trump to Kim: My Button’s Bigger than Yours’, *BBC News*, 3 January 2018, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42549687>> [Accessed 19 April 2018].

¹²⁴ Mason, ‘Nuclear War Has Become Thinkable Again – We Need a Reminder of What It Means’.

statements like this arguably convey exaggerated fears, it captures perfectly a complex memory of the Cold War and the nuclear threat which dominated it. As Boyer remarked, we can see a conflicting memory of the Cold War. Many depictions portray the darkness of the Cold War and the danger and threat of nuclear attack. Yet, we perhaps also continue to return to the period, both in new cultural depictions and old, because the rules of the Cold War, and even its sometimes charismatic and powerful leaders, provide a sense of stability, which is lacking from terror states and tyrannical, unpredictable leaders today. We are drawn to expressing current concerns through past events for the feeling of safety and security.

In capturing either a narrative of terror or a nostalgic reminiscence of the Cold War, narratives can become simplified. Hogg has argued that post-1989 as the nuclear threat decreased with the ending of the Cold War, British cultural portrayals of the nuclear state have become 'static, depoliticized representations of the nuclear past'. This depoliticization, Hogg argues, aided the receding of the nuclear state in everyday life, rendering it 'invisible', 'reinforcing the nostalgic appeal, harmlessness, or purely dramatic potential of nuclear weapons culture'.¹²⁵ In the previous section the drama in cultural portrayals was demonstrated. However, the simplification of nuclear narratives through these sometimes-depoliticised images of the mushroom cloud into a harmless past, is an interesting point to consider further. Whilst, as we have seen, there is a tendency for nuclear narratives to become flattened into a narrative of terror, the simplification may have more meaning and purpose, Hogg also pointing to kitsch being 'mobilized to recreate a lost and harmless past'.¹²⁶ As argued above, this depoliticisation may simply be the result of distance from the conflict, and a lack of the same need to fight the Cold War through shocking imaginings of nuclear apocalypse. However, in simplifying Cold

¹²⁵ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, pp. 164, 167.

¹²⁶ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, p.172.

War narratives, the Cold War also becomes less complex than its reality and more digestible. A narrative of the Cold War as a time of looming nuclear threat can be understood alongside the Cold War rules of MAD, deterrence, and non-proliferation. In capturing the Cuban Missile Crisis, both *Ginger and Rosa* and the *National Cold War Exhibition*, conveyed the turbulence and fear but equally conveyed the survival of this crisis, be that through the understanding of MAD or the effectiveness of protest. The simplifying of these narratives into recognisable, even kitsch, images such as the mushroom cloud, reflect a far safer and predictable world than the complexity and uncertainty of modern-day terrorism and new nuclear threats from increased proliferation. However, they also provide an opportunity to face current political concerns and threats imposed on a past background, exploring these fears at a safe distance. Thus, whilst there may be a degree of depoliticisation and sanitisation, this may represent a nostalgia but also a need to view a more predictable world and the ability to view similar current political fears as equally survivable.

Beyond a nostalgia for the simplicity of the Cold War is an appeal to the drama and darkness of the nuclear narrative, as well as the ability to learn more about Britain's Cold War past. An application of the literature on dark tourism, can help to shed light on the attraction of these narratives. The study of dark tourism has seen many competing and conflicting definitions, be that dark tourism, morbid tourism, or thanatourism, among others. In 1996, A. V. Seaton introduced the term thanatourism, taken from the word thanatopsis, defined as the 'contemplation of death'.¹²⁷ In turn, Seaton defined thanatourism as a motivation of tourists to travel to sites where 'actual or symbolic encounters with death' can occur, especially, though not limited to, violent death.¹²⁸ Through links to thanatopsis, Seaton argued that this fascination

¹²⁷ A. V. Seaton, 'Guided by the dark: From thanatopsis to thanatourism', *International journal of heritage studies*, 2. 4 (1996), pp. 234 - 244 (p. 235), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13527259608722178>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

¹²⁸ Seaton, 'Guided by the dark: From thanatopsis to thanatourism', p. 240.

with sites of death has long existed. Unlike Lennon and Foley who in 2000, argued that dark tourism is a product of post-modernism, particularly in regard to ‘global communications technology’, ‘anxiety and doubt about the project of modernity’ and a ‘commodification and commercial ethic’.¹²⁹ Also in 2000, Thomas Blom explored what he defined as ‘morbid tourism’, as containing ‘significant elements of what might be labelled deviant, dubious, macabre and even frightening and is often linked with death and destruction’.¹³⁰ This varied scholarship enables an exploration of people’s fascination with the darker narratives and sites of history. What fascinates people? And what draws them in?

For Thomas Blom, ‘morbid tourism’ attracts those who wish to explore something ‘unknown’ or ‘frightening’. Blom articulated that security in the Western world may create a desire for these ‘unknown’ and ‘frightening’ experiences, a diversion from daily life.¹³¹ In her study on Cold War heritage and tourism, Inge Hermann also disclosed results from a survey of visitors of why they visited a Cold War site, with many seeing it as a day out, or something different.¹³² This simple point of entertainment and distraction may thus partly account for an interest in Cold War sites and narratives. Indeed, in Ganna Yankovsk and Kevin Hannam’s article exploring dark tourism in Chernobyl, tour guides noted a generational divide with younger generations identified as wanting a ‘thrill’ from their visit to the exclusion zone.¹³³ Continuity with the theme of entertainment and drama found throughout cultural portrayals of the Cold War can be found here. In this sense, both film and television portrayals of the Cold War,

¹²⁹ John Lennon and Malcolm Foley, *Dark Tourism: The Attraction of Death and Disaster*, (Andover: Cengage Learning EMEA, 2010 [originally published 2000]), p. 11.

¹³⁰ Thomas Blom, ‘Morbid tourism - a postmodern market niche with an example from Althorp’, *Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift*, 54. 1 (2000), pp. 29 - 36 (p. 29), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/002919500423564>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

¹³¹ Blom, ‘Morbid tourism’, pp. 30, 32.

¹³² Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 251.

¹³³ Ganna Yankovska & Kevin Hannam, ‘Dark and toxic tourism in the Chernobyl exclusion zone’, *Current Issues in Tourism*, 17. 10 (2014), pp. 929 - 939 (p. 934), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/13683500.2013.820260>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

alongside the physical remnants, may be of interest to audiences and visitors purely because the secretive Cold War era, under the shadow of the bomb, provides a dramatic and exciting narrative from recent memory.

Further to this sense of excitement, Blom stated that tourists ‘approach the unknown and frightening while not having to commit ourselves in any deeper sense since real personal nearness to the “attraction” is lacking’.¹³⁴ In this sense there is a secure distance between the visitor to Cold War heritage or tourism sites and the time they capture. There is a security in returning to a prior moment in history and exploring complex or turbulent narratives rather than having to face the turbulence of modern threats and concerns. Alongside mere entertainment, Cold War heritage and equally popular culture, provide something we need – an escape into a previous time to address threats and concerns we face without having to confront them in the real and present context. A fascination and rise in Cold War nuclear narratives thus provide both entertainment and escapism from the tumult of the world today.

The idea that Cold War nuclear narratives, whether they are captured in visual media, exhibitions, or nuclear bunkers, provide something that people need or desire can be seen in the argument of Hugh Gusterson. Gusterson employs the argument of Robert Jay Lifton, that in a world of nuclear technology, there is a desire, to “‘imagine the real’”.¹³⁵ This we can see is a theme which has continued throughout and after the Cold War and is particularly relevant to nuclear sites. As Grant has argued, the difficulty to imagine the effects of a nuclear bomb or conflict in Britain, especially after the Pacific tests in 1954, went on to shape ideas and how

¹³⁴ Blom, ‘Morbid tourism’, p. 35.

¹³⁵ R. J. Lifton and R. Falk, *Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), referenced in Hugh Gusterson, ‘Nuclear Tourism’, *Journal for Cultural Research*, 8. 1 (2004), pp. 23 – 31 (p. 29), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/1479758042000197006>> [Accessed 23 March 2020].

the nuclear threat was imagined (or not imagined) throughout the rest of the conflict.¹³⁶ The lack of further nuclear attacks after Nagasaki continue to render the size and destructive capability of a nuclear bomb on a city or country virtually unimaginable. Gusterson uses this argument to explain tourists at the Fiftieth anniversary of the Trinity tests in Los Alamos. He argues that in visiting the site of where the tests took place, and scientists like Oppenheimer worked, visitors were enticed by the desire and possibility of imagining the real.¹³⁷ Equally, Hermann points to the fact that nuclear bunkers offer a ‘physical reality’ to the narratives or images of the Cold War they may be aware of from media, memory and education.¹³⁸ Hermann argues it is the “‘doing” of visiting the site that enables visitors to engage in a memory making process. As such, from responses to surveys undertaken, Hermann notes that ‘The legitimacy, validity or significance of the site as a ‘place of memory’ where visitors could negotiate and engage with the material culture (...) were important in exploring and experiencing Cold War history’.¹³⁹ In this sense both Gusterson’s and Hermann’s studies highlight the physical space of Cold War sites as offering the chance for visitors to ‘imagine the real’ and feel an authenticity, aiding memories and understandings of the conflict. It is possible that the lack of a clear British memory of the Cold War, even as Hermann highlights by those who lived during the Cold War, with no physical, conventional conflict to remember, means that nuclear bunkers provide a tangible symbol of the Cold War and the nuclear threat. This in turn aids an understanding of this ambiguous conflict and a threat that whilst technically still present, does not loom in everyday life as it did in the Cold War. Again, Cold War sites and narratives can be seen to provide something for British history, memory and identity and thus lure audiences and visitors.

¹³⁶ Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, p. 111.

¹³⁷ Gusterson, ‘Nuclear Tourism’, p. 29.

¹³⁸ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 241 - 242, 246.

¹³⁹ Hermann, ‘Cold War heritage (and) tourism’, p. 249.

4.7 Conclusion

The memory of the Cold War nuclear threat is ambiguous and divided between a memory of a turbulent past and one we are continually drawn to either for entertainment or a nostalgic escape from the world today. Post-1989 cultural portrayals of the conflict emphasise imagery and language of apocalypse. Images of nothingness and contrasts between the future offered by youth and that denied by nuclear war, convey an atmosphere of threat and danger; one which draws several similarities with Cold War cultural imaginings. The focus of cultural portrayals on 'hot points' such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the continued use of the mushroom cloud emphasise horror and destruction but can also work to flatten the Cold War nuclear narrative into a depoliticised one of periods of crises and tumult. Whilst the nuclear threat was a fact of the Cold War, with many terrified of a possible nuclear attack, life also continued as normal for many Britons. The nuclear threat, like the Cold War, formed a backdrop to everyday life. A persistent narrative of constant terror thus simplifies, and at times exaggerates, the reality of the conflict. The need to emphasise this sense of terror may suggest a lack of Cold War memory in Britain, the distance from the conflict reducing the sense of fear from nuclear attack. That bunkers in particular go to efforts to explain the nuclear threat suggests a need to demonstrate the purpose of nuclear bunkers when no nuclear conflict emerged.

However, increasingly these images are also used to convey varied messages of deterrence vs. non-proliferation. Whilst drawing on rhetoric and debates of the Cold War, these messages also closely reflect events and debates in today's world. Debates surrounding the renewal of Trident and the Government's continued reliance on a strategy of deterrence, highlights how the legacy of the Cold War continues to influence the world today. These debates, in turn, influence how audiences and visitors perceive and decode narratives of the Cold War nuclear threat. Rather than being entirely depoliticised, narratives as seen in *Ginger and Rosa*, the *People Power* and *Peter Kennard* exhibitions capture the use of the Cold War backdrop to voice criticisms of, and

question, the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they still pose. Visitors and audiences of post-1989 Cold War cultural portrayals are thus able to construct memories of the Cold War via their experience and engagement with these narratives and the messages of deterrence vs. non-proliferation. Current memories of the conflict and the nuclear threat are further shaped by the producers of these cultural portrayals. The memories and experiences of Cold War “survivors” can be seen to feed into depictions of crisis and fear, as well as to promote messages of non-proliferation or deterrence. The given present of the post-Cold War world thus shapes memories of the conflict, influenced through previous imaginings of the nuclear threat and renewed tensions and debates, raising questions and concerns over potential future hostilities or nuclear accidents.

Despite the horrors which are constantly reflected in modern cultural portrayals, people seem increasingly drawn to these narratives, with a rising number of films, dramas and exhibitions depicting the period. In one sense, much like narratives of Cold War espionage, the nuclear threat provides an exciting and dramatic narrative to attract and entertain visitors and audiences. In particular, Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch are good examples of this. As both are privately owned and rely on income from tourists, they tend to emphasise secrecy and extra activities for families such as spy trails and adventure courses. These features demonstrate the attraction of nuclear narratives for intrigue, drama, and thrills; capturing once again these depoliticised and simplified nuclear and Cold War narratives.

However, with recent events including nuclear testing by North Korea and the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal between Iran and the USA, the unpredictable nature of today’s world leaders and the absence of the bi-polar Cold War world with defined rules such as MAD, also results in a growing nostalgia for the Cold War and its nuclear threat. Further to this, the simplified narratives of terror which are often found in Cold War narratives, alongside messages of deterrence and non-proliferation, provide a background on which to project current concerns.

The depoliticised, flattened narratives equally reflect a need for simplicity or indeed the Cold War being viewed as far simpler and more predictable in contrast to the world today. With continued fears of proliferation this nostalgia for the Cold War may continue to increase. Today's cultural memory of Britain's Cold War is therefore caught between continued themes and motifs of apocalypse, from during the Cold War itself, though this often results in a flattened narrative; and a growing nostalgia for the simplicity and predictability of the Cold War conflict and its nuclear threat, shaped by modern concerns and fears for future nuclear and diplomatic relations. This simplicity providing both an escape and a need for simplicity in the face of the unpredictable and complex present.

5 'Ban the Bomb!': The Memory of Cold War Protest

'Ban the Bomb!', a familiar phrase used by anti-nuclear activists in the Cold War, perfectly demonstrates the close connection between the nuclear arms race of the conflict and the opposition and protest which accompanied it. This chapter explores how Cold War activism is remembered in modern cultural portrayals of the period. It will demonstrate the struggle in cultural memory to balance a celebration of Cold War activism with an acknowledgment of its faults and failings. It is this struggle for *how* to remember that produces variations in portrayals of Cold War activism, and, at times, simplified and celebratory narratives. It will initially explore the idea that a developing cultural memory of the constant and looming threat of nuclear war, provides a basis of portrayals of, and often a justification for, activism, enabling a more celebratory memory. However, alongside this celebratory message is often a questioning of the success of Cold War activism and whether it has achieved its goals. This struggle in how to remember, often leads to ambiguous and contradictory messages, pointing to Britain's complex cultural memory of the Cold War. As shall be demonstrated, a common feature of cultural portrayals is to concentrate on key movements and campaigns; often those most famous and discussed during the Cold War itself and studied by academics since. From the late 1950s, with rising Cold War tensions, the detonation of Britain's first atomic weapon in 1952 and the detonation of Britain's H-Bomb in 1957 contributed to the formation of several organisations within the wider Nuclear Disarmament Movement and British Peace Movement. Those most famous organisations and campaigns which are focused on are Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp, and to some extent the Committee of 100 (C100) and the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War (DAC). The focus on these campaigns serves to shape memories of activism in the period and this chapter will explore how these campaigns are remembered, and what about their narratives is

both included and excluded. This will enable a greater understanding of this struggle in *how* to remember Cold War activism and *how* to remember the Cold War more generally.

5.1 Dependent on the Memory of Nuclear Threat

Mark Phythian's article, 'CND's Cold War', raised an interesting point about the memory of CND in relation to the memory of the Cold War itself. Writing in 2001, Phythian remarked that the way in which CND is remembered will depend on how the Cold War is remembered more generally. At the time of writing, Phythian accounted for the fact that the contemporary historiography and views focused on the West "winning" the Cold War, and therefore focused on deterrence and the escalation of the arms race in the 1980s in bringing about victory. This, he argued, would result in CND becoming marginalised within the memory of the wider conflict, adding that if this was the way the Cold War continued to be remembered, CND would be seen as 'more misguided'. However, Phythian also remarked that if the memory of the Cold War focused on the constant fear caused by nuclear weapons, then CND would be seen more favourably and 'in a more noble light'.¹ This argument could be applied to the wider Nuclear Disarmament Movement throughout the Cold War. As previously identified, it is evident that modern cultural portrayals focus on the looming threat of nuclear war and Armageddon; no matter how simplified or nostalgic this memory may be. Whether this focus is due to nostalgia or a sense of excitement and drama which serves to attract audiences, the portrayals explored certainly convey this continual threat as a focal point for memory. The cultural portrayals of the nuclear threat and activism assessed here, being produced in the last decade, indicate that the memory has developed from Phythian's time of writing. There is instead an emphasis on the whole Cold War period as a turbulent one, with little attention paid to who "won" the Cold

¹ Mark Phythian, 'CND's Cold War', *Contemporary British History*, 15 (2001), pp. 133 - 156 (p. 152), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/713999421>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

War, especially as nuclear weapons and concerns still exist. This sense of threat may partly account for the few, but rather positive, portrayals of Cold War activism in modern culture. Though far fewer than portrayals of Cold War espionage and the nuclear threat, the portrayals of Cold War activism assessed help to demonstrate that the memory of activism is relative to the wider Cold War memory and the recollection of a constant fear of nuclear war.

In several instances, we see this relationship between the portrayed threat of nuclear war and the portrayal of activism. This is most evident in Sally Potter's film, *Ginger and Rosa*. The film centres around Ginger's aspiration to take action and 'do something' about the bomb.² In fact, as one review for the *Guardian* noted, in the film 'Ginger is riven with worry about the threat of annihilation; a threat that the film is careful to justify, if not quite vindicate'.³ In this sense Ginger's activism is shown as necessary, demonstrating this connection between the memory of nuclear war and that of activism. Equally, both the *People Power: Fighting For Peace* exhibition at the Imperial War Museum London (IWM), and the *National Cold War Exhibition* at the RAF Museum, Cosford, situated their displays of Cold War activism within a narrative of the nuclear threat. Whilst the *People Power* exhibition captured the actions and power of anti-war protest from the First World War to present day, its largest section was on the Cold War. Within the Cold War section, the primary focus was that of anti-nuclear protest. Whilst other movements may have been briefly noted, including the protests against the Vietnam War and US involvement, the anti-nuclear movement provided the focus and dominant memory of this part of the exhibition. This highlights the dominance of the memory of the nuclear threat in modern culture, and portrayals of activism rely on this memory to

² *Ginger and Rosa*, dir. Sally Potter (Artificial Eye, 2012).

³ Catherine Shoard, 'Sally Potter: "I Dreamed about the Nuclear Threat Most Nights"', *The Guardian*, 4 October 2012 <<http://www.theguardian.com/film/2012/oct/04/sally-potter-nuclear-threat-ginger-rosa>> [Accessed 20 April 2018].

convey why anti-nuclear movements formed. The *National Cold War* exhibition only briefly captured Cold War activism in a silo-like display under the label of MAD. This display featured a voice-over narrative whilst parts of the display, of activists, protest signs and banners, were lit up. The narrative began by detailing MAD and the developing arms race during the Cold War, stating the idea that ‘full scale nuclear war’ would cause total destruction. It then led on to the narrative of the formation of CND, framing the establishment of anti-nuclear movements within a narrative of the nuclear threat and fear of devastation.

These few portrayals demonstrate the correlation between a cultural memory of constant nuclear fear and the memory of activism which opposed such nuclear weapons. The memory of activism being dependent on the present-day memory of the nuclear threat, demonstrating the fluidity of memory and how this adjusts in relation to the given present. However, as discussed previously, the emphasis on the danger of the Cold War and nuclear threat could indicate a lack of memory. The emphasis on the dangers of the Cold War creates entertainment and drama, yet it also serves to explain why nuclear bunkers were built and why activism campaigns took place, despite a nuclear war never emerging. Distance from the Cold War and new generations may result in a lack of understanding of the conflict. In capturing Cold War threats and the fight against these threats, cultural portrayals help to explain, and sometimes exaggerate, the fears present during the Cold War. In doing so, the everyday of the Cold War period and the fact that, for many, life continued as normal, is omitted. Perhaps in creating these narratives of terror and activism, modern portrayals are seeking to carve out a memory of Britain’s Cold War which so far has failed to fully materialise.

However, modern cultural depictions do capture a sense of a celebratory message for Cold War protest. Presenting activism in correlation with the nuclear threat serves to depict the cause of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement and, at times, to justify the cause of the Movement’s

various groups and actions; the fear enabling a characterisation of activism as noble and justified.

5.2 Celebratory Memory

Celebratory portrayals often convey activism as a noble and justified response to Cold War threats. A celebratory message of activism was evident in the IWM's *People Power* exhibition. The title of the exhibition itself echoed a celebration of 'people power', a fight for peace conveyed as noble. *Ginger and Rosa* also serves as a clear example of this noble and celebratory message. With the looming threat of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two best friends find different ways to cope with their fear. Whilst Ginger chooses activism, Rosa chooses romance. There are many ways in which Ginger's choice is shown to be far more noble than that of Rosa's. In one scene, Rosa meets Ginger in a café. Ginger tries to talk to Rosa about the Cuban Missile Crisis; however, Rosa confesses she does not know what Ginger is talking about. Ginger is shocked that Rosa can be so unaware of the events. Potter also ensures the audience feels this shock by including short radio broadcasts, narrating the rising tensions, throughout the film. This serves to emphasise Rosa's distraction and obsession with romance, whilst Ginger anxiously listens to the news each day with fear driving her to activism. It is in this scene that Rosa dropped the figurative bomb of her pregnancy with Roland's child.⁴ Rosa and Roland are thus portrayed almost as living in a dream world, unaware of how their actions are affecting those around them. In a sense, they become the antagonists of the narrative, in that they cause the explosion and the destruction at the end of the film, when Ginger finally reveals their secret relationship and the pregnancy. This leads to Nat's, Ginger's mother, overdose. Consequently, whilst their obsession with romance brings devastation, Ginger's activism is portrayed as her method of coping, which later enables her to take action and reveal,

⁴ See, Sophie Mayer, *Political Animals: The New Feminist Cinema* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), p. 96.

and survive, the news of their relationship.⁵ Sophie Mayer accurately conveys the moment of Ginger's revelation:

The bomb explodes – and is survived. In a meaningful sense, within the film's narration, Ginger's dramatic speaking of the truth - and her subsequent decision to ask Rosa's forgiveness – are the direct actions that prevent the Russian and American missiles from firing. Speaking out (...) and forgiveness can and do change the future.⁶

The narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Ginger's personal life run parallel throughout the film, and, as Mayer suggests, it is Ginger's move to direct action which prevents danger both in the international sphere and her own family sphere. Ginger's actions are thus at once both noble and worthy of celebrating.

In conveying a celebratory message, modern portrayals of Cold War activism focus on the high-points and successes of activism. The *People Power* exhibition in particular focused on the successes of activism throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The Press Release for the exhibition declared that it was 'the UK's first major exhibition to explore the evolution of the anti-war movement from the First World War to the present day'.⁷ The stated aims of the exhibition were to address conflict from different perspectives.⁸ The depiction of a hundred years of protest is also significant as Lowe and Joel argue, that protesters are not often remembered by monuments, but more by social and oral histories and 'museums recalling their peak moments'.⁹ This is precisely what the IWM produced in the *People Power* exhibition. In the narrative for the first half of the twentieth century, the focus was primarily on Conscientious Objectors; focussing on the stories of individuals and the formation of organisations and

⁵ Mayer, *Political Animals*, p. 96.

⁶ Mayer, *Political Animals*, p. 96.

⁷ *People Power Fighting for Peace* (IWM London: Press Release), pp. 1 – 3

<https://www.iwm.org.uk/sites/default/files/press-release/People%20Power%20Fighting%20for%20Peace_Press%20Release.pdf> [Accessed 11 July 2018], see p. 1.

⁸ *People Power Fighting for Peace* (IWM London: Press Release), p. 1.

⁹ David Lowe, and Tony Joel, *Remembering the Cold War: Global Contest and National Stories* (London and New York: Routledge, 2013) p. 47.

networks such as the No-Conscription Fellowship (NCF), set up in 1914 and the Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU), set up by non-absolutist Conscientious Objectors. The narrative continued through to the interwar years, discussing a rising awareness and commitment from individuals following the First World War to not enter into or support further conflict. Organisations such as the No More War Movement (NMWM) formed in 1921 and the formation of the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) in 1935 were also covered, documenting the rise of strong activist organisations once again through individuals' stories, protest banners, and art capturing the horrors of war. The exhibition and accompanying book, however, noted how the rise of fascism caused many to question or 'soften' their pacifist beliefs.¹⁰ The Second World War once again saw a large number of Conscientious Objectors, including actor Paul Eddington, whose national registration card was placed on display in the exhibition. Some connections were made from the First World War, detailing greater acceptance for Conscientious Objectors by the government, despite many still being ostracised by society. The Second World War section then progressed into that of the Cold War, connected by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, introducing the Cold War with an imposing image of a nuclear mushroom cloud.

The Cold War section in particular focused on the most famous movements. The exhibition's senior curator, Matt Brosnan, noted in an interview that 'The Cold War period was dotted with real (...) high points (...) in anti-nuclear protest', and he listed the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Aldermaston Marches, as well as adding, Vietnam, Civil Rights and the escalated protest of the 1980s.¹¹ It is mostly these events and movements which the exhibition

¹⁰ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum, London: 23 March- 28 August 2017), visited on 19 August 2017.

¹¹ Pete Bailey, 'Episode 24 - Documentary - Imperial War Museum (People Power: Fighting For Peace with Matt Brosnan)', *Pete Bailey*, 2017 <<http://petebailey.net/wonder-junkie-podcast/2017/5/2/episode-24-documentary-imperial-war-museum-people-power-fighting-for-peace-with-matt-brosnan>> [Accessed 11 July 2018].

itself prioritised. The Cold War section followed the same emphasis on the visual and audible power of protests and activist groups, with a central focus on anti-nuclear activism. The visitor was first walked through the bombing of Japan, followed by the formation of early anti-nuclear organisations such as Operation Gandhi (1952) and the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War. The exhibition traced the evolution of these movements, the DAC merging into the Committee of 100, set up in 1960. The formation and work of CND formed a central focus, as did the Women's Peace Camp at Greenham Common, with numerous artworks, banners and ephemera exhibited to capture the colour and visual nature of protest; these are explored in more detail later in the chapter. While a small collection of posters conveyed anti-war and anti-draft protests against the Vietnam War, the exhibition primarily focused on anti-nuclear activism, captured as the defining threat of the Cold War. Following the section on Greenham Common, the exhibition brought the visitor to the present day. This final section moved away from an anti-nuclear focus, although placards from the 2016 Trident march were hung from the wall, with captions such as 'Cut War Not Welfare'.¹² The exhibition demonstrated continuity with the statement that 'Nearly 60 years on from the creation of CND, anti-nuclear protest in Britain continues', drawing out continuity between recent financial arguments against the renewal of Trident and those of CND throughout its existence.¹³

The exhibition, in celebrating the successes and 'peak moments' of activism, omitted the challenges of activists as well as public opposition to such groups. Public opinion during the Cold War was quite often divided between belief in the nuclear deterrent and the fight to ban nuclear bombs. In celebrating activism's 'peak moments', some of the nuance of Cold War attitudes was lost. This simplification could be a result of the purpose of the exhibition in

¹² *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

¹³ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

celebrating ‘people power’. However, it could also be a reflection of the influence of modern day on Cold War memory. Narratives of successful activism capture challenges against the government and a fight against the status quo, creating a people vs government narrative. With a decline in trust in the government in recent years, particularly following the Iraq War, and an increase in activism, narratives of taking the fight to the government may be more popular and relatable in the post-Cold War world. This is reiterated even further by showing the development of protest from the First World War to modern day. The choice of a simplified narrative may thus be a reflection of the influence of the given present on Cold War memory.

Furthermore, as one review by Andrea Needham for Peace News read:

The huge opposition to the 1991 Gulf War and to ongoing British interventionism in the Middle East is ignored, as are the long years of protest against the arms trade. Decades of opposition to Trident are represented by five placards stuck randomly on the wall at the end. Although the huge march against the Iraq war is well documented, there’s precious little sign of any of the other activism that was going on at the time.¹⁴

The narrative was therefore highly selective, recalling the most remembered moments throughout the century and today. It is not possible for everything from a century of protest to be covered. However, it is noteworthy that the selection of these narratives shapes the cultural memories created. In omitting or paying less attention to certain movements and links, some sense of continuity was lost. The structure of the exhibition itself, though logical, provided strict periodisation for activist movements when in reality many overlap and are linked. Instead, the exhibition conveyed a sense that First World War to Second World War centred around Conscientious Objectors, conscription, and anti-war protest, while the Cold War was primarily anti-nuclear protest, despite the Civil Rights movement, anti-Vietnam War protest and

¹⁴ Andrea Needham, “‘People Power: Fighting for Peace’ | Peace News”, *Peace News*, July 2017, Issue 2606-2607 edition <<https://peacenews.info/node/8721/%E2%80%98people-power-fighting-peace%E2%80%99>> [Accessed 11 July 2018].

Women's Liberation Movement. Equally, the present was focussed on conflict in the Middle East, despite other notable protest action such as that against climate change. In the case of the Cold War, this is a memory almost exclusively centred on anti-nuclear activism and a celebration of key and famous moments. This simplification inevitably carves out a large role for Cold War anti-nuclear activism in Britain's cultural memory, omitting the intricacies of activist groups, their various causes, and divided opinion amongst activists and the wider public on the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. It echoes the focus and fascination with the nuclear threat, emphasising the danger of the Cold War over the everyday. This more simple, celebratory memory may thus be a result of how the Cold War threat is remembered as well as an increase in activism in recent years.

The sense of a modern audience finding Cold War activism admirable and relatable is further aided by the structure and content of the exhibition which enabled a celebratory and immersive experience. There was a significant emphasis on creating an immersive environment for visitors and to submerge them in the act and experience of protest. An introductory note as you entered the exhibition explained that soundscape was employed throughout. The notice read: 'We have woven together contemporary sound recordings from demonstrations, rallies and marches to give a sense of the atmosphere of anti-war protest through time. Listen for excerpts made by campaigners and the songs and music played at these demonstrations'.¹⁵ Matt Brosnan, the curator, remarked that the museum wanted to provide 'an atmospheric experience of what it's like to be involved in anti-war protest activity'.¹⁶ The exhibition was thus carefully designed not purely to inform but to provide an experience and to entertain. The visitor was

¹⁵ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

¹⁶ Jessie Thompson, and Marta PortoCarréro, 'Five Important Anti-War Moments from New Imperial War Museum Show', *Evening Standard*, 23 March 2017 <<http://www.standard.co.uk/go/london/arts/imperial-war-museum-explores-antiwar-movement-five-moments-when-people-fought-for-peace-a3497746.html>> [Accessed 11 July 2018].

then an active participant to the exhibition, and the sounds undoubtedly shaped memories of the different periods of protest, the voices behind the acts and the feelings of activism, people power and inclusivity. As a visitor to the exhibition you could not help but become engaged in this atmosphere with the sounds of protesters and songs. It very much had the effect of pulling the visitor into the lives of the activists throughout different periods of history. In this sense there was a general celebratory and inclusive tone to the exhibition as you became engaged through this experience.

It is worth noting that the *National Cold War Exhibition*, similarly to the IWM, also employed soundscape, with the sound of protest music and the noise of protesters, including the Greenham chant 'take the toys from the boys'.¹⁷ This same immersive atmosphere drew the audience into the environment of Cold War protest, serving to create, rekindle, or further shape, memories of the Cold War and activism in the period. It is notable that many cultural portrayals of activism focus on very visual and audible content, particularly to convey a celebration of activism. In addition to sound scaping, this further indicates and recreates the power and vibrancy of this social and cultural history of protest.

As with other exhibitions such as *Peace and Security* and films like *Ginger and Rosa*, the Cold War in the *People Power* exhibition was framed between the Second World War - and indeed earlier conflict - and the present day. Once again, perceptions and understandings of the Cold War can be seen to be influenced by memories of the preceding conflict and concerns in today's world. The *People Power* exhibition in particular helped to demonstrate the evolution of activism over the last century. However, whilst narratives of espionage and the nuclear threat create images of a dark, secretive, and turbulent period, by contrasting the Cold War with a

¹⁷ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition] RAF Museum Cosford, visited on 4 February 2018.

nostalgic, idyllic narrative of the Second World War, modern cultural narratives of activism are generally celebratory. Instead, the celebratory image of activism is reliant on images and narratives of a turbulent Cold War, with far fewer comparisons to the idealism of wartime Britain. In the *People Power* exhibition, both Second World War and Cold War activism were generally celebrated as standing for peace and against nuclear weapons. In each instance, activism was portrayed as opposing dark forces either in fascism, fears of the blitz or fears of the nuclear bomb. The cultural memory of Cold War activism created today is thus a far more positive memory than those of espionage and the nuclear threat. However, this positive memory relies on the images and memory of a turbulent period in decline. Britain's cultural memory of the Cold War is thus not one simply defined by terror and negativity. The role of activism in fighting the threats and government offer a more positive memory. This, as argued, is likely a result of the given present; the established cultural memory of a turbulent Cold War enables activism to be worthy of celebrating. Equally, with a lack of trust in government and an increase in activism in recent years, such narratives reflect modern understandings, shaping and potentially distorting memories of the Cold War. This complexity is further demonstrated in the questioning of activism's success.

5.3 Questions of Success and Failure

Despite these celebratory messages, it is also common in cultural portrayals of Cold War activism to see a questioning of the success of the protest movement. This can lead to an ambiguous or even contradictory message. Lowe and Joel remark that commemoration and remembrance of movements, such as CND, have faced challenges due to 'the lack of consensus

over their effectiveness'.¹⁸ Consequently, it is perhaps a case of people not being sure how to remember Cold War activism and activists.

The best demonstration of this duality is the *People Power* exhibition. As previously discussed, the exhibition captured a largely celebratory portrayal of Cold War activism and activism in general. However, each portrayal of Cold War and anti-nuclear activism has to deal with the fundamental point that nuclear weapons still exist, and since the Cold War, more countries possess or could soon possess nuclear weapons. Recent news stories regarding North Korea's testing of nuclear weapons and Trump's renegeing on the Iran Nuclear Deal, demonstrate this continued proliferation.¹⁹ In fact, the *People Power* exhibition ended with the recent 2016 march and protest against the renewal of Trident, a further continuation and legacy of the Cold War fight against nuclear weapons. As visitors reached the end of the *People Power* exhibition, they were invited to add their views about the success of protest to a peace symbol on the wall. Some of the headings around the peace symbol included, 'Is war ever necessary?' and 'Does protest work?'.²⁰ This was preceded by a board headed: 'Why Protest?'. It read:

It is difficult to assess whether anti-war protest has been effective over the last hundred years. Mass protest has led to increased publicity and attention on particular issues. But real change is often more nuanced and gradual.

(...)

Anti-nuclear campaigners in the 1960s and 1980s could point towards the signing of international treaties imposing nuclear test bans and reductions in nuclear weapons. But ultimately these weapons still exist.

(...)

¹⁸ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 46.

¹⁹ See, 'Trump to Kim: My Button's Bigger than Yours', *BBC News*, 3 January 2018, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42549687>> [Accessed 19 April 2018]; Rozina Sabur, Ben Riley-Smith, Raf Sanchez, and Nick Allen, 'Donald Trump Announces "Withdrawal" from Iran Nuclear Deal', *The Telegraph*, 9 May 2018 <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/08/donald-trump-announces-decision-iran-nuclear-deal-live-updates/>> [Accessed 17 November 2018].

²⁰ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

But perhaps it is not just about results. For many the act itself – of participating, of having the right to publicly voice an opinion and act on the basis of your own conscience – is what matters most.²¹

The exhibition encouraged the visitor to consider whether protest throughout the last century has actually been successful or not. Many visitors had added their thoughts to the peace sign, demonstrating visitor engagement and the fact that visitors had considered the success of protest, having learnt about it throughout the exhibition. Although, as one review by Alison Wilcox comments, ‘[i]t might have been useful for this question to have been posed at the start, enabling visitors to adopt a critical view of the utility of protest before being introduced to the various peace campaigns of the exhibition’.²² The continued existence of nuclear weapons in today’s world, connects us directly to the Cold War and the period’s anti-nuclear activism. Perhaps it is, as the exhibition stated, ‘the act itself’ which is most significant here – the exhibition possibly captured a celebration of those who took action and the ability to do so, as opposed to a celebration of the success of activism itself. The emphasis being on the noble and courageous actions undertaken.

Further questioning and doubt over the success of protest is captured in *Ginger and Rosa*. Whilst Ginger’s activism portrays her as brave and driven, it is also simply Ginger’s way of coping. The film does not end with the removal of nuclear weapons and with them the threat of nuclear war. Of course, this would be too simple and idealistic, as in reality the audience would be all too aware of the continued existence and development of nuclear capabilities. Perhaps the film is more a message of what activism could achieve if all were as driven as Ginger. However, the film ends on an ambiguous note. The audience, for example, is left without ever knowing whether Nat survives her overdose. The audience are merely witness to

²¹ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

²² Alison Wilcox, ‘Review of “People Power: Fighting for Peace”’, *Reviews in History*, 2017 <<https://doi.org/10.14296/RiH/2014/2112>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

the final scene of Ginger and Roland waiting anxiously for news. The film therefore leaves the audience in a state of suspension and unknowing. With an ending which leaves so many issues unresolved: Nat, Rosa and Roland's relationship, and nuclear weapons, there is a sense of ambiguity. This ambiguity over the end of the narrative mirrors the ambiguity of the success of activism; Ginger does survive, but the challenge faced by both nuclear weapons and Rosa and Roland's relationship remain. Writing on the early British Peace Movement in 1988, Richard Taylor remarked that up to 1965, 'the Movement failed' in its aims, adding further that 'even in the 1980s (...) the arms race has escalated (...) to a degree that was not imagined by most activists in the 1950s and 1960s'.²³ Thus, even within the 1980s, before the end of the Cold War, the successes of the early Movement were being questioned, particularly given the rising arms race during the 1980s, under the Reagan Presidency. This further enhances this sense that whilst much of the currently portrayed memory of activism is celebratory about taking action, there has long been a developing questioning of activism's success feeding into memories of the period, thus modern portrayals are not as celebratory about the success of protest itself. This ambiguity once more highlighting Britain's difficult and dubious relationship with its Cold War past.

The *National Cold War Exhibition* also conveyed failure. The narrative of the display on protest, that is mentioned above, ended on a rather sobering thought. The short narrative took the visitor right through to the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In its concluding remarks the voice over commented that perhaps deterrence or MAD did in fact work as 'we survived,' yet adding 'but so did nuclear weapons'.²⁴ That the narrative ended here with the display turning dark, was highly evocative. It emphasised that the issue is ongoing and

²³ Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement 1958-1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988; repr. 2001) p. 339.

²⁴ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

there is thus a question over the achievements of the protest movements the visitor had just heard about. Once again, the visitor was provoked to question the protest movement, the effectiveness of deterrence, and the legacy of the Cold War more generally. This repeated theme of questioning reflects Lowe and Joel's words, that there is often a challenge with how to remember activist groups, as there is a 'lack of consensus over their effectiveness'.²⁵ This questioning is thus symptomatic of this challenge; capturing an uncertainty, or perhaps a division, between wishing to acknowledge those who took action, whilst also having to acknowledge that the threat has not entirely left us.

This parallel of celebration but also doubt was clearly captured in reviews for the *People Power* exhibition. In a review for *The Telegraph*, Alastair Sooke concluded:

Perhaps the most heartrending thing, then, about this exhibition is the thought that, despite the aims and actions of the international peace movement over the past century, collectively, as a species, we have learned nothing at all (...) People often talk about the futility of war. Depressingly, the same could be said of the peace movement too.²⁶

Sooke's review and feelings towards the exhibition clearly reflect this doubt and questioning of what has actually been achieved throughout the last century of protest; capturing the disheartening truth that controversial wars continue, and nuclear weapons still exist.

This questioning highlights the challenges of forming a clear cultural memory of Britain's Cold War. With the questioning surrounding activism's successes it raises further questions of why activism is celebrated at all. It could be argued that there is a desire to claim a role for Britain and 'ordinary people' in the Cold War. A sense of influencing change and taking action. The focus on, and celebration of, this active role of protest may serve, in part, to reclaim a role for

²⁵ Lowe, and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 46.

²⁶ Alastair Sooke, 'People Power - Fighting for Peace, IWM London, Review: A Moving, Nuanced Look at the Anti-War Movement across the Decades', *The Telegraph*, 21 March 2017 <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/art/what-to-see/people-power-fighting-peace-iwm-london-review-a-moving-nuanced/>> [Accessed 11 July 2018].

Britain; a role which contrasts to the narrative of Britain's decline and loss of influence post-war. The celebration of individuals and a social history equally provide a sense that, even if goals are not always achieved, collective action can have an influence and raise awareness. This hope perhaps being needed following the failure of the anti-Iraq War march.

In a further review of the *People Power* exhibition in the *Guardian*, Lara Feigel remarked on the nostalgic appeal of the exhibition. Feigel commented, for example, on a 'vision of lost innocence' when mentioning the Aldermaston marches; adding that there seemed, in 1958, to be a sense of optimism which today now seems lost or at least deflated. The review linked this loss of optimism, in particular, with the post-Cold War march against the Iraq War in 2003, where, despite such widespread opposition, the war was not stopped or prevented. However, Feigel remarked that, 'the exhibition is timely, because now we are on the march again. I'm part of a large cohort who hadn't marched since the despair of 2003, but took to the streets once more for the Women's March in January'.²⁷

Whilst recognising the fact that protest had not prevented the existence of nuclear weapons or the war in Iraq, Feigel noted that the exhibition tapped into a renewed hope in protest; 'Though I can't share the optimism of the eager crowds leaving Aldermaston, I have lost some of the hopelessness I felt in the wake of the Iraq March.'²⁸ Feigel stated that particularly with Donald Trump as President, not only was there a new 'opponent' but also one who 'seems to care about the size of crowds'.²⁹ Perhaps in this, there is some new hope to be found in the possibility and reach of protest. As John Schofield and Mike Anderton stated, when writing in 2000, people

²⁷ Lara Feigel, "'Four-Minute Warning: Time to Boil Your Last Egg' – 100 Years of Anti-War Protests', *The Guardian*, 17 March 2017, section Art and design
<<http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/mar/17/made-for-marching-the-art-of-anti-war-protest>>
[Accessed 11 July 2018].

²⁸ Feigel, "'Four-Minute Warning: Time to Boil Your Last Egg' – 100 Years of Anti-War Protests'.

²⁹ Feigel, "'Four-Minute Warning: Time to Boil Your Last Egg' – 100 Years of Anti-War Protests'.

have become more interested in peaceful protest movements as they have become more common.³⁰ From this it is possible to see that this tension between celebration and questioning success reflects modern attitudes to protest, despite failures such as that of the Iraq march, the belief in the power of protest and of giving people a voice continues. It would seem that an increased hope and faith in activism has resulted in a more positive attitude towards Cold War protest and in turn, a celebration of ‘people power’ during the period. The legacy of the history of protest can thus be seen today. Protest always has and will be controversial, yet the power of people taking action is often still celebrated. In an interview, Matt Brosnan, when asked if peace was ‘starting to become mainstream’, noted that he felt the head of the Stop the War Coalition, Lindsey German, would state that the Iraq march ‘encouraged a different kind of culture’, relating to the government and their approach to future actions.³¹ Writing in the 1980s about the earlier protest movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Taylor noted that despite the movement’s failure to achieve its goals, it created a culture and a common idea of peoples’ right to have a say, which, he remarked, continued into the 1980s.³² Equally, Taylor noted, that the early movement had changed politics in Britain and that since there had been multiple ‘extra-parliamentary’ campaigns,³³ moving politics away from the centre of Westminster.³⁴ The early protest movement of the 1950s and 1960s thus formed perceptions and ideas of protest which were later grounded in and built upon in the protest movement of the 1980s. Cold War protest leaves its legacy in the world today through this political culture of ‘extra-parliamentary campaigns’. The memory of Cold War protest can therefore provide a recent

³⁰ John Schofield and Mike Anderton, ‘The queer archaeology of Green Gate: interpreting contested space at Greenham Common Airbase’, *World Archaeology*, 32. 2 (2000), pp. 336 - 251 (p. 238), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/00438240050131216>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

³¹ Bailey, ‘Episode 24 - Documentary - Imperial War Museum (People Power: Fighting For Peace with Matt Brosnan)’.

³² Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, p. 340 .

³³ Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard, *The Protest Makers: The British Nuclear Disarmament Movement of 1958-1965 Twenty Years On*, (Oxford; New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 9.

³⁴ Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, p. 340.

memory which is relatable to present day and can be tapped into at times of, and in the environment of, protest. Such mass protest has been seen more recently in the 2016 Trident march and the 2018 march against President Trump's visit to the UK, as well as the now frequent and rising number of protests against climate change. Perhaps this gradual, yet seemingly increasing interest and portrayal of peaceful protest, and particularly the focus on Cold War protest, mirrors the rising hopes and beliefs in mass activism, as well as a possible nostalgia for activism in the recent past.

Protest continues to play a key role in today's political environment. Following the release of *Ginger and Rosa*, Mayer stated in her article 'Bomb Culture', that: 'With the police shown kettling CND marchers in the film, 1962 and 2012 come together, giving the film a startling immediacy'.³⁵ 2012 saw much controversy over kettling with many court rulings on the use of the tactic on several occasions in the years previous. The largest of which was a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that ruled that kettling was lawful in the case of Met Police actions during anti-globalisation demonstrations in May 2001.³⁶ A later student march, against the rising tuition fees, in 2010, also witnessed the use of kettling. The issue of peaceful protest and kettling was therefore prominent in the years surrounding the film *Ginger and Rosa*. Questions as to the truth behind the freedom of protest arose with these controversial events. The film was thus released in a time of many public demonstrations, questions about the form these demonstrations took, and the responses to these by the authorities; all issues which were

³⁵ Sophie Mayer, 'Bomb Culture', *Sight and Sound* (2012), pp. 34 - 35

<http://sallypotter.com/uploads/websites/774/wysiwyg/Sophie_Mayer_Bomb_Culture_Sight_and_Sound_PDF.pdf>, [Accessed 19 April 2018], see p. 35.

³⁶ "'Kettling' Tactics in 2001 Lawful", *BBC News*, 15 March 2012, section UK <<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-17378700>> [Accessed 16 August 2018]; Louise Christian, 'This Judgment in Favour of Kettling Is a Missed Opportunity | Louise Christian', *The Guardian*, 15 March 2018, section Opinion <<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/15/judgment-in-favour-of-kettling>> [Accessed 16 August 2018].

addressed in the film itself in the form of Ginger's journey to discovering protest and her role within the world. The film was consequently, both historic and yet relevant to today, the audience can feel a relatability to the topic of the film, and the questions it raised. We therefore continue to see issues and debates surrounding protest and its effectiveness. Yet, ultimately, protest or non-violent direct action, are today very much part of our political environment. The strong level of protest during the 1960s, portrayed in *Ginger and Rosa*, is a memory which can be revisited to reflect on current issues. This period would seem to be remembered as a high point for protest and subsequently can be recalled upon in the film's contemporary climate of protest and questions surrounding activism. Cultural portrayals of Cold War activism such as *Ginger and Rosa*, not only provide a memory of mass protest but also reflect a political culture, of which mass protest and non-violent direct action continue to play a key part. The challenge of celebrating protest whilst questioning its overall success highlights Britain's ambiguous relationship with the Cold War. However, as discussed there is a sense of recent exhibitions and films capturing a new hope in activism. A belief in the power of activism evident in the early Cold War years, a time which can be looked to, related to, and understood in today's political climate.

5.4 Key Movements and Campaigns:

5.4.1 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Cultural portrayals of activism tend to focus on key movements and campaigns. This often results in the most famous movements and events dominating portrayals. A review of the *People Power* exhibition by Andrea Needham for *Peace News*, reflected that:

the exhibition focuses heavily on the higher-profile campaigns while largely ignoring the real heart of the peace movement (...) Furthermore, if one didn't know better (...) one could reach the conclusion that the peace movement was essentially dormant

between the end of large-scale protests at Greenham in the late '80s and the protests against the Iraq war in 2003'.³⁷

Consequently, the exhibition's focus on key moments tended to omit the sense that protest and the work of movements is gradual and ongoing, much like the focus on the Cuban Missile Crisis in the previous chapter, a focus on 'hot points' gives an impression of outbursts of activism as opposed to ongoing battles. It is clear that the focus on these key events has a strong influence on the memories and perceptions of protest and Cold War activism which are depicted in cultural portrayals. In focusing on 'hot points' and 'peak moments' cultural portrayals of the conflict tend to present a memory which does not capture the Cold War as a unified whole but as a series of events which have, most often, become the more memorable moments or features of the Cold War. On the other hand, focussing on these moments may be used to symbolise the period as a whole, but one far more simplified and dominated by moments of crisis and protest. It is the ambiguity of Britain's role in the Cold War and its experience of the conflict which arguably leads to a focus on 'peak moments', those moments that create the sense of a more conventional conflict via intelligence gathering, military weapons and defences, and public opposition. The struggle with how to remember the Cold War thus contributes to a memory of turbulence and action, as opposed to the backdrop to daily life that it was for many in Britain.

The main movement which attracts the greatest level of attention for the Cold War period, is Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), forming a common focal point for cultural portrayals. CND was established in 1958, following increasing concerns over the development of the arms race and nuclear weapons. Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard have argued that four events in 1957 acted as triggers for the establishment of CND. The Soviet launch of

³⁷ Needham, "People Power: Fighting for Peace" | Peace News'.

Sputnik in 1957, they argue, indicated the increasing technological and military might of the Soviet Union, and the superpowers generally. Taylor and Pritchard also pointed to George F. Kennan's Reith Lectures in 1957 which called attention to the escalating dangers of any confrontation, but particularly nuclear confrontation, between the two sides of the Cold War. A further factor was Aneurin Bevan's U-turn on the Labour unilateralist policy at the Party conference in 1957. This, they argue caused many unilateralists within and outside of the party to take action.³⁸ In reaction to this, J. B. Priestley's *New Statesman* article, formed a final catalyst, as the responses to the article led to a meeting of like-minded individuals. In January 1958, the Executive Committee was elected, and CND was formally established.³⁹ Members of the early movement included prominent figures and intellectuals such as, Bertrand Russell, J. B. Priestley, and Canon John Collins, among many others. The movement was effectively borne out of the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT). The NCANWT focused on 'lobbying MPs' as well as 'peaceful and legal demonstrations', choosing to focus on a single-issue with 'elite influence rather than mass support' for the movement. These points, Taylor argued, later formed the basis for CND.⁴⁰ CND were the 'first mass movement against nuclear weapons',⁴¹ and figures estimate that national membership reached approximately 50,000 members in 1982, a peak period for the movement.⁴² As such, much scholarship has also explored the history, role, and achievements or failures of CND and the wider Movement.⁴³ This focus has likely influenced and shaped how activism in the Cold

³⁸ Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, p. 6.

³⁹ J.B. Priestley, "Britain and the Nuclear Bombs", *New Statesman*, 2 November 1957, referenced in Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, pp. 10 - 12.

⁴¹ Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, p. 112.

⁴² Appendix Two, 'CND Since 1970 – some figures', (information supplied by Duncan Rees) in, John Minnion and Philip Bolsover (eds.), *The CND Story: The first 25 years of CND in the words of the people involved* (London: Allison and Busby Limited, 1983) p. 150.

⁴³ See, Phythian, 'CND's Cold War'; Jodi Burkett, 'The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Changing Attitudes towards the Earth in the Nuclear Age', *The British Journal for the History of Science*, 45. 4 (2012), 625 –639 <<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007087412001094>> [Accessed 19 May 2020]; Kate Hudson, *CND at 60*:

War is remembered, and certainly which aspects are emphasised. The portrayal of CND in films and exhibitions therefore often forms a central focus as the first mass anti-nuclear movement and one from which other groups are portrayed in comparison.

The portrayal of CND in the *People Power* exhibition demonstrated CND's centrality to the memory of the Cold War and Cold War activism in particular. Both the Cold War section of the exhibition and the accompanying book, *People Power*,⁴⁴ almost used CND as a focal point off which other events and strands of activism branch off. Indeed, in one review, Alison Wilcox remarked that particular events and groups of Cold War activists were portrayed within the exhibition, 'with the overarching presence and campaigning of CND highlighted throughout the period'.⁴⁵ CND were in fact mentioned from the very beginning of the exhibition's Cold War section through to their involvement in the most recent event portrayed, the 2016 Trident march. As a result, CND not only featured in the Cold War narrative as a focal point for activism in the period, but their continued existence and campaigning ensured that their reach and significance extended to the modern-day display of activism and 'people power'. This 'overarching presence' thus served to demonstrate its prominence in the Cold War narrative of protest. The exhibition in this sense conveyed CND as a key aspect of Cold War memory, serving as a symbol and shorthand for Cold War anti-nuclear activism, and shaping the memories of visitors.

The depictions of other movements are subsequently shown in comparison to CND. The Committee of 100, for example, is portrayed as a far more radical group. The C100 formed in

Britain's Most Enduring Mass Movement (Public Reading Rooms, 2018); Kate Hudson, *CND: Now More Than Ever: The Story of a Peace Movement* (London: Vision Paperbacks, 2005); Taylor, *Against the Bomb*; Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement: 1971 to the Present: Volume Three: The Struggle Against the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

⁴⁴ Lyn Smith, *People Power: Fighting for Peace from the First World War to the Present* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2017).

⁴⁵ Wilcox, 'Review of "People Power: Fighting for Peace"'.

1960, in response to growing divisions and dissatisfaction, among some, with CND's methods. The early CND focus on peaceful demonstration and lobbying, as well as the single-issue of focusing on the anti-nuclear cause, often resulted in divisions within the movement; primarily with those that deemed CND's actions as not doing enough to create radical change. These divisions later manifested in the establishment of C100, when Bertrand Russell and other members formed a more radical group, which the DAC later merged into. The Committee therefore established itself and formed its programme of direct action – action which often bordered on or leant towards illegal activities.

Ginger and Rosa draws on this comparison between CND and C100. In an early scene, Ginger and Rosa attend a 'Ban the Bomb' march with CND groups and others. The film shows the march to be strong with many people in attendance, capturing the early years of CND and their success. However, *Ginger and Rosa* hints towards the argument that CND were not necessarily radical or sufficiently active. During the scene of the 'Ban the Bomb' march, there are times where Ginger and Rosa look bored, merely walking along in a line of people. To emphasise this, after the march when Ginger is walking with her two godfathers Mark and Mark Two, and their American activist friend Bella, Mark Two comments on the politeness of British people, stating, 'even the Ban the Bomb march was polite'.⁴⁶ This comment, and portrayal of CND, is perhaps used to help demonstrate Ginger's consideration, later in the film, to join the C100, believing that more direct action was needed than simply marching. Director Sally Potter therefore conveys Ginger's hardening of views and drive for activism in her consideration to join the C100.

⁴⁶ *Ginger and Rosa*, dir. Sally Potter.

This change in Ginger's commitment is equally driven by the strengthening relationship between Rosa and Roland. Ginger's more radical beliefs and action highlight the rising tensions, not only with the nuclear threat and missile crisis, but also the tensions within her own personal and domestic sphere. As the narrative progresses and Rosa and Roland's relationship intensifies, Ginger announces to her godfathers, Bella, and her mother Nat, that she is considering joining the C100, stating she agrees with Bertrand Russell that lawful protest was not enough. It is after the sit-in protest to block the gates of a military base with Bella, that Ginger, after being held in a cell, is taken home and finally pours out the truth about Rosa and Roland; as if more radical activism has enabled her to take the action necessary. Whilst the film does not go into detail regarding the divisions and tensions between the organisations, Ginger's developing belief that lawful protest is not enough to 'save us (...) from total extinction', hints towards the different views and divisions which existed. CND therefore serves as the focus and other movements tend to be shown in comparison, the C100 shown very much to diverge from CND as more radical.

The DAC and C100's policy of non-violent direct action impacted upon people's perceptions of the anti-nuclear movement more generally. Taylor has stated that the DAC's, and later the C100's, more radical protest methods 'became synonymous in the public mind with the Movement as a whole (much to CND's leadership's distress).'⁴⁷ The perception that the entire movement, and C100 in particular, was radical and regularly broke the law therefore likely shaped views of the movements in the press. From portrayals today, it is clear that this radical image has remained, despite memory often focusing on the CND narrative.

⁴⁷ Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, p. 129, p. 69.

This radicalism was reiterated in the *People Power* exhibition. The exhibition dedicated a display to the actions of the C100, particularly emphasising their radical actions. One point the exhibition made was that C100 activists and supporters were willing to be arrested during their protests. The display contained a C100 legal handbook to emphasise the preparedness for this radical action. This was further reiterated with the inclusion of the ‘Wethersfield Six’. The six were arrested prior to planned C100 demonstrations, the main site of which being Wethersfield, resulting in chaos at these demonstrations. After the trial, each served a prison sentence ranging from 12-18 months.⁴⁸ The inclusion of this key event was used to emphasise and reflect the radicalism of the group; highlighting the ‘people power’ and determination, as well as the controversy that surrounded C100. In this sense, differences and divisions between groups were acknowledged in the exhibition, yet seemingly, C100 featured as one aspect of the anti-nuclear story, whilst CND’s presence was made clear throughout.

As well as CND being portrayed as central to the anti-nuclear narrative, the *People Power* exhibition also highlighted key moments and features of CND history and campaigning; many of which served to celebrate or acknowledge some of the more well-known campaigns by CND. In a video and article promoting the exhibition, the curator Matt Brosnan, highlighted the sketches of Gerald’s Holtom’s nuclear disarmament symbol, as one of the ‘five unmissable highlights’ of the exhibition.⁴⁹ Gerald Holtom was introduced, in the exhibition, as the ‘designer and artist’ who created the nuclear disarmament symbol for the first Aldermaston March in 1958, which is known more generally today as the peace symbol.⁵⁰ The exhibition detailed how Holtom designed the symbol using the ‘semaphore for the letters ‘N’ and ‘D’

⁴⁸ Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, pp. 11 - 12.

⁴⁹ Thompson, and PortoCarréro, ‘Five Important Anti-War Moments from New Imperial War Museum Show’; See also: *People Power Fighting for Peace* (IWM London: Press Release), pp. 1 – 3.

⁵⁰ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

and did not seek to copyright the symbol, enabling its wide use throughout the Cold War and its continued use today.⁵¹ Much as Jonathan Hogg, and others, argue that the mushroom cloud has become an ‘iconic motif’ of the nuclear threat and the Cold War, the Nuclear Disarmament symbol has a similar familiarity and acts as an icon for activism.⁵² The symbol’s familiarity enables a short-hand for Cold War activism and as such it features heavily in cultural portrayals; the *People Power* exhibition being a prime example. CND in particular have used this symbol since its early years and it has continued to be their symbol ever since. The exhibition would seem to have tapped into symbols, images, and campaigns which are well-known and familiar to visitors, reinforcing memories of the Cold War and activism, and framing these images and campaigns as dominant and central aspects of the period.

Other key campaigns including the Aldermaston Marches were also focused on in the exhibition. The Aldermaston Marches began in 1958, becoming an annual feature of the Peace Movement calendar. The first march was actually organised by the DAC, CND dubious about its direct action, initially simply offered support.⁵³ However, from 1959, the marches were reversed *from* Aldermaston *to* London, and organised by CND. The size and popularity of the marches likely accounts for their continued emphasis in modern cultural memory. Today, Aldermaston continues to be a prime site for anti-nuclear and peace activists due to continued weapons development at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The exhibition dedicated the majority of a display to ephemera from early Aldermaston Marches. These included flyers promoting the march, signs and arm bands used, specifically containing the Nuclear

⁵¹ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

⁵² Jonathan G. Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), pp. 140, 161, 164; See also Peggy Rosenthal, ‘The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image’, *American Literary History*, 3. 1 (1991), pp. 63 – 92, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/489733>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

⁵³ Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, p. 7.

Disarmament symbol, and a sign for the DAC. Song sheets and lyrics of songs sung on the 1958 march were also displayed along with a photograph of 1958, which saw up to 8,000 people participate in the march.⁵⁴ The display of these objects told the story of the Aldermaston Marches, and their early success and popularity. It is important to note that the exhibition focused on the early Aldermaston Marches of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and not those later, by which point Hogg argues, the ‘normalization’ of the marches had partly led to more negative press attention towards anti-nuclear demonstrators.⁵⁵ The exhibition’s narrative thus served to map out the ‘peak moments’ which Lowe and Joel refer to.⁵⁶ Once more, issues with seeing the Cold War as a whole arise in the focus on particular moments, the Cold War being captured as a series of ‘hot points’ as opposed to a unified whole. Consequently, the Cold War narrative is often flattened by these emphases. These marches, as a key, annual event for the Peace Movement were a crucial aspect of the Cold War anti-nuclear demonstrations. By including an entire display on the marches, the exhibition helped to reinforce their prominence in the memory of Cold War activism.⁵⁷ The display, through these signs, arm bands, photos and song sheets, also highlighted the strong influences of art and culture within the protest movement, demonstrating again the very visual and audible portrayals of activism, as so much protest was conducted through various artforms and cultural platforms. The portrayals thus serve to perpetuate this memory of creativity and culture as central to the movement.

Both the CND’s screenings of *The War Game* (1965) and the *Protest and Survive* CND publication, were also captured and celebrated in the exhibition. The exhibition’s inclusion of CND’s screenings of *The War Game*, after it was denied broadcasting in 1965, portrayed CND’s actions in ‘educating’ the wider public about the true horrors of nuclear weapons. The

⁵⁴ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

⁵⁵ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, p. 142.

⁵⁶ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 47.

⁵⁷ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

exhibition included a short clip of *The War Game*, among other clips of broadcasts and programmes relating to government preparations and cultural portrayals of the perceived threat. The inclusion of the clip, not only enabled visitors to see part of the film and understand the fear that the nuclear threat caused, but, just as Ginger's fear of the Cuban Missile Crisis in *Ginger and Rosa* serves to justify her activism, the clip also served to promote and highlight the CND's cause in condemning the bomb, and fighting for the broadcast of *The War Game* to educate people about the threat. In this sense there was a rather positive portrayal of CND as a movement with a just cause. Consequently, here, we see a connection between the cultural memory of the nuclear threat serving as a basis, and justification for, the narrative and cultural memory of Cold War anti-nuclear protest. Their fight to screen *The War Game* was not necessarily a large or well-known campaign. However, the fact that *The War Game* has become widely known, in part for its controversy, and its harrowing depiction of nuclear war, enabled curators to play on this knowledge and emphasise CND's role in the conflict. As with the screening of films in bunkers, *The War Game* becomes the cultural memory.

Similarly, in 1979 the government pamphlet *Protect and Survive* was released following pressures from an aired *Panorama* programme pointing to the truth behind the government's Civil Defence.⁵⁸ *Protect and Survive*, gave British citizens instructions for how to protect themselves and their families in the event of a nuclear attack. These instructions included, blocking up windows and openings with sandbags, bricks, earth or furniture; creating an 'inner-refuge' in the house, and painting windows inside with light paint, to reflect the heat flash resulting from the blast.⁵⁹ In response and outrage at the release of *Protect and Survive*, E. P. Thompson wrote a counter-argument *Protest and Survive*, criticising the absurdity and futility

⁵⁸ Hudson, *CND: Now More Than Ever*, p. 129.

⁵⁹ *Protect and Survive* (London: Trustees of the Imperial War Museum, 2017 [originally published 1980]).

of these preparations. The work was also published by CND in 1980.⁶⁰ This, as the *People Power* exhibition noted, helped to fuel the 1980s resurgence in anti-nuclear activism and CND. The exhibition's inclusion of these key events and campaigns reflect Lowe and Joel's argument that museums tend to concentrate on 'recalling (...) peak moments' of activist groups. In recalling the 'peak moments', however, the focus can provide a celebratory, even nostalgic, view of the success of the movement, yet the movement's less successful moments tend to be more overlooked and forgotten.

It is interesting that portrayals, particularly the *People Power* exhibition, tend to focus on high-points and celebration, when in reality CND was often viewed as controversial and divided. The early success of CND as a mass movement inevitably led to many people being in favour of their cause, but there were also many against it. Negative views and portrayals of CND were particularly prominent in the press. Hogg has highlighted that in the 1950s, before the formation of CND, the press was generally supportive of the aims of contemporary anti-nuclear groups. However, Hogg adds that from the establishment of CND and particularly with the rise of anti-nuclear activism in the 1960s, press coverage of CND became increasingly negative.⁶¹ Many criticisms centred on the 'leftist' and 'elitist' make-up of the movement. Particularly in the early life of CND, the group had a largely middle-class make-up in the leadership. As Taylor and Pritchard's study on CND membership and members' views twenty years after the organisation was established showed, of '403 respondents (...) [t]hey were predominantly middle class', adding that '[b]y 1978, 73% of our respondents had either a degree or professional qualification'.⁶² The large majority of respondents also tended to vote Labour or

⁶⁰ Hudson, *CND: Now More Than Ever*, p. 130.

⁶¹ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, p. 142.

⁶² Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, pp. 22 - 23.

other left-wing/liberal groups.⁶³ As Hogg's study and contemporary press coverage show, this make-up led to much controversy particularly criticisms of 'leftism' and communism.⁶⁴

Whilst the film does not point specifically to criticisms, *Ginger and Rosa*, certainly captures this early middle-class make-up of the movement. The scene in which Ginger and Rosa attend their first YCND meeting captures a rather middle-class student group. Those that speak tend to be well-spoken, and likely well-educated. Whilst not hinting to this as a criticism, the memory of early CND as an intellectual and left-wing movement seems to be reiterated here. Taylor and Pritchard argued, in 1983, that the movement failed to build-up sufficient working-class support, and yet that this was not a concern for the elitist leadership. They further added that, the image of the movement constructed in the press, which 'centred on alleged promiscuity, drugs and irresponsibility', created a 'psychological barrier' between them and the working-class.⁶⁵ Criticisms in the press also tended to focus on the appearance of protesters, particularly portrayals of dirty individuals. These criticisms of 'leftism', dirtiness and also 'foreignness', Hogg argues, suggested 'that the idea of protest clashed with a particular British conservative sensibility'.⁶⁶ Such criticisms continued during the 1980s, with protesters' political messages often being ignored in favour of comments of condemnation.⁶⁷

Why then, despite these comments and perceptions of the movement, developing and increasing throughout the Cold War, do we see many positive and even celebratory portrayals of the organisation's 'peak moments'? In one obvious sense, the *People Power* exhibition itself had a clear message of the power of individuals engaging in protest, inclusion of, or a focus on, the hostility towards the movement would therefore have affected this message. This is not

⁶³ Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, p. 25.

⁶⁴ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, p. 121.

⁶⁵ Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, p. 116.

⁶⁶ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, p. 121.

⁶⁷ Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture*, pp. 142 - 144.

to say that the exhibition completely ignored criticisms of the various groups, there were occasions within the exhibition when animosity was captured in an attempt to convey this controversy and ambiguity in the memory of activism. One example of this was the inclusion, in the display of the Aldermaston marches, of a letter and envelope from Spring 1959, which was sent to the organisers, stating the disapproval of their actions and that the letter had been sent without paying for the postage “in the hope that it will deplete your fund”.⁶⁸ Aspects of animosity were therefore captured, but the focus was very much placed on ‘peak moments’ of CND and the wider movement, reflecting the exhibition’s message of ‘people power’. There is also the fact for portrayals more generally, that a message of ‘people power’ and action, can only be achieved if complexities, hostilities, and divisions are side-lined. The narrative of CND fighting for a justified and noble cause of a world without nuclear weapons, fits into a wider narrative of the history of protest. The history of protest predominantly focuses on causes which are deemed to be good, for instance causes which seek peace or social advancement. The ‘people’s’ role in protest is therefore often portrayed to capture the ‘other side’ of conflict and to fit ‘within a wider history from below’.⁶⁹ In this, we can also recognise the IWM’s aim to present different perspectives of conflict via the *People Power* exhibition.

In addition to the animosity towards CND being less central in recent portrayals, other omissions have shaped memories of the movement. One such omission is the complexities and relationships between the different groups within the wider peace movement. Although we have seen some of the differences between CND and C100’s actions, it is the intricate relationships and differences which are not so explicit or detailed. The complex relationship between the Labour Party and CND, for instance, is also often omitted from the narrative. This

⁶⁸ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

⁶⁹ Katrina Navickas, ‘Protest History or the History of Protest?’, *History Workshop Journal*, 73 (2012), pp. 302 - 307 (p. 306), <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/23277792>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

relationship was an important part of CND, particularly its early hopes for a unilateralist policy from the Labour left; sections of the Labour Party offering a support base for CND and the chance for CND's policies to be put forward, following their tactics of lobbying MPs and providing petitions.⁷⁰ That many of these more intricate details are omitted results in a predominantly positive image of activism without numerous divisions and complexities. Whilst the balancing of different views is at times attempted and achieved, the focus on the 'people power' message in many cultural portrayals demonstrates an attempt to reconcile the tensions, complications, and contradictions of Cold War activism. Yet the result is a very selective and specific memory.

As discussed previously, this reflects the wider narrative of protest movements, acknowledging the role of the 'ordinary people'. Perhaps this positive attitude also reflects a sense of nostalgia for protest, the early movement in the 1950s and 1960s particularly is seen to have changed politics in Britain and therefore provides an example, and even nostalgia, for the success or optimism placed in protest.⁷¹ As mentioned above, Schofield and Anderton have noted that there is more of an interest today in non-violent protest as it has become a common part of our political culture.⁷² A renewed hope and increase in activism today may also trigger a nostalgia for the protest movements of the Cold War and even earlier. The legacy of the Cold War can therefore be seen here, whilst memories of protest and protesters were often critical during the Cold War, the early movement had changed the political climate and practice even by the later movement in the 1980s.⁷³ Britain's decline and the increasing loss of faith in the British government which had firmly been established by the second wave of activism in the 1980s, also meant that it was the people's role in challenging and questioning the government that

⁷⁰ See Taylor and Pritchard, *The Protest Makers*, p. 8; Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*.

⁷¹ Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, pp. 340 - 341.

⁷² Schofield and Anderton, 'The queer archaeology of Green Gate', p. 238.

⁷³ Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, p. 340.

could be emphasised. As such the voices of ‘ordinary people’ stand out and can be celebrated in the sense of people taking action. Previous protests and the mass movements of the Cold War can be drawn on as a memory of these values.

5.4.2 Portrayal of The Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp

Much like CND and C100, cultural portrayals of the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp recall the ‘peak moments’ of the campaign. A ‘peak moment’ which is particularly emphasised in portrayals is the ‘Embrace the Base’ campaign in December 1982. In both the *People Power* and *National Cold War* exhibitions, photos and details of the ‘Embrace the Base’ campaign were used to represent key moments, both of the peace camp in particular, and in the *National Cold War Exhibition’s* brief display on activism, key moments of Cold War protest in general.⁷⁴ The prominence of this campaign in portrayals of Greenham Peace Camp and Cold War protest, points to its prominence and significance to the memory of Cold War activism. This is likely due to the scale of the campaign which saw approximately 30,000 people join hands to surround the Greenham military base. The size and symbolism of the campaign lends itself to the message of ‘people power’ and unified action which represents the protest movement at Greenham. In particular, the photos capturing the event served to encapsulate and reflect these messages, hence their prominence in recent cultural portrayals. In both these exhibitions, photos of the ‘Embrace the Base’ campaign stood out. A photo by Edward Barber of ‘Embrace the Base’ was enlarged and used as a backdrop to the Greenham Common display in the *People Power* exhibition, the size of the photo provided a focal point for visitors, and in doing so conveyed images of collective action.⁷⁵ Similarly, the display of placards with photos, symbols and slogans of Cold War anti-nuclear protest, in the *National*

⁷⁴ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition]; *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁷⁵ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

Cold War Exhibition, featured another photo from ‘Embrace the Base’.⁷⁶ Both were powerful images and examples of the strength of individuals united in their cause. In focusing on this event and the visualisation of the campaign, the message conveyed *was* one of ‘people power’ and the power of action. Once again it is the visual nature of the displays which add to and influence memories of the vibrancy and celebration of Cold War protest.

In the *People Power* exhibition, the Greenham Common Women’s Peace camp display was particularly celebratory. The Peace Camp section was tucked behind a recreated section of metal fencing, such as that which would have surrounded the Greenham Common airbase. The Camp is remembered in part for its decoration of the airbase fence, particularly on large protest occasions such as the ‘Embrace the Base’ event. The women often adorned the fence with belongings and pieces of art, creating a patchwork of art around the base. The *People Power* exhibition tapped into the environment of Greenham Common and some of the activities that took place there. The information card next to the recreated fence stated that ‘the perimeter fence was a focus of division, but also creativity. Protesters often cut the fence and tried to get through it, while also decorating it with daisy-chains of artwork and webs of thread’.⁷⁷ The exhibition was also therefore connecting to the significance of creativity and symbolism that is often related to Greenham Common. Below the description of the fence on the information card, visitors were encouraged to take ribbons provided in a box and decorate the fence themselves. Again, as active participants, visitors were encouraged by the exhibition to recreate the symbolism and creativity of the protest at Greenham Common. This echoed the rather celebratory tone of the exhibition towards protest. Whilst the exhibition attempted to portray balance, visitors were greeted with stories of defiance and bravery, as well as creativity and

⁷⁶ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

⁷⁷ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

inclusivity. In joining in and recreating moments of Greenham Common, the visitor was able to be active in celebrating the Greenham protest; the activity helped to provide a memory of life at the Women's Peace Camp and the demonstrations they were involved in. It is also arguable that this interactive activity aided the creation and shaping of memories regarding the importance of symbolism at the Women's Peace Camp. In this recreation, however, it was the creativity, which was prioritised, creating a nostalgic sense of the power of this symbolism at Greenham Common.

Yet, this focus very much excluded the real day-to-day life on the camp. Whilst this was pointed to briefly in the display with the comment: 'Conditions were primitive, with protestors living in tents or under plastic sheeting' and some footage of the camp,⁷⁸ at the centre of the exhibition stood the fence as a celebration of creativity, beauty and inclusivity, again prioritising the 'peak moments'. Equally, in the exhibition's accompanying book by Lyn Smith, artist Peter Kennard, whose artwork featured in areas of the exhibition, was quoted as saying, that the fence was "One of the greatest art works of the twentieth century (...) this eight-mile perimeter collage (...) an *extraordinary* creative work. You got all this life and humanity on one side and this blank on the other".⁷⁹ Kennard's comment evokes a celebration of 'life and humanity' against the cold and plain military side of the base. The inclusion of Kennard's quote in the book and the prominence of symbolism and creativity in the Greenham section of the exhibition, helped to echo further, the celebration of Cold War anti-nuclear protest. Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp is thus a dominant feature of Cold War activism portrayals.

An exploration of how the Peace Camp is remembered, is particularly interesting due to the dual narrative which inevitably accompanies it. As Lowe and Joel have remarked, the Women's

⁷⁸ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

⁷⁹ Smith, *People Power: Fighting for Peace from the First World War to the Present*, p. 165.

Peace Camp 'became a beacon for activist feminism as well as the anti-nuclear movement, a dual symbolism that also shapes its remembering'.⁸⁰ The Women's Peace Camp was set up in 1981 after the Women for Life on Earth group had marched from Wales, to demonstrate and demand a discussion with the government over the proposed siting of Pershing II Cruise missiles in Britain, including the military base at Greenham Common. When this discussion was rejected, a camp was set up which remained throughout the 1980s, with some protesters even remaining until 2000. Whilst the early stages of the camp included both male and female protesters, a decision was taken in 1982 to make the camp 'women-only'.⁸¹ In their book, Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins stated that this decision 'was primarily a tactical one - and a gut reaction by some to what was happening at the camp at the time.'⁸² This tactic was to do with the camp's chosen method of peaceful protest, believing that the absence of men may aid this, as well as their aim of challenging the patriarchy of the military and arms race, and creating a new society. The women-only initiative saw the equating of nuclear weapons and violence with a patriarchal system and male domination. As Harford and Hopkins noted in 1984: 'Over the months, Cruise has become a symbol of nuclear terror, male domination and imperialist exploitation.'⁸³ The decision caused much controversy and hostility, however, it enabled the camp to encompass this dual-meaning and dual-symbolism which remains today, and provided women with a place which symbolised women taking initiative and providing inspiration to others.⁸⁴ Consequently, portrayals of the Women's Peace Camp have to juggle this dual-narrative and meaning.

⁸⁰ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 47.

⁸¹ See, Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, pp. 133 - 134.

⁸² Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins, (eds.) *Greenham Common: Women at the Wire* (London: The Women's Press, 1984) p. 4.

⁸³ Harford and Hopkins, *Greenham Common*, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Harford and Hopkins, *Greenham Common*, p. 4.

Greenham Common, due to its multiple and controversial histories is undoubtedly a difficult past to portray. This difficulty, it would seem, has resulted in different focuses and emphases in cultural portrayals, as well as different levels of detail. The *National Cold War Exhibition*, for example, dedicated a small section of the exhibition to protest and activism during the Cold War. Due to the size of the display, protest groups and movements were dealt with more collectively than separately, to convey a general idea of protest. A collection of placards and large badges formed the display, along with a figure of Bertrand Russell sat on the floor. The voice-over narrative told the story of Cold War protest, mentioning the formation of CND, the Aldermaston marches, anti-Vietnam protests, alongside the development of a culture of protest in music – the accompanying soundscape capturing some of this. The narrative then moved onto a description of Greenham Common accompanied by the soundscape of chanting: ‘Take the toys from the boys’.⁸⁵ The display did therefore capture, briefly, the significance of the women’s protest at Greenham, yet the primary focus of the display was a collective narrative and broad picture of anti-nuclear and anti-war protest throughout the Cold War period.

Similarly, in the *People Power* exhibition, the section on the Cold War predominantly focused on anti-nuclear protest, though Vietnam was mentioned very briefly, it was the larger anti-nuclear movements which were focused on. Within this section, the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp formed a prominent part of the narrative. There was a focus on the creativity of the peace camp, as well as the collective action of women. This exhibition did present more detail in regard to the controversy of the women-only initiative, and the significance of Greenham as a women’s movement. This was primarily captured through the inclusion of personal stories and ephemera, including video clips of experiences and life at the peace camp. The exhibition stated that the decision did result in ‘some hostility’ but that the

⁸⁵ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition].

women-only initiative also gave the protest a ‘distinct sense of identity’.⁸⁶ However, at the same time, the Greenham Common section was situated within a wider narrative which predominantly focused on anti-nuclear protest, and thus Greenham Common was primarily shown as part of this anti-nuclear movement, whilst also being women-only. It would seem that in the two exhibitions discussed, although to varying degrees of detail, the anti-nuclear movement was the central focus. This could link to the idea that our memory of activism is linked to our memories of the threat and fear of nuclear war, inevitably shaping the focus and emphasis of portrayals of protest.

The *Greenham Cold War Experience* tour at Greenham Common, however, did capture, to a greater extent, the aim for a new society and the feminist focus. The power of the women-only initiative was conveyed through re-enactment and immersive theatre. Press and promotions for the event focused on the concept of immersive theatre and, as the promotion on the Greenham Trust website stated, a ‘Journey back through time to the 1980s’, adding that the tour aimed to ‘bring the Cold War of the 1980s to life’.⁸⁷ Other reviews used similar language such as, ‘recreate life on the airbase’.⁸⁸ Interested members of the public were thus presented with this step back in time and an ‘experience’ of the past. The tour was very much about this immersive experience and trying to inform the visitor about life at Greenham Common, whilst also entertaining them. On the tour, the visitor or, primarily in this case, audience, were guided to several ‘acts’ where actors and actresses immersed the audience in their recreations of life at Greenham Common during the 1980s. One act, included a glimpse of life in the Indigo camp of the Women’s Peace Camp. The act involved the characters Pat and Elsa, Pat having been at

⁸⁶ *People Power: Fighting for Peace* [Exhibition].

⁸⁷ ‘The Greenham Cold War Experience | Greenham Common Trust’, 2018 <<http://www.greenhamtrust.com/community-events/cold-war-experience>> [Accessed 17 November 2018].

⁸⁸ Vanessa Thorpe, ‘Peace Camp to Stage: Greenham Common Is Venue for Cold War Play’, *The Observer*, 9 June 2018, section UK news <<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/09/greenham-common-cold-war-play-nuclear-protest-camp>> [Accessed 17 November 2018].

Greenham for three years and Elsa having just arrived. Pat explained several aspects of life at the camp, including the decoration of the fence, but also the increasing number of police raids and arrests, and the mess they left afterwards, meaning they had to start again after the police had removed their possessions.

Alongside details of everyday life on the camp, a point was made to emphasise the women-only initiative. When Elsa arrived, she asked who was in charge. Pat smirked, claiming there were 'no leaders, no hierarchy, we are all equal'.⁸⁹ The inclusion of this scene helped to capture and stress the significance of the women-only camp, the rejection of patriarchal systems and the idea of a different and equal society, separate to the one of military hierarchies and regimental life on the other side of the fence. Further to this, Pat asked the audience if their families were alright with them being at the camp, explaining that whilst her husband was accepting, her mother no longer talked to her. Elsa, who had travelled all the way from Holland to join the camp, stated that she had left a three-year-old son behind with her husband, arguing that she was fighting for his future. Here the significance of women-only was further stressed in the particular role of motherhood. It was as a result of this conversation that Pat turned to the audience and said, 'see what we're trying to do?'; making a declaration of their cause and their commitment to a future without nuclear weapons, and the specific role of women as mothers and symbols of peace. Finally, near the close of the act, the audience were told to spread the word about the camp, that they were welcome back, and the women in particular were welcome to stay, leaving a lasting impression of the significance and importance of the women-only movement.⁹⁰ In this sense, this particular scene within the *Greenham Cold War*

⁸⁹ *Greenham Cold War Experience*, (2018) Greenham Trust, visited 9 September 2018.

⁹⁰ *Greenham Cold War Experience*, (2018) Greenham Trust.

Experience, emphasised the women's initiative of creating a new society and the significance of women leading this protest against the masculine military.

The personal narratives of Pat and Elsa not only captured the women-only initiative but provided an empathetic experience to further enhance the visitor's understanding of the Women's cause, making the experience more tangible and memorable. The use of immersive theatre to emphasise this message provided the audience with a personal insight into the aims and cause of the Women's Peace Camp, as well as the sacrifices they made. Jenny Kidd, in her article on the Performance, Learning and Heritage project at the University of Manchester 2005–2008, remarked that, 'An ability to empathise with or feel ownership over the narratives being portrayed (...) made that sense of the past more urgent, tangible and, for our respondents, memorable'. This ability to empathise and try to understand more the experience of the particular past being portrayed was evident in the *Greenham Cold War Experience*. As Kidd comments, when a performance 'strikes a chord with visitors' own memories and experiences', it can enable this empathy and memorability.⁹¹ This is applicable to the *Greenham Cold War Experience*, as the majority of visitors lived through the Cold War and would therefore likely be able to recall memories of the events at Greenham Common, and also the controversy surrounding the camp; many of them also being local to the community.

In addition to the dual narrative of feminist activism and anti-nuclear protest, lies the further duality of a military narrative and a narrative of protest and the anti-nuclear movement. Sophie Campbell, a columnist for *The Daily Telegraph*, framed this in an article dated September 2011, reviewing tours of the Greenham Common site, stating that 'For anyone over 30, the words "Greenham Common" mean two things: cruise missiles and the women's peace camps of the

⁹¹ Jenny Kidd, 'Performing the knowing archive: heritage performance and Authenticity', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 17 1, (2011), pp. 22 - 35 (p. 30), < <https://doi.org/10.1080/13527258.2011.524003> > [Accessed 2 June 2020].

mid-Eighties.⁹² Schofield and Anderton conducted a study of the archaeological remains at Greenham Common in 2000. In their assessment of the site they concluded that, ‘For a site of such significance, in social, political, military, strategic, and technological terms, some symbol of the power and of the contradictory and conflicting stances the site represented in the later twentieth century should be retained’.⁹³ As a result of this complex narrative, Veronica Fiorato, in her archaeological study of Greenham Common, adds that ‘In truth it is essential to study, record, and where feasible retain elements of each, [military and protest remains] as the story of Cold War Greenham cannot be told without looking at the archaeology on both sides of the fence.’ This, Fiorato stated, is a real challenge for those now managing the common.⁹⁴

Whilst the *Greenham Cold War Experience* did, through its immersive theatre, emphasise the significance of the peace camp being about creating a different society, the rest of the tour provided a predominantly military focus. The *Greenham Cold War Experience* followed a successful performance in 2017 of *Greenham: 100 Years of War and Peace*, marking the return of the common to the public in 1997.⁹⁵ One article in the *Guardian*, promoting the event, however, also highlighted that the renovation of the Control Tower and immersive theatre events, were very much community focused. The presence of the Peace Women at Greenham Common was highly controversial during the 1980s, particularly for local residents. Catriona H. Jardine Brown’s article on the memory of the landscape of Greenham and Crookham Commons, explored the memories of locals via their ‘cognitive maps’ of the Commons. In this

⁹² Sophie Campbell, ‘UK Open Days: Nelson’s Flagship and Nuclear Silos Reveal Britain’s Hidden Past’, 1 September 2011, section Travel, *The Daily Telegraph* <<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/columnists/sophie-campbell/8734854/UK-Open-Days-Nelsons-flagship-and-nuclear-silos-reveal-Britains-hidden-past.html>> [Accessed 17 November 2018].

⁹³ Schofield and Anderton, ‘The queer archaeology of Green Gate’, p. 247.

⁹⁴ Veronica Fiorato, ‘Greenham Common: The conservation and management of a Cold War archetype’, In Wayne Cocroft and A. J. Schofield, (eds.), *A Fearsome Heritage: Diverse Legacies of the Cold War* (Walnut Creek, Calif: Routledge, 2009), pp. 129 - 154, see p. 154.

⁹⁵ ‘Our 20th Anniversary | Greenham Common Trust’, 2017 <<http://www.greenhamtrust.com/community-events/greenham-100-years-of-war-and-peace>> [Accessed 17 November 2018].

exploration Jardine Brown found that those who lived in the area prior to the Cold War did not acknowledge the Commons today as having been restored because it was too different from their childhood memories; the Cold War restrictions on the Commons as a result of the American air base, fundamentally changed what the Commons meant to them as a free and open space. Whilst those that moved there during or since the Greenham Peace Camp came to associate the Commons with the air base and the protest, previous inhabitants rejected this.⁹⁶ The *People Power* exhibition, but specifically the accompanying book, also mentioned this hostility and the formation of local groups against the camp, including Ratepayers Against the Greenham Encampment (RAGE), amongst others.⁹⁷ Chris Moores' article, 'Opposition to the Greenham Women's Peace Camps in 1980s Britain' analyses RAGE as part of the wider 'new right' and Thatcherite period. Moores states that the use of the term 'ratepayer' emphasised an 'inclusivity' of all ratepayers but also excluded and looked negatively on those who were not, the term matching Thatcherite rhetoric.⁹⁸ In contrast, Greenham women 'were characterised as scroungers' and threatening sexuality and 'normative gender modes', Moores arguing that RAGE went beyond simply economic causes, instead wider social concerns also fuelled animosity.⁹⁹ It is therefore hardly surprising that nearly twenty years after the last women left the site, much hostility towards the camp still exists. Within the *Guardian* article, Rosemary Richards of the production organisers, Fete Day, remarked that debates from the 2017 event revealed these hostilities, "We found, and it was not difficult to find, a fair amount of angst and anger in the community. We wanted to give some space for the animosity that is still in the

⁹⁶ Catriona H. Jardine Brown, 'In living memory: Mapping the landscape of Greenham and Crookham Commons', *Memory Studies*, 5. 4 (2012), pp. 425 - 444, <<http://0-journals.sagepub.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1177/1750698012448139>> [Accessed 23 May 2018].

⁹⁷ Smith, *People Power: Fighting for Peace from the First World War to the Present*, p. 173.

⁹⁸ Christopher Moores, 'Opposition to the Greenham Women's Peace Camps in 1980s Britain: RAGE Against the "Obscene"', *History Workshop Journal*, 78. 1 (2014), pp. 204 – 227 (p. 210) <<https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbt038>> [Accessed 14 June 2021].

⁹⁹ Moores, 'Opposition to the Greenham Women's Peace Camps in 1980s Britain', pp. 211, 213.

local community about the peace camp”’. The article also quoted a local parish councillor who, the article stated, ‘has long been opposed to celebrating this part of the town’s history’.¹⁰⁰ The event was thus a clear response to these feelings and as such formed a key community project. It is perhaps because of this hostility, or at least in part, that the acts which formed the *Greenham Cold War Experience* would seem to primarily have focused on the military operations of the base. They also provided space, in the Q & A act with the base Commander, for criticisms of the peace camp; providing some balance but also a ‘space for the animosity’.¹⁰¹ If this was the case, it would certainly demonstrate the influence of current perceptions on the portrayal of the Common and the base during the Cold War. In fact, it demonstrates the impact that memories from during the Cold War itself, of the base and camp in the 1980s, have had on shaping and creating future memories – both for Cold War “survivors” and younger visitors to the site. In turn, Cold War memory has continued to form and develop throughout the Cold War, and after, to influence these current perceptions.

The press Q&A was also an immersive act and centred on ‘second-person interpretation’, where the visitor adopts a character.¹⁰² This involved some audience members playing specific roles as members of the press, from various national and local newspapers. These audience members were handed clipboards to form a role in the act, where they asked set questions, followed by the mostly scripted answers by the actors. This enabled the audience to become part of the scene and interact, learning about the history of the base and perspectives of the peace camp from the American military, via the questions asked.¹⁰³ Ultimately, this engaged visitors and also provided space for the American perspective to be heard, as well as some local

¹⁰⁰ Thorpe, ‘Peace Camp to Stage: Greenham Common Is Venue for Cold War Play’.

¹⁰¹ Thorpe, ‘Peace Camp to Stage: Greenham Common Is Venue for Cold War Play’.

¹⁰² Scott Mangelssen, “Making History in the Second Person: Post-Touristic Considerations for Living Historical Interpretation”, *Theatre Journal*, 58 (2), 2006, pp. 291 - 312, referenced in Thomas Cauvin, *Public History: A Textbook of Practice* (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), p. 193.

¹⁰³ *Greenham Cold War Experience*, (2018) Greenham Trust.

animosity to the peace camp; reflecting the dual memory of the military and the feminist activism.

The military focus in the *Greenham Cold War Experience* was further added to with the act involving the sites' decontamination suite. Within this act the audience was greeted by the character Marjorie, the wife of the American Commander, Colonel Robert Thompson. Marjorie welcomed the audience, to the 'Family Orientation Day', which, like the Press Q&A, was supposedly organised to 'dispel the myths' which the protest had created about the base. However, Marjorie's welcome was interrupted by sirens, followed by two men approaching in overalls, face masks, and shouting through megaphones, warning the audience to stay still, as they had been contaminated and had to proceed through the decontamination suite. Whilst Marjorie's flamboyant character offered humour, the men themselves created a somewhat sinister experience for the audience, who were shouted at 'this is not a drill, I repeat, this is not a drill' and then were corralled into the decontamination suite where visitors were walked through several rooms and the process of decontamination.¹⁰⁴ This experience was highly informative of the process of decontamination, giving the audience some idea of the severity of the process, whilst also providing much entertainment for visitors.

However, whilst the suite did exist on site during the Cold War and was tested multiple times, the audience were informed that it was, thankfully, never actually used. One might therefore question why this scene was included in the tour. Interestingly, in the same article by the *Guardian*, Rosemary Richards from Fete Day, was quoted as declaring that, "We have decided to use the decontamination suite, although it is not part of the main cold war story. It started out as a bit of a sideline, but now, since the attack in Salisbury, it suddenly seems a lot more

¹⁰⁴ *Greenham Cold War Experience*, (2018) Greenham Trust.

relevant””.¹⁰⁵ This connection with the recent poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury in March 2018 was emphasised within the act itself. When one of the men was shouting from the roof, he read out a list of chemicals, the audience had been exposed to. An emphasis was placed on noting the nerve agent Novichok. Following the attack in Salisbury several months previous to the event, this would have been immediately recognisable to the audience, who would then be able to link the two events together, the main idea which was ultimately perpetuated was that of a chemical attack on ‘the West’. The inclusion of this scene and of Novichok provides an obvious example of the influence of contemporary events on cultural portrayals and memory. The use of Novichok and pointing to the events in Salisbury provided some form of relatability for the audience, and, arguably, would immediately trigger thoughts and perceptions of a Russian attack by Russian hostiles, influencing the cultural portrayals and the memory created. In this sense, we can see that recent events have shaped portrayals and memories but that these are also very much based on memories and cultural perceptions from during the Cold War itself, of a Russian enemy likely to attack.

This influence of recent events could also be said to provide a disjointed memory of the Cold War. As Rosemary Richards noted, the decontamination suite was only minor in the Cold War story of the base, and yet recent events would seem to have suddenly made it more relevant. The portrayal and memory were therefore shaped by this, demonstrating the fluidity of memory and its reactionary relationship to the present. It also, however, demonstrates a partly limited and simplified memory of the Cold War, reduced to the narrative of a Russian enemy, radiation scares and the drama of such processes, despite the fact that the decontamination suite was never actually used or needed. Consequently, not only does the inclusion of the

¹⁰⁵ Thorpe, ‘Peace Camp to Stage: Greenham Common Is Venue for Cold War Play’.

decontamination suite actually reflect contemporary events but also a somewhat simplified and nostalgic memory of the Cold War period.

In addition to the varying focuses of portrayals of the Greenham Peace Camp, there are several omissions. Among the omissions in the narratives of Cold War activism is that despite the prominence of Greenham Common within displays, other contemporary peace camps are rarely, if ever mentioned. Portrayals of Cold War activism, thus seem to focus on the larger or more press-covered movements and events, further perpetuating their prominence and significance in cultural memories of Cold War protest. Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp is perhaps remembered most due to the controversy that it created, particularly in response to the women-only initiative. As Schofield and Anderton remark, 'Greenham was different, in being consciously and deliberately women only (unlike contemporary peace camps at Faslane and Molesworth), and its agenda was wider as a consequence'.¹⁰⁶ That the Greenham Peace Camp represented a space and inspirational model for feminist action and women across the world, as well as a centre for anti-nuclear protest and non-violent direct action, meant that its reach was broad. It is thus likely the controversy over the women-only initiative and their actions sparks a vivid and also powerful memory of different aspects of Cold War protest. Ironically, however, as seen with the community-focused project at Greenham Common itself, this controversy can at times also mean that the focus on the peace camp is downplayed to allow space for the controversy and criticism which still exists. Again, reinforcing dominant memories over others, portrayals often simplify the wider reach of the peace and anti-nuclear movement in general.

¹⁰⁶ Schofield and Anderton, 'The queer archaeology of Green Gate', p. 237.

A further omission results from the focus on Greenham as primarily an anti-nuclear protest. Whilst there are brief mentions of the women-only movement, the situating and main focus of the narrative is in one of anti-nuclear protest and military narratives. The activism and context of the wider Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) greatly influenced Greenham Common. For example, June Hannam has highlighted how the WLM or Second Wave Feminism focused on questioning social constructions of femininity, and that 'autonomous women's groups' were key in the WLM, providing women with a space and opportunity to find their voice, with a further emphasis placed on the discarding of hierarchies.¹⁰⁷ Equally, Jill Liddington highlights the importance of non-violent protest to the WLM, whilst Margaret L. Laware adds that the WLM placed great emphasis on the use of images and symbols.¹⁰⁸ Each of these features of the WLM and Second Wave Feminism can be found at Greenham Common, from the rejection of men on the site, to the discarding of hierarchies and most visibly the powerful use of symbolism at events like Embrace the Base. The influence of the WLM on Greenham is therefore unmistakable, yet in limiting the information and focus on this, the *People Power* exhibition, and other portrayals, flattened the narrative to a primarily anti-nuclear one. The modern cultural memory of the Cold War as a turbulent era and the nuclear threat as one of looming apocalypse thus further shape the memory of activism. The memories and images of turbulence causing a focus on the anti-nuclear protest, excluding the broader context of feminism and protest in the era. The memory of the Cold War as a whole is thus shaped by this negative and nuclear focus, shaping not only which narratives are recalled but how they are recalled and what is omitted to maintain this narrative.

¹⁰⁷ June Hannam, *Feminism* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2012), pp. 81 - 83.

¹⁰⁸ Jill Liddington, *The Long Road to Greenham: Feminism & Anti-Militarism in Britain since 1820* (London: Virago Press, 1989), pp. 202 - 212, 235 - 236; Margaret L. Laware, 'Circling the Missiles and Staining Them Red: Feminist Rhetorical Invention and Strategies of Resistance at the Women's Peace Camp at Greenham Common', *NWSA Journal*, 16. 3 (2004), pp. 18 - 41 (p. 18), <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/4317078>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

5.5 Conclusion

The portrayals of Cold War activism explored here, present a rather dichotomous memory of activism; one divided between a celebration for anti-nuclear protest and having to acknowledge the Nuclear Disarmament Movement's failure to fully achieve its aims. This dichotomy represents a tension in *how* to remember Cold War activism and the Cold War more generally. As Lowe and Joel have stated, remembrance of groups such as CND has proved difficult due to issues surrounding the 'effectiveness' of the movements.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, this tension has resulted in variations in portrayals.

As has been demonstrated, portrayals of Cold War activism tend to focus on the anti-nuclear protests throughout the period. The centralisation of anti-nuclear protest over the Civil Rights movement, anti-Vietnam protests, WLM and student protests, demonstrates the significance of the memory of the nuclear threat, and Cold War opposition to that threat, in Britain's cultural narrative of Cold War history. The development of a cultural memory of the looming nuclear threat thus aids these portrayals, often providing a justification for the actions taken by anti-nuclear activists. This justification, in turn, allows for a more celebratory message, building on Phythian's argument that a memory of nuclear fear would enable a view of CND and others as more 'noble'.¹¹⁰ We see this most evidently in the film *Ginger and Rosa*, where Ginger's activism was not only justified as a response to the nuclear threat and the impending Cuban Missile Crisis, but was also the tool Ginger uses to survive her own domestic turmoil in the form of Rosa and Roland's relationship; Ginger's survival of which provides the central theme of the power of activism.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 46.

¹¹⁰ Phythian, 'CND's Cold War', p. 152.

¹¹¹ *Ginger and Rosa*, dir. Sally Potter.

Celebratory portrayals also capture the vibrancy of the protest movement during the Cold War. The inclusion of artwork, soundscape, and immersive experiences such as decorating the Greenham fence or taking part in participatory performances, creates an atmosphere of inclusion and of being submerged in the culture of activism. Despite many portrayals including some detail of controversies or divisions, the methods and approaches used to portray the narratives of Cold War activism in exhibitions, lend themselves to these more celebratory notions. In addition to this, the numerous depictions not only of culture but of specific individuals, their artwork, their role, and their personal experience, serves to highlight the idea of “ordinary people” taking action and having a voice. The narratives thus follow closely the general structure of the history of protest, through exploring social history and a ‘history from below’, providing a different perspective to periods of conflict.

The dominant movements and campaigns of Cold War activism form a further focus in cultural portrayals. This generally follows a pattern of mapping ‘peak moments’,¹¹² as opposed to presenting the complex reality of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement, its weaknesses, divisions and failures. This, however, echoes the tension between celebrating the actions of movements and individuals and acknowledging their faults. In focussing primarily on the ‘peak moments’, portrayals in films and exhibitions can attempt to accommodate this dichotomy or deal with its challenges. The uncertainty of *how* to remember Cold War activism can thus lead to more simplified, even rose-tinted, nostalgic and celebratory messages.

However, whilst the majority of portrayals are predominantly celebratory, this uncertainty over memory is also reflected in some portrayals providing a space to question the success of the anti-nuclear and peace movements. We saw this particularly in the *People Power* exhibition,

¹¹² Lowe and Joel, *Remembering the Cold War*, p. 47.

where visitors were openly invited to consider the success of protest over the last one hundred years. This questioning alongside such positive portrayals demonstrates the challenge of *how* to remember Cold War activism. Whilst there would appear to be a desire to acknowledge the actions of groups and individuals, there is an underlying tension that nuclear weapons continue to exist, and that controversial wars continue to be fought.

The portrayals explored in this chapter have also demonstrated attempts to include criticisms and voices against the protesters in order to accommodate the memory of, and even continued, animosity towards some of the movements and campaigns of the Cold War. This is most evident in the *Greenham Cold War Experience*, where much of the performance revolved around the military base, and only one act reflected the perspective of the Greenham Women's Peace Camp, to accommodate continued local animosity towards the camp.¹¹³ It is therefore clear that perceptions from the Cold War continue to influence cultural portrayals today and very much shape how Cold War "survivors" and younger generations view campaigns such as that at Greenham Common. The persevering controversy surrounding Cold War activism thus acts as a further contributing factor to the tension within cultural memories of Cold War protest.

Alongside existing Cold War memories, recent post-Cold War events can be seen to have influenced the cultural memory of Cold War activism and the conflict in general. This can be seen in the distortion of memories through the merging of recent events and Cold War events such as the emphasis on Novichok and the decontamination suite at the *Greenham Cold War Experience*. Equally, renewed hope in the power of protest in recent years enables a more celebratory and nostalgic memory of Cold War activism. The cultural memory of the Cold War

¹¹³ *Greenham Cold War Experience*, (2018) Greenham Trust.

and Cold War activism being shaped by the relationship between the past and future in the given present.

These various portrayals, with narratives of celebration and the power of protest, alongside a questioning of the true success of Cold War activism, capture this struggle of how to remember the conflict. This inherently reflects wider questions for the memory of the Cold War more generally. Was the Cold War won? Are there moments of the narrative to celebrate? Or is the Cold War increasingly seen as a period of British decline where both the “ordinary people” and British Government increasingly had little say in the global events surrounding them; and a period of a continuous, looming threat of nuclear war, a threat which arguably still exists today? These questions inevitably shape and influence cultural portrayals and memories of the Cold War, and the complexity and tensions within this memory can be seen in the dichotomy, of celebration and questioning, evident in cultural portrayals of Cold War activism.

6 Conclusion

In 2019, the *Protect and Survive* exhibition captured the divided and ambiguous memory of Britain's Cold War. From its dramatic portrayal of a "turbulent era" to a celebration of Cold War culture, the exhibition demonstrated the wide reach of the Cold War both in military and political spheres, as well as everyday life. Consequently, the key questions it evoked were: how was the Cold War lived and experienced? And can the Cold War be celebrated or simply remembered as a time of fear and turmoil?

The analysis of exhibitions, films and television dramas in this thesis has demonstrated that there is no clear consensus on how Britain's Cold War should be defined or remembered. The ambiguity of Britain's cultural memory of the period is evident in the diverse narrative frameworks in post-1989 films, television series and exhibitions. There is a persistent dichotomy between conveying a dark, turbulent era versus a sense of nostalgia for the Cold War. The memory of the Cold War as being ridden with terror and fear is particularly created in the nuclear narratives conveyed. The instantly recognisable and symbolic power of the nuclear mushroom cloud is employed across portrayals, from the mushroom cloud which opens *Ginger and Rosa*, to the enlarged mushroom cloud images which featured in the *National Cold War Exhibition*, and *People Power* exhibition. It is this imagery which helps to convey and justify the fears and actions of activists and protesters during the period. Equally, the macabre environments often created in nuclear bunkers open to the public, specifically those run privately by individuals, emphasise the bleak prospects facing the nation and the "ordinary" person in the event of nuclear attack. In particular, the nature of nuclear bunkers being secret military buildings, often underground, create cold, dark, and damp environments. The arena of articulation being especially relevant in creating this notion of a stark and troubled period. The

emphasis and even exaggeration of the Cold War as a dark period, creates entertainment but may also reflect a lack of memory, a need to highlight why bunkers were built and why activists campaigned. A lack of clear memory and distance from the period makes this necessary for modern audiences. A narrative of turbulence is equally reflected in portrayals of espionage, particularly regarding the Cambridge spies. The values which the spies shattered, from those of class to masculinity and sexuality, and breaking away from the wartime and pre-war values of gentleman bred for empire, symbolise and reflect the economic and political decline of Britain post-1945. The upheaval of such values is emphasised in post-1989 cultural portrayals, often with the Cold War being compared with the ideal and myth of Second World War bravery and heroism.

In contrast to these dark images of nuclear devastation and social and political upheaval, there are also clear connotations of a growing nostalgia for the Cold War in post-1989 portrayals. Despite the creation of several negative images and atmospheres, there is often also a sense of the certainty and order that came with the bi-polar world of the Cold War. In chapter two, the discussion of reports in the press of the unknown post-Cold War world reveal that a sense of nostalgia and uncertainty were predicted with the collapse of the Cold War order. This sense of nostalgia has been increasingly captured since the end of the conflict in portrayals of the Cold War. The espionage chapter for example demonstrated the appeal of spies taking action and, in the cases of George Smiley and Joe Lambe, bringing about justice despite their own character flaws and flaws in the system. Equally, the nuclear chapter revealed a strange nostalgia for the bomb. As Peggy Rosenthal declared, unlike modern weapons there was a visibility and certainty about the bomb. Today weapons such as biological weapons can be

invisible, the unknown danger being that much more threatening.¹ Lastly, post-1989 portrayals of Cold War activism, even whilst questioning activism's success, convey a sense of hope and celebration for activism, a hope that can be tapped into today in the increasing number of popular protests against Trident, President Trump or climate change. The Cold War was of course a time of fear for many, this fear lingering in the background to everyday life, the fear that a nuclear war may break out between the superpowers. However, a nostalgia is possible as a result of looking back on the Cold War from the given present. Current events including increasing proliferation in countries like Iran and North Korea, in addition to the unpredictable nature of tyrannical and populist leaders, creates an uncertain world. Whilst some fears remain, those of nuclear threat, the lack of established rules and understandings such as MAD, can result in the Cold War appearing safer, more orderly, even quaint in comparison to today's threats. Fears today thus make it possible to look on the Cold War with a rose-tinted view. Further to this, the unknown and nationless enemies facing the world today in the form of terrorism provide further uncertainty in contrast to the known enemy of the Cold War. Today's cultural memory of Britain's Cold War is thus dependent on the given present, shaped by past understandings and the developing memory throughout the Cold War and fears for the future. The past equally influences the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War today as Cold War "survivors" themselves create, shape, and reflect particular memories of the Cold War. Both Sally Potter and Toby Whithouse indicated that their childhood experiences of the Cold War in the 1960s and 1980s shaped their perceptions and memories of the period. These perceptions now being reflected in their films and dramas, shaping and moulding the memory of the Cold War for younger generations. Through the experiences of writers and others behind the

¹ Peggy Rosenthal, 'The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image', *American Literary History*, 3. 1 (1991), pp. 63 – 92, <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/489733>> [Accessed 19 May 2020], p. 89.

production of Cold War portrayals, the significance of the past being drawn into the present is evident. This thesis thus builds on and adds to the literature on Cold War memory through acknowledging the many time layers and influences on Britain's memory and experience of the Cold War, how this has developed and continues to be re-formed.

In employing Koselleck's theory of time layers this thesis has illustrated the futility of strict periodisation in relation to the Cold War. It is not possible to fully understand the legacy and memory of Britain's Cold War without acknowledging how memories have formed and developed throughout the Cold War and to present day. This approach enables an awareness of how the given present of the post-1989 world continues to shape and even distort cultural perceptions of the Cold War; allowing for a more comprehensive knowledge of why particular themes and narratives continue to be drawn on and emphasised.

Further to the influence of the given present and recent events, a resistance of strict periodisation highlights the influence of the Second World War, and more specifically the national memory of the conflict on the Cold War. Throughout the portrayals discussed there are often distinct comparisons between the Second World War and Cold War period. These comparisons often serve to convey the Cold War as a period of decline and turbulence in contrast to the victory of wartime Britain. For example, in the espionage chapter it was demonstrated that in Cold War espionage dramas produced after 1989, spies themselves often shared their disenchantment with their work and the system. In *The Game* both Daddy and Joe Lambe are shown to be disillusioned. Daddy in particular longs for the clarity of the Second World War, whilst Joe seems isolated and disconnected with little trust in anyone or anything.² Equally, in the remake of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, George Smiley's disillusionment

² *The Game*, BBC Two, 30 April – 4 June 2015, 21:00.

continues to be captured, yet with more exaggerated emphasis on Smiley's darker, grittier monologue about the decay in the East and West.³ Further to the examples in espionage, the sweet and innocent attempts of Hilda and James Bloggs to survive a nuclear attack as they did the Blitz in *When the Wind Blows*, captured the devastating complexity and danger of the Cold War and Cold War weapons in contrast to the Second World War.⁴ The memory of wartime Britain is played upon and utilised to create these negative depictions of the Cold War, the memories working alongside one another and shaping how each conflict is remembered. The two memories need to be considered together in order to fully understand the fluid and developmental nature of memory and the legacy of each conflict in today's world. Strict periodisation prevents an understanding for how memory of the Cold War has developed over the years and the many influences which construct, shape and re-mould that memory. Britain's strong national memory of the Second World War enables a more negative, contrasting memory of the Cold War. However, this negative memory is increasingly challenged by a nostalgia for the period, and as an escape from the uncertainty of the present and the future.

In addition to the dichotomy of turbulence and nostalgia, the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War is further complicated by the division between conveying the Cold War as a conflict or a period as a whole. The *National Cold War Exhibition* and indeed the *Cold War* series in 1998, both attempted in many ways to convey the Cold War as a whole and as a conflict, one which also influenced culture and society through propaganda. These narratives did however focus on similar 'hot points' such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin, Greenham Common or the CND.⁵ In contrast, the most recent exhibition explored in this thesis, the *Protect and Survive* exhibition at TNA, balanced a military narrative with one on everyday life during the Cold

³ *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, dir. By Tomas Alfredson (StudioCanal, 2011) [Motion picture].

⁴ *When the Wind Blows*, dir. Jimmy T. Murakami (Recorded Releasing, 1987).

⁵ *National Cold War Exhibition* [Permanent Exhibition] (RAF Museum, Cosford: 7 February 2007 - Present), visited on 4 February 2018; *Cold War*, BBC Two, 19 September 1998 – 9 May 1999, 20:05 and 20:00.

War. This exhibition differed from many other portrayals in emphasising the infiltration of the conflict into everyday life and its impact on the “ordinary” person. The exhibition thus placed much emphasis on the Cold War as a whole period.⁶ The IWM’s *Peace and Security* exhibition differed yet again in capturing a series of events and ‘hot points’ under the umbrella of the Cold War yet framed as post-1945 conflicts.⁷ The post-1989 films and television series which portray the Cold War also pay much attention to capturing a particular decade or Cold War aesthetic, capturing the period itself. Once again, the fact that there is no uniform framework for presenting the Cold War heightens the ambiguity surrounding its cultural memory in Britain.

As a result of this ambiguous memory, narratives are often simplified. As demonstrated with the *People Power* exhibition, the complexities of CND in regard to criticisms of the movement, divisions within CND or its relationship with the Labour Party had been omitted. In doing so this prevented the narrative becoming too complex for visitors, but also ensured the ‘people power’ message that the exhibition wished to convey. Equally, the limited information on decolonisation after the war and Britain’s role resulted in complexities of the Cold War being simplified into “other global conflicts”. Yet this lack of information also contributes to the uncertainty surrounding Britain’s role in, and experience of, the Cold War. This simplification was also found in the 1998 *Cold War* series, the Cuban Missile Crisis episode being criticised for conveying the event as a sudden outburst as opposed to a build-up of tension. These examples of simplification may be symptomatic of the complexity of the Cold War narratives and the challenges faced by those who attempt to convey the period or conflict. Consequently,

⁶ *Protect and Survive: Britain’s Cold War Revealed* [Exhibition] (The National Archives, London: 4 April 2019 – 9 November 2019), visited on 10 October 2019.

⁷ *Peace and Security, 1945-2015* [Permanent Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum, London: - 2020), visited on 10 October 2019.

similarities in the themes and topics presented are evident across post-1989 cultural portrayals, from the Cuban Missile Crisis in the *National Cold War Exhibition* and *Ginger and Rosa*, to the emphasis on Greenham Common and the CND in the *Greenham Common Cold War Experience* and *People Power* exhibition. The structure of this thesis demonstrates that the themes of espionage, the nuclear threat and activism form central focuses and ‘hot points’ for post-1989 portrayals. The cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War and the Cold War generally is centred on these topics, they have become the key moments and episodes of the Cold War in cultural memory. These moments are often moments of crisis and therefore drama. The repetition of these themes in portrayals therefore generates a dramatic narrative, both exciting and entertaining for visitors and viewers. As entertaining narratives these themes serve to attract visitors and viewers, their success at attracting people likely accounting for their continued employment and emphasis in Cold War narratives today. The entertainment aspect is key to consider here, as museums, films and dramas have to entice visitors and viewers. Certain aspects of the Cold War are inevitably exaggerated or emphasised to meet this, particularly the creation of dramatic scenery and spaces to draw out the turbulence of the era. The cultural memory generated is thus equally shaped by the financial needs of producers and museums; museums and bunkers often having to balance entertainment with education.

The cultural memory approach employed in this thesis has enabled a focus on cultural objects and institutions, and how these each influence the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War in the narratives that they choose. As Erll declared ‘the medium is the memory’.⁸ The fact that museums are now often sought as places of entertainment as well as education, we have seen, has some influence on how narratives are told and displayed. The active role of the visitor in engaging in the narrative, such as decorating the Greenham fence in the *People Power*

⁸ Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture*, trans. by Sara B. Young (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 115.

exhibition or experiencing a fallout shelter in Hack Green Nuclear Bunker, add to the immersive and entertaining experience. These moments both enable visitors to get a sense of the period they are learning about but can also distort or dramatise memories of the period. Equally, film with its ability to capture aesthetics and convey complex plots can create emotions and atmospheres that draw the audience in. These again can shape memories in their dramatic and emotional portrayals of betrayal, corruption, and fear. In exploring the temporal heterogeneity of these films and exhibitions, through interviews and reviews it has been possible to identify the influences surrounding the encoding and decoding of the portrayals, identifying how events such as the Iraq War, Trident debates and the Skripal poisoning can re-shape, re-frame and even distort the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War.

In acknowledging the complexities and many influences on cultural memory of the Cold War, this thesis has demonstrated how the cultural memory of Britain's Cold War has developed from the beginning of the conflict itself and been reshaped in each given present. As we have seen, the nuclear threat following 1945, at first dissipated in Britain, but from 1954 became increasingly looked to as an unimaginable threat with few portrayals in the 1950s and 1960s attempting to imagine life post-nuclear attack.⁹ However, following Hogg's argument, the 1980s saw increasing attempts to imagine the devastation that would follow an attack and increasing criticisms of the government's emphasis on deterrence.¹⁰ These criticisms and the debate between deterrence versus non-proliferation continue to be seen today. This was particularly evident in the 2016 debates surrounding the renewal of Trident. Cold War debates and rhetoric thus have their legacy in today's world, bringing the Cold War back into

⁹ Matthew Grant, 'The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65' in , *Understanding the Imaginary War: Culture Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90*, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 92 - 115, (pp. 94, 101 - 103); Tony Shaw, *British Cinema and the Cold War: The state, propaganda and consensus* (London: I.B Tauris, 2001), p. 132.

¹⁰ Jonathan G. Hogg, *British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), pp. 8 - 11.

significance. As such this in part explains an increase in Cold War narratives as proliferation issues and nuclear deterrence debates continue to fill headlines. The Cold War not only provides an understanding of these discussions but also provides an outlet to air debates from today's world without necessarily facing them directly. In *Ginger and Rosa* for instance, Ginger's activism can be interpreted as a criticism of inaction both during the Cold War but also today, as the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant proved that nuclear dangers continue to exist.

Similarly, whilst activism during the Cold War itself was often controversial with many criticisms of CND and the women at Greenham Peace Camp, for either being too left-wing, "foreign" or irresponsible, post-1989 portrayals of Cold War activism convey a narrative of celebration and 'people power'. As discussed, this falls in line with Phythian's argument that if the nuclear conflict was portrayed as a looming threat then activism would be seen as a more noble cause.¹¹ The memory of nuclear weapons generated today thus equally shapes and influences the memory of activism. Even though activism's successes and effectiveness are questioned in cultural portrayals, the narrative is primarily one of celebration and has developed to suit the ideals and perspectives of today's world. Protest and activism have become a key part of Britain's political climate since the Cold War. A recent sense of renewed hope in activism after the failure of the anti-Iraq War march in 2003, brings the power of Cold War activism into significance as something that can be drawn on. Equally, a lack of faith in the government following Iraq ensures that a people vs government narrative is relatable in today's world. Once more the conditions of the given present shape and determine both how the Cold War is presented today and how it is interpreted.

¹¹ Mark Phythian, 'CND's Cold War', *Contemporary British History*, 15 (2001), pp. 133 - 156 (p. 152), <<https://doi.org/10.1080/713999421>> [Accessed 19 May 2020].

Narratives of espionage both during the Cold War and since have often focused on the Cambridge spies and narratives of decline and betrayal, with the exception of James Bond who restored faith in British prowess. In this sense espionage narratives continue to follow similar themes, the modern espionage genre developing during the Cold War itself. However, certain aspects have new meanings as a result of being produced and decoded in the given present. For example, the notion of homosexuality as an indication of treason is now out of date, instead homosexuality in the 2011 remake of *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy* and *Cambridge Spies* series is used to emphasise the secret and disjointed lives of the spies, unable to be their true selves. Furthermore, following the Iraq War it has become possible for more people to understand the spies' position of love for country but their contempt for and betrayal of government. As reviews and interviews surrounding the *Cambridge Spies* series demonstrated, the contemporary debates surrounding Iraq enabled a more sympathetic interpretation of the spies' actions. It is thus possible to see how the given present of the portrayal's production and viewing, or encoding and decoding, has influenced and reshaped memories of the Cold War, with new conflicts providing a lens through which to view and compare previous conflicts.

In more general terms the changes in Cold War memory have seen an increase in nostalgia. Whether that is for the clearer order during the conflict as a result of rules such as MAD or a known enemy, or for the hope placed in protest which can be drawn on today, or even a sympathy for those deemed traitors of Britain as perspectives have changed. It is clear that both the simplicity of the Cold War in comparison to today and the increasing relevance of these themes and debates in today's world have brought the Cold War into significance, with recent events shaping perspectives and memories. The increasing number of exhibitions, films and series produced about the Cold War highlight the rising fascination and relevance of the topic, yet also a rising interest in understanding the conflict and Britain's experience of and role in it.

This thesis has contributed to the growing analysis of Cold War memory, yet there is still much to be understood about the impact of the Cold War in the world and in Britain. It will be particularly interesting and necessary to explore how this cultural memory continues to develop and re-form in the coming years. In particular the events of Brexit and Britain's uncertain position in the world may bring yet more relatability with the Cold War. Equally, the recent global turmoil caused by the Coronavirus pandemic will inevitably provide a new pinpoint in national and global history, one which will likely provide new perspectives for past events and particularly the security that the recent past can provide. The fluid nature of memory ensures that there will never be a definitive 'Cold War memory', yet continued analysis is required to understand the legacy of the Cold War in shaping the world around us and the place of the Cold War in Britain's national history and memory.

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