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Bounding the Inefficiency of Compromise in Opinion Formation

Caragiannis, Ioannis and Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Voudouris, Alexandros A (2022) 'Bounding the Inefficiency of Compromise in Opinion Formation.' Algorithmica, 84 (1). pp. 234-271. ISSN 0178-4617

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Abstract

Social networks on the Internet have seen an enormous growth recently and play a crucial role in different aspects of today’s life. They have facilitated information dissemination in ways that have been beneficial for their users but they are often used strategically in order to spread information that only serves the objectives of particular users. These properties have inspired a revision of classical opinion formation models from sociology using game-theoretic notions and tools. We follow the same modeling approach, focusing on scenarios where the opinion expressed by each user is a compromise between her internal belief and the opinions of a small number of neighbors among her social acquaintances. We formulate simple games that capture this behavior and quantify the inefficiency of equilibria using the well-known notion of the price of anarchy. Our results indicate that compromise comes at a cost that strongly depends on the neighborhood size.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Opinion formation; Nash equilibrium; Price of anarchy
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Health
Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 25 Nov 2021 13:30
Last Modified: 24 Jan 2022 21:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/31661

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