The Politics of Local Disaster Management in Thailand, A Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis of Earthquake Governance in the Upper Northern Region

Watcharapol Supajakwattana

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government

Department of Government

University of Essex

January 2022

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abbreviations

ANT	Actor-Network Theory
BMA	Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
CBDRR	Community-Based Disaster Risks Reduction
CBDRM	Community-Based Disaster Risk Management
CCDMN	Chiang Rai Civil Society Disaster Management Network
CEOC	Central Emergency Operation Centre
CDR	Community Disaster Recovery
CDRMN	Community Disaster Recovery Management Network
CRDMN	Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network
CRDDPM	Chiang Rai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
CREO	Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre
CRES	Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation
CDV	Civil Defense Volunteers
CODI	Community Organisation Development Institution
DCD	Department of Civil Defence
DDPM	Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
DDR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DDRM	Disaster Risk Reduction Management
DEOC	District Emergency Operation Centre
CDV	Civil Defense Volunteers
DM	Disaster Management
DOPA	Department of Provincial Administration
EOC	Emergency Operation Centre
LCE	Logics of Critical Explanation Approach
LEOC	Local Emergency Operation Centre
MEOC	Municipality Emergency Operation Centre
MOI	Ministry of Interior
NEOH	National Emergency Operation Headquarter
NDDPM	National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee

PAO	Provincial Administrative Organisation
PDNA	Post–Disaster Needs Assessment Approach
NDPDC	National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee
PDT	Poststructuralist Discourse Theory
PEOC	Provincial Emergency Operation Centre
SAO	Subdistrict Administrative Organisation
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk and Reduction

Abstract

Although disaster management has become an effective approach through which the security of society can be secured, it has produced failure and conflict in some circumstances. The academic approach given to this phenomena has often been criticised, namely in relation to how attention is given predominantly to technical and positivist means and thus how social and political dimensions are not adequately considered. Importantly, these neglected factors play a crucial role in determining the success and/or failure of disaster management.

Drawing upon Poststructuralist Discourse Theory, this thesis develops a new conceptual framework to critically explain the politics of disaster management, thus revealing the issues that are embedded in the construction of, and political practices involved in responding to, disaster management. It further analyses the politics of disaster management surrounding the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake of Thailand. At the national level, the thesis characterises disaster management via four key logics - security, bureaucracy, managerialism and hybridity - showing how their merging in a hybrid form has caused failure/conflict. The discourses that surfaced in this context are demonstrated to have manifested a political space in which local residents used logics of the community to politicise issues and to challenge the state. Conversely, logics of uncertainty and professionalisation were used as de/re-politicisation mechanisms by provincial agencies to regain authority. This thesis considers such disaster management as contested political terrain where political strategies were implemented through anti- and pro-central disaster management projects.

The thesis contributes to Disaster Management Studies in three ways – by offering an alternative means of conducting research as to disaster management politics, exemplifying the benefits of applying a logics approach in explaining the political practices involved in disaster management and calling for further analysis to be given as to the role of subjective desires and the affective register in this field.

Acknowledgements

This genesis of this thesis emerged from my scepticism towards Thailand's Disaster Management phenomena, particularly that witnessed in recent history. This stance has inspired me to seek a powerful and effective mechanism through which to comprehend the sophisticated and political phenomena which exists as a source of Thailand's repeated failure in instituting effective Disaster Management policy. Here, an in-depth and critical explanation has been produced as to the political phenomenon which manifests via the utilisation of Poststructuralist Discourse Theory or Essex School of Discourse Analysis.

The development of this thesis has spanned four years in the Department of Government, Centre for Ideology and Discourse Analysis (CIDA) at the University of Essex (Colchester Campus) and has included numerous people and agencies whom have supported the successful completion of this research.

Firstly, I would like to thank Chiang Mai University, the National Institution Development Administration (NIDA) and Naresuan University – entities that all played a role in training me as a social and policy phenomenon investigator. This gratitude is extended to several key players operating (or who have operated) in Thailand's Disaster Management system or who were/are involved in the Chiang Rai earthquake governance arena –for example, the coordinators of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network and Chiang Rai's DDPM officers who provided crucial information in this research, thereby illustrating the paradoxes, conflicts and issues faced in Thailand's Disaster Management operations following the 2014 Chiang Rai earthquake.

Secondly, during the problem comprehension stages of the study, the collation of documents and pertinent data could not have been achieved without the database access provided by Naresuan University Library and the National Assembly Library of Thailand. While conducting fieldwork, researchers from NIDA and Rajamangala University of Technology Lanna,

alongside local leaders from Wa-Wee, Sai-Kao and Pong-Phrae Subdistrict Administrative Organisations and NGOs (notably the Mirror Foundation and Local Thai Toys Group) played a pivotal role in providing empirical data able to demonstrate the occurrence of important political phenomenon.

Thirdly, in studying PDT within the CIDA, I have encountered and engaged with wonderful colleagues and world-class academics who have enabled me to heighten the critical approach employed in my research. In addition, the challenges, comments and recommendations raised as part of the PhD supervision panel constituting a committee of expertise – Professor Gina Yannitell Reinhardt (a preeminent Disaster Studies and Disaster Risk Management expert), Professor Jason Glynos (a leading PDT, logics approaches and fantasmatic practioner), and Professor David Howarth (a ground-breaking political theorist who developed PDT to account for empirical policy cases) – have guided this thesis to best illuminate Thailand's Disaster Management politics. The primary supervision of Professor David Howarth has provided continual support, inspiration and engagement, therein encouraging me to introduce new lines of inquiry and means through which to challenge orthodox Disaster Management and policy approaches. Ultimately, this has allowed me to produce more practical and critical research.

Finally, my academic journey thus far and its outputs would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my family – especially Mrs Panatchada Supajakwattana, my wife, who has dedicated herself to being both an academic colleague and a life partner, never abandoning me amidst a lonely, lengthy and challenging PhD journey in the midst of a global pandemic. Supajakwattana's family (Umbhon (Mom), Sompob (Dad), and Sujitra (Sister)) has, in addition, always been supportive of me in all aspects of my studying particularly during the completion year. The Faculty of Social Science at Naresuan University, Thailand must be acknowledged for recognising my potential to pursue a PhD and for funding me with a three-year scholarship. Ultimately, I acknowledge my colleagues at the Department of

Political Science and Public Administration, Nareasuan University, who have provided me with consistent motivation when I have found myself confronted with difficulties.

‘The contributions of this thesis are dedicated to the students of Naresuan University, as are the real scholarship funders.’

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Research Overview

More than a decade ago, significant and dramatic changes began to arise in relation to the world economy, society and politics. This was witnessed strongly in respect of technology, whereby such shifts have had positive impacts on human life in many dimensions – including in the provision of better standards of living and quality of life. Such adaptions appear to have enabled the building of a more sustainable society and, at the same time, to have reduced the insecurity of people's lives and property. However, alongside these outcomes, the manifest developments have also caused many adverse effects – including natural resources depletion, Climate Change and some of the worst natural disasters ever recorded (Zakour and Gillespie, 2013). The negative results here derive from a lack of planning by pertinent organisations towards ensuring global environmental sustainability in the use of resources across the world. Although in the last two decades, the United Nations has given greater focus to the concept of environmental sustainability among countries (Tonami and Mori, 2007; Mori, 2013) and to global Climate Change issues (Joyeeta, 2010), the negative impact of disasters continues to cause severe damage to many regions of the world. Globally, it is found that associated economic losses have increased more than twofold in the last twenty years (CRED, 2016) while the death tolls from such disasters have risen more than threefold since 2005.

Amidst this dramatic change and occurrence of severe disasters, most countries have reverted to emphasising their disaster management agenda as a powerful mechanism through which to reduce the loss and damage liable to be faced. The United Nations noted its concern as to the impact of disasters in 1990 and subsequently established the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 1994. These events were a landmark stage in the development of a global disaster

management system. In addition, the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World in 1994 emerged as one of the first plans positioned to respond to international disasters while the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk and Reduction (UNISDR) was established in 1999 to introduce and support pertinent mechanisms through which a framework (international plan) of disaster management, new disaster knowledge and disaster management tools could manifest. More frameworks have subsequently emerged, including the Hyogo Framework for Action which operated between 2005 and 2015 and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction which covers the period of 2015-2030 (UNIDSR, 2009). These provisions have become the primary approach used by most countries when undertaking their policy formation in this area. The United Nations' efforts here are not the only means through which disaster approaches have begun to move towards standard implementation on national and international levels. Notably, there has been a growth in disaster management studies being produced around the world – including in countries such as Japan, Australia (O'Brien *et al.*, 2006) and the USA. This academic work has led to disaster management practice and policy becoming substantial, inter-disciplinary and broadened to witness global provisions (Comfort, Waugh and Cigler, 2012). Disaster management has thus gained standard tools, approaches and essential knowledge that every country must accept and apply in reducing risk and loss and in ensuring that sustainable development occurs.

The benefits of the above-detailed steps have led to reduced causalities, loss of life and economic damage in the context of the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan (Panda, 2002; Okazumi and Nakasu, 2015), to effective responses and recovery arising in the context of the Christchurch Earthquake in New Zealand (Webb and McEntire, 2011) and to precise forecasting, advanced warnings and effective evacuation in the context of Typhoon Haiyan in The Philippines (UNOCHA, 2013; UNISDR, 2015; Stephens and Philip, 2016) Thus, it is evidenced that the advantages provided by contemporary disaster management drive countries to adopt the associated organisational structures, decision-making and intergovernmental collaboration when

confronting disasters. Nonetheless, some countries have not witnessed the same level of success as gained elsewhere. This may be seen to derive from a given country's lack of understanding as to how disaster management mechanisms should be positioned in practice or where that state lacks capacity in relation to the requisite resources, political agency and knowledge pertaining to disaster agencies (Tonami and Mori, 2007; Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011). In this regard, political issues seem to be a significant obstacle and directly influence the effectiveness of any disaster management apparatuses. Some research has identified the influential nature of politics in the enhancing or limiting of disaster management policies. For instance, a state's political landscape may affect the maintaining of the political authority required to undertake negotiations and expertise-based decision-making by bureaucrats and state agencies. This can lead to certain parties dominating the policy design and resource distribution processes of a state's disaster management. In this regard, the political strategies of central government may be employed in a way which limits decentralisation movements and leads to de- and re-politicisation where disaster management is utilised as a tool of populism rather than in responding to real problems (Murdiyarso *et al.*, 2004; Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Mori, 2013; Atkinson, 2014; Boin *et al.*, 2016; Riet, 2017). For some governments, it seems that disaster management has become a political mechanism and terrain within which politicians, policymakers, bureaucrats and stakeholders seek to challenge respective political states in an effort to obtain resource distribution authority, broadened power and the return of overt bureaucracy (Wood, 2015). Such political intervention in disaster contexts leads countries to encounter increasingly complicated problems and repeated failures – including disputes as to the value of public participation in policy production (value divergence), the fragmentation of problem formulation and solution processes, the politics of scalar and as to inter-organisational cooperation and multilevel governance. This reflects the state of wicked problems[1], all solutions in solving issues are still limited by a rational-technical approach that manipulate and limit the development of a disaster management system

(Rittel and Webber, 1973; Durant and Legge, 2006; Head and Alford, 2013). The outcomes faced here may negatively influence disaster policy implementation and result in policy failure (McConnell, 2010).

Thailand has undertaken its own disaster management approach for a number of decades (Khunwishit and McEntire, 2011). The Civil Defense Act of 1979 and the latest revision of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of Thailand of 2007 reflects the significant effort given to constituting disaster management designed to protect the country from significant (and ever-increasing) disasters [2]. The endeavours raised as to improving the capacity of Thailand's disaster management –in the structures in place for both central and local levels – have pertained to budgeting, organisational roles and command-and-communication procedures. This has led to the establishment of the National Disaster Warning Centre, as has permitted Third Sector entities (e.g., NGOs and international organisations) to be involved in Thailand's disaster management (Kamolvej, 2006, 2014; MOI, 2017) and has led to the re-considering of decentralised provisions within the disaster and environmental authority of local government. These appear to be major steps in the building of effective disaster management and in invoking radical change in this system. Importantly, the development of disaster management should arise as a model through which all authorities manifest a more systematic and coordinated approach in reflection of the conventional practices witnessed in many developed countries. The systems and policy formulations of disaster management in Thailand have, due to the aforementioned conflicts, led to complicated, diverse and uncertain problems being grappled with in disasters, for example, the northern wildfire and smog situations faced in 2007 and 2012 and the major flooding in 2010-2011 (MOI, 2017) revealed empirical failures and the recurrent dislocation of disaster management in various dimensions. Here, institutions responsible for Thailand's disaster system were found to be unable to deal efficiently with the devastation experienced due to organisational fragmentation[3] (e.g., bureaucracy separatism, institutionalised capacity and gaps in the provision

of services), rigidity (e.g., emphasis on the control held and inflexible institutions), scale (e.g., focusing on resources at a single level), elite capture (e.g., disaster management relying on leader interests and populism) and crisis (e.g., management based on political pressure and negotiation, as is not reliable in the long term) (Charoenmuang, 2006; Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Sighasem, 2013). In terms of intergovernmental relations, the outcomes of this disaster management has invoked various new terrains of conflict – whereby coordination fails to arise between central disaster agencies and local government entities and disputes emerge between central government and new disaster actors (e.g., non-profit organisations, international agencies and NGOs). Occurrences in this vein lead to mistrust between the central state and local areas and a blame game arising among central government, local bodies, populations, individuals and the mass-media in a disaster context. As a part of this, conflict appears in the political practice of local and not-for-profit organisations when negotiating resources between local movements and central government (Charoenmuang, 2006; Kamolvej, 2006; Tonami and Mori, 2007; Manuta *et al.*, 2009; Tiyapairat, 2012; Sighasem, 2013). Thailand's disaster management has thus become a maze which is difficult to systematically explain. This leads to problems when solving recurrent problems if only using orthodox methods of analysis.

The primary problems which occur here have changed the disaster management of Thailand into discrete areas of political conflict. The employment of political strategies by the central government of Thailand in constituting and controlling disaster management have produced mechanisms designed to sustain power and re-constitute big bureaucracy through strategies of de-politicisation and re-politicisation (Trakransirinon, 2010; Tiyapairat, 2012; Kamolvej, 2014; MOI, 2017).[4] In doing so, the disaster management of local government and other sectors has therefore become an area of negotiation where respective parties seek to gain authority and resources in disaster contexts and the ability to escape from allegations of policy

failure by criticising others and producing counter-discourses. These phenomena have rarely been touched upon in academic work produced as to disaster management.

The devastation of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake[5] clearly illustrates the failure of Thailand's disaster management policy, particularly in regards to its implementation process – both in its management and political aspects. Here, the disaster management enacted was unable to deal with the circumstances, whereby local government bodies and local agencies were not able to address the needs faced and there was no direction for coordination. The responses given were delayed and the local population was anxious about the earthquake's after-effects (e.g., building collapse) and the chaotic response and recovery processes instituted. The local government claimed that most of the managerial failure encountered derived from a lack of disaster management authority and resources being provided, asserting that every decision, resource and facility had been centralised by the central government of Thailand and that there was a deficiency in the experience and management abilities held through which to deal with the impact of earthquakes (INN, 2014; S. Khunwishit, 2014; Thairathonline, 2014). The central government of Thailand, as the principal supervisor in this case, failed to efficiently manage the situation or provide effective decision-making and comprehensive communication among provincial organisations such as Thailand's earthquake agencies and the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (CODI, 2014). Consequently, the management instituted was delayed in all stages of this disaster, resulting in detrimental effects for the local area, organisations and people. This affected the political situation of the time (2014-2015), where disputes frequently arose between local and central government entities in relation to several schemes. First, the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake created demands and grievances being held by the local government and local residents in relation to the delayed responses, underestimations held and unsupported measurements imposed by the central government. As a result, a coalition of local government and civil society organisations came together to raise local demands positioned to challenge the

central disaster management authorities of Thailand. Secondly, the central government of Thailand seemingly did not want to defend itself against any criticism of its actions nor did it want to lose its authority. Consequently, local disaster networks were gradually formulated of local coalitions, comprising 16 NGOs networks, local governments, university scholars, public media outlets and local community entities – as were positioned to identify and implement alternative disaster management forms. These networks were established to support the provision of local disaster management, offering this via negotiation and assistance from central agencies and other organisations (CODI, 2015). As the central government of Thailand appeared to disregard the activity and efforts enacted at the local level and any arisen community demands, it seemingly continued to respond to the earthquake via its orthodox centralised and technocratic style via manifold depoliticised and re-politicised strategies. Indeed, between May 2014 and June 2015, new rhetoric at the central/provincial level – for example, the earthquake being an 'uncertainty situation', that the central government 'did it better' than local efforts and that the new system would establish 'integrated and participatory management' and 'effective recovery and resilience building'[6] – were extensively employed (DDPM, 2016) Alongside this, several political projects were instituted – for instance, in relation to earthquake-related financial assistance, a master plan for earthquake hazard mitigation and building collapse prevention in post-earthquake contexts. These were designed to minimise local contestation and to denigrate the abilities of local alliances. Through such phenomena, Thailand's disaster management was transformed to manifest a terrain of conflict and to form the power practices of both the central state and local alliances.

1.1.1 Earthquake Governance of Thailand's Upper Northern Region

The upper northern region of Thailand, notably in the context of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, has witnessed disaster management being stated to be a panacea in solving disaster circumstances. At the same time, the disaster management practice employed has operated as political practice with contingency that can be constructed and reconstructed, or identified or redefined, by both the

central government of Thailand and local counter-alliances in order to respond to the demands which arose in this area and to maintain or regain power and authority. The manifestations of such power practices and political regimes have appeared in many instances:

First, following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, the disaster management of Thailand was problematised and challenged by local and community discourses, wherein demands were raised for the system to be more regulated and commanded by the central government, for the abolition of some assistance forms and for the accountability of the re-centralised functions. At that moment, the orthodox disaster system was denoted as having failed, from which local government entities and other local alliances were established to produce local and community networks which mobilised self-local and disaster management projects – such as the Chiang Rai Community Disaster Recovery Model, the Local Disaster Management Centre and a Fund Project as a 'success system' requiring the disaster management of Thailand to transform. This demonstrated the fluidity and uncertainty of disaster management being framed by political practice.

Secondly, the projects of both central government and local entities were mobilised as political (hegemonic) practice which aimed to articulate the disparate demands of people faced during devastating circumstances. The occurrence of these hegemonic exercises are significant and allows us to better comprehend the politics of disaster management. This is especially true for the strategies and logics of both central and local government alliances, as were diversely deployed during the earthquake recovery and mitigation process. Indeed, the centrality of this phenomena plays a crucial role in providing an opportunity through which to critically discuss the role of power and its articulation within disaster management discourses – this being understood as a source of repeated disaster management failure and its wicked problems.

Thirdly, and finally, this earthquake not only led to the formulating of new politics, but it also motivated a successful local anti-central government disaster management project - the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network. This comprised more than 40 organisations, some of which were constituted of local elected members, local government authorities and people/community members. Others witnessed the grouping of private businesses and voluntary organisations with demonstrable success in enacting local practice and models when negotiating with the powerful central government of Thailand. These strategies were influential in strengthening civil society organisations in the long-term. The case study of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake could thus benefit the exploration of the political formulations which arise in disaster and crisis contexts.

1.1.2 Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT), the Politics of Thailand's Disaster Management and the Policy Failure of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake

While some disaster management scholars has sought to explain the political practices which emerge in disaster contexts alongside the effects of such practice (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009; Pelling and Dill, 2010b; Grove, 2014; Weichselgartner and Kelman, 2014; Donovan, 2016), this area of consideration has received limited attention (Wyatt-Nichol and Abel, 2007; Andharia, 2020a; Horowitz and Remes, 2021). Most studies produced to date have focussed on how disaster management is perceived or how the disaster management discourse of developing countries or the international expertise of this area can have negative effects upon the policy processes and polity implementation in affected areas. Further attention has been given to the conflicts generated between central authorities and local people in such circumstances. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the studies produced have explored the political purposes of actors in disaster situations, whereby primary focus has been aimed at examining the power mechanisms in a given situation. Here, the dominant power apparatus is identified by considering discourse solely as a source of

politics. Consequently, the analysis provided as to the politics of disaster management has been limited and not systematically developed when seeking to explain the politics which arise here. Examples of crucial work in this area include that of Bankoff, Frerks and Hilhorst (2004) Bankoff and Hilhorst (2009) and Wyatt-Nichol and Abel (2007), as have predominantly adopted interpretive analysis and critical discourse analysis. Notably, only a few studies have focused on examining the ideas, interests, actors and structures which result in the fundamental conflict of disaster management politics. To put it simply, very little research has provided critical explanation as to what/how disaster management politics are fabricated and performed.

PDT is to be used in this case study as to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake to explain the politics of the disaster management of Thailand in this context. The characteristics of PDT lead analysts to emphasise radical contingency notions or to rely on the idea that all aspects of a given circumstance can be understood as political constructions which can take different dynamic forms in different political and historical contexts. This allows the observation of the political practices and interactions utilised when concealing the fundamental antagonism of social elements or discourses of disaster management. In doing so via the hegemony concept, explanation can be given to how elements of power or disaster management practice can be connected or separated in relation to disparate demands, thereby enabling us to understand moments of crisis and failure via ideas of dislocation (e.g., the declining of existing identities). Finally, this approach permits us to capture how people or actors dismiss and/or engage with policies, practices or regimes by analysing horrific and beatific narratives. Such a perspective enables critical explanation and interpretation to be given to the disaster management politics of Thailand, its chronic failures and the wicked problems which have appeared in recent decades.

The present study begins by exploring how the disaster management of Thailand has been framed via the problematising of relevant events, historical contexts, disaster institutions, ideologies and aspirational/political statements raised in relation to the disaster management of

Thailand spanning 1940-2015. The study, moreover, analyses how the outcomes of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake manifested policy failure and dislocatory moments in the disaster management of Thailand. This research therefore investigates the political exercises, negotiations and conflicts which arose between the local disaster management movement and the provincial/central government when operating post-earthquake management measures. This is to be achieved by adopting logics of critical explanation in elucidating the logics found in the political strategies employed alongside the performing of diverse hegemony and counter-discourse projects in that terrain.

1.2 Research Questions

The research questions of this present study have been generated by utilising the logics of critical explanation approach as a key strategy in assessing the politics phenomena of PDT. This allows us to problematise this phenomenon, to explore the reproduction and transformation of hegemonic orders and practices and to use reproductive explanations to make political phenomenon intelligible (Howarth, 2000: 72-73; Jason Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Thus, the research questions held are:

1. How was the disaster management of Thailand constituted and shaped between 1940 and 2015 and why did this manifest wicked problems and controversial issues?
2. What were the political practices and strategies of both the central government and local earthquake alliances of Thailand, as arose following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake?

1.3 Research Objectives

1. To identify how Thailand's disaster management was constituted between 1940 and 2015.
2. To understand the logics used to drive Thailand's disaster management and the resultant paradoxes and failures of this disaster management.
3. To investigate the political practices (and associated failure) of both the central government and local earthquake alliances of Thailand following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake.
4. To develop a methodological framework capable of analysing the role of power and politics that appear and operate in the disaster management terrain by drawing on PDT and logics of critical explanation.

1.4. Scope of Research

The present research considers disaster management as a key area of study when exploring the 'ignoble origin' of given discourse – with this being the radical contingency of disaster management. This focus allows us to understand how consent is created and how political practice is performed at different levels over time (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).

To answer the research questions held, emphasis is to be given towards analysing the politics of the disaster management of Thailand in two respects. Firstly, focus shall be provided as to the politics that occurred at the national/central level (e.g., in the policy formulation process) between 1940 and 2014. This is to reveal the dominant logics (ideological, political, discourse coalition, actor-led and institutional) that formed the foundation of the disaster management enacted in each era. Secondly, attention is provided as to the political strategies which occurred following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. The intention of doing so is to explore the political practices and

de/repoliticised processes of both the central authority of Thailand and the anti-centralised disaster management movement (local alliance network) which appeared in response to the failure of the orthodox earthquake governance implemented.

1.5 Structure of the Research

To detail the fundamental politics of the disaster management of Thailand in the past decade, the approach of PDT will be employed to reconstruct and critically explain the characteristics of disaster management, the key decision-making undertaken here, the contradictions faced, the rival discourses which arose and the discourse coalitions formed both in respect of the central government's efforts at the policy level spanning 1940-2015 alongside the period following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. This is to be undertaken through the examining of the discursive and non-discursive means articulated and shaped by key events, actors and power transitions as witnessed in the context of Thailand. To explain and characterise these issues, the research is designed to systematically answer the research questions held across nine chapters.

This first chapter has set out the background of the disaster management of Thailand and the characteristics of its wicked problems, policy failures and conflicts which have occurred in earthquake areas. It has also illustrated the main research questions that will be tackled and the overall purposes of this research, while sketching out the contours of the core argument. In the second chapter, in order to shape the theoretical framework of the research and to construct its analytical approach, an overview of PDT shall be provided alongside its limitations. In building upon this, specific attention is given to how PDT can be applied and related to the study of policy and disasters. This is to highlight the related conceptual logics that can be employed to explain the politics and twisted policy in disaster contexts – including the logics of critical explanation, hegemony and policy analysis, the logics of equivalence/difference and the concept of subject

position/fantasy. These concepts will help us to decipher the politics and problems encountered in relation to the disaster management of Thailand. To illustrate the mechanisms of policy failure, the emergence of politics and how best to comprehend these issues, the rest of the chapter considers the meanings, processes and development of these ideas.

The third chapter explores the logics of critical explanation to address how systems can be explained and how a research methodology utilising PDT can be explicitly operated within the field of policy research. From looking at policy problems to operational questions, this chapter will explain how such logics can be applied in examining the background of arisen policy failure, disaster management politics and policy discourses. This chapter also delineates how data has been collected via sampling and then analysed. The fourth chapter provides a history of disaster management and its associated policy in Thailand spanning 1940 – 2015. Here I illustrate the emergence of a new era of disaster management policy wherein security agencies, bureaucrats, and technocrats became key actors in driving this policy and decentralised ideologies were predominantly used in all management processes. The emergence of disaster policy in the third era, spanning 2007 – 2014, is shown to have manifested reshaped organisations, a master plan and the application of international concepts within the wider system. This led to the buffering of some of the demands raised by local government bodies and people following serious flooding in Thailand in 2013. Despite this, no changes were made to the fundamental ideological stances and key mechanisms of Thailand's disaster regime.

The fifth chapter problematises the phenomenon and discourses of the disaster management of Thailand via 3 logics which respond to ideological discourses, influenced actors, institutions and mechanisms. Therein, it is noted that the logics of the central government of Thailand became embedded in the state's disaster management system over a period of time via the use of a problematisation process (genealogical analysis). The sixth chapter will explore Chiang Rai's disaster management apparatus and logics as a system which related to the national

disaster management of Thailand prior to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. This overview provides a fundamental understanding as to the structural issues which escalated the demands and challenges of local coalitions alongside the politics which arose in this context. The seventh chapter will thoroughly scrutinise the politics that emerged in relation to the earthquake risk of Thailand between 2014 and 2015 in particular local coalition camps. Here, attention is paid to the failure characteristics identified, the source of local demands for revised earthquake management and the keys political (politicisation) strategies (logics of community) employed by local alliances when responding to provincial disaster management (as was perceived to represent a failed system).

The eighth chapter will demonstrate the political exercises or (de/re-politicised) strategies of the central/provincial government of Thailand as deployed to respond to and diminish the challenges raised by local alliances as an anti-central disaster management movement. This was enacted to regain central authority in the earthquake governance enacted during the post-earthquake recovery process (e.g., between August 2014 and May 2015). This chapter will explore the political contexts of Thailand that invoked sources of local demands, new nodal points and the assessment of effective political strategies through which to effectively disintegrate local alliances. The ninth and last chapter will provide key conclusions as to the fundamental wicked problems and failures faced at the national level in Thailand, the characteristics of the disaster management politics which occurred in response to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, the achievements of the overall research presented in this thesis and, finally, the benefits and drawbacks of utilising PDT in relation to disaster management practice and policy.

Chapter Two

Disaster Management as the Political Realm: Poststructuralist Discourse Theory as a Critical Tool in Analysing the Politics of Disaster

Introduction

The concept of disaster management has been accepted as a fundamental notion of study when considering how best to mitigate damage and loss from disasters and when seeking to build society in a way which eliminates risks, hazards and disasters via the establishment of sustainable and resilient systems. However, as a discipline which relies on a base of positivism, scientific knowledge and trust is given to the provision of systematic data when undertaking decision-making. Furthermore, emphasis is provided as to the need to create consensual solutions through which to guide countries/societies rather than the focusing on the requirement to institute features designed to positively affect pertinent management in that area or to enhance public confidence as to the present administration. This approach invokes several difficulties for wider social systems and populations. The occurrence of conflict, the contestation of people and communities, the disruption of existing social inequality and the trust given to the state and its disaster management systems are, among other aspects, unable to be appropriately addressed via conventional Disaster Management Studies.

In framing the critical analysis produced in this area via Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (or the Essex School of Discourse), a means becomes available through which to explain disaster management problems from different angles – therein allowing us to unpack the politics of disaster management, to comprehend the dynamics of disasters and the meaning and power of disaster management and to understand the political exercises which arise within disaster circumstances. This has the ability to realistically illuminate the origin of various disaster management issues,

particularly those which lead to failure and wicked problems. Under the key concepts of PDT, essentialist and foundationalist orientations are dismissed and attention is paid to the primacy of politics, the perceiving of disaster management as radical contingency constructs and the providing of critical explanation as to the political practices encountered in disaster management areas. This differentiates PDT from other critical stances and such ideas can help us to better explain and understand the conflict and wicked problem which have appeared in the disaster management systems of Thailand.

To conceptualise alternative ways through which disaster management, as a political realm, can be approached, the present chapter is divided into three key sections. In the first section, Disaster Management Studies as an academic field is delineated by exploring the main focus and epistemology given towards both the hazard paradigm and the vulnerability paradigm. This overview is provided alongside the gaps and criticisms which have been identified in relation to each approach. To deeply understand the politics of disaster management, the second section reviews Disaster Management Politics Studies, therein detailing the key characteristics, prior research and main challenges faced in regards to each research approach. Further to this, it is elucidated how each means of study is limited in explaining the emergence of the politics/political logics operated within disaster management. The identification of such knowledge gaps is able to lead to the third section, as addresses how PDT responds to such gaps and supports disaster management research in explaining the political formations and political strategies witnessed in disaster and crisis arenas. In this regard, PDT has the potential to provide a critical explanation as to the root of political conflict in disaster management by exploring, for example, ideas relating to radical contingency, dislocation, hegemony and affective dimensions – positioning these as mechanisms in reconstructing the emergence of the politics in the arena of disaster management.

2.1 Disaster Management Studies: Hazards, Vulnerabilities, Paradigms and its Critique

The study of disaster management has expanded in the past decade and positioned as a crucial approach in producing significant solutions through which to mitigate society and in providing a centre in which vast participation can emerge from interdisciplinary scholars in finding disaster solutions.

In reflection of this, the work of Quarantelli (2000) has addressed how dynamic changes of perception and the identification of disasters in each era of human history (e.g., spanning acts of God, acts of nature and outcomes of human activity) have influenced Disaster Management Studies to assume different characteristics, focuses, perspectives and weaknesses.

From the epistemological perspective, fundamental disaster management can be categorised between two crucial paradigms. The first, the 'hazard paradigm' or 'event-centric approach' (Hilhorst, 2003; Andharia, 2020a) views disasters as a neutral arena and as extraordinary events wherein the devastation (and its location) is separated from the normalcy of human society and life. Such situations can be controlled and need to be appropriately managed in order to secure society via the application of expert knowledge and/or scientific study (e.g., by geologists, hydrologists or climatologists). Technological solutions are here thus the main means through which disasters and hazards are resolved without regard being given to ecological specificity or cultural contexts (Andharia, 2020b). Of course, under this paradigm, people are perceived as the victims of a disaster and as clients who shall receive the prepared drill of government. In this context, formal agencies and actors – following the standard operations, expert knowledge and best practice guided by scientific knowledge – manifest the primary apparatus involved and play an important role in processing disaster prevention systems and in seeking appropriate means of resolving all of the issues liable to occur in a disaster terrain. The majority of studies have focused on impact, the measurement of exact magnitudes and the analysing of the causes and structures of

natural phenomena as can be experienced concretely and measured. Such disaster management represents positivist Social Science, thereby invoking a de-politicised approach to disasters which is directly influenced by Structural Functionalism Theory[7]. This research emphasises the building of effectively-organised societies/communities via the utilisation of advanced scientific technology (to assess impacts and outcomes), the invention and creation of new management approaches to deal with disasters and the routes through which disaster areas and the behaviour of crises-affected people can be understood (Donovan, 2016; Tierney, 2019; Hillhost, 2011). Key examples of such work include that of Prince (1920) and Carr (1932) and much of the work produced under the Disaster Research Centre – such as by Haas, Kates and Bowden (1977), as have focused on community, social recovery and the adaptation processes and approaches witnessed after the 1964 Great Alaska Earthquake. Similarly, White (1945;1972) and White and Haas (1975) have explored several flooding and natural hazards in the USA, while Parker and Harding (1979) have worked under the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Centre – with such research output having consistently asserted that scientific and communication technology must be applied if disaster warning/preparation provisions are to be effective and if the human psychology of disasters is to be positioned as helping to solve disasters and minimise hazard impacts.[8]

Although this paradigm has had popular appeal among practitioners and policy makers alike, primarily as a result of its outcomes as to predicting and preventing disasters, the approach has nonetheless been critiqued by progressive geographical and sociological scholars – for example, Hewitt, (1983) has argued that Disaster Studies should explore more than geographical factors and thus must emphasise social vulnerability as a source of disaster. Scholars which have followed the Quanrantelli school of thought[9] have applied the concept of social behaviourism to explain and resolve disaster problems in parallel with scientific and managerial notions, therein

arguing that disaster management which focuses solely on hazards, and that neglects to understand the surrounding social system, behavioural and cultural dimensions and that primarily aim to install a scientific disaster system will not be comprehensive. If such a comprehensive view is not taken, then no resolution shall be gained in either reaching the study aims held or appropriate/responsive disaster mechanisms as disasters are social phenomena or occasions that don't exist without human (or other) practice forms (Quarantelli and Dynes,1977; Quarantelli,1987; 1988; 1993; 2000). Consequently, Disaster Management Studies undertaken without addressing human ecology have been sources of conflict and failure in society (Tierney, 2019).

Evidently, challenges have arisen since the 1980s to establish a different approach, that of the 'vulnerability paradigm', whereby the 'event-centric technocratic (hazard) approach' is countered. This vulnerability paradigm has been influenced by sociological, anthropological and geological scholars (such as Hewitt (1983) Susman, O'Keefe and Wisner (1983) Quarantelli (1988)). A notable aspect of this model, as delineated by Kenneth Hewitt (1983) in his work entitled 'Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology', is that it holds disasters not as primarily the outcome of geographical processes but rather of structural factors (such as increasing poverty and related social processes) which account for the vulnerability of people and societies towards disasters. The connecting of social vulnerability to disasters was, in that period, novel as disasters were predominantly equated to natural hazards.

Through this change, the vulnerability paradigm has expanded the remit and focus of Disaster Studies, leading to disasters being defined as a fundamental aspect of social life and a consequence of how society is structured (economically and socially). Hence, Disaster Studies here need to examine 'the process/event involved, the combination of potentially destructive

agents from the natural, modified and/or constructed environment and a population in a socially and economically produced condition of vulnerability' (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Riet, 2017).[10]

The interventions and research approaches invoked by this paradigm have gained the attention of some academics, moving their emphasis as given to natural conditions being crucial causes of disasters (Oliver-Smith, 1996, 2016; Quarantelli, 1998) and leading to explanations being provided as to the origins of risk and the influence of risk factors by assessing the sources of disasters (e.g., identifying the vulnerability faced) (see Blaikie *et al*., 1994; Wisner *et al*., 2003)[11]. The vulnerability paradigm has also led to the exploration of disaster consequences in primarily qualitative (rather than quantitative) terms – thus looking at the psychological damage, long-term vulnerabilities and resilience encountered. Finally, instead of focusing only on the recovery-based operations launched in responding to a disaster, the vulnerability paradigm leads research to address the pertinent strategies which span disaster mitigation and preparation, risk assessments and cultural/environmental development processes. Over time, this has led to the concept of 'comprehensive (disaster) vulnerability management' (McEntire *et al.*, 2002).

It could be said that the provision of this paradigm pertains to its transforming of disaster management from being dominated by positivism to increasingly utilising constructivism (Andharia, 2020a), the latter of which emphasises the complex and dynamic nature of human–environment interactions in the disaster and crisis domain (see the research of Albala-Bertrand (1993), Stonich (1993), Blaikie et al., (1994), Hewitt (1995), Pelling, (1999), Kelly and Adger (2000). This paradigm has become the dominant approach in studying disasters and has become manifest in mainstream international practice.

To date, although both disaster management paradigms have benefited the development of Disaster Management Studies and associated systems, critiques have arisen among scholars. A prominent criticism given here holds that disciplinary work which intensively relies upon a

positivist or descriptive empirical approach shall result in explanations and solutions which focus on causation and that pay attention to narratives as to what transpired and its consequences. This will lead to emphasis being placed on disaster prediction, prevention and response processes and outcomes (Riet, 2017; Andharia, 2020). Consequently, the resolutions and practices of these approaches have comprised scientific, rational and technological "fixes" which, in turn, have resulted in the paradigm of disasters becoming largely event-centric and bounded by space and geographies. Likewise, the assumed neutrality of science in both paradigms results in the commodification of knowledge around disasters, whereby experts and consultants push certain kinds of knowledge and strategy forms. This leads to a lack of attention being given to the significance of social and political power dimensions when determining the failure or success of disaster management. This limits how disasters are understood, addressed and explained, especially in the realms of policy, politics and academia (Riet, 2017; Tierney, 2019).

In light of such paradigms, it can be said that, at present, Disaster Management Studies and its associated practice remains trapped in approaching such issues via descriptive, empirical and rational means. The limitations encountered here repeatedly cause inappropriate research question setting and explanation production. Furthermore, the normative is rarely articulated. Unsurprisingly, the theorisation of disaster management is thus often weak and emphasises how policies and/or processes can be successfully practiced (Andharia, 2020b).

Accordingly, critics have questioned how the current (limited) disaster management paradigm is able to fully explain the politics or repetitive failure and wicked problems of disaster management systems. It has also been asked whether approaches can be employed to critically explain disaster management phenomena. Such queries have invoked us to explore other alternative disaster management paradigms. To expand upon this idea, the next section considers the primacy of politics in the research of disaster management.

2.2 Politics of Disaster Management: Gaps and Challenges

It is appropriate to consider Disaster Studies as an assemblage of theories, practices, discourses and institutions that seek to derive meaning from the ideas held as to disasters and disaster management, doing so in order to comprehend the roots of the issues and logics maintained in the decision-making and frameworks utilised (Andharia, 2020a; McGowran and Donovan, 2021). Understanding disaster management via the lens of positivism and a rational approach may not be enabled to explain and resolve all disaster issues and wicked issues, namely as disasters and crises are realistically constituted of social interactions and constructions. The emergence of a disaster is liable to change social interactions, re-balance power and stimulate fundamental problems and societal conflicts. Instead of manifesting as a tool through which to respond to unbalanced and unequal power amidst a disaster situation, disaster management has become a mechanism of hegemony positioned to dominate power and increase social inequality. Thus, the revealing of the power, practices of power and politics which are foregrounded in disaster circumstances is crucial in approaching chronic and wicked issues (Donovan, 2016; McGowran and Donovan, 2021).

Notions as to the politics of disasters and disaster management have been increasingly addressed by both empirical and critical disaster management scholars, whereby attention has been given to the idea that the occurrence of disasters and crises always leads to changes in power structures, increases in the demands of people and shifts in power practices (Pelling and Dill, 2010a). Consequently, the disaster management terrain is heavily related to political context, conflict, resistance and domination (Kuus, 2014). Hence, it can be said that disaster management processes are realistically un-immunised from politics or are disputed when seeking to yield rational consensus or technocratic solutions.

When attempting to understand the politics involved in a disaster situation, it is crucial for disaster scholars to perceive the complex root of the problems encountered and to accept that

technical-only approaches cannot provide a full resolution (Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009; Pelling and Dill, 2010a; Grove, 2014; Weichselgartner and Kelman, 2014; Donovan, 2016).

Within the study of disaster management politics, it is found that different perspectives, comprehensions and interpretations exist. There are two crucial approaches presented in relation to this research. A dominant approach here pertains to those who study empirical disaster management politics. Politics, under this perspective, comprises the action or practice of governments alongside the authority and influential held by social organisations or people who desire to steer how management or governance is enacted. Here, politics can be observed and empirically analysed under the dynamics of the political realm and in relation to the policy processes raised as to disasters and crises (e.g., the positivism approach). It is not a shock to find that the influence and intervention of different organisations and groups involved in enacting disaster management systems and policies (or indeed those who instigate political conflict and the adaptation of disaster management systems) have become key figures of focus. Thomas Birkland (2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), whose influential 2009 work of 'Disasters, Lessons Learned, and Fantasy Documents' and 'The Politics and Policy Challenges of Disaster Resilience', has demonstrated the primary conflicts and challenges faced in disasters or crises are the outcomes of political or deviant behaviour/action undertaken by the state or related authorities. This may include the provision of inconsistent definitions being given towards disaster resilience, the lack of political commitment being placed as to instituting disaster management and the presence of incomplete intergovernmental policy processes. Similarly, the works of Olasky (2006), Olson (2008), Boin et al. (2016) Kapucu and Boin, (2016) present how states apply political strategies and leadership in an effort to deal with major disasters/crises. In doing so, attempts are given to explaining the lessons learnt from disasters, how governmental crises have led to certain decision-making and the different communication means of respective governments. Although such studies are fruitful in helping us to understand the behaviourist political strategies of authorities (actors)

in crisis circumstances (events), those research examples do not pay attention to analysing discursive practice, the political tactics of informal groups or the context/situation of disaster management subjects and strategies. This context comprises the practices which occur both from the given disaster situation alongside the surrounding long-term political, historical, power-balance and socio-economic aspects. By neglecting to consider these areas, insufficient explanation shall be reached as to the political logics rooted in the political exercises relating to disaster management. Furthermore, a lack of critical elucidation shall be gained towards the political struggles which arise between states and dominated camps.

The second means of understanding disaster management politics is through the provision of critical analysis**.** If the aforementioned approach seeks to understand the prevailing reality of politics (in a descriptive sense), critical analysis scholars attempt to explain how a given political realm could be a normative ideal and thereby reveal additional pertinent disaster management practices and political exercises. This is achieved by illustrating how all manifestations and practices of disaster management constitute the concealed power mechanisms of authorities. Disasters and crises are thus a political space where power operations are enacted through disaster management tools (e.g., disaster expertise techniques, disaster risk assessments, mapping and jargon) to suppress and devalue other (and potentially alternative) power forms, local knowledge and approaches/perspectives. Consequently, crises inherently comprise conflict and contestation in both expressive and non-expressed forms. Bankoff and Hilhorst (2009) have clarified that the dissimilar nature of such politics is concealed behind a facade of shared language as to disaster and crisis management implementation. This evokes disaster conflict that leads to power struggles, competitiveness, attempts to gain/maintain hegemonic power and negotiations of power between different groups in crisis (Grove, 2014; Pugh and Grove, 2017; Riet, 2017). To elucidate, a Foucauldian approach (e.g., as pertains to discourse, biopower and governmentality) is mainly deployed for analysis and to explain the dynamics of such politics. This is also employed in an

attempt to find objects of power, the discourses which represent power and the governmentality that acts as the origin of politics. Significant work in this area includes that produced by Bankoff (2001) and Bankoff, Frerks and Hilhorst (2004), as have shown that Disaster Risk Reduction and vulnerability ideas are concealed by Western discourse that has been historically, ideologically and culturally grounded in Western thought. Grove (2010;2014) has also approached this area by focussing on Climate Change adaptation under the rubric of disaster management research[12], viewing this application as comprising international frameworks and guidelines framed as biopolitics. This is in line with the findings of many scholars – such as Gaillard (2010), Davoudi (2012), Reid (2012), Joseph (2013), Grove (2013; 2014), Riet (2017), Lövbrand, Stripple and Wiman (2009) and Lövbrand and Stripple (2011). Thus far, it could be concluded that such research is significantly influenced by Foucault's ontology of discourse as is purposed to show the weaknesses or dark side of disaster management via the interpretation of the surface meanings of discursive practice, the systems of rules which govern the production, operation and regulation of discursive statements that appear within disaster management systems and the conflict derived from different perspectives and endeavours as to dominating power via disaster management language and institutional ideologies/knowledge. The focus of this research has often been given to delineating what and where is the object and element or mechanism of such power and the characteristics of its suppression of power. However, this approach has seemingly been unpopular among mainstream disaster management scholars, with stronger focus continuing to be given to the analysis of texts or discursive practice than to real practice. By over-exaggerating ideological and subjective factors, no practical proposals emerge for disaster management systems and a collective concrete methodology (methodological anarchism) through which to directly access complex politics remains lacking.

From the broad literature and criticisms detailed here, it might be argued that such studies continue to face limitations, with the two considered conceptual frameworks (e.g., positivism and

critical analysis) appearing to be in parallel. It can thus be questioned how these frameworks can be operationalised together to explain the politics of disaster management and, furthermore, how a concrete method may emerge through which to access and critically explain the politics which manifest a source of disaster management failure.

This research therefore seeks to both address these gaps in the research of disaster management and to open up new epistemological and ontological avenues of disaster management and disaster risk reduction research via multiple lens in an effort to understand the political arenas of disaster management. The next section will elaborate upon this approach.

2.3 Poststructuralist Discourse Theory and Radical Contingency: Fundamental Framing and Apprehension in the Politics of Disaster Management

Within environmental politics and policy research, one notion considered is the political performance and political strategies deep-rooted in any policy and management undertaken. Most critical scholars refer to this approach as constituting PDT, a method of thought designed to deconstruct dominant power forms, to emphasise the radical contingency of social life (whereby all practices are politically constructed) and to explore the interaction of ideas, interests, agencies and structures (and their roles) as the core and heart of politics (Griggs and Howarth, 2013a; Nabers, 2016; Howarth and Griggs, 2017b). Consequently, this approach has gained attention from interdisciplinary and critical scholars who seek to deeply understand given politics from different perspectives. In recent decades, PDT has been increasingly adopted to assess and explain various political phenomena, strategies of contestation, post-political modes and the roots of policy failure. Significant work in this area has pertained to the logics of UK health policy in relation to UK airport expansions (Glynos, Speed and West, 2014), the construction of Climate Change adaptation policy (Remling, 2018), the depoliticisation of marine spatial policy (Tafon,

2017; Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018) and the limits of Nantes' urban planning policy (Griggs, Howarth and Feandeiro, 2018; Howarth and Griggs, 2020).

The distinctive characteristics of PDT in terms of its ontology and epistemology firstly are positioned against positivist, essentialist epistemology and foundationist ontology, therein presuming discourse as 'articulatory practice' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).[13] This allows the approach given to go beyond 'talk and text' and to encompass practices and institutions together and to re-signify pertinent elements into a rational system. Secondly, PDT, as articulatory practice, supposes a world of radical contingency that has no fixed essence and instead can be constituted and reinterpreted via different forces. Thirdly, PDT hinges on the belief that the articulation of contingent elements in moments of discourse yields certain systems of order of meaning. By including forms of power that exclude certain elements, such order is always incomplete and is marked from the outside (Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018). Fourthly, PDT is constructed by ideas of uncertainty, whereby the meaning of discourse or practice is partly determined by the role of a nodal point and empty signifier, as are privileged moments of organisation (nodal point) and the signification of discourse or social order. This function is designed to merge together elements and differences, then furnishing a partially-fixed identity at a particular time. Fifthly, under PDT, practice and discourse which occurs in the field discursively cannot be loosened or emptied but can be fixed and re-established. Sixthly, PDT denotes that subjects or political agencies are not the origin of an outcome or practice and are instead located as part of the discourse. They can be contingently framed and reframed, particularly in crisis or dislocation circumstances. Here, they can shape the antagonistic relations that are considered to block their identity and interests (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Howarth, 2000, 2013b). Finally, PDT constitutes a practical methodology and systematic approach (as the logics of critical explanation) through which examination can be given of emerging politics as to various issues. In sum, these attributes may go beyond existing studies

and help the vigorous investigation of disaster management as a manifestation of political practice or strategy.

2.3.1 Politics of Disaster Management as Radical Contingency

Radical Contingency

Drawing on foundational PDT as to radical contingency, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have indicated that the social comprises radical contingency or that the world is constituted by irreducible contingency. Indeed, radical contingency draws upon the recognition of negativity or antagonism which permeates all social relation systems. Such antagonism blocks the full totalisation of society and thus forecloses the possibility of a society in which divisions and powers are eradicable (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 2014). Society, in this way, is marked by a continual lack and is presumed to be an uncertain terrain overflowing with a constitution of hegemonic practice, thereby seeking to build order in the context of contingency (Mouffe, 2013). Thus, societal forms and the identities of subjects and objects are not ahistorical nor are they determined by a pre-given essence. Instead, they are a consequence of political struggle and transformation (Howarth, 2010; Mouffe, 2013). Radical contingency is, in brief, a notion that allows us to illustrate the role of power and ideology in forging and stabilising social order (Howarth, 2010). It also allows a realisation of the uncertainty of power that is challenged and blocked by both the environment and practice itself (Griggs and Howarth, 2016; Howarth and Griggs, 2017b).

Primacy of Politics

In order to connect the radical contingency notion with the ‘primacy of politics’, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) have demonstrated in their social ontology that systems of social relation, which are understood as articulated sets of discourse, are always political constructions involving the construction of antagonisms and the exercise of power. Moreover, since social systems have inherent political characteristics, they are rendered vulnerable to those forces that are excluded in the process of political construction (Howarth, 2000). From here, it can be said that social

antagonism is central to PDT, whereby the existence of antagonism proves the contingency notion which holds that there are no necessary laws of history or universal political actors motivated by pre-constituted interests/identities. Instead, antagonism establishes the social experience (such as failure, wicked problems, negativity or lack), as cannot be comprehended by any positivist or essentialist logic of society. Additionally, antagonism discloses the contingency and instability of all identities and social objectivity, a result of all identity being threatened by external elements. The role assumed is to construct social objectivity, as a social formation, depending upon the antagonistic relations held between social agents 'inside' and 'outside' of the given social formation (Laclau, 1990). Thus, antagonisms reveal the political frontier of a social constitution, thereby representing the moment where identity is uncertain in a meaningful system of difference and where challenge by force can emerge (Howarth, 2000).

Against this setting, studying the 'primacy of politics and radical contingency is significant in explaining the politics of disaster management as unstable and as manifesting a structure of contingency. This allows us to approach the political exercises and phenomena (of exclusion or inclusion) employed to fix the identity of disaster management under the contingency of a social context. In doing so, a critical explanation of politics can be produced (Howarth, 2010; Howarth and Griggs, 2017b).

2.3.2 The Political Dimensions of Disaster Management: Dislocation and Hegemony

Within this framework, the politics of disaster management are considered to be the totality of any practices, discourses and institutions that attempt to organise or reorganise social and human community orders which are permanently in conflict and antagonistic due to the effects of the radical contingency foundation held. The political practice which appears in a given terrain shall therefore involve the construction of social antagonism and the creation of a political frontier between a force and subjects (Howarth, Glynos and Griggs, 2016; Howarth and Griggs, 2017b).

Disaster management, in practice, is therefore not immunised from the politics or conflict terrain ready to dislocate and disrupt over time.

In terms of understanding the politics of disaster management when following this notion, both the discursive and non-discursive phenomena encountered here should be analysed or interpreted together as all objects and actions are meaningful (Howarth, 2000) in the social system. For instance, non-discursive disaster management phenomena (e.g., attempts being made to increase participation, provide integrated planning regulations and institute community-based disaster risk management) are often in-and-of-themselves discursive and may shape systems of inclusion and exclusion in which there are winners and losers. By attempting to organise human communities and resolve disputes around a disaster, the emergence of disaster management that underpins such practice may function to conceal radical contingency. In this regard, it is claimed that adaptation disaster management can create long-term sustainable development for a community and/or its locals who understand and apply community-based disaster risk management principles. In such examples (as derived from both discursive phenomena and non-discursive disaster management), the disaster management enacted cannot be assumed as neutral, rational and/or consensus-based practice and should be comprehended as a site of politics that represents rational consensus and science-based knowledge related to deep systems of power, exclusion and antagonism (Tafon, 2017).

Dislocation

It can be asked what conditions cause certain politics to emerge, with PDT addressing this via the concept of dislocation. As Laclau (1990) has noted, ‘every symbol and order (of disaster management) is dislocated and ready to challenge counter-hegemonic practices that endeavour to disarticulate it and install, in its place, a new order’. Mouffe (2005; 2013) furthermore has considered dislocation by noting that ‘politics is the ineradicable dimension of antagonism, power and conflict that is constitutive of the social’. This political condition, which reveals the social as

constitutively divided and thus dislocated (Laclau, 1990), represents a window of hope for marginalised voices in social relations (Tafon, 2017). Thus, dislocation is essential as a moment or condition that comprises antagonism and threat and which is motivated negativity towards existing structures and identities – as invokes changes to those objects. This concept can be employed to explain how the constitutive outside becomes constructed in discourse as the starting point of politics (Jacobs, 2018).

Practically, Howarth and Griggs (2017) explain that, in the policy context, the key condition for policy change is the dislocation of existing discursive social relation systems. Policy itself is then vulnerable to challenge from the forces underpinning contingent events over time, particularly in moments of policy failure where social actors need to reconfigure and transform identities to address the new situation. This is dislocation in the context of policy.

To further clarify the interaction of actors and agencies amidst dislocation situations, Howarth and Griggs (2017) explain that, within dislocation, those entities 'are required to articulate new mobilising narrative[s] and campaigns with the new means of representation and signifiers to partially stabilise policy regimes'. In this respect, the roles of both actors and agencies are increasingly positioned as policy entrepreneurship (much like an organic intellectual of Gramsci) which has to elaborate and inculcate 'the new nodal point[14]' (in PDT terms) or 'common sense' (in Gramscian terms) to counter and challenge hegemonic discourse and power. This role is therefore important and requires explanation in dislocation situations.[15]

In light of this, dislocation can help to explain disaster and disaster management terrains. If disasters, crises and post-disaster management failures are considered to be factors which amplify conflict, antagonism and demand for change, such circumstances can be both a moment of dislocation able to destabilise disaster management systems/regimes and a provocative factor

in shaping other dislocation moments invoked as external threat or opportunity within disaster management practices.

Hegemony as a Political Practice and Political Strategy Within Disaster Management

Building on the ontology of lack, it can be asked what is the function of power or practice in concealing or covering negativity or tying-up disparate elements within dislocation circumstances – a query that needs addressing if one is to truly understand the politics of disaster management. Laclau and Mouffe (1985; 2014) have concluded that hegemony is articulatory practice that functions in linking all kinds of elements and demands that are partly fixed and contingency. Similarly, Griggs and Howarth (2013b) have extended hegemony concepts to policy phenomena and therein have illustrated that firstly, 'hegemony is a kind of rule which captures the way in which a regime, practice or policy, actively and passively, governs over a set of subjects by interweaving consent, compliance and coercion'. Secondly, hegemony is understood as an exercise of politics that involves the linking together of disparate demands to forge projects or a 'discourse coalition', as can actively contest a particular form of rule, practice or policy. Such practice presupposes the existence of antagonism (or the presence of a 'floating signifier') that can be articulated by rival political forces in a struggle for power. In all political terrains or fields of discursivity, hegemony is arguably a key political practice in concealing the negativity of policy subjectivity within dislocated circumstances and in being a primary mechanism in the interpretation of social change, power relations, political strategies and the challenge of domination amidst disruption.

On the presumption of disaster management as a political site, hegemony can be interwoven within this terrain, as is similar to the politics encountered among policy and management phenomena. The implementation of disaster management through technocratic tools, scientific approaches and engineering solutions (via discursive and non-discursive means that appeal to scientific legitimacy) can witness the establishing of new collaborative disaster

management, risk disaster assessments and rhetoric strategies raised in discursive terms such as ‘this is authentically community-based’ and ‘professional method’ (scientific discourse) when seeking to mitigate against disasters. This also arises alongside local campaigning instituted to challenge state disaster agencies – such as by setting up local self-led disaster provisions, risk recovery teams and counter-discourses (e.g., ‘this is our local area’) to present ownership. These are hegemonic practices that appear as political practice and discursive strategies, utilised to link different demands and identities in an effort to invoke certain practices, social orders and challenges among disaster areas.

Howarth and Griggs, (2017a) have further delineated pertinent political relations or practices in this regards. Firstly, this pertains to drawing chains of equivalence or the building of logics of equivalence, as manifests an approach designed to forge relations between disparate elements or demands by constructing political frontiers which divide social fields or articulate common opposition. This process invokes differences which are rendered equivalent. One example of this practice relates to the case of UK airport expansion, whereby local resistance groups have raised campaigns against such practice by drawing equivalence between diverse and competing demands held against the proposed expansion of Stansted Airport and Gatwick Airport among different groups. In doing so, the struggles of different terrains have been set as being equivalent, bringing each demand against the proposed expansion together as a universal campaign. Notably, an equivalence chain between local resident campaigns and other (place) campaigners against the proposed expansion has been constituted, with this further forging wider local protests and demands such as in relation to climate change, environmental protection and planning reform. The drawing of such equivalence has become a key practice both in building broad coalitions against airport expansion at a local and UK-wide level and in connecting new challenges as to aviation extension activity (such as towards increasing carbon emissions and addressing privileged taxation regimes for carriers, raising this against the government of the UK

and the international aviation industry) (Howarth and Griggs, 2017; Griggs and Howarth, 2019). Likewise, in response to an Estonian offshore wind energy project, politicisation was employed by drawing equivalence between Hiiumaa local residents and nearby project areas via a campaign of 'we don't want wind farms' – i.e., by drawing a political frontier between the central state authority and local residents in order to create a collective enemy and by connecting the disparate demands of local groups focused on environmental protection, local lifestyle changes and democratic planning processes. Ultimately, this movement successfully negotiated with the Estonian central authority and the project was moved far from the coast (Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018).

Secondly, this drawing on differences or the logics of difference is, interestingly, also logics of equivalence which focuses on the dividing of demands alongside the loosening up or disarticulating of equivalence chains (e.g., of demands and identities). Of course, these logics can appear as the practice of challenge, institutionalisation and deflection/negation from domination. Such logics are then characterised either by the incorporation or co-option of demands (where the cutting edge may be blunted) or may be accompanied by the pluralising of a new regime or the selection of practices to form new demands and claims (Howarth, 2010; Howarth and Griggs, 2017). Logics of difference are often practically performed as a mechanism of stabilising power. In the case of airport expansion in the UK, logics of difference were constructed by rival alliances (such as held by government and scientific bodies) and have been widely employed since 2003 via attempts to disengage chains of equivalence and local alliances – for instance, by stating the progress of the UK Government's emissions-trading policy and technological advances designed to resolve rising emissions and Climate Change, thereby framing this as a driver of social progress. Such exercises have fused environmental demands into discourse expansion, thus attempting to separate the equivalences being drawn by local alliances. Here, aviation expansion was empirically merged with social progress, diminishing rival local demands raised against the

adverse impacts of aviation upon the community. Likewise, in the Estonian wind energy project case, the authority (as 4 Energeia) divided and blurred the chain of equivalence of local coalitions against wind farm energy (as sought to protect the coastal environment) by offering financial incentives, community development projects and applied (logics of dis-othering) discourses of not-in-my-backyard to diminish rival local demands and to blame opposing groups or people for blocking local progress. Ultimately, these logics weakened the local movement (Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018).

Understanding hegemony as practice benefits the critical elucidation of political logics, formations and strategies while also explaining the institutions, contestations and transformations of policy or management regimes. By considering disaster management as a political site and a notion of powerful hegemony allows a critical explanation as to the politics of disaster management to emerge.

2.3.3 Affective Dimension/Fantasmatic Logics of Disaster Management: How Actors Dismiss or Engage with Disaster Policies and Practices

One key concept of PDT which enables us to approach how actors are a part of practice and a regime is that of affective dimension or fantasmatic logics. This notion can elucidate how (policy) actors engage with policy practice and/or how and why actors are either gripped by, and fail to be attached to, particular policies or regimes (Howarth and Griggs, 2012; 2017a).

This insight is influenced by Lacanian logics of fantasy developed to examine fantasmatic narratives covering radical contingency and differences so that social relations appear subject to images of fullness and completion where none exist and, furthermore, their identifications are rendered obvious to other possibilities (Howarth and Griggs, 2017a; Griggs and Howarth, 2019).[16]

This may be termed as ‘fantasmatic logics or narratives of analysis’, whereby attention is paid to the unconscious and affective investment of subjects in certain policy (rhetorical) devices, signifiers and images, while questioning is given to the narratives that motivate and compel certain policy. This invokes ideas that go beyond other critical policy approaches. However, to understand the operational mechanisms of such fantasmatic logics, Glynos and Howarth (2007) and Howarth and Griggs (2017) have considered how functions arise – 1) via a beautific means which has stabilising dimensions and appear as governance by a dream of the state without disruption, out of reach of human depravity and as obtaining a utopia future and 2) via a horrific means which has destabilising dimensions and is dominated by fateful stories, disaster imaginations or predictions of disaster if obstacles prove insurmountable. Practically, horrific narratives are often represented as a threatening or irritating force that might destroy society (Griggs and Howarth, 2013a). These forces and logics can be seen, for example, in the UK airport expansion case where fantasmatic narratives of ‘sustainable aviation’ (as include assertions as to technological advances, emissions-trading and effective airport management by scientific experts) have been projected as a beautific imagination and a factor in balancing the demands for environmental protection and economic growth. Indeed this narrative has reduced the dissatisfaction of locals and persuaded neutral groups to engage with the policy (Griggs and Howarth, 2019).

In relation to the Estonian wind farm programme, the imagined horrific threat of Russian interference became a frightening narrative in evoking and mobilising Estonian local residents against the project[17] (Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018). This also invoked an evolving narrative of urban governance (beautiful dimension) via the ‘jeu à la Nantaise’ slogan of Nantes City, as represented the ‘shifting from government to governance’ and decentering of policy-making via collaborative networks of interdependent actors in the city. Such narratives ‘gripped’ people and public actors, particularly city council members, and motivated their belief that Nantes could be a

collaborative city with participatory policy-making processes via ‘citizen dialogue’ (Griggs, Howarth and Feandeiro, 2018).

Fantasmatic narratives evidently influence people or actors in determining the direction of their identity and/or can lead to an exploration of how identities are stabilised in a given direction as well as when such identifications begin to lose their adhesion or resonance (Griggs and Howarth, 2019). Fantasmatic logics are undeniably important as a tool of critical explanation at the actor-level, particularly when inquiring as to why people/actors continue to engage with policies and their implementation despite repeated failure being encountered. This is an aspect of disaster management politics to which previous research has not given adequate attention. Consequently, this study seeks to position politics as a way through which to determine how people identity and behave amidst disasters.[18]

In summary, PDT and the relative insights presented here are fruitful approaches in critically explaining cases of disaster management and the associated politics. The present chapter has outlined new concepts through which to understand the politics of disaster management as a source of failure and wicked issues. The core of PDT – for example, in addressing the primacy of politics, radical contingency and dislocation – helps us to see understand how disaster management can be radically contingent and constructed, thereby being understood and re-understood in diverse ways. Disaster management will regularly take different forms in respective dynamic political and historical contexts over time. Through this, illumination can be given to the concept of hegemony, how disaster management can be shaped and unshaped via equivalence or difference logics and, lastly, how fantasmatic dimensions reveal the ways in which actors engage with or fail to be attached to a regime. These concepts play an important role in discerning such politics from different angles and can better explain the ideas, interests, agencies and structures

involved. PDT here plays an important role in accessing wicked, messy and failed disaster management processes and practices.

Conclusion

This chapter has delineated the emergence of Disaster Management Studies and its respective gaps since the early 19th Century to the present day. The development of disaster management has been set out in two key paradigms. Firstly, the hazard paradigm has been detailed to consider disasters as neutral objects, occurring by natural phenomena. Here, scholars primarily seek approaches through which to resolve post-disaster situations and to mitigate the devastation encountered through scientific and rational means. Secondly, the vulnerability paradigm has been described as failing to acknowledge disasters as also arising from human interactions and the socio-economic context of society. Consequently, focus must be given to the human ecology dimension. Despite this relocating of the vulnerability paradigm, disaster management or disaster risk reduction has not escaped from the domination of the rational approach or positivism and thus continues to ignore power-related dimensions when producing explanations and resolutions. This may be a significant reason as to why failures and conflicts under disaster management systems continue to arise.

The political aspects within disaster management are therefore now being studied by both positivist scholars (as aim to study political disaster management as behavioural or policy interventions) and critical scholars (as aim to pay attention to reconstructing and/or revealing the power concealed within disaster management tools or discourses). However, existing studies still demonstrate several limitations – including in relation to their focus on behavioural explanations that neglect ideological dominance and other dimensions of power alongside the emphasis given to subjective interpretations and analysis. In this place, greater focus is provided as to language

than to practice and no concrete methodology is available through which to explain the politics involved. These limitations and gaps can be fulfilled by utilising PDT as an alternative method of explaining such politics.

PDT therefore represents a crucial approach through which to analysis both discursive and non-discursive phenomena, thus allowing us to explore in more depth the role of ideas, interests, agencies and structures in the political realm. Under PDT, disaster management is understood as radical contingency which can dynamically take different forms in different political and historical contexts. This approach enables an observation of the political practices and interactions utilised to conceal the fundamental antagonism of disaster management and to tie disparate elements together. The dislocation concept, for example, enables us to understand moments of crisis and failure alongside the conditions of transformation (policy) for existing identities. The hegemony concept, in contrast, allows us to explain how elements of power or practices in disaster management can be connected or separated among disparate demands through chains of equivalence or difference, undertaken as strategies designed to connect demands in crisis situations. Finally, the affective dimension of social relations and practices, as can be explored through the idea of fantasmatic logics, is positioned to capture how actors dismiss or engage with disaster policies/practices/regimes by providing horrific and beatific narratives. Thus, the application of PDT in analysing the politics of disaster management is crucial in supporting disaster management scholars towards understanding the contingency of disaster management politics. Specifically, in this thesis, it allows an illumination of the chronic failures and characteristics of the disaster management politics of Thailand, as are realistically contingent, contested and forged, thus making them difficult to explain via other approaches. In subsequent chapters, the theoretical considerations outlined here are applied in relation to the methodologies, data collection steps, analysis methods and research frameworks utilised in the study of Thailand's disaster management.

Chapter Three

Researching the Politics of Disaster Management: A Logics Approach

Introduction

A crucial question raised within studies as to the politics of disaster management pertains to how we can apprehend the political practices, power operations and/or hegemonic phenomena which arise within disaster terrains?

At present, although a small number of scholars seek to present novel approaches through which to investigate disaster phenomena, most research produced to date has paid little attention towards examining the fundamental politics of disaster management. In Chapter 2, query was given as to how the politics of disaster management are constituted and reproduced alongside how/why disaster management means transform and are overthrown. To respond to such questions, poststructuralists discourse scholars – such Glynos and Howarth (2007) and Griggs and Howarth (2013) – have developed concrete strategies or methods through which to systematically interrogate the political issues which occur across discipline arenas. This has been termed as the 'logics of critical explanation' approach, as relies upon a radical contingency notion whereby all meanings and social practices represent political constructions. The utilisation of this approach has helped this research to interpret and observe the contingent and paradoxical aspects of disaster management policy-making alongside any associated conflict formations, negotiation processes, power struggles and governing practices which occur in disaster contexts.

This chapter applies the logics of critical explanation to explore the political aspects of Thailand's disaster management processes by focusing on the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake case study. This example has been chosen as it allows a comprehension to be gained as to the full dynamics of the (shadow) power struggles, negotiations and political tactics arisen among the

central government and local government/coalitions (e.g., the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network) of Thailand. These disaster management conflicts can therein lead to several symbolic actions being invoked to resist the central disaster management provisions instituted and to transform the perceived failure into opportunities for local participation.

To reveal the characteristics of the disaster management-related political exercises enacted in Thailand alongside the deep roots of the wicked issues and failures faced here at both the national and local level, this chapter is divided into two key sections. The first section outlines how the logics of critical explanation can be employed as a means of explaining and problematising the emergence, normalisation and contestation of disaster management practices in a given context. This allows an effective explanation of Thailand's disaster management politics. The second section sets out the rationale for the data collected and analysed in the present research, detailing how prior data as to the past disaster management of Thailand can be placed against the analysis of empirical phenomena through a logics approach to achieve the purposes of the present research.

3.1 The Logics of Critical Explanation in Exploring Disaster Management Politics

Although Poststructuralist Discourse Theory has been criticised in regards to it lacking a stringent methodology, intensive ideology or simple application on the ontic level (Torfing, 1999a; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Griggs and Howarth, 2013a; Howarth, 2013a), some poststructuralists have argued that PDT can be effectively employed to examine the occurrence of politics in a broad range of arenas – for instance, in relation to the politics of apartheid, the welfare state, new social movements, green politics, public (health) management and policy, organisational development, foreign policy, environmental concerns, Climate Change, urban issues and energy policy (Norval, 1996; Howarth, 1997; Howarth and Norval, 1998; Torfing, 1999b; Budd *et al.*, 2011; Glynos and Speed, 2012; Griggs and Howarth, 2013b, 2016; Mert, 2015; Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2015;

Jakub, 2016; MacKillop, 2018; Remling, 2018; Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018; Griggs, Howarth and Feandeiro, 2018; Howarth and Griggs, 2020). Such empirical research has reflected that knowledge derived from PDT has become a practical tool of political analysis. In extension of this, Poststructuralist Discourse Theory has been adopted in this thesis to consider the logics of critical explanation when explaining the politics of disaster management.

In holding an understanding of discourse as constitutive of the social realm and disaster management as a political constitution, wherein all discursive constructions are always dislocated (lacking), a logics approach allows us to analyse 'different dimensions of social reality' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007:14) or the different 'rule' types which govern a given system and how these may lead to chronic and/or wicked problems in society. This is achieved by giving interpretation beyond 'talk and text', thereby providing stronger exploration of empirical norms, actions, identities and other discursive practices. Glynos and Howarth (2007) have argued that all exploration and critiques set against given discourses or political practice can be achieved through the characterising of the logics of critical explanation and three key types of logic (social, political and fantasmatic). Below, these logics are detailed and it is demonstrated how this approach can explain the political phenomena of disaster management policy and implementation.

As a first step, problematisation is a process set out to reconstruct an object of study, positioning this as a problem through which to explore the controversial, dilemma-filled and ignorable origins of given discourses and issues by employing Foucault's genealogy or the construction of a 'historical of the present'. Thus, this research might initially consider that the current conflict of disaster management phenomena is not only an issue caused by temporary factors, but also that it is the outcome of sedimented power and long-embedded politics. Doing so allows us to explore a longitudinal period and the wider history of disaster management (as the object of study)[19] and to cross-examine how disaster management (consent) is forged and what influential powers or agencies are operated in disaster contexts. Put differently, this approach leads

to an interrogating of the historical ‘reproduction and transformation of hegemonic orders and practices’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) in the disaster management arena of Thailand. The second aspect of this step pertains to analysis being given as to how the object of research is itself constructed via history and politics, thereby framing different empirical phenomena as problems (Howarth, 2000; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2015). In the case of the disaster management and policy failure of Thailand, the problems which have occurred have often been considered as deriving only from a lack of capacity and awareness among local government bodies and people, the non-adaptation of central bureaucratic systems and the infectiveness of disaster management systems. However, if we look at these problems through the lens of this problematisation, more than a ‘single rationale’ will emerge through which to explain the disaster management phenomena of Thailand. Indeed, this idea has motivated researchers to re-question the development and establishment of the disaster management regime of Thailand in each era. In the case of the disaster management of Thailand, some problems may have derived from multiple phenomena (e.g., the formulation of bureaucratic polity, the long-stay power of dictatorship governments, international interventions and/or the weaknesses of people's politics). These disparate aspects, when articulated together and framed as different disaster management identities, may eventually transform into wicked problems and failure. In short, this stage is critical in explaining the emergence and sedimentation of disaster management provisions.

As a second step, retroduction is a process of making the problematised phenomenon more intelligible by emphasising the production and ‘posting of hypotheses (proto-explanation)’ rather than the simple providing of an explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Here, empirical data is used to re-challenge the problematised study.[20] To clearly determine a retroductive explanation, Glynos and Howarth (2007) have suggested that three key questions should be addressed; 1) Is the phenomenon more intelligible with the explanation?, 2) Are the theoretical and empirical claims consistent? and 3) Can the relevant communities be persuaded of the validity and worth of this

research? In this thesis, such an approach can be followed by refusing to explain the local disaster management fiasco phenomena of Thailand solely through the use of conventional explanations and theories (such as by asserting that most failures occurred due to a deficit in local capabilities and poor disaster management awareness among local citizens). Instead, new explanations should emerge based on new hypotheses, revised questions or novel study frameworks, namely by reconsidering what realistically appears to have been the development of disaster management in the Thai context and what relevant explanations from the past to the present can emerge. For example, in the case of Thailand, although the state's disaster management system has developed over a number of decades, local disaster management has not progressed sufficiently in terms of its associated decision-making and resource management. This is because, in Thailand, it is often asserted that 'all disaster management has been decentralised'. Conversely, the empirical results show that the central authority of Thailand has continued to weaken local governments in this area and have destabilised democratic and participatory power. From this, it may be said that, for the central authority of Thailand, an inefficient local disaster management system is needed more than effective disaster management if its governing power is to be maintained.[21] Thus, the assumptions and explanations held in this regard should be re-explained and re-established in order to find new notions and theories when explaining the context of Thailand.

As a third step, 'logics' analysis is a process of critically explaining and evaluating the problematised phenomena (Howarth, 2008), perceiving this as that which regularly appears as rules governing practice or a policy regime (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Griggs and Howarth, 2013; Griggs and Howarth, 2017). In the case of disaster management, contextualising any interpretations with social, political and fantasmatic logics allows investigation to be given to how disaster management projects have emerged, mobilised consent and then become embedded or failed. Such analysis contains three dimensions:

1. *Social Logics* enable us to consider sedimented values and the dominant norm, 'normal' or 'taken-for-granted' found within a given disaster management context. Put differently, these logics serve to interrogate what are considered to be the rules and norms governing social practice in a case under investigation. The practical questions that arise under these logics, in the present research, are for example 'How/why does the disaster management work here' and 'how do we do disaster management'. These questions can then point to the naturalised aspects of those practices. An example of such logics is found in the study of Glynos and Howarth (2007) as demonstrates how UK Higher Education reforms since the 1980s have been dominated by the social logics of bureaucratisation, competition and instrumentalisation. From this, it has been found that the UK's university system has embraced a range of top-down modes of governance, some forms of collegial governance structure and the monitoring of teaching and research quality indicators under the context of high competition in this sector.
2. *Political logics* allow us to explain the practices defending or contesting the social logics or political strategies which arise in the policy and management domain. In other words, such logics serve to characterise how demands, identities, actions, beliefs and policies are brought or excluded by a hegemonic or disaster management project. Thus, these logics consist of two dimensions

   equivalence logics (as are used to explain how disaster management (discourses) can be constructed to maintain coalitions and difference logics (as are used to explain how disaster management practices can be expunged or alliances demolished) (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Glynos and Speed, 2012). In short, the operation of these logics permit us to understand how various (disaster management) discourses emerge and endeavour

to close a field of discursivity, something that is impossible according to the concept of radical contingency (see Chapter 2 for further details).

3. *Fantasmatic logics*[22] are based on the 'subjectivity notion' of Lacan's psychological concept, whereby it is argued that individuals realistically have an inherent *lack* and thus are always searching for subject positions through which to fulfil this lack and to reach enjoyment (see Chapter 2). Likewise, actors in a policy or management regime always need to fulfil their identities and thus promise the enjoyment of their subject. Hence, these logics are influential in helping to identify the emotive or affective dimensions of disaster management discourses and in examining how demands (particularly the identities of individuals) become 'gripped' by particular discursive practices and regimes (Griggs and Howarth, 2013b; Howarth and Griggs, 2017b). To explain how the regime can pursue such actors, these logics provide two dimensions through which to explain this – beautific fantasy (as comprise the logics that project a promise of a better future, successful stories and the enjoyment of a given policy subject and its actors) and horrific fantasy (as comprise the logics that represent danger, fear, failure imagination or narratives that will eliminate the enjoyment of people or society if such actors fail to follow the given policy). In this case, obviously the last type of logics permits us to discern why particular disaster management practices or discourses appeal to individuals, such as those promising a better and/or more secure sustainable future society and why fear-mongering arises as to the potential loss of life and economic disruption if certain disaster management practices are not implemented.

As a fourth step, articulation is a process of addressing an ontological concept constituted by the interplay or articulation of signifiers within discursive systems (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Articulation is also a fundamental methodological 'tool' of explaining and critiquing problematised phenomena by mobilising and linking the three logics explicated above (Howarth, 2010). However,

this articulation also implies that theoretical concepts (the ontological) and objects of study (the empirical) cannot be considered as immune from each other. Instead, both are modified by the intervention of the researcher. For example, in explaining the source of disaster management policy failure, instead of all analysis steps being framed under technical disaster management logics (e.g., evaluation failures by disaster risk reduction or disaster management indicators), any empirical research allows us to elaborate further upon theoretical concepts of power and depoliticisation in explaining disaster management fiascos in new ways. In brief, articulation is a process which allows the researcher to link the appearances of discursive fields and the object of study together in an effort to disclose and endorse the issues faced in an intelligible manner.

As a fifth step, critique is a process of revealing moments of controversy, conflict, exclusion, operational inclusion and ideological domination (Griggs and Howarth, 2013b, 2016). This step provides guidelines through which to raise criticism against a policy in a given context, doing so under the assumption that pre-given categories of evaluation, rationality or interest maximisation should not be trusted. Thus, when considering an occurred phenomenon in following these steps, the outcomes will account for any fundamental problems faced and emphasis shall be given to all aspects constituted by circumstance and power (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Howarth, Glynos and Griggs, 2016; Griggs and Howarth, 2016). This makes it possible to produce an ethical critique, to discuss pluralism and alternative possibilities and to meet the aims of PDT.

In brief, the logics of critical explanation have been designed to disclose ontological puzzles. With its five-step ‘guiding’ approach, this framework supports the operationalised discursive concepts of contingency, hegemony, discourse and articulation to develop the best possible explanation of the problematised phenomenon of disaster management. This provision also serves to develop PDT in practice. The next section focuses on the rationale for the data collection and analysis undertaken in the present research.

3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

This section outlines the reasoning for the empirical data collection and analysis undertaken in this thesis. Firstly, the types of data collected are detailed, noting this to comprise primarily of interview-based and systematic documentary archive research. Secondly, description is given as to how the collected data has been analysed and interpreted. As this research applies PDT to explore the politics of disaster management in the Thai context and the disaster management failures witnessed in the circumstances of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, data has been collected which is both document-based and empirical in nature, therein covering both the national and local levels of Thailand. This comprises more than talk text and therefore explores a whole regime of practices. To fully apprehend the phenomenon under consideration, data has been collected from two source types. Firstly, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 key players (11 persons pertaining to the national and provincial level of Thailand and 14 persons from the local level (Chiang Rai province). These interviews were held between February 2018 and April 2018, with each being recorded and fully transcribed. Secondly, documents were collected and can be categorised between those corresponding to the national level (with most documents related to disaster policy-making being official documents and news items spanning the disaster management provisions of 1940-2015) and the local level (in relation specifically to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake). Most of these sources comprise official documents (provincial documents) and unofficial documents (the publications of NGOs and local movement groups) produced 2014-2016 – e.g., during the period in which the post-2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake governance was being implemented.

3.2.1 Interviews: Selection of Participants

The interviewees selected were required to have an understanding of how disaster management, primarily in the Thai context, has been seen to emerge, succeed, be maintained and fail. Through these insights, pertinent practices (e.g., rules, identities and contestations) can be identified as

playing specific roles – either positive or negative – in the formulation and implementation of disaster management. This methodological framework therefore requires the insight of key players who have experienced the disaster management system of Thailand or who have played a role in the wider Thai system or in the governance associated with the earthquake management of Thailand between 2014 and 2015. At the national (policy) level, to reflect and verify the overall contradictory notions of history and the paradoxical development of the disaster management of Thailand over many decades, interviewees were selected by using purposive sampling. Consequently, 11 key national disaster management actors were selected. These figures comprised individuals who have experience in operating within central government agencies – from the highest level to the operational level. Such roles included provincial governors (as a provincial chief executive of the disaster management of Thailand), representatives of the Thai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (as disaster management specialists), chief district officers (as district disaster management directors), representatives of local governments and representatives of NGOs and disaster-related networking groups. In contrast, at the local (earthquake-affected) level, to understand the earthquake governance failure, disputes and emergence of anti-central disaster management provisions in the Chiang Rai context, 14 interviewees were purposively selected from the key actors engaged in such post-earthquake governance. Details as to these interviewees can be found in Appendix 1. These individuals can be separated between 4 categories:

1) Local and community residents who played a role in progressing an alternative disaster management (anti-centralised disaster management) form or the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network and thus who came together under a campaign of anti-centralised disaster management.
2) Representatives of national and local NGOs who played a primary role in the initiating and establishing of alternative disaster management campaigns or a community earthquake

management coalition, doing so as symbolic action in responding to and resisting state failure.

3) Representatives of local government, academia and the actors who played a crucial role in supporting and running anti-centralised disaster management movements.
4) Representatives of provincial government and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation actors (as represent the central authority of Thailand) who played a significant role in the provincial disaster management policy-making and policy implementation undertaken, actions which transformed into ‘problems or failure’ during the post-2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake governance and which invoked sufficient ‘solutions’ under the new campaigns of the central/provincial government of Thailand following local challenges.

3.2.2 Interview Management

As fieldwork, the interviews undertaken were semi-structured and conducted face-to-face (in 20 cases) and via telephone (in 5 cases). Most of the interviews (15 out of 25) were conducted at provincial/local administrative Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation offices, at universities or in school cafeterias. All of the interviews were recorded via a mobile phone, conducted in Thai and lasted 40-90 minutes each. All of the audio recorded comprised 18 hours. The interviews were then fully transcribed and subsequently analysed through an inductive coding process. The use of Nvivo 12 has helped to reveal the political exercises, discourses, interests, demands and power dynamics at play.

3.2.3 Interview Content

The interview questions of this research were positioned to explore the paradoxes and logics involved in the formulation and implementation of the disaster management of Thailand. Two approaches were followed in an effort to achieve the research aims held. Firstly, to consider the policy levels of the disaster management of Thailand, participants were selected who could provide perspectives as to the operations enacted in regards to national-central and practical bureaucratic-

level policy. The content of these interviews constituted some of the preliminary interview themes. These themes pertained to evaluating the power relations and wider context of the disaster management of Thailand over past decades. This allowed the questioning of which paradoxes had occurred in the development of the disaster management of Thailand alongside the key situations, pressures, political tactics, motivations and scarcities faced in different eras and what has become manifested as the 'normality' of the state's disaster management regime. Second, as a case study connected to these prior themes, 14 interviewees were asked to explain what have been the causes of Thailand's disaster management failure, the characteristics of any alternative disaster management established, the contestation strategies employed following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake and which disaster management recovery provisions were instituted here to respond to/resolve the devastation and failure witnessed. The questions asked are detailed in Appendix 2. For example, the interviewees were asked to explain their decisions or actions and those of other groups, thereby allowing a gathering of different interpretations as to particular disaster management practices. In light of this aim, semi-structured interviews were identified as the best way through which comprehensive answers could be gained from participants as to the systematic logics held.

3.2.4 Documentary Archive

In the documentary archive research of this thesis, all documents collected highlighted the mobilisation and constitution of meanings as related to the disaster management of Thailand spanning 1940-2015 and the political strategies which emerged in response to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. Here, different types/genres of document were analysed to characterise the normalising, transforming and contesting of any ideological dimensions set in underpinning the employed discourses. Primary documents, in this regard, included House of Representatives meeting minutes, prime ministerial and cabinet policy statements and press releases. At the local level, when considering the Chiang Rai context, both provincial and local documents were collected

– such as the minutes of the provincial government and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, provincial disaster declarations, plans, minutes and reports of earthquake management partnerships (as established during 2013-15) and the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network's documents spanning the post-earthquake period of 2014-2016. There documents were collected to explain the political exercises deployed in the earthquake-affected areas. Such documents were systematically collected from the provincial authorities, local office records, official YouTube channels of mass media entities (e.g., Thai PBS), local university libraries, the websites of institutions and Thailand's National Assembly Library and Matichon's news databases.

The documents gathered were selected on the basis of different concerns. Firstly, documents were collected as they were relevant to understanding the taken-for-granted or 'official' discourse of the disaster management of Thailand. For example, similarities were sought in relation to how disaster management has been framed over past decades by considering the threats, forces, demands and desires linked to the radical change of disaster management and also in relation to who the crucial players have been within the disaster management regime. Secondly, documents were collected in relation to the contestation launched against the centralised disaster management implemented and the disaster management failure perceived in the period following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. These local documents illustrate the arisen conflicts and negotiations of this context.

3.2.5 Data Coding and Analysis

The data collected included 18 hours of interviews and documentary archive research covering five decades and comprising approximately 350 documents. The data coding and analysis produced constituted two interlinked steps.

Firstly, the interview transcriptions and data from all document collections were coded according to the questionnaires and classified into three major themes and four sub-logic aspects.

For instance, the social logics (theme) and data were first coded and classified. These were held to refer to Thai sedimented values and the dominant norm, as are referred to as the 'normal' or 'taken-for-granted' and which have been found to have occurred in the Thai Disaster Management context. For instance, in 1940, the Thai Prime Minister stated that 'Thais must follow the Thai nationalism way and 'must follow the Thai State's approach as a central authority' (Sangchatkaew, 2014). In addition, other forms of rhetoric have emerged in responding to earthquakes – including that provincial government entities 'take no action' or pay 'no pragmatic attention to the local' (Local Academic Scholar A, 2019). These instances were then categorised as social logics based on their demonstrated value and some of the norms prevalent at the time.

Secondly, political logics and data were classified, as were held to pertain to those activities or operations positioned to defend or contest the social logics or as political exercises to have emerged in the Thai Disaster Management arena at both the national and local levels. In a nutshell, this theme coded data that demonstrated political strategies - e.g., how demands, antagonism, identities, behaviours, beliefs and policies are/were formed or excluded under a hegemonic practice/project or how divisions arose between 'them' and 'us'. The coding associated with such political logics can also be divided into two sub-categories. The first sub-category is equivalence logics, whereby declarations are raised to construct and/or maintain coalitions (seen, for instance, following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake – 'This is our sphere and these are our interests' (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019)). These logics are so coded as they demonstrate antagonism (our/their) characteristics, social contestations and attempts to connect similar social demands and alliances. The second sub-category is difference logics, whereby techniques are raised to erase or destroy links as well as to blur equivalence linkages (seen, for instance, following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake – 'this is (our) pro-active, unified and standardised plan' that can help 'build back better and safer' (CRDDPM, 2015; NDPDC, 2015). Such discourse illuminates any antagonism characteristics between the provincial government (our) and local/community alliances

(their) and attempts made to disentangle linkages of equivalence between anti-central Disaster Management alliances opposed to conventional Disaster Management.

Thirdly, fantasmatic logics and data were classified, as were held to pertain to narratives, ideologies and stories used to persuade Disaster Management policy actors or management regimes. Such narratives function to address the enjoyment (emotive dimensions) of policy actors. The coding associated with such fantasmatic logics can also be divided into two sub-categories. The first sub-category pertains to the beautific dimension, whereby arisen narratives or imaginations are utilised as a motivator or promise of a better future, success and/or enjoyment of a certain policy. The second sub-category relates to the horrific dimension, whereby arisen narratives represent danger, fear and failure liable to eliminate the enjoyment of society if such actors fail to follow the given policy (seen, for instance, in how the 2015 Disaster Management Strategy promised to foster 'community immunity' and assist society in achieving 'sustainability' (NDPDC, 2015)). This example manifests the beautific dimension in it representing the state's attempts at instilling optimism in a plan and requiring people to follow it.

The data and documents collected in this research were coded among the three logics categories and four sub-themes via the Nvivo application. Through such coding, the researcher sought to systematically draw upon similarities and differences within the data. The frequencies of the statements, words and rhetoric tropes (data) considered here became a starting point for framing, problematisating and interpretating these issues. Subsequently, logics of critical explanation were employed as guidelines in understanding the social realities and hegemonic projects witnessed, therein illuminating the complex linkages and separations of the demands raised. These aspects further appeared as logics of equivalence and difference and, in addition, as narratives designed to motivate or discourage people and actors under the Thai Disaster Management context.

The data was then progressively organised in accordance with four problematisations (as the first step of the logics approach), formulated for interrogation and then critically explained as to the Disaster Management successes/failures identified. These problematisations were reshaped during the research project in-line with the retroductive endeavour of this thesis – i.e., in an attempt to answer the crucial research questions held pertaining to how and why Disaster Management provisions succeed or fail, what are the paradoxical origins of a given Disaster Management project, how Disaster Management hegemonic projects deal with resistance and continue to articulate new solutions, why are Disaster Management provisions formulated and sustained and what are the conditions for a project to be progressively considered to be a 'failure'? These questions have allowed the analysis and coding/decoding to be controlled and more precise in responding to the overall research purposes assumed.

One could argue that due to the limited data gathered in this research and the lack of systematic datasets available in this area, the capabilities of the Nvivo application have been unable to be fully utilised. Thus, the Nvivo application was merely utilised as a support tool for coding and frequency analysis, as well as a notebook or coding workbook whereupon the research sought to verify the logics that emerged in each context alongside the themes, keywords and characteristics of the discourse(s) expressed on either side. Thus, it might be argued that the majority of the analysis produced was evaluated and interpreted directly by the researcher.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how the present research has collected and analysed its data at both local/fieldwork (Chiang Rai earthquake) and national policy-related levels. In using the logic of critical explanation as the main strategy or methodology of PDT to examine and interrogate the political practices of the central and local government arenas of Thailand when constituting and

responding to disaster management, attention has been able to be given to the paradox of Thailand's disaster management development. This is understood to allow the evidencing of pertinent political strategies, controversies, negotiations and failures encountered in the implementation of the country's disaster management following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. It further allows us to see the contingency of Thailand's disaster management characteristics and the historical roots of any disaster management failure faced.

This chapter has also described how the logics of critical explanation can be applied to apprehend the politics of the disaster management of Thailand, the characteristics of the contingency of the disaster management system of Thailand and the mechanisms of such governance and depoliticisation which may comprise the origin of any disaster management failure and/or wicked problems. Indeed, the five steps of these logics –problematisation, retroduction, logics, articulation and critiques – enable us to operationalise and critically explain the complicated situation, the roles of different powers/ ideologies and the logics which have dominated Thailand's disaster management system (both at the national and local level) over past decades.

Description has also been given as to how this research has gathered and analysed its data, noting that empirical fieldwork information (semi-structure interviews) and historical disaster management documents were collected from the key informants/entities operating in the disaster management arena of Thailand. As part of this, interviews were undertaken with figures involved in the disaster management governance implemented following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake via purposive sampling. All of the data gathered was coded using NVivo 12 software to support the researcher in organising the data as to the political phenomena and practice pertinent to the disaster management and earthquake terrain of Thailand. Finally, all such data was analysed and critiqued via the logics of critical explanation to meet the research purposes held.

Chapter Four

Disaster Management Policy in Thailand: Development, Controversy and Conjuncture

Introduction

Although the central state, related authorities and politicians of Thailand have claimed that the development of the country's disaster management policy illuminates progress being made in transferring natural management authority to local government entities in an effort to build crisis management capacities and to enhance participatory democracy, these transitions do not seem to have yet reached an adequate level of success (Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010; Khunwishit, 2014a). In a number of disaster incidents to have been faced in Thailand – for example, the northern region haze pollution suffered since 2010, the massive flooding which occurred in 2011 and the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake – the disaster management systems implemented have witnessed failure, fragmented coordination, intergovernmental disputes between central and local government entities and blame politics (Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011). These interconnected problems are perceived as 'wicked problems' (Head, 2008; Head and Alford, 2013)[23] in the disaster management context of Thailand. Although policy scholars and technocrats have given effort towards escaping these outcomes by researching the preliminary issues faced alongside redesigning and reconstructing the disaster management system and its planning, policy-related controversies continue to occur and extend into almost all events (Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Tiyapairat, 2012; Sighasem, 2016; Lebel and Lebel, 2018) The consequences of this have directly affected the decentralisation process of Thailand in various dimensions, particularly in relation to the ability to enhance local government capacities as to undertaking environmental management and policy-making and in accommodating locals/communities in preparing themselves to respond to crises. In sum, it could be stated that all

phenomena which have appeared here are outcomes of the disaster policy dilemmas of the past decade (Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010).

This chapter illuminates the historical development of Thailand's disaster management, thereby highlighting key shifts by tracing the lineage of such policy and the key issues which have affected this disaster management. The narrative provided emphasises the political agenda found in both unofficial and official policies, the master plans and law instituted in this area. In addition, light is shone on the exchange of views which has arisen between crucial policy players in the disaster management system of Thailand. To achieve this, the present chapter focusses on two major themes – the key characteristics of the public administration of Thailand and its associated power and politics as have influenced the country's disaster management system and the key developments of the state's disaster management alongside any related controversies, crucial disaster events, actors and influential institutions/structures in four periods.

4.1 Overview of the Administration and Politics of Thailand

Thailand is a centralised state whose administration is considerably centred via hierarchal and central authorities. Most decision-making procedures are determined by central ministries or bureaucratic units. Province, district and local-level administrations are dominated by bureaucracy. Arghiros (2001) has argued that in the administration of Thailand, authorities emphasise centralisation over decentralisation and local agencies possessing autonomy. Thus, the systems of Thailand are vertically-operated. The bureaucratic system of this country is also criticised as being fragmented and competitive, as generates incompetence in the public services and provisions offered (Charoenmuang, 2006; Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010; Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2010). In addition, Thailand has been considered to be a bureaucratic and authoritarian state in which a small group of bureaucrats and military figures hold administrative

power and have influenced the policy-making processes employed over the past five decades (Riggs, 1966; Ockey, 2004; Baker, 2016; Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). Thailand has witnessed the development of democratic institutions and many public administration reforms – for example, Thailand's democratic movements following 1997 provoked localism streams and a decentralised, democratised era (Connors, 2002) alongside the accession to power of a strong democratic and reform-focussed civilian government between 2001-2006 (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004; Bowornwathana, 2005; Bowornwathana and Poocharoen, 2005; McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005). However, these developments appear to only have had short durations and little improvement has been gained in the main bureaucracy arenas – particularly in regards to local government areas. Although local governments and people in Thailand have gained more responsibilities since 1997, these remain flimsy and lack appropriate participatory provisions owing to the sluggish decentralisation process, inadequate financial resources provided and insincerity/neglect held as to ensuring decentralisation by bureaucrats and politicians (Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee, 2015).

The bureaucratic arrangements, fragmentation and separatism operated under this centralised authoritarianism seemingly reflect the features of the administration and disaster management system of Thailand (White and Smoke, 2005; Charoenmuang, 2006). The current bureaucratic system of Thailand can be divided between the central government (composed of the central administration and ministry administration) and provincial administrations (as is allocated administration authority by the central administration). The province level is also divided into districts and sub-districts. In regards to the command held at the province and district levels, provincial and district governors are the highest commander figures in supervising the coordination undertaken in these areas. Provincial heads of each ministry are positioned to help those provincial operations (Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010). The bureaucrats operating at the province and district level rely on the central ministries according to their affiliation (i.e.,

an area-based administrative hierarchy). Nowadays, local governments are divided between 3 administrative units, each with its own name, size, income and location. For instance, a sub-district administrative organisation is the smallest organisation at the local government level, as operates alongside municipality administration and provincial administration organisations. Indeed, all local government executive types are directly elected by the people, with local government administration likely being primarily under the control of local government executives – particularly in regards to policy decision-making, implementation and development. Conversely, the main resources of such administration remain centralised – such as the provisions of personnel administration, tax authorities and some operating budgets. Thus, in the administration of Thailand, central bureaucratic agencies still dominate over the wider population and all local authorities.

In the last two decades, the Thai Military has played an important role in the managing of the country, with military interventions in September 2006 and May 2014[24] having driven the country to manifest a semi-authoritarian state wherein democratic developments, decentralisation steps and participatory movements have been limited. These shifts have led to all apparatuses being brought under a 'solid re-centralised state' administration form, as has negatively affected the preceding decentralisation processes pertaining to environmental and disaster management policy. Hence, it can be stated that Thailand has been dominated by elite bureaucratic polity and military governance in recent years.

4.2 Development of the Disaster Management Policy of Thailand

The public policy of Thailand has evidently been dominated by bureaucratic polity and strong state ideology since the 1960s [25]. Consequently, the administration of the country has been inefficient and its decentralisation and democracy has been limited (Riggs, 1966; Phongpaichit

and Baker, 1996; Ockey, 2004; Nishizaki, 2018). However, it seems that this bureaucratic polity declined between 1975 and 1989, a period in which political awareness among the population gradually increased. Undoubtedly, several changes occurred during that time. Since 1990, the political landscape of Thailand has shifted, with neoliberal, democratic and decentralisation streams coming into play. These shifts have influenced the explanations of the policy ideologies and substances of Thailand (Vandergeest, 1993; Arghiros, 2001; Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010), as well as the dominant environmental management ideas of the country. Even when emerging disaster management policies developed in later periods and in different contexts, such ideologies have been maintained and have been seen to be a primary cause of the phenomena faced (Lebel and Lebel, 2018).

Below, illumination is given as to the development of the disaster management of Thailand by explaining the role of the country's government, political conflict, key events and social/policy contexts which surround policy formation here. This is considered in relation to four key periods.

4.2.1 The First Period: Military Defences Driven by Big Bureaucracy and Security Sectors (1940-1997)

The early period of the disaster management of Thailand was termed 'civil defences', namely as this system was provided solely to protect civilians from military operations (NDPDC, 2010). Here, threats and national security reasons were the presupposition set for the disaster management formulation of Thailand (Khunwishit and McEntire, 2011; DDPM, 2013). The disaster management policy of Thailand was managed mainly by the Thai Military, Ministry of defence, Ministry of Interior and royal foundations[26], a result of the Thai Military at that time being the only entity with the capacity to provide the responses and recovery needed. The structure of such disaster management followed that of military structures, therein being highly centralised, witnessing a single command and allowing hierarchal decision-making when confronting security disasters. Thus, we may call this period a 'military or army defence era' (DDPM, 2019b). At the

period, taking over the Ministry of Interior and civil defences units by Thai Military government had been become the technique for consolidation to their governments (Ruamsil, 1978). Disaster recovery, people subsidisation and victim aid became the core responsibilities of security sectors and the central state, thus witnessing a lack of public participation in those activities.

The rise of the disaster management of Thailand in this early period and the focus given to maintaining national security derived from the Thai and Indo-China (France) conflicts occurring between 1940 and 1941 as well as the emergence of World War II between 1941 and 1944.[27] In this context, Thailand became a region within which air strikes were launched against targets in South East Asian countries. To protect Thailand from such military operations and to ensure the efficiency of its evacuation and recovery procedures, the Air Defences Act of 1939 was established to build effective warning systems, protect government offices and facilitate the evacuation of people. After the end of the World War II, namely in the years spanning 1945-1947, authority pertaining to disaster and security prevention was transferred to the civilian government. Consequently, civilians assumed a primary role in implementing disaster management and thereby replaced the Thai Military here.[28] In doing so, the role of the Thai Military in planning for war and disaster management gradually declined – therein seeing military power being retrieved by elected politicians (albeit ones driven by old and elite bureaucratic ideas). Notably, the enacting of the Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1952 ratified this transference of authority, wherein the Ministry of Interior was positioned as the centre of the powers assumed. In other words, the power of elected politicians became consolidated and bureaucratic polity gradually came into play. This can be seen in the period spanning 1950-1953, where air and sabotage defence authority was transferred and remerged to form part of the civil defences and responsibility of the Ministry of Interior (Fire Prevention and Control Act, 1952).

To effectively operate and support the extension of disaster management authority, the Department of Civil Defence was established in 1952[29] under the Ministry of Interior[30] (MOI,

2019). This new unit assumed extended responsibility and thus covered air defences alongside sabotage, underwater and ground mine prevention and earthquake protection. However, the Department of Civil Defence seemingly paid greater attention to maintaining national security in relation to the context of war threats. The Department of Civil Defence operated only for a short period as Thailand's war and domestic defence organisation [31] because, in 1958, its size and authority was reformed by a new government to increase the effectiveness of its mechanisms in operating civil government power[32], consequently being downgraded to a divisional unit (initially under the Office of the Permanent Secretary for Interior and then under the Department of Provincial Administration in 1962). The entities with authority in relation to disaster circumstances during this period depended upon the structures held at the provincial administration level – as operated under the Ministry of Interior (OSC, 2019)[33]. Significant natural disasters were encountered in 1962. For example, Tropical Storm Harriet hit the southern part[34] of Thailand during this year, as demonstrated the inefficiency of the country's disaster management provisions under the centralised state – namely as experience was lacking in dealing with massive storms. Consequently, delays were encountered in the issuance of disaster warnings by related authorities, appropriate communication being given by provincial and district governmental bodies and the required recovery being provided to those affected (Khoasod, 2019; Sangwiman, 2019). Here, only security sectors, the Thai Military and the Thai Police manifested as crucial organisations in areas which had experienced widespread damaged. In this context, Thai volunteer organisations provided disaster assistance in a supportive role and in donating any resources needed[35]. However, it appears that the impact of Tropical Storm Harriet in 1962 did not directly lead to the reform of the disaster management system of Thailand as the political structures of the junta government of Thailand remained tenacious. On the other hand, the outcomes of this natural disaster can be seen to have changed the balance of powers held between the Thai Military and the country's elite bureaucrats and technocrats – evidenced in the three

political coups which occurred between 1962 and 1978. These coups became key factors in instigating administrative reform and disaster management shifts to a stronger degree that the risk of disasters being faced.

A student uprising in 1973 challenged the junta government's rule and resulted in governmental instability wherein the coalition governments formed were fragile and political power became diffused. This was another reason as to why the disaster management of Thailand became overlooked by the state.[36] Bureaucrats gradually returned to power following this student uprising and resistance began to be raised against the authoritarian military government. The public distrust held towards the military government between 1973 and 1977 paved the way for elite bureaucrats and technocrats to increasingly influence the political administration of Thailand, despite the Thai Military having long-dominated the political systems of the country[37] (Kongkirati, 2013). The enacting of the Public Disaster and Civilian Prevention and Mitigation Act 1979 was another turning point for Thailand's disaster management, namely as this legal provision set out specific regulations pertaining to how disasters should be coped with. Importantly, this 1979 Act was a consequence of the political situation of Thailand and represented an attempt to increase the power of bureaucrats again following the political domination of the Thai Military. This may be viewed as the dismissing of security (military) unit intervention, whereby a new disaster management committee was established containing bureaucrats[38], as was set to centralise the decision-making authority held by the Department of Provincial Administration and the Ministry of Interior. This positioned the hierarchical Ministry of Interior to command crisis events and to formalise the entirety of the disaster management unit (OSC, 2019) within the new disaster management system of Thailand. It could be said that the Department of Provincial Administration, as governed by the Ministry of Interior, became highly influential in all its disaster management command areas. Here, even bodies within the security

sector – such as the police and firefighters, as well as school teachers – were controlled by provincial governors (Provincial Governor, 2019).

This witnessed the domination of large bureaucracy through the designing of a disaster management committee and associated structures. According to the 1979 Act, the Department of Provincial Administration retained the power to mobilise resources, manage pertinent workforces and command disaster units in crisis situations[39] (Sighasem, 2017; OSC, 2019). This new workforce was officially recruited and promoted by the Department of Provincial Administration. At the same time, the Civil defence Volunteers (CDV) was established to replace the security sector workforce[40] and to support civilian disaster management operations.[41] This increased the personnel directly associated with the disaster management of Thailand. Under this bureaucratic approach and the disaster management of Thailand being led by the Ministry of Interior and Department of Provincial Administration, it is likely than an aim was held to consolidate such power rather than opening up space for other sectors and people to participate.[42] The bureaucratic ideology and approach of this era was crucial in facilitating the state's consolidation of power (Krause, 1968).

Between the 1980s and 1990s, this bureaucratic approach to the disaster management of Thailand was maintained. This led to less political intervention[43] and fewer external factors being enabled to affect the country's disaster policy when compared to prior periods. However, when an enormous storm, 'Typhoon Gay'[44], hit the southern region of Thailand in 1989, the 1979 disaster management reforms became challenged. The storm led to more than 900 deaths and 200,000 people being affected (Vongvisessomjai, 2009). In addition, primary transportation and communication means were rendered inoperable for two weeks[45] (ADRC, 2011). Due to the lack of a disaster preparation plan being held, there was a failure to warn fisheries and the local people about the storm, to coordinate an international warning unit, to enact appropriate sea rescue provisions and to rapidly recover remote areas. In response to these outcomes, the Prime Minister

of Thailand[46] was forced to become involved in the recovery coordination and in the seeking of donations from international organisations due to the protests of local/affected people. Despite this occurrence having displayed the weaknesses of the bureaucratic disaster management of Thailand, change did not occur – primarily as there was a lack of public participation and due to the strong centralisation of the country's bureaucratic state.

4.2.2 The Second Period: Bureaucratic Disaster Management Overtaken by Neoliberalism (1997-2007)

The bureaucratic disaster management model of Thailand was challenged by a good governance stream under the strength of electoral democracy. The administrative reform enacted in 2002 foregrounded this, whereby neoliberalism ideologies were approached – for instance, in relation to enacting decentralisation, citizen participation, deregulation, control without command and the autonomisation of the state. This became the main driver of Thailand in reconstructing all public sectors, including the disaster management system as led by the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Provincial Administration.[47] Nonetheless, the disaster management of Thailand continued to face the same wicked issues and it was not until the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that this dilemma was fully illuminated.

It seems that radical change in the politics and policies of Thailand occurred between 1997 and 2002. Here, international factors arose which compelled Thailand to adopt a "good governance" approach in reforming its state apparatus following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.[48] At the same time, domestic factors which influenced this shift included the strengthening of elected politicians after a period of military governments (Laothamatas, 1993) and the partial decentralisation enacted post-1987[49] (Nelson, 1998; Arghiros, 2002; Chardchawarn, 2010). These aspects were vital forces in transforming the political landscape and disaster management of Thailand. The 1997 Constitution of Thailand laid down the foundation for a democratic governance regime, for instance in enacting and prioritising accountability mechanisms, citizen

power, an active civil society, governmental honesty and integrity, decentralisation and the minimising of the central government of Thailand. This led to changes in the budgeting and human resources allocation authority held. Meanwhile, the managerial authority of all municipalities was enhanced and environmental and disaster management responsibilities were officially transferred to local government bodies via the Decentralisation Plan and Transition Act of 1999.[50] The Public Sector reform undertaken at that time also affected the structure and primary organisations of the disaster management of Thailand.

The re-establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was, at that time, purposed to constitute an organisation primarily responsible for the disaster management of Thailand (as a specialist unit)[51], therein witnessing the integration of disaster management tasks[52] and the connection of these to the Thai Government's Public Sector reform spanning 2002-2003[53] (DDPM, 2019a).

Although integrating the disaster management units of Thailand resulted in systematic functions and an explicit purpose being held, the new Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was escalated in size and resources and its hierarchy was strengthened. Furthermore, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's units were expanded across the country. This rearrangement constituted 19 divisions at the central administration level and regional Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation centres were set up with 12 units covering all regions. Ultimately, provincial offices of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation were established in 76 provinces alongside 30 district office units. The budget of this department was increased four times following its 2003 formation.[54] These changes illuminated the bureaucratisation of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and the return of large bureaucracy. This benefited Ministry of Interior bureaucrats as such figures assumed executive positions in that entity and were able to gain increased negotiation power when bureaucrats and elected politicians interacted and when central bureaucrats and local government entities had to

work together. This bureaucratisation ultimately demolished the progress derived from the 2002 administrative reforms of Thailand. In this sense, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was positioned to manifest best practice and to respond to managerial dilemmas – for example, by being set as a specialist consultancy agency with a flat organisation that enacted horizontal command which intensively emphasised research and innovation in support of practical units (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2019). Nonetheless, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was perceived as a function-based organisation with a complicated hierarchy, as operating an intensive single command and as a centralisation of all disaster management resources (Sighasem, 2011).[55]

When the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami hit the southern part of Thailand in 2004[56], the wicked problems and paradoxical aspects of the disaster management system of Thailand came to the fore in many ways. An example of this is seen in how Thailand had failed to provide mitigation provisions and a preparedness system. Similarly, the country had not established disaster warning centres[57] or tsunami/earthquake alerts. In the same vein, it had neglected to institute measures through which to increase local awareness of disaster risks, even in areas liable to experience crises. When the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami hit, local and community authorities were thus unprepared both for the event itself and also the aftermath. Evidently, the government of Thailand had underestimated the threat faced[58] and responding agencies possessed a low-level of disaster management capacity through which to operate (e.g., in lacking appropriate equipment, techniques and codes of conduct). In the initial response, the operations launched were perceived to witness confusion in the command enacted and a lack of direction in the activities performed. This criticism was aimed especially at the efforts given towards the collaboration raised in working with international governments, NGOs and volunteer organisations (Kamolvej, 2014). The delays in such resource dissemination and utilisation was highly visible at all levels. Importantly, local authorities were unable to command assistance and support from other

organisations as such managerial authority was centralised and split between several units (e.g., witnessing bureaucratic separatism) (Pongpanich, 2005; Segschneider and Worakul, 2007). The Thai Military become the fundamental unit in undertaking recovery in this context. Whereupon those operations were understood to have encountered failure, the central government of Thailand, via the Thai Prime Minister, was forced to take direct control and command of the situation. The disaster management units positioned at the frontline were newly arranged by the Prime Minister of Thailand, as organised *ad hoc* assignments and project committees to cope with the situation.

Although the reconstruction of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation in 2002 was a milestone in increasing the disaster management capacity of Thailand, in actuality it pushed Thailand's provisions in this area into being forming a clumsy system labouring underneath bureaucracy. Such bureaucratic disaster management was not able to appropriately respond to a large disaster area. In other words, such disaster management encountered command complications, inflexible decision-making procedures and an extended coordination gap between the disaster management of the state and the efforts of other disaster management actors, local government entities, disaster specialists and NGOs. The failures faced thus not only disclosed the disaster management paradoxes of Thailand, but they also constituted a new era of disaster management for the country.

4.2.3 The Third Period: New Disaster Management Under a Bureaucratic Government (2007-2015)

As aforementioned, the development of the disaster management of Thailand has been influenced by two crucial factors – 1) the demands of society and the public as to revising the disaster management of the country following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2) the political stability of the government of Thailand between 2007 and 2015, wherein the elected civilian government was confronted with criticism as to the occurrence of policy failures (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). This context created political tension between the Thai Military, elite bureaucrats and

elected politicians (as comprised Thaksin's networks) - the latter groups having previously dominated the governance of Thailand.

The disaster management policy which appeared here comprised a dynamic and mixed approach which seemingly was ignored by the national government of Thailand. This led to bureaucratic reintervention. In 2005, in the period following the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the disaster management system of Thailand became geared towards building a modern disaster management system[59] which witnessed effective standards and open participation provisions for local government entities, the public and NGOs. Here necessary resources began to be progressively allocated to the disaster management system of Thailand to enhance its infrastructure. As part of this endeavour, a national warning centre was activated as the primary unit in providing early mitigation of crises while an international and regional collaboration network was produced for the provision of hazard warnings. An organisational redesign also occurred through the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of Thailand of 2007, as was designed to illustrate a clear hierarchy of command at each level[60] and to manifest a flexible structure for disaster agencies. This led to the installation of a disaster plan covering all levels, within which attention was paid to the requirement of local operation units participating in these activities[61] (Kamolvej, 2014). While the contents of the plan were seemingly more progressive than that contained in the Disaster Management Act of 1979, the old ideas (as pertained primarily to security threats, air threats and terrorism) remained foregrounded and so too were the roles played by Thai Military chiefs and the elite bureaucrats of the Ministry of Interior as members of the National Disaster Management Committee[62].

However, following the 2007 promulgation of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007, no natural disasters of the scale witnessed in the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami occurred. While northern haze pollution arose between 2007 and 2010 (Simachaya, 2012) and there were southern insurgency terrorist attacks in 2007[63] (BBC, 2018), the Thai state did not utilise the

Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act here. Notably, during this period, political controversies, unstable governments (e.g., an elected coalition government) and attempts by the Thai Military to seize power[64] were encountered – as negatively affected the administration of the government of Thailand. These ramifications influenced the progression of decentralisation in the country and its policy developments. One clear example of this was the restrictions faced in the efforts given to drafting the national Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (as required under the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act). When the elected government (elected politicians) was weakened, bureaucratic entities and security agencies (e.g., the Thai Military) were able to intervene in and control the political systems of Thailand (Chardchawarn, 2010).[65] Indeed, these factors directly affected the drafting of Thailand's National Disaster Management Plan (2010-2014) (hereafter the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010), as may be seen in the increasing number of regional Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation units[66], executive positions in that department (NDPDC, 2010) and the designing of a new approach through which to control the disaster management systems of Thailand though a centralisation disaster management plan and budget. Focus was also given here to identifying new disasters through which to cover (another) four security threats (i.e., air threats, sabotage, terrorism and domestic protestation/riot threats).[67] Finally, there was an expansion of the role played by the security sectors (such as the Office of National Security) in the operations of the disaster management of Thailand.

Although the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007 and Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010 were intensively intervened with by both bureaucrats and the Thai Military, some parts of these provisions reflected progress – for instance, in determining which agencies needed to provide and implement disaster management plans and guidelines, to undertake coordination with relevant units, to create disaster management flowcharts for precise implementation and to initiate the development of corroborative and networking disaster management ideas by (principally) allowing international organisations, NGOs and community

alliances to assistant and thus be a legal recipient of pertinent resources[68] (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2010). A Thai disaster management scholar has noted this disaster management as comprising "[a] clear hierarchical command, flexible management [and] the 2P/2R principles'[69] (Sighasem, 2017).

However, in practice, this 2007 reform as led by the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation seems to have sought, as a form of idealism, the integration of authorities and operational units, flowable coordination and effective resource mobilisation via disaster management partnerships. However, these aims were not able to be achieved in real life. The failure of the flooding management of Thailand in 2010 and 2011 displayed that the previously-encountered issues had yet to be resolved. In 2010, when a tropical storm and heavy rain devastated the northeastern region of Thailand and widespread flooding later affected several provinces, the government[70] of Thailand took action and enacted disaster management structures based upon the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2010. The disaster management network launched in the area, as led by the state authority, was set up to deal with the flooding yet local disaster command centres were unable to be installed due to the local agencies not wanting to participate in accordance with the plan. Here, the collaborative resources were rigidly applied and the disaster management coordination required broke down at the local level as a result of bureaucratic separatism, fragmented authority being held[71] and the failure of intergovernmental activity (Sighasem, 2011, 2017; Lebel and Lebel, 2018). These outcomes highlight how the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2010, as was intentionally designed by the Thai state to be the main instrument in integrating disaster directors and local agencies, resulted in failure. A primary cause of this failure pertained to the inability of disaster management unit and provincial disaster management director levels to command other units due to the bureaucratic separatism instituted. Instead, most of the disaster agencies involved undertook command-and-decision steps based on historical hierarchies and experiences, therefore

failing to follow the disaster management workflow set out by the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010. This reflects the lack of capacity of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010 in connecting and integrating each unit and in eliminating the bureaucratic separatism from such disaster management operations.

With the return of disaster management bureaucracy and its associated security regime, the political situation manifested uncertainty and the power creep of the Thai Military. In 2011, severe flooding affected large areas of Thailand, mainly in the northern and central regions and the capital of the country.[72] Among the political concerns that arose as to the intervention of the Thai Military and elite government officers appointed by the preceding government, Yingluck`s Administration (as the incoming government) set out to deal with the flood immediately yet encountered a fiasco again. Here, the government of Thailand appointed disaster management directors[73] in reflection of their mistrust towards the old regime. However, these directors were ineffective at arranging a new operational team and in commanding operational teams among the bureaucratic and security agencies tasked with dealing with the flooding. Despite the disaster management mechanisms held denoting that all power was to be delegated to the Thai Cabinet in working with the security sectors and the Ministry of Interior, a decision was made not to utilise the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act in launching a response. This is because the government sought to avoid authorising power being given to the security sectors, its former government alliance partner[74] (The Nation, 2011; Lebel and Lebel, 2018). Thus, the government of Thailand employed the Administration Act of 1991[75] to confront the flooding, whereupon a flood relief operation centre was established as the command centre tasked with improving communications and eliminating rumours and un-collaborative activity. The reversion to this old-fashioned centralised model, complete with intensive control and command structures maintained by the state, restricted the participation of other sectors and this led to politics of blame, political motivation (Kamolvej, 2014) and controversies as to the interactions between the command centre

and incident units (Marks and Lebel, 2016; Sighasem, 2017). Amidst this conflict and failure, the flooding assistance network (as comprised mass media, NGO, university, civil society and Private Sector entities) and self-community-based management moved to play a vital role in assisting victims and addressing flood-risk areas. This effort included supporting coordination and the monitoring/reporting of the flooding situation (Kaewnu, 2011; The Mirror Foundation, 2011). The emergence of such networks was one factor to have reduced the degree of failure faced in the disaster management of Thailand at that time.

These examples of flooding in Thailand were able to illustrate the failure of disaster management in the country alongside the gradual return of a bureaucratic and security-based regime in this context. Merely a few years later, the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake once again reflected the paradoxical characteristics of the disaster management of Thailand. In this crisis, a massive earthquake hit the upper northern region of Thailand and damaged a widespread area – especially in the Chiang Rai province (Khunwishit, 2014a; Thairathonline, 2014b). Political controversies became centralised in relation to the interactions of the Thai Military and the civil government of Thailand.[76] Although the earthquake was addressed via the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2010, the operations instituted were not smoothly managed, witnessed the lack of participation within the disaster management structure, evidenced governmental underestimations, highlighted the lack of earthquake management experience and proved how chaotic Thailand's political situation had become.[77] Consequently, people in Chiang Rai were affected to a significant degree. While provincial disaster management did not have the capacity to deal with the devastation caused by the earthquake, this failure was gradually revealed in relation to the inaccessibility of the affected areas, the non-directional communication provided and the delays faced in providing urgent recovery. Despite the provincial centre of disaster recovery having been established after an hour,

issues arose as to the connections formed with the disaster management database and its information pertaining to earthquake-vulnerable area, the victims and the damage caused.

At this point, volunteer-led local-based disaster management networks played the main role in supporting the post-earthquake governance of this period[78], therein leading the recovery of affected areas, the campaigning for and mobilising of resources through which to support the community's movements and the supporting of local people in negotiating with the province (Kangwannawakul, 2017b; Suwanmolee, 2017). This appearance of networks and collaborative communities hence turned the tide of the disaster management of Thailand and its earthquake responses. Due to its flexible management structure, participation of local people, openness to collaboration with other networks, encouraging of community engagement and interaction with mass media, NGO and university entities, such efforts became a crucial connection point in building a local coalition against the failure of the central disaster management of Thailand. Eventually, this network assumed a primary role in providing effective recovery without significant bureaucratic involvement. This milestone allows an exploration as to the state-local interactions which arose and how power operations were framed through antagonism and disaster management definitions (see Chapter 7 for further details).

4.2.4 The Fourth Period: Disaster Management Under a Security and Bureaucratic Regime (2015-2017)

The coming to power of a military junta in 2011 invoked changes in the disaster management regime of Thailand in at least two critical aspects. Firstly, it gradually increased the power and importance of the Thai Military in the disaster management system of the country. The Security Act was revised to increase the Thai Military's power, with disasters therein being defined as a domestic security threat. Consequently, military units (for example, as enacted internal security operations and the Thai Security Council) have played a central role in the disaster management planning and operations of Thailand[79] (Bumrungsuk, 2017; Thai Royal Gazette, 2017). The

Minister of Interior, as a former military elite figure, was appointed to control the domestic security policy of Thailand – as includes the country's disaster policy[80]. The development of the disaster management policy of Thailand thus became connected to the country's national security policy (2017) as drafted by the security sectors. There was also a solidifying of the roles played by central bureaucrats and technocrats, with most of the deputies and advisors working within the Ministry of Interior being former and elite bureaucrats of that ministry. Notably, the drafting of the national Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 failed to witness the participation of civil society or local representatives. Instead, the Draft Plan Committee comprised only of central elite bureaucrats and experts (NDPDC, 2015). In this plan, the central state retained a primary decision-making and budget-setting position via the assigning of the provincial governor as a supervisor.[81] As part of this, the National Disaster Warning Centre of Thailand was merged into the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, thereby extending the authority of the latter and allowing it to become the key centre unit in managing large mechanical resources, vehicles and recovery equipment. This led to a complete return to disaster management being a bureaucratic system under a military government.

Upon the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 being promulgated, it became the core plan implemented over the country – seeking to drive the disaster management of Thailand to go beyond its traditional model and to emphasise the provisions of appropriate response and recovery procedures. An aim was also held to connect the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 with international disaster management perspectives, to encourage disaster resilience and to solve the chronic issues of bureaucratic separatism, coordination failure and deficient disaster management knowledge and research (DDPM, 2015) This approach was presented via proactive disaster management processes and disaster risk management (DRRM) provisions[82], thus focusing not only on response-and-recovery processes (as in the previous disaster management plan of Thailand) but also paying attention to pre-disaster or disaster risk-

reduction aspects. These new areas of focus pertained to disaster prevention and mitigation, preparedness and the minimising of damages/losses in disaster contexts. In terms of the structure of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015, integrated budgeting and measures at all levels were applied in an attempt to resolve the fragmented and undirected disaster management of Thailand. Moreover, to avoid chaotic circumstances and to enhance the capacities of the operational units, an incident command approach was installed under the approach of unified commands, objectives, strategies and tactics being needed for a standard to be implemented, effective collaboration to arise and resources to be coordination (NDPDC, 2015).

Despite the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 having facilitated this new disaster management concept, the practical output sought has yet to emerge. The desire for a stable security regime and bureaucratic domination has led to the mechanisms proposed by the plan to have seemingly been forgotten in practice. The disaster management approach of Thailand enacted between 2015 and 2018 – as was required to respond to the Phetchaburi flooding in 2015, flooding in the southern regions of Thailand in 2017 and the Nan Landslide in 2018 – evidenced that a unified command arising in disaster circumstances has yet be achieved in the country (Thaiwater, 2019). The community-based disaster risk management introduced in this plan failed to manifest in these disaster areas as a lack of awareness was held among those living in risk-vulnerable areas and the local units of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation were seemingly powerless at this circumstance. The complex technicalities of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 have restricted the ability to move away from the old issues which have plagued the disaster management of Thailand. As the Chief Executive of the SAO (2019) has emphasised, ‘the new plan made us work more on paper than in resolving the real issues’.

Since 2015, the Thai Military has played an increasingly vital role in the disaster management of Thailand alongside the instituting of appropriate command provisions, resource utilisation and equipment readiness. Thus, ‘people have more confidence in the Thai Army than

in the civil defences and local disaster management of Thailand' (Provincial Governor, 2019). The effective assistance of the Thai Military in responding to disasters within Thailand between 2016 and 2018 – as saw the occurrence of flooding in southern Thailand in October 2017 and a landslide in Nan in July 2018 (Thaiwater, 2019) - saw the security forces positioned as the best entity to solve such issues. The Prime Minister of Thailand during this time, General Prayut Chan-Ocha, as was a former army commander, provided rhetoric during public appearances which argued that the Thai public should ask in disaster circumstances, 'if we do not have the military, who will assist the people" (Bamrungsuk, 2019) and claimed that "the role of the military is mainly to provide national defence… and in responding to disasters because we are a military of the people" (ASEAN Informantion Centre, 2018). This reiterates the notion that the disaster management of Thailand in this era was dominated by security ideas despite international influences and Climate Change streams arising (Sae-Chua, 2020).

In sum, it could be argued that, in this period, the disaster management characteristics as appeared in the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 maintained the bureaucratic and military regime which emerged after the 2011 coups in Thailand. This negatively the disaster management of the country and restricted its ability to address the long-held issues faced.

Conclusion

This chapter initially demonstrated the overall administration traits and historical characteristics of Thailand's disaster management development, failure and repeated problems. Here, it has been noted that the state apparatuses of Thailand have been governed and ruled by bureaucratic polity alongside authoritative governance. This centralisation broadened the authority held by the centre, thereby emphasising a hierarchy of power and certain tools being used to maintain this power

among politicians and other sectors. Shifts in the disaster management systems and policies of Thailand over a number of decades have arisen via the occurrence of several disasters and crises.

A number of circumstances have thus influenced the disaster management of Thailand. This development can be categorised into four crucial periods, with each era being driven and articulated by different circumstances, dynamics of power, ideologies and concepts. In the first period (1970-1996), the disaster management of Thailand was driven by big bureaucracy, military power and the security of the state, thereby being positioned as a mechanism to secure the country's interests and society from war and military defences while bureaucratic ideas were deployed when designing disaster management apparatus. In the second period (1997-2007), the role played by bureaucracy and the security sectors was minimised by the power of elected politicians. Seemingly, the bureaucratic disaster management as focused on domestic threats was transformed to respond to new ideas of management, governance and decentralisation by elected politicians. The emergence of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 failed to invoke any progression in practice here and instead illustrated the paradoxical nature at play, whereby centralisation was maintained despite claims being raised that flexible management, integrated plans and clear command structures had been implemented. In the third period (2007-2015), the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation had, between 2007 and 2015, defined the roles of related disaster management agencies and sought to strengthen the disaster management processes and planning of Thailand. However, real change was unable to emerge due to how the revised Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan was drafted. This plan was seemingly designed as tool to ensure the domination of the country's disaster management by bureaucrats and the security sectors. In the last period (2015-2017), as arose alongside attempts by the Thai Military to seize power and the elected government's political instability, the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan was employed to regain the power of the Thai Military and to reprioritise bureaucratic polity. The plan was linked to security concerns and was structured to return authority

to central bureaucrats. This was demonstrated in the circumstances of the 2013 flooding and 2014 earthquake in Thailand, whereby both central/provincial bureaucrats and the Thai Military played a significant role in the launched operations.

It is still too early to conclude whether the disaster management models or approaches of Thailand are directly responsible for the wicked problems encountered here. A purpose of this chapter has been to delineate the characteristics of the disaster management of Thailand in various eras alongside some of the crucial factors which have affected the framing of the discourses and logics encountered. This chapter has hence functioned as a background in understanding the disaster management of Thailand. The next chapter will demonstrate the disaster management logics framed in the Thai context in the past decade as well as how those discourses have been articulated.

Chapter Five

Emergence of Thailand's Disaster Management Logics: A Genealogy of National Disaster Management

Introduction

In light of the previous chapter's illumination of the disaster management development of Thailand, alongside the emergence of the country's disaster management-related plans, legal acts and committees, the present chapter delineates how these developments have directly affected the wicked problems and policy failure witnessed in this arena – considering this in correspondence with a number of disasters – especially the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. This chapter initially provides an analysis as to the development and installing of the disaster management regime of Thailand between 1979 and 2011, whereby attention is given to how shifting social and political practices influenced the defining of disaster management in the country.

In clarifying the development and articulation of the disaster management of Thailand, the chapter applies genealogy to explore the emergence of a new form of disaster management, as commenced in early 2007, wherein disaster management discourses were installed at various governance levels and then transferred to local agencies by means of the Disaster Management and Prevention Act 2007 and the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010 Notably, the analysis presented here does not constitute a historical narrative as to the centralised style of reform undertaken by the central government of Thailand, the disaster management development capacity problems faced or the role of local governments in implementing disaster management here. Instead, this chapter portrays how the changing conditions and development of disaster management in Thailand arose in parallel with other influential shifts – such as the rise of new logics systems within disaster management managerialism, bureaucracy and security alongside other forms of collaboration which aimed to install a disaster management regime across the

country. These conditions were articulated as the contemporary disaster management discourses of Thailand and were subsequently conveyed to local disaster management entities as orthodox practice within disaster occurrences. However, notwithstanding the discourses installed through state apparatuses for a decade, local entities began to challenge this approach and drew attention to the contradictory notions, inefficient management and implementation failure seen in light of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake.

To discern how and why the disaster management regime of Thailand was forged, became hegemonised and was ultimately sustained, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the historical development of the disaster management regime of Thailand from 1979 until the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. The second section details the disaster management employed in responding to the Chiang Rai Earthquake between May 2014 and 2015. From this, analysis is given as to how each logic arose in this context. The third section summarises the problematic development of the local disaster management of Thailand.

5.1 Emergence of the Disaster Management Regime of Thailand: From WWII to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake

The 2007 Disaster Management and Prevention Act illustrates how Thailand attempted to create effective and flexible organisations, standards and international measures while strengthening disaster management capacity so local governments could respond to disaster events (as seemed to be increasing in severity). Conversely, the 2007 Act forged paradoxes in terms of its presumptions and in invoking failure in many aspects of its implementation.

Crucially, the 2007 Act aimed to steer the disaster management of all levels to be an efficient, effective and systematic provision when facing crises, assigning responsibility to the

Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation as to developing standard disaster management implementations, measurements and integrating the disaster management system (DDPM, 2007).

As Kamolvej (2011) has concluded in relation to this legislation:

> The new Act […] authorised the regional level as the main actor in disaster management — that is, provinces and local governments will be the key organisations utilising disaster prevention through cooperation with the military, non-profit organisations and other sectors. While local government still has vital responsibilities for disaster prevention and relief, it is also the frontline organisation which faces the crisis (p.55).

The sentences here illustrate a number of logics embedded within the approach taken, whereby the paradoxical characteristics of the disaster management of Thailand and its assumptions manifested in various ways and ultimately invoked wicked problems for a decade. To understand how and when the disaster management discourses of Thailand emerged as the dominating regime of practice, two areas must be investigated; 1) how disaster management discourse was framed by the dynamic situations of Thailand and 2) how disaster management discourses (or logics) were connected and maintained in these systems despite resulting in failure problems.

5.1.1 Legacy of Security Logics

The civil government's influence over disaster management in Thailand cannot be completely separated from that of the Thai Military or security sectors. The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act, and the definition held as to disaster management more widely, was often related to notions pertaining to 'threats to the nation', 'air-strikes', 'devastating harm', being 'over-controlled' and 'terrorist threats'. Hence, the disaster management system of Thailand was positioned as being required to prevent/mitigate disasters effectively, with this necessitating capable organisations with appropriate human resources, recovery equipment and active response

capabilities. Consequently, security agencies, the Thai Military and Thai Police Force were denoted as being essential actors in this system and the 'security and national stability' of Thailand was stated as being the primary aim of this disaster management system.

Although the disaster management policy of Thailand was established through the first Disaster Management Act in 1979, the country's disaster management system was influenced by the ideology of the 1939-1952 military government. Here, in a policy statement of the Council of Ministers, as delivered by Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram in 1938 and 1942, declarations were given that the Thai state paid attention to disasters as they represented 'security threats to the nation' and thus the government of Thailand was focussed on manifesting 'national intervention'. Such sentiments were, inevitably, held in response to World War II and thus, at that time, the primary responsibility of disaster management was 'to protect people', to avoid damage by 'securing the national security' and to resist 'war threats' through concerted effort by the Thai Military, Thai Police Force and government agencies (SHR, 2006). Indeed, policy statements made by the ruling junta between 1938 and 1942 noted, for example, that 'securing Thai people from domestic threats […] is the State and government's duties' (SHR, 1938:22). 'Under the war condition', the Thai Army maintained the security of Thai citizens from both war threats and domestic threats (sabotage and burglary) (SHR, 1942: 268-269).

In response to such discourse, the Air defence Act of 1939 and the Fire, defence and Protection Act of 1952 were produced, as assigned all disaster management duties to the Thai Military and the Ministry of Interior, entities which were tasked with defending against air strikes, providing shelter to people, relieving war damage and controlling fires.

A public statement by the Prime Minister of Thailand in 1940 (cited in Sangchatkaew, 2014) illustrates the generally-held discourse of that time, wherein it was claimed that:

> The chaos of the world at the moment […] must certainly affect Thailand. Thus, there are two solutions to alleviate this disaster. First, Thais must follow the 'Thai nationalism way' that will build social unity against external threats […] Second, we must follow the Thai State's approach as a central authority in managing and obtaining security for the people of the country (p.117-118).

In considering why these logics occurred, it is evident that the conditional social and political aspects and contexts of Thailand at that time were very important. These included, for instance, the Franco-Thai War and the involvement of Thailand in World War II. Due to the conflicts which arose between Thailand and France in regards to the division of South-East Asian land borders between 1940 and 1941, as well as Thailand's positioning within the South-East Asian arena of World War II between 1941 and 1945, the country became a target of Allied air-strikes. Consequently, the need to secure (and recover) the society and people of Thailand was invoked and the government responded to this requirement by articulating its hegemonic projects. An example of this was the public discourse given towards 'Thai nationalism ways', as relied upon the notion of strengthening Thailand against external threats and on the consolidating of the military state via an installation of a 'Thai nationalist' projects. This was contained in statements made by the central state, as held in twelve volumes between 1939 and 1942. Here, it was conveyed how Thai citizens were expected to manifest in best protecting the national characteristics of the Thai people – such as in the enforcement of Thai naming conventions (Kasetsiri, 2002; Sangdee, 2009; Sangchatkaew, 2014).

Additionally, the Thai Military were positioned as the 'main authority' and as a 'powerful organisation' dedicated to assisting the country in overcoming negative situations and thereby securing Thai society. The government of Thailand often employed public statements to respond to situations – for example, in relation to the demands and desires of the social sphere – doing so through public events and governmental actions. One instance of this is seen in the statement of

policy of the Thai Cabinet in 1942, wherein the prime minister of Thailand announced that ‘due to the country […] confronting the Second World War, it [was] necessary for the government and people to support the Thai Army, Navy and Air Force to [ensure Thailand remained a] powerful country’ (SHR, 1942: 270). Alongside the symbolic actions taken in response to many disasters within Thailand – e.g., the Bangkok flooding of 1942 and the recovery undertaken after the air strikes faced between 1942 and 1945 – the military and security sectors assumed a primary role in ensuring the security of the nation, in recovering the country following natural disasters and in dealing with threats of war (Jensantikul, 2015).

Hence, it could be considered that the emergence of such security logics and the emphasising of security actors within the disaster management of Thailand was significantly caused by the role played by the country in World War II and how this participation instigated a chain of equivalence between such security demands, nationalism and militarism.

5.1.2 Predominant Civil Defence and Bureaucratic Logics

After two decades following 1939, a decline was witnessed in the power held by the military government of Thailand. In 1978, new logics of disaster management arose due to the shifting social and political dynamics of Thailand. In this period, the disaster management of the country was portrayed as manifesting a ‘civil defence system’ which assumed more extensive responsibility than the former system. In the new laws that were produced, a disaster was defined as comprising a wider scope and pertained to either a ‘fire, flooding, storm [or] man-made disaster’, events that were now termed to be ‘public hazards’. In this context, the disaster management command centre was moved away from the control of the Thai Military and was positioned within the Ministry of Interior and Department of Provincial Administration as a ‘central director’. This was achieved by assigning all operations to ‘central bureaucrats’, whereby disaster management officers were considered to represent the core agencies involved in the

‘controlling, supervising and commanding’ of disaster management. It can thus be said that the disaster management of this period was dominated by bureaucratic logics.

The Disaster Management Act of 1979 is considered to be Thailand’s first official disaster law. During this era, the role of security logics had been marginalised due to pressure from international organisation and new political movement groups – comprising both bureaucratic and new technocratic polity entities (Kongkirati, 2013). At this point, it seems that bureaucratic logics were gradually installed. The disaster management structure, as produced through the 1979 Act, operated under a centralised bureaucracy, with the Ministry of Interior and Department of Provincial Administration being the primary organisations involved. It is seen from the 1979 Act that the contemporary law of Thailand emphasised the ability to 'control' and 'command' through this mechanism. In order to create a specific unit for disaster management, the law defined ‘the Civil defence Secretariat Office’ as a unit designed to respond to disaster operations. Consequently all Ministry of Interior staff became primary agents in such operations. In terms of the hierarchical structure employed, the Disaster Management Act was designed to designate decision-making capabilities to the National Disaster Policy Committee, as was chaired by politicians (i.e., the Minister of Interior). However, the membership of the National Disaster Policy Committee was dominated by the bureaucratic polity context due to almost all of the members holding elite bureaucratic positions – for instance, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Defence, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Public Health and Transport (Ministry of Interior, 1979:2).

Many scholars – for instance, Bowornwathana (2005) and Luangprapat (2008) – have elucidated this era as manifesting ‘bureaucratic polity supremacy’ which operated under a 'authoritarian military technocratic alliance regime' in which civil servants influenced the direction of the country and supporters of the government of Thailand. Here, the lack of policy development skills among the military junta led to bureaucrats being assigned by the Thai Military to handle the country’s policy administration between 1980 and 1990.

In considering the Disaster Management Act of 1979, it is clear that the disaster management structure and commands utilised at that time were further characterised via a bureaucratic form – seen in the inclusion of terms such as ‘authority’ ‘control’, ‘assignment’, ‘command’, ‘appointment’ and ‘hierarchy’. See, for example:

> Commanding, appointment of disaster prevention staff, establishing the civil defence unit and supervising the Local Areas Director in the provincial areas is the responsibility of the Provincial Governor as the Provincial Civil Defence Director (Ministry of Interior, 1979).

> The highest command is given by the Minister of Interior, the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of Interior as Deputy Director of the National Civil Defence Unit, next is the Provincial Civil Defence Director (Provincial Governor), the Director of the District Civil Defence (District Chief) and at the bottom is the Municipal Civil Defence Director (Mayor) (Ministry of Interior, 1979:p.5).



Figure 1 Hierarchy of Disaster Management Under the Disaster Management Act of 1979

The provisions of the Disaster Management Act of 1979 required, in order to process and control the Ministry of Interior (as the centre of the disaster management operations of Thailand), all government levels (i.e., national, provincial, district and local levels) to draft disaster management plans that linked such work with the national disaster management regime. The disaster management instituted as a result of the 1979 Act was thus operated via a stringent chain of command.

As aforementioned, when examining the conditions that were maintained via the bureaucratic logics embedded in the disaster management system of Thailand between 1979 until 2002, it seems that articulation was given of multiple social demands and factors prevalent at that time.

The first factor pertained to the failure of public administration and disaster management by the junta during the preceding years, with this being understood alongside the severe drought that affected Thailand between 1980 and 1985. These elements provoked the public of Thailand to demand changes to the disaster management system. In other words, opposition was raised to the government's emphasis towards protecting the country from war threats and its interests via the Thai Army being positioned as a core organisation in this administration). A desire was therefore held for a new responsive form of disaster management that was enabled to comprehensively manage a range of threats – such as flooding and landslides – via provisions such as a clear commanding system, access to public services and effective recovery assistance in disaster areas.

The second factor pertained to the successful imagination of the bureaucratic system of Thailand, as developed between 1980 and 1989 and thereby led to shifts in the social imagination of the country's population. The long premiership of Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda (between 1980 and 1988) and the successful policy implementation of 'military-led politics' in an

attempt to enhance the country (whereby bureaucrats were able to elaborate their networks and connect many big business groups and political groups together), enabled the consolidation of the authority of the country's bureaucratic polity and the sustaining of Thailand's administrative system. An example of this can be seen in the establishing of a joint committee for the Public Sector and Private Sector (as was designed to solve an economic depression facing Thailand), the instituting of a special committee to coordinate projects under Thai Royal patronage (as were official responses to the social and environmental development of the country) and the inaugurating of a rural policy produced to solve a drought facing the nation. The successful implementation of these respective committees were portrayed to the social sphere via the Thai Economic Policy Achievements Survey in 1985 (Prompanjai, 2015). Evidently, these elements were vital steps in the consolidation of the bureaucratic logics of Thailand.

5.1.3 Hybrid Logics in the Disaster Management of Thailand: Managerialism Logics and Re-Constituted Security and Bureaucratic Logics (2000–2014)

Increased Managerialism in the Disaster Management of Thailand Within Public Management Streams

In considering the political and social context of Thailand, alongside its influence upon the country's disaster management between 2003 and 2011, it is seen that the disaster management of this period was driven by mixed logics and contradictory ideologies. It can be said that the characteristics of disaster management in this period were unique and this may have been a primary cause of the policy failures that were subsequently witnessed. Overall, this disaster management was the outcome of social articulations.

The language used in relation to the disaster management of Thailand between 2001 and 2007 demonstrates how this concept had become defined as 'a crucial tool in modern management' under the public management reforms occurring in the country. In this context,

disaster management was required to rely on ideas of ‘efficiency’, ‘flexibility in adaptation and management’ and ‘standardis[ation] in prevention and rehabilitation’, doing so in order to protect against ‘large-scale disasters’ derived from ‘natural disasters’, ‘man-made disasters’ and ‘security threats’ (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007). To mobilise the vast resources available from multiple sectors in a crisis, this new disaster management form was compelled to connect all pertinent organisations and to integrate relevant operations. Furthermore, the new disaster management structure was required to use a horizontal and single command structure and system and to implement multiple ‘strategies and integrated’ notions. This structure was created to reduce ‘the loss of lives and property of people’. Moreover, a Disaster Command Centre was created to allow ‘public spaces’, ‘a volunteer network’, ‘civil society’ and NGOs to participate in this disaster management regime.

Evidently, the disaster management of Thailand between 2000 and 2004 was influenced by the reforms undertaken as to the public management of the country and the demand for a more effective system following the failure of the government in managing the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. As described in the 2003 policy statement of the Thai Cabinet in regards to public management reform, there was an identified need:

> For the government to create [an] effective civil service to suit the situation [...] and to adjust the role of the state from actors and controllers to become a supporter and facilitator [...] by encouraging the Private Sector and the people to participate in the important process (SHR, 2003: p.24-25).

Furthermore, the prime minister’s statement to the public on the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami highlighted the approach to be taken by the government towards disasters:

> From now on, the development of meteorological and geological knowledge, the establishing of international cooperation, a disaster warning system and crisis management

> knowledge, as well as the mission of rehabilitating the mind and restoring buildings, is a crucial mission of the Thai State (Shinawatra, 2004 cited in Thairathonline, 2004).

Both statements illustrate the contemporary development of the disaster management system of Thailand, with this being manifested in the establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (under the Ministry of Interior in 2003) and the National Disaster Warning Centre (under the Ministry of Information Technology in 2004). This led to the further drafting of a new disaster law – the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007. The revised disaster management of Thailand was understood as needing to be constructed as a modern organisation that operated as an effective unit that could be promptly commanded, flexibly managed, efficiently implemented and collaborated upon with international volunteer organisations. Ultimately, these structures were combined to form the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2010-2014. These aspects, as all became embedded in the disaster management system of Thailand, can be viewed as a form of managerialism.

The standardisation of disaster management in Thailand in 2007 witnessed the adoption of an international disaster management concept. Here, the first Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan was developed under the principles of a disaster management process, as required all pertinent agencies to formulate strategic plans and to implement these following four procedures – 1. Prevention and Mitigation, 2. Preparedness, 3. Response and Relief and 4. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee, 2010: 30). In this way, according to an interviewed disaster management specialist, ‘the elementary principles of Thailand’s disaster management plan were fabricated from the 2P 2R principles by applying this idea in organising and integrating all levels’ (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Specialist A, 2019). The occurrence of provisions such as the risk disaster warning project and warning disaster volunteers at the local level were clearly consequences of this approach.

Moreover, it was found that the new disaster management structure of Thailand emphasised the 'integrating' of strategic actions and the 'allocating [of] command power to disaster management committees at various levels'. This disaster management structure was separated into two types. Firstly, the policy components (i.e., of the National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee) pertained only to directing, developing, approving and implementing the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and wider disaster management system (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007). Secondly, the operational units (e.g., the National Emergency Operation Headquarter and the Central Emergency Operation Centre) remained under the command of a bureaucratic hierarchy (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007) – see Figure 2.

Notions of participation and collaboration were also core in this disaster management structure. This is witnessed in the language employed in the Disaster Management Act of 2007 – for example, where it is stated that '[i]n disaster operations, the director or official [...] may assign a non-profit organisation to implement or assist in the disaster management process' (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007:18-19) and that 'the local government directly commands, coordinates and collaborates with charities, volunteers and local civil society' (National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee, 2010:40). These steps involved the development of local rescue team projects, as were positioned to provide local volunteers to work in disaster management and to improve disaster management village volunteer provisions in support of the central disaster management system. Such aspects continue to comprise the disaster management of Thailand today.



Figure 2 Present Command and Operational Levels of the Disaster Management Regime of Thailand

Source: Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015-2019

The managerialism logics witnessed (such as installation of new disaster directing centres, as adopted disaster management principles) in these periods articulated multiple Thai contexts spanning 1997-2007.

The first context was the shift in political awareness, the new forms of public management that arose among the society of Thailand and the social demands for a more efficient bureaucratic system following the establishment of the 1997 Constitution of Thailand. This governing document set out a new rule which compelled the political and bureaucratic system (both central and local) to provide public spaces and to give more opportunities for people to participate in policy processes and their management. At the same time, the determining of plans and procedures was decentralised via the Local Administrative Organisation Act 1999, as was a major shift in the operations of the traditional governance of Thailand and led to the allocation of resources and authority to greater swathes of the population and to local government (Charoenmuang, 2006; Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee, 2016). Such changes stimulated public administration reform in 2002 and introduced new public management concepts to the country in early 2000.

The second influential context witnessed here was the strengthening of the prime minister's role during this time. Here, the business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, as was the Thai Prime Minister from 2003 to 2006, dramatically changed the public administration and disaster management of Thailand in 2004. This led to the public administration system of Thailand, as had previously been dominated by bureaucrats, to be directed via a new form of public management. In this regard, Thaksin challenged the bureaucrats of the country by critiquing their historical role as comprising a 'slow-moving organisation' and as being 'old-fashioned and fully corrupt' which was thus required to 'change to [an] entrepreneurial and business style' (Painter, 2006). This discourse led to a major public management reform project in 2002, as instigated the reshaping of ministries and government units, limitations as to bureaucratic expansion, the creation of a special delivery unit, the application of a business-like approach, the initial use of evaluation tools in

public organisations and the employment of strategy notions within public sector reforms. In these endeavours, the reforming of the Ministry of Interior (as the primary organisation overseeing the country's disaster management) was essential for the government due to it being a highly influential authority in directing regional and local governments. The agendas which arose in this environment were based on managerialism, the horizontalisation of bureaucracy and a governmental endeavour to control the bureaucrats of Thailand. In this regard, the overall aim was to transfer authority from central bureaucrats to the country's politicians. As part of this process, the disaster management committees of the country were reconstructed and redesigned by authorising policy-making responsibilities to be assumed by the prime minister as the chairperson of the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee, by decentralising disaster management authority to local government entities as front-line disaster responders and by using managerialism to shift authority as to disaster management from big bureaucrats to the country's politicians.

The third context to invoke this shift in the disaster management of Thailand related to the demands raised for an effective disaster management system following the failure of the disaster management enacted in responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Here, people began to question the effectiveness of the 1979 Disaster Management Act 1979, the suitability of Thailand's disaster management law and the structural failures witnessed in relation to the country's disaster management, warning and communication systems, disaster operations as run by central and local government units and disaster management command provisions (Kamolvej, 2006). This failure, as arose under the bureaucratic logics of the disaster management regime of Thailand, was presented by the media of the country and provoked social and state awareness as to the need to build up a greater degree of disaster knowledge, to possess an effective warning system and to connect the different disaster warning systems of international organisations in an effort to standardise the disaster management undertaken. Indeed, the desire for 'integrated

disaster management', 'single command' structures, 'adaptive and flexible management' and the 'decentralisation of disaster management to local governments' became the primary aims when the disaster management system of Thailand was reorganised in late 2004 (Sighasem, 2016).

The fourth context related to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, as is considered to be a framework for cooperation in the disaster coordination of 10 ASEAN Member States. Having become a signatory in 2004, Thailand was required to implement the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015. At that time, Thailand was forced to establish an effective disaster prevention mechanism and tools through which to support the reduction of risk from disasters. Thus, the disaster management system of Thailand, as developed following 2005, contained the disaster management principles of; 1) risk assessment, warning and surveillance, 2) prevention and mitigation, 3) preparation and response and 4) recovery. These aspects were incorporated into Thai law in 2007.

5.1.4 Re-Installing Bureaucratic/Security Logics: Three Logics in One Disaster Management System (2007-2014)

In recent years, the political landscape and social context of Thailand has altered dramatically, a result of military interventions into the politics of the country, the instability of the civil government, the major enlargement of the Thai bureaucracy and the confrontation of big disasters between 2011 and 2014. From this, a paradoxical logic has once again arisen.

Disaster management that was portrayed as managerialism emphasised upon the need for effective systems and standardisation. This was transferred into a disaster management system which focused on 'national security' 'continual operations', 'strengthened communities' and 'the building of immunity'. Within this system, bureaucrats and security forces continued to play a major role.

To enhance capabilities and mobilise resources, the disaster management system of Thailand in this era was shaped by a centralised concept which was considered in relation to the specific Thai context of its implementation. The terms ‘clear hierarchy of command’ and ‘single command and decision’ were employed within the primary Disaster Management Act of 2007, whereupon it seems that all disaster management authority had been returned to the Ministry of Interior.

The presence of terms such as ‘supervision’, ‘director’ and ‘facilitation’, alongside the scoping of an ‘integrated disaster management plan and security preparation plan’, can here be seen as a new governance tool of bureaucratic and security logics. The policy statement of Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, as rose to power following a military coup in 2006, addressed the disaster and security dimensions facing the country by noting that;

> Amidst the world changing [...] the Thai State must encourage coordination among the Government, the Private Sector and civil society [...] including by enhancing the potential of the Thai Military to guarantee the security and prosperity of the country [...] and to prevent and solve critical national problems (SHR, 2006:5).
>
> To develop the nation [...] civil servants must be professional [...] as well as proficient and capable in servicing people, both in normal and crisis times (SHR, 2006: 7).

These statements indicated the ideological concepts that were being brought to the fore and the developing of the disaster management of Thailand that was to occur post-2007.

However, when considering the contextual practice and disaster management tools utilised between 2006 and 2009 in Thailand, it is seen that such disaster management apparatuses, commands and perceptions were defined by security and bureaucratic logics. Although the Disaster Management Act of 2007 was initially driven by managerialism logics, the assumption of power by a junta in 2007 affected the disaster management landscape in many ways –

particularly in relation to the drafting process of the Disaster Management Act of 2007 wherein the bureaucracy and military of Thailand became the supreme policymakers and were positioned as being at the centre of the country's disaster management command.

In 2007, the junta determined that elite bureaucrats, the Thai Military and technocrats were to become the leading agents in the drafting of the Disaster Management Act (SHR, 2006). Realistically, this formulation should have witnessed the participation of all pertinent stakeholders – such as citizens and local government representatives (Sighasem, 2016). Additionally, the Disaster Management Act of 2007 saw the denoting of a number of disaster management committees comprising actors from the security sectors – such as the Permanent Secretary for defence National, the Police Commissioner, the Commander in Chief, the Army, Air, and Navy Commander and the Secretary of the National Security Council. This represented an increase of committees by over one-third (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007) and comprised a super board of disaster management provisions which held responsibility for establishing policies designed to develop the country's disaster management systems. This is evidence that the disaster management of Thailand at this time encountered significant intervention by security agencies and the Thai Military, namely in an effort to consolidate their power following a period in which Thailand saw the rise of a business-politician regime (e.g., the rise of populism by Thaksin).

During this time, the definition held as to what constitutes a disaster within the Disaster Management Act of 2004 was expanded. Firstly, the Act determined a disaster to include an 'air disaster' and 'sabotage' within the disaster management system of Thailand (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007). Furthermore, the Thai Military was, in this context, portrayed as an 'effective, proficient' unit in its provision of assistance to major disasters and in connecting all security plans with the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and all disaster management structure levels (i.e., Thailand's National Security Policy in 2005, National

Readiness Plan in 2012 and Ministry of defence and Disaster Plans) (National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee, 2010). It can thus be argued that this comprised the re-intervention of the Thai Military in the country's disaster management (see Figure 3).



Figure 3 Linkage Between the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (2010-2014) and the Security Plans held at Different Levels

As described above, the new disaster management structure gave a chance for the Thai Military to intervene in the disaster management operations of the country via an integrated approach being employed in relation to the National Defence Plan responding effectively to disasters. In this case, it can be seen that, by 2007, the government of Thailand had positioned the military as playing a primary role in commanding disaster management agencies and in handling the disaster management employed when addressing the upper northern haze (SOC, 2007). This was also

witnessed in the Thai Military being positioned as the main force in responding to, assisting and rehabilitating flood victims in 2011. Here, the Thai Military successfully cultivated an image of being capable of resolving disaster issues. As part of this, the phrase ‘military of the people’ was utilised to connect this concept with the wider context of Thailand, a step which illustrated the strengthening role of the security logics within this disaster management regime. In addition the return of the bureaucratic system and of centralisation was evidenced through the usage of terms such as ‘governance’, ‘direction’ and ‘supervision’ in the Disaster Management Act of 2007, the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010-2014 and in the enlargement of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation between 2008 and 2010 (National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee, 2010).

As aforementioned, the disaster management system of Thailand between 2004 and 2006 became driven by managerialism logics and emphasised ‘efficiency’ and the establishing of ‘standards’. The revitalisation of bureaucratic and security logics (i.e., military intervention) following 2007 significantly affected the disaster management of the country – seen in relation to both the disaster management discourses and practices which emerged in regards to the Thai context. Here, all decision-making authority pertaining to the country’s disaster management had become re-centralised to the Ministry of Interior (i.e., the bureaucratic structure) and relied upon bureaucratic hierarchy. For instance, power was assigned to the Director-General of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (under the Ministry of Interior) in regards to preventing and mitigating disasters throughout the country. In addition, power was removed from provincial governors and district chiefs due to provisions instituted under the new disaster management system (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007).

Disaster management decision-making was centralised. Initially, in 2010, the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan was clearly established in a way as to develop local disaster management. Consequently, disaster management authority was decentralised to local

governments in relation to their ability to cope with local disaster areas. Conversely, the central government of Thailand maintained power. It can be seen that this new disaster management structure divided disaster management authority into four scales – whereby different commanders were assigned in relation to respective scales of disaster severity (see Table 1).

Level	Management Scale	Authority
1	Small Scale Disaster	District Director, Local Director and/or BMA Assistant Director – commands and controls
2	Medium Scale Disaster	Provincial Director or BMA Director – controls, directs and commands
3	Large Scale Disaster	Commander of National Emergency Operation Headquarter – controls, directs and commands
4	Extremely Large Scale Disaster	Prime Minister or assigned Deputy Prime Minister – controls, directs and commands

Table 1 Disaster Management Scale

Source: Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010-2014, National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee (2010)

The system design of this disaster management scale was obviously influenced by the area base management and decentralised concept. Conversely, the decision-making as to declaring the disaster management scale was entirely centralised. The announcement of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation in 2013 conveyed how all decision-making authority as to disaster management had been located with the Director-General of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and with the Provincial Governor (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2013). Hence, local disaster management and localism notions were characterised as an ideal-type.

In regards to the disaster management budget and approval process, the disaster management of Thailand at this time emphasised the controlling and monitoring of such resources (DDPM, 2013). Notably, this budget was linked to the bureaucratic hierarchy and regular budget processes held, whereby all approvals had to be processed and monitored via the documents and provisions instituted by the central government unit. The reason for doing so was to institute a transparent disaster management process and to respond to the scepticism held towards local operations. In an interview with a Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation specialist, the prevalence of such bureaucratic logics was addressed: “We know that the disaster management system requires a flexible operation, but emergencies often come with financial leaks and corruption. Therefore, budget implementation in disasters must be transparent” (DDPM Specialist A, 2019).

Further evidence of the return of such bureaucratic logics to this context is seen in the expanding nature and budget allocations of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation following 2008. According to a 2014 Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Report, its regional units had expanded from 12 units nationwide in 2004 to 18 units by 2008 (NDPDC, 2015). This is consistent with the growth witnessed in terms of disaster management budgeting, whereby the department’s budget expanded threefold between 2007 and 2010. Such growth caused the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation to become the third-largest department in the Ministry of Interior (NDPDC, 2015). Accordingly, an interviewed disaster management officer stated that: “It is very necessary for our department to perform in disaster operations with knowledge, ability and the department's information” (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019) and that if that team has “sufficient resources, high technology disaster management and competent human resources, [it] can prevent disasters in our country” (Provincial DDPM Officer B, 2019).

When considering the Thai context since 2007, it is seen that hybrid logics became installed in the disaster management system – a result of Thailand's ever-shifting social and political contexts.

The first reason for this emergence pertains to the demands of the political order of Thailand and the desire for efficient disaster management. Due to the political instability experienced in Thailand between 2006 and 2013, the government was unable to operate effective administration, with on-street protests by the population having led to frequent changes in government. Ultimately, Thailand had four governments and cabinets in five years (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). Additionally, Thailand encountered a number of big disasters during this period – including mudslides in the lower northern region in 2006, haze in the upper northern region in 2007 and, most damagingly, significant flooding in late 2011 (BangkokPost, 2011). These disasters affected the total economic system and national development of Thailand and led to the mass media often portraying this as a failure of disaster management by the civilian government. Here, it was held that the disaster management system was unacceptable due its lack of long-term and consistent policy formulations, effective command, active and coherent management, adequate response provisions and transparency (Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Sighasem, 2013, 2016; Kamolvej, 2014; Lebel and Lebel, 2018). These concerns led to major pressure being felt by the government to improve upon its disaster management, namely in relation to providing administrative continuity, transparency, inspections and monitoring and a clear hierarchical system.

Secondly, the Thai Military interventions in Thailand's governance following the 2006 coup greatly instigated political reform and significantly changed the landscape of public administration. In responding to the perceived distrustfulness of politicians, the junta initially seized security and administrative authority from politicians, doing so in order to reconstruct such power by using hegemonised projects and discourses – seen in the usage of terms such as

‘politician policy corruption’, ‘the transparency of the bureaucracy and Thai Military’, ‘civil servants, the military of the people and the nation’, ‘doing so for the nation of the military’ and ‘professional military’. Additionally, the structural administration of Thailand became decentralised to the Thai Military. The junta at that time divided policy administration into two tasks. The first, the national security and development task, saw the Thai Military assume responsibility for security management while elite-bureaucrats and technocrats assumed control of national development and administration policy (Baker, 2016). Consequently, these bureaucracy and security logics became combined (Bamrungsuk, 2017, 2019).

Thirdly, local governments, as acted as fundamental democratic agents, had been weakened and held no negotiating role in the decentralisation of power within Thailand for more than a decade. As a result, the collective actions and demands of local governments in relation to their self-management and the decentralisation of authority as to disaster management had become diminished. When people and local entities lack political consciousness, it is often easy to hegemonise the civil service and security units via the use of discourse – for instance, by publically describing or alleging the ineffectiveness of local governments, the lack of political awareness by those with power and the prevalence of corruption among government agents.

As aforementioned, political and social contexts in Thailand shifted dramatically following 2007. In this regard, it can be seen that disaster management in the country was subsequently affected by the intervention of the security sectors and the reconsolidated power of the bureaucratic polity. These elements were essential in diminishing people and local government power in contributing to disaster management. Ultimately, the emergence of contemporary disaster management in Thailand has merely derived from former governing notions being concealed by managerialism. This is characterised as a self-contradictory, paradoxical and antagonistic system which manifests in a decentralised style. Meanwhile, focus is now given to monitoring and controlling, whereby the management enacted refers to public participation but

considers disasters to be an issue of national security. This system highlights the formation of an integrated and adaptable norm but uses integration as a governing tool. This can be summarised as in Table 2.

Shifting of the Disaster Management Logics of Thailand				
Logics Driving Thai Disaster Management	**Security Logics (During and Post-World War II)**	**Bureaucratic Logics (Between 1979 and 2000)**	**Managerialism Logics (Between 2001 and 2007)**	**Hybrid Logics (Between 2007 and 2014)**
Government Regimes	Military government *Autocracy*	Authoritarian military technocratic alliance (elite bureaucrats and military) *Semi-Democracy*	Strong civilian government *Democracy*	Military government and (weak) civilian government *Autocracy-dominated democracy*
Disaster Management Discourses and Discursive Practices	'National security' 'Threat of the nation', 'Air strikes' 'Over-controlled' 'Terrorist threat' -Recovery projects following significant flooding and airstrikes	'The civil defence system' 'Fire, Flooding, Storm and Man-made disasters' 'Public hazard' 'Controlling', 'Command' 'Bureaucracy mechanisms' 'Bureaucratic hierarchy'	'Efficiency system', 'Flexible adaptation, management' 'Large-scale disasters', 'Natural disasters and man-made disasters' 'Loss of life and property of people'. 'Preparing public space for people 'Allocating command power' 'Area base management'	'National security' 'Terrorist and air threats' 'Single command' 'Supervision', 'Director' and 'Facilitation' 'Integrated disaster management plan' 'Military of the people' 'Continual operations'

		-Supporting all disaster events, such as massive droughts	'Integrated disaster management plan' -Recovery projects following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami	'Strengthened communities' 'Building immunity'. - Massive flooding operations of the Thai Military - Earthquake management failure by regional bureaucracy
Centre of Disaster Management Authority	Military Ministry of Interior as assists security agencies	Ministry of Interior and Department of Provincial Administration as the central disaster management units (the National Disaster Policy Committee) with military assistance	-Ministry of Interior and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation units - National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee (as chaired by the Prime Minister) - Local disaster management command centre	-Ministry of Interior and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation units - Military - Director-General of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation - Provincial Governor

Provocative and Maintainable Factors	-Franco-Thai War - Involvement in World War II - Thailand's nationalism projects - Military capacity in enacting disaster management	-Failure of public administration and disaster management of the junta (frequent changes in government) - Fruitful imagination of the bureaucratic system	- New public management trends - Decentralisation streams - Strongest prime minister and government - Demands for an effective disaster management system, following the 2014 Indian Ocean Tsunami	-Demanding of efficient disaster management after significant flooding - Military intervention - Weakened local government

Table 2 Shifting of the Disaster Management Logics of Thailand (World War II – 2014)

The consequences of this system have led to disaster management failure in several situations, particularly between 2011 and 2014, a time in which Thailand faced severe flooding and an earthquake in the upper north region. This eventually led to local people and governments challenging the disaster management provisions of the country – as illustrated in the next section.

5.2 Embedded Hybrid Disaster Management Over Local Government: New or Old Disaster Management Installations?

This section explores the disaster management logics that were installed at the local government level in response to a number of conditions and contexts in Thailand between 2007 and 2014. Here, investigation will be given as to what notions affected local disaster management alongside the demands of local people and governments in challenging the primary disaster management

provisions of the country. This is to be achieved by examining the political practices, rhetorical strategies and symbolic actions undertaken in relation to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake.

5.2.1 Installation of New Disaster Management Among Local Government (2007-2010)

Local disaster management provisions were installed in Thailand following 2007, namely through the Disaster Management Act of 2007 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2010. Although the disaster management structure produced in 2010 contained hybrid logics (primarily bureaucratic and security), within its initial instalment policy the disaster management was portrayed 'as a decentralised tool' which devolved authority to local government (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007; National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee, 2010) as a collection of 'efficient mechanisms' designed to assist local people, to manifest a 'collective management system' which operated by distributing authority to local administrations and bureaucratic agents and to invoke a collective of 'disaster management directors' who held the 'main responsibility in facing all disasters' under the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and its integrated norms (Kamolvej, 2011; Sighasem, 2016).

As aforementioned, to capture the demands of local governments, as positioned as a tool of managerialism transferred from the central government, an efficient disaster management system was required to cope with the massive losses and damages caused by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.

The Disaster Management Act in 2007 was provided to produce explicit practice built upon managerialism logics. This 2007 Act assigned full disaster management authority to local agents (i.e., to area commanders). Additionally, local governments were allocated decision-making authority, could command a disaster management workforce and were enabled to organise available resources (DDPM, 2007). Here, terms such as 'integrated with the National Disaster

Plan', 'capacity development', 'unity of command' and 'local participation' were employed, as signified the local disaster management authority of this period (NDPDC, 2010).

Another managerialism technique applied in this disaster management pertained to the use of a standardised disaster management plan (template) to link such operations with the national strategy and thereby fully integrate all disaster management provisions. The setting up of a committee to approve local disaster management plans by the Ministry of Interior and provincial governor (as the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee) was an essential mechanism through which to integrate the direction of respective local operations and those of the central government - whereby the local disaster management plan required approval from the provincial governor. Meanwhile, the provincial level disaster management plan required certification by the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee (i.e., the national committee) (see Figure 4).



Figure 4 Hierarchy of the Disaster Management Plan of Thailand

In order to decentralise disaster management authority to local government units, as arose in accordance with the managerialism logics held, the new plan determined local governments as

possessing full disaster management authority – as was to be exercised via the setting up of a commanding centre and a disaster management department. This enabled command to be held by a single authority. Notably, disaster management workforces derived from local government officers (NDPDC, 2010) (see Figure 5).



Figure 5 The Disaster Management Organisational Structure for Local Governments (ad-hoc) in Thailand

Source: Kamolvej, 2013

Although the disaster management concept, as based upon managerialism logics, was comprised to manifest decentralisation and to empower civil society in relation to disaster management participation, such concepts were concealed by centralisation tactics via the reliance on the notion of 'integration'. When considering the production of local disaster management plans and acts here, it is seen that local disaster management authorities held responsibility for controlling budgets, supervising and coordinating, collaborating with national-level organisations and declaring a state of disaster. However, local disaster management approval was ruled over by the central government (DDPM, 2011), a process operated under the notion of the central government 'supporting and facilitating' (DDPM, 2007; NDPDC, 2010).

Several contextual factors sustained such logics in relation to the authority of local governments. For example, local governments had witnessed a significant decrease in their

negotiating power through the post-2003 centralising intentions of the central government. The frequent changes in the political governance of Thailand, the inefficiency of the Disaster Management Act 1979 and the failure to respond adequately to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami also acted as factors which maintained the hybrid logics held in local disaster management.

5.2.2 Disaster Turmoil: From Efficiency to Failure in Local Disaster Management post-Chiang Rai Earthquake

As a local Deputy Officer noted in an interview: **'**When the integration and coordinating was ineffective, the efficiency of the bureaucratic disaster system was questioned by locals and communities' (Deputy of Chief Administration of SAO, 2019).

First Challenge of Thailand's Disaster Management: The 2011 Floods

The major flooding which occurred in Thailand in 2011 had an impact upon the overall country and represented one of the world's biggest disasters – having caused more than 500 million US Dollars worth of damage (Thairepublica, 2011). This event led to the disaster management system of Thailand, as installed since 2007, being questioned. Here, the disaster management in practice was characterised as being embedded with hybrid logics. Despite this, the government of Thailand avoided using the Disaster Management Act 2007 (the main disaster management structure of Thailand) since they distrusted the security sectors and elite bureaucracy promoted by the previous government.

It seemed that, in this context, the blame for the disaster management failure fell upon the government's flooding management rather than on the main disaster management system. These events were illustrated as the failure of the prime minister in regards to establishing the Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation (CRES). The discourse of the central government being 'on top of it' in regards to the flooding situation only contributed to this failure. Consequently,

collaboration between the Private Sector and security sectors became the primary approach employed when responding to flooding.

The failure of such flood management in 2011 provoked Thai people to question the effectiveness of the held disaster management. At that time, Thailand's disaster management was portrayed as a 'non-practical system', as manifesting an 'inflexible structure', as possessing a 'lack of resource' (Marks and Lebel, 2016), as demonstrating 'fake decentralisation' and as having an 'inefficient integration plan' (Kamolvej, 2014; Khunwishit, 2014a). Indeed, disaster management agencies were accused of being 'incompetent' in their 'day-to-day disaster management operations' (The Nation, 2011b) and the situation highlighted the 'PM's lack of potential' (The Nation, 2011a).

In addition, local people also invoked practices that were not aligned with the main disaster management provisions set out. Firstly, they performed 'self-reliance' and followed discourses pertaining to 'community participation'. In many areas, civil society and local governments acted together to prevent flooding. For instance, some local governments cooperated with locals, civil societies and security authorities to build water barriers and warning systems. The emergence of the 'Pak Kret model' – as is a local flood management model in which a local government, local coalitions and local volunteers work together – is an example of this cooperation. This was the first wave of challenges which rose up against the disaster management system of Thailand (Keawsomboon, 2013; Ruammek, 2014). Secondly, demands were made by the mass media, civil society and people in response to the delay of disaster management that had been witnessed, with this following discourses pertaining to the unacceptability of the 'ongoing flooding' and local populations being 'unable to deal with it' (Thairathonline, 2011, 2014c). The Thaiflood Data Centre was established by the mass media, whereby flooding was reported by local journalists and fundraising was undertaken by mass media and civil society organisations. Such actions invoked a 'mass media hero' phenomenon in response to the perception that the disaster management of

Thailand had failed (Techaprasertsakun, 2013; Matichon, 2017). Thirdly**,** public forums were maintained and flooding conferences held, as arranged by scholars and academic institutions, which highlighted 'the failure of disaster management' in Thailand in terms of its planning, 'fragmented management', 'lack of efficiency [in] commanding and communication' and lack of 'opportunity for people participation' (Lebel and Lebel, 2018).

However, those challenges were unable to reframe the centralised approach of the country's disaster management, a form driven by hybrid logics. Here, the central government offered new structures of disaster management (i.e., hegemonic projects for diminishing social demands) – such as pertained to the establishing of the Integrated Water Management Plan Board and the Flood Management Committee. Furthermore, the National Water Management System Plan was created and chaired by the prime minister. Nonetheless, all of these structures remained overshadowed by the former logics (Manageronline, 2011; Posttoday, 2011b). The logics that appeared and were sustained in this era resulted from the multiple contexts of the society and politics of Thailand.

Firstly, the country had encountered damage worth over 46 thousand million US Dollars and approximately 12.8 million people had been affected (Thaiwater, 2013). It took over six months for all impacted areas to recover. The local governments, in recovering their respective areas, were given assistance from the central government and regional governments in regards to processing recovery compensation for local flood victims. From this, a dependent condition arose between local governments and the central government in addressing the devastation of the flooding, a critical factor that led to a reduction of demands for social and collective action among local people.

Secondly, effective blaming strategies and governmental statements were conveyed via Thai mass media (Thaiwater, 2013) – for instance, 'a short period for the government's

administration', 'the mistakes of the previous government in water management', 'our country confronted three tropical storms in that year' and the 'impact of global climate change' (PhueaThaiparty, 2019). These powerful strategies were able to generate social sympathy towards the central government and led to a reduction of local demands as to reconstructing the main disaster management approach of Thailand.

Thirdly, in regards to the employed rehabilitation measurements, the flood protection projects launched in 2011 had a collective central budget of more than 40 million thousand US Dollars (Posttoday,2011a). Such projects included the installing of a new Integrated Water Management Plan and the creating of national water management committees (as commanded by the prime minister). Evidently, these projects were designed to resolve the flooding issues faced by Thailand and to diminish the demands of people towards reforming the country's disaster management. However, these projects were not designed efficiently enough to improve the disaster management system of Thailand in the long-term.

Confronting the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake: Reframing Thailand's Disaster Management

As noted in an interview with local leaders:

> The disaster management approach in this earthquake was designed and managed by our network (i.e., the Chiang Rai Civil Society Disaster Management Network) [...] The assistance and disaster system operated by the central government seems to be inefficient and did not meet the demands of people (Local Leader A, 2019).

This earthquake was centred in the Chiang Rai Province and occurred on the 5th of May, 2014. The seismic activity was of historic strength in the country and caused extensive damage to the northern region, especially the Chiang Rai Province (Suwanmolee, 2016, 2017) and seven connected provinces. Moreover, the earthquake instigated changes as to how Thailand considered, defined and operated disaster management.

Again, the disaster management failure witnessed pertained to the lack of direction and integrated information, coherent coordination, warning systems, systematic damage assessments and effective responses to the demands of locals. These elements provoked the local community and local units to reconstruct the central disaster management. In this event, the disaster management system of Thailand was framed as comprising 'management failure' which 'highlighted procedures rather than decentralisation', as a context that 'focused on command rather than coordination' and which 'emphasised the public image rather than resolving the real issues' and as a situation which ultimately 'closed the door for participation' (CRDMN, 2014).

The disaster management provisions of Thailand were thus shifted to establish a local disaster management mechanism and to institute disaster relief networks (UNDMT, 2015). Notably, the emergence of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network collaborated with local and national foundations, local civil societies, academia and mass media, an endeavour which is seen as a primary form of discourse practice constructed to respond to the demands of local people and to address public grievances as held towards the main disaster management approach.

Amongst the chaos, the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network was projected as a crucial organisation in rehabilitating the earthquake-struck area – seen, for instance, in it creating a database of damaged residential areas, designing a database for collections and fundraising across the country, providing donation centres through which to allocate resources and provoking local earthquake awareness (as part of the recovery process). The network was portrayed as an organisation which had demonstrated 'more success than the main disaster management' approach, having implemented a 'collaborative' structure that incorporated 'people and civil society participation' and as 'driven by the demands of local people' (CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019).

Using rhetoric pertaining to ‘Chiang Rai is still shaking’ and the ‘voice of the people’, as was presented via mass media, local earthquake documents were published and public forums were arranged in order to fully identify the scope of suffering caused by the earthquake. Through these steps, the inability of the central government to have accurately prepared these areas was revealed. Such counter-discourses were vital in providing effective and local opposition to the main disaster management of Thailand.

Consideration should also be given as to how social media was employed in relation to the earthquake and its aftermaths. The Movement Earthquake Network, as arose under the ThaiQuake campaign, had a major impact here. The campaign manifested as an information centre for earthquake management. Instead of public agencies being in charge, the ThaiQuake website, Facebook and Twitter became the main source of earthquake information and damage statistics (Suwanmolee, 2017). These projects played a vital role in reflecting local demands and public grievances while also being a mechanism through which to constitute rival discourses that challenged the main disaster management regime of Thailand.

It can be asked how such local and network processes were, in this case, able to challenge and reframe the main disaster management of Thailand. To answer this, a number of social context and political factors must be considered.

The first context pertains to the change of civilian government and the political vacuum conditions faced between 2013 and 2014, with the long-term political protests at the national level seemingly having affected the disaster management of Thailand adversely. Here, the central government was posited as a caretaker government, yet the Thai Military sought to seize power by declaring a state of emergency. This had the effect of severely affecting the political stability of the central government. Ultimately, the Thai Military seized power on the 22nd of May, 2014, notably in the same period as the earthquake management being enacted in Chiang Rai. In these

circumstances, it was found that the central government, as operated by a civilian government, had limited authority through which to cope with such an emergency. Most ministers were only able to survey the damaged area due to the pressures of the unfolding political crisis at the national level. After the 2014 coup, it seems that the command and authority held in the earthquake-affected areas had changed. The central bureaucrats (for instance, the provincial governor, regional Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation unit and Thai Military) became the primary unit in commanding and operating absolute control in responding to the earthquake. A bureaucratic style and security approach thus empirically came to the fore and became embedded in all of the disaster management processes launched in addressing the disaster. However, the disaster management as driven by strong bureaucratic and security logics was seen not to have succeeded.

Secondly, recurrent failures in such earthquake management had occurred and inefficient provincial units had been allowed to operate. This aspect provoked major demands from local populations and mobilised local networks. Evidently, the provincial governor, as was fully authorised as a provincial commander, was unable to deal with the earthquake situation (Local Leader A, 2019). The entire operational process was a failure – whereby no earthquake or aftershock warnings occurred, the affected areas were not surveyed, a damage assessment system was not set up, victim-compensation was delayed and the budget was controlled rigidly. Thus, local networks and local disaster management arose to handle local demands and to produce an earthquake management command centre (Local Leader B, 2019).

Thirdly, this earthquake was different from any other disaster Thailand had faced (TRF, 2014) and thus could not be predicted. Indeed, the aftershocks of an earthquake can happen over subsequent years and this impact can be more destructive to buildings than other disasters (SeismologicalBureau, 2014). Furthermore, no earthquake management measures, warning

systems or public information sources were available (with these only being provided to bureaucratic units). Hence, the disaster management produced at all levels seemingly failed.

The symbolic actions and challenges of local networks caused a reframing of some aspects of the disaster management system of Thailand – seen, for example, in the launching of the National Earthquake Plan in 2015 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan in 2015, as emphasised the idea of community-based disaster risk management. The discourses employed here pertained to notions such as 'unpredicted situation', 'professional disaster management' and 'integrating standards for local systems' (NDPDC, 2015: 12-17). While the disaster management of Thailand partially changed in response, the bureaucratic and security logics still dominated. This was evidenced by discourses being present relating to the notion of 'representing a new single command, installing 'community risk prevention plans' and creating disaster management evaluation tools for 'post-disaster assessments' – aspects that followed the slogan: 'Build Back Better and Safer'. Ultimately, these new mechanisms did not instigate major changes in the disaster management system as the apparatuses employed merely sustained the power of the former logics and decreased the demands of local people (NDPDC, 2015).

5.3 Development Problematisation of Thailand's Disaster Management

Public Policy is, in the contemporary age, sophisticated and thus it is difficult to identify where fundamental problems lay and how to solve them. Employing only technical policy mechanisms via policy positivism leads to consideration as to the causal relationship which arises and to a universal solution being sought – with this being inadequate. Realistically, policy issues are caused by numerous problems and imperceptible sources of dilemma (Griggs and Howarth, 2013a). If policy scholars merely emphasise mainstream policy notions rather than considering multiple perspectives when exploring public issues, this ineffectiveness may intensify. The

disaster management issues of Thailand are also difficult to define in relation to their formation and notably they affect the symptoms of other failures, yet no centrality is employed through which to manage the faced problems (Head, 2019; Peters and Tarpey, 2019). This form of 'super-wicked problems' is highly evident in the disaster management of Thailand.

This chapter has illustrated the fundamental problems of disaster management in Thailand, achieved by applying a genealogical approach in exploring the foundations of the disaster management of the country and the problems which arose in each era. The analysis presented here began by examining the historical development of the discursive elements and practices of the country's disaster management spanning from World War II to the modern day. It has been found that the major problems encountered have led to hybrid logics. This system has also been installed among local governments since 2007, as has invoked failure, fragmentation, conflict and confusion among local disaster management forms and relevant authorities.

Nonetheless, the logics of the disaster management of Thailand have maintained and balanced themselves amidst the ever-changing social dynamics of the country. This has been achieved by articulating surrounding elements (i.e., using hegemony power). Thus, the disaster management of Thailand has not dramatically changed in structure or logic, despite the country having been significantly affected by numerous disaster management failures.

Whereupon the disaster management system of Thailand has encountered disasters, the hybrid logics held have affected the disaster management approach of the country – seen, for example, in how the northern region haze in 2007 led the Thai Military to assume a primary role in handling the disaster (SHR, 2012). The north-eastern region flooding in 2010 witnessed failings in the responses of local governments, a result of all systems being centralised but operated at the provincial level (Sighasem, 2013). The major flooding in 2011 saw fragmented management via delayed communication, institutional traps and politics of scales (Lebel, Manuta and Garden,

2011; Marks and Lebel, 2016; Lebel and Lebel, 2018) – as instigated local concerns as to this disaster management.

The upper northern earthquake of 2014 raised further questions as to the disaster management system of Thailand, its effectiveness and its failures among local populations. The failure in areas such as planning, responsiveness and recovery occurred widely in this context. In response, local entities thus established disaster management and related networks themselves – such as the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network. A successful model of local disaster management derived from collaboration among civil society entities, a cross-functional cooperation model and the creating of a recovery project without the intervention of the central government. These positive outcomes led to a reframing of the country's main disaster management form. This ultimately led to improvements in the 2015 National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan.

Although the earthquake instigated changes in the disaster management of Thailand, the hybrid logics were predominantly maintained. It seems that the hegemonised projects and dominant narratives of the logics remained and were effectively utilised to articulate and grasp the demands and social grievances of local government and people. This has continued until now.

The overall disaster management of Thailand is the outcome of power shifts and political constitutions arising under contingency contexts. This study has revealed the fundamental problems faced by analysing the disaster management as arose in relation to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. To unpack these issues, three areas must be considered.

Firstly, it must be ascertained what discourses and political strategies have been used to maintain the disaster management approach of Thailand and to govern local governments and people. This has been touched upon in this chapter, but greater exploration is given in Chapter

Seven and Eight of this thesis – as illustrates the political, social and ideological characteristics that sustain the failure problems of such disaster management in Thailand.

Secondly, it must be noted that after the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, a number of crucial elements led to local governments and populations demanding change – as was a catalyst in identifying the failures of the disaster management system of Thailand and the need to reframe this disaster management. If considering this in theoretical language, the presence of such failures manifests the dislocated situation of this disaster management system whereby visible subjects are compelled to act or decide in a 'foundation fashion'. The movements, approaches, strategies and negotiating techniques of local agents, alongside how these aspects were able to reframe new disaster management meanings within local communities, are presented in Chapter Seven of this thesis). This is able to reveal the characteristics of the political exercises and rival discourses created from local coalitions, with these having emerged in the process of bargaining with the dominant agencies. This exploration also conveys how the central and provincial government sought to manage the competing demands faced and to legitimise its decisions in this area.

Thirdly, although the earthquake responses enacted caused shifts in the disaster management of Thailand, seen in the new Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015 and the Earthquake Master Plan, the structure of the discursive practice employed in Thailand during that period did not fundamentally change. The transformed disaster management still met with similar issues, institutional traps, failure in participation and traditional operations (Lebel and Lebel, 2018). The transformed disaster management approaches of Thailand and the strategies used to create and articulate new elements in the Thai context following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake are illustrated in Chapter Eight, wherein investigation is further given to the various discursive devices and political strategies which appeared in this context.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this chapter has been to illuminate the problems faced within the disaster management system of Thailand, achieved by applying a genealogical approach in seeking the 'ignorable origin' or by tracing the struggles, displacements and processes of contemporary disaster management practices at both the central and local government levels of the country. The results reveal that the disaster management of Thailand has been determined by the dynamics of the country's social circumstances and political situation – for example, the disaster management form utilised during World War II and post-World War II was driven by national interests or security logics and the centre of command was assumed by the security sectors. In the 2000s, the disaster management of Thailand conversely became determined by managerialism logics and command centres were seemingly moved to specialist units due to the emergence of public demands for administrative reform. However, this disaster management has developed ideas and systems contingently and thus remains a source of wicked problems. Such policy failures originate from the hybrid logics which drive the country's disaster management.

Such hybrid logics not only provide an infective structure and system, as this context also directly generates failure and disputes between the central government and local government/people. The case of the Chiang Rai Earthquake in 2014 demonstrated, in particular, how local disaster management was decentralised following low levels of trust being given to the disaster management of the country and the increased relationship strain witnessed between the central government and local governments. The disaster management failure encountered here provoked local people/governments to attempt to reframe and challenge the meaning and practices of the primary disaster management system of Thailand by undertaking collective action through local networks. However, this appears to have been unsuccessful in reframing and challenging the orthodox disaster management regime. The predominant hybrid logics are still utilised to sustain

the primary disaster management system of Thailand, achieved by reframing new political strategies via a new Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan. To critically elucidate Thailand's disaster management and failure problems, three themes are foregrounded:

- What have been the dominant discourses and political strategies used to maintain disaster management in Thailand?
- What political strategies have local people and governments employed to challenge the central/provincial disaster management form in responding to failed disaster management?
- What political strategies of central/provincial government have been applied to sustain or regain authority in times of contextual shift and failure?

These questions are considered, in more detail, in subsequent chapters.

Chapter Six

Provincial (Chiang Rai) Disaster Management: Key Logics and Mechanisms

Introduction

The main purpose of disaster management is, in general, to identify ways through which to reduce the damage and loss derived from a disaster, to protect the whole of society from devastation and to build societal resilience in preparation of a crisis (Comfort, Waugh and Cigler, 2012; Bynander and Nohrstedt, 2020). Thus, the development of a disaster management system is associated with the application of new management approaches – for example, in relation to network governance, collaborative governments and community-based management. This requires the installation of effective systems driven by the logics of managerialism (Riet, 2017; Larsson, 2019).

In the case study of Thailand, disaster management may be more significant than merely those managerial devices which only aim to create effectiveness in a system. The disaster management of Thailand, in this sense, has been framed as a political mechanism through which the power of dominant groups (such as central bureaucrats and security agencies) can be maintained. Unsurprisingly, the disaster management system of Thailand nowadays manifests a hybrid disaster management system which relies on a dominating central hierarchy and which emphasises control and command more than decentralisation.

Consequently, the disaster management of Thailand has been criticised as a source of wicked and failures issues (Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010; Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Marks and Lebel, 2016; Lebel and Lebel, 2018). Despite the disaster management of Thailand being condemned as a failed system, it has been able to be sustained as the country's main approach. In addition, the system has not been considerably challenged by stakeholders,

local people or regional communities. This therefore leads us to inquire what are the components of this system and why such failures have been forgotten over time?

This chapter further explores the disaster management practices and mechanisms undertaken at the provincial level in Thailand by key commanding agencies (as play significant roles in governing over and negotiating with local entities). Here, focus is given to the Chiang Rai disaster management systems in place before the 2014 Earthquake to understand the structures and discourses which were being operated in normal conditions. The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the administrative apparatuses and key characteristics of Chiang Rai and details the logics and assumptions of the Chiang Rai context transferred from national logics and contexts. The next section details a number of key disaster management projects and approaches utilised in the Chiang Rai context prior to the 2014 Earthquake, focussing on these aspects by considering them as controversial mechanisms for governing local government and people. Finally, it is noted that these provisions led to demands for change in the area of provincial disaster management when the 2014 Earthquake hit.

6.1 Structure and Authority of Chiang Rai's Disaster Management

6.1.1 Chiang Rai: A Profile

The disaster management development witnessed between 2007 and 2013 demonstrates how the reform undertaken invoked a powerfully centralised process of authorising central agencies and bureaucrats after the loss of their power following the post-1997 decentralisation movement. Notably, this also created opportunities for the military to enact interventions and to consolidate their power in the disaster management arena. Provincial bodies were therefore created to be powerful organisations or 'super bureaus' in the disaster management context. Thus, provincial governors became disaster management command and authority centres by way of hegemony or,

to use the official terms (as appeared in the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Acts enacted), they were responsible for ‘facilitation’, ‘integration’ and taking on a ‘coordinative-collaborative role’ under the single command process and disaster management integrated plan structures. Here, the provincial unit essentially became merely representative of the disaster management undertaken by the central state.

More than 869 km from Bangkok (the capital city of Thailand), Chiang Rai is the second biggest city of the upper northern part of Thailand. This province is important as the international trade centre of Thailand and the country’s gateway to Myanmar, Laos and China. It is also known as a big natural tourist hub which has mountainous geography and represents the country’s biggest northern border area. Due to its abundance of nature and rich culture, its economy depends mainly an agriculture, tourism and border trade. Presently, Chiang Rai has a population of approximately 1,293,788 people and consists of 18 districts, 124 sub-districts and 1,753 villages. This province is the twelfth largest in the country (Tourismchiangrai, 2019)

In terms of administration, Chiang Rai is a provincial administration unit that has been allocated administrative power from the central government via its performing of local and central bureaucratic supervision, decision-making at the provincial task level and approving or screening administrative task before these are progressed to other levels. The provincial governor is likely the chief commander in this area. Thai scholars have noted, however, that at present the province has in practice little authority in its decision-making and commands due to each ministry operating at the provincial level having its own chain of command and the local level lacking financial or budgeting management authority. The provincial governor has retained the authority to veto and supervise the provincial plan, local acts and the local Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan. Between 2012 and 2014, the power of provincial bureaucrats became consolidated due to the political uncertainty, military interventions and political contestation witnessed in Thailand. This was heightened in response to the 2013 floods in the country (see further chapter 5). Disaster

management authority in this era remained centralised and assigned to the provincial governor and provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. Thus, it can be said that during 2013 and 2014, provincial bureaucrats still played a significant role in the disaster management of Chiang Rai.

In regards to its disaster management experience and civil organisation, Chiang Rai is considered as possessing strong capabilities as the authorities and local people have experienced many disasters (Chiang Rai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2013; Provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Officer A, 2019) – for instance, in responding to the 2005 Mae-Suay landslide and the 2011 Phan landslide. In addition, the development of civil societies and NGOs in this area has long been considered to be strong and effective in being responsive to the local population. Such local NGOs and civil organisations include the Mirror Foundation, Hill Area and Community Foundation, as have worked to build communities and local networks for more than a decade (CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019; NGO Representatives A, 2019).

6.1.2 The Hybrid Logics of Central Government in the Chiang Rai Context

Amidst the changing national context, provincial disaster management has been seen to have manifested as a diminutive prototype of that undertaken at the national level. Thus, Chiang Rai has been influenced by this context and its norms. Between 2009 and 2013, the hybrid logics that were concealed in official plans and acts became adopted within the disaster management implementation of Chiang Rai.

Emergence of Security Logics in the Disaster Management of Chiang Rai

The Thai Military was never completely separated from the disaster management system of Thailand between World War II and 2011. When considering the disasters faced by Thailand in each era, these were often denoted to be threats to the state. Historically, military and security

actors have thus has played key roles in such disaster management operations. After the 2006 coup in Thailand, all security agencies were integrated into the new disaster management system. The official integrating of national security policy, the national readiness policy of 2012 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (National Security Council, 2019) arose. At the same time, the public image of the Thai Military was strengthened following its assistance in responding to the 2011 Thai floods. This orchestrated the Thai Military in becoming a key disaster management partner.

In the Chiang Rai context, these logics penetrated the disaster management processes and logics implemented. This can be seen from the projects launched during 2010-2013:

> The security threats of the contemporary era are disasters which occur in many ways – be they natural, man-made or terrorism-related. To protect against the negative consequences of this, we, as the primary unit, have a responsibility to provide public services, to protect people from loss, to enhance our disaster management capacity and to integrate the cooperation of us and the Thai Military (Provincial DDPM Officer B, 2019).

> We must admit that the military and army is masterful in its disaster management and well-equipped with manpower. This can be seen in their experience in dealing with the Chiang Rai haze and the 2013 flood… Obviously, nowadays they have become the crucial agency in recovering from the worst circumstances and have a tendency to increase their role in Thailand's disaster management due to the severity of the disasters faced (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019).

The disaster management projects which saw the Thai Military become re-integrated into the provincial disaster management[83] system during 2006-2013 included a wildfire and haze prevention project in 2006 as led by the 3rd Army Region and co-hosted by the Chiang Rai

authority and a 2012 recovery operation launched as to the Phan and Mae-Suay landslides where the Thai Military was the main support (CRDDPM, 2013).

Such rhetoric forms and projects reflect the assumption that this provincial disaster management was driven by security assumptions, particularly in regards to disaster being considered as an emergency or extraordinary situation which is liable to widely affect the security of society and its regions. This understanding perceives relevant agencies as requiring professional officers and legitimacy when dealing with crises. Consequently, for catastrophic events, only capable agencies (for example, the Thai Military and central disaster management specialists) can govern such situations. Thus, the involvement of the Thai Military and security sectors in Chiang Rai became normalised.

The surging of bureaucratic logics following military intervention is seemingly a regular occurrence in Thai politics, particularly in the perspective of Thai politics scholars (Ockey, 2004; Bowornwathana, 2005). Most juntas have formed alliances with bureaucrats when governing a country and ruling over a state's economic development and domestic tasks. This is similar to what occurred in relation to the provincial disaster management of Thailand, whereby the loss of central bureaucratic power during the early 2000s[84] (Ockey, 2004; Bowornwathana and Poocharoen, 2005) and distrust being aimed towards local and national politicians and local government bureaucrats following 2002[85] and the 2006 coup (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016) led to opportunities through which the bureaucrat polity could re-consolidate its power – namely within the disaster management sphere (Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2010; Tiyapairat, 2012). In regards to the provincial disaster management enacted in the Chiang Rai context, it is seen that bureaucratic logics were the principal assumptions held in steering diverse disaster management projects. This rhetoric is revealed in the following statements:

> Among catastrophe incidences, the regular provincial bureaucratic units tend to ineffectively separate the management needed. Thus, the new disaster management must be centralised via the provincial governor acting as the provincial commander of a disaster area by using a single command structure in resolving redundant and fragmented operations (Provincial DDPM officer A, 2019).

> A province is a more powerful and capable agency than local neighbourhood agencies in undertaking negotiations, co-ordination and command in the event of a crisis (Provincial Governor, 2019).

> The primary aspect of the disaster management of Thailand is the expertise of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. At the regional and provincial level, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation holds duties as to developing and integrating the disaster management systems and processes of each department and agency to ensure that they work in the same direction (Head of Regional DDPM, as stated in the CODI, 2014).

These statements illuminate the perspectives held as to the professional, centralised and technical notions of contemporary disaster management. It is agreed that the enhancing of the capacity of the central bureaucracy, the placing of disaster management as a component of the central authority, the arranging of a single command approach and the centralising of all decision-making via the provincial governor (as the highest commander at the province-level) represents effective and transparent ways of dealing with a crisis. Indeed, the bureaucratic assumptions which appear within these discourses are underlined by two main aspects. The first aspect is the centralised rationale, whereby the province and the provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation are seen to be ‘the leading organisation’ in providing disaster management knowledge, in working for the public interest, in ensuring ethical operations and in being political

neutral. This was also manifested in the 2013 Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of Chiang Rai, where it was held that 'to prevent loss and damage, the province has a crucial responsibility to provide a secured disaster management structure and an explicit hierarchy of command as disaster management centres of the province' (DDPM, 2007; CRDDPM, 2013). The second aspect is the expertise rationale, as had emerged from the distrust of local politicians and governments and which had come to shape the disaster management enacted in the province, whereby disasters and crises were seen as solely being able to be resolved by specialists with professional knowledge. This knowledge was to be provided by central bureaucrats, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officers and provincial officers. This rationale largely appeared in the provincial disaster management arena and formed the value of such units. Furthermore, it was reflected in the motto of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation – as states its duty to provide 'proactive protection relief in every disaster' (DDPM, 2013). Here, the 'disaster plan is the crucial mechanism through which to integrate the co-ordination required in disaster management governance to effectively manage a crisis situation' (CRDDPM, 2013). Notably, it was held that 'Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation tasks, nowadays, are construing big disaster management-data for use in solving and protecting against disasters' (Regional Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Head, 2014 cited in the CODI, 2014).

Besides the discourses which appeared within interviews and documents, such notions can be seen in the bureaucratic projects subsequently installed in the Chiang Rai context. Firstly, these were evidenced in the installation of provincial disaster management committees and their assuming of responsibility as to developing and approving local disaster management plans. The implementation of this approach was undertaken via a number of bureaucrats and the provision of expertise.[86] Secondly, significant investment was given as to the physical disaster management measures, the utilisation of high-technology devices and the reservoirs built to protect against flash floods and landslide in the districts of Phan, Mae-Suay and Thoeng between 2010 and 2013

(NDPDC, 2010). Here, bureaucratic and expertise logics became normalised in the disaster management formed by provincial disaster management entities.

The embedding of 'local weakness' assumptions in the Chiang Rai authority context also arose. Although Thailand had vigorously sought to enact decentralisation, a lack of strong progression was witnessed and this overall process became delayed after the coup in 2006 wherein the elite bureaucrats (in particular, those from the Ministry of Interior) reconsolidated their power. Chardchawarn (2010) and Charoenmuang (2006)have noted that late decentralisation resulted from central bureaucratic domination and the demands held in relation to the maintaining of power in the governance of local authorities, political areas and the resources of professional bureaucrats. In order to stabilise such power, influential claims were often utilised in regards to the lack of political awareness or political knowledge held among local people, the lack of capacity possessed by local governments and the corruption of politicians. The decentralising of Thailand and the reforming of disaster management has long-sought to confront this barrier (Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Lebel and Lebel, 2018). At the province level, weakness rationality has hinged upon the assumption that local people lack disaster management knowledge, awareness, collective action and a mind-set through which to appropriately judge risks or hazards. This is held as disasters are ostensibly far from their everyday concerns (i.e., working for a living is more important than other unprecedented circumstances). In the same vein, a lack of attention given as to disaster management by self-interested local leaders and incapable local agencies are additional key assumptions which underlie this rationale:

'The first priority of disaster management is that Thais need to overcome the perception that the people and local governments are the forefront units for disasters' (District Chief Officer, 2019)

'Even one sandbag in the flood prevention of locals is used as a populist device and political campaign' (DDPM Specialist, 2019).

Alongside the establishment of several (monitoring) disaster management projects, other aspects were instituted – such as the 2010 drafting of the local Disaster Prevention and Mitigation plan, the need to include local representation in this drafting process, the requirements that the plan's technical provisions were approved by Chiang Rai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation unit officers and that the local disaster management budget needed to be approved by the provincial governor. These exercises demonstrated a lack of confidence in the local capacity held as to dealing with crises and disasters (Deputy of Chief Administration of the SAO, 2019).

6.2. Provincial Disaster Management Mechanisms: Tactical and Governing Ideas Under Hybrid Logics (2010-2014)

Following the assumption of hybrid logics (Bureaucratisation and Securitisation) and the local weakness assumptions which emerged in the Chiang Rai context, many projects were progressively formed and mobilised. These included establishing the Provincial Disaster Management Committee, the producing of a disaster management integrated plan and approaches and the investment given to physical and technical disaster management tools at the local level. The overall aim held was to show the expertise, professional systems and political neutrality of the provincial bureaucrats and to capture the demands of local people between 2010 and 2013. These practices are discussed in the following section.

6.2.1 Diversity of Securitised and Technocratic Disaster Management Practices

The period of 2010-2013 was important in that several potential disaster management projects were introduced and installed in the Chiang Rai context. One of the projects was the installation of provincial disaster management commissions in the provincial structure, with the reason given for this being to increase stakeholder participation in such policy formulation. While these disaster management commissions were formed to be a public space through which to collect opinions from various actors as to disaster management, the committees became a centralised gathering of

provincial technocrat members. More than three committees were instituted here – the Provincial Plan Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee (as responsible for drafting provincial disaster management plans)[87], the Provincial Disaster Management Commanding Centre Committee[88] and the Provincial Disaster Assistance Committee[89] (Ratchakicha, 2019). These committees were mostly comprised of techno-bureaucrats and failed to collect the diverse ideas held as to the development of the disaster management of Thailand. Due to same backgrounds of the provincial governors, these committees were arguably representative of the central/provincial bureaucratic and technocratic structure. This can be seen in light of the details of such plans and the monitoring techniques formed having similar structures and technical terms as the centralised system – such as 'disaster risk reduction', 'disaster management strategic plan', 'comprehensive disaster management', 'table task exercises' and 'disaster calendars' (NDPDC, 2010; Measai Municipality, 2012; Pha-ngam SAO, 2012; Pa-Tueng SAO, 2012; CRDDPM, 2013). This was instituted via the claim that it could provide efficient management and integrated coordination in emergency situations alongside transparent operations. A financial approval process was also established to control this disaster management system. This instalment of disaster financial assistance became another tool in the centralising and monitoring of Chiang Rai's disaster management. This required all financial aspects invoked in a disaster to be approved by the Provincial Disaster Assistance Committee and central financial agencies. This process required the processing of hard-copy documents that identified; 1) the disaster type alongside the place and date of damage, 2) the amount of injury, 3) the approximate amount of damaged property, 4) any offhand measures used and 5) the reasons for the disaster assistance needed. Thus, it can be said that such structures of provincial disaster management were evidently under the shade of centralised technocratic power.

6.2.2 Integrated Disaster Management Plan and Approach: A Powerful Mechanism in Monitoring the Local Context

It is seen that terms such as ‘integrate’, ‘supervisory’ and ‘for effective’ have been signified in various aspects of the disaster management arena of Thailand. In considering the rationality behind these integration logics, it could be argued that such notions rested upon the endeavours undertaken to resolve the ineffective disaster management systems of Thailand – including in relation to its bureaucratic separatism and lack of command. Thus, the integration plan was applied in response to old issues and to link the demands of the public and local governments towards resolving delayed management. The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (as an integrated disaster management plan) was therefore introduced as a key instrument in resolving the issues which occurred at the provincial level.

According to the Disaster Management and Prevention Act 2010, all level units were required to provide this plan, particularly provinces. The integrated plan functioned as a mechanism to rearrange all relations between local governments and the central government in regards to the hierarchy of control, organising of command centres and communication enacted within the new disaster management system. These plans additionally were to construct how local people and the community were to be engaged with, as was set as a crucial aspect of provincial disaster management. This was claimed to be able to “fix ineffective conditions in local disaster management and its command... by providing the same direction, indicators and single command’(NDPDC, 2010). Indeed, the elements and drafting process of this plan explicitly related to the provincial technocratic supervision system by conveying the requirement to enhance ‘effective disaster management’ and ‘local government capacity’. In accordance with the Disaster Management and Prevention Act of 2007, the local plans and resource mobilisation processes outlined needed to be supervised and facilitated by the provincial governor and Disaster Management Planning Committee (Section 15-16, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of

2007). Needless to say, the drafting of local disaster management plans in practice became 'the process of outlining and framing plans by provincial scholars and bureaucrats' rather than a furthering of the participation of local people (Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019). While such local disaster management plans should have been generated to respond to the local population, instead the plans were produced to create the same patterns held under the central requirements and for these to be integrated with the national and central framework. Thus, the disaster management plan framework/template, as operated at local levels, was similar to the national operations imposed.[90] Hence, local governments were forced to undertake coerced partnerships under the notion that this would produce an integrated system. Here, it was held that, 'overall, disaster management plans were determined by provincial bureaucrats, but if these plans enabled the reduction of losses, amelioration of local damage and provision of sufficient financial assistance for affected locals, this would be ok' (Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019).

6.2.3 Technical Disaster Management: A Way in Invoking Local Awareness

The employment of technical strategies in building trust and coalitions among local areas generally occurred in the Chiang Rai context and through local disaster management provisions. Between 2013 and 2014, various central/provincial disaster management projects were used as strategies through which to ensure collaboration between local governments and the demands of local populations. It seems that the utilising of such disaster management innovations, technical and scientific projects and local disaster resilience approaches arose as a political tactic. As stated by two Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officers:

> The installation of landslide warning and earthquake protection systems, the building of flood protection dams and the setting up of a new disaster database system integrated across all areas has allowed our department to be prepared. These schemes allow us to operate efficient management, to reduce public losses and to make problem-resolving decisions

> (Head of Regional Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2014 cited in the CODI, 2014).
>
> Today, we have great partnerships teams with scholars in seeking efficient disaster management approaches and measures that support us in addressing the failures witnessed in the past. Thus, engineering consultants from provincial public works, scholars from educational institutions and specialists from the Engineering Institute of Thailand have joined our team and help us to build an innovative disaster prevention system and to install modern warning systems used in the international disaster management sphere. Thus, local entities should have trust in us (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019).

Noticeably, the disaster management projects implemented at the local level have given emphasis to physical investment projects and the use of technical terms and mechanisms in the employed disaster prevention measures and in controlling emergencies. This is likely due to the increase in physical investment projects (disaster management construction and training projects) invoked by the 2010-2014 Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and the Chiang Rai Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan. These plans, at the national level, required all units to improve the disaster management information systems held to connect the local with the international, to annually adjust the disaster risk maps produced, to develop 5 disaster management training programmes per year, to build disaster prevention constructions (at least 5 projects in each province in a fiscal year), to reconstruct flood system protection (at least 5 projects in each province in a fiscal year), to develop disaster management research projects (at least 2 projects a year), to install a warning system for all local government units within 2014, to purchase disaster management mechanics and instruments (for central Disaster Prevention and Mitigation) comprising at least 50% of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's budgeting plan within 2010 and to produce at least 5 disaster management reports (lessons learnt from disaster management) within 2010 (NDPDC, 2010).[91] In the Chiang Rai context, technical and investment

projects were established – such as in relation to the development of disaster management database projects to shape disaster statistics, the building of specialisms, the producing of a volunteer database for provincial staff (Chiang Rai Disaster GIS), the installing of 281 rain meters covering landslide-affected locals, the provision of 57 disaster sirens and the construction of 5 disaster warning centres in risk communities over Chiang Rai (CRDDPM, 2013).

Alongside these building projects, annual disaster drilling projects were also crucial programmes that the province provided to build local disaster management awareness. The practice required multiple bureaucratic agencies, the Thai Military, the Thai Police, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officers and rescue agencies to be involved in building the technical provisions of recovery and communication (via disaster management table top exercises, functional exercises, full-scale exercises and command post-exercises). This comprised a 'project of central technicians' (Deputy Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019) enacted 'engineering and complicated training' to a stronger degree than the building of disaster management awareness and preparedness among local governments and people (Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019).

6.2.4 Community-Based Disaster Risks Reduction: New Words and Old Structure of the Central/Provincial Disaster Management

It is accepted that the principle of disaster risk reduction was originally sourced to solve the issues faced by the top-down disaster risk reduction programme, provisions that could not successfully understand the hazard and disaster risks encountered at the local and community level. This relied upon the invoking of local community participation and community capacity as frontline units in promoting a culture of safety and self-reliance when protecting against disasters, hazards and disaster risks. Such disaster risk reduction required disaster awareness, as was initially generated by the community as this comprised 'the people being at the centre of decision-making and

implementation'. Such community collaboration arose between multiple stakeholders, locals and NGO networks in all processes (KantaKafle and Murshed, 2006; Zwi *et al.*, 2013).

However, the disaster risk reduction enacted in Chiang Rai seemed to be implemented differently. It is noticeable that the community involvement, awareness in creating disaster risk maps, risk assessment processes and heightening of safety awareness in the minds of people in the community were aspects entirely set and controlled by national expertise entities (i.e., central Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officers trained by international organisations such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre and Japan International Cooperation Agency) and provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation bureaucrats. All such disaster risk reduction projects were thus seemingly centralised at the province level. This was a crucial task of the provincial bureaucrats and was likely used as a primary tactic in accessing the community as well.

As stated by a Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officer:

> We have been working hard since 2010… Currently, more than 70% of Chiang Rai community areas have been trained by our teams (as comprise experts from central and regional Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation centres, provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation entities and community leaders). We trust that all of the knowledge and techniques that we give to locals will support and enhance provincial disaster management capabilities and, ultimately, our nation (Provincial DDPM Officer B, 2019).

> If the disaster risk reduction installed within communities is strong, local governments will be more supported in their disaster management capacity and the mechanisms in the budgeting process of disaster management will be monitored (District Chief Officer, 2019).

The intervention of provinces as to these communities was additionally practiced via the shaping of the patterns of disaster risk reduction plans and processes. The standardisation of such

disaster risk reduction plans and procedures, for example, led to communities being required to undertake disaster risk assessments, analyse the vulnerabilities faced, survey community backgrounds (i.e., via social and economic profiles), trace past disasters, consider community hazards, locate disaster and hazard information through maps, create risk maps, analyse vulnerable areas/people/families, identify how vulnerabilities can be avoided, analyse how communities can reduce the disaster risks faced and build community risk maps and safety maps (NDPDC, 2010; CRDDPM, 2013). There were positioned as key devices in the building of community trust within provincial disaster management. In addition to providing the endorsement of these planning processes, the disaster risk reduction management process intervened at the province level. In relation to the setting up of disaster risk reduction committees, all members had to be appointed from an existing village committee structure (as would be under the command of the provincial governor and central government). Furthermore, a sub-committee had to be established to help the main board, whereby all sub-committee members were civil defence volunteers[92]. In the disaster response process, the hegemonies of practice were widely applied to the community. There were a number of different requirements of the community – to have a disaster management practitioner at the community and village level in providing disaster alarms (as a civil defence volunteer), to regulate 'community rescue teams' at the sub-district and community levels under a training programme named OTOS (One- Tumbon (sub-district) and One Reach and Rescue Team provided by the provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation) and to build disaster training and community drill projects twice a year (NDPDC, 2010; CR DDPM, 2013). It can be said that the disaster risk reduction notion here was not designed to build community strength but rather was used as an intervention tool of the central/provincial government in re-accessing the locality.

Conclusion

From the discussions of this chapter, it is identified that the disaster management administration of Chiang Rai was dominated by central bureaucracy. Under this centralisation, the provincial governor has increasingly gained a greater role and stronger authority at both the provincial and local administration level. This was steered by hybrid logics (mixed security and bureaucratic logics). For this reason, subsequent disaster management practices and projects were employed as tools through which to govern the local government, people and to consolidate the power of provincial bureaucrats. This can be seen in relation to key disaster management projects – for instance, in the installation of the Provincial Disaster Management Commanding Centre Committee and the Provincial Disaster Assistance Committee to control disaster management decision-making and to approve local disaster management plans, to set the disaster management local (integrated) plan and to introduce the Community-Based Disaster Risks Reduction Programme as a means of monitoring, controlling and accessing the local administration. Indeed, these projects, as installed following 2010, could be identified to be the root cause of the failure faced and to be the source of controversy and challenge when the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake hit. This conflict and political practice will be revealed in the next chapter.

Chapter Seven

Failure of Disaster Management in the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake: The Politics and Challenges of the Local/Community Network

Introduction

The 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, as hit the upper northern part of Thailand, raised questions about the effectiveness of Thailand's disaster management – both at the provincial and national level. Due to the solidification of the central government and its provincial governments following 2003, alongside the frequent military interventions witnessed between 2007 and 2014, there was an iterative failure of orthodox disaster management. This outcome was manifested in the collapse of the disaster management enacted in response to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. However, the 2014 event differed from others as it encountered the emergence of powerful local/community disaster management alliances designed to challenge the outdated provincial/central disaster management regime. Between May 2014 and May 2015, several political phenomena arose that reflected the power and discourse struggles occurring, the political strategies deployed and the alliances formed between the local/community and central/provincial governments.

This chapter investigates how and why the affected communities and local coalitions (the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network) established disaster management models through which to respond to and help recover people who faced damages – wherein this community mechanism was instituted as an alternative disaster management form. These models subsequently become major political strategies, thus being enabled to fully merge the local and partnership demands of affected areas and successfully challenge the main disaster management approach previously utilised.

To describe the configuration of the local/community disaster management of 2014, alongside the political strategies employed, this chapter reveals the challenge strategies which

arose by using the logics of critical explanation in its analysis. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section details the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake context, explaining how the event provoked the local community, people and government to challenge the central disaster management regime imposed (emergent demands). The second section explores the occurrence of politics at the local/community level. Here, investigation is given as to how local/community coalitions were framed and how campaigning projects were deployed to gather together disparate local demands, to forge a discourse coalition capable of actively contesting the provincial disaster management system and to handle the hazards faced through the empirical practices of the logics of Community. The third section discusses and interprets the local/community movements and logics exercised in responding to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake.

7.1 Changing National Conditions: The Emergence of Local Demands in Challenging Central and Provincial Disaster Management (2012-2014)

From 2010 onwards, national political conflicts and frequently-changing governments were witnessed in Thailand. It can be said that the occurrence of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake provoked Thai people, the local governments of Thailand and the disaster networks formed to question the reasonableness and appropriateness of the disaster management processes held under the central government's control. This led the community and its people to seek alternative disaster management forms. However, the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake was only an explicit or soft-touch factor in driving such demands for change. Indeed, several change conditions emerged between 2012-2014, thereby dislocating communities from the central disaster management that was imposed. These included the delayed decentralisation process encountered in the preceding decades, the re-solidifying of provincial bureaucrats as associated with ineffective and/or corrupt local governments, the repetitive failure of the central disaster management approach (including as witnessed in the disaster management given to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake) and the

political vacuum conditions caused by the central government of Thailand. Such conditions became crucial forces in reigniting local grievances and in generating new demands among locals/communities in regards to the need for effective disaster management provisions at the province level. This section considers how such demands and grievances, as challenged the central disaster management regime, arose between 2012 and 2014.

7.1.1 Delayed Decentralisation and Bureaucratic Re-Solidification of the Central Disaster Management System

Although the local governments and public participation provisions of Thailand had been a primary focus of the administration and decentralisation of Thailand following 1997 (with the People's Constitution of 1997 being implemented alongside the Determining Plan and Process of Decentralisation Act 1999), this decentralisation process had not progressed smoothly and remained incomplete as of 2014 due to the lack of political will held by politicians and the central government (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004; Painter, 2006), the embedded central/provincial bureaucratic power and state apparatus available (Charoenmuang, 2006; Chardchawarn, 2010) and, often, the military interference enacted within the Thai politics of that era (i.e., 2006-2012) (Baker, 2016; Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). Thereby, disaster management authorities had been centralised while local entities were limited in terms of their authority to make decisions, to deploy manpower and to produce budgets.

Although local governments had been legitimately assigned to deal with tasks related to this area, as occurred in accordance with the local government acts instituted following 1999 (see Chapter Five), all such authority in practice seemed to be centralised through central ministries and units – especially the Ministry of Interior and its higher-level bureaucrats. These entities held extensive responsibilities in supervising all internal security affairs, local governments and disaster management tasks.

The establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Management in 2002 and the enacting of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 occurred under a wave of managerialism alongside demands to remove the predominant top-down approach and to address the failure of the old disaster management style. Nonetheless, this context did not generate any changes to the disaster management of Thailand employed. Furthermore, the intervention of the Thai Military in 2007 strongly influenced the construction of the highly centralised disaster management system. Here, much of the disaster management authority held was allocated to bureaucrats, technocrats or specialists operating within central government via technocratic projects (such as the 'Local Disaster Management Integrated Plan') and plans for 'community-based disaster risk management', 'disaster management technology construction'. This was governed though discourses promising to be 'more effective', 'integrated' and 'resilient'. These aspects appeared in the content of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2009. This context became a crucial factor in articulating the demands of local communities and people while maintaining the central disaster management regime instituted between 2009 and 2013 without substantial interruption.

In contrast, in Chiang Rai, the disaster management regime installed following 2010 reiterated the powerlessness of the local government and created grievances among the local community, people and environmental NGOs in relation to the political negotiations enacted, the participation available and the deficiency of real rights provided in the sphere of disaster management policy-drafting. The presentation of such disaster management to locals, at least in their perspective, comprised a new architecture of power being assumed by the central/provincial government designed to control and govern local administrative entities. This can be confirmed from the interviews conducted with local government leaders – where it was stated, for example, 'disaster management is another governance and control tool produced by the central government'

(Deputy Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019) and 'it comprises complicated plans and technical projects that we had no participation in' (Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019).

Lack of Local Participation and Partnership in the Disaster Preparedness Phase: The Gathering of Chiang Rai Local Demands

According to the Disaster Management and Prevention Act of 2007 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2009, the disaster management regime instituted required all local government and community units in Chiang Rai to ensure disaster preparedness via the supervising of and consulting on the provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan and its policy. In 2010, the Chiang Rai governor organised a series of preparedness projects in this area (see Chapter Six) – for instance, in relation to determining how the local government was to provide a standard local disaster management form, how community-based disaster risk management was to be instituted, how a local warning station was to be constructed and how the disaster management officers within local communities were to be trained. These plans and projects were installed to invoke satisfaction among the local community towards the new measures – namely under the catchwords of 'integration and unity', 'professionalisation', 'effectiveness' and 'damage reduction' (CRDPM, 2012). However, the ability to achieve success here was restricted by the fears and old grievances held among local governments about the re-centralisation enacted, the lack of participation available in the policy-making process and the re-branding of the intervention tools of provincial administrations as disaster management.

During 2011-2013, the installing of the local disaster management plan seemed to provoke increasing participation-related grievances among local entities. The drafting of the plan and the policy instituted at local levels were centralised and dominated by provincial and central bureaucratic agencies. For example, at the policy level and in the drafting of provincial disaster management (as a local master plan), only a small committee was constituted with very few members who represented local and community agencies. Indeed, only 7 local members were

included out of the 19 committee members, with most having been appointed as representatives of provincial and local agencies by the provincial governor (NDPDC, 2010). At the local level, in contrast, all local plan structures were produced to reflect similar patterns or standards as that provided by the provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation rubric, thus placing the latter as the main plan to be consulted. Notably, there was no process through which the public sphere (i.e., locals and community intellectuals) could contribute their knowledge of the local geography or any disaster risk data within the drafting of these plans. The determining of all local disaster management budgets also had to be approved via a process controlled by the provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation regime (NDPDC, 2010). The planning witnessed was therefore restricted and dominated rather than being collaborative in nature. Evidently, local anxiety arose in the drafting of these plans. The Chief Administrator of the SAO (2019) has stated that local disaster management plans 'seemed not to represent our risk, situation or demands. Although we put in some of the detail, the budgeting and approval process remained centralised and monitored by the provincial administration – for me, this was the new hierarchy' and that, 'nowadays, the provincial governor and administration have little budget and the new disaster management projects of the province have assumed control over local resources again'.

Grievances not only emerged in relation to the local disaster management budgeting and planning process, but also in concern as to the restrictions faced in the sphere of local participation and the building of intensive technical approaches among Chiang Rai's community organisations and disaster management-focussed NGOs – namely as the new disaster management allowed only registered and formal organisations to play a role in the drafting of the disaster management plans (NDPDC, 2015). Local NGOs and people have indicated their view that "there was no room for ordinary people or NGOs in the drafting of the disaster management plan and all processes were exclusively undertaken by provincial bureaucrats" (NGO Representative A, 2019). Furthermore, it has been denoted that such groups "never knew [they] had a local disaster management plan and

this might have been an informal plan" (NGO Representative B, 2019). Finally, it has been conveyed that "all matters received from the central and provincial projects – such as community-based disaster risk management training and haze warning reports – were so complicated and technical in nature when transferred to community members" (Local Leader A, 2019).

7.1.2 Rising Local Demands for Change: Disruption of the Earthquake Response and Recovery Process of Provincial Disaster Management

Through the Disaster Management and Prevention Act of 2010, all disasters triggered at the provincial level (i.e., a medium-scale disaster) witnessed management authority being assumed by provincial disaster management plans and policies and emergency operation units. Here, the provincial governor operated as the highest commander, while the provincial Department of Disaster Management and Prevention functioned as the core assistance unit. Under this regime, the appointed central bureaucrats were responsible for tasks related to that which followed the governor's assignments (NDPDC, 2015). This rubric positioned the local government as the main apparatus in coping with disaster situations while the mayor or chief executive of the respective local government units arose as the local commander. However, in practice, such disaster management could not deal with significant catastrophes due to the limited authority and resources provided to local governments. The authority needed pertained to the ability to declare disasters, approve and monitor disaster budgets and permit the use of designated areas, equipment and workforces in responding to a disaster. However, these provisions were fragmented across departments, ministries and provincial units. The occurrence of politics of scale in the disaster management of Thailand was a regular phenomena witnessed amidst numerous crises (Marks and Lebel, 2016).

Collapse of 'Effective' 'Standardised' and 'Command Unity' Narratives

On the 5th of May 2014, a 6.3 Richter earthquake hit the Chiang Rai province of Thailand. The earthquake and its aftershocks severely damaged 7 districts, 50 sub-districts and 609 villages, with

more than 15,139 public and residential buildings having encountered some level of destruction. Amidst the devastation, demands for effective recovery and assistance emerged. This was a point of dislocation for the provincial disaster management regime.

Due to the severe and widespread damage encountered, the earthquake was officially declared a medium-scale disaster. Thus, the Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre was established by the provincial Department of Disaster Management and Prevention, relative bureaucrats, Chiang Rai's regional military and central bureaucrats alongside educational institutions under the command of the Chiang Rai governor. In practice, the Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre became the centre of command in all of the disaster management phases deployed (i.e., the emergency response, recovery and mitigation enacted), with this provision operating with the support of the local government centres of each area. While the Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre was immediately established and implemented post-earthquake, therein following the official disaster management mechanism plan, the setting up of the local emergency operation units and the preparing of the centralised coordination centre of the building inspectors were provincial processes that were broadly criticised. Indeed, the flexible management and bureaucratic style instituted were publicly questioned, with it being denoted that this disaster management approach was ignorant as to the public and local damage and the community issues which needed to be resolved and/or recovered. This led to the loss of credibility for the primary system and invoked the failure of those systems in the perspective of the local government, people and communities of Chiang Rai. Such failure responded to a number of areas.

Unresponsive, Messy and Segregated Approaches in the Emergency Response Process

Despite the Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre being established after the main earthquake hit, the affected areas encountered a confused response and muddled control in the disaster management enacted. The centre was intensively centralised and top-down in nature, while the disaster management plan and local disaster management processes had been determined solely

by central/provincial officers without any local participation. Most of the communities and villages thus had no knowledge towards how they were to respond to the earthquake and inadequate earthquake provisions and knowledge had been conveyed via the community-based disaster risk management training provided.

Furthermore, the evacuation plan of those locals followed the master Disaster Management and Prevention Plan. The Dong-Lan community was one group (among many) unable to deal with the immediate chaos post-quake, yet there was no official assistance provided from the centre in terms of a warning mechanism or in coping with the immediate local damage. In fact, local residents did not know how to evacuate themselves or where the assembly point was. Thus, most local people had to trust their basic instincts to survive (Local People, 2014 cited in ThaiPBS, 2014). Similarly, many areas in the Phan and Mae-Suay districts saw local residents having to confront collapsed infrastructure – including in regards to the disruption of electronics, communication means and drinking water – for more than a week due to the aftershocks encountered, lack of official assistance provided and underestimations held by the centre. Indeed, during that period, the heads of villages, local community figures and informal leaders became key people in organising the emergency response in terms of setting up temporary shelters, providing warnings through community broadcast towers and enacting public communications.

The unresponsive and impractical outcomes of the central disaster management plan arose due to the ‘unprecedented situation’, ‘insufficient manpower’ and reliance given to ‘responsible units or specialists’, discourses which appeared in the mass media of that time. Nonetheless, this was exacerbated by the fragmented management instituted, inadequate disaster warning systems enacted, ignorance held as to the severity of the local damage faced and the concealing of failure via blaming. Such events explicitly revealed the failure conditions of the disaster management regime of Thailand. Despite the earthquake’s aftershocks spanning a week, locals and affected communities failed to receive updated earthquake-related news, revised information on the

damage which had occurred or advice as to how to adapt themselves to the crisis. This could only be accessed through the content and guidance provided by local leaders, on television and through community broadcast towers. There were no official measures designed to address this from the centre or at the province level (Local Leader B, 2019). It is seen that the pertinent earthquake information and warnings that were needed had not been integrated between the provincial centre and the central specialist agencies (the Earthquake Bureau, Department of Geology and National Warning Centre) due to the different command lines and limited powers of the Chiang Rai Provincial Governor (Provincial DDPM officer A, 2019). Thus, in the initial response stage, local people were afraid due to the lack of clarity held as to what responses would be given. Some residents stayed in temporary shelters for more than a week owing to their distrust of the situation. The emergence of rumours as to the severity of the damage and losses faced also began to emerge, as manifested the ineffective response given to the situation and the ignorance of the centre. This was evidenced, in particular, in the concealing of the cracking of the new Mae-Suay Dam post-earthquake by central/provincial officers. This falsity created scepticism and distrust among locals in the province (Manageronline, 2014; Local Leader B, 2019), whereby 'instead of trustworthy news, measures were delivered by the central/provincial centre' and local people had to educate themselves and had representatives 'monitor the dam every day' (Local People Interview cited in Bangkokbiznew, 2014). This 'concealment and inability of the officers' arose in order to 'maintain their (bureaucratic career) stability … they seemed to do things even if the damage would affect the locals' (Local Leader B, 2019).

Distrust towards the provincial system and anxiety as to the warning system being inadequate became vital factors in motivating the collective demands of locals/communities in requiring a more effective disaster management form. As illustrated by a local/community network member:

> In the situation in which damage become widespread, locals are disaster victims and third sectors are ready to assist. The new system required real integrated work, flexibility and a need to be driven by the voices and requirements of the people rather than a hierarchical system or centralised command which relies only on the provincial governor – a figure who pays attention only to their self-benefit and career (CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019).

Fiasco of the Recovery Process – A Fragmented and Ignorant System (1-Week to 3-Months)

Although the Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre had officially been assigned to deal with the recovery tasks associated with the earthquake damage, thus assuming a central role in gaining and distributing public donations, almost all of the processes raised became a fiasco in terms of their command and coordination provisions. Notably, these provisions consistently failed to mobilise local and community participation. In fact, this regime was portrayed as 'a messy and centralised system' (Leader People B, 2019) which 'excluded people' (Chief of Administration of the SAO, 2019).

The provincial disaster management centre seemed unable to provide a reliable database or institute cooperation systems in the surveying of damage, despite commencing this role on the 10th of May 2014 – with such efforts being evidenced in the 'complicated and redundant data' gained, 'lack of professionalism' witnessed and 'integrated failings' encountered (Deputy Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019). The remaining processes were thoroughly centralised via the Chiang Rai Emergency Operation Centre, where all commands were top-down and operated through a bureaucratic monitoring approach enacted within the main structure of the Ministry of Interior. For every decision made here – for example, in the creation of a new database and the administering of disaster-related financial aid – determinations were processed under the hierarchical structure of the Department of Provincial Administration and the Department of Local Administration (see Figure 6). In this context, all procedures were processed via a top-down structure which involved the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Provincial Administration

(central) bureaucrats, entities which worked within legal, monitoring and command cultures (Suwanmolee, 2017). As perceived by the local community, “extreme bureaucracy [was] still embedded in Thailand’s crisis management” and “this system was not applied appropriately amid people’s suffering” (Local Leader A, 2019).



Figure 6 Disaster Victim Database Creation Process and Disaster-Related Financial Assistance Consideration Procedure Post-Earthquake

Source: Adopted from Suwanmolee (2017)

Aside from the drawbacks and failures of this centralised and hierarchical process, it is also evident that all damage assessment processes enacted were inadequate and the employed technicians and engineers failed to appropriately intervene. At the village, community and local levels, database creation and data collection tasks became the responsibility of village heads and local committees, mainly due to the lack of capacity held among the deployed technicians and disaster staff – “They had no specialists to support us in analysing building structures” (Local Leader A, 2019). Notably, “most of them came from the Provincial Administration Organisation and the Department of Public Works and Town Planning, thus the operations were delayed” (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019). The database created was therefore not trusted by the

locals/communities to which they corresponded. As expressed by local NGOs: “This dataset did not represent any real reflection of the devastation suffered as it was designed solely for the operations of the bureaucratic disaster management process, the disbursement of disaster-related financial assistance and the monitoring of local government operations” (NGO Representative A, 2019). The failure in coordinating earthquake-related information was a major factor in invoking the demands of local people. While the integration and unity of the command enacted was a crucial aim of the provincial disaster management regime, it is seen that this system did not correspond to the producing of an earthquake database spanning sources on the national, regional and local levels. Here, redundancy was encountered in the collecting of data from affected areas by respective official departments, as led to standalone earthquake database systems which did not represent an ‘integrated system’ as claimed. Thus, such processes represented mere propaganda and actually caused information administration failure – as illuminated by the statements of locals:

> More than 5 times a week, we [had] to give similar information to different bureaucratic units. Why did they not plan to do this only once and to integrate the collected data? (Local Leader B, 2019).
>
> We spent more than a week revising the format and re-collecting community data that the province needed. It seemed a waste and redundant (Deputy Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019).

As the prepared database was not integrated and did not mirror the actual damages faced, the mitigation processes and disaster-related subsidies set out failed to be deployed correctly. Parallel to this, the procedures used were strongly dominated by bureaucratic teams and ideas, with all processes operated under the central regulation arm. The financial assistance available was determined to be limited to 1,000 US Dollars per household and the process instituted to obtain this was complicated, with ambiguous requirements, monitoring provisions and assessment standards being held. Each community and household was subsidised differently (Local Leader A

and B, 2019). Local people who were victims were unable to participate in these assessments and local representatives formed a minority on the assessment committee (Deputy of the Chief of Administration of SAO, 2019; Local Leader as cited in Suwanmolee, 2017). Within the short-term response system, attention was only given to the distribution of financial aid to people in the interest of recovery. Indeed, these aspects became an important stimulus for the demands which arose as to the need for disaster management changes and community integration at that moment. As some local people stressed:

> It appeared that the main mission of the disaster management regime was only to know the damage information and to gain documents through which to monitor local processes. In practice, we never saw a real recovery operation in our areas (Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019).

The collapse of the disaster donation and distribution centre was an additional problem faced. As determined by the Disaster Management and Prevention Act of 2007, provincial disaster management provisions were authorised to be at the centre of the public donation network under the rubric of there being a need for 'integrated coordination' and 'equal and proper distribution' (Provincial DDPM Officer B, 2019). Nonetheless, these tasks were not successfully undertaken in light of the vast amounts of public donations coming in from over the country. Indeed, within a couple of weeks, it became clear that the operation was unable to deal with the scope encountered. This led to a collapse in appropriate responses being given to community needs and a mismatch between the community needs witnessed and the public donations received. Consequently, survival bags (as included instant food, fish tins) and cement-only construction equipment were provided rather than that which related to local and community requirements (i.e., the repairing of local residences by technicians and engineering consultants). This led to dissatisfaction in several areas and motivated local movements:

> We were very angry and disappointed in regards to the assistance and donations provided. We spent more than 4 hours trying to receive useful public assistance but eventually we only got instant noodles and canned fish (Chief Executive of the SAO, 2019).

The inequality witnessed in the distribution of public donations and the neglect of the area management invoked local demands for a new disaster management form. From the reporting as to the severe damage which had occurred in Chiang Rai, significant donations were received from private and government agencies across the country. However, these donations were distributed only to the areas reported upon by the news – such as the Mae-Suay and Dong-Mada sub-districts. These were located at the frontline of the provincial disaster management centre and were often visited by ministers and national politicians. Little assistance was given to remote areas and certain terrains (such as the Wawee sub-district) were disregarded. This neglect spanned more than a week and the province seemed to ignore what was happening in those areas, merely claiming that they had 'limited human resources' to address those 'wider areas' (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019).

Such failure evoked inequality as to the donation and aid distribution within marginal areas. Eventually, a local collective drive was awakened that sought to develop a more effective system of disaster management.

7.1.3 The 2014 Coup, National Military Intervention, Status Quo of Provincial Administration and Bureaucratic Re-Solidification

While the failure of provincial disaster management was elevated, the Thai Military coup of the 22nd of May 2014 generated a political vacuum and reconsolidated bureaucrats at the national level. Here, provincial administration was seemingly used to reinforce the increased demands for change emanating from locals/communities.

After the removal of the civil government of Yingluck Shinawatra in May 2014, the Thai Junta spent almost a year (May 2014 - April 2015) rearranging Thailand's political power structures, wherein it sought to eliminate and suppress the opposition and former powers of the

‘Thaksin Regime’ (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). The consequences of this affected the provincial disaster management enacted in response to the Chiang Rai Earthquake in at least two regards.

Firstly, the certainty of the provincial administration and governor role in the earthquake management was negatively affected due to the tightening of power instituted by the Thai Junta. Chiang Rai, at that moment, was anxious as to how the devastating situation would be handled and how provincial administration would manifest as the provision of the provincial governor being the highest commander here may have been removed following the 2014 Thai Military coup. This condition led to a disaster management deadlock and to delays in the commanding and recovery of this disaster situation. Here, ‘take no action’, ‘do nothing’ and ‘sluggish’ responses were given by provincial bureaucrats, as represented the instability of the provincial government. These ‘wait and see’ strategies, as designed to maintain the status quo, were employed by provincial technocrats as they waited to find out what new policy would arise under the new government. This undoubtedly caused delayed disaster management. At that time, little effort was given by province-level technocrats and the provincial government towards accessing and mobilising cooperation between province-based and external organisations. The provisions available pertained only to surveying damage, dealing with the official distribution of donations and corresponding with mass media (Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019; CRDMN Staff, 2019). Indeed, “they paid no pragmatic attention to the locals or the community” (Local Academic Scholar A and B, 2019).

This phenomenon thereby become an important instigator of collective action. This was confirmed by a local who stated that: ‘The province and all central disaster management centres took no action in this situation […] a sluggish command and operations were witnessed in general’ (Deputy Chief Administrator of the SAO, 2019).

Secondly, local elections in the earthquake-affected areas were suspended. May 2014 was a crucial moment for Chiang Rai's local elections – especially in the districts of Mae-Suay and Phan, areas that comprised the epicentre of the earthquake and that encountered severe damage. The 2014 Thai Military coup resulted in the suspending of all local elections and democratic processes in the country, including at the local government level in Chiang Rai. Post-earthquake, most of the local executives in that area were hesitant to use their administrative power in coping with the earthquake as they were in their termination period, despite the Thai Junta having allowed those figures to use such temporary authority at the regular local executive and council level. The earthquake management and recovery of some local areas saw ambiguous decision-making and a lack of action among a number of local government executives due to the temporary political vacuum perceived. This may have manifested a 'perfect storm for this earthquake and the provincial disaster management regime, as motivated locals to reconsider how community disaster management could arise' (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019). Such outcomes failed to satisfy local people in command of the situation due to the limited assistance of the province, lack of collaboration and cooperation enacted between local and external agencies in the recovery of the community and deficient self-guided mechanisms through which to confront the existing disaster management and the ineffective nature of the local disaster management plan (Local Leader B and C, 2019). These aspects became factors which drove local and community demands in mobilising local symbolic contestation through the framing of self-recovery disaster management, the gathering of community and people-based networks and the seeking of cooperation from external organisations.

In conclusion, the changing circumstances following 2010 and the 2014 Earthquake resulted in local and community grievances, demands for a participatory disaster management form and the identified requirement for effective disaster management that responded to community needs. These demands seemingly threatened orthodox or province-level disaster

management. The post-earthquake response and recovery processes enacted thus registered as comprehensive disaster management failures. Demands for real, effective and participatory local/community-based management consequently appeared. This period was therefore a decisive moment for the local/community level in struggling against and redefining the existing disaster management.

7.2. The Politics of Coalition-Building Among Chiang Rai's Locals and Communities: Politicisation of Chiang Rai's Post-Earthquake Management

This section examines the political dimensions of the disaster management witnessed in the context of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, as was shaped to contest and resist the hegemonic disaster management of that time. The analysis presented here is designed to discern and interpret how such disaster management was constructed as antagonistic in itself (Grigg & Howarth, 2019) and how the political strategies available were framed by privileging the reactivation of the contingency form of every institution and by linking the demands held through the establishing of alliances (Griggs and Howarth, 2016; Howarth and Griggs, 2017a, 2020; Griggs, Howarth and Feandeiro, 2018; Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018). Below, the campaign movements, political project practice (e.g., how demands were equivalenced) and coalition formation of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network are illuminated.

The emergence of demands for change and the recognition given to the need for effective and competent disaster management recovery systems strongly came to the fore following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake and the collapse of the associated province-level disaster management and earthquake centre. Here, local contestations and counter discourse were displayed through two targets. The first was the attempt to elucidate the weakness and failure root of the disaster management process via the blaming of the ineffective provincial/central disaster management structure and lack of participation by locals in the operations launched. The second

was the framing of a 'discourse coalition' in order to build a strong local movement and to present an alternative disaster management form, model and practice that could replace the traditional form instituted. In this context, it can be said that the presentation of an alternative disaster management form was in line with the employment of the symbolic expressions of locals and the wider community – as conveyed through criticisms of the disaster management terrain. These approaches were used to reach a consensual and satisfactory solution and to stand against the perceived failure of the existing provincial disaster management. As a leader of a local government network indicated:

> Realistically, we cannot deny that disaster management is a political space that the provincial government does not need to decentralise – primarily for security and resource distribution authority reasons. Hence, the Thai disaster management apparatus was designed to manifest a single command and bureaucratic monitoring. In our perspective however, disaster management should be a public terrain and a collaborative field in which all stakeholders (i.e., local people and communities) can participate and work together. This might be a tool through which common ground can be reached and negotiations undertaken with the provincial and central government (Local Leader A, 2019).

Among the distressed local residents of Chiang Rai, the practice of politics revealed itself as various expressions and local projects. Obviously, many of these expressions sought to collate the disparate demands of local groups in challenging the failure seen. Blame appeared in response to the first post-quake period wherein most locals viewed the provincial disaster management instituted as comprising 'unresponsive practice' and a 'doing nothing system'. This conceptualisation arose through public media such as Thai PBS (ThaiPBS, 2014b, 2014c, 2014a). As part of this disaster management failure identification, and in an effort to mobilise a powerful agenda, a local/community coalition was constituted merely 3 days following the earthquake (on the 8th May 2015) as the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network. The emergence of this local

movement was formed around two main assertions – that the central unit involved in receiving information as to the damage faced by locals led to the failure of all operations of the provincial disaster management and that the appropriate/effective efforts given towards relieving the suffering of locals and the wider community derived from a self-led recovery process undertaken by local/community figures and agents. As members of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network have indicated:

> We have known that the province is the big brother in the disaster management regime, yet these processes have become trapped due to the bureaucratic style, unprofessional staff, lack of familiarity with locals/communities and inadequate assistance encountered. Public suffering and community demands brought us to form a network and to drive this work by ourselves (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2014).
>
> All of us are victims of both a natural disaster and the failure of central disaster management, thus all damages need to be addressed by ourselves (CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019).

This coalition was formed through the inclusion and leadership of experienced local NGOs – for example, the Mirror Foundation, Hill Area and Community Development, the Study and Development of Highland People Foundation, the Chiang Rai People Council, the local Thai Toy Group and the Women and Community Centre and local government agencies. Alongside this, community leaders acted as the main supporters and operators – seen, for instance, in relation to the Pa-Dad, Doi Chaang, Pong-Phrae, Dong-Lan and Sai-Kao sub-district organisations.

Nonetheless, the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network was not seamlessly assembled due to the fact that the provincial disaster management centres carefully and deliberately retained their power and position as (ostensibly) the only legitimate means through which to cope with the earthquake situation. The provincial disaster management parties did not accept that their work had resulted in failure and instead they employed blame strategies to counter any criticism. They further maintained their authority status under a claim of being ‘specialists’

operating in an ‘unprecedented and uncertainty situation’ (Provincial DDPM officer A, 2019). In addition, no consensus was held amid the diversity of local demands as to how recovery was to be best-achieved and who was responsible for dealing with the significant damage from the earthquake. At the wake of the crisis, it appeared that two different viewpoints were held among local and community leaders in regards to how the crisis should be handled and how disaster management was to arise appropriately. From the interviews conducted, it is shown how local/community figures were in agreement that they were required to play a major role in actively responding to the earthquake and in relieving the suffering of locals – a result of the community owning the issues faced and the local social capital possessed. Hence, the utilising of a simple self-recovery process was positioned as being a crucial route to take (Local Leader A, 2019: CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019). In contrast, other local groups argued that despite the widespread failures encountered, the community should follow the provincial guidelines and wait for the assistance of state agencies because ‘disasters, as manifest a security threat, are the responsibility of the central state and agencies’ and ‘locals would struggle to assume the required resources and authority’ (Local Leader A and B, 2019). The disparate ideas held as to the approach that should be taken highlight the contested beliefs and demands raised by local/community groups in the initial post-earthquake phase. Consequently, the local/community alliances which emerged had to find commonality as the recovery process progressed (i.e., in the first month following the earthquake). In addition to solving the immediate problems faced, a key strategy used by the leaders of these local alliances was to find ways through which to expand the network formed and thereby best mobilise resources and negotiate with powerful and inactive central agencies (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019).

To bring together disparate local demands, identities and needs for change, rhetoric forms were shaped in response to the failure of the provincial disaster management via three public dialogues following the 9th of May 2015. These rhetoric forms solidified under two slogans. The

first slogan was ‘we are the people located on the fault plate’ [‘*Kon Bon Roy Leun*’ in Thai], as was designed to reflect ‘the common feeling’ or ‘collective awareness’ held among locals as to their context. This foregrounded an implicit truth for Chiang Rai locals that, realistically, they could not avoid the occurrence and impact of earthquakes in that area. Thus, it was argued that as long as people lived in this earthquake area and face such problems, they should be involved in addressing this context and should assume a primary role in seeking sustainable solutions rather than relying on central government (Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network Leader as cited in CRDMN, 2014). The second slogan was that ‘We Chiang Rai people are able to survive’ [‘*Chiang Rai Young Wai Yoo*’ in Thai]. This reflects discourses of both ‘blaming the provincial disaster management’ and the requirement perceived to ‘build common sense in facing major earthquakes’, as was set out to illustrate how provincial disaster management relating to earthquake occurrences had failed in almost all of its processes, yet the local people had been able to survive and find ways through which to recover by themselves under their own ‘coordination and social capital’ (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019). Arguably, both slogans functioned as a *nodal point* or an empty signifier (in symbolic terms) of this event, with this therefore being a moment that could fuse together internal differences and allow actors to engage in political action against common opposition forces (Griggs and Howarth, 2013a, 2016; Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018). Such slogans were presented initially to provoke community cohesion, local collective awareness as to the local spirit and ownership over the issues faced while illustrating provincial/central disaster management as an overarching enemy. This was a crucial moment in the local movement’s attempts to expand upon the arisen local alliances – despite the different demands and identities of various areas. Such notions have been reflected upon by local leaders:

> This rhetoric (we are the people located on the fault plate) represented our real issues, no matter what! We have to seek an exit route via locals/our community (CRDMN Staff, 2019)

> We know the tasks were officially the responsibility of the central state or provincial disaster management, but in a crisis, we must survive and the slogans provoked our local spirit in dealing with the large-scale damages and led us to develop our local self-management (Local Leader A, 2019).

In June 2014, a political frontier was thus explicitly drawn between community/local disaster management as a counter alliance (we) and provincial/central hegemonic and failed disaster management (they). In this regard, the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network established various political exercises and campaigns designed to bring and hold together emerging local coalitions and to build a common opposition to non-local disaster management (Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018). This led to a series of local political projects, as detailed below.

7.2.1 Logics of Community, Community Disaster Recovery Model and Local Disaster Management Centre and Fund Projects as Universal Projects and the Chain of Equivalence

Without question, endeavours given to creating a 'smaller government' and 'bigger society' (Kisby, 2010) – alongside attempts to increase the role of civil society, self-reliance and self-organisation – are nowadays understood to be a mainstream method of challenging and changing the role of the state and its bureaucracy (Stolle and Hooghe, 2005; Bang, 2009; Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier, 2010; Edelenbos, van Meerkerk and Schenk, 2016). This idea corresponds to minimising the role of the state in dominating the governmentality of a jurisdiction and/or its population. Through this, the role of active citizens is enhanced, democratic processes are either installed or strengthened and significance is given to the constructing of new forms of citizenry and community. This is often manifested in self-community/citizen organisations, as frequently arise as primary tools in countering traditional/formal institutions and dominant discourses (Healey, 2015).

Similarly, such community and collective tenets were invoked in the sphere of community recovery and a local-led disaster management model following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. This discourse was deployed to counter the political projects (both discursive and non-discursive) of the hegemonic provincial disaster management. In response to these politicised processes, local logics were operated during the post-earthquake crisis. Following the nodal point of 'we are the people located on the fault plate', as represented the beginning node of re-politicised disaster management, the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network drew a more explicit and deeper political boundary between local/community and central/provincial government agencies. This was undertaken to strengthen and unify local alliances by forging together local demands and thereby constructing equivalencies which linked the two predominant political strategies.

'This is Our Local/Community Sphere' Rhetoric and 'Community Disaster Recovery' as the First (Effective) Chain of Equivalence

Although ownership over local issues was set as a main agenda in the efforts given to decentralisation in Thailand and in the drafting of local disaster management plans following 2010, this notion appeared too weak to invoke real empowerment through which to negotiate real benefits with the central government. Due to the discourse of security concealment in the disaster management regime of Thailand, locals/communities fell under the control of provincial administration structures (Chardchawarn, 2010; Garden, Lebel and Chirangworapat, 2010).

Amidst the failure of the main disaster management practices enacted post-earthquake, rhetoric such as 'this is our sphere', and 'these are our issues' – alongside the asserting of local/community response capacity and social capital – became foregrounded when seeking to position self-community disaster management as appropriate and necessary. This produced a node placed to forge local/community unity in challenging provincial-level power structures.

Two weeks after the earthquake, rhetoric such as "this is our sphere and these are our interests" (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019) and "there is not only one way or one actor capable of

tackling these devastating issues" (Deputy of Chief Administration of SAO, 2019) were initially shaped through Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network leader meetings, in the second and third public forums held (on the 12th and 14th of May, respectively) and via various forms of Thai mass media. Indeed, these tropes sought to illustrate the negative outcomes of central/provincial disaster management being the primary force in handling local disasters. Here, such provincial administration (including its core figures – such as the provincial governor and the head of provincial DDPM) were denoted to be 'outside actors and exterior agencies'. In addition, the wickedness of disaster management standardisation was signalled, wherein it was asserted that disaster management should be the responsibility of local people and their networks. In this vein, community leaders expressed that: 'There is no way the governor or head of the DDPM knows better than us... They are temporary residents and came here only to progress their career' (Chief Administration of SAO, 2019).

This rhetoric was not only used as blame strategies against provincial-level power structures, but also as a means to bring and hold together the different identities and demands of affected locals under empty signifiers.

The emergence of the 'Community Disaster Recovery' or 'Fixing Buildings by the Community' Model on the 10th of June 2014 was a visible form of the discourse 'this is our sphere and these are our issues'. These universal or popular projects were set out to eliminate any antagonism among local groups and to integrate the disparate demands held into a discourse coalition. As noted:

> 'The Community Disaster Recovery approach is an authentic, integrated, collaborative and community-based disaster management model which operated independently from that enacted on the provincial and central level. This provided an opportunity for all sector types to work and share knowledge together, for flexible and vertical operation styles to

arise by driving the demands of affected locals and communities and for effective and sustainable self-recovery management to be produced' (CRDMN Staff, 2019)

Despite this project having been installed within only 2 weeks, it was nonetheless an effective political strategy as it was able to merge disparate local demands by highlighting the availability of an alternative disaster management form, one that emphasised the capabilities of a local/community network in producing a self-led recovery process in responding to the earthquake. Clearly, when considering the Community Disaster Recovery Model, as required the involvement of locals/communities, it is seen that the project offered a complete local/community participation system as its driver (spanning the surveying process to the designing of self-led recovery projects), collaborative working and networking by allowing all sectors to participate in accordance with their respective specialities and skills/provisions. In this respect, a forum also emerged which used community ideas and language in the produced communications and practice (see Figure 7). This project was stated to represent a new and effective disaster management form which offered a 'simplified system' that was 'driven by local/community interests', 'local engagement', 'respect for community learning processes' and 'participation in its implementation' (CRDMN, 2014). This is confirmed by a local leader, as denoted that: "Unquestionably, the structural appeal for us working with the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network […] was that the model had wider ideas and incorporated several partners within its committees, instigated horizontal decision-making, addressed community needs and invoked local and community processes. These were the advantages of the model" (CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019).



Figure 7 Community Disaster Recovery Model

Source: CRDMN (2014)

Arguably, such projects were highly successful in uniting different groups and sectors in responding to the crisis. Overall, the approach derived from an alliance and network being formed, as came to cover all sectors and to work on a multi-level basis. Here, more than 40 organisations across multiple sectors became partners, therein contributing to the new capabilities of this local alliance. In addition, Private Sector involvement was expanded – thus including contributions from Thai universities and NGOs (for example, the Chiang Rai Provincial Administrative Organisation, Thai Chamber of Commerce, Rajabhat University, Rajamangala University of Technology, Thai PBS Friends, SCG Group, Thai Bank Alliance, Singha Corporation and PTT groups) (CRDMN, 2014). Such alliances assumed a critical role in acting as advocates and in the providing of financial support (seen in the establishment of Thai PBS and the Chiang Rai Coordination Group and their administering of donations and assistance), the giving of technical advice and volunteer taskforces (seen in the Chiang Rai Local Damage Database) and the

provision of a real-time earthquake warning website (Thaiquake.com). These aspects arose under the belief that this Community Disaster Recovery Model 'reflected real local demands' and that trust was to be given to a community/local government process which 'generally had the potential to develop the seemingly-suppressed community' (CRDMN, 2014).

In addition to its integration of local alliances in Chiang Rai, the model played an important role in countering the 'the exclusive management' and 'standardisation' approach of the provincial disaster management employed by offering new disaster management insights via the notion that 'no universal disaster management could fully resolve the diversity of local problems' (CRDMN Staff, 2019). Thus, the recovery model required had to be diverse and to support the various characteristics and strengths of Chiang Rai's community.

On the 14th of June 2014, the Community Disaster Recovery Model was progressed to its implementation stage, whereby locals and communities were able to broaden the project (i.e., to extend it beyond the central model) and thus connect the disparate demands of each locality. This project represented various best practice forms and organisational models in instituting an appropriate autonomous local recovery process wherein local residences could be repaired, locals could be trained as to how to rebuild damaged areas and local artisans could be developed in the support recovery process. This arose via 4 crucial areas, in a diversity of conditions, without the intervention of the dominant province-level disaster management. For example, the *Dong-Lan Model* drove collaborative work undertaken by strong community and village leaders and instigated intense community participation. The *Pong-Phrae Model* had strong support from the local government (SAO) and knowledgeable local bureaucrats and could be extended to incorporate external organisations. The *Mae-Phrik Model* was successfully supported by strong local government leaders (e.g., Chief Executives of SAOs), had sufficient (human) resources and was well-connected with local civil society. Finally, the *Pa-Dad Model* was steered by local NGOs

and civil society networks and was entirely facilitated by local academic institutions (Suwanmolee, 2016; CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019).

'We Shall Build Sustainable Local/Community Disaster Management, a Self/Local Disaster Management Centre and a Fund Project': The Second Chain of Equivalence

After the boom of the Community Disaster Recovery Model in early July 2014, such projects were further developed by members of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network alongside new partners – such as the Community Organisation Development Institution, Mae-Suay Community Organisation Council and San-Ma-Ka and Mae-Suay sub-districts. To sustain the momentum of these challenges and to extend the success of the Community Disaster Recovery Model, self-led local disaster management centres and funds were introduced as an advanced model through which to frame local and community-based comprehensive disaster management. This occurred via the perspective that these leading groups 'knew what the local demands were', that 'real and sustainable disaster management should be enacted via local/community processes' and that 'locals can sustainably deal with disasters'. These notions were reiterated in the Handbook of Local Knowledge in the Chiang Rai Earthquake Management and in a meeting of new Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network leaders held during August 2014 (CRDMN, CMC and the CODI, 2016). This approach further led to preventative steps being taken towards the occurrence of future disaster events by ensuring that effective procedures were held by local and community committees. Notably, these provisions did not pertain only to earthquake recovery as previous structures and plans had. The project signified the flourishing of local and community disaster management approaches, positioning these as 'effective' and 'sustainable' ways of dealing with a range of disasters in the long-term and seeing these as explicitly responding to local demands through real, effective and participatory disaster management. The arrangement of this system was then characterised in explicit contrast to the province-level disaster management of that time, whereby all working procedures enacted were conducted by local, community and village/disaster

victim representatives working through horizontal local committees and practice teams - with all final decisions being made at this level[93] (CRDMN, CMC and the CODI, 2016). This structure ensured that uncomplicated and flexible means of assistance were accessible. This rubric focused on the participation of local people and was designed to remain 'independent from the Central Government' while developing 'local and community practices', mobilising 'collective community support' and organising 'local volunteers' to produce a suitable disaster management form and its associated processes.

Practically, this model was implemented as the disaster management fund system provided in the San-Ma-Ka municipality. This invoked the participation of locals and communities, with all fund flows having been mobilised from local people and NGO networks to ensure that the system was to be sustainable and effective whereupon an earthquake hit. Here, the decision-making given towards the distribution of assistance derived from a local committee, whereby the whole of the community could use this fund for public means. Thus, the fundamental aspects of this disaster management form were its self-led sustainable operations and its ongoing expansion and promotion to new areas (Chief Administrative Officer of the SAO, 2019). Seen through the PDT lens, this project was able to be used as a chain of equivalence that held together broad local coalitions who demanded long-term disaster management, flexible funds to be distributed for local assistance purposes, self-led community management and strategies which emphasised the frontier between local/community disaster management and province-level disaster management. This can be seen from the comments of a member of this scheme: "Although local/community provisions and funds cannot provide an equivalent level of support to that provided by the central state, these are nonetheless effective in meeting the needs denoted by the community itself. As such, this is a sustainable model" (Local Leader B, 2019). The number of local alliances associated with this movement increased between August and December 2014, with this being another sign of this chain's success.

Indeed, the local/community disaster management model, particularly its disaster management fund provision, elevated approximately 50% of affected communities and areas to which it was applied – notably in the Mae-Suay, Mae-Lao, Phan, Muang Chiang Rai districts (CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019) and new alliances and parties began to join the endeavour and thus support the local fund project (such as the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security).

In short, both political exercises were evidently able to be used as an effective equivalence chain to hold together a diverse set of local demands via the presentation of community-led alternative models which instigated explicit opposition between local/community disaster management and provincial disaster management, with the latter being stated to be a failed system. At that time, provincial/central disaster management became challenged and critiqued, as caused the powerful existing disaster management of Thailand to temporarily lose credibility and almost be replaced by community models. As confirmed by a local leader: ‘We did not see any effective or integrated coordination, or the active role of the province in this context, despite this having been traditionally portrayed. Indeed, all recovery processes were enacted by ourselves’ (Chief Executive of the SAO, 2019).

7.3 Interpretation (Communitisation) Disaster Management as Politicisation in Challenging Disaster Management Failure

In considering the case of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake through the lens of PDT, the appearance of the logics of communisation comprised a sophisticated set of practices designed to politicise the new disaster management via the collecting of local demands surrounding the witnessed failure of the centralised earthquake management implemented, doing so to counter the hegemonic (provincial) disaster management system. In fact, the emergence of local networks and the success of the community projects launched not only arose from the demands of people to

escape the suffering encountered but such outcomes also represented articulated practice or the politicisation of disaster management through the compounding and application of multiple local political strategies (both discursive and non-discursive in nature). Empirically, the case illustrates that local/community alliances, as formed under the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network umbrella, deployed hegemonic strategies of coalition-building by drawing boundaries between the local people/community and provincial/central agencies, achieved by symbolically manifesting the campaigns of 'we are the people on the fault plate' and 'the failure issues faced are a consequence of outsider action, management, centralisation, bureaucratisation, technicalisation and non-democratic processes'. This was a nodal point (or empty signifier) through which calls were made for alternative disaster management models to replace provincial disaster management. Indeed, to successfully hold together this local coalition, these political rhetoric forms and projects were triggered as equivalence linkages to collect dispersed local demands and identities, undertaken in an attempt to unify hostile opponents into a discourse coalition (Griggs and Howarth, 2016). Local discourses (for example 'this is our terrain') and projects were transformed to manifest the Community Disaster Recovery Model while the notion of 'we are building sustainable disaster management' transformed into self-led disaster management fund projects. Such practice was utilised as a significant chain of equivalence as to the provincial disaster management in support of replacing provincial disaster management operations.

However, following the success of these local/community campaigns between June and December 2014, divergences between the ideological approaches held towards appropriate disaster management began to re-emerge among Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network members and local leaders. This occurred despite most of these parties seemingly being in agreement towards the need for self-led community disaster management. As my analysis highlights, half of those actors agreed that disaster management cannot be isolated from the

facilitation of central/provincial administration entities due to those entities being the legal rights holders. The remaining parties agreed with the aims of the local movement, therein asserting that effective disaster management can be framed almost solely by locals and the community. This illustrates the contingency, dynamics and antagonism characteristics of the disaster management of Thailand, as remains an ongoing political process and as continues to provide an opportunity to 'turn things around' and to be 're-articulated' when situations change. This may be a crucial source of the conflict which occurs in disaster circumstances in Thailand.

Obviously, the disaster management of Thailand and its policy is still compounded by technocratic applications and elite modes of problem-defining and solution-engineering which appeal to scientific legitimacy, discourse or evidence-based policy-making (Dryzek, 2004; Stone, 2017). In this sense, 'rationality' (Fischer, 1990, 2017; Stone, 2002) dominates all related processes. Thus, instead of this system responding effectively to local demands and enhancing the participation of locals/communities, the disaster management of Thailand itself has become a divisive tool which continues to reiterate the frontier between provincial/central disaster management and local/community disaster management. All disaster management processes of Thailand seemingly rest upon 'being systematic, formal and expertise-led' (driven by bureaucratic logics), with the assumption that locals/communities are the 'policy receiver' (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019). Spanning the planning process to the recovery process, all disaster management committees predominantly comprise central and provincial technocrats. In the same vein, commanding structures are centralised while provincial official agencies are positioned as the formal and legal authority here. This shows that, realistically, no room has been provided for informal knowledge, local intellectualism or local participation in the disaster management of Thailand. Thus, frontiers have been drawn between local/community and central/provincial administration, as comprises a source of the chronic or wicked problems which have occurred.

Local/community demands have thus invoked a need for change in the provincial disaster management system, wherein effective and efficient means are suggested in relation to appropriate disaster responses. In this regard, affected locals are stated to be best-able to manage the protection and recovery of areas and thereby ensure the survival and adaptation of locals/communities. To counter Thailand's hegemonic disaster management, new disaster management narratives were presented via a self-led community and local disaster management model which campaigned by foregrounding collective/local interests and the need for greater policy and decision-making authority to be assumed by locals/communities. As part of this, collaborative networks organising local/community operations and which enhanced local democratic structures required a central role. Arguably, this movement showed characteristics assigned to many of the environmental movements which have appeared in recent decades – for example, the 'ecological citizenship movement' (Dobson, 2003; Dobson and Valencia Sáiz, 2005), 'community participatory movement' (Fischer, 2017) and 'eco-localism movement' (Hines, 2003; North, 2010). This is also reflected in post-political movements – such as in relation to 'anti-offshore wind energy' (Tafon, 2017; Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018), 'anti-airport expansion in the UK (Griggs and Howarth, 2013a, 2016) and 'anti-collaborative city' (Griggs *et al.*, 2017; Howarth and Griggs, 2020) groups. These campaigns aim to discharge any conflict generated and are dominated by legal and expert discourses (i.e., as depoliticisation strategies), therein creating or providing 'public space', 'diverse democratic practices' or 'universal projects' – such as those pertaining to 'Human Rights' or 'earth citizenship' (Dobson, 2003; Dobson and Valencia Sáiz, 2005) – to mobilise alliances and thus counter established hegemonic power structures. In the Chiang Rai local movement, disaster management became framed as a political space with various political strategies used to associate disparate local identities and demands together to reveal the failure of provincial disaster management and to protest against central governmentality.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the pertinent and contingent politics of the local/community alliances raised in challenging provincial/central disaster management in light of the failed management given towards the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. In analysing this case though the lens of PDT, it has been illustrated that the failure of provincial disaster management arose for three reasons; the delayed decentralisation of the preceding decades, the inability to institute appropriate response and recovery processes following the 2014 Earthquake by the main disaster management provisions available and the status quo of the provincial administration following the 2014 Thai Military coup. These circumstances mobilised local and community demands against the province-level disaster management held, wherein the latter was denoted as being exclusionary, ineffective and unequal, as lacking direction and as unable to provide the local recovery needed. Such demands were articulated by local/community alliances under the umbrella of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network in an effort to respond adequately to the severe damage.

To hold the local/community demands together, the logics of community were framed via the rhetoric form of ‘we are the people located on the fault plate’, as effectively functioned as a nodal point (or empty signifier). Indeed, the division between the local/community alliance (we) and provincial/central disaster management (they) was foregrounded. The chain of equivalence instituted comprised notions spanning ‘this is our local/community sphere’ and ‘we can build sustainable local/community disaster management in the form of Community Disaster Recovery Model and self-led local disaster management’. Such slogans and exercises were initially successful in replacing province-level operations as those projects responded to local/community demands (e.g., they represented ‘universal or popular projects’). This was a significant moment where local/community disaster management was asserted to have more credibility than province-level disaster management.

While local projects and campaigns were implemented, local leaders proposed different ideological approaches towards the disaster management needed, as illuminated the existence of antagonism and the presence of floating signifiers within such local disaster management. Thus, the disaster management of Thailand continues to have the opportunity to change dynamically and contingently.

In fact, this disruption of the disaster management of Thailand revealed the characteristics and paradoxical nature of such disaster management itself, with its technocratic approaches or bureaucratic logics being a root problem here. In being ‘evidence-based’ and relying on the ‘formality of knowledge’, the disaster management of Thailand became a political mechanism which invoked a strict division between the provincial/central government and local/community people rather than the strengthening of democratic and participatory approaches in this context.

The contestation raised against the dominant disaster management symbolically sought to frame alternative, effective and democratic ways of instituting self-led community disaster management and to seize power back from the hegemony of provincial/central disaster management via a process of redefining and politicising the disaster management of Thailand.

Chapter Eight

The Regaining of Central and Provincial Disaster Management in Chiang Rai Post-Earthquake: The Politics of Governing Disaster Management Failure

Introduction

Evidently, the failure of the response given to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake and the recovery enacted by central and provincial agencies between May and August 2014 resulted in a loss of credibility for such state-led operations and became a crucial nodal point in framing (as symbolic contestation) the need for a new disaster management form comprising local/community alliances. These group efforts, such as instigated via the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network, sought to articulate local disparate demands and to produce effective, trustworthy, community-based and participatory disaster management. At this stage, a number of politicised strategies (i.e., via the logics of community) were produced (see Chapter Seven). However, this recasting of community disaster management and the successful growth of local disaster management alliances seems to have been short-lived. By the end of August 2014, the dominance of traditional disaster management began to re-emerge and local projects, as had been framed as 'popular local/community projects' began to close down due to new dislocations, growing local antagonism, expanding disparate demands and state-led interventions. Eventually, central/province-level disaster management was seemingly able to regain its hegemonic positioning by April 2015, with this being only one year after the Chiang Rai Earthquake.

In this context, various rhetorical mechanisms publicly emerged – such as the context being an 'unpredictable and uncertain situation', certain groups being 'specialist' and there being a need for a 'system'. Alongside this, non-discursive strategies were applied – such as the establishment of an Earthquake Plan Independent Committee, the publication of Chiang Rai Earthquake Financial Reports, the installing of the Earthquake Plan 2014, the presenting of the

National Disaster Plan 2015 and the instituting of disaster risk reduction projects. These outcomes evidence a 'de/re-politicisation phenomena' which was developed by central/provincial parties to respond to the claims raised towards the perceived failure of traditional disaster management, to decrease local resistance and to separate the chains of equivalence formed among local/community disaster management coalitions post-earthquake.

To account for those political actions and the de/re-politicised strategies of the central/provincial government of Thailand, this chapter analyses and assessse the characteristics, implementations and roles encountered among the Chiang Rai locality and central government of Thailand between August 2014 and May 2015. This chapter firstly explains the then-contemporary political context of Thailand and how this affected the disaster management enacted at the time of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. In this regard, consideration shall be given to how, a mere 4 months following a military coup in Thailand, an authoritarian regime had been well-established and had led to all levels of Thailand's administration being ultra-centralised and bureaucratised. In building upon this, secondly chapter then gives its focus to the disparate local/community demands that were raised post-earthquake, alongside the different expectations held as to how disaster management in Thailand could be made more professional. Within this sphere, antagonism was encountered among the local coalitions formed and the people involved. Such conflicts adversely affected the local campaigns and movements produced. Central/provincial parties took advantage from this discord to position state-led disaster management as a reasoned, professional and systematic form of disaster management, whereby effort was given to eliminate the authority of provincial agencies and to endorse the oversight of disaster and risk management by technocratic and scientific bodies. These steps are clear evidence of the construction of new political strategies by the central government at this time. To expand upon these discussions, the third section of this chapter examines the nodal point through which these aspects interacted. In this context, the political mechanisms and discourses employed were

framed as being able to respond to local demands and grievances and to minimise local/community resistance through two crucial logics – the logics of uncertainty and the logics of professionalisation around disaster management issues and governance. The fourth section of this chapter evaluates the provincial government logics was exercised via de/re-politicisation tactics witnessed post-earthquake – considering these alongside the elements and phenomena that appeared at the time, contemporary debates and other comparable situations.

8.1 Thailand's Authoritarian Regime and Technocratic Cabinet: The Reconsolidation of Provincial Bureaucracy and Expertise

The May 2014 coup of Thailand, as led by General Prayut Chan-Ocha[94], changed the political landscape of the country in many ways. For instance, it took the country back to being governed by an authoritarian regime (last experienced following a coup in 2007), saw all administration and policymaking being centralised and led to democratic processes being suspended as the Thai Military sought to solidify and tighten its power via martial law, special decrees and the further expansion of the country's draconian Lese-Majeste Law (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). These tools of suppression affected the management of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake in two major ways. Firstly, the suspension of local government elections invoked insecurity in the authority held whereupon local bodies sought to deal with the earthquake. Secondly, delays were encountered in taking control of the crisis and in enacting recovery among the central agencies – particularly among the provincial government and its leadership by the Chiang Rai provincial governor and provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, as possessed unstable power between May 2014 and August 2014 (see Chapter Seven).

The assuming of power by Prayut[95] as prime minister on the 24th of August 2014 and his handpicked Cabinet on the 31st of August 2014[96] shaped the Thai political regime and manifested the public administration of Thailand to be highly authoritarian and bureaucratised. Prayut's

policy statements, as addressed to the National Council of Thailand on the 12th of September 2014 (amounting to 31 pages and 11 agendas), were presented under the slogan 'Security, Prosperity, Sustainability' and 'Stronger Together'. Under this discourse, it was stated that:

> Initially, this government came to attempt to terminate all internal social controversies and to resolve the issues that were originated from the previous government' (Prayut, 2014:1), that 'bringing peace or happiness back to the people should be the first priority and done sustainability' and that 'this government does not need populism policies [...] with the unity of the power and policy of government, people do not need to worry about fragmented administration (Prayut, 2014 cited in SOC, 2014:2).

At this time, state-led suppressive projects were launched, as constituted the '[i]nstalling of 12 core values among the Thai people and in all schools – that children must recite and practice' (Kanchoochat and Hewison, 2016). This further comprised the 'development of new anti-corruption mechanisms to monitor public administration at all levels' and the 'drafting of a 20-year strategic plan (roadmap) for Thailand designed to develop and reform (control) the country over the next 20 years' (SOPM, 2016). Such practices reflected the style of Prayut's administration of the nation and its focus on centralisation, bureaucratisation and securitisation. Notably, these political ideas were transferred strongly into the policies and programmes launched at that time.

This regime widely dominated all of Thai society and the apparatus provisions of all public administration, with the Thai Cabinet 'endeavouring to bring back social solidarity to Thailand again' (Prayut, 2014 cited in SOC, 2014). Unsurprisingly, major ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior assumed responsibility for all domestic security tasks and for disaster management – therein being fully authorised to command all organisations involved in the country's internal security schemes, requiring them to establish a series of social solidity projects and to control all political and environmental movements (Sae-Chua, 2020; Visetpricha, 2020). The inauguration

of General Anupong Pao-Chinda (a leader of the 2007 coup) as minister of interior and Sutee Makboon (a former provincial governor and elite bureaucrat within the Ministry of Interior) as deputy minister of Interior had a major impact upon the shaping of this ministry, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and disaster management processes enacted following the Chiang Rai Earthquake. As with the wider political landscape, this shift in the Ministry of Interior witnessed an attempt to produce comprehensive bureaucratisation and technocratisation. Due to the background and networks of the minister and deputy minister of the Ministry of Interior, they were practiced in instituting strong central bureaucracy, technocratic systems and military norms when resolving problems. Unquestionably, the Ministry of Interior and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation administration of the time manifested the central/provincial government as the main unit in commanding, controlling and monitoring all local and community areas under suspicion by national and local politicians, undertaken in an attempt to limit political movements and contestation across the country (Elinoff, 2020; Sae-Chua, 2020).

This can be confirmed by a statement of the minister for the Ministry of Interior, as given on the 9th of October 2014 on the topic of policy assignments: 'Regional (provincial) administration apparatus now has a crucial role in transferring security and peace to the people [...] The provincial governor, district governor and the head of government (…) must integrate all state mechanisms to transfer this to the sub-districts and village level' (Ministry of Interior, 2014, 2015). Among the projects launched by the Ministry of Interior between October 2014 and September 2015, more than half (54 projects of the 102 in total) were concerned with the centralising of provincial government power and the installing of monitoring mechanisms at the local level.[97] These projects also sought to downplay decentralisation processes or the delegation of power via local government projects. Arguably, almost all of the projects launched were designed to direct power back to the Ministry of Interior and its central and provincial bureaus (i.e., as operated under the control of the Department of Provincial Administration and the Office

of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior) (Ministry of Interior, 2015). It was this authoritarian, centralised, technocratic and bureaucratic context under which the management of the Chiang Rai Earthquake occurred.

The stability of the national regime had positively affected the Chiang Rai Province and its bureaucrats in several aspects, with at least two areas relating directly to the disaster management failure encountered and the effective movement of local disaster management discourses. Firstly, this context allowed the provincial governor[98] to exercise their disaster management authority securely and fully since they was not removed under the changing national political landscape, with all provincial authority (particularly in regards to the disaster management responsibilities held) being gradually re-centralised due to the instigation of the new deputy minister of the Ministry of Interior following September 2014 (Ministry of Interior B, 2014).[99] Secondly, central/provincial bureaucrats (particularly in the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Department of Provincial Administration) possessed stronger power in the 3 months following the Chiang Rai Earthquake, being relatively free from the national and provincial power shifts occurring, and thus were able to undertake their routine bureaucratic work and use their authority appropriately (CRDMN Coordinator A, 2019)

8.2. Disparate Demands and Grievances of Chiang Rai's Local/Community Bodies: State Disaster Management Versus Local/Community Disaster Management

The local/community movement, as was formalised as the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network, can be asserted to have been successful in articulating disparate local/community demands, in enacting effective recovery and in invoking participatory disaster management (at the nodal point of 'we are the people on the fault plate') in the first 3-6 months following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. These achievements mainly arose in opposition to central/provincial-led disaster management. The antagonistic demands as to disaster management emerged from the

affected people and local leaders/representatives. Although these demands diverged, they were firmly connected through their binding with universal discourse that related to ‘local/community interests and trust’ and to ‘democratic processes and networks’ (Kangwannawakul, 2017; CRDMN Coordinator A, and B, 2019).

At the local/community-level (i.e., those people affected by the earthquake), the opinions and demands held differed according to the level of earthquake damage encountered, the access held to resources and the location of the entity articulating their requirements – with this being identified from the interviews conducted. Content analysis allows these demands to be categorised into main two groups. The first group related to local conservative demands aimed towards the provincial/central government and its legal disaster management authority (despite potentially viewing the devastating effects of the earthquake as this government’s fault). This group of demands held that the ‘units to support and command the crisis should solely be at the province and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation level’. The response of those who held such views post-earthquake appeared to denote those locals should ‘wait for assistance from the province (at first) and then from private agencies’ (Local Leader C, 2019). This group did not demand a change of system or management and merely demanded restitution for damaged residents ‘as the world is unpredictable and it’s going to be OK’ (Local People, A, 2019). The second group related to local progressive demands[100], derived from people who did not trust the central/provincial government or who were unsatisfied with the way those entities had handled the disaster management or enacted disaster management structures and mechanisms. Here, it was argued that ‘this failure was only the tip of the iceberg for Thailand’s disaster management structure problems’ (NGO Representative A, 2019) and that the ‘domination of the centralised system, undemocratic decisions and bureaucratic approach defined this disaster management failure’ (Deputy Chief Administrator Officer of SAO, 2019). Such statements reflect demands being raised for change and for effective and participatory approaches that exceeded that offered

by the state's mechanisms. These discourses thus arose in an attempt to enhance the role of local/community disaster management, to display the weaknesses/drawbacks of traditional disaster management and the dominating central/provincial government and to produce groups (such as the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network) and public forums (such as the 'People Voice Station' and public forum with Thai PBS). Overall, this sought to manifest agency for local bodies (Kangwannawakul, 2017a) and to create 'a system which supported [locals], allowed [locals] to form partnerships and to assume ownership of the issues faced' (Deputy Chief Administrator Officer of the SAO, 2019; Chief Executive of the SAO, 2019).

At the local leader level, particularly within the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network, hints of controversy among local groups can be found – especially in relation to the disaster management demands raised and who should be responsible for enacting such disaster management in the long-term. Almost half of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network leaders (local/community alliance members) interviewed (4 of the 10) retained their belief that 'disaster management is an obligation or task for the central state' and 'disaster management remains a security motif which requires complicated and technological knowledge' (Local Leader C, 2019; CRDMN Coordinator B, 2019). Others who were interviewed, as were mostly NGO and professional organisation representatives, conversely argued that disaster management should fall under the authority of local/community bodies – entities who realistically had the ability to handle all potential disasters and crises. This second group conveyed how 'we have to think outside of the box (of the legal and provincial hierarchy) if we want to survive in the long-term' (Chief Administrator Officer of SAO, 2019) and 'as far as we know, we are ready with both the manpower and budgeting skills needed' (Deputy Chief Administrator Officer of SAO, 2019).

By the end of June 2014 (3 months following the earthquake), the consequences of such conflict escalated the antagonism which surrounded the disaster management provisions of Thailand – coming to a head in a public meeting designed to detail the progress and recovery

achieved post-earthquake. This gathering was meant to influence the restoring of provincial technocratic projects and to endorse the central role of the central government and Ministry of Interior. Within this meeting, residents and some leaders began to raise questions as to the potential for alternative disaster management models and networks in this sphere, arguing that they had 'resources available through which to work in damaged areas' and 'legitimacy in recovering public spaces'. It was further asserted that these efforts would ensure 'inclusiveness in the assistance offered'. Notably, one local person remarked: 'working without the central bureaucracy is impossible because we have to rely on the technical data and technician assistants from the Department of Geology' (Chief Administrator Officer of SAO, 2019).

Moreover, the unofficial termination of the first phase of such Community Disaster Recovery Model projects occurred following the withdrawal of some NGOs (such as Mirror and the Elderly Group Foundation)[101] at the end of July 2014. These were additional factors that enlarged the local contradictions identified. In fact, earthquake recovery knowledge and collaborative working methods had been broadly implemented, in a large-scale manner, across the Chiang Rai region over the span of 3 months. Nonetheless, some locals and community leaders continued to lack confidence in independently implementing local-led projects, with some evidently having become caught in an ideological trap of believing that they were only victims and thus should solely be the receiver of assistance (Deputy Chief Administrator Officer of SAO, 2019). At this point, many areas began to seek new partnerships through which to recover from the earthquake. Here, voices from marginalised areas (such as the San-ma-ka Municipality and Mae-Suay District) began to emerge, asking for emancipatory relief and arguing for 'equality in accessing projects, comprehensive assistance and more than temporary assistance' (Head of Villages as cited in CRDMN, CMC and the CODI, 2016:19). Requests were also made for an official Community Organisation Development Institution[102] to act as the new leader of Thailand's earthquake recovery provisions, raised alongside the claim that local disaster management

movements could support community mechanisms and help communities to coordinate with external and bureaucratic organisations.[103] This reaffirmed the disparity of local/community demands and how they responded to shifting situations and the termination of projects. Ultimately, the conflict which occurred between these leaders affected the declining relations of local alliances.

8.3 Politics of Governing Disaster Management: De/Re-Politicisation of the Central/Provincial Government Following the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake

Despite province-level disaster management having lost credibility and being seen as a 'failed disaster management system' between May and August 2014, namely as a result of many local/community politicisation strategies having been deployed, it is evident that the authority of such province-level disaster management was not completely eliminated. Indeed, only a few months later, this provincial disaster management was able to regain its hegemonic positioning. This phenomenon is regularly witnessed in many states whereupon the traditional and legal authority (hard power) of states is employed as a primary tool in regaining credibility and in destabilising social contestation (Hajer, 2009a). However, when analysed, the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake context illustrates how conventional authority was not the only means used in seeking to delegitimise local movements. Here, the central government and Chiang Rai province-level governance employed a variety of strategies and tactics (both discursive and non-discursive) to embody policy and to enact regime stabilisation while attempting to weaken the coherency of local/community coalitions (i.e., decoupling local/community demands).

To fully understand these state-led techniques, the discussions given below explore the depoliticisation strategies of the central/provincial government – as utilised the logics of uncertainty and the logics of professionalisation to dismantle the growing chains of equivalence formed by local/community alliances. This was partly achieved by re-casting challengers and

local disaster management movements as the *Other* (i.e., representing private/individual interests), as possessing limited and irrational systems and as being unable to provide safety, democratic participation and self-management in future crises.

8.3.1 Articulating Management and Projects Designed to Sustain Demand Around an Empty Signifier: Reasoned and Professional Disaster Management

The coming of power of General Anupong and Mr. Sutee in the Ministry of Interior at the end of August 2014 had a significant impact upon many aspects of the disaster management of Thailand, primarily in relation to the re-centralising of the Ministry of Interior's apparatus, central elite bureaucrats and provincial agencies – all of which had their power re-strengthened.

Significantly, the deputy provincial governor of Chiang Rai announced, at the end of August 2014, that the failure of the earthquake management witnessed had derived from 'the complicated, unexpected' characteristics of the earthquake and it being 'a historical earthquake for Thailand which made us confused as to how to handle the situation (…) Now we need to develop our capacity to produce systems and expert units' (ThaiPBS, 2014e). This notion was reiterated in announcements by the deputy minister of the Ministry of Interior, Sutee Makboon, in September-October Ministry of Interior policy implementation meetings pertaining to Thailand's disaster management arrangements, whereupon he asserted that the 'integrated skills of a provincial governor is needed in this management' and that subsequent disaster management 'must rely upon databases and scientific data' (Ministry of Interior, 2014, 2015).

Both rhetorical examples reveal the views and motivations of the authorities post-earthquake, where blame was placed on the earthquake being unprecedented and it having involved mixed/complicated factors. Here, it was asserted that future disasters would be best resolved via integrated systems, the use of scientific data and province-led activities.

Framed via a PDT lens, these views evidence the nodal point or function as empty signifiers, a privileged cluster of signification wherein this connected point of a series of internal differences allowed central/provincial state actors (e.g., the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, the Chiang Rai provincial governor and related agencies) to engage in political actions/symbolic terms (Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018; Griggs and Howarth, 2019).[104] This positioning allowed common oppositions (i.e., a local/community coalition) or counter-discourses to emerge in response to the perceived disaster management failure. Clearly, the rhetorical tropes raised publicly embodied the (new) universal demand for effective and potential disaster management via 'reasoned and scientific' means that represented a series of dispersed and even contradictory local demands.

When these universal demands occurred, central/provincial state actors responded and moved to reframe or blur the political frontier which the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network had positioned between the local/community and provincial government. This was achieved through the creating of new disaster management projects which ostensibly utilised scientific, evidence-based methods to 'other' alternative local disaster management networks, to transfer all local challenges and to respond to community dissatisfaction with the natural domain, scientific notions and social field. This was possible as impartial experts and professionals were seen to be immunised from day-to-day politics (Griggs and Howarth, 2019). In short, this depoliticisation of the provincial government sought to re-couple local demands for effective, trusted and democratic disaster management and to minimise local resistance via the framing of new disaster management practices as 'reasoned' and 'scientific'.

8.3.2. The Logics of Uncertainty as a Blame Strategy in Diminishing Local Challenges: The First Disaster Management Depoliticisation Strategy (Chain of difference of provincial government)

After such public announcements, a series of rival discourses and depoliticised strategies emerged with the crucial aim of minimising the resistance of local disaster management discourses and of re-gaining the credibility of central/provincial disaster management. An initial strategy using the logics of uncertainty was deployed as a blame tactic to re-shape the failure witnessed with a new agenda, therein seeking to scapegoat and remove any state liability here (Hood, 2002, 2011; Howlett, 2012).

Between July and September 2014, the provincial government attempted to justify its ineffective recovery efforts by deploying rhetoric which stated that the failure derived from the 'unprecedented', 'overwhelming', 'historical' and 'unpredictable' situation encountered (CRDDPM, 2014b, 2014a). This arose publicly through two main official documents – the 'Summary of the Chiang Rai Damage Situation and Recovery of the Disaster Management' (61 pages) and the 'Executive Summary, Lessons and Suggestions for Chiang Rai Earthquakes' (30 pages). Both documents were produced to reframe the failed disaster management (i.e., in its response and recovery) and to separate the chains of equivalence formed between local demands for change by illustrating the provincial disaster management as an effective system that was best able to face the unprecedented damage resulting from a historical earthquake (Provincial DDPM Officer A and B, 2019).

These documents were publicly released to disclose the (stated-to-be successful) outcomes of the province-led post-earthquake operations, as well as the new measures that were to be instituted in response to the operational limitations encountered in the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake context. The chains of equivalence formed by local coalitions were responded to via four primary discourses. Firstly, it was asserted that each disaster management agency

demonstrated certain degrees of fragmentation and managerial indirection at the provincial-ministry level, as resulted in confusion arising in the initial stages of the disaster response given. Secondly, it was asserted that the 'unprecedented, unpredicted and uncertain situation' (i.e., the uniqueness of the earthquake) required the state to mobilise significant resources despite facing limited budgets and national political turmoil. Thirdly, it was asserted that the lack of awareness of local/community bodies, as well as the inadequate disaster knowledge of local government agencies, increased the damage encountered. Fourthly, it was asserted that the inexperience of the relevant central agencies alongside the shortage of specific measures and plans available led to contingent-based management being employed (CR DDPM, 2014b). Such claims have also been confirmed by Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officers:

> This was a tremendous natural disaster, the severity of which we had never experienced before in Thai history. In fact, even Thai geologists could not have predicted it… that being said, the delayed response and recovery operations witnessed seemed to reflect the inexperience of all involved in the system, including our own inexperience, despite it having been well-prepared for (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019).

Such discourse seems to represent an attempt to conceal the failure witnessed, achieved by presenting this as 'not only a provincial issue but also the outcome of natural phenomenon and structural issues.

Alongside these two earthquake reports, the financial assistance provided was also used as a crucial tool in depoliticising local campaigns (producing chain of difference of provincial government), seen in the declarations of the Chiang Rai provincial governor and provincial disaster management report as to the damage and recovery of the 2014 Earthquake between August and October 2014. For instance, it was claimed that the province 'could pay maximised financial assistance to each damaged household of 33,000 Baht (1,000 USD)', with coordination via the local government being able to distribute more assistance to those affected (Chiang Rai

Provincial Governor, cited in Manageronline, 2014). Furthermore, it was claimed that 'the public agencies coordination led by the Chiang Rai Province had provided more than 418 million Baht of support to people, thereby covering the repairing of 16,894 damaged households, 160 religious places, 126 schools and 69 public places' (CR DDPM, 2014b, 2014a).[105]

Such declarations demonstrate the tactics utilised to represent that the province-level efforts were useful (rather than a failure) and were not in opposition to local involvement/responses. In this sense, the central/province bodies involved were positioned as 'the real public agencies' and as entities who comprehensively provided support to affected areas – even when in a transitional period. These countering strategies appear designed to deflect local allegations as to the failure and ineffectiveness of the province-level disaster management and the subsequent local demands for change.

As a result of these public discourses, local opinion changed and began to be more positive towards the state, thereby holding that "even if it was somehow delayed and unequal, we eventually received assistance" (Local Leader A, 2019) and that, "under the uncertainty, uncommon nature and severity encountered, alongside the coming of a new government and the legal constraints that the province faced (…) this operation provided acceptable assistance" (Local Leader C, 2019). This shows the effectiveness of the state in regaining local trust in the wake of the disaster.

8.3.3. Logics of Professionalisation as the De/Re-Politicisation Strategy: A 'Pro-Active Plan', 'Build Back Better and Safer' and Appearing 'Reasonable and as Possessing Expertise'

After employing the logics of uncertainty, October 2014 saw the publishing of the new 'Master Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention' (162 pages), the installing of the Chiang Rai Implementation Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention of 2014 (24 pages) and the release of the National Disaster Prevention and

Mitigation Plan 2015 (136 pages). These become additional re-politicisation tactics designed to re-imagine central/provincial disaster management in a favourable and reasonable light. The content of these plans shared the discourses of the state possessing the potential to deal with earthquakes by introducing systematic management, clear command hierarchy, effective and proactive assistance and advanced technology through which to protect against all risk. In other words, these plans were progressed to regenerate the state's authority and credibility by differentiating the disaster management potential of the state from that available to local/community entities. For the state, 'scientific and engineering' provisions and its 'evidence-based decisions' were asserted to be able to resolve conflict and contestation in disaster contexts (Hajer, 2009b; Griggs and Howarth, 2019). These notions were succinctly conveyed through mottos such as 'this is a pro-active, unified and standardised plan' that can help 'build back better and safer'[106] (CRDDPM, 2015; NDPDC, 2015). Provincial officers further argued that the new plans 'reflected how [the state] never stopped developing disaster management to prevent future damages' (Provincial DDPM Officer A, 2019) and that the state had 'learnt from failure and this plan was designed to deal with earthquakes effectively and efficiently' (Provincial DDPM Officer B, 2019). These statements appear to have responded directly to local demands for management change and to have local/community advocacy towards supporting central disaster management.

To signify that these projects could resolve the failure witnessed following the 2014 Earthquake, new ostensibly re-politicised provisions were tangibly constructed and manifested across disaster management areas following August 2014.

This was arrived at by, as the first step, creating a National Subcommittee for Earthquake Plan Drafting[107] under the Ministry of Interior – a group that gave academic recommendations as to the potential impact of earthquakes, thereby framing the National Earthquake Plan produced as deriving from scientific and engineering principles and as being 'accepted by all sectors', 'academically-accredited' and 'legally-related' (DDPM, 2014). The Committee's main

responsibilities pertained to two areas. Firstly, in a direct way, it was to produce a plan with a scientific model using ‘seismic models’ and ‘earthquake scenarios’ to protect Thai society from possible damage and future disasters. Secondly, in an indirect (political) way, political tactics were used to recover the credibility of state-led disaster management and to rebuild social trust (after the perceived failure witnessed) via the expertise of the Committee allowing the plan to be ‘academically-accredited’.

The second step here involved the insertion of scientific and technical jargon within the National Earthquake Plan – thereby detailing ‘engineering technicalities’, ‘earthquake scenario maps’, ‘background seismicity’ and ‘subduction zones’, placed as manifesting a framework through which to determine the behaviour of people and local agencies in accordance with their different risk areas (as assessed by experts and the scientific tools available). These provisions, it was deemed, were the only way to build a ‘pro-disaster management active system’ and to ‘mitigate risk and damage’. Such an approach also had the effect of making Thailand’s disaster management and earthquake system too complicated for local and community networks (with their limited resources) to understand and/or match.

The third step involved the reinstalling of central technocratic mechanisms, especially via revised official emergency management guidelines that required all disaster management agencies (particularly those operating at the local government level) to set up ‘incident command systems’ or a ‘single command’, to build an Incident Management Assistance Team and to follow the Guidelines for Conducting Damage and Needs Assessments via the Post–Disaster Needs Assessment Approach[108]. This was held to be ‘the most effective method’ through which to eliminate ‘fragmented operations and communication failure’ (NDPDC, 2015). These requirements, as imposed by the state upon local entities, highlighted the power possessed at the state-level when compared to the potential operations of local bodies in a disaster circumstance.

The fourth step saw the reiterating of democratic participatory provisions for local entities when responding to earthquakes, wherein the National Earthquake Plan conveyed how ‘it is remarkably necessary to create participation mechanisms’ and that ‘people’s awareness and working with local networks is a successful pathway’ (DDPM, 2014:45-46). Furthermore, the Provincial Earthquake Plan of 2015 emphasised the need to ‘create new partnerships’ (CRDDPM, 2015). These statements led to the framing of essential projects being able to enhance real/democratic participation and citizen engagement (i.e., ‘it is guaranteed that this is a local/community plan’ (DDPM Specialist, 2019)). This was purported to be achievable through four processes. The first process was to identify and map the risks of respective areas. The second process was to hold disaster (community-based disaster risk management) workshops ‘in order to identify the necessary resources and related organisations’. The third process was to initiate internal work within respective communities and local governments to survey risk areas, to hold public hearings and to deliver local/community plans to provincial Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation officers for revision and approval via a provincial committee. The fourth process was to design a new earthquake commanding structure which required the provincial government to incorporate both external partnerships (such as with professional organisations - including the Chiang Rai Local Artisan group, the Chiang Rai Media and Public Relations Association and the Chiang Rai Charitable Foundation), local government agencies (e.g., the Mae-Suay Sub-district municipality and Sai-Kao Sub-district Administrative Organisation) and Private Sector entities within the new Chiang Rai Earthquake Implementation Plan. All of these entities were stated to be essential operational units in assisting the state in accessing the community and in using local wisdom to enact effective recovery post-disaster (CR DDPM, 2015). Such practices demonstrate effort being given to reimagining this new disaster management as ‘participatory disaster management’.

These strategies all seemingly sought to re-standardise or build professional central/province-level disaster management and to denote this as operating a proactive, systematic, accredited, reasonable and technological system supported by expertise and bureaucratic systems which nonetheless involved democratic participatory provisions. This was held to be a vast improvement on the failed disaster management witnessed in response to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake.

The de and re-politicisation strategies and discursive embodiments (establishing chain of difference of provincial government) deployed between August 2014 and April 2015 had a significant effect upon the alternative disaster management projects and movements raised. Indeed, following the announcement of the Provincial Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 and the drafting of the Local Disaster Plan of 2015 (Suwanmolee, 2016) , most alternative disaster management projects witnessed a major decline in popularity. Notably, only 16 local/community areas (from over 50 areas) were seen to still implement local/community projects at this point, with most others having decided to discontinue such projects and to adopt provincial-level projects – such as the community-based disaster risk management training programmes introduced after May 2014. Here, most Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network members or local contestation entities had progressively limited their leadership role to become mere project advocators and temporary coordinators, while others had ceased working with local disaster management networks and instead undertook recovery activities on their own. Due to this splintering and the continual decline of community projects, May 2015 could be set as the termination point for widespread local movements being raised as to this disaster.

8.4 Characterising of Disaster Management as a Process For Regaining Power: De/Re-Politicisation in Chiang Rai Post-Earthquake

Following the above discussions as to how provincial disaster management regained its power and how the alternative disaster management movement regressed in this period, this section explores the government practices enacted and the limitations of the new disaster management regime in Chiang Rai.

The analysis presented in this thesis has consistently argued that disaster management is not only a management mechanism, but that it also manifests a political terrain and a political mechanism used to maintain authority, negotiations and social governmentality. The phenomena of reframing disaster management, as encountered post-August 2014, in its employment of de- and re-politicisation strategies (via creating chain of difference), was constructed by the central government and the provincial Chiang Rai government to decouple local disaster management coalitions. This was achieved by portraying the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network as (the other) who is lacking capacity and continuity through which to respond to disasters, by blurring the political frontier which the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network had drawn between central/provincial-level disaster management and local/community disaster management and by, ostensibly, rebinding disparate demands of local/community movements for revised management by concealing the antagonism of this local contestation and reframing disaster management as a scientific and technocratic matter. The application of financial assistance post-earthquake was also positioned not only as a tool designed to provide relief for affected local people, to enhance the effectiveness of the disaster management apparatus available and to invoke participatory and sustainable disaster management, but also to minimise local/community resistance, to diminish oppositional power and to divide protestor alliances.

The analysis presented here reveals that three crucial techniques (as both discursive and non-discursive means) were employed in this endeavour. Firstly**,** a blaming strategy was utilised

to downplay the failure witnessed and to delegitimise local/community contestation against this disaster management (Hood, 2002, 2011; Brändström, Kuipers and Daléus, 2008; Boin *et al.*, 2016). In this regard, the state utilised rhetoric tropes to blame aspects other than itself, further implementing bureaucratic mechanisms to demonstrate the positive potential of the provincial apparatus in disaster contexts to maintain its legitimacy. Such projects were thus set to illustrate the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake as 'uncertain and unpredicted' and 'historical' – seen, for example, in the Earthquake Financial Assistance Report of 2014.

Secondly, the establishment of an independent committee and installing of a disaster management technical plan (as an 'evidence-based policy') was set as providing expertise and elite technocratic provisions through which local/community voices and alliances could be devalued and decoupled (Pielke, 2007; Strassheim, Jung and Korinek, 2015; Strassheim, 2017). Here, the Ministry of Interior, (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Chiang Rai government transformed the earthquake issue into merely comprising technical and scientific concerns, thereby rejecting the stated need for 'temporary community disaster management' and 'local wisdom' as raised by local/community alliances. The establishment of the National Subcommittee for the Earthquake Plan Drafting was stated to provide 'a source of knowledge of earthquakes, real expertise and advisory capacity in producing earthquake management in the future' (DDPM, 2014). In addition, the publication of the Master Plan and Provincial Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention was positioned as the 'only effective way, as comprising trusted methods and as offering the best practices in tracking earthquake issues'(DDPM, 2014; CRDDPM, 2015). This was further conveyed via the use of disaster management jargon – such as 'earthquake scenario and risk maps', 'seismicity zones' and 'risk assessments'.[109] Such re-politicisation tactics of the state represented an attempt to respond to any conflict and challenges raised by reiterating the essential nature of technocratic modes and scientific and engineering solutions capable of generating 'consensus' or 'universal acceptability'

(Fischer, 2000; Strassheim, 2017; Griggs and Howarth, 2019). This was, at least according to the state, able to limit local contestation and to build local trust.

Thirdly, democratic participatory provisions were introduced to allow local/community bodies to be disaster management stakeholders, stated as a means of enhancing the disaster management available (Hajar, 2009; Griggs, Howarth and Feandeiro, 2018). Here, the Chiang Rai plan was to witness the prominent involvement of stakeholders through new institutional rules and routines being instituted and all interests being addressed through an expert scientific and technocratic advisory panel with the authority to approve new earthquake management measures. This represented a new engagement plan, as designed by the state, to position local professional organisations as a contributor of local knowledge and as capable of supporting the provincial government in any recovery processes via its official earthquake commanding structure (CRDDPM, 2015). This manifested the practices of 'therapeutic consultation' (Griggs and Howarth, 2013b; Griggs, Howarth and Feandeiro, 2018; Tafon, Howarth and Griggs, 2018). This space for participation was determined to benefit acts of demands being expressed. In practice, however, little communication arose, argumentative dialogue was encountered and some content remained controlled by consultants or committees. For example, at a pre-planning event, local residents were able to participate in surveying risk areas, therein being initially framed as an exercise in community-based disaster risk management and the collation of local knowledge. Nonetheless, the decisions made continued to be controlled by central/provincial committees and were unresponsive to relative agencies. This lack of consideration being given to local voices was especially prominent when it made central and provincial agencies/committee uncomfortable – such as when locals requested a large budget to install a self-risk management system. The deliberation of this disaster management was therefore limited and often local residents did not attend planning exercises or undertake activity required by province-level entities (Deputy of the Chief Administrator of SAO, 2019).

Aside from the powerful strategies that were systematically operated, the enacting of governmentality should not be overlooked as a vital factor in allowing the smooth maintenance of the central/province-level disaster management authority and power. Notably, the phenomena which developed in the Chiang Rai context did not comprise a classic form of neoliberal governmentality and instead was characterised as a Thai traditional form or a Thai (bureaucratic) state governmentality wherein the social was set to embrace authoritarian or hierarchical values and to pay attention to the role of the charismatic state or its elite/bureaucrats (as a unit in securing and maintaining social order). This form of governmentality is distinct from those forms which seek to centralise democratic and egalitarian values, to decentralise power and to instigate collective action among the population (Herzfeld, 2006; Aulino, 2014; Baker, 2016; Sopranzetti, 2016; Elinoff, 2019). In this sense, Thai traditions demand that individuals and organisations occupy the subject position of being 'passive' or 'subordinate' (Charoenmuang, 2006), therein minimising (or at least not demanding) any challenges, participation or self-organisation/management.[110] As a local government officer and local leader argued, 'no matter what, the province has more authority and legitimacy than us' (Chief Administrator Officer, 2019) and 'we still trust in the experiences of the provincial governor in relation to their coordination, network and authority' (Local Leader C, 2019).

It is indicated that most local and community bodies operated under this governmentality and gave a general belief as to the notion that the provincial government and the provincial governor possessed a core role in securing society and providing public benefit. Although, nowadays, all resources and authority levels in Thailand have become increasingly decentralised, it is seen that, generally, people and local government agencies are still policy receivers rather than policy creators. Unquestionably, all orders, announcements or interventions are issued by central/provincial governments, as occupy the top hierarchical level in the disaster management operations enacted post-August 2014.

Although the central state's disaster management and its associated authority was able to regain its hierarchical position following May 2015, the limitations of the revised disaster management regime still encountered scrutiny – particularly in regards to its ability to enact participatory disaster management and the collaborative provisions set out in the Provincial Earthquake Implementation Plan of 2014 and the Disaster Prevention and Management Plan of 2015. These projects occurred as a mode of statecraft (Burnham, 2001; Buller and James, 2011; Griggs and Howarth, 2019) [111] and as a 'rhetoric draft' designed to respond to the democratic demands raised after the perceived failure of the central/province-level disaster management post-Earthquake. In other words, this discourse did not correspond to the shaping of the actual disaster management being instituted and failed to enact authentic collaborative disaster management.

Conclusion

This chapter has detailed how the central government of Thailand and provincial government of Chiang Rai sought to depoliticise and re-politicise the disaster management failure encountered when responding to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. These efforts have been shown to have arisen under the logics of uncertainty (blaming others as the source of failure) and the logics of professionalisation (applying new scientific, technical and evidence-based provisions). The logics analysis produced has allowed us to examine both the discursive and non-discursive forms of Thai state practice in its de/re-politicising of counter-disaster management discourses and local/community disaster management movements. Thus, the main exploration of this chapter has been given to how the logics of difference employed (as logics of uncertainty and professionalisation) functioned in this context. Evidently, the assuming of power by Prayuth's junta government, and the official dominating of the Ministry of Interior by ministers with elite bureaucratic and technocratic backgrounds, saw the central government of Thailand tighten its grip over the power apparatuses of the country, limit contesting political movements and prepare

systematic and evidence-based disaster management. This involved the transferring of significant authority to the Ministry of Interior and to provincial governments. In relation to the disaster management of Thailand, official announcements were made by the deputy minister of the Ministry of Interior in early September 2014 in relation to the 'integrated skills of provincial governors' and the need for the disaster management of Thailand to be 'based on scientific data'. This represented a nodal point and came to function as an empty signifier of the situation. This approach allowed state actors to position rationality, technological resolutions and scientific/expertise modes into the disaster management provisions enacted, as acted to override the competing demands of local/community entities. Such phenomena directly affected the construction of the various de/re-politicisation strategies which followed. The Chiang Rai Earthquake Financial Assistance Report 2014, for example, was produced under the discourse of the context faced being 'unpredicted and contingent'. Further to this, sources other than the central/provincial government were blamed for the failure encountered (as logics of an uncertainty), which was set to justify the creation of the National and Chiang Rai Implementation Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention of 2014 and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015. These plans were stated to manifest 'effective' and 'pro-active' disaster management that provided 'unity' and 'professionalisation' via the provision of independent expert committees, new earthquake management technology and sustainable 'local fulfilment' in the future. These strategies shifted the terrain of public argumentation towards a rational and evidence-based system which rearticulated the demands for (more) effective management by forging logics of difference.

Three concrete and crucial de/re-politicisation techniques manifested in the post-earthquake context. Firstly, a blaming strategy was deployed to assert the failure witnessed as being the fault of parties other than the central/provincial government. In this respect, a financial assistance scheme was launched to downplay the failure imagination. Secondly, an expert/elite

technocratic independent committee and technical disaster management plan was established to regain local trust and to devalue the voices and demands of local alliances. Thirdly, the state asserted that democratic participatory collaboration would be instituted in recognition that local/community groups/entities were stakeholders in this area, doing so in an attempt to avoid potential conflict in the future.

By the end of April 2014, central/province-led disaster management had successfully regained its power and authority due to the above-detailed de/re politicisation strategies employed, yet the conflict and antagonism given towards such disaster management had not been fully expunged. Consequently, the Thai state had failed to solve the real issues faced, choosing instead to deploy technocratic and expert solutions and project practices that merely achieved the aim of de/re-politicising the opposition and demands of local/community entities. Overall, the methods employed by the state comprised a mode of statecraft rather than a real response as to the need for democratic, participatory collaboration and for agency to be possessed by local parties. Unsurprisingly, Chiang Rai locals and community entities have grown in scepticism towards how participatory this disaster management regime is in practice. Contemporary disaster management in Thailand thus continues to demonstrate antagonistic or (veiled) conflict characteristics.

Chapter Nine: Conclusion

The Politics of Disaster Management: Explaining the Failure of Thailand's Disaster Management

Introduction

The rapid development of disaster management as a school of thought over the last decade has provided routes through which effective disaster management methods have emerged and disaster risk mitigation has been standardised via positivist, scientific and technical approaches. Nonetheless, the political realm and its associated management structure has received little interest in related policy or academic work (Comfort, Waugh and Cigler, 2012; Donovan, 2016; Riet, 2017; Siddiqi, 2018; Tierney, 2019). While such academic output has been relatively limited, some scholars have given attention to the characteristics of disaster politics – such as by considering the relationship between given political contexts and disasters and/or the interactions between political actors and the processes instituted in response to disasters at different levels (Olson, 2008; Pelling and Dill, 2010b; Blackburn and Pelling, 2018; Siddiqi, 2018) or by exploring the dominant notions of disaster management governance, including when led or assumed by society (Oliver-Smith, A., no date; Brown, 2007; Burton and Cutter, 2008; Button, 2010; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 2012; Browne, 2015; Oliver-Smith, 2016; Tierney, 2019). Critical Disaster Research has also endeavoured to identify how disaster management can play a role in the governing of society (Warner, 2013; Remes, 2016; Riet, 2017; Beuret, 2020; Hilhorst, Boersma and Raju, 2020).

Nonetheless, such research has often failed to consider disaster management as a radically contingent political construction, which thus fails to fully explain: what disaster management is and how it is constituted and reconstructed; why disaster management encounters recurrent failure; and how wicked problems still emerge and lessons remain unlearnt from prior political

phenomena in the disaster management arena. The present research has sought to respond to these notions and to explain such phenomena by drawing upon poststructuralist discourse analysis, as emphasises the primacy of politics, the political terrain encountered and any related political exercises, doing so via the application of key notions including those of radical contingency, dislocatory moments and hegemonic practice.

This thesis has endeavoured to explore how the system of disaster management in Thailand has been constituted, how this disaster management regime has failed, and how/why it continues to be maintained despite such failures. This has been achieved through the exploring of a case study as to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. More particularly, I have demonstrated how the disaster management system that operated in this context was a political construction and invoked a political terrain through which contestation and negotiation arose between the central government (and its provincial counterparts) in Thailand and local government entities. It was also shown that within this regime, the failure and wicked issues faced are all outcomes derived from the dynamic and contingent nature of such political phenomena.

To fully illustrate such dynamics, the research has investigated the lineage of disaster management in Thailand alongside the political transformations which occurred in parallel. At the same time, attention has been given to the conflict encountered at the local level, with this grassroots-and-national joint analysis allowing an appreciation of the emergent politics of disaster management. The framework of the research was outlined in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis, wherein conceptualisation was given of disaster management as a political construct, as comprising radical contingency and as producing hegemonic power as understood via the lens of Poststructuralist Discourse Theory (PDT) and the logics of critical explanation.

This concluding chapter brings together the findings of the preceding chapters to explicitly respond to the research objectives held in relation to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. To achieve

this, three sections are provided. The first section delineates the research findings and the answers gained in response to the research questions that were constructed, thus revealing the logics which formed the background of the disaster management of Thailand alongside the political strategies operated post-disaster by, respectively, local coalitions (as a form of challenge) and the central/provincial government of Thailand (as a form of hegemony). The second section considers three contributions provided by this research as to the fields of Critical Policy Studies and Disaster Management Studies. The third section indicates the limitations of this research and provides suggestions for further/future research.

9.1 The Origin of Thai Disaster Management Issues: Discourses, Logics and Local Resistance

9.1.1 Bureaucratic and Security Logics: The Root of Thailand's Disaster Management Issues

Most disaster management-related studies and policy research outputs relating to the Thai context conducted within recent decades have found that the disaster management of Thailand continues to fail, mainly because of the failure/wicked character of the problems that are encountered in its formulation and implementation. It's 'wickedness' is derived from a variety of causes, including, for instance, the insufficient capacity of national institutions and actors, the over-centralisation of power, the fragmentation of institutional disaster management, the lack of disaster management knowledge and a failure to identify, respond to and mitigate pertinent risks and hazards across multiple levels (Kamolvej, 2006, 2014; Lebel, Manuta and Garden, 2011; Khunwishit, 2014a; Marks and Lebel, 2016; Supajakwattana and Supajakwattana, 2017; Lebel and Lebel, 2018).

Using PDT, the analysis presented in this thesis has endeavoured to show that disaster management is in essence 'radically contingent' and a 'political construct', which is interpreted and reinterpreted according to the given context, thus taking on different forms amid political and historical shifts (Howarth and Griggs, 2017b). The disaster management of Thailand can therefore

be held to have been contingently constituted via the changing balance of interacting political forces, predominant socio-economic powers and social-cultural practices. In this regard, the disaster management of Thailand can be mapped across a period spanning 1940-2014 and its contingent framing in each period. Indeed, Chapter Five of this thesis has divided this period into four major eras. The first era comprised a period of security logics (1940-1970s), with the rubric of Thailand's involvement in World War II positioning the country as a target for airstrikes, military attacks and fires. Consequently, the disaster management of Thailand during this period was governed by state-led/military government, with 'national security' being assumed to be a primary aim of all of society and the disaster management of Thailand being constructed as 'the mechanism which secures national security' through its operations by the security sectors of the country (i.e., the Thai Military and Ministry of Interior). This followed the enacting of the Air defence Act of 1939 and led to the establishment of urban firefighters and civil defence units (as sub-units of the Ministry of Interior), the use of military forces in coping with flooding in 1962, and the institution of the Fire, defence and Protection Act of 1952. All of these steps represent the policy outcomes of the security epoch encountered.

The second era – the epoch of 'bureaucratic supremacy' - was the longest period and spanned 1979-2000. This duration saw the declining role of the Thai Military in Thai politics, an escalating of public awareness and more explicit public demands for protection from recurring large-scale disasters. In this conjuncture, disaster management was reshaped as a 'civil or public defence system', which had the pivotal goals of securing Thailand from significant 'natural disaster or public hazards' and of enhancing the competence of Thai bureaucracy in dealing with domestic crises. All disaster management apparatus forms were hereupon assembled to be extensive and employed via/by centralised (civil) bureaucratic agencies. In doing so, the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Provincial Administration were placed as the primary organisations in 'the Civil defence Secretariat Office (Committee)' or as a 'central director', with

this power deriving from 'control' and 'command' law. The Disaster Management Act of 1979 or Civil defence Law represents the policy outcome of this political shift.

The third era, as comprised the managerial epoch, spanned 2001-2007 and saw disaster management being transformed into ‘an effective and decentralised mechanism’ which was established to protect Thailand from large-scale crises/disasters (e.g., tsunamis and haze) and to decentralise some disaster management authority to the local government level. This disaster management architecture responded strongly to the wider political decentralisation process and public administration reform of Thailand alongside the recovery operations enacted in responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. This became solidified within the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007, as were designed to give power to the National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee, whereby the latter was an entity comprising both politicians and security sector bureaucrats. In the same period, the disaster management (integrated) 5-year plan emerged and was stated as being a good way through which Thailand could be protected against future losses. Concurrently, technologies of government were steered by state-led modelling. Through these steps, disaster management authorities became centralised by the Ministry of Interior, despite the establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.

Finally, the fourth era, which was marked by both bureaucracy and security fabrication, saw hybrid logics employed between 2007 and 2014. This arose in the context of the Thai Military’s re-intervention in Thai politics, a weak civilian government, failure being witnessed in dealing with several significant disasters and public demands for effective and responsive disaster management. Such disaster management was framed as a tool through which to preserve ‘national security’ and to form ‘social immunity’, thus being emphasised as the best means of solving institutional traps, fragmented disaster management and unaddressed risks for local communities. This was partially achieved by installing the National Security Council as a key actor at the national disaster management level, allocating full disaster management power to the provincial

government (or committee) level and decentralising disaster management authority to local levels amidst a discursive need for an integrated and thus single (command) system while ‘building local/community engagement’.

This changing disaster management landscape of Thailand has been considered as a temporal lineage to unpack the critical roots of Thailand’s failure issues in this area. Firstly, it has been found that the disaster management of Thailand does not, *per se*, comprise fixed tools (essences) designed to protect Thailand from disasters and crises. Instead, this is a field affected by social-economic structural shifts and the re-balancing of political enforcement. Thus, across time, the disaster management of Thailand has been framed differently and deployed as a mechanism of statecraft intended to balance political forces, to remove uncertainty or the contingency of the political system and/or to shield the state from the consequences of failure (Burnham, 2001; Buller and James, 2011; Griggs and Howarth, 2019). Secondly, in the bureaucratic period (1979-2000), the disaster management of Thailand was applied as a vehicle through which to reconsolidate and foreground central or civil bureaucratic power and thereby to prioritise this over the powerful military government operating prior to the 1970s. This manifested the establishment of new agencies (such as civil defence agencies under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior) and the formulating of discourses relating to the notion that ‘all disasters are the responsibility of civil defence volunteers’ (MOI, 1979). Equally, within the managerialism period, the disaster management of Thailand was utilised as an instrument and apparatus of politicians and civilian governments in regaining authority form the Ministry of Interior’s long-held bureaucratic polity, which was sought via the installation of a new disaster management system and the associated Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007, as was designed to enhance the disaster management decision-making enacted by politicians through the National Disaster Prevention and Development Committee. This movement furthered the decentralisation of disaster management authority to local governments, entities then positioned as providing

disaster management via area-based management units enabled to reduce the power of the Ministry of Interior and central bureaucrats.

Between 2007 and 2014, following a 2006 military coup undertaken with the pretext of responding to civil government corruption, the disaster management of Thailand was again used by the Thai Junta to seize power from the civil government. This post-2006 disaster management reconstruction saw the reestablishment of national security policy as a central plank of Thailand's disaster management developments. Here, security sector representatives (i.e., as derived from the Thai Military) were placed as National Disaster Management Committee members while provincial governors gained supreme control over provinces and local areas.

Against this background, the disaster management of Thailand failed to incorporate the participation of the public, local governments, non-profit organisations or civil society organisations. Notably, from the 1940s to 2014, the disaster management of Thailand was predominantly driven by security and bureaucratic logics, whereby disaster management developments focused on novel apparatus forms, the institution of new command hierarchies and the delegation and transferring of managerial power and resources between bureaucratic agencies and security agencies (e.g., the Ministry of Interior and Thai Military). These activities were undertaken to consolidate state power and to build effective state-led disaster management. In this respect, brief attention was given to aspects relating to the public space, participation and collaborative governance following 2002, wherein discourses pertaining to decentralised disaster management, self-local disaster management and the framing of 'building immunity'/'strengthening community and the local' were raised. However, state-led approaches continued to be widely implemented in the face of several crisis situations. Here, narratives were presented as a means to develop 'a single command for effectiveness', invoke 'a new way for self-local management' and ensure 'a securing of the community' (DDPM Specialist, 2019). Provincial disaster management committees emerged here as area-focused supra-boards tasked

with reviewing local disaster management plans. Similarly, provincial governors gained authority to declare emergencies and to subsequently command the local government (under the discursive framing of providing 'supervision ' and 'facilitation'). This system neglected public participation and community involvement, thus characterising ‘contradictions, ambiguity and dilemmas’ driven by hybrid logics. It can be said that this is the root of Thailand’s disaster management wicked problems and failure.

9.1.2 Logics of Community, the Resistance of Local Alliances and the Politicisation of the Disaster Management of Thailand

This thesis has additionally sought to understand how and why the disaster management of Thailand has manifested as a contested and ultimately failed terrain by exploring the failure of the disaster management launched in responding to the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. Through this, it has been evidenced that the failure of such provincial disaster management derived from the exclusionary nature of the disaster management itself and its associated application of bureaucratic and technical disaster management methods (e.g., in looking for technical constructions and neglecting local participation in pertinent plans and operations). When a dislocatory moment arose in 2014, the empty signifiers positioned as central disaster management became exposed and signified the embedded wicked issues of the country’s disaster management, including its fragmented and centralised management, unequal operations, inability to provide the local recovery needed and rejection of local participation. It was this that invoked local demand for change, trusted organisations and participatory disaster management.

In the face of the failed earthquake governance and the resultant disparate demands which emerged, the central/provincial disaster management of Thailand was challenged by local governments, affected people and loosely-knitted communities. Disaster management was here transformed to be a political terrain and collection of exercises able to bring change. At the crisis moment, local alliances were mobilised and initially countered the provincial disaster

management by re-identifying the disaster management as a failure system and by denoting the need for alternative disaster management forms. At this juncture, the counter discourses and local (chain of equivalence) projects led by community-based alliances (such as the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network) deployed rhetoric relating to 'this is our local/community sphere'. The Community Disaster Recovery Model projects which emerged here were also able to be deployed in a form bonded with the arisen demands for change, trusted organisations and public participation. These logics of community were framed as a form of disaster management politicisation by local alliances, raised in an effort to challenge the hegemonic disaster management faced. In terms of the political operations witnessed, logics of community were systematically performed under the manifesto of 'we are the people located on the fault plate'. This was a nodal point or empty signifier that was framed by local leaders and that represented local universal demands. This process was initially poised to draw political frontiers between local/community alliances (we) and provincial/central disaster management (they). Here, local disaster management lead actors came together to form the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Networks and to arrange chains of equivalence which comprised discourses represented by statements and slogans such as 'this is our local/community sphere' and 'we can build sustainable local/community disaster management'. These became local counter-discourses and such effort became solidified into several new hegemonic projects that were manifested in community-led disaster project management and self/local disaster management funds. Such projects represented the universal demands of local people at that time and the primary projects which local governments adopted rather than those instigated by provincial disaster management entities in the 4-5 months following the earthquake.

In responding to the research question which asks how and why the disaster management of Thailand resulted in failure and conflict, it has been found that such disaster management became a tool which explicitly excluded the public from leading its provisions via a framing

discourse of expertise and bureaucracy. To escape or mitigate this failure, the politicisation of disaster management as logics of community was subsequently employed as a key tool enabled to challenge central/provincial disaster management.

9.1.3 Logics of Uncertainty and Logics of Professionalisation: Governing Strategies of Thailand's Disaster Management When Facing Failure

The emergence of local challenges and alternative disaster management forms negatively affected the status of central/provincial disaster management as a form of hegemonic power. This thesis has demonstrated how, during crises, the central/provincial Government of Thailand has historically retaliated against contestation to maintain and stabilise its power (see Chapter Eight)[112]. In considering this recurring practice, it is also shown how disaster management has been reshaped in the Thai context by the oscillation of authoritarian regimes and old technocratic cabinet re-interventions, the re-solidification of expertise/provincial bureaucracy and the management uncertainty of alternative local disaster management following the local challenges raised during August 2014**.** Indeed, as part of this disaster management de/re-politicisation (as logics of difference in relation to logics of uncertainty and logics of professionalisation), effort was given to linking the demands for effective, capable and secure organisation. This activity was enacted by pro-bureaucracy groups, as were disguised as a local coalition (with separate demands for change from those of local alliances). The official announcements of the Ministry of Interior in early September 2014 addressed how successful disaster management must rely upon the 'integrated skills of provincial government and governors' and that disaster management needs to be 'based on scientific data'. In this regard, another nodal point arose which endorsed all technocratic and bureaucratic notions and scientific/expertise modes in combination**.** The blaming strategies of the central state were exercised by deploying rhetoric that addressed 'the failure derived from the unprecedented' alongside the 'overwhelming', 'unpredictable' and 'uncertain' nature of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake. This sought to deflect blame for any failure

encountered. The provisions instituted here included the installing of the Chiang Rai Earthquake Financial Assistance Project of 2014, where financial assistance was provided to the local population under the discourse of these provisions being ‘adequate’ disaster management. These projects, as arose via the logics of uncertainty under the umbrella of the logics of difference, became the key tool in addressing local demands for trust while diminishing local demands for change.

Further, the logics of professionalisation (as re/de-politicisation strategies or logic of difference) were brought into play as a means of separating local demands for change and the acquisition of (more) competent organisations via the configuration of the logics of difference. Indeed, these logics were implemented by re-politicisation strategies, became operated through both discursive and non-discursive projects. This can be seen in relation to the discourse framing undertaken in relation to notions of ‘effective’, ‘pro-active’, ‘unified’, ‘standardised’ and ‘professional’ disaster management[113] being needed in accordance with the expansion of local movements. The provision of independent expert committees, the launching of new earthquake management measures (such as the Post–Disaster Needs Assessment Approach) and the reiterating of the democratic participatory provisions in a new disaster management plan were attempts to again delegate political power to experts and the central technocratic terrain of central/provincial government (CRDDPM, 2015).

9.1.4 Thai Local Government and Community Values vs Authoritarianism Hierarchy: Obstacles to Freedom and Causes of Contestation

This research has found that Thai values and governmentality forms have historically supported the central and provincial political strategies employed when governing failure and the local terrain, thereby influencing Thais to be docile and thus to surrender to hegemonic power.

A number of studies have identified that traditional Thai social characteristics witness the embracing of authoritarian or hierarchical values, with the Thai population thereby paying strong

attention to the charismatic state or its elite/bureaucrats (as units positioned as securing and maintaining social order) (Baker, 2016; Elinoff, 2020; Visetpricha, 2020). In this sense, the Thai social system relies upon hierarchical power and authoritarianism, usually when enacted by official authorities. Notably, Thai traditions demand that individuals and organisations occupy the subject position of being 'passive' or 'subordinate' (Charoenmuang, 2006; Baker, 2016), thereby minimising (or at least not demanding) any challenges, participation requirements or self-organisation/management forms.

Thus, the notion of democracy or egalitarian values has only slowly developed here and demands for freedom, self-management and/or collective action have rarely arisen (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2004; Herzfeld, 2006; Aulino, 2014; Baker, 2016; Sopranzetti, 2016; Elinoff, 2019). As illustrated in this research (see Chapter Eight), while local elites and leaders became involved in the local disaster management movement, most still agreed (without significant questioning) that the system provided by the central authority was good and reliable. As illustrated in the empirical narratives of this thesis, local government officers and local leaders have argued that, in relation to the ability of self-disaster management to be instituted, 'no matter what, the province has more authority and legitimacy than us' (Chief Administrator Officer of SAO, 2019) and that trust should be given to 'the experiences of the provincial governor in relation to their coordination, network and authority' (Local Leader C, 2019).

In this case, it can be argued that most local and community bodies have historically relied upon the traditional Thai societal structure of authoritarian and hierarchy, especially at local and community levels. Indeed, most local leaders, people and officers have maintained the belief that the central/provincial Government and its officers have a higher status than local entities as the former holds authority directly obtained from the Ministry of Interior. In other words, Thais tend to hold the view that the securing of society, providing of the public interest and ensuring of disaster management should be the main responsibility of the provincial-level. While some

resources and authorities in Thailand have now become increasingly decentralised, such values and norms continue to influence the daily practice of Thais and local government agencies. Unquestionably, most orders or interventions issued by the central/provincial government are accepted at the local level (i.e., government or people) without long-term contestation, despite the recurring failure or wicked issues faced. Thus central/provincial disaster management contestation has only been short-term in the past.

9.2 Contributions to Critical Policy Studies and Disaster Management Studies

A broad range of Disaster Management Studies research has sought to clarify how disaster management can encounter success and failure and to identify which factors can produce effective disaster management. This has pointed to disaster management reiterating integrative tools through which to secure society and its people while achieving social sustainability amidst risk intensification (Kelman, 2003; Pelling and Dill, 2009; Saraçoğlu and Demirtaş-Milz, 2014; Donovan, 2016; Riet, 2017; Tierney, 2019; Hilhorst, Boersma and Raju, 2020; McGowran and Donovan, 2021). This thesis differs from mainstream academic work by interrogating disaster management as a form of power, discourse and manifestation of political logics that characterise radical contingency with no fixed essence, as can be constituted and reinterpreted in different ways and result in success and failure when struggling under the power of competing forces. In taking this approach, the present research has formulated four main contributions to the field of Disaster Management Studies.

Firstly, this research has illustrated how disaster management is formed in situations of radical contingency or in the operation of political logics which differ between contexts – i.e., where ‘the object is not fully constituted’ (Howarth and Griggs, 2006, 2012, 2017a; Howarth, 2013b; Eleanor, 2016; Griggs and Howarth, 2017, 2019). This notion differs from the mainstream

discourses of disaster management, where subjects and objects are understood as fully-constructed and whole, and the emphasis is placed on utilising positivism and neutral and rational mechanisms to examine associated phenomenon (Ash, 2020; McGowran and Donovan, 2021). By contrast, the analysis presented here, which is based on an ontology of radical contingency, has discerned the different relations that constitute the driving forces of material composition and denotes that problematic tendencies stratify and classify disaster management (as an object) (Marston, Jones and Woodward, 2005; Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Marston, Woodward and Jones, 2007; Howarth, 2013b; Ash, 2020). In Chapter Five of this thesis, for example, it was demonstrated how the disaster management of Thailand has been contingently shaped in the context of the country's social and political dynamics, the state's problems set alongside the ever-changing balance of power and socio-economic structures. Here, it was shown that the disaster management discourses in Thailand (i.e., its solutions, roles, regimes and parties) were able to adapt and change in distinct eras.

Secondly, against this background, the disaster management of Thailand has to been shown to be examinable in relation to its radical contingency, incompleteness and political construction (Griggs and Howarth, 2008; Howarth and Griggs, 2017a).[114] This research had indicated that PDT and the logics of critical explanation can be positioned as effective strategies available to researchers in investigating disaster situations. The application of this logics approach across a research process can help to deconstruct the political aspects of a disaster, contribute to an understanding of how given disaster management has been constructed and explore how disaster management policy failures and/or the pragmatism of power forms operate throughout a disaster area. In this research, for example in the empirical findings set out in Chapter Five, problem-driven approaches have been deployed to analyse and problematise the disaster management of Thailand. This has allowed review to be given as to all discursive and empirical phenomena, the taken-for-grantedness of disaster management and disasters in the Thai context.

This has revealed the bureaucratic logics, security logics and hybrid logics deployed and how these manifest a source of the wicked problems and failure of Thailand's disaster management at the national level.

Further to this, Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight of the thesis illustrated the advantages of applying logics analysis (specifically as to social and political logics) in revealing the deep-rooted issues faced at the implementation (local) level. This research has used the logics of critical explanation to argue that failure is consistently a consequence of the falsity of disaster management's ineffectiveness. These conclusions require disaster management to be explored as a political terrain or discourse involved in the creation of political frontiers. The present chapter has set out the explicit causes of the disaster management failures witnessed in Thailand, encompassing the recurrence of fiascos, the persistent inability to gain success and the lack of consent being gathered, alliances built or coalitions developed around non-empty signifiers. Such failures have invoked demands for change and participation via local disaster management politicisation (as a form of community logics gathered around an empty signifier). Simultaneously, in order to maintain its hegemonic power and to govern the occurring failure, the disaster management of Thailand has been continually reshaped by the relations between central and provincial government in addressing local demands via discourses pertaining to resource and security availability. In this context, practises of de/re-politicisation were subsequently deployed via the logics of difference (as logics of uncertainty and logics of professionalisation) under the empty signifier of 'reasoned disaster management and potential disaster management'. Here, logics analysis exposes such politicisation strategies (Griggs and Howarth, 2019).

Thirdly, the influences of the affective or fantasmatic logics of disaster management have been considered in depth. There are many phenomena and research questions that orthodox disaster management and policy studies cannot address sufficiently, including, for example, the reasons why disaster management continues to be adopted and applied despite successive failure;

why disaster management regimes are supported even when the power utilised is suppressive; and why key factors/narratives/ideologies are frequently used in disaster management regimes. It has been shown in this thesis that these inquiries can be responded to by focussing on the affective dimension or through the analysis of fantasmatic logics, thereby allowing ideological disclosure of the radical contingencies and social relations at play here (Glynos, 2001; Griggs *et al.*, 2017). This provides a practical understanding of how regimes are mobilised and seeks to comprehend the fears/desires of individuals in disaster contexts.

Within disaster or crisis situations, social fears arise as to potential loss or past-experienced loss, with a desire then emerging to escape from the risks faced. The delineation of narratives of a beautific society (i.e., the presentation of an imagined secure and resilient society, possible if a given disaster management regime is adopted) and narrative of a horrific society (i.e., the presentation of imagined negatives, threats, losses, risks, hazards and failure liable to arise if a given disaster management regime is not adopted) thus proves a crucial tool for states in enacting governance, securitisation or the de/re-politicisation of crises (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998; Balzacq, 2005; Buller and Flinders, 2005; Salter, 2008; Floyd, 2010; Watts, 2013; Kuzemko, 2014; Wood, 2015; Riet, 2017). This thesis has not focussed upon the role of affective dimensions in influencing and capturing the disaster management of Thailand and local actor desires due to limitations being faced in accessing pertinent data, yet the study of the Thai disaster management context has found some signs of horrific narratives being presented. For instance, certain plans produced have mentioned the negative impacts of Climate Change on Thailand, including the risk to life and economic stability. At the same time, some beautific logics have been presented, for example in regards to the building of societal sustainability and immunity under certain plans. Subsequent research may seek to investigate these aspects further as such logics may be a core dimension of disaster management success/failure.

9.3 Recommendations and Limitations of the Research

Although the logics approach applied in this thesis has unpacked many disaster management-related issues in a way not available via mainstream approaches, other issues require elaboration in future research. This thesis has focused on revealing the political strategies employed by the central/provincial government of Thailand within its disaster management governance, yet other factors may help explain the emergence and maintenance of this hegemonic power. One factor here is the docile way in which Thais accept authority and the hierarchical and authoritarian values present in Thai Society, leading to the de-escalation of local coalitions and the reversion to accepting central/provincial disaster management. Indeed, further research should examine the reasons for this docility and how it relates to notions of governmentality and biopolitics, therein expanding the comprehension held as to the relationship between a government, the self-governing of a population, how social ordering is formed and how the production of knowledge functions.

Undeniably, a primary revelation of this thesis pertains to the political strategies of both community disaster management networks (detailed in Chapter Seven) as logics of community constructed to challenge provincial disaster management failure and central/provincial government entities (detailed in Chapter Eight) as logics of uncertainty and professionalisation. Nonetheless, the present study has not adequately explained why/how both camps framed disaster management (discourse) or reality in different ways or how those networks came into being differently. These are questions related to network influences but any answers gained could help to deepen our understanding as to how networks can be achieved, be temporarily stable or then become unstable. Such questions link to Actor-Network Theory, as focuses on explaining the source of actions (regardless of whether these are its human or non-human in nature) and their effect on social processes by tracing the associations/relationships between network components

(including humans, things, ideas and concepts) (Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour, 2005). Subsequent research should thus adopt Actor-Network Theory in support of PDT when critically examining the processes of counter-movements, coalition networks and networks which affect political actions or strategies framed or expunged in dislocatory (crisis) situations.

Although this thesis has revealed the role of political logics in the politicised strategies of both local alliances and the central/provincial government of Thailand, fantasmatic logics have not been considered extensively due to limitations in accessing pertinent data and due to the scope set for the study. To better understand disasters and their associated logics, fantasmatic logics and mechanisms could be addressed in future research, thus considering the fundamental desire(s) of society/locals and how disaster management regimes/narrative can access these. In addition, the logic of therapeutic consultation (as analysed in Chapter Nine) should also be further elaborated upon, as this thesis has identified related effects in this provision being used as a tool of the central/provincial government of Thailand in its de/re-politicisation efforts, in the disaster management terrain such logics have been influential in the decision-making, negotiation/conflict resolution and presentation of demands among local people and thus should be considered in depth within subsequent research – e.g., the characteristics of such logics and how they perform in different situations. This will enhance the understanding held as to the dynamics of hegemonic power re/de-politicisation.

Conclusion

The 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake provides a pertinent case study through which the disaster management of Thailand, including its alternative forms, can be unpacked. More fully, it has been demonstrated how disaster management in this context has historically been constructed and manifested as a form of failure that resulted in controversy. It has also been delineated in terms of

the ways that hegemonic systems are maintained at local levels. Overall, this thesis has demonstrated, explicitly, that the root of wicked issues and failure in the disaster management of Thailand is the bureaucratic and security logics that were employed. At the local level, it has been found that this disaster management form has produced a means of excluding local people. In the case of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake, this structure caused conflict within and over the disaster area and thus this disaster management became a political realm The analysis presented in this thesis has shown how community logics have become effective strategies available to local actors in order to politicise and challenge the relationships between the central and provincial government of Thailand. Likewise, what have been termed 'logics of uncertainty' and 'logics of professionalisation', as de/re-politicised strategies, have been identified as vital tools for both central and provincial government to respond to conflict and contestation, governance failure, and the need to sustain the power of disaster management discourses and practices.

This thesis has contributed to Disaster Management Studies in three key areas. Firstly, this thesis has offered a new framework of analysis for such research by perceiving disaster management as a political construct or as comprising radical contingency. Secondly, it has been shown that the logics of critical explanation can be employed as an alternative research methodology in the disaster management field. Thirdly, the affective dimension analysis produced has identified how this methodology should be foregrounded when analysing the recurrence of failure. Finally, although this thesis has put forward a number of innovative and original findings, several limitations must also be recognised, including the relatively limited attention given to governmentality, biopower and fantasmatic logics within the disaster management regime of Thailand and the support given by the Thai population. Furthermore, only limited explanation has been given as to why the two groups (Thais or Chiang Rai people) have raised different concepts and have influenced their political practice networks in different ways. Furthermore, the logics of therapeutic consultation, as a means of placating local communities or enacting re-politicisation,

has not been adequately interrogated here. Nonetheless, this thesis has created a springboard for future research in these areas.

Bibiography

ADRC (2011) *Natural Disaster Data Book 2011 (An Analytical Overview)*. Available at: https://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/ORG/databook_2011/pdf/DataBook2011e.pdf (Accessed: 1 April 2018).

Albala-Bertrand, J. M. (1993) *Political Economy of Large Natural Disasters: With Special Reference to Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Andharia, J. (2020a) 'Blurred Boundaries, Shared Practices:Disaster Studies as an Emerging Discipline and Disaster Management as a Field of Practice', in Andharia, J. (ed.) *Disaster studies :Exploring intersectionalities in disaster discourse*. Singapore: Springer, pp. 33–76.

Andharia, J. (2020b) 'Thinking About Disasters: A Call for Intersectionality and Transdisciplinarity in Disaster Studies', in Andharia, J. (ed.) *Disaster Studies : Exploring Intersectionalities in Disaster Discourse*. Singapore: Springer, pp. 3–32.

Arghiros, D. (2001) *Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand*. London: Routledge.

Arghiros, D. (2002) 'Political Reform and Civil Society at the Local Level: Thailand's Local Government Reforms', in McCargo, D. (ed.) *Reforming Thai Politics*. Copenhagen: NIAS.

ASEAN Informantion Centre (2018) *General Prayuth Chan-Ocha Time interviewing*. Available at: http://www.aseanthai.net/ewt_news.php?nid=8359 (Accessed: 2 February 2019).

Ash, J. (2020) 'Flat ontology and geography', *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 10(3), pp. 345–361. doi: 10.1177/2043820620940052.

Atkinson, C. L. (2014) 'Deforestation and Transboundary Haze in Indonesia', *Environment and Urbanization ASIA*, 5(2), pp. 253–267. doi: 10.1177/0975425315577905.

Aulino, F. (2014) 'Perceiving the social body: A phenomenological perspective on ethical practice in Buddhist Thailand', *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 42(3), pp. 415–441.

Baker, C. (2016) 'The 2014 Thai Coup and Some Roots of Authoritarianism', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 46(3), pp. 388–404. doi: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1150500.

Baker, C. and Phongpaichit, P. (2004) *Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand*. Copenhangen, Denmark: NIAS Press.

Balzacq, T. (2005) 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2), pp. 171–201. doi: 10.1177/1354066105052960.

Bamrungsuk, S. (2017) 'Super Internal Operations Command (organisation) and the future role of military', *Matichon*, 6 December. Available at: https://www.matichon.co.th/news-monitor/news_757170.

Bamrungsuk, S. (2019) 'Internal Security Operations (organisation) and Thai politics, the state of the military, and the civil society', *Matichonweekly*, September. Available at: https://www.matichonweekly.com/column/article_224941.

Bang, H. P. (2009) '"Yes we can": identity politics and project politics for a late-modern world', *Urban Research & Practice*, 2(2), pp. 117–137. doi: 10.1080/17535060902979022.

Bangkokbiznew (2014a) *History and Background Prayuth Cabinet's, Bangkokbiznews.com*. Available at: https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/601874 (Accessed: 2 January 2021).

Bangkokbiznew (2014b) *Villagers dreaded the Mae Suai Dam Break After Shock, Bangkokbiznews.com*. Available at: https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/detail/594570 (Accessed: 13 July 2020).

BangkokPost (2011) ‘What water management’, *Bangkokpost*, 21 November.

Bankoff, G. (2001) ‘Rendering the World Unsafe: “Vulnerability” as Western Discourse’, *Disasters*, 25, pp. 19–35. doi: 10.1111/1467-7717.00159.

Bankoff, G., Frerks, G. and Hilhorst, D. J. M. (2004) ‘Mapping Vulnerability, Disasters, Development and People’, *Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People*. doi: 10.4324/9781849771924.

Bankoff, G. and Hilhorst, D. (2009) ‘The politics of risk in the Philippines: Comparing state and NGO perceptions of disaster management’, *Disasters*, 33(4), pp. 686–704. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.2009.01104.x.

BBC (2018) *14 years, The release of the violence in Southern part of Thailand but suffering is to be continued*. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/thai/thailand-42562915.

Beuret, N. (2020) ‘Containing climate change: The new governmental strategies of catastrophic environments’, *Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space*, p. 2514848620902384. doi: 10.1177/2514848620902384.

Birkland, T. A. (2010) ‘Federal Disaster Policy Learning, Priorities, and Prospects for Resilience’, in Boin, A., Comfort, L., and Demchak, C. (eds) *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Blackburn, S. and Pelling, M. (2018) ‘The political impacts of adaptation actions: Social contracts, a research agenda’, *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 9(6), p. e549. doi: 10.1002/wcc.549.

Blaikie, P. *et al.* (1994) *At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters*. London: Routledge.

Boin, A. *et al.* (2016) *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure*. doi: 10.1017/9781316339756.

Bowornwathana, B. (2005) ‘Administrative Reform and Tidal Waves from Regime Shifts: Tsunamis in Thailand’s Political and Administrative History’, *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 27(1), pp. 37–52. doi: 10.1080/23276665.2005.10779298.

Bowornwathana, B. and Poocharoen, O. (2005) ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Administrative Reform: Why Politics Matters’, *Public Organization Review: A Global Journal*, 27(1), pp. 37–52. doi: 10.1007/s11115-010-0129-0.

Brändström, A., Kuipers, S. and Daléus, P. (2008) ‘The politics of tsunami responses: Comparing patterns of blame management in Scandinavia’, pp. 114–147. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511756122.005.

Brown, P. (2007) *Toxic Exposures: Contested Illnesses and the Environmental Health Movement*. New York: Columbia University.

Browne, K. E. (2015) *Standing in the Need: Culture, Comfort, and Coming Home After Katrina*. Texas: University of Texas Press.

Budd, L. *et al.* (2011) ‘A Fiasco of Volcanic Proportions? Eyjafjallajökull and the Closure of European Airspace’, *Mobilities*, 6(1), pp. 31–40. doi: 10.1080/17450101.2011.532650.

Buller, J. and Flinders, M. (2005) ‘The Domestic Origins of Depoliticisation in the Area of British Economic Policy’, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7(4), pp. 526–543. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856x.2005.00205.x.

Buller, J. and James, T. S. (2011) ‘Statecraft and the Assessment of National Political Leaders: The Case of New Labour and Tony Blair’, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 14(4), pp. 534–555. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00471.x.

Bumrungsuk, S. (2017) *Super power of Internal Security Operations Command in the military role*. Available at: https://www.matichon.co.th/columnists/news_750594 (Accessed: 22 January 2019).

Burnham, P. (2001) 'New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 3(2), pp. 127–149. doi: 10.1111/1467-856X.00054.

Burton, C. and Cutter, S. L. (2008) 'Levee Failures and Social Vulnerability in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Area, California', *Natural Hazards Review*, 9(3). doi: 10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988(2008)9:3(136).

Button, G. (2010) *Disaster Culture: Knowledge and Uncertainty in the Wake of Human and Environmental Catastrophe*. New York: Routledge.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Bynander, F. and Nohrstedt, D. (2020) 'Collaborative Crisis Management, Inter-Organizational Approaches to Extreme Events', in Bynander, F. and Nohrstedt, D. (eds) *Collaborative Crisis Management, Inter-Organizational Approaches to Extreme Events*. New York: Routledge, pp. 1–12.

Carr, L. J. (1932) 'Disaster and the Sequence-Pattern Concept of Social Change', *American Journal of Sociology*, 38(2), pp. 207–218. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2766454.

Chardchawarn, S. C. (2010) *Local Governance in Thailand : The Politics of Decentralization and the Roles of Bureaucrats, Politicians, and the People*. Chiba. Available at: https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Download/Vrf/pdf/459.pdf.

Charoenmuang, T. (2006) *Thailand A Late Decentralising Country*. Chiang Mai: Ueban Development Institute Foundation.

Chiang Rai DDPM (2012) *Chiang Rai Disaster Management Plan 2012*. Chiang Rai.

CODI (2014) 'One year remembrance of Chiang Rai Earthquake'. Community Organizations Development Institute. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kEbZCU5caH4.

Comfort, L. K., Waugh, W. L. and Cigler, B. A. (2012) 'Emergency Management Research and Practice in Public Administration: Emergence, Evolution, Expansion, and Future Directions', *Public Administration Review*, 72(4), pp. 539–547. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02549.x.

Connors, M. (2002) 'Framing the"People's Constitution"', in McCargo, D. (ed.) *Reforming Thai Politics*. Copenhangen, Denmark: NIAS Press.

CR DDPM (2013) 'Chiang Rai Disaster Management Plan 2009-2014'. Chiang Rai: Chiang Rai department of disaster prevention and mitigation.

CR DDPM (2014a) 'Chaing Rai Earthquake Summury Operation 2014'. Chiang Rai: Chiang Rai department of disaster prevention and mitigation.

CR DDPM (2014b) 'Executive summary of Chiang Rai Earthquake 2014'. Chiang Rai: Chiang Rai department of disaster prevention and mitigation.

CR DDPM (2015) *Chiang Rai Earthquake Implementation Plan 2015*. Chiang Rai: Chiang Rai department of disaster prevention and mitigation.

CRDMN (2014) *Lesson and Learn from the Chiang Rai Civil Society Disaster Management Network*. Chiang Rai. Available at: http://www.volunteerspirit.org/file/ncv/R702c.pdf.

CRDMN, CMC and CODI (2016) *Knowlegde 'Disaster Management Chiang Rai Earthquake :Case Study Mae-Suay,San-Ma-Ka*. Chiang Rai. Available at: https://web.codi.or.th/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/km_300458.pdf.

CRED (2016) *2015 , the disasters in numbers*. Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/47804/ (Accessed: 18 February 2019).

Davoudi, S. (2012) 'Resilience: A Bridging Concept or a Dead End?', *Planning Theory & Practice*, 13(2), pp. 299–307.

DDPM (2007) *Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act 2007 and Ordinance*. Bangkok. Available at: http://project-wre.eng.chula.ac.th/watercu_eng/sites/default/files/lecture intro 2112681 materials/9 Laws %28thai%29.pdf.

DDPM (2013) *Announcement of Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: Rules, Procedures for the disaster areas*. Bangkok. Available at: file:///C:/Users/supaj/Downloads/ประกาศกรมปภ._เรื่อง_หลักเกณฑ์วิธีการ_และเงื่อนไขการประกาศเขตฯ_ลว._25_ก.ค._56.pdf.

DDPM (2014) *Master Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention*. Nonthaburi: Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. Available at: file:///D:/Master Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention 2557.pdf.

DDPM (2015) *Handbook of DDPM structures and Manpower*. Bangkok: Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.

DDPM (2016) *Announcement of the Disaster Assistance Zone according with the Ministry of Finance's order of financial advances to assist the disaster victim 2013 (amended no. 2) 2016*. Bangkok.

DDPM (2019a) *Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation budget book 2003*. Available at: http://www.bb.go.th/web/budget/budget_book/blue46n/15/15006.pdf.

DDPM (2019b) *Historical of Department of Disaster Management*. Available at: https://www.disaster.go.th/th/about/.

Dobson, A. (2003) *Citizenship and the Environment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dobson, A. and Valencia Sáiz, Á. (2005) 'Introduction', *Environmental Politics*, 14(2), pp. 157–162. doi: 10.1080/09644010500054822.

Donovan, A. (2016) 'Geopower: Reflections on the critical geography of disasters', *Progress in Human Geography*, 41(1), pp. 44–67. doi: 10.1177/0309132515627020.

Dryzek, J. S. (2004) *The politics of the earth : environmental discourses*. 2th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Durant, R. F. and Legge, J. S. (2006) '"Wicked Problems," Public Policy, and Administrative Theory', *Administration & Society*, 38(3), pp. 309–334. doi: 10.1177/0095399706289713.

Edelenbos, J., van Meerkerk, I. and Schenk, T. (2016) 'The Evolution of Community Self-Organization in Interaction With Government Institutions: Cross-Case Insights From Three Countries', *The American Review of Public Administration*, 48(1), pp. 52–66. doi: 10.1177/0275074016651142.

Eleanor, M. (2016) 'Emphasising the political and emotional dimensions of organisational change politics with Laclauian discourse theory', *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 11(1), pp. 46–66. doi: 10.1108/QROM-11-2015-1334.

Elinoff, E. (2019) 'Subjects of politics: Between democracy and dictatorship in Thailand', *Anthropological Theory*, 19(1), pp. 143–169. doi: 10.1177/1463499618782365.

Elinoff, E. (2020) *From the Editor: Environmental Politics in and after Military Authoritarianism in Thailand | Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*. Available at: https://kyotoreview.org/issue-30/environmental-politics-in-and-after-military-authoritarianism-in-thailand/ (Accessed: 8 March 2021).

Fire Prevention and Control Act (1952) *Fire Prevention and Control Act*. Available at: https://www.aerothai.co.th/ (Accessed: 18 February 2019).

Fischer, F. (1990) *Technocratic and the Politics of Expertise*. Newbury Park,CA: SAGE.

Fischer, F. (2000) *Citizens, Expert,and Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Fischer, F. (2017) *Climate Crisis and the Democratic Prospect, Participatory Governance in Sustanable Communities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Floyd, R. (2010) *Security and Environment, Securitisation Theory and US Environment Security Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gaillard, J. C. (2010) 'Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: Perspectives for climate and development policy', *Journal of International Development*, 22(2), pp. 218–232. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1675.

Garden, P., Lebel, L. and Chirangworapat, C. (2010) 'Local Government Reforms as Work in Progress', in Wittayapak, C. and Vandergeest, P. (eds) *The Politics of Decentralization Natural Resource Management in Asia*. Chiang Mai: Mekong Press, pp. 138–160.

Glynos, J and Howarth, D. (2007) *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory*. London: Routledge.

Glynos, J. (2001) 'The grip of ideology: A Lacanian approach to the theory of ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 6(2), pp. 191–214. doi: 10.1080/13569310120053858.

Glynos, J. and Howarth, D. (2007) *Logics of critical explanation in social and political theory*. Abington : Routledge.

Glynos, J., Klimecki, R. and Willmott, H. (2015) 'Logics in policy and practice: a critical nodal analysis of the UK banking reform process', *Critical Policy Studies*, 9(4), pp. 393–415. doi: 10.1080/19460171.2015.1009841.

Glynos, J. and Speed, E. (2012) 'Varieties of co-production in public services: time banks in a UK health policy context', *Critical Policy Studies*, 6(4), pp. 402–433. doi: 10.1080/19460171.2012.730760.

Glynos, J., Speed, E. and West, K. (2014) 'Logics of marginalisation in health and social care reform: Integration, choice, and provider-blind provision', *Critical Social Policy*, 35(1), pp. 45–68. doi: 10.1177/0261018314545599.

Griggs, S. *et al.* (2017) 'Characterizing and evaluating rival discourses of the "sustainable city": Towards a politics of pragmatic adversarialism', *Political Geography*, 59, pp. 36–46. doi: 10.1016/J.POLGEO.2017.02.007.

Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2008) 'Populism, Localism and Environmental Politics: the Logic and Rhetoric of the Stop Stansted Expansion campaign', *Planning Theory*, 7(2), pp. 123–144. doi: 10.1177/1473095208090431.

Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2013a) *The politics of airport expansion in the United Kingdom : hegemony, policy and the rhetoric of 'sustainable aviation'*. Manchester : Manchester University Press,. Available at: http://encore.essex.ac.uk/iii/encore/record/C__Rb1843678__Sdavid howarth__Orightresult__U__X4?lang=eng&suite=cobalt (Accessed: 28 November 2018).

Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2013b) *The politics of airport expansion in the United Kingdom : hegemony, policy and the rhetoric of 'sustainable aviation'*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2016) *The politics of airport expansion in the United Kingdom*. Manchester University Press. doi: 10.7765/9781526112132.

Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2017) 'Discourse, policy and the environment: hegemony, statements and the analysis of U.K. airport expansion', *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, pp. 1–15. doi: 10.1080/1523908X.2016.1266930.

Griggs, S., Howarth, D. and Feandeiro, A. (2018) 'The logics and limits of "collaborative governance" in Nantes: Myth, ideology, and the politics of new urban regimes', *Journal of Urban Affairs*, pp. 1–18. doi: 10.1080/07352166.2018.1516508.

Griggs, S. and Howarth, D. (2019) 'The Airport Commission, Depoliticisation and the Third Runway at Heathrow Airport', in Buller, J. et al. (eds) *Comparing Strategies of (De) Politicisation in Euroup: Governance, Resistance and Anti-politics*. Swizerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 79–102.

Grove, K. (2013) 'Hidden transcripts of resilience: power and politics in Jamaican disaster management', *Resilience*, 1(3), pp. 193–209. doi: 10.1080/21693293.2013.825463.

Grove, K. (2014) 'Biopolitics and Adaptation: Governing Socio-Ecological Contingency Through Climate Change and Disaster Studies', *Geography Compass*, 8. doi: 10.1111/gec3.12118.

Grove, K. J. (2010) 'Insuring "Our Common Future?" Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security', *Geopolitics*, 15(3), pp. 536–563. doi: 10.1080/14650040903501070.

Haas, J. E., Kates, R. and Bowden, M. (1977) *Reconstruction Following Disaster*. Edited by E. H. J, W. K. Robert, and M. J. Bowden. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Hajar, M. (2009) *Authoritative Governance: Policy-making in the Age of Mediatization*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hajer, M. (2009a) *Authoritative governance : policy-making in the age of mediatization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hajer, M. (2009b) *Authoritative Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199281671.001.0001.

Head, B. (2008) 'Wicked Problems in Public Policy', *Public Policy*, 3.

Head, B. (2019) 'Forty years of wicked problems literature: forging closer links to policy studies', *Policy and Society*, 38(2), pp. 180–197. doi: 10.1080/14494035.2018.1488797.

Head, B. and Alford, J. (2013) 'Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management', *Administration & Society*, 47(6), pp. 711–739. doi: 10.1177/0095399713481601.

Healey, P. (2015) 'Citizen-generated local development initiative: recent English experience', *International Journal of Urban Sciences*, 19(2), pp. 109–118. doi: 10.1080/12265934.2014.989892.

Herzfeld, M. (2006) *Siege of the Spirits: Community and Polity in Bangkok*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hewitt, K. (1983) *Interpretations of Calamity From the Viewpoint of Human Ecology*. Edited by K. Hewitt. Boston,MA: Routledge.

Hewitt, K. (1995) 'Excluded perspectives in the social construction of disaster', *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 13(3), pp. 317–339.

Hilhorst, D. (2003) 'Unlocking disaster paradigms: An actor-oriented focus on disaster response', in *The 6th European Sociological Conference, the Disaster Research and Social Crisis Network panel*. Murcia, Spain.: European Sociological Conference.

Hilhorst, D., Boersma, K. and Raju, E. (2020) 'Research on politics of disaster risk governance: where are we headed?', *Politics and Governance*, 8(4), pp. 214–219. doi: 10.17645/pag.v8i4.3843.

Hines, C. (2003) *A Global Look to the Local : Replacing Economic Globalisation with Democratic Localisation*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. Available at: https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9308IIED.pdf.

Hood, C. (2002) 'The Risk Game and the Blame Game', *Government and Opposition*. 2014/03/28, 37(1), pp. 15–37. doi: DOI: 10.1111/1477-7053.00085.

Hood, C. (2011) *The Blame Game, Spin, Bureacracy, and Self-Preservation in Government*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Horowitz, A. and Remes, J. (2021) 'Introduction Critical Disaster Studies', in *Critical Disaster Studies*. Pheladelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania presss, pp. 1–8.

Howarth, D. (1997) 'Complexities of identity/difference: Black Consciousness ideology in South Africa', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2(1), pp. 51–78. doi: 10.1080/13569319708420750.

Howarth, D. (2010) 'Power, discourse, and policy: articulating a hegemony approach to critical policy studies', *Critical Policy Studies*, 3(3–4), pp. 309–335. doi: 10.1080/19460171003619725.

Howarth, D. (2013) *Poststructuralism and after : structure, subjectivity, and power*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Howarth, D., Glynos, J. and Griggs, S. (2016) 'Discourse, explanation and critique', *Critical Policy Studies*, 10(1), pp. 99–104. doi: 10.1080/19460171.2015.1131618.

Howarth, D. and Griggs, S. (2006) 'Metaphor, Catachresis and Equivalence: The Rhetoric of Freedom to Fly in the Struggle over Aviation Policy in the United Kingdom', *Policy and Society*, 25(2), pp. 23–46. doi: 10.1016/S1449-4035(06)70073-X.

Howarth, D. and Griggs, S. (2012) 'Poststructuralist Policy Analysis: Discourse, Hegemony, and Critical Explanation', in F. Fischer and F. Fischer, & H. G. (ed.) *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 305–324.

Howarth, D. and Griggs, S. (2017a) 'Poststructuralist discourse theory and critical policy studies: interest,identies and policy change', in Fischer, F. (ed.) *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, pp. 111–127.

Howarth, D. and Griggs, S. (2017b) 'Poststructuralist discourse theory and critical policy studies: interests, identities and policy change', in Fischer, F. et al. (eds) *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar.

Howarth, D. (2000) *Discourse*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Howarth, D. (2008) 'Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical Democracy', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10(2), pp. 171–193. doi: 10.1177/030437540603100201.

Howarth, D. and Griggs, S. (2020) 'Two Images of Nantes as a "Green Model" of Urban Planning and Governance: The "Collaborative City" versus the 'Slow City', *The Town Planning Review*, 91(4), pp. 415–436. doi: 10.3828/tpr.2020.24.

Howarth, D. and Norval, A. J. (1998) *South Africa in Transition : New Theoretical Perspectives*. Edited by D. R. Howarth and A. J. Norval. New York: MacMillan Press. Available at: https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=UTy_DAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&ots=sIcBbn-RQD&sig=WBn3eXlX7eMqLmEbjvE6pEZzwX0&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false (Accessed: 29 July 2019).

Howlett, M. (2012) 'The lessons of failure: learning and blame avoidance in public policy-making', *International Political Science Review*, 33(5), pp. 539–555. doi: 10.1177/0192512112453603.

iLaw (2014) *No Title, Knows, Thai National Legislative Assembly and thier legislation process*. Available at: https://ilaw.or.th/node/3350 (Accessed: 3 December 2020).

INN (2014) *Prime Minister Commands to help people in Chiangrai Earthquake*. Available at: https://www.innnews.co.th/shownews/show?newscode=535276.

Jacobs, T. (2018) 'The Dislocated Universe of Laclau and Mouffe: An Introduction to Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory', *Critical Review*, 30(3–4), pp. 294–315. doi: 10.1080/08913811.2018.1565731.

Jakub, E. (2016) *Logics of foreign policy : discourse, fantasy and Germany's policies in the Iraq crisis*. Warwick.

Jensantikul, N. (2015) *Management towords government policy in responsibility to disaster in Thailand: case study of floods between 1942-2012*. Mahidol University. Available at: http://pws.npru.ac.th/nipapan/data/files/M8_389.pdf.

Joseph, J. (2013) 'Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach', *Resilience*, 1(1), pp. 38–52. doi: 10.1080/21693293.2013.765741.

Joyeeta, G. (2010) 'A history of international climate change policy', *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 1(5), pp. 636–653. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.67.

Kaewnu, A. (2011) *Community Movement for Flood Management: Why and How?*, *Isaranews*. Available at: https://www.isranews.org/community/comm-interview/4393-ขบวนชุมชนจัดการอุทกภัย-ทำไมและอย่างไร.html (Accessed: 10 October 2019).

Kamolvej (2006) *The Integration o Intergovernmental coordination and Information Management in Response to immediate Crises Thailand Emergency management*. University of Pittsburgh. Available at: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/9270/1/ETD_DISSERTATION_Tavida_Kamolvej.pdf.

Kamolvej (2011) *Handbook of local disaster management*. Bangkok: King Prajadhipok's Institute.

Kamolvej (2014) 'Has Thailand Disaster Management, from Tsunami to Flood, Been Better?', *Public Affairs*, 4(2), pp. 103–119. Available at: http://www.copag.msu.ac.th/journal/filesjournal/4-2/180120171057216.pdf.

Kanchoochat, V. and Hewison, K. (2016) 'Introduction: Understanding Thailand's Politics', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 46(3), pp. 371–387. doi: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1173305.

Kangwannawakul, W. (2017a) *The Disaster in mind memory*. Chiang Rai: Poapathu Press.

Kangwannawakul, W. (2017b) *The remembrance of faithfulness in the disaster*. Chiang Rai: Pauportu.

KantaKafle, S. and Murshed, Z. (2006) *COMMUNITY-BASED DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES*. Bangkok: the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. Available at: https://www.unisdr.org/preventionweb/files/3366_3366CBDRMShesh.pdf.

Kapucu, N. and Boin, A. (2016) *Disaster and Crisis Management: Public Management Perspectives*. Edited by N. Kapucu and A. Boin. Oxford: Routledge.

Kasetsiri, Charnvit (2002) 'Nationalism and Militarilism: Plaek Pibulsongkram cabinet 1938-1944', in Kasetsiri, Chanvit, Phetlertanun, T., and Phongpanita, W. (eds) *Field Mashal Phibunsongkhram and Modern Politics*. 11th edn. Bangkok: Thummasat University Press.

Keawsomboon, W. (2013) *The role of civil society in 2011 in flood management in Pak Kret Municipality, Nonthaburi*. Chulalongkron University. Available at: https://cuir.car.chula.ac.th/dspace/bitstream/123456789/42954/1/5480622224.pdf.

Kelly, P. M. and Adger, W. N. (2000) 'Theory and Practice in Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change andFacilitating Adaptation', *Climatic Change*, 47(4), pp. 325–352. doi: 10.1023/A:1005627828199.

Kelman, I. (2003) 'Beyond disaster, beyond diplomacy', in Pelling, M. (ed.) *Natural disaster and development in globalizing world*. London: Routledge, pp. 110–123.

Khoasod (2019) *Back to the History Harriet Tropical Strom: The devasted Talumpook*. Available at: https://www.khaosod.co.th/special-stories/news_2037090 (Accessed: 19 April 2018).

Khunwishit, S. (2014a) '10 Years of Disaster Management in Thailand: An Examination of Policy, Organisation, and Performance after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2014', *Public Affairs*, 4(2), pp. 80–102.

Khunwishit, S. (2014b) '10 Years of Disaster Management in Thailand: An Examination of Policy, Organisation and Performance after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2014', *Public Affairs*, 4(2), pp. 80–102.

Khunwishit, S. and McEntire, D. . (2011) *Emergency management in Thailand: on the way to creating a more systematic approach to disasters*, *Comparative emergency management: understanding disaster policies, organizations, and initiatives from around the world*. North Texus. Available at: https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/downloads/compemmgmtbookproject/comparative em book - chapter - em in thailand-on the way to creating a more systematic approach .doc.

Kisby, B. (2010) 'The Big Society: Power to the People?', *The Political Quarterly*, 81(4), pp. 484–491. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2010.02133.x.

Kongkirati, P. (2013) *Bosses, bullets and ballots : electoral violence and democracy in Thailand, 1975-2011*. The Australian National University.

Krause, E. A. (1968) 'Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: "Citizen Participation"*', *Social Problems*, 16(2), pp. 129–143. doi: 10.2307/799999.

Kuus, M. (2014) *Geopolitics and Expertise: Knowledge and Authority in European Diplomacy*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Kuzemko, C. (2014) 'Politicising UK energy: What "speaking energy security" can do', *Policy & Politics*, 42. doi: 10.1332/030557312X655990.

Laclau, E. (1990) *New reflections on the revolution of our time: Ernesto Laclau*. London: Verso.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2014) *Hegemony and socialist strategy : towards a radical democratic politics*. London: Verso.

Laothamatas, A. (1993) 'Sleeping giant awakens: The middle class in Thai politics', *Asian Review*, 7(1), pp. 78–125.

Larsson, O. (2019) 'A theoretical framework for analyzing institutionalized domination in network governance arrangements', *Critical Policy Studies*, 13(1), pp. 81–100. doi: 10.1080/19460171.2017.1393440.

Latour, B. (2005) *Reassembling the social: an introduction to Actor-Network Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Law, J. and Hassard, J. (1999) *Actor network theory and after*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Lebel, L. and Lebel, P. (2018) 'Policy narratives help maintain institutional traps in the governance of floods in Thailand', *International Journal of Water Resources Development*, 34(4), pp. 616–631. doi: 10.1080/07900627.2017.1336989.

Lebel, L., Manuta, J. B. and Garden, P. (2011) 'Institutional traps and vulnerability to changes in climate and flood regimes in Thailand', *Regional Environmental Change*, 11(1), pp. 45–58. doi: 10.1007/s10113-010-0118-4.

Lövbrand, E. and Stripple, J. (2011) 'Bringing governmentality to the study of global climate governance', *Governing the Climate: New Approaches to Rationality, Power and Politics*, pp. 27–41. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781107110069.005.

Lövbrand, E., Stripple, J. and Wiman, B. (2009) 'Earth System governmentality: Reflections on science in the Anthropocene', *Global Environmental Change*, 19, pp. 7–13. doi: 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.002.

Luangprapat, W. (2008) *Public Sector Reform in Thailand: Causes and Consequences*. Kobe.

MacKillop, E. (2018) 'Leadership in organisational change: A post-structuralist research agenda', *Organization*, 25(2). doi: 10.1177/1350508417733137.

Manageronline (2011) *Flooding crisis, Yingluck's government crisis*, *Manageronline*. Available at: https://mgronline.com/specialscoop/detail/9540000129038 (Accessed: 11 October 2019).

Manageronline (2014) *'Charupong' Freak out! when was asked about breaking of Mae Suay dam after the earthquake, news*. Available at: https://mgronline.com/local/detail/9570000050607 (Accessed: 13 July 2020).

Manuta, J. B. *et al.* (2009) 'Institutionalized incapacities and practice in flood disaster management in Thailand', *Science and Culture*, 72, pp. 10–22.

Marien, S., Hooghe, M. and Quintelier, E. (2010) 'Inequalities in Non-Institutionalised forms of Political Participation: A Multi-Level Analysis of 25 Countries', *Political Studies*, 58(1), pp. 187–213. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00801.x.

Marks, D. and Lebel, L. (2016) 'Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: Fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand', *Habitat International*, 52, pp. 57–66. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.024.

Marston, S. A., Jones, J. P. and Woodward, K. (2005) 'Human geography without scale', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 30(4), pp. 416–432. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2005.00180.x.

Marston, S. A., Woodward, K. and Jones, J. P. (2007) 'Flattening Ontologies of Globalization: The Nollywood Case', *Globalizations*, 4(1), pp. 45–63. doi: 10.1080/14747730701245608.

Matichon (2017) *The real 'Hero of Thai flood 2011' "Sorayut Sutatsachinda"*, *Matichonweekly*. Available at: https://www.matichonweekly.com/scoop/article_20401 (Accessed: 11 October 2019).

McCargo, D. and Pathmanand, U. (2005) *The Thaksinization of Thailand*. Copenhangen, Denmark: NIAS Press.

McConnell, A. (2010) 'Policy success, policy failure and grey areas in-between', *Journal of Public Policy*, 30(30), pp. 345–362. doi: 10.1017/S0143814X10000152.

McEntire, D. A. *et al.* (2002) 'A Comparison of Disaster Paradigms: The Search for a Holistic Policy Guide', *Public Administration Review*, 62(3), pp. 267–281. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00178.

McGowran, P. and Donovan, A. (2021) 'Assemblage theory and disaster risk management', *Progress in Human Geography*, p. 03091325211003328. doi: 10.1177/03091325211003328.

Measai Municipality (2012) 'Measai Mulnipacility Disaster Management Plan 2012-2015'. Chiang Rai: Measai Municipality.

Mert, A. (2015) *Environmental Governance Through Partnerships: A Discourse Theory*. Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar.

Ministry of Interior (MOI) (2014) *The summary of policy assignment and implementatiom of MOI Minister (General Anupong PaoChinda)*. Bangkok. Available at: http://www.oic.go.th/infocenter7/ifunc_paging.asp?i=3.%3AN.378&b=1&t=@&f=06300009010030 02&g=นโยบายรัฐมนตรีว่าการกระทรวงมหาดไทย.

Ministry of Interior (MOI) (2015) *Ministry of Interior Roadmap durung October 2014- Semtember 2015*. Bangkok.

MOI (1979) *Thailand Civil Defence Act 1979*. Bangkok. Available at: http://203.155.220.230/bmainfo/law/011/prevent2522.pdf.

MOI (2017) *National disaster Risk Management Plan*. Thailand: Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. Ministry of Interior Thailand. Available at: http://www.disaster.go.th/upload/download/file_attach/58eb0815370c3.pdf.

MOI (2019) *Minister of Interior authority in each period*. Available at: https://www.moi.go.th/portal/page?_pageid=814,1066848&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (Accessed: 10 April 2018).

Mori, A. (2013) 'Thailand's Snail's Progress towards Good Environment Governance', in *Environmental Governance for Sustainable Development: East Asia Perspective (Multilevel Environmental Governance for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 61–84.

Mouffe, C. (2005) *On the Political*. London: Routledge.

Mouffe, C. (2013) *Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically*. London: Verso.

Murdiyarso, D. *et al.* (2004) 'Policy responses to complex environmental problems: insights from a science-policy activity on trans boundary haze from vegetation fires in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment*, 104, pp. 47–56.

Nabers, D. (2016) 'Crisis as dislocation in global politics', *Politics*, 37(4), pp. 418–431. doi: 10.1177/0263395716661341.

National Security Council (2019) 'National Security Policy of 2007-2011'. Bangkok: National Security Council.

NDPDC (2010) *The National Disaster Prevention Plan of 2010-2014*. Bangkok: Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.

NDPDC (2015) *National Disaster Prevention and Prevention 2015*. Bangkok: Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.

Nelson, M. H. (1998) *Central authority and local democratization in Thailand*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press.

Nishizaki, Y. (2018) *Political Authority and Provincial Identity in Thailand: The Making of Banharn-buri*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

North, P. (2010) 'Eco-localisation as a progressive response to peak oil and climate change – A sympathetic critique', *Geoforum*, 41(4), pp. 585–594. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.04.013.

Norval, A. J. (1996) *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse*. London: Verso.

O'Brien, G. *et al.* (2006) 'Climate change and disaster management', *Disasters*, 30(1), pp. 64–80. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2006.00307.x.

Ockey, J. (2004) 'State, bureaucracy and polity in modern Thai politics', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 34(2), pp. 143–162. doi: 10.1080/00472330480000021.

Okazumi, T. and Nakasu, T. (2015) 'Lessons learned from two unprecedented disasters in 2011 – Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan and Chao Phraya River flood in Thailand', *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 13, pp. 200–206. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.05.008.

Olasky, M. (2006) *The Politics of Disaster: Katrina, Big Government, and A New Strategy for Future Crises*. Tennessee: Thomas Nelson.

Oliver-Smith, A., S. M. (no date) *Catastrophe & Culture: The Anthropology of Disaster*. Edited by S. Hoffman and A. Oliver-Smith. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press. Available at: https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1525/ae.2003.30.2.319.

Oliver-Smith, A. (1996) 'Anthropological Research on Hazards and Disasters', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 25, pp. 303–328.

Oliver-Smith, A. (2016) 'Disaster risk reduction and applied anthropology: Disaster risk reduction', *Annals of Anthropological Practice*, 40, pp. 73–85. doi: 10.1111/napa.12089.

Oliver-Smith, A. and Hoffman, S. (2012) *The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective*. doi: 10.4324/9781315298917.

Olson, S. (2008) 'Toward a politics of disaster: Losses, Values, Agendas, and Blame', in Boin, A. (ed.) *Crisis Management*. London : SAGE, pp. 154–170.

OSC (2019) *The National Strategy of Preparedness Plan B.E 2560- 2065*. Available at: http://www.nsc.go.th/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/National-Preparedness-Plan-2017-2022.pdf (Accessed: 10 April 2018).

Pa-Tueng SAO (2012) 'Pa-Tueng Disaster Management Plan 2012-2015'. Chiang Rai: Pa-Tueng Sub-District Administration Organisation.

Painter, M. (2006) 'Thaksinisation or managerialism? Reforming the Thai bureaucracy', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 36(1), pp. 26–47. doi: 10.1080/00472330680000031.

Panda, R. (2002) 'Japan's Disaster Response Management: Lesson for the World', *Journal of Defense Studies*, 6(1), pp. 59–76. Available at: https://www.idsa.in/jds/6_1_2012_JapansDisasterResponseManagementLessonsfortheWorld_RajaramPanda.

Parker, D. J. and Harding, D. M. (1979) 'Natural Hazard Evaluation, Perception and Adjustment', *Geography*, 64(4), pp. 307–316. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40569987.

Pelling, M. (1999) 'The Political Ecology of Flood Hazard in Urban Guyana', *Geoforum*, 30, pp. 249–261. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0016-7185(99)00015-9.

Pelling, M. and Dill, K. (2009) 'Disaster politics: tipping points for change in the adaptation of sociopolitical regimes', *Progress in Human Geography*, 34(1), pp. 21–37. doi: 10.1177/0309132509105004.

Pelling, M. and Dill, K. (2010a) 'Disaster politics: Tipping points for change in the adaptation of sociopolitical regimes', *Progress in Human Geography*, 34(1), pp. 21–37. doi: 10.1177/0309132509105004.

Pelling, M. and Dill, K. (2010b) 'Disaster Politics: Tipping Points for Change in the Adaptation of Sociopolitical Regimes', *Progress in Human Geography - PROG HUM GEOGR*, 34, pp. 21–37. doi: 10.1177/0309132509105004.

Peters, B. G. and Tarpey, M. (2019) 'Are wicked problems really so wicked? Perceptions of policy problems', *Policy and Society*, 38(2), pp. 218–236. doi: 10.1080/14494035.2019.1626595.

Pha-ngam SAO (2012) ‘Pha-ngam Disaster Management Plan 2012-2015’. Chiang Rai: Pha-ngam Sub-District Administration Organisation.

Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (1996) *Thailand: Economy and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PhueaThaiparty (2019) *From crisis to lesson.. Bangkok floods, PTP.or.th*. Available at: https://www.ptp.or.th/news/190 (Accessed: 11 October 2019).

Pielke, J. R. (2007) *The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pitidol, T. (2013) *The limits of community participation: examining the roles of discourse, institutions, and agency in the promotion of community participation in Thailand*. Oxford.

Pitidol, T. (2016) ‘Redefining Democratic Discourse in Thailand’s Civil Society’, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 46(3), pp. 520–537. doi: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1164229.

Pongpanich, B. (2005) *100 Days Recall: Andaman coast Tsunami in Thailand. Nakhon Si Thammarat*. Nakhon Si Thammarat: Play+Learn Pleon Satarn Markpalm Muangnakorn.

Posttoday (2011a) *Foreigner reportors reports ‘Thai’s politics intensifed flooding crisis’, Posttoday*. Available at: https://www.posttoday.com/politic/analysis/119219 (Accessed: 9 October 2019).

Posttoday (2011b) *Thai’s flood issue, Not integrated..and fragmented management, Posttoday*. Available at: https://www.posttoday.com/politic/report/496360 (Accessed: 10 October 2019).

Prince, S. . (1920) *Catastrophe and Social Change*. New York: Columbia University.

Prompanjai, A. (2015) *Thai Politics during The General Prem Tinsulanonda : Political Management (1980 – 88)*. Chulalongkron. Available at: http://cuir.car.chula.ac.th/handle/123456789/50766.

Pugh, J. and Grove, K. (2017) ‘Assemblage, transversality and participation in the neoliberal university’, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 35(6), pp. 1134–1152. doi: 10.1177/0263775817709478.

Quarantelli, E. L. (1987) ‘Disaster Studies: An Analysis of The Social Historical Factors Affecting The Development of Research in The Area’, *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, 5(3), pp. 285–310.

Quarantelli, E. L. (1998) ‘What is a Disaster?’, *Natural Hazards*, 18(1), pp. 87–88. doi: 10.1023/A:1008061717921.

Quarantelli, E. L. (2000) *Disaster Planning, Emergency Management and Civil Protection: The Historical Development of Organized Efforts To Plan For and To Respond To Disasters*. 301. Delaware. Available at: https://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/673/PP301.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Quarantelli, E. L. (1988) ‘Disaster Crisis Management: A Summary of Research Findings’, *Journal of Management Studies*, 25(4), pp. 373–385. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1988.tb00043.x.

Quarantelli, E. L. (1993) ‘Community Crises: An Exploratory Comparison of the Characteristics and Consequences of Disasters and Riots’, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 1(2), pp. 67–78. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5973.1993.tb00009.x.

Quarantelli, E. L. (1997) ‘Ten Criteria for Evaluating the Management of Community Disasters’, *Disasters*, 21(1), pp. 39–56. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00043.

Quarantelli, E. L. and Dynes, R. R. (1977) ‘Response to Social Crisis and Disaster’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 3, pp. 23–49. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945929.

Ratchakicha (2019) *The regulations of the Ministry of Finance on the trial funds to disaster assistance 2019* . Bangkok: Ratchakicha. Available at: http://www.ratchakitcha.soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2562/E/120/T_0036.PDF (Accessed: 3 April 2020).

Reid, J. (2012) 'The disastrous and politically debased subject of resilience', *Development Dialogue*, 58, pp. 67–80.

Remes, J. (2016) *Disaster Citizenship: Survivors, Solidarity, and Power in the Progressive Era*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Remling, E. (2018) 'Depoliticizing adaptation: a critical analysis of EU climate adaptation policy', *Environmental Politics*, 27(3), pp. 477–497. doi: 10.1080/09644016.2018.1429207.

Riet, G. (2017) *The institutionalisation of Disaster Risk Reduction*. Oxford: Routledge.

Riggs, F. (1966) *Thailand: The Modernization of Bureucratic Polity*. Honolulu: East West Center.

Rittel, H. and Webber, M. (1973) 'Dilemmas in a general theory of planning', *Policy Sciences*, 4(2), pp. 155–169. doi: 10.1007/BF01405730.

Ruammek, P. (2014) *Community base disaster management under the decentralisation policy: a case study of Pak Kret Municipality*. Chulalongkron University. doi: 10.14457/CU.the.2014.847.

Ruamsil, P. (1978) *Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram's policy of economic development from 1938 to 1944*. Chulalongkron University. Available at: http://cuir.car.chula.ac.th/handle/123456789/24508.

Sae-Chua, B. (2020) *Environmental Movements and the Politics of Morality: Revisiting Environmental Movements under and, Perhaps, After the Thai Military Government | Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*. Available at: https://kyotoreview.org/issue-30/environmental-movements-politics-of-morality-after-thai-military-gov-2/ (Accessed: 8 March 2021).

Salter, M. (2008) 'Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11(4), pp. 321–349. doi: 10.1057/jird.2008.20.

Sangchatkaew, S. (2014) 'Discourse about Democracy in Field Marshal Plaek Pibulsongkram's Speeches', *Silapakron University Journal*, 24(2), pp. 109–120.

Sangdee, C. (2009) *Images of field marshal Pibulsonggram in Thai political history, 1933-1997*. Chulalongkron University. Available at: http://cuir.car.chula.ac.th/handle/123456789/36106?src=%2Fsimple-search%3Fquery%3D%25E0%25B8%2588%25E0%25B8%25AD%25E0%25B8%25A1%25E0%25B8%259E%25E0%25B8%25A5%2B%25E0%25B8%259B%26brw_total%3D61%26brw_pos%3D1&query=จอมพล+ป.

Sangwiman, S. (2019) *Devastation of Talumpook in memory*. Available at: https://www.gotoknow.org/posts/465892 (Accessed: 19 April 2018).

Saraçoğlu, C. and Demirtaş-Milz, N. (2014) 'Disasters as an ideological strategy for governing neoliberal urban transformation in Turkey: Insights from Izmir/Kadifekale', *Disasters*, 38(1), pp. 178–201. doi: 10.1111/disa.12038.

Secretariat of the Cabinet Office (SOC) (2014) *The Policy Statement of Prayath Cabinet's*. Bangkok. Available at: http://www.sti.or.th/sti/uploads/content_file/109_TH.pdf.

Segschneider, K. and Worakul, W. (2007) *78 weeks later a descriptive, quantitative and qualitative summary after the Tsunami in Thailand*. 2nd edn. Edited by W. M. : Lars Krause. Chiang Mai: Suthep Printing. Available at: http://www.sea-cr.com/taw book/78 week_eng.pdf.

SeismologicalBureau (2014) *Chiang rai Earthquake Report May 5, 2014*. ฺBangkok. Available at: http://www.earthquake.tmd.go.th/documents/file/seismo-doc-1404703458.pdf.

SHR (2006) *Thailand Statement of Policy*. Bangkok. Available at: https://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_sp/sp56.pdf.

SHR (2012) 'Financial Assistance Provision for flood victims 2012 Royal Decree'. Bangkok: Secretariat of the House of Representatives. Available at: https://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_hr/hr24/apl019-2555.pdf.

Siddiqi, A. (2018) 'Disasters in conflict areas: finding the politics', *Disasters*, 42, pp. S161–S172. doi: 10.1111/disa.12302.

Sighasem, S. (2011) 'Policy Network and Natural Disaster Caused by Flood Management: Case Study Nakronratchasima and Chaiyaphum Province', *Journal of Politics Administration and Law*, 3(3), pp. 175–213.

Sighasem, S. (2013) 'Policy Network and Natural Disaster Caused by Flood Management: A Case Study of Nakronratchasima and Chaiyaphum Province', *The Jounal of Politics Administration and Laws*, 3(3), pp. 175–213. Available at: www.polsci-law.buu.ac.th/journal/document/3-3/6.pdf.

Sighasem, S. (2016) *Institutional Analysis of Flood Disaster Management in Thailand, 2010-2011*. Chulalongkron University. Available at: http://cuir.car.chula.ac.th/handle/123456789/54887.

Simachaya, W. (2012) *Air pollution in the northern part: problems and solutions*. Available at: https://www.pcd.go.th/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/pcdnew-2020-06-05_07-33-31_040770.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2019).

SOC (2007) *The policy implementation report of the General Surayud Chulanon Cabinet*. Bangkok. Available at: https://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_nla/d052450-01.pdf.

SOPM (2016) *2 years Summary of General Prayuth's Governmental Projects (12th September 2014-12th September 2016)*. Bangkok. Available at: https://www.ops.go.th/main/images/govoutput2y.pdf.

Sopranzetti, C. (2016) 'Thailand's relapse: The implications of the 2014 coup. Journal of Asian Studies', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 75(2), pp. 299–316.

Stephens, T. and Philip, D. (2016) *The Typhoon Haiyan Response: Strengthening Coordination among Philippine Government, Civil Society, and International Actors*. Available at: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/research-initiatives/crisisleadership/files/Dy_and_Stephens.pdf.

Stolle, D. and Hooghe, M. (2005) 'Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies', *British Journal of Political Science*. 2004/12/08, 35(1), pp. 149–167. doi: DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000074.

Stone, D. (2002) *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision-Making*. New York: W.W.Norton.

Stone, D. (2017) 'Understanding the transfer of policy failure: Bricolage, experimentalism and translation', *Policy and politics*, 45(1). doi: 10.1332/030557316X14748914098041.

Stonich, S. (1993) *I Am Destroying The Land! The Political Ecology Of Poverty And Environmental Destruction In Honduras*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Strassheim, H. (2017) 'Politics and policy expertise: Towards a political epistemology', in Fischer, F. et al. (eds) *Handbook of Critical Policy Studies*. Edward Elgar, pp. 319–340. doi: 10.4337/9781783472352.00026.

Strassheim, H., Jung, A. and Korinek, R.-L. (2015) 'Reframing Expertise The Rise of Behavioral Insights and Interventions in Public Policy', in Antal, B. A., Hutter, M., and Stark, D. (eds) *Moments of Valuation: Exploring Sites of Dissonance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sudhipongpracha, T. and Wongpredee, A. (2015) 'Demystifying Decentralization and Its Setback: Evidence From Thailand's Decentralization Reform', *International Journal of Public Administration*, pp. 1–11. doi: 10.1080/01900692.2015.1020549.

Sudhipongpracha, T. and Wongpredee, A. (2016) 'Demystifying Decentralization and Its Setback: Evidence From Thailand's Decentralization Reform', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 39(6), pp. 437–448. doi: 10.1080/01900692.2015.1020549.

Supajakwattana, W. and Supajakwattana, P. (2017) 'Tri-Characteristic Problems in Thailand Local Disaster Management: Finding from Literature Review Snapshot', *FEU Academic Review*, 4, pp. 19–33.

Susman, S., O'Keefe, P. and Wisner, B. (1983) 'Global disasters, a radical interpretation', in Hewit, K. (ed.) *Interpretations of Calamity*. Boston,MA: Allen&Unwin, pp. 263–283.

Suwanmolee, S. (2016) 'Social Network Analysis of Disaster Response in 2014 Chiangrai Province Earthquake', *Social research*, 39, pp. 109–145.

Suwanmolee, S. (2017) *Disaster Mitigation: The Integration of Inter-organizational according to Public Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Strategy Plan to Encourage Earthquake Readiness in Chiangrai Province*. National Institute of Development Administration.

Tafon, R., Howarth, D. and Griggs, S. (2018) 'The politics of Estonia's offshore wind energy programme: Discourse, power and marine spatial planning', *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 37(1), pp. 157–176. doi: 10.1177/2399654418778037.

Tafon, R. V (2017) 'Taking power to sea: Towards a post-structuralist discourse theoretical critique of marine spatial planning', *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 36(2), pp. 258–273. doi: 10.1177/2399654417707527.

Techaprasertsakun, N. (2013) *New Media and the building of citizen engagement during the 2011 flood crisis*. Chulalongkron University. doi: 10.14457/CU.the.2013.1728.

Thai Royal Gazette (2017) *NNational Council for Pace and Order declaration 51/60*. Available at: https://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_ncpo/ncpo-head-order51-2560.pdf (Accessed: 22 January 2019).

ThaiPBS (2014a) *People Station: Dong Lan Model, Chiang Rai, Earthquake Community Model*. Thailand: Thai Public Broadcasting Service. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ona0iAi930g.

ThaiPBS (2014b) *People Station: Lack of Residential Repaired Equipments after Chiang Rai Earthquake 26-05-2014*. Thailand: Thai Public Broadcasting Service. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hF5w6XVJmLw.

ThaiPBS (2014c) *Public Forum: Restoring Mea Suay people's minds 31-05-2014*. Thailand: Thai Public Broadcasting Service. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2dNUe1rKLo.

ThaiPBS (2014d) *Thai PBS and Network the Chiang Rai Earthquake Overcoming 12-05-2014*. Thailand: Thai Public Broadcasting Service. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGFLQJeWiRw.

ThaiPBS (2014e) 'Understanding Disaster: 3 months Chiang Rai Earthquake'. Thailand: Thai Public Broadcasting Service. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QDOcD2o3b4.

Thairathonline (2004) ‘The statement of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand tsunami 2004’, *Thairathonline*, 29 December.

Thairathonline (2011) *Yingluck threaten to punish the slackers with Legal measures*, *Thairathonline*. Available at: https://www.thairath.co.th/content/211104 (Accessed: 8 September 2019).

Thairathonline (2014a) *Earthquake non-stop shaking Mae Suai people fears the breakage dam*, *Thairathonline*. Available at: https://www.thairath.co.th/content/437967 (Accessed: 13 July 2020).

Thairathonline (2014b) *‘Mae Suai’ - shocked again, local fears the dam breakage !*, *Thairathonline.com*. Available at: https://www.thairath.co.th/content/445775 (Accessed: 13 July 2020).

Thairathonline (2014c) *Thailand Great Flood 2011, ‘Nong Nam’ caused Thai people remember because ‘Can not deal with it’*, *Thairath*.

Thairepublica (2011) *Estimating of World Bank, Thai’s flood damage about 1.356 trillion baht and more than 7 hundred billion baht in restoration*, *Thaipublica.org*. Available at: https://thaipublica.org/2011/12/world-bank-flood-damage/ (Accessed: 10 September 2019).

Thaiwater (2013) *Thailand 2011 the greatest flood record*, *Thaiwater.net*. Available at: http://www.thaiwater.net/current/flood54.html (Accessed: 9 September 2019).

Thaiwater (2019) *Flooding memorandum*. Available at: http://www.thaiwater.net/web/index.php/flood-history.html (Accessed: 20 January 2019).

The Mirror Foundation (2011) *Operation Centre by civil society: Resolution by volunteers*. Available at: http://www.mirror.or.th/autopagev4/show_page.php?topic_id=1705&auto_id=38&TopicPk=1703 (Accessed: 14 January 2019).

The Nation (2011a) ‘Even this national disaster is being used as a political weapon’, *The Nation*, 26 October.

The Nation (2011b) ‘The flood crisis: Lesson learnt,opportunities created’, *The Nation*, 24 October.

Tierney, K. (2019) *Disaster: a sociological approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tiyapairat, Y. (2012) ‘Public Sector Responses to Sustainable Haze Management in Upper Northern Thailand’, *Environmental Asia*, 5(2), pp. 1–10. Available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/25899733.pdf.

Tonami, A. and Mori, A. (2007) ‘Sustainable Development in Thailand: Lessons From Implementing Local Agenda 21 in Three Cities’, *The Journal of Environment & Development*, 16(3), pp. 269–289. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/44319905.

Torfing, J. (1999a) *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Torfing, J. (1999b) ‘Workfare With Welfare: Recent Reforms of the Danish Welfare State’, *Journal of European Social Policy*, 9(1), pp. 5–28. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/095892879900900101.

Tourismchiangrai (2019) *Chiang Rai Province*. Available at: http://www.tourismchiangrai.com/index.php?p=chiangrai (Accessed: 25 July 2018).

Trakransirinon, P. (2010) *The Project of Community Strength in Resolving Haze crisis: the Communities Base Learning*. Chiang Mai: Chiang Mai University.

TRF (2014) ‘Mae Lao earthquake, Chiang Rai, Lessons’, in Fund, T. T. R. (ed.) *Mae Lao earthquake, Chiang Rai, Lessons*. Bangkok: The Thailand Research Fund. Available at: http://www.dmr.go.th/download/article/article_20141119151717.pdf.

UNDMT (2015) *Disaster management knowlegde case study: Chiang Rai Earthqauke in Mae Suruai and San Makha Subdistrict*. Chiang Rai: Upper Northern Province Disaster Management Team.

Available at: https://www.codi.or.th/attachments/article/7623/km-cr300458.pdf.

UNIDSR (2009) *UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction*. Geneva: UNISDR. Available at: https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/7817.

UNISDR (2015) *Hurricane Katrina Raised the Bar for Disaster Risk Management*. Available at: https://www.unisdr.org/files/45571_2015no28.pdf.

UNOCHA (2013) *Philippines: Super Typhoon Haiyan makes landfall, UN and humanitarian community on high-alert.* Available at: https://www.unocha.org/story/philippines-super-typhoon-haiyan-makes-landfall-un-and-humanitarian-community-high-alert (Accessed: 1 April 2018).

Vandergeest, P. (1993) 'Constructing Thailand: Regulation, everyday resistance, and citizenship', *Comparative Studies of Society and History*, 35(1), pp. 133–158.

Visetpricha, B. (2020) *Environmental Gentrification and Eco-authoritarianism: Restoring Canals under the Military-led Government in Thailand | Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*. Available at: https://kyotoreview.org/issue-30/environmental-gentrification-and-eco-authoritarianism-restoring-canals-under-the-military-led-government-in-thailand-2/ (Accessed: 8 March 2021).

Vongvisessomjai, S. (2009) 'Tropical cyclone disasters in the Gulf of Thailand', *Songklanakarin Journal of Science and Technology*, 31.

Warner, J. (2013) 'The Politics of "Catastrophization"', in Hilhorst, D. (ed.) *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises*. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 76–94.

Watts, M. (2013) 'A Political Ecology of Environmental Security', in Rita, F. and Richard, M. (eds) *Environmental Security Approaches and Issues*. London: Routledge, pp. 82–101.

Webb, C. and McEntire, D. A. (2011) *Emergency Management in New Zealand: Potential Disasters and Opportunities for Resilience*.

Weichselgartner, J. and Kelman, I. (2014) 'Geographies of resilience: Challenges and opportunities of a descriptive concept', *Progress in Human Geography*, 39(3), pp. 249–267. doi: 10.1177/0309132513518834.

White, G. (1945) *Human adjustment to floods*. A Geographical Approach to the Flood Problem in the United States. University of Chicago.

White, G. (1972) 'Geography and public policy', The Professional Geographer, 24, pp. 101–104.

White, G. and Haas, J. E. (1975) *Assessment of Research on Natural Hazards*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

White, R. and Smoke, P. (2005) 'East Asia decentralizes', in Bank, T. W. (ed.) *East Asia Decentralizs Making Local Government Work*. Washington: The World Bank, pp. 1–24.

Wisner, B. *et al.* (2003) *At Risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Wood, M. (2015) 'Paradoxical Politics: Emergency, Security and the Depoliticisation of Flooding', *Political Studies*, 64(3), pp. 699–718. doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12192.

Wyatt-Nichol, H. and Abel, C. (2007) 'A Critical Analysis of Emergency Management', *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 29, pp. 567–585. doi: 10.1080/10841806.2007.11029611.

Zakour, M. J. and Gillespie, D. F. (2013) *Community Disaster Vulnerability*. New York: Springer.

Zwi, A. *et al.* (2013) *Do community based disaster risk management (CBDRM) initiatives reduce the social and economic cost of disasters?* London. Available at: http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/Portals/0/PDF reviews and summaries/CDBRM 2013 Zwi protocol.pdf?ver=2013-06-12-143922-063.

Notes

[1] Rittel and Webber (1973) have identified the characteristics of 'wicked problems' as follows; there is no definitive formation of wicked problems, they have no stop rule, the solutions are not merely true or false, every solution has only a one-shot operation, it is a uniqueness problem and can be considered to be a symptom of another problem, they can be explained in numerous ways and public opinion is not wrong. Moreover, Head and Alford (2015) have identified that the wicked problems concept grew in the 1970s-1980s because such problems became more complicated and valuable. Traditional policy analysis may not use merely a rational-technical approach to find an effective way of solving such problems, so new methods must be produced to analyse wicked problems – for example, a critical analysis approach (intractable policy controversies) was developed by Schon and Rein (1994).

[2] The 2007 Act originated from the management failure of the Thai state, breakdowns in communication, the lack of efficient disaster warnings, the fragmented management of all parts of the state, inexperienced staff and inadequate local authority when facing the Indian Ocean Tsunami that hit the southern part of Thailand in 2004 and which resulted in 5,401 deaths and 2,921 missing persons. In addition, some Thai scholars, such as Sighasem (2017), have argued that the disaster management reform of Thailand was also influenced by the new public management (good governance) scheme of the Thai government in that period, positing that the establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention Mitigation in 2004 was a landmark of the disaster management reform undertaken in Thailand. In my perspective, the emergence of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation only changed the organisational structure held but did not change the fundamental disaster approach of Thailand. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation is also affiliated to and controlled by the Ministry of Interior, as is part of the centralised authority.

[3] Each organisation of Thailand has its own plans and goals as they belong to different departments and ministries. When they face disaster circumstances, they shall have their own methods through which to respond. For example, in relation to the significant flooding in Chiang Mai in 2005, departments failed to coordinate with one another. As the Thai Meteorological Department did not warn the Chiang Mai municipality about the upcoming heavy rainfall, the latter was unable to drain the floodwater fast enough.

[4] The proclamations of the Thai state, for example, have denoted that local government entities will be the main organisations within enacting disaster procedures, planning, prevention, mitigation, decision-making and resource mobilisation efforts. This rhetoric has appeared in official documents, meeting reports and the official handbook that disaster consultants created for local government (e.g., the Handbook of Thai Local Disaster Management (2013)) and in unofficial sources such as the news and mass communication forms.

[5] The Chiang Rai Earthquake, the most severe earthquake to have occurred in the history of Thailand, began on May 4, 2014 and measured 6.3 on the Richter Scale. Furthermore, several aftershocks hit six provinces in the upper northern region. These quakes caused one fatality and 40 injuries, devastated 15,139 residences and had an impact on official buildings and infrastructure. (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2017).

[6] This plan was based on an approach to disaster risk management influenced by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, with the assumption that massive damage can be reduced by controlling vulnerable factors and areas and via the reduction of existing risks and hazards. Educational, social, environmental, institutional and cultural measures must be considered as an essential tool here (in strengthening pertinent policy and institutions and in assessing and monitoring risk and developing early warnings) to enhance people's awareness of disaster risk. The majority of this content therefore revolves around measures designed to build community resilience based on four processes; 1) focusing on a disaster risk reduction strategy, 2) applying an integrated emergency management system, 3) strengthening and enhancing the efficiency of sustainable disaster recovery and 4) promoting and strengthening international cooperation as to disaster risk management.

[7] This perspective presumes a disaster is a damaging situation that ruins the operations of society and its sub-systems, thereby distorting regular functions and creating excessive demand. To return to equilibrium and to respond to raised demands, the seeking of capable management and organisation becomes a key means through which to cope with a disaster and to manifest community organisation.

[8] Presently, this paradigm is also considered a dominant approach in Disaster Management Studies and research undertaken in the fields of Science, Engineering and Geography.

[9] This school of thought is led by key American sociologist Enrico (Henry) Quarantelli, as pioneered the Sociology of Disaster. He also founded the Disaster Research Center. Other key scholars here include Russell Dynes, Eugen Hass, Steven Tripp, Thomus Drabek and Antony Taylor.

[10] The foreground of this logic relies on (the issues that result from) patterns of development or man-made disasters – for instance, from poor planning and/or a lack of public awareness, elements which render populations vulnerable to the adverse effects of hazards (Riet, 2017).

[11] Blaikie *et al*. (1994) and Wisner *et al.* (2003) have presented seminal models through which to understanding the sources of risk and vulnerability that have influenced global disaster management and disaster risk reduction policy to the present day. These models are the Pressure and Release and Household Access Model and the Household Access Model, as lead to an understanding of risk through eminent (risk) equation forms – for instance, Risks (R) = Vulnerability (V) * Hazard (H).

[12] The study of Climate Change adaption is often held to be the same matter as in disaster (geographical hazards) research – seen in Schipper and Pelling (2006), Mercer (2010) and Stripple and Bulkeley (2014).

[13] Discourse is the construction of all social relations, whereby all actors connect together as a chain of different elements and thereby form relation systems, modifying the identities of these components and constituting actions, social behaviour and system institutions.

[14] A nodal point is a privileged cluster of significations which fuse together a series of internal differences or which form a point that contingently harnesses together different identities and interests. This point allows the organisation of oppositional alliances among members of a forged assemblage, hence allowing actors to be involved in political action against a common opposition.

In symbolic terms, it is an empty signifier that is a representational term which partially fixes the meaning of different identities.

[15] In explaining policy change, PDT draws attention to actors who potentially make decisions or changes as to a structure rather than analysing actors as a unit within a structure (Griggs and Howarth, 2018). Therefore, many Poststructuralist Discourse Theory critical policy researchers often mention particular key agencies or actors who arise as key players in driving campaigns or counter-discourses.

[16] Howarth and Griggs (2017a) refer to Zizak (1997) and additionally explain that the emergence of fantasmatic logics is an endeavour designed to find the rationale of a subject in sustaining a social order or in abolishing it. This captures the ways in which a subject manages their enjoyment by connecting themselves to objects and representations.

[17] Due to the long-standing conflict between Estonia and Russia, Estonians feared Russian intervention and domination of Estonian public companies.

[18] Griggs and Howarth (2019) have further explained the idea of hegemony, political logics and fantasmatic logics, holding these concepts as being best used in interpreting new forms of politics or post-politics eras – particularly in the second wave of studies as to depoliticisation. This is achieved via similar assumptions in apprehending the given politics of a study, such as by drawing attention to contingency as a condition of politics, discerning the strategies of depolitisation as a means of eliminating or closing-down possibilities of choice and collective agency, perceiving depoliticised issues as necessary state affairs or as a given set of practices to which there is no alternative and focusing on explaining the policy-making practice and democratic governance involved. These aspects can relate to the political insight of PDT.

[19] Foucault employed a genealogical approach to illustrate how historical research can be brought to bear on contemporary intuitions in ways that are powerfully critical and revealing. Further detail as to such genealogy can be found in the work of Glynos and Howarth (2007) in terms of practical PDT.

[20] Glynos and Howarth (2007: 28-30) have argued that positivism and normativism involves deduction and induction processes being used in finding problems and explaining phenomena. Retroduction should be applied in inventing the social world because it can be extended to break the compartmentalisation established in the Natural Sciences between discovery and judgement and allows us to interrogate ontological principles.

[21] Indeed, such practice may be a political strategy of central government intentionally designed to centralise and sustain its hegemonic power by blaming the weakness and incompetence of local government bodies.

[22] On the other hand, ‘Fantasy logics function as the tool in concealing the contingency of the social relation and naturalising the relations of domination in discourse’ (Griggs & Howarth, 2013: 47). In this way, the role of ideology is important in fulfilling the aim of the subject.

[23] The characteristics of wicked problems in policy relate to their invocation of dilemmas and objectives in policy (value divergence), highly complex issues (policy implementation related to inter-organisational cooperation and multi-level governance) and difficulty in defining formulations and solutions within uncertain situations (fragmentation issues and stakeholders).

[24] Both interventions were operated under key excuses such as the need to maintain the peace of society in responding to widespread protests and broad corruption at several levels (particularly national or policy-decision levels). However, conversely, politics scholars, such as Conner and Hewison (2008) and Kanchoochat and Hewison (2016), have suggested that both coups were entirely the result of the political motivations of traditional Thai powers and networks. Evidently, the two coups were supported by the traditional ruling class due to concerns and fears being held as to the increments of political power being gained by electoral politicians (in particular, Thaksin Shinawatra and his party). Notably, those politicians had a tendency to extend their administrative power more than in the past - see Journal of Contemporary Asia, Volume 46, No 3.

[25] Fred Rigg (1966; 311-329) developed the Bureaucratic Polity Model to analyse the political systems of Thailand. In brief, Rigg described how the 1932 overthrowing of the absolute monarchy had not been popular among Thai people. An uprising of bureaucracy in building the country was important at that time. In requiring technical and development knowledge, national security was the main factor in entering and dominating high-ranking bureaucratic (civilians) and military cabinet positions. The Thai Cabinet was here able to control the decision-making given in the policy process and could entirely access the policy via personal relations (e.g., among a group of high-ranking bureaucrats and elite business leaders). Therefore, in the making of decisions and the operating of policy, bureaucratic norms were predominantly employed.

[26] The Rajaprajanugroh Foundation, as operated under royal patronage, was the main organisation in assisting disaster victims and areas following 1963.

[27] Although Thailand confronted massive flooding throughout the country between September and November 1941, particularly in its central provinces, this was seen as a domestic threat which did not influence the government of Thailand's approach in coping with disasters or the formulating of new measures.

[28] Some Thai political scholars (e.g., Ngamcachonkulkid, 2005; Chaiching, 2009) have noted that, after the failure of the Axis Powers, and due to Thai Prime Minister Field Marshall Pibulsongkram having aligned the country with the Axis Powers, control was seized by others (e.g., the Allied Powers and Seri Thai groups) and liberal democracy became strengthened. Thus, the delegation of disaster authority partially resulted from the decreasing influence and power of the military government of Thailand.

[29] The establishment of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was an upgrade from the Division of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation in 1950 as the government of Thailand confronted more strongly its security threats – perceived to be, for example, communist interventions in the region and the conflict of the Korean War in 1949. The Thai Junta here defined defined disasters in the context of security.

[30] Between 1952 and 1953, under the Public Sector Reform Act of 1953, the Ministry of Interior assumed broad responsibilities as to domestic security, disaster prevention (including the Thai Police Department), attorney and correction tasks, social work and land management. Thus, when political change occurred, the Ministry of Interior was always the alternating target (Bowarnwathana, 2005).

[31] The Ministry of Interior and Civil defence Unit of Thailand are powerful organisations as they represent the resources centre which every policy actor must engage with. Indeed, when political

change occurs, these entities are the first priority for taking over by both military and bureaucracy elites (DDPM specialist, 2019).

[32] Thailand's coup in 1957 by the new military elite (Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat), some royalists and conservative groups (Seni and Kukrit Pramoj) also witnessed the involvement of technocrats and Thai bureaucratic elites. Later, these groups came into play as the Thai Cabinet and played a main role in the Public Sector reform undertaken in 1962 (e.g., the uprising of national economic and social development committees and large central bureaus, the Ministry of Economic Development, Budget Bureaus and others). In the perspective of comparative public administration and politics, this witnessed the emergence of a "bureaucratic polity" (Riggs, 1966; Ockey, 2004; Yoshinori, 2002) and an initial period of paternalism (Chaloemtiarana, 2007).

[33] The Provincial Administration Act of 1955, Section 31, determined that disaster management or civil defence was a provincial government task.

[34] Tropical Storm Harriet devastated the southern region of Thailand across 12 provinces, damaging more than 22,000 houses and 435 schools. The event caused 911 deaths, over 10,000 people were made homeless and 142 people were missing. Communication and transportation means were terminated and interrupted for over a month. Economic damage, at the time, was estimated at 30-40 million US Dollars.

[35] The Rajaprajanugroh Foundation was established by Thai King Rama IX and the Royal Family in 1964 to support that situation. At that time, the Foundation had responsibility for coordinating related organisations which lacked direction in recovering affected areas. Through the charismatic nature of the Foundation, the assistance provided was integrated and this enabled a more effective operation. The successful recovery witnessed in that situation resulted in the Foundation being broadened to cover several areas of Thailand.

[36] Bowarnwathana (2005: 42) demonstrated that the administrative reform of that period was marked by a struggle for power between the bureaucratic elite and elected politicians. Notwithstanding this, elected politicians became increasingly powerful (if compared with previous periods) and the government of Thailand realistically had less power as the government comprised multiple powers in the hands of separate partners who shared control of the country's ministries. The stability of the government of Thailand depended upon the Thai Prime Minister and their competence in coordinating the interests of each of the partners. In this regard, the government of Thailand was highly centralised.

[37] This can be seen in the Thai Cabinet between 1978 and 1983, as comprised more retired elite bureaucrat and technocrat members.

[38] Although this Act had fully given the main role of disaster management to civilians and the Ministry of Interior, some statements – such as Section 3-4 of the Act – constituted air threats and terrorism as forms of disaster which fell under civilian responsibility.

[39] A single command structure, hierarchical decisions and bureaucratic presumptions were ideas which appeared in the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 1973, Section 1-3. (OSC, 2019)

[40] Previous acts, operational units and human resource provisions had determined the security services and Thai Military as the main organisations for coping with disaster situations.

[41] The establishment of the Civil defence Volunteers was formalised by the Thai state. The Civil defence Volunteers, following the Act's content, was likely to be led by bureaucrats or full-time officers as the Ministry of Interior regulated official requirements, regulations and various procedures in this area. For instance, Civil defence Volunteer staff were regulated to have an official uniform and tasked with increasing public welfare and reward (from the state) via the use of a central bureaucratic hierarchy (as overseen by the Department of Provincial Administration and Ministry of Interior) (Ministry of Interior, 2019). The unit thus was not as flexible as other general volunteers. It was, on the other hand, a new department of Thai bureaucracy.

[42] Although Sections 20, 23 and 24 of the Act assigned local government to deal with disaster prevention, the appointing of civil defence officers and the providing of assistance to the provincial director of secretaries of the civil defence office meant that all decisions were eventually centralised at the provincial and national level.

[43] Most of the governments of Thailand between 1980 and 1992 were coalitions, with Prem Tinsulanonda holding the Office of Prime Minister in the years 1980-1988. Here, military and bureaucratic elites created strong bureaucracy in the policy formulation process.

[44] This storm was the strongest in Thailand for 35 years.

[45] More than 1,000 roads, 194 bridges, and 38,002 houses and buildings were damaged, covering an area of 618,000 acres or 2,500 km2. The economic loss was estimated at 456.5 million US Dollars.

[46] General Chatichai Choonhavan was the Thai Prime Minister between 4 August 1988 and 23 February 1991.

[47] The administrative reform as to natural environment management and disaster management in this era opened the door more for technocrats and experts to be involved to a stronger degree than other people and other sectors. The emergence of the Decentralisation Plan and Transition Act of 1999 and the constituting of a participatory plan partially reduced the demand for public, local government and political involvement in such policy areas and thus secured large bureaucratic authority (Vandergeest & Wittayapak, 2010).

[48] Thailand suffered significantly from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, namely as the government of Thailand had inappropriately implemented policy since 1989 – for instance, in emphasising the financial liberation of international investments (uncontrolled international financing) and by implementing mis-directed policy. Thailand thus becoming a weak state whose economic system depended on other countries. In this sense, the country had failed to deploy R&D, lacked measurements through which to control the use of resources and the environment including investment in national infrastructure, instituted insufficient fiscal discipline among the activity of the government of Thailand and deregulated the country's financial institutions (Bello, Cunningham & Poh Li, 1998). Following this economic failure, international organisations were called upon for assistance (World Bank, IMF, UNDP and ADB) and therefore intervened in the state systems of Thailand by using a good governance approach and securing financial discipline in the economic recovery (Bowarnwathana, 2005: 43).

[49] Political awareness, participation demands, the rise of civil society and several NGOs emerged in that moment.

[50] Those decentralised details were defined in the Decentralisation Plan and Transition Act of 1999. Noticeably, this Act determined environmental management and disaster management as the responsibilities of the local level (Section 2) and also set benchmarks for the percentage of government income to be transferred to local government – 20 percent in 2001, increasing in steps to 35 percent by 2006 and thereafter to be reviewed every five years (Section 4). This was not achieved and the Transformation of Sanitation District into Municipality Act of 1999 upgraded sanitation districts to be municipalities. Between 1997 and 2000, the large bureaucratic structure was challenged by the growth of public awareness and good governance streams. As a result, many decentralised actions were the outcome of a compromise between politicians and the bureaucratic polity, through which people's demands were diminished. Bowarnwathana (2005) has depicted how "big bureaucrats power, in this period, was taken over by elected politicians".

[51] The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was tasked with drafting the disaster management plan of the country, providing measurements as to supporting, preventing and responding to disasters by setting up disaster and security policy, building disaster warning provisions and a prevention, recovery and evaluation system to secure the safety of human beings in an economical manner.

[52] The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation was established by combining five units – the Department of Rural Development (Ministry of Interior), Division of Civil defence (Department of Provincial Administration, Ministry of Interior), Division of Victim Services (Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Interior), the Infrastructural Mechanism section (Department of Social Development, Ministry of Interior), and the Office of Accident Prevention (Office of the Permanent Secretary).

[53] This administrative reform of Thailand was implemented under three crucial acts – the Reorganisation of Ministry, Sub-Ministry and Department Act of 2002; the Good Governance Decree of 2003 and the Secretariat of the Cabinet Regulation on Public Administrative Planning of 2004.

[54] From the Thai Budget Bureau Report (2019), in 2003 the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's budget was approximately 1,296 million Baht (40 million US Dollars). However, in 2007, the budget was dramatically increased to approximately 3,516 million Baht (106 million US Dollars).

[55] Comparative public administration and politics scholars have argued that the dilemmas of the administrative reform and intensive bureaucratisation of some Thai departments and ministries resulted first from the lack of governmental intention. This administrative reform was the power consolidation of the government of Thailand and the increasing absolute power of the Thai Prime Minister (Thaksin) in an effort to build a strong state under the businessman's authoritarian approach (Macago & Pathmanand, 2004; Pasuk & Baker, 2004; Bowarnwathana, 2004, 2005; Painter, 2006; Chardchawarn, 2010). The governmental reform was not designed to minimise bureaucratic power, but rather to transfer power to super-CEOs. Secondly, this lack of intention created fake administrative reform. The new unit became the centre of the (transferred) old bureaucrats who only sought success in their career in the new structure, particularly in the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. This created "old wine in a new bottle" (Interviewee C and D, 2019). Thirdly, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation reform arose under an old disaster management provision (the Civil defence Act of 1979), as laid

down the disaster management hierarchy of the Department of Provincial Administration and the Ministry of Interior manifesting an intensive single command form with central and provincial units (Sighasem, 2017). This centralisation of the government of Thailand was a chance to recover bureaucratic power in the face of increased public awareness, elected politicians and the decentralisation efforts witnessed in the early 1990s. It was difficult for large bureaucracies such as the Department of Provincial Administration and the Ministry of Interior to bring explicated power back (such as in holding authority in commanding local governments and in appointing local executives). Consequently, indirect intervention in local disaster and natural environment management by central government via the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's structure was seen by the state as a way to achieve gradual domination, primarily as the Thai public and local government entities were understood not to pay attention too much towards environmental policy (Director of Department of Public Work of PAO,2019).

[56] The Indian Ocean Tsunami was devastating in many aspects, causing over 5,400 deaths, 2,921 missing persons, 458 million US Dollars of economic damage and devastation over six provinces (Secretariat of the Cabinet, 2005).

[57] At that moment in 2004, Thailand did not have a main unit for disaster warnings. Only the Thai Meteorological Department (as belonged to the Department of Transportation) had a mission of forecasting weather and storms yet did not hold a mandate to provide disaster warning networks or to utilise tsunami/earthquake forecasting technologies.

[58] Obviously, the authority had underestimated the situation. This could be seen in the reporting by the Thai mass media on the day the tsunami hit. They reported that flooding had only occurred around the coast, that this was solely caused by a storm and that the storm surf had not affected a wide area or produced significant damage (Thairath, 2014).

[59] The 2007 disaster management reform was evidently influenced by the administrative approach of the tycoon Prime Minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, as drove the country's mixed approach (new public management with business authoritarianism). Some scholars have called this "prime ministerialisation", denoting the centralisation of all authorities under the prime minister and transforming politicians and bureaucrats to be company employees (Bowarnwathana, 2004). Although the new Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act was launched in 2007 (during the military government of Thailand under Prime Minister Surayaud Chulanont,), it can be said that this provision was in reality created by Thaksin's Government as the law had principally been approved by the Thai Cabinet since November 2004 but had not been able to be used for the December 2007 Tsunami as it needed to be revised before its use (Secretariat of the Cabinet, 2007).

[60] The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 transferred more disaster management power to politicians and local authorities than had been possessed in the past. It can be seen that this provision set the National Committee on Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (as chaired by the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand) to assume responsibility for the related policy formulation and implementation in the country (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2006). However, this committee comprised 23 members, only 2 of which were elected politicians (Section 6), 5 of which were disaster management scholars and other relevant scholars (appointed by the Thai Cabinet) and 16 were bureaucrats (with 8 of those 16 coming from the Thai Military and security sectors).

[61] The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 sought to decentralise, presumably, disaster management duties to local governments (as led by local governors), whereby the local director was enabled to command and utilise resources whereupon a disaster occurred in their local area (Section 21). Here, the local government would merely assist provincial and district directors in respect of the scope/damage of the disaster faced (Section 20) (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007). This reflects how the provincial and district government retained more disaster management authority than local governments. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 allowed provincial governors to command and make judgments in disaster areas declared at the provincial level and for the local areas that form part of the provincial and district government's areas (Section 15) (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2008).

[62] Sections 4 and 6 of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007.

[63] Deep South Watch records show that, in 2007, the highest number of deaths occurred, with 892 being killed from 2,409 bomb attacks. However, the state employed security mechanisms and martial law to deal with the chaotic situation instead of using the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act.

[64] Between 2006 and 2010, Thailand was administered by four governments and 4 prime ministers (two prime ministers were elected, two were appointed by the Thai Military). The situation was contested regularly following 2006 – for example, in 2006 by the People's Alliance for Democracy, in 2007 by the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship group and again by that group in 2009.

[65] Chardchawarn (2010) points out that Thailand's 2006 coup opened the door wider for bureaucrats and the Thai Military in many aspects – for example, in responding to the decentralisation process and in drafting the 2007 Constitution of Thailand.

[66] Under the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007, there were 12 regional Disaster Prevention and Mitigation units. There are now 18 units, with the increase being due to the Ministry of Interior Regulation of 2008.

[67] This identification allowed the Thai Military and other security sectors to officially become involved in Thailand's disaster management system again.

[68] These reform notions are the consequence of effort being given to resolving the problems as to the intergovernmental relations of Thailand as found across a whole range of administration levels – including in the disaster management context. Research has indicated that each local government holds different ideas about their authority and jurisdictional boundaries in regards to disaster management, with no clarity being held as to the responsibilities assigned towards dealing with certain tasks. Some believe that the national government must manage everything while others believe that disaster management is a duty of local government and citizens. These different ideas contribute towards the difficulties faced in coordinating and coping with disasters among local and and upper-level government bodies in disaster areas (Sudhipongpracha, 2014).

[69] This is the short from of the disaster management procedures that all Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation staff are acquainted with - P1 (Prevention and Mitigation), P2 (Preparedness), R1 (Response), and R2 (Recovery) – following the Disaster Prevention and

Mitigation Act and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan promulgated in 2007 and 2010, respectively.

[70] Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva was in office between 2008 and 2011. His administration was installed with the strong support of the Thai Military and the Privy Council as was similarly involved in the coup in 2006 (Kanchoochat & Hewison, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2011).

[71] Each disaster management unit owns their empire, has their own resources and enacts a hierarchical command. Command by a disaster management director is quite difficult to operate. Sighasem (2011) has shown this in relation to flood management, whereby local governors as the disaster director cannot effectively command or coordinate with other disaster management agencies. Here, conflict shall arise between the security sectors (Thai Military and Thai Police) and the provincial and district government. In this regard, the governor cannot command security agencies, even though the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act gives this authority to provincial and local governors. Thus, disaster management directors and the disaster management efforts enacted at the provincial level have needed to pay more attention to building informal disaster management networks over using formal disaster management mechanisms. It has been noted that, in this context, "[e]ffective disaster management will happen if you have a good relationship with a powerful authority" (Provincial Governor, 2019).

[72] This was one of the biggest floods in Thailand since 1942. The flooding of 2011 had a tremendous social and economic impact, with the economic damage exceeding 42 million US Dollars, four million families being affected and 615 deaths having occurred.

[73] Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was in office 5 August 2011 – 7 May 2014, starting in a period of massive flooding that gradually intensified. According to HII (2011), the flooding beginning in January 2011 was due to multiple tropical storms hitting Thailand.

[74] Nevertheless, the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act aimed to transfer significant disaster management authority from the Ministry of Interior (as a bureaucratic entity) to the Prime Minister and Cabinet of Thailand (as comprised elected politicians) by manifesting the National Committee on Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. This entity constituted 23 members and was chaired by Thailand's Prime Minister. Most of the committee was formed of high-ranking bureaucrats and leaders of the security sectors. Only two members were elected politicians (Section 6-7 of the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act) (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2007). The government of Thailand introduced military intervention into the crisis. It did not require the security forces to be involved too much with the administration (The Nation, 2011). A report has claimed that 'PM Yingluck feared the military would use the opportunity to consolidate their power' (The Nation, 2011b).

[75] The Administrative Act of 1991 sought to organise the bureaucratic units, hierarchical command, span of authority and command of each ministry. This law, of course, centralised all administrative authorities to the Cabinet or government of Thailand. At the same time, the government of Thailand grasped some sections to consolidate its disaster management power.

[76] Only two weeks after the earthquake, the Thai Military, through General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, seized power from the civilian government on 24 May, 2011. Thailand was subsequently governed by a junta and Prayuth became the Prime Minister of Thailand. This was a critical point of change for the disaster management landscape of Thailand.

[77] Although the government of Thailand, through the Ministry of Interior and transportation ministers, had commanded the use of the state's emergency budget to recover affected areas, a state of emergency was not announced at the national level. On the other hand, the provincial government was assigned to declare a state of emergency (at the provincial level) in some areas only (Chiang Rai Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2011; Manager, 2011a, 2011b).

[78] The Chiang Rai Civil Society Disaster Management Network comprised of local civil society groups, local foundations, local people and government representatives and the mass media (ThaiPBS), possessing an initial objective as to managing a disaster database and providing assistance for building inspections following the disaster.

[79] According to the Nation Security Act of 2008 (revised in 2017), as set out by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Declaration 51/60, Section 1, the army area commander was also assigned to be the regional disaster management commander.

[80] The Minister of Interior, General Anupong Paochinda, had been in office since 2014 following General Prayut Chan-o-cha's coup. Anupong was also an advisor to the Junta, officially called the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Furthermore, he was the leader of the Thai coup in 2006.

[81] All disaster management resources – for example local emergency budgeting and planning processes – must be approved at the provincial level and by the governor (as a unit of the central state). This can be seen in several regulations of the Ministry of Interior, the latest being the ministry regulations on local emergency assistance budgeting of 2018 (2nd edition). This provision was positioned to enact centralisation.

[82] The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was a core source of guidance when drafting the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015. Further detail as to the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan of 2015 can be found at www.disaster.go.th/en/download.php.

[83] This integrated the national security policy of the Thai Military with the national readiness policy in 2012 and the national disaster management plan (National Security Council, 2019). This was an official manifestation of the Thai Military's intervention into the disaster management of Thailand.

[84] The decentralisation stream of local governments and peoples since 1995, alongside the strong civil government, led to the Thai bureaucracy being controlled and governed by politicians, especially following the 2004 Thai public sector reform. This implemented new managerial tools (new public management) such as employing CEO concepts, KPIs and strategic-based management within public administration.

[85] In the Thai context, central government officers or bureaucrats tend to hold a higher status than politicians and local civil servants. Additionally, most bureaucrats work to underlie assumptions that aim to intensively secure the public interest of the state more than the providing of public service to the people and being servants of the Royal Thai Government. Hence, when national or local politicians regained power, they became significant figures in the development of the country between 2000 and 2009. Most elite bureaucrats were unsecure and increased their distrust of this new power (Baker, 2016). In the Thai politics context, particularly in the period of 2004-2014, the distrust of politicians and local governments often related to notions of corruption, the lack of

fiscal discipline among this group, the inadequacies of local governments, the self-interest of politicians and the rise of populism.

[86] The Disaster Management and Prevention Act 2010 authorised the disaster management power of the provincial governor (as a provincial disaster commander) by assigning many disaster management tasks. Some of the key responsibilities here pertained to disaster management planning, the approving of the local disaster management plan (Section 6) and the establishing of a provincial disaster management planning committee (the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Policy Committee) (Section 16) to operate the plan approval process. This Committee was appointed from a number of professional bureaucrats (section 17). Although the Act determined that the committee should contain seven local government representatives, realistically those local members had no significant negotiation or voting power due to the official hierarchy of the provincial administration and status of the local authorities. Traditionally, local officers or politicians in Thailand are always affronted by national or central officers in terms of the inefficiency, unqualified staff and lack of transparency allegations aimed at local government.

[87] This committee was responsible for developing the provincial plan, facilitating local governments to provide a comprehensive disaster management plan and approving the disaster management local plan (Section 19-16, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2010).

[88] This Committee was in charge of disaster management implementation in crisis situations, wherein a medium scale disaster occurs, by operating as a special unit that commanded, coordinated and facilitated relative organisations (Chiang Rai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2014)

[89] This Committee functioned as a unit in disaster damage investigations, in declaring disaster assistance areas and in monitoring, controlling and coordinating related organisations to provide assistance to disaster victims.

[90] It comprised of 7 chapters; 1) the disaster risk situation 2) background and geography of the local 3) disaster management command centre in the crisis area 4) pre-disaster implementation 5) disaster responsive implementation 6) post-disaster implementation and 7) communication in disasters.

[91] Interestingly, in relation to the projects and operations defined in this plan, central and provincial agencies were able to access and use the annual local budget to support the disaster management projects located in their local areas by claiming collective responsibility for the public interest (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2009: 34).

[92] The civil defence volunteers (*or por por raw* in Thai) are official volunteers selected from the general population to support the public in confronting disasters and other public hazards. These figures must be trained by the centre programmes and formally appointed by the Ministry of Interior hierarchy via the sub-district level. Such volunteers operate under central (Ministry of Interior), provincial (governor) and chief of district command. They do not work under the control of local government units.

[93] In the San Ma Kha municipality, the Committee comprised 70 people, with 54 of the members having been selected from 17 villages (4 people per village), 2 members from senior local leaders and 14 members from local NGOs. The decision-making process was based upon direct voting.

[94] At that time, he was the Commander of the Thai Army and thus leader of the 2014 Coup.

[95] Although the 2014 National Legislative Assembly voted him to be prime minister, he arguably appointed himself due to the fact that all National Legislative Assembly members at that moment were appointed by the coup d'état council and more than half (105 of 200 members) were high-ranking military and retired military officials (iLaw, 2014).

[96] Prayut's Cabinet comprised 12 ministers (almost half) who were retired military officials (most being involved in the 2007 and 2014 Thai coups – for example, General Anupong Paochinda (Minister of Interior) and General Prawit Wongsuwan (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of defence). Others were retired (elite) bureaucrats – for example, Panadda Diskul (Minister of the Prime Minister's Office) who was a former provincial governor and Permanent Secretary of Office of the Prime Minister, and Archom Termpittayapaisit (Minister of Transport) who was former Secretary-General of National Economic and Social Development Board). Finally, the Cabinet included technocrats connected to Prayuth and his networks (Bangkokbiznew, 2014; SOC, 2014).

[97] Such projects included the provision of a new local goods governance mechanism, the installing of operational integrity and transparency evaluations and the development of a provincial complaints system.

[98] At that time, the Chiang Rai governor was Pongsak Wang-Samer, as held this position between October 2012 and September 2015.

[99] Upon becoming Deputy Ministry of Interior Minister in August 2014, Sutee seemed to centralise all area management authorities within the provincial administration sphere, doing so under the discourse of the province providing 'integration centres' and there being a crucial need for 'integrated operations'. This enhancing of disaster management authority at the provincial level included increasing the disaster management budget for provincial administrations. In particular, on the 9th of October 2014, Sutee announced an increase from 600,000 US Dollars (20 million Baht) to 1.6 million US Dollars (50 million Baht) per disaster.

[100] The interviews undertaken demonstrate that most members of this party derived from remote areas and locations far away from the provincial disaster management centre. These figures invoked collective characteristics, had experience in mobilising local people movements and held strong connections with local NGOs.

[101] The reason for the removal of (most) NGOs here was due to the overall situation having improved and the majority of communities having learnt from community recovery models via their networks and the transferring of knowledge via training community leaders within 4 main projects. From this point, it was held that recovery had become 'the responsibility of the locals/community themselves' (Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network Coordinator A,2019), as had 'facilitated and provided self-community knowledge and management…and already had success' (NGOs Representative A,2019). This was confirmed by NGO leaders.

[102] Although the Community Organisation Development Institution was responsible for developing Thai civil society organisations and for building and supporting community/local

democratic processes which functioned as non-governmental organisations, it was realistically a state organisation (or a 'semi-public organisation') supervised by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security and central elite bureaucrats. Thus, the operations of the Community Organisation Development Institution were bureaucratic in style and utilised central bureaucrats/the Ministry of Interior network when transferring ideas. The role played by the Community Organisation Development Institution may have led to greater trust being given to the continued operations of the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network over the framing of effective self-disaster management (see Pitidol's work (2013, 2016) for further detail).

[103] Undeniably, the role played by the Community Organisation Development Institution led some local government leaders, village heads and communities to be persuaded that central/provincial government provisions remained a crucial part of the disaster management of Thailand, as made it difficult to mobilise local/community-only networks when dealing with disasters.

[104] Indeed, the nodal point or empty signifies (functions) operated as representational forms that partially fixed the meaning of the demands of different identities.

[105] As mentioned in the provincial report, the central disaster management enacted spent more than the private donations which had been received (being recorded at approximately 192 million Baht). However, it seems that a representative from the Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network disagreed with this number as several local and community projects provided non-financial assistance, construction material and operated separately from the province (Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network Coordinator A, 2019).

[106] This slogan refers to the building of an effective recovery process - as includes 1. processes to assist and relieve disaster-affected people via self-help, 2. procedures to restore public utility services, livelihoods and living conditions via the participation of affected people, and 3. proceeding to review past recovery measures to better face future disasters. This process is akin to the Community Disaster Recovery Model applied when connecting the demands of local people and alliances following the 2014 Earthquake, yet this model is operated at the state/province level.

[107] According to the Earthquake Master Plan 2014, Committee members should be comprised of representatives from a diversity of sectors. However, of the 18 members overall, 16 members were central bureaucrats (from the Ministry of Interior and the security sectors) and 2 were engineering and disaster management expert representatives (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2014). No representatives from local governments, civil society or NGOs were selected, despite this being a suggested need under the Earthquake Master Plan 2014.

[108] Local governments were required to draft incident command centre, operation and coordination guidelines, as included identifying the objectives, strategies and tactics needed within the local government plans formed.

[109] Riet (2017) has argued that these notions of risk assessment often use land cover and land-use maps to deduce the potential for adverse events and seek to add insight as to dangerous issues faced in relation to social practice. This, it is asserted, leads to simplistic causal explanations and ignores social knowledge and relations.

[110] Indeed, the grounds of the universal demands being held for social security reconstructed rationality whereby public officers or the authoritative hierarchy claimed the creation of social

interests and the negation of opposition from other groups who were seen to promote only sectional interests.

[111] Statecraft is a governing strategy of a state framed to remove the political character of decision-making, thereby shielding the state from the consequences of failure in order to ensure its power can be retained.

[112] This section responds to Research Question Three, as asks why/how the central authority can stabilise its power and maintain its practices of disaster management.

[113] These discourses appeared in two key plans – the Master Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention of 2004 and the Chiang Rai Implementation Plan for Earthquake Hazard Mitigation and Building Collapse Prevention 2004.

[114] Although disaster management scholars have recently begun to pay more attention to this area and have prepared novel strategies to investigate this phenomena (Kelman, 2003; Pelling and Dill, 2005; Pelling and Dill, 2010; Warner, 2013; Blackburn and Pelling, 2018), limited research has presented concrete strategies to access this knowledge (Warner, 2013; Donovan, 2016; Hilhorst, Boersma and Raju, 2020; McGowran and Donovan, 2021).

APPENDIX 1: List of Interviewee (Anonymised)

National and policy levels comprised 11 key informants

Purpose of interview: Understanding Thailand (paradox of) disaster management development, logics, ideologies that dominated DM policy and implementation over past decades.

1. Provincial governor, 13th March 2019
2. DDPM Specialist A,2019 15th March 2019
3. Provincial planning specialist, 26th February 2019
4. District Chief officer, 24th March 2019
5. Mayor A, 25th March 2019
6. Mayor B, 19th March 2019
7. Municipal Clerk A, 25th February 2019
8. Local policy analysis officer,14th February 2019
9. Director of Department of Public Work of PAO, 20th March 2019
10. Local disaster policy and management scholar, 24th February 2019
11. Representative of environmental and disaster network NGOs, (NGOs Representative B, 20th March 2019)

Chiang Rai earthquake (local) level comprised 14 key informants

Purpose of interview: understand the ways in which a political practice (appeared as the DM) was operated by the conflict parties (between Chiang Rai provincial authorities and local DM alliance or community alternative DM groups) amidst 2014 earthquake governance failure.

1. Provincial DDPM (Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation) officer A, 22nd February 2019
2. District DDPM officer B, 22nd March 2019
3. Chief Administration of SAO, 20th February 2019
4. Deputy of Chief Administration of SAO (Sub District Administration),2019 15th February 2019
5. Chief of Exclusive of SAO, 11th March 2019
6. Local Leader A, 27th February 2019
7. Local Leader B, 26th March 2019
8. Local Leader C, 20th March 2019
9. NGOs Representative A, 19th March 2019
10. CRDMN (Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network) coordinator A, 14th February 2019
11. CRDMN coordinator B,19th February 2019
12. CRDMN Staff, 13th February 2019
13. Local Academic Scholar A, 19th March 2019
14. Local Academic Scholar B, 19th March 2019

APPENDIX 2: Interview Questiones, Themes and Themes and Their Research Purrposes

Interview themes	Examples of question	Aims	Remarks
Background of participant and role in Thailand DM	-How long have you been working in Thai DM department and sectors?	Understand the development of past DM and relationships, the articulation of past demand and grievances	For all national levels interviewees
Origins of DM and emergence and causes of failure in (general) Thai DM as key signifier in Thai DM systems	- What is the origin/ and purpose of Thai DM? - When did you start realising about development of Thai DM? - How do you view DM of central/provincial government? - What was causes of DM failure in your opinion? -What did DM mean? Are you afraid with DM? and - What does DM or Disasters involve according to you?"	- Examination the linking of conditions around a particular, and increasingly empty, demand. -Understand the mobilisation of political and fantasmatic logics.	For all national levels interviewees
Thailand Disaster Management and failure forming: who, when, why, how	-Who generally influenced to Thai DM? / What was the original causes of Thailand DM success/failure (in overall)? - Who were a part of this phenomena? - Do you want to change DM? Why did you want to change? - Why did they say DM need to change? - How did that past project emerge?	- Understand the mobilisation of conditions (e.g. Government policies, local instability) as opportunities and threats requiring change; - Understand the taken-for-granted aspects of change, such as who was the key actor in construction successes and failure in DM or the main purpose of DM	For all national levels interviewees
Emergence of DM failure and success in 2014 Chiang Rai earthquake	-Where were this provincial DM failure from? -What/Who was the crucial cause and actor this failure?"; - Were there consultations or gathering? - How were disagreements negotiated under the earthquake failure/success?	- These questions are similar to national level questions but here focusing on the present era and 2014 Chiang Rai earthquake. - Compare this phenomenon with DM construction in the past eras in order to understand types of political practices (hegemonic strategies).	For all local (Chiang Rai earthquake) level interviewees
Characteristics of alternative of DM or DM by self-community	-What was occurred before local alliance gathering? -What were the characters of local/community or alternative DM? - What/How were main strategies in challenging the central DM? - Who was the main coalition of the local DM? - What could have been the other options (of DM) for local people?	- understand the drawing of equivalences and differences around particular signifiers, notably via strategies. - explore the exclusion of alternatives.	For local people and key actors of local alternative DM

Components of provincial/central DM	What was happened before the earthquake hit? -Could central DM mechanisms can deal with the earthquake? - How did the provincial government deal with the devastated situation? - What/How was the key strategies in bringing the people to be part of new DM (recovery) projects?	-understand the hegemonic project of central/provincial government (drawing of equivalences and differences around particular signifiers, notably via strategies)	For representatives of provincial authorities
Purpose of DM project	-Why did you think this DM was constituted? - Do you think this DM corresponds to what people is needed or is out of touch?	-Understand the fantasmatic logics via explore how those DM can have the consent and covered over social via examining articulation of fears and hopes (e.g. how does the project 'grip' participants)	For all local (Chiang Rai earthquake) level interviewees
Barriers to DM project implementation	-What could hinder the implementation of this project and why? -Has opposition emerged against this DM project? -Would another DM project have been more suitable?	-Understand the exclusion and inclusion of demands by a hegemonic project; in particular -explore the signification of resistance	For all local (Chiang Rai earthquake) level interviewees

APPENDIX 3: Key Events of the 2014 Chiang Rai Earthquake: Crucial Operations

Disaster Management Phase	Key Events and Decisions	Dates
Preparedness	- Chiang Rai Provincial DDPM had launched the DM Plan 2010-2014. The local government was required to frame its local DM plan following the National DM Plan.	20th June 2010
	- 2010 Chiang Rai DDPM Plan was revised under an 'integrated management and coordination' approach and implemented in this area.	1st June 2012
	- DM had been promoted and officially implemented by giving a prominent role to the Province Governor as Chairman of the Provincial Disaster Management Policy Committee and Director of the DM Operation Unit.	8th Oct 2012
	- An earthquake response drill was arranged by the Chiang Rai DDPM, the Centre of Disaster Warning and the local government.	25th Mach 2014
Emergency Response	- A 6.3 Richter earthquake hit and 2,000 aftershocks followed over 7 districts and 50 sub-districts in the span of a year.	5th May 2014
	- A state of emergency in the province was officially declared and the Chiang Rai Earthquake Operation Centre was established to enact recovery.	5th May 2014
	- Frontline earthquake operation units were installed by the Regional DDPM Zone 10,15.	7th May 2014
	- The Earthquakes Data Centre of the province was established and EQ data was initially collected by the provincial DM centre.	9th - 20th May 2014
	- The provincial DDPM failed in its collection of data, distributing of resources/assistance and meeting of local/community needs due to the vast area affected and fragmented corporation instituted.	11th -23rd May 2014
	- Mae-Suay dam cracked and several Chiang Rai landmarks were damaged. This was concealed and local people were afraid and suspicious.	7th May 2014
	- The Collective Victim Network was installed by an initial founder of the CRDMN.	8th May 2014
	- The Chiang Rai Disaster Management Network (CRDMN) was established.	
Recovery Process	*National political disruption arose following the 2014 Thai Military Coup and a year of political pressure.*	*22nd May 2014*
	- Public dialogue forums in various areas were provided by the Thai PBS network, CRDMN and local NGOs. These manifested the demands of local people.	10th,12th ,14th May 2014
	- The community fixing and building project and the CDR Model was firstly implemented at the local/community-level in Dong-lan village.	14th June 2014
	- The CRD Model was widely applied in more than 4 villages, 5 sub-districts and 4 districts	23rd June 2014
	- A major public seminar, '3 Months Past the Chiang Rai Earthquake: Lessons Learnt' was held and a Handbook of Community CR	25th July 2015

	Earthquake Management was published by the CRDMN. - The CDR (Phase 2) was extended to more than 16 areas covering 3 districts and 1 municipality.	 24th June – August 2014
Mitigation	- Several community and local DM funds were established as a comprehensive DM form and a sustainable system to support and replace province-level DM. - The Thai Master Plan as to earthquakes and hazards was launched, initially to deal specifically with earthquakes. - Most CRD models and local/community DM centres declined and were not extensively installed. - The new province-level DM and recovery project was launched and introduced a 'one school on rescue teams' as a mitigation form and to provoke disaster awareness. - DM drills for disaster responses were arranged by central DM agencies, Regional DDPM Zone 15, Chiang Rai DDPM, the Chiang Rai Army Headquarters and the local government. - The new National DDPM Plan 2016 was officially launched and implemented under the 'community immunity concept', as designed to enact 'sustainable recovery and resilience'. - All DDPM plans in the Chiang Rai province, alongside its districts and sub-districts, had to be revised to be compliant with the National DDPM Plan and the recommendations of the provincial DDPM.	Since August 2014 October 2014 November 2014 February 2015 March 2015 31st March 2015 1st July 2015