Building walls to tame time: Enclaves and the enduring power of failure

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Building walls to tame time: Enclaves and the enduring power of failure

Jason Sumich

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the ways in which the construction of enclaves became central to utopian attempts of social engineering and how their legacies shape contemporary society despite the failures of these projects. By focusing on the role of enclaving, in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, I demonstrate how it derives its power as a walled remnant of the resuscitation of past utopian goals and simultaneously, by being presented as a solution to current festering urban problems, often themselves the result of previous attempts of enclaving. Rather than solely acting as an outgrowth of the most exclusionary aspects of contemporary capitalism, I argue that enclaving is a highly malleable strategy of enacting power despite its enduring failure.

Keywords: enclave; impossibility; temporality; utopia; Maputo.
Introduction

Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, hosts the largest suspension bridge in Africa, which was completed by the China Bridge and Road Corporation in 2018. At first glance, one could question whether all the effort and expense was necessary to link the capital to a small town, Katembe, on the other side of the bay. This bridge, though, was supposed to be the first step in a project of urban transformation. The goal was to escape the crumbling infrastructure, social polarization, pervasive insecurity and simmering unrest of Maputo by linking it with Katembe and then constructing an entirely new city, New Katembe. There was so much official faith in the potential of New Katembe that the government decided it would house the National Parliament as well as being the headquarters for other state and commercial enterprises.

City-building ambitions of this scale are not restricted to Mozambique; over 70 new cities are under construction throughout Africa (Moser et al., 2021, p. 1). Analysts have traced the rise of new cities on the continent as another aspect of the triumphalism of ‘Africa Rising’. This narrative claimed that, after centuries of neglect, Africa, like the Asian ‘tigers’, would soon take its rightful place on the capitalist world stage. Africa’s rise, if it is possible for an entire continent to ‘rise’, has been characterized by enclaving, the unequal distribution of resources based on the production of differentiated spaces (Appel, 2012, p. 441; Nielsen et al., 2021). Economic growth has been driven by the tightly guarded mining complexes, oil compounds, plantations and special export zones all with differentiated political, administrative and legal structures. Enclaves have also transformed urban areas, either by the vast ambitions of new cities or more subtly by the humble, but ubiquitous, gated community.

Many analysts have rightfully demonstrated the often complicated and opaque connections to the role of foreign capital and the larger destructive potential of this enclaved spatial strategy (Côté-Roy & Moser, 2019; Murray, 2015, 2017; Nielsen et al., 2021; Watson, 2014). In the following, I explore a slightly different angle, enclaves are the part of a long and contradictory history that is far more complex than simply acting as exemplars of untrammeled capitalism. What began as an, often relatively crude, technology of domination slowly morphed into a utopian project of social engineering that attempted to speed up the passage of linear time by the means of spatial rupture.

These utopian projects are generally considered to have failed. However, the raw material of the brave new world is the rubble of the past (see West, 2009; West & Ramen, 2009). Enclaves now serve as walled remnants or traces of previous projects. Developmentalist visions of change that were once supposed to encompass the nation have been stripped down to small focal points, such as New Katembe, and, as we shall see, have similar prospects of success. Architects and planners attempt to provide a small section of the urban population the order, solidarity and security that fuel
nostalgic memories (or reimaginings) of the socialist period, yet the un-intended result of their efforts seems to be the opposite. This rarely seems to discredit the enclaved model though; in fact, failure usually results in calls for more enclaves. Examples of enclaving as utopian social engineering span the African continent and the world more generally, but as we shall see in the following sections, Mozambique’s long history with various enclaved projects serves as an instructive case study.

Enclaving as a utopian form

For a brief moment, the official optimism surrounding New Katembe seemed justified, material proof of Mozambique’s and, by extension, Africa’s irresistible rise. The project got off to a good start with the Maputo-Katembe bridge, but despite its initial success, it soon began to flounder. As of 2022, the vast majority of the new city can only be found in glossy PowerPoint presentations designed to entice investors. Senhor Evaristo was a senior planner on the project, according to him, the blame for its current non-realization was widely spread. There were the venal political machinations of his Mozambican colleagues and the continued obstructionism of residents who refused to follow the plan, ‘we set out the plans with well demarcated plots and they just built everywhere at all angles’.1 The only people he viewed positively were his Chinese counterparts. According to Evaristo, they went to the site and worked until the job was done, unlike the other foreigners (and Mozambicans) who spouted platitudes from the comforts of a far-removed, air-conditioned office while revelling in ‘heavy’ bureaucracy. Evaristo’s respect only grew when he was invited for an official visit to Shanghai. At first, he was taken to the old, historic city, which was in his words, ‘ugly, dirty and chaotic, but mainly ugly’. Evaristo’s guides jokingly commented that the old city was ugly, they then pointed to a new neighbouring area filled with skyscrapers and shopping malls and said, ‘That is why we had to build this’. He knew they were teasing him, but he thought the joke contained a fundamental truth. The new area was a vision that symbolized the only way forward. The old cities are too far gone to be saved. Instead, one needs to start again.

The militantly modernist architect Le Corbusier famously stated that he did not care if capitalism or communism eventually won the day as he was convinced any possible future would still require the guiding hand of an ‘all-powerful master planner’ (Eaton, 2002, p. 156). In a similar fashion, Senhor Evaristo, a committed capitalist, demonstrated flashes of an almost Stalinist faith in the power of planning and bureaucratic control, and his ambitions, for a time, found their culmination in New Katembe.2 Pitcher and Askew (2006) have argued that the collapse of socialism in Africa coincided with the abandonment of previous large-scale projects that combined ideas of infrastructure, development and nation-building, such as collectivization, villagization
and the industrialization programmes that were so common in previous decades (p. 7). However, in recent years, attempts to realize socially transformative visions through large-scale infrastructure projects have resumed (Bertelsen, 2021; Buur & Sumich, 2019; Gastrow, 2019; Mains, 2012; Schubert, 2021; Sumich & Nielsen, 2020). In such a context, projects like New Katembe appear as a stanza in the saga of utopian ambition masquerading as urban design. This ‘modernist’ plot is well-established: proper planning, both material and social, will tame what was only chaos. Beautiful new buildings will rise from crumbling decay, leading to the transformation of the city and its residents (for a broader discussion of modernist ideals and infrastructure, see Alexander, 2009; Holston, 1989; Larkin, 2013; Schwenkel, 2020).

The idea that one can utterly transform social reality through the medium of urban design is influential, as can be seen by David Harvey’s (1973, p. 27) observation that the spatial organization of a city shapes the social processes that take place within it (see also Nielsen et al., 2021). The ways in which planners, architects and officials of various stripes attempt to mould human life through transformations in the built environment resembles James Scott’s famous treatise Seeing like a state (1998). Enclaving offers the promise of control combined with utopian ambition that seems irresistible to planners. Despite the best efforts of these planners, though, attempts to shape social life are often Janus-faced; enclaves may create new publics, but rarely in the manner that is intended. Efforts to render populations ‘legible’, visible so that they can be arranged in concordance with the plans of the powerful, often create new forms of illegibility.

The infrastructural dream that so enamoured Senhor Evaristo seemed to resemble the hopes that underlay the construction of 1960s Brasilia as the harbinger of a new, rational plan for urban life that will ‘modernize’ the nation (Holston, 1989). The underlying utopianism of enclaving is often expressed through the idiom of time, either as efforts to speed it up through modernizing projects to transform the nation and by extension its inhabitants, or to escape the ravages of time by erecting defensive enclosures or various combinations of both. Efforts to control time have been fundamental to ideological projects across a wide spectrum. It appeals to the racist delusions of colonial adventurers or the voracious appetite for expansion that characterizes both the cartel of party cadres and authoritarian state bureaucracy of command economies and the equally authoritarian, corporate and state bureaucracies of neo-liberalism.3

In the next section, I will briefly discuss some of the various strategies of enclaving in Mozambique. From its origins as a means of enforcing domination, it soon became central to a supposedly ‘civilizing mission’, that was employed to both police and transform the African population along desired lines while protecting the settler population from ‘contamination’ during the colonial period (Penvenne, 1995). The project of ‘civilizational’ uplift was inconsistent, hypocritical, meandering and oppressive (Hall & Young, 1997). However, it was not so much abandoned during socialism as repurposed with the tempo increasing dramatically under the high modernist gaze of the party (Coelho,
2013; Dinerman, 2006; Sumich, 2012, 2018). Much like urban Vietnam as described by Schwenkel (2020), the party attempted to enact its power through fantasies of a better future and the building of infrastructure was a material instantiation of its promise to accelerate time (p.109). In Mozambique, this fantasy was best expressed in the claim by Mozambique’s legendary first president Samora Machel, that underdevelopment would be overcome in just a decade. Here the enclave serves as the engine that will kickstart the future, the focal point radiating change outward, creating a ‘modern’ state while transforming the citizenry into new social subjects.

Portugal’s colonial claim of turning Mozambique into a ‘overseas province’, a civilizational extension of the motherland, and the revolutionary dream of building a new country through the creation of a socialist ‘new man’ both lie in ruins. Yarrow (2017) argues that ruination renders absence physically present, the concrete form of a nostalgia for a past that never was, a utopia never realized (p. 585). Such nostalgia is evidenced in a variety of ways, from the wistful manner which so many in Maputo speak about the socialist period to the periodic upsurges of elements of former utopian ambition, such as new cities, which provide at least a fragment of Chinese style urban development, or even the gated communities being the first step of transcending urban chaos and re-establishing order.

As the nostalgia for times past hints at, the current model of enclaving is far less about kickstarting time, radiating outward to the nation as a whole. Enclaves now serve as traces or remnants of previous utopian ambitions as well as monuments to the failures of these ambitions. The ‘outside’ is no longer a tabula rasa on which the foundations of the glorious future will be built, but instead a threatening hinterland trapped in a downward spiral of decay, which enclaves will supposedly provide protection against. A similar defensive tendency is evident in Thomas More’s famous description of utopia as an isolated, static, homogeneous, closed, xenophobic walled settlement (see Eaton, 2002; Nielsen, 2014; Nielsen et al., 2021). However, the promise of protection can prove illusory. Designing architectural uniformity is far easier than creating social uniformity, than rendering the subject population legible.

While enclaving affects groups on all levels of the social hierarchy and in both rural and urban areas (for further Mozambican examples, see Buur & Sumich, 2019: Kirshner & Power, 2015), this paper will primarily focus on the perspective of the privileged. My argument is based on long-term anthropological fieldwork in Maputo on topics ranging from the legacies of transformative social projects, middle-class formation, urban politics and, most recently, enclaving. Since 2002 my ethnographic engagement has focused on participant observation, interviews and the collection of life histories among a range of people of varying levels of privilege, but whom could generally be described as members of a middle class. They provide a fascinating prism through which to engage with contemporary projects of enclaving in Mozambique from imperial pretensions of ‘assimilation’, the socialist ‘new man’, through designing or residing in contemporary gated communities.
The perspective of those who occupy positions of at least relative privilege offers a useful alternative from a common representation of African cities in anthropology and urban studies as ‘liquid’ or ‘heterodox’, imperfectly integrated into the reductionist order of high modernism (see Hoffman, 2017; Simone, 2004). According to many scholars, urban life on the continent is not characterized by strict regulations and powerful institutions, but rather by the inventiveness, provisionality and creativity exercised by its struggling, excluded but endlessly resourceful, populations who turn the margins into areas of ironic experimentation and play (Hoffman, 2017; Quayson, 2014; Simone, 2004). Regardless of whether this description is accurate, it is exactly this ‘chaos’ that the planners, architects and the segments of the population they cater to are building the walls to shut out. For these people, the ‘liquid’ city is not a celebration of provisionality, but a painful reminder of the failure of previous utopian visions.

The utopianism of enclaves

The infrastructural exclusion that undergirds enclaving is frequently combined with spatialized governance, creating an archipelago of differently regulated zones throughout a given territory. The inevitable inequality unleashed by this model is frequently argued to be the latest salvo in neoliberalism’s unrelenting class war (Davis, 1992). Such a claim is not incorrect; both capitalism and enclaves are exclusionary by definition. However, conflating enclaving with capitalism risks overlooking the malleable qualities that have made it such a durable utopian project in a variety of social, political and economic contexts. Enclaving is primarily about the use and distribution of infrastructure to produce differentiated spaces and designed to enforce and/or transform the social order and human behaviour. Examples appear throughout history in both urban and rural contexts, from medieval walled cities to monasteries, prisons, plantations, socialist factories and capitalist gated communities (for a fuller discussion see Eaton, 2002; Foucault, 1979; Low, 2003; Rhodes, 2004).

Although an in-depth historical exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, as we can see from a very brief sketch, the antecedents of elements of enclaving in Mozambique also precede neoliberalism. In fact, it could date back at least 500 years to the beginnings of a colonial period, if not earlier. While Portugal claimed that vast amounts of Africa were subject to its suzerainty, this grandiose vision has little resemblance to reality and colonial rule was profoundly spatialized in terms of administration. The south of the country was socially and economically integrated with neighbouring South Africa. Parts of the centre and north of Mozambique were divided into prazos, which functioned as personal fiefdoms, where power was held by Afro-Portuguese ‘feudal lords’ backed by their personal armies of slaves (Newitt, 1995). Other territories in the centre and north were ruled by chartered companies that wielded the powers of a government with their own police, currencies and forms of taxation (Roberts, 1986).
With the rise of the fascistic *estado novo* or new state in 1933, Portuguese colonial rule was centralized. However, this political transformation did not do away with previous forms of enclaving, but rather formalized them in an effort to create and enforce a rigid social and spatial hierarchy of class, racial and civilizational categories (see Morton, 2019; Newitt, 1995). Colonial rule in Mozambique crumbled in the face of an armed struggle (1964-1975) launched by Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo). Frelimo’s utopian, revolutionary project also made use of an enclaved logic. This was epitomized by the *zonas libertadas* (liberated zones), the rural struggle era bases which were to serve as the crucible of the *homem novo* (new man), the socialist vanguard that would take the lead in the total transformation of Mozambique (see Sumich & Bertelsen, 2021; Zawangoni, 2007). After independence, the liberated zones stood in contrast to the more negative form of enclaving, the ‘re-education’ camps. Under harsh conditions, ‘counter-revolutionaries’ were carefully sequestered so as not to ‘contaminate’ the wider population and instead to overcome their ‘backwardness’ and, like the prison or the asylum, inmates faced a gruelling, if not impossible, ordeal to attempt to earn their right to return to the body politic.

Beginning in the immediate post-independence period, the *aldementos*, or fortified villages, built as counter-insurgency measures by the Portuguese, were repurposed and expanded to become the kernel of the Frelimo’s programme of social engineering through the creation ‘communal villages’, similar to the collective farms of the USSR. These were basically small rural versions of new cities on the cheap, where the massing of people would allow economies of scale to unleash the long-awaited ‘modernization’, and development would radiate outward, eventually encompassing the entire nation. Communal villages had an overdetermined economic function as the bedrock of the party’s plan to conquer under-development in a decade through the achievement of a 17.5 per cent annual economic growth rate (Hall & Young, 1997). Just as important, though, was the role they would play in the symbolic production of political control. In a similar manner to the former USSR, communal villages would act to ‘… train subjects in a particular relationship to state power, to organize management structures that preserved that power, and represent it to the people …’ (Larkin, 2013, p. 335).

During the socialist period, there is some evidence that the communal villages did transform relationships between the state and its people, especially in parts of the country such as the south and parts of the far north, where Frelimo had strong popular support. However, they also unleashed new conflicts that the planners failed to foresee. Attempts to create economies of scale and render populations ‘legible’ and uniform depended on grouping ever greater numbers of people together, leading to an outpouring of accusations of sorcery, land disputes and fierce battles concerning what was the proper sexual, familial, generational and personal comportment under a system of control that constantly veered from wildly ambitious to sporadic and uncertain (West, 2001).
Communal villages were also bedevilled by material difficulties as construction ate up scarce resources. Promised infrastructure was either broken or non-existent and a chronic lack of funds meant that no communal farm ever turned a profit (West, 2001). As the grand revolutionary vision of the glorious future to come crumbled, many communal villages came to resemble Yarrow’s (2017) description of the ruins of new towns near the Volga dam in Ghana: ‘This paradoxical ruination entails a palpable sense of the failure of modernization to arrive, associated with an unstable and unresolved relationship between the actuality of existing circumstances and the imagined futures that continue to be projected from the unrealized plan’ (p. 568). In the face of this litany of difficulties, Frelimo often resorted to coercion. One of the few ways to populate what was supposed to be the cradle of the ‘new man’ was to herd people in at gunpoint. Unsurprisingly, communal villages became perennial and attractive targets during the civil war (1976-1992) for the Renamo rebels (Dinerman, 2006; Geffray, 1991).

Communal villages and giant state farms, as vanguard enclaved sites of development, were the foundations of Frelimo’s attempt to accelerate time by leaping from a colonial backwater to industrialized prosperity in 10 years. Cities though also had a role in utopian projects of enclaved development. Initially, infrastructural efforts were primarily restricted to the nationalization and redistribution of housing to party militants and the former inhabitants of the bairros (neighbourhoods). In a similar manner to other socialist and newly liberated nations, the goal was to redress a historic injustice, the elimination of racial and class-based segregation and the creation of a ‘modern’, unified urban subject through the transformation of the property regime (Morton, 2019; Sumich, 2018; Sumich & Nielsen, 2020). Once again, though, utopian ambitions clashed with mundane reality. Although the redistribution of housing was a popular move, it tended to benefit an emerging elite who could afford it, as the plan largely ignored most urbanites’ social, cultural and economic needs (Morton, 2019).

In tandem with the redistribution of housing were efforts to build new political and, ultimately new social structures. Despite the poverty and hardships, many now view this period with rose-tinted nostalgia. The claim that the new revolutionary society was defined by solidarity ‘we were all poor together’, neighbours looked out for each other and shared what they had. Children could play on the streets and doors were left unlocked as crime was supposedly almost unknown and any infraction that did occur was quickly and ferociously punished by the state. If hardship was almost universal, so was security as I was told. The reality was doubtlessly more complex, the same people who told me how they lived in perfect amity with their neighbours would also describe how they had to cover their windows with sheets to frustrate the gaze of ever-present informers and train their children never to reveal in public what was said at home. However, memories of chronic shortages, informers, firing squads, public flogging and the always watchful security services have softened and what remains is a vision of hope, solidarity, purpose and order.
While Frelimo attempted to entrench the foundations of the new society and proudly dismantled former racialized barriers, new areas of privilege were cordoned off. There were compounds for officials, soldiers and workers in protected industries and special walled residential areas for certain cooperantes, or foreign sympathizers who came to help build socialism. A friend of mine who grew up in a high-ranking family told me of his childhood in an entire neighbourhood that was reserved for top party officials and their families surrounded by walls and manned by heavily armed guards. He remembered it with affection and the guards as helpful and wise playmates, although the restrictions and numerous watchful eyes began to chafe when he became a teenager. The children of high-ranking families also went to a special, well-equipped school staffed by expat teachers from other socialist nations. Students were transported there by bus, which was almost unheard of at the time. Those forced to trudge their way to normal schools recalled how they used to throw rocks at the school bus while making mooing sounds (referencing the supposed similarity of the bus to a cattle car).

Revolutionary enclaving was geared towards utopian social transformation, and its origins as a technology of domination were never far from the surface. Tomásio, who was a teenager at independence, remembers how Frelimo’s soldiers were initially stationed across Maputo to guard public buildings or even just the sidewalks they happened to be standing on. In many cases soldiers went above and beyond the call of duty. While they may not have provided enclaves with preferential access to infrastructure, they did create their own special, if informal, administrative zones. According to Tomásio, soldiers would just place some string between two cans, or take over the entire sidewalk and say that was their space and they were guarding it. No one could cross the string or walk on their side of the road (for a public building). The penalty for disobeying was an ad hoc (and technically illegal) punishment. Once Tomásio was forced to do 20 min of physical exercises on the street because he had stepped over some string by mistake. The soldiers with their strings and creatively improvised punishments are gone, although the social complexity of successfully navigating one of Maputo’s numerous police roadblocks suggest this is largely due to an evolution in tactics.

During the civil war, the utopian elements of enclaving crumbled, while its use as a raw attempt to enforce domination intensified. Urban policy morphed into a programme of coercion based on cleansing ‘undesirable’ social elements from the cities, culminating in 1983 with the declaration of the infamous Operação Produção (operation production). Between 30,000 and 50,000 people were rounded up and exiled to the far north to build cities in the bush with little to no supplies or means of support, with predictably horrific consequences. Enclaves, such as communal villages, had played a central role in planners’ attempts to enact socialist transformation, but the results seemed to be the exact opposite of what was promised. Rural areas starved, the civil war dragged on in a blood-soaked stalemate, the economy tipped off the edge of the abyss and Frelimo’s early gains in health and education evaporated. Instead of the promised acceleration through a great leap forward, time, it appeared, was brought to a grinding halt.
To build a wall

The devastation and economic collapse of the civil war and the socialist period resulted in the adoption of capitalism, which again transformed Maputo. Housing was privatized, creating new classes of homeowners and even landlords (see Sumich & Nielsen, 2020, for a further discussion). The cement city, as the city centre is known, is characterized by a mixture of single-family homes in the most affluent areas and large, high-density apartment buildings once reserved for the colonial middle class. As the housing stock became depleted, the historic core is now encircled by walled satellite communities spreading in every direction. The dream of home ownership spurred ever more development, and there are more than 80 gated developments in Maputo alone (Mazzolini, 2016). The promised prosperity of capitalism has proved to be illusive for many, and once again enclaving has been adopted as a strategy to deal with disorder and insecurity of the contemporary era.

When I asked Senhor Águia, the urban planner, to reflect on the changes he has seen in the city, he did not mention privatization, new corporate headquarters or any of the other features I had assumed he would. Instead, he immediately remarked, ‘Walls, they are everywhere now, we are a city of walls’. According to Senhor Águia, walls have a role far beyond the simply functional:

[Walls] They are for security and that is serious these days, but it is not just that. It is a cultural legacy, it is what people think is part of a proper dwelling and it is also about status, a way to show off. Even in gated communities which are surrounded by walls, they will build a wall around their house, a wall inside a wall. So many of my projects have been ruined by this, I try and design something that is open, that circulates, that breathes but people insist on walls. If I do not give them one, they will build it themselves. I think this is partly due to the ways in which rural life impregnates the city. They want their own space, what they are used to from the village. They carve out their own space and stamp their own character on it through their walls. Even the middle classes though simply do not like to live in buildings, they would rather be walled in.

During the revolutionary period, the promise of utopia was dependent on the urbanization of the rural and enclaving was central to production of the modern citizen; now it seems to be emblematic of its binary opposite. Walls in urban studies are frequently portrayed as a method of social engineering, ‘Walls produce docile bodies, anchored in space to make them governable’ (Schwenkel, 2020, p. 195). In this case, though, they produce a very different effect, at least to the architects and planners, they obscure the legibility that Scott (1998) found so central to modernist plans and appeared more of a display of popular agency, challenging Senhor Águia’s implicit architectural determinism.

When explaining the reasons for the failure of the socialist project, a senior Frelimo cadre explained to me that the party’s revolutionary dreams went wrong because Mozambique did not have the sufficient conditions to realize it:
Frelimo was progressive; the goal was not simply to free the nation, but also to transform it. For this the party wanted to create a modern socialist state but we simply did not have the conditions. We did not have the social preparation to make a revolution. At independence most people were peasants, even those who lived in the urban areas were psychologically peasants. The cities did not fulfil their historic role by making them workers, most people were servants and now they wanted to be masters. We tried to turn peasants into workers, but we failed. We lived in an imaginary nation, the dream of the nation we wanted to create, not the flesh and blood nation we actually had.

Although Frelimo employed Maoist rhetoric during the liberation struggle, after independence, the party increasingly portrayed the peasantry as a bastion of ‘backwardness’, or ‘obscurantism’ as it was known (Coelho, 2013; Hall & Young, 1997; Sumich, 2018). Senhor Águia is drawing on the same symbolic vocabulary and the conceptual universe as the cadre above when he speaks of the ‘city being impregnated by rural life’. While some of the residents he is referring to were surely born in a village, his use of the term ‘rural’ is more about a turning back of the clock, rather than a strictly geographic location. Nor is it clear that villagers have an inordinate love of walls as compared to urbanites. These details matter little for Senhor Águia, though. For him, enclaving is the ruralization of the urban, the final, ironic triumph of the peasantry’s great march backwards, reshaping the city in their own spatial image (see also Nielsen, 2014).

Enclaves are viewed as a tragic necessity by many of those who build them. Tiago is an architect and developer, and as an architect, he also hated the walls, and he too seemed to be engaged in a seemingly doomed attempt to combine a popular love of barriers with legibility:

I remember when the first gated communities appeared and I thought to myself, why are they hiding away from us? As an architect I find them ugly from a design point of view—the streets are now just lined with featureless walls, no windows, no breaks. As a developer though, I have to build them, they are what people want and from a business perspective that is what we will supply. I thought that maybe I could build a condomino (gated community) with transparent walls, where privacy could be maintained by allowing ivy or plants to cover part of it, but I have not had any luck with that yet.

Tiago appears to be drawing a firm line between the walled compounds and communal villages of his youth during the socialist period and gated communities, which, for him, are an outgrowth of capitalism. Despite this periodization, though, many of the concerns that animated socialist enclaves are present in capitalist gated communities, as we shall see in the next sections.
Utopian remnants

Mozambique had seen substantial economic growth since the end of the civil war, but much of this was the result of foreign aid secured by the country’s status as a donor darling. However, the government soon began to pursue a new utopian (or perhaps dystopian for most of those directly affected) vision of turning the country into an energy-producing superpower, as massive coal fields and LNG (liquidified natural gas) deposits were brought online starting in the early 2000s.

Senhor Golfinho is an architect with a major firm that designs gated communities. According to him, it was the discovery of LNG that changed the market. With the influx of LNG money, he and his colleagues thought that the economy would soon be utterly transformed. According to Golfinho: ‘A lot of people started building gated communities because they thought that the personnel from Andarko (a multinational oil company) and wherever else would soon be flooding in and that they could charge them whatever they wanted’. The expected flood never really came, though. The dream of becoming an LNG fuelled superpower, much like the previous goal of being the tomb of capitalism and exploitation (as a verse in the socialist national anthem so colourfully put it), sputtered out. The coal mines caused dispossession and immiseration of the regions inhabitants (see Lesutis, 2019) and the turbo-powered inequalities of the LNG industry fed into an Islamic insurgency in the north. Staggeringly large corruption scandals and sweetheart deals between highly placed officials and LNG companies were an early indicator of problems on the horizon. This was followed by the discovery that the government had taken on secret debts worth billions to provide kickbacks and fund a suspiciously well-armed state-owned tuna fleet (the New Katembe bridge offers the perfect vantage point to view this fleet, sitting unused, rusting in the harbour) and the economy tipped into free fall. Foreign exchange almost ran out, savings and salaries were wiped out due to inflation, shortages became common again and people I knew in Maputo experienced the worst period of hardship since the civil war.

There has been a sense that the city is ungoverned, if not ungovernable, since the fall of socialism for many that I know. They usually contrast the present to a vision of the early socialist period, where solidarity was the name of the day and a fiercely vigilant state ensured order and security. The statement ‘there was no crime when Samora was alive’ has become a mantra. Simmering disquiet with the present has been dramatically accelerated by the crisis. While architects and planners may have had misgivings about the proliferation of walls, these were soon overcome by the supposed advantages of gated communities. The city itself may be beyond saving, but at least one could combine social uniformity and economies of scale to create oases of well-provisioned order. Senhor Ver-melho, a high-ranking official in charge of municipal services, told me:

In addition to unending drought, on average in Maputo we lose 40 per cent of all water, our infrastructure is old and decrepit. There is simply not enough water
to keep the city going. We need to rationalize its management. Gated communities are the future. I live in one myself. My neighbours are all of my *camada social* (literally social layer, referring to social class), not too rich, not too poor, not all crazy. I also like them from a professional standpoint. It is easier to negotiate with one entity rather than dealing with individual house owners and they have the advantage of economies of scale, they are planned, and it is easier to arrange infrastructure and services.

Here the stated goal was to provide housing and services in a rational and above all relatively cheap manner with the enclaved model protecting an emerging middle class. This is especially important as the city is desperately short of resources like water and affordable housing and suffering from near perennial crises. I have been told numerous times, the subsidized bank interest rate on a mortgage for state officials is 24 per cent and the normal interest rate is over 30 per cent.

Senhor Golfinho’s efforts to build gated communities were not restricted to luring in the near mythical foreign expats of the LNG industry. He was also involved in a range of other projects of varying sizes and budgets. Although gated communities are still largely restricted to at least the relatively privileged minority that works in the formal sector of the economy, he feels that while gated communities are not ideal, they are necessary.

It is also almost impossible for the average person to borrow money. Rents have been skyrocketing and people are groaning under debt. Gated communities, especially the lower-cost ones seemed to offer a possible way out of this. They allow people to have a house with dignity and the now adult children of the middle class some independence. Many are still living with their parents although they have children and families themselves, but they cannot move out because of the cost of housing, even renting a house is too expensive.

In their various ways, Senhor Águia, Tiago and Senhor Golfinho are all involved in an attempt to overcome the ‘liquid’ or heterodox nature of African cities, a condition that since the colonial period has been emblematic of ‘backwardness’ and ‘inferiority’ in official discourse (Sumich & Nielsen, 2020). Thus far, Senhor Golfinho’s efforts to provide order and dignified living through enclaving, like those of his colleagues, have stalled. As he told me, ‘There is no centralized planning, projects are not joined up with one another, they just happen all over the city. There is administrative chaos, it’s basically the golden rule, whoever has the gold makes the rule’. He has not been able to access any of the promised state subsidies nor has he been able to convince the municipality to sign off on the project. Still, he remains optimistic, ‘… change is slow, it will be an almost evolutionary process, but things are gradually heading in the right direction’. Tiago, on the other hand, was more critical:
The system is characterized by radical uncertainty, security of tenure, one’s ability to do things, one is never sure, unlike South Africa or Europe where the rules of the game are better stated and more universally adhered to. Here it is often reliant on personal relationships, or whims. It can be that there are other issues at play and other interests at work, one never knows, but it often seems arbitrary.

As with other nations in sub-Saharan Africa, property ownership is more of a perilous, ongoing process rather than a fixed concept or established fact (for a discussion in Maputo, see Sumich & Nielsen, 2020, for further examples, see Goodfellow & Owen, 2020). Gated communities were a far less ambitious attempt to provide the order that is now associated with the past, but it has been about as successful as the socialist attempts to overcome underdevelopment in 10 years. Attempts to impose order still derive from an idea of tabula rasa. Such an idea is difficult to support in a situation characterized by highly contested processes of land ownership, state incapacity or malevolence, the shifting and shadowy motivations of the powerful and the ‘gangster’, ‘casino’ like qualities of contemporary capitalism. What is left are far more disjointed, DIY attempts to provide infrastructure and security. Residents frequently combine their efforts and drill the boreholes for water, have the streets paved and build the walls themselves, an informal method of urban planning made necessary by the reluctance of the municipality and developers to provide promised services. However, gated communities are subject to many of the same shortcomings and contradictions that plagued both their socialist predecessors, such as the communal village, or their capitalist big brother, the new city.

Sketches from inside the walls

As one drives along Avenida da Marginal, the popular coastal road, one is confronted with a seemingly endless vista of walled communities. There is considerable variation from within: some gated communities are populated by stately and imposing, if identical houses, gazing imperiously towards the rest of the city. Others are geared more towards younger, less ostentatiously privileged middle-class families. Once inside the gates, these can appear slightly scruffy. Their pastel uniformity has become weathered by the elements. Their walls are pockmarked after long service as props for the games of the children running through the streets and the facades buried behind brightly coloured clothes swaying on laundry lines. However, individual variations are largely hidden from the external gaze as the road becomes long stretches of wall broken up by the occasional shopping centre, restaurant or villa. The unrelenting sameness stands in stark contrast with older areas of the city, such as the rapidly gentrifying bairro of Alto Maé. There even the most spacious and well-appointed flats face a crowded street teeming with traffic and
people and full of shops spanning the spectrum from formal concrete ventures to a blanket with some goods on it carefully displayed on the crumbling, overburdened sidewalk. Enclaves promise escape from this urban tumult through echoes of previous utopian visions, an archipelago of planning, order, security and social homogeneity in a threatening sea.

Security is a major selling point for enclaves. As with so many other promises, failure again tends to be the rule, although the response to this failure from both designers and residents is to call for more enclaves. This was brought home to me when being shown a gated community by a real estate agent. As he drove us away after the tour, he asked if my wife and I were interested in putting in an offer on the flat. We said that it was unlikely, and he replied that this was probably a good idea because we would be largely trapped inside the walls due to our lack of a car. He went on to point to an area of scrub just outside of the walls of the community and said that is where the thieves wait for anyone unwise enough to stroll by the area and several joggers from the gated community had already been robbed.

Tiago, the architect introduced in the previous section, told me that he felt the proliferation of walls actually increased crime as the sidewalk was rarely visible to nearby residents, and there was no longer anyone around to respond to call for help. Even a car and walls do not necessary guarantee safety for those inside, though. Tiago told me a story concerning one of the oldest and more expensive gated communities in the city. One evening a resident drove home and a car drove in behind him. The second vehicle followed the man home, and then they preceded to tie the homeowner up, strip his house of all valuables and calmly drive away. The very nature of the enclave renders it vulnerable. Upon arriving at the gate, one would be vetted by security guards who did not live there. When entering, one would pass gardeners mowing the lawns and trimming the hedges who also did not live there. When one finally knocked on the door of the house one was looking for, it would be opened by an empregada (maid or servant) who did not live there. It is unlikely that these particular people harboured any ill-intent, but their very presence was a constant, if occasionally unsettling, reminder that such porous walls could never truly keep the outside out.

The social forms and behaviours that were once supposed to be a harbinger of a brave new world have diminished to a restricted mark of status (Sumich, 2018). In such a situation, residing in an enclave and benefitting from the peace and understanding that would flow from being protected from the outside world with one’s own camada social is as attractive as it is elusive. I was told numerous stories from both developers and residents of gated communities of intractable and interminable conflicts. Sometimes they were waged between residents and the municipality over roads, walls, property rights and promised services that never appeared. Other times they were fought between residents and the management as money paid in advance disappeared into pyramid schemes while houses, although paid for, were never actually built, or developments turned out to have been constructed in a flood plain and were washed away with the annual rains. Even those lucky enough to
obtain a liveable house and at least some of the services they paid for were often engaged in vicious internal conflicts with their neighbours. According to a woman who recently moved to a gated community, Senhor Vermelho’s image of social uniformity described in the last section was illusory. ‘They say it is socially homogeneous, but it is really not, we have people from all walks of life, and this is causing conflict. People fight over all sorts of things, like noise to issues over shared space, where can you put the rubbish, who pays their dues for upkeep and who does not, who builds additions to their houses or new walls, what the concept of shared space really means’. As projects of social engineering, gated communities, like communal farms before them, have shaped those who reside within them, just rarely in the ways that were intended.

Conclusion

The largely ‘informal’ nature of many African cities has often been taken as an example of state incapacity or failure. However, scholars such as Gastrow (2019) argue that this conception arises from a misrecognition of how power works and the ways in which ‘local incapacity’ can be the result of a deliberate strategy of neglect. Although, as frequently observed, disorder can be politically expedient, a utopian faith in the powers of planning, as with Evaristo in the introduction, continues to linger on as well. Paolucci (2001) argues that cities are a time machine, one that, ‘… gathers, interprets and makes concrete the different experiences of time, translating them into networks of social relations that are spatially oriented’ (p. 647). Enclaves have also come to be time machines, ones that embody a utopian hope of ushering in the future (or recapturing a past) based on security and rational order, something radically different from the conditions of the present.

Escaping the present through the construction of enclaves, despite so many failed attempts, was central for planners like Evaristo and New Katembe. If the old city cannot transform the population, it should be abandoned for a new one, either a new city or a new population, whichever is easier. In this sweeping vision enclaving remains an ideology of social engineering through urban design, which holds the promise of overcoming the ‘liquid’ nature of African cities, to tame chaos and render order through the stroke of a pen. It is this faith that reveals the utopian drive of enclaving. Despite the promise of tabula rasa, it is a utopian drive that often-made use of the tropes, practices, goals and techniques of the previous efforts and encountered very similar challenges as well.9

Infrastructural projects are portrayed by governments, investors and international agencies as exploitable resources (Heslop, 2020, p. 377) and within this ‘market’ the logic of enclaving flourishes. However, as Appel (2019) argues ‘capitalism is a project, not a context, daily being enacted’ (p. 28). Similarly, enclaving is a project that is constantly enacted but never truly realized.
This can be seen clearly in the case of Mozambique, where successive attempts to implement forms of enclaving are often an effort to address the unforeseen social problems created by the last round of enclaving. In the socialist era party cadres worried that urbanites, those who had been the most exposed to the colonial cultural rot, would act as a cancer at the heart of the revolution, slowly eating it away from the inside. Shortly after independence Senhor Águia was denounced several times for his urban decadence as demonstrated by his afro, bellbottom jeans and fondness for the music of Led Zeppelin, all of which threatened to corrupt the austere, revolutionary purity cultivated in the far-off zonas libertadas. The zeal that animated the socialist period is now, but a distant memory and Senhor Águia currently looks on in frustrated bemusement as the supposed ruralization of the city undermines the cosmopolitan urban fabric he cherishes, dragging the city back in time with its ceaseless construction of walls. Enclaving is perhaps such a malleable and durable form of social engineering because it promises the ability to achieve sweeping goals of social transformation and enacts visible change, while simultaneously creating unanticipated consequences that undermine those self-same goals its enduring power expressed largely through remnants of previous visions, monuments to failure.

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Notes

1 For a broader discussion of the trials and travails of planning in Maputo (see Nielsen & Jenkins, 2020; Bunkenborg et al., 2022).
2 For further examples of the ways in which the legacies of socialism influence capitalism in Mozambique (see Pitcher, 2006; Sumich, 2010, 2021).
3 For further discussions on the malleability of forms of infrastructure under a variety of political regimes (see Folkers, 2017; Fox, 2020). And for an insightful discussion of the shared utopian impulses of both socialism and liberalism (see Buck-Morss, 2002).
4 This is a common feature of actually existing socialism, as argued by Alexander (2009) for Almaty in Kazakhstan, ‘It is of course worth noting both that many ‘socialist’ characteristics were themselves reformulations of presocialist modes … ’ (p. 150).
5 See Sarmento and Lineham (2019) for a fascinating discussion on the construction of an enclaved archipelago of settler’s spaces that became crucial to the formation of a settler identity which bolstered the colonial project in Mozambique.
6 For an in-depth account see diaries such as Searle (1981).
7 For a fascinating discussion of some the social effects of the civil war (see Igreja, 2014, 2019).
8 For a broader discussion of walls in the global south (see Caldeira, 2000).
9 See West and Ramen (2009) for an in-depth discussion on the continuities between the pre-socialist order, socialism and neoliberalism throughout the world.

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