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Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly

Symeonidis, G (2010) 'Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly.' International Journal of Industrial Organization, 28 (3). 230 - 243. ISSN 0167-7187

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Abstract

I analyse the effects of a downstream merger in a differentiated oligopoly when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). Bargaining outcomes can be observable or unobservable by rivals. When competition is in quantities, upstream agents are independent and bargaining is over a uniform input price, a merger between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. However, when competition is in prices or the upstream agents are not independent or bargaining is over a two-part tariff or bargaining covers both the input price and the level of output, the standard welfare results are restored: a downstream merger always reduces consumer surplus and overall welfare. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 16 Aug 2012 10:27
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:16
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/3680

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