Symeonidis, George (2007) Downstream Competition, Bargaining and Welfare. UNSPECIFIED. UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

I analyse the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). When bargaining is over a uniform input price, a decrease in the intensity of competition (or a merger) between downstream firms may raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. When bargaining is over a two-part tariff, a decrease in the intensity of competition reduces downstream profits and upstream utility and raises consumer surplus and overall welfare. In both cases, standard welfare results of oligopoly theory can be reversed: less competition can be unprofitable for firms and/or beneficial for consumers and society as a whole.

Item Type:	Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	HB;
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	16 Aug 2012 10:21
Last Modified:	17 Aug 2017 18:08
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/3686

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