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Cartel Policy, Non-Price Competition and Market Structure: Theory and Evidence from the UK (Revised version published in Economica, vol.67 (August 2000), pp.437-456)

Symeonidis, George Cartel Policy, Non-Price Competition and Market Structure: Theory and Evidence from the UK (Revised version published in Economica, vol.67 (August 2000), pp.437-456). [UNSPECIFIED]

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Abstract

This paper examines the impact of price competition on advertising/R&D expenditure and market structure. General theoretical results are derived which restrict the space of possible outcomes regarding the behaviour of concentration and advertising/R&D expenditure following an intensification of price competition. The theoretical predictions are tested using UK data on the evolution of competition, concentration and advertising over 1954-1977. The econometric results suggest that the introduction of restrictive practices legislation in the UK cause a rise in concentration in previously cartelised high-advertising manufacturing industries and probably also a fall in advertising intensity.

Item Type: UNSPECIFIED
Uncontrolled Keywords: Market structure, price competition, cartels, endogenous sunk costs, advertising, UK manufacturing.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 16 Aug 2012 10:27
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:08
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/3705

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