Samothrakis, S and Lucas, S (2011) Approximating n-player behavioural strategy Nash equilibria using coevolution. In: UNSPECIFIED, ? - ?.

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Abstract

Coevolutionary algorithms are plagued with a set of problems related to intransitivity that make it questionable what the end product of a coevolutionary run can achieve. With the introduction of solution concepts into coevolution, part of the issue was alleviated, however efficiently representing and achieving game theoretic solution concepts is still not a trivial task. In this paper we propose a coevolutionary algorithm that approximates behavioural strategy Nash equilibria in n-player zero sum games, by exploiting the minimax solution concept. In order to support our case we provide a set of experiments in both games of known and unknown equilibria. In the case of known equilibria, we can confirm our algorithm converges to the known solution, while in the case of unknown equilibria we can see a steady progress towards Nash. Copyright 2011 ACM.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:	Published proceedings: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, GECCO'11
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions:	Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	19 Oct 2012 21:30
Last Modified:	30 Jan 2019 16:17
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4113

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