Coles, M (1996) Designing a Cheaper and More Effective Unemployment Benefit System. UNSPECIFIED. CEPR Discussion Papers.
Coles, M (1996) Designing a Cheaper and More Effective Unemployment Benefit System. UNSPECIFIED. CEPR Discussion Papers.
Coles, M (1996) Designing a Cheaper and More Effective Unemployment Benefit System. UNSPECIFIED. CEPR Discussion Papers.
Abstract
This paper describes an equilibrium labour market in which an unemployment benefit system cannot raise the average value of being unemployed in the long run. It proposes an alternative benefit system which pays generous benefit rates when unemployment is high, but pays much lower rates in booms. By targeting unemployment compensation to recessions, when being unemployed is particularly costly, this policy provides insurance equivalent to that provided by the current system. By reducing the value of remaining unemployed in booms, the benefit reduction increases wage flexibility over the cycle, which substantially reduces average unemployment.
Item Type: | Monograph (UNSPECIFIED) |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Insurance; Policy; Unemployment |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
SWORD Depositor: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email elements@essex.ac.uk |
Date Deposited: | 05 Jan 2013 20:49 |
Last Modified: | 16 May 2024 18:16 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4885 |