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A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money

Coles, Melvyn G and Wright, Randall (1998) 'A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money.' Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (1). pp. 32-54. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching, strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, D83, E31. © 1998 Academic Press.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 04 Jan 2013 12:48
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2022 10:54
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4893

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