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Dynamic bargaining theory

Coles, M and Wright, R (1994) Dynamic bargaining theory. UNSPECIFIED. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report 172.

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to extend the analysis of strategic bargaining to nonstationary environments, where preferences or opportunities may be changing over time. We are mainly interested in equilibria where trade occurs immediately, once the agents start negotiating, but the terms of trade depend on when the negotiations begin. We characterize equilibria in terms of simply dynamical systems, and compare these outcomes with the myopic Nash bargaining solution. We illustrate the practicality of the approach with an application in monetary economics.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Game theory
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2013 20:23
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:04
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4907

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