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Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: an integration of the static and dynamic approaches

Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1989) 'Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: an integration of the static and dynamic approaches.' Mathematical Social Sciences, 18 (3). pp. 211-228. ISSN 0165-4896

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Abstract

A language (message space) and allocation rules (outcome function) are specified which, at Nash equilibria of the associated game, implement the Lindahl performance under different technological assumptions. This purely static approach is complemented by showing that myopically optimal adjustment on the part of agents guarantees, from any initial conditions, convergence to one of the former Nash equilibria. Since, moreover, the set of such Nash equilibria and that of stationary points of the adjustment process coincide, our results can be regarded as an integration of the static and dynamic approaches to the implementation of Lindahl performance.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Lindahl equilibrium; dynamic implementation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2013 21:30
Last Modified: 05 Jan 2013 21:30
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4932

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