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Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example

Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1993) 'Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection: A Simple Example.' Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (4). pp. 618-631. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

Competition tends to promote efficient (equilibrium) behavior through the higher survival of the organizations (say firms) that adopt it. On the other hand, culture (understood as the "inherited" social pattern of behavior) may induce certain short-run inertias. This paper analyzes a dynamic model of the struggle between these two forces in the evolution of alternative stable configurations of social behavior.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2013 22:42
Last Modified: 05 Jan 2013 22:42
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4944

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