Goyal, Sanjeev and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (2005) 'Network formation and social coordination.' Games and Economic Behavior, 50 (2). pp. 178-207. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pair-wise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network formation, however, has powerful effects on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are below a certain threshold then players coordinate on the risk-dominant action, while if costs are above this threshold then they coordinate on the efficient action. These findings are robust to a variety of modifications in the link formation process. For example, it may be posited that, in order for a link to materialize, the link proposal must be two-sided (i.e. put forward by both agents); or that, in case of a unilateral proposal, the link may be refused by the other party (if, say, the latter's net payoff is negative); or that a pair of agents can play the game even if connected only through indirect links.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Networks; Links; Coordination games; Equilibrium selection; Risk dominance; Efficiency
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	05 Jan 2013 23:27
Last Modified:	05 Jan 2013 23:27
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4953

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