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Multi-level evolution in population games

Canals, José and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1998) 'Multi-level evolution in population games.' International Journal of Game Theory, 27 (1). pp. 21-35. ISSN 0020-7276

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1993) where the population is partitioned into groups and evolution takes place "in parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-run equilibrium. This provides an explicitly dynamic basis for a conclusion reminiscent of those put forward in the biological literature by the so-called theories group selection. From a normative viewpoint, it suggests the potential importance of "decentralization", here understood as local and independent interaction.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Evolution; games; multilevel; group selection
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2013 09:24
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2013 09:24
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4962

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