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Migration and the Evolution of Conventions

Bhaskar, V and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) Migration and the Evolution of Conventions. Working Paper. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96.

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This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Economic Models; Games
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2013 17:00
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2013 17:00

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