Bhaskar, V and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) Migration and the Evolution of Conventions. Working Paper. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96.
Bhaskar, V and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) Migration and the Evolution of Conventions. Working Paper. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96.
Bhaskar, V and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) Migration and the Evolution of Conventions. Working Paper. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96.
Abstract
This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Economic Models; Games |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| Depositing User: | Jim Jamieson |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2013 17:00 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2013 17:00 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4972 |