Bhaskar, V and Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996) Migration and the Evolution of Conventions. Working Paper. UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96.
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Official URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/aub/autbar/354.96.html
Abstract
This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Economic Models; Games |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
| Depositing User: | Jim Jamieson |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jan 2013 17:00 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Jan 2013 17:00 |
| URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/4972 |
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