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Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

Renou, Ludovic and Schlag, Karl H (2011) 'Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium.' Games and Economic Behavior, 71 (2). pp. 527-533. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of epsilon-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in epsilon-minimax regret equilibrium for all epsilonset membership, variant0,1).

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Implementation; Minimax regret; Maskin monotonicity
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 06 Jan 2013 22:43
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2013 22:43
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5030

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