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## **Reconceptualizing the Republic: Diversity and Education in France, 1945–2008**

As the first nation-states to establish the grounding principles of basic human rights and universalistic citizenship, France and the United States are often subjected to comparative analysis. Despite similar beginnings, their subsequent national projects could not be further apart. U.S. nation building incorporated the recognition of ethnoracial identities, with trials and tribulations, whereas the French nation's trajectory took on a unitary form. The "divergent" immigration histories of the two countries are offered as an explanation for their respective orientations toward identities, although a close historical look revises this view.

France, along with other European countries, has experienced significant immigration since the nineteenth century, and, as a result, great flux. Yet, the French public discourse and policy instruments concerned with ethnic and racial diversities evolved in sharp contrast to those in the United States. True to its unitary stance, the French republic for a long time has even resisted the use of categories or statistical tools to take into account the diversity of its population. Recent developments, however, point to changes in the Republic's projection of its identity and its citizenry. This article follows these changes in the field of education, via an analysis of the ways in which "diversity" is treated and incorporated into school teaching, finding that the Republic is now envisioned as open and tolerant to diversity. This diversity still manifests itself within a universalistic perspective that the United States does not share. Diversity enters the notion of French citizenship more from a universalistic, normative perspective—

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increasingly indexed at the transnational level—than from a perspective that privileges the nation’s immigrant and colonial past.<sup>1</sup>

The empirical basis of the argument herein derives from an analysis of the postwar transformations in French education, with a focus on secondary-school curricula and textbooks for history and civics subjects, covering the school years that correspond to *Collège* (four years of compulsory education after the primary school; *6ème, 5ème, 4ème, and 3ème* in French). The time frame is from 1945 until 2008, when the latest curricular reform was instituted. Four major curricular changes took place before 2008, from 1961 to 1963 and from 1975 to 1977, as well as in 1985 and 1995. The analytical emphasis on these curricular moments is justified, given that France has a centralized educational system, compared to other European countries. Even though textbook production is market-based, the centralized nature of curricula brings a continuity of style and content to teaching subjects and textbooks. The major publishers on the schoolbook market are Hachette, Nathan, Hatier, and Bordas. The textbooks chosen for analysis correspond to the curricular reforms. Subsequent textbook editions through the years bore few content changes, if any at all, so long as the curriculum remained the same. Since the most recent curricular reform was scheduled to take effect in autumn 2009, no textbook has been published as of this writing to reflect substantial changes.<sup>2</sup>

OPENING UP THE REPUBLIC’S HISTORY One significant way in which French school teaching has introduced diversity is through an increasing emphasis in curricula and textbooks on the broad world as a reference point. The 2008 curriculum calls for a “multiscalar” approach, starting from the local and culminating in the global. One of the stated aims is to build an identity that is “rich, multiple, and open to otherness.” More explicitly, “While

1 George M. Fredrickson, “Diverse Republics: French and American Responses to Racial Pluralism,” *Daedalus*, CXXXIV (2005), 88–101; Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (New York, 1988); Adrian Favell, “Immigration, Migration and Free Movement in the Making of Europe,” in Jeffrey C. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *European Identity* (New York, 2008); Patrick Simon, “The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France,” *French Politics, Culture and Society*, XXVI (2008), 7–31.

2 The broader research project from which this article derives—“Teaching ‘Good Citizen’ and ‘Good Society’ in Europe and East Asia: A Longitudinal and Comparative Analysis of European and Asian Curricula and Textbooks”—encompasses the case countries of England, Germany, France and China, Japan, and Korea, tracking changes since 1945.

national history remains essential, it is no longer a prerequisite for an opening to the history of Europe or of the world.” Globalization, which is taken as a given, has become a lens on understanding diversity. The geography curriculum aims to “[bring] meaning to the diversity of landscapes and territories, [contribute] to the discovery of otherness and [develop] curiosity for other societies and other places.”<sup>3</sup>

The first changes toward opening up the history of the Republic occurred in the 1977 curriculum, even though a strong sense of “our history” and “our civilization” was still present at that point. The curricular goal was to “project our interest toward extra-European civilizations without sacrificing the knowledge either of our own civilization or of the origins and evolution of our country.” Europe also appeared as a theme in its own right for the first time in the 1977 curriculum, marking the beginning of a gradual trend toward abstracting what was previously celebrated as distinctly French to a European level. References to things specifically “French” have decreased in curricular topics over time. In the 1995 history curriculum, “the French Revolution” is replaced with the broader label “the Revolutionary Period.” In 2008, the curricular topics “the French Kingdom, 16<sup>th</sup> century” and “Renaissance and Reformation” are regrouped under the label “Towards Modernity: the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> Centuries.”

Part of this development is due to a shift in teaching from a chronological to a thematic approach. During the 1950s and the 1960s, the curriculum was exclusively chronological in its treatment of French historical development; “historical continuity” from prehistory to the nineteenth century was a fundamental assumption. The 1977 curriculum not only introduced “themes” but also the teaching of contemporary history in line with new trends in the field of historiography. Curricular attention to recent history has increased over time; history teaching is now more about the future, directly linked to education about citizenship in an increasingly diverse world: “[The curriculum aims to] help the construction of the citizen, [which involves] understanding the contemporary world and acting on it freely and responsibly; and

3 In secondary schools, history and geography are treated as one subject, taught by one teacher, with one textbook (usually divided into two parts). See *Programmes du collège; Programmes de l'enseignement d'histoire-géographie-éducation civique*, at <http://www.education.gouv.fr/cid22116/meneo817481a.html>, 1, 3.

being present and active in the life of the city, which requires knowledge of the world in its diversity and its evolution.”<sup>4</sup>

Textbooks ever since have attempted to move away from a French-centric perspective, forging an overall European umbrella to accommodate diversity and emphasizing from the mid-1990s Europe’s varied origins. Hellenistic Alexandria is described as a city characterized by a vibrant intellectual and cultural diversity, where Greek and indigenous peoples co-existed. Greeks, Macedonians, Egyptians, and Jews and their intercultural encounters receive prominent mention. Similarly, the exposition about the Roman Empire highlights its religious and cultural complexity, as well as its connections to the broader world.<sup>5</sup>

In conveying the diverse origins of Europe, civics textbooks invariably include chapters titled “Unity and Diversity.” The chapters show contiguous images of Socrates, Erasmus, and Voltaire, thus suggesting a common legacy that includes ancient Greek philosophy, humanism, and enlightenment, and then more contemporary pictures of the Saint Week celebrations in Seville, the *Binche* carnival in Belgium, the Beer-Fest in Germany, the Venice carnival in Italy, the *pétanque* in France, cricket in England, and flamenco dancing in Spain. The point of this juxtaposition is to showcase “a Europe of Human Rights . . . gradually built along the centuries, giving birth to a common culture based on the universal values of liberty and respect of the human being. . . . Today, European people preserve this heritage without denying their own identities. Different but united, such is the message transmitted by the education provided to the young Europeans.”<sup>6</sup>

To acknowledge the various sources of diversity, textbooks even question the sanctity of nation-state identity: “Although the 19<sup>th</sup> century historians invented the ‘Nation-State’ and proclaimed

4 Histoire et Géographie, Instructions et programmes, Enseignement de l’histoire dans les établissements du second degré, Instructions du 7 mai 1963; *Histoire, Géographie, Économie, Éducation civique, Classes des Collèges* (Paris, 1979); *Enseigner au collège. Histoire-Géographie. Éducation Civique. Programmes et Accompagnement* (Paris, 2004), 14.

5 Martin Ivernel et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1996), 96; Claire Appere et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1996), 93; Gerard Hugonie et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1996), 96; Christian Bouvet et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1996), 75.

6 Hubert Neant, Anne-Marie Tourillon, and Arlette Heymann-Doat, *Éducation civique: Demain, citoyens 4<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1998), 78–79.

the Republic as ‘one and not divisible,’ regional diversity still exists, especially in the cultural field.” Note that the European context again comes into play, even when the subject purports to be France: “Linguistic differences are arranged in a rich national harmony . . . French regional languages are similar to some European languages and for this reason they constitute a precious bridge towards the languages of neighboring countries, with which, in the frame of the EU, political and economic links are becoming increasingly close: Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands.” This acceptance of regional and linguistic diversity is remarkable, given that the regions of France have always had to take second place in favor of the center.<sup>7</sup>

Although the textbooks display a distinct focus on Europe, and its diverse makeup, they also explore other parts of the world—particularly, Africa, Asia, and America—and their contribution to the “world cultural heritage.” The coverage of non-European civilizations is not completely new, already introduced by the 1977 curriculum, as stated above. What is new, however, from the mid-1990s onward is an added stress on the openness and diversity of these past civilizations, most clearly exemplified in the chapters about Islam. In describing Cordoba, the textbooks depict a thriving urban and cultural life, a “mixed and free” city: “[The city] knows great prosperity: the mosque is the biggest in western Islam. . . . But most of all, *Cordoba is a cultural foyer, a space for exchange between Muslims, Jews and Christians*, between the East and the West.”<sup>8</sup>

A crucial pointer for the opening up of the Republic’s history is the treatment of early European colonialism and its “destructive” consequences in the curricula and textbooks. The textbooks detail the “brilliant civilizations” of the Aztecs, Incas, and Mayans, praising their agriculture, craftsmanship, and architecture and lamenting their suffering (“massacre” and “pillage”) at the hands of “conquerors.” Although history education had included the age of European discoveries and conquests as early as 1977, not until the 1990s was the exploitive nature of colonialism made explicit. One of the textbooks from the late 1990s offers a schema under the

7 Marie-Thérèse Drouillon et al., *Histoire-géographie—initiation économique 3<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1994), 230, 231.

8 Karine Bennafla et al., *Histoire-Géographie 5<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1997), 36.

heading “Europe Exploits the World” that displays the relationships between the continents and the exploitation patterns.<sup>9</sup>

The textbooks mention individual European states as the purveyors of the trade in such goods as sugar and tobacco, but they invariably refer to “Europeans” as the agents of the slave trade. Before the 1985 curriculum, they did not even acknowledge France’s own history of slavery; later textbooks refer to it only in connection with human rights. A chapter in a history textbook of the mid-1990s, “Human Rights: Principles and Realities,” narrates the resistance against, and the abolition of, slavery in France, showing a photogravure of Toussaint-L’Ouverture—the black leader of the antislavery movement in the French colonized Caribbean—on a horse and with a sword in his hand. In another textbook, a drawing of a white slave owner and an African slave in the background bears the caption “Slavery: The Negation of Human Rights.” The 2008 curriculum finally introduced slavery as a discrete topic, “putting the slave trade and slavery back into historical perspective” and marking the abolition of slavery (1848) as a “chronological milestone” for students to remember.<sup>10</sup>

In a similar manner, the teaching of nineteenth-century colonialism and twentieth-century decolonization also falls within a pan-European framework. “Europe and Its Expansion” is the title under which the 1985 and 1995 curricula cover this issue. Textbooks present colonialism not as a French, English, or German phenomenon but as an overarching European one, under the heading “The European Apogee.” References to colonies, resistance movements, and decolonization tend to be generalized, France’s own tribulations being mentioned only in passing. A civics textbook describes the decolonization process as “the extensive post-1945 retreat movement of the European powers from their colonies (especially the African and Asian ones).” Another one, in a section dealing with “New States” and “Independence” in Africa, explains, “Since the beginning of colonization, populations demanded their freedom or, at least, equality with Europeans.

9 Bouvet et al., *Histoire-Géographie 5<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1997), 148–161 (quotation, 159); Ivernel et al., *Histoire-Géographie 5<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1997), 160–175; Bennaffla et al. *Histoire—Géographie 5<sup>e</sup>*, 156–169.

10 Bernard Klein et al., *Histoire-Géographie 4<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l’élève* (Paris, 1998), 66; Jacques Longuet et al., *Éducation civique: Objectif Citoyen 4<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1998), 6; *Programmes du collège*, 3, 31.

These struggles became stronger and more efficient after WWII, because European powers became weaker.” Some books offer special dossiers on the “War in Algeria”; others give equal attention to Mohandas K. (Mahatma) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the fathers of India’s “passive revolution.”<sup>11</sup>

Although the curricula and textbooks unequivocally denounce the wrongs done by Europeans to past civilizations, their position regarding the effects of late colonialism is not as straightforward. The tone of exposition may have changed to some extent through the years, but even as late as the 1990s, definite traces of an affirmative voice regarding the “contributions” of French and European colonialism still remained, despite a hint of condemnation: “Europeans have a feeling of superiority about their civilization. But their imperialism is sometimes subjected to criticism from and rejection by [colonized] populations. In China and in India, as well as in the Muslim world and Africa, elites want to regain their independence, though they often wish to retain European schools, a model of progress.” “France considers colonization in a positive light: as a country acting with respect for human rights, France brings the advantages of civilization and progress to dominated areas.”<sup>12</sup>

The textbooks are also uneasy about “life after decolonization,” conveying France’s role in the new world of free and equal states only with some difficulty: “Far from weakening France, decolonization allows it to find a renewed audience in the world. It [France] maintains a great role in Africa.” “Almost 200 million foreign people around the world use the French language. France maintains a certain prestige abroad: it still remains a country known for human rights and its artistic and cultural patrimony. Cultural and technical co-operation largely persist with its one-time African colonies.”<sup>13</sup>

11 Drouillon et al., *Histoire-géographie—initiation économique 4<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1992), 160; Longuet, Isabelle Beneteau, and Marc Estrade, *Éducation civique: Objectif Citoyen 3<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1999), 86; Jacques Marseille et al., *Histoire-géographie—initiation économique 5<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1987), 194; Drouillon et al., *Histoire-géographie—initiation économique 3<sup>e</sup>*, 116; Klein et al., *Histoire-Géographie 3<sup>e</sup>: Le Monde Actuel* (Paris, 1999), 182–183.

12 Klein et al., *Histoire-Géographie 4<sup>e</sup>*, 158; Drouillon et al., *Histoire-géographie—initiation économique 3<sup>e</sup>*, 60.

13 Klein et al., *Histoire-Géographie 3<sup>e</sup>*, 344. See also the dossier, “France and Africa after 1960.” Maurice Brogini et al., *Tout Simplement Histoire Géographie Éducation Civique 3<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1999), 151.

As the teaching tools depart from a predominantly French-oriented history to one that incorporates other civilizations into the citizens' heritage, France's position on its late colonial experience and decolonization remains ambivalent at best. Even though the new 2008 curriculum has added decolonization and the formation of the new postcolonial states as a separate topic to be taught, allowing the possibility of further amendments, this ambivalence emerges as one of the determining factors in the treatment of immigrant diversity.<sup>14</sup>

DIVERSIFYING THE NATION A universalistic outlook on the nation as a community transcending ethnic, religious, and class distinctions underlay the introduction of compulsory schooling in 1880. For a century, until the mid-1980s, this universalistic perspective was accepted as a matter of course. The 1985 history/geography curriculum noted, for the first time, the “diverse cultures” that contributed to the development of the French nation, while still upholding the universalistic tradition. The curriculum instructed teachers to provide students with a perspective on the “formation of the national identity” that acknowledged “the continuity of French history, as a meeting for diverse peoples and cultures.” It also touted the “multicultural” nature of schooling: “An insight into the characteristics of diverse milieu and cultural surroundings is crucial to discuss ideas and develop a relativistic outlook, critical analysis and the ability to unveil universal characteristics amongst diverse cultures. A good percentage of foreign students in the classroom will help tackle certain historical events or particular aspects of civilization more efficiently.”<sup>15</sup>

This multicultural view gradually found its way into the textbooks as well; “diversity” emerged as a ubiquitous feature of contemporary society. Civics textbooks contain pictures of school children from different sexes and ethnic/racial backgrounds. The caption “Differences—a Source of Richness” graces one of these

14 In 2005, the government introduced an Act to recognize the contribution of French returnees (*pied noir*) from North Africa. One of the Articles, consequently dropped amid extensive protest—particularly from historians—was the required teaching of “the positive role played by the French presence overseas.” See Valerie Sala Pala and Patrick Simon, “The Political and Policy Responses to Migration-Related Diversity in the French Education System,” paper prepared for EMILIE project, WP3, deliverable D4, 2007.

15 *Histoire, Géographie, initiation économique: classes des collèges 6<sup>e</sup>, 5<sup>e</sup>, 4<sup>e</sup>, 3<sup>e</sup>* (*Horaires, objectifs, programmes, instructions*) (Paris, 1989), 19.



photographs. Since the 1990s, pictures of the “multiracial,” “multiethnic” French national football team have proliferated in school books. Following France’s victory in the 1998 World Cup, textbooks were especially keen to highlight France’s diversity (“France: ‘Black, White, North African’”) and its universalistic stance regarding integration. A photograph in one textbook shows the dedication of a black Marianne statue, the symbol of the French republic, by a black boy and a white girl at the town hall of Val-d’Oise in 1999. In reference to France’s immigrant origins, another book reports, “Today, one French child in four has a parent or grandparent of foreign origin.” This information is juxtaposed with Article 1 from the 1958 French Constitution: “France assures equality for all of its citizens before the law, regardless of their origin, race or religion.” A couple pages later, the chapter displays a group portrait of mustached Turkish men in front of an obviously Turkish bar with the wry caption, “Germany: An Easy Integration for the Turks?” The point is not lost.<sup>16</sup>

In general, however, the nation’s diversity, as presented in curricula and textbooks, is not related to its migration history. Indeed, the study of population movements is mainly confined to geography teaching. Contemporary migrations are often discussed in textbooks either in the context of population dynamics or in the context of the inequality in the distribution of the world’s population and wealth: “In today’s world, the demographic pressure within southern countries and the attraction of northern countries are the reasons why people emigrate.” “People emigrate from Mediterranean and African countries to Europe and from Mexico to the USA to find jobs.” “International migrations of workers and refugees concern mostly developing countries. During the 1970s and the 1990s, European countries have welcomed millions of African and Asian migrants. This immigration raises the issue of integration of these populations.” The textbooks are selective in the migratory flows that they discuss. Economically and politically motivated migrations from poor/southern countries to rich/northern countries receive mention but not the migrations of

16 Dominique Chagnollaude et al., *Éducation civique 6<sup>e</sup>: Documents et exercices* (Paris, 1996), 10; Dany Feuillard, Marie-José Valdenaire, and Edouard Berteaux, *Éducation civique 3<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1999), 19; Longuet, Beneteau, and Estrade, *Éducation civique: Objectif Citoyen 3<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1999), 15; Annie Lambert and Tourillon, *Éducation civique: Demain, citoyens 3<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1999), 11; Lambert and Tourillon, *Éducation Civique 3<sup>e</sup>*, 15.

skilled labor. Nor do they report the more recent forms of temporary migration within the European Union (EU). But such a lapse in the curricula and textbooks of the mid-1990s is hardly a surprise.<sup>17</sup>

What is surprising, however, is the extent to which immigration is left out of the nation's symbolic makeup. The history textbooks are rife with symbolism about the United States as a country of immigration, but France's own immigration history is nearly invisible. Stories and pictures of immigrants arriving in New York abound. A map entitled "The Agglomeration of New York" is accompanied by a description of Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty, symbols of New York's varied ethnic and racial immigrant population. Paris as a metropolis with a history of immigration similar to that of New York would seem to deserve the same treatment, but no equivalent symbolism is provided for France. The books note that all of the city's inhabitants have access to the same economic, political, and cultural services, but only a photograph of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) building with its array of national flags is provided to illustrate its diversity.<sup>18</sup>

Civics textbooks since the mid-1990s have increasingly placed immigration in a European context of human rights, further distancing it from France itself. Often the textbooks use the title "Europe Facing Immigration" to present statistics on labor migration and claims of asylum in the EU. The photograph of a boat full of Albanian asylum seekers debarking on the Italian coast is in every textbook of the late 1990s, accompanied by the definition of *refugee* from the United Nations (UN) convention of 1951 and extracts from the universal declaration of human rights. Students are invited to debate, "Should Europe be an open or a closed space?" "How can Human Rights be reconciled with the fight against economic crisis?" "Are Human Rights reserved for Europeans?"<sup>19</sup>

17 Hugonie et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>*, 194–195; Ivernel et al. *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>*, 198–199; Appere et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>*, 184–185, 187–189; Bouvet et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>*, 152–153; Drouillon et. al., *Histoire-géographie—initiation économique 6<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1990), 292, 188; Brogini et al., *Tout Simplement Histoire Géographie Éducation Civique 3<sup>e</sup>*, 65.

18 Appere et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>*, 228–229; Ivernel et al., *Histoire-Géographie 4<sup>e</sup>: Livre de l'élève* (Paris, 1998), 158; Klein et al., *Histoire-Géographie 4<sup>e</sup>*, 112; Hugonie et al., *Histoire-Géographie 6<sup>e</sup>*, 234.

19 Martine Allaire et al., *Éducation civique 4<sup>e</sup> Document et exercices*, 82; Longuet, Beneteau, and Estrade, *Éducation civique*, 15; 82.

The integration of immigrant minorities also emerges as a European issue. In one civics textbook, the answer to the question “How is the diversity of Europeans manifested?” lists linguistic minorities, both in the EU as a whole and in its individual member countries; immigrants; different religions and religious practices (with photographs of mosques, cathedrals, and synagogues, and prayers from different religions); and the traditions and customs of nation-states. European integration policies from “multiculturalism” to “assimilation,” as well as policies regarding political rights and naturalization, are subjected to comparison. A special dossier entitled “The Problems of Integration in a European Country” provides details of racist incidents in re-unified Germany but does not delve into the problems that immigrant minorities face in France.<sup>20</sup>

The lack of an adequate historical and contemporary discussion of immigration in France, and its cultural and political implications, is remarkable. The colonial structures that grounded the major migratory flows in the postwar period are conspicuous in their absence from textbook accounts, and the treatment of population movements is only tangential: “The immigrants have supplied France with workers, children and soldiers: one French person out of four is of foreign origin.” The 2008 curriculum marks a departure by including as a subject “the successive contributions of immigrations and immigrants” and their historical and cultural contexts, but how this new approach plays out in the new textbooks remains to be seen.<sup>21</sup>

REINTERPRETING THE REPUBLIC’S VALUES    Diversifying the French nation, outwardly and inwardly, entails a reinterpretation of republican and citizenship values. The years have witnessed a clear movement away from the high value placed on “republican and patriotic French” citizens to a new appreciation for the individual who abides by human rights, democratic principles, and tolerance as anchoring concepts. This shift is evident in curricular goals.<sup>22</sup>

20 Neant, Tourillon, and Heymann-Doat, *Éducation civique: Demain, citoyens 4<sup>e</sup>*, 82–85; Dany Feuillard, Jean-Pierre Rosenczweig, and Jean Menand, *Éducation civique 4<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1998), 84–85.

21 Neant et al., *Éducation civique: Demain, citoyens 5<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1997), 23; *Programmes du collège*, 3.

22 See François Audigier, “L’éducation civique dans l’école française” (Civic Education in French Schools), *Journal of Social Science Education*, II (2002), at [http://www.sowi-onlinejournal.de/2002-2/france\\_audigier.htm](http://www.sowi-onlinejournal.de/2002-2/france_audigier.htm).

The 1945 curriculum stated that civic education “should aim to deeply imbue the pupils’ soul with a national and republican spirit.” Similarly, the 1961 guidelines suggested that “civic spirit is in the first place national. Patriotism is the instinctive and passionate attachment to the national territory where men and women speak the same language and share traditions.” Accordingly, the curricular program, from the sixth through the third grade, progressed from local institutions to national ones—the sixth grade devoted to the study of municipality, the first step toward social responsibility, and the last year of *Collège* to the delineation of social, economic, and cultural developments in France, the basis for allegiance to the national community. As the foreword to one of the textbooks following the 1961 curricular guidelines clearly stated, “This year the program is aimed at making you realize that you belong to a national community. . . . Moreover, it is necessary to realize that social life is organized according to appropriate structures and national institutions. Civic education aims at preparing you for social and political life by familiarizing you with the sense of responsibility at school and in relation to your specific social context. . . . Life at school, a small scale society of which you are an active member, can give you an insight into a common civic ideal . . . a sense of responsibility, of collective work, of solidarity and self-discipline.”<sup>23</sup>

The 1961 guidelines also introduced a sense of civic awareness beyond the national confines, though it did not advance much beyond a recognition of international interdependence and the contribution of different nations to the “world heritage”: “French citizens should realize that the development of their own country is inextricably linked to that of other countries. National civic virtue extends to the international community inasmuch as it expresses amicable sentiment for other peoples and passionate interest in the works, miseries and great achievements of the world. It is desirable that French youths be interested in other countries, recognize the way diverse peoples contribute to the common human patrimony (sciences and technology, the arts and literature) and become familiar with the concept of economic and technical

23 *Horaires et programmes de l'enseignement du second degré* (Paris, 1959), 32; *Horaires, Programmes, Instructions, Instruction civique* (Paris, 1970); Pierre Brétillot, *Instruction civique* (Paris, 1968), 3.

solidarity and the possibility—and necessity—of a global organization.”<sup>24</sup>

This excerpt clearly shows the influence of ideas about “international cooperation” that became predominant directly after World War II. However, not until the 1985 curriculum were human rights, tolerance, and the recognition of other cultures mentioned as civic values to be taught. Partly reflecting the political priorities of the reigning Socialist government, and partly adapting to the international educational approaches promoted by UNESCO and the Council of Europe at the time, “intercultural education” was the framework selected to recognize “different origins, beliefs, opinions, and ways of living.”<sup>25</sup>

Since the installment of the 1995 curriculum, human rights have found an even more pronounced place in the curricular goals—“to educate about human rights and citizenship” and “. . . [form] the citizen in the French Republic, in Europe and in the international world.” “Respect for the other” and “tolerance” were re-defined qua individual rights and responsibilities (not merely the recognition of particular cultures as promoted by intercultural education) to be inculcated as among the values of citizenship. These values, though connected to French national institutions and contexts, are in the nature of universalistic imperatives, projected to European and world levels. The French *laïcité* principle serves as the guarantor of tolerance and respect for difference, but equally the European and international human-rights conventions, as well as the International Convention on the Rights of Children, lend support to the French ideal of pluralism and its practice.<sup>26</sup>

24 *Horaires, Programmes, Instructions, Instruction civique.*

25 Between 1975 and 1985, a series of international-action programs and directives promoted “intercultural education” in schools as a way to recognize the value of different cultures and create mutual understanding between cultures—the 1976 UN resolution on “action programs for migrant workers and their families,” the 1981 EU Council directive on “the education of the children of migrant workers,” and the 1984 Council of Europe Committee of Minister’s recommendation “on the training of teachers in education for intercultural understanding.” The introduction of “intercultural education” in France developed in conjunction with these international guidelines (see Sala Pala and Simon, “Political and Policy Responses”).

26 *Enseigner au collège*, 37. In broad terms, the laicity principle refers to the secular character of a society, that is, to the separation of church and state. However, in the French case, laicity has a peculiar meaning related to the ideals of the French Revolution and the creation of compulsory, nonclerical, public schooling by the Jules Ferry laws of the Third Republic.

These citizenship values orient students beyond the boundaries of the nation as well. The curricula cite numerous examples of human-rights violations across the world—the South African apartheid regime, the poor working conditions of workers in Sri Lanka, legal protection of Romany populations, etc.—and duly celebrate the work of Martin Luther King, Taslima Nasreen, and various international women’s organizations. The textbooks include chapters like “Citizens of the World” and “A Planet Based on Solidarity.” The work of international nongovernmental organizations such as UNESCO and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is explained. Examples of humanitarian aid and international cooperation cited by the texts include the UN Peace Corps in Bosnia; the college twin-partnership between a French and African school; the “doctors without frontiers” mission in Biafra; and the solidarity campaign against child-labor exploitation in Asia, China, and even Paris. Students are invited to think about similarities between themselves and pupils in Africa and to reflect on their solidarity with them. They are expected not only to learn about other countries, and the world, but also to acknowledge a connection with, and a responsibility to, people outside their own borders.<sup>27</sup>

This “cosmopolitan” orientation contrasts with earlier curricula and textbooks, in which the national collective constituted the exclusive concern. The later curricula advance beyond the national and immediate environment increasingly to privilege individual agency over collective structure. Over time, the construction of a civic identity based exclusively on nationality and a solidarity deriving solely from well-functioning public services subsided. A commitment to more abstract human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values took their place.

The evolution of curricular themes reveals these changes in orientation: The title “France: A Republican State” in the 1985 curriculum transformed into “Citizen, Republic, and Democracy” in 1995, moving the emphasis from state to citizen. By the 2008 curriculum, the state had largely disappeared, and with it France’s municipal institutions and administrative organization, in favor of law, justice, and liberty as enshrined in national and international conventions. Local actors and the process of democratic

27 Allaire et al., *Éducation civique 5: Documents et exercices* (Paris, 1997), 18–28; Neant et al., *Éducation civique: Demain, citoyens 5<sup>e</sup>*, 38–39; Allaire et al. *Éducation civique 5<sup>e</sup>*, 52.

decision making replaced the detailed entries on state departments, functions, and public services. The 1985 curricular theme “School and the State: The Right to Education and Instruction” became “Education: A Right, a Liberty, and a Necessity” in 2008, portraying children as eminently worthy of rights and responsibilities. Diversity found expression through “the multiple identities of the person”—identity being delineated as “rich with [several] aspects: familial, cultural, religious, professional,” rather than as a mere manifestation of an inherited culture in the manner of the previous curricula.<sup>28</sup>

This new orientation transferred the responsibility for ensuring “social cohesion” to individual citizens: “*The objective* [of civics education] *is to form an autonomous citizen*, responsible for his/her choices, open to otherness, in order to ensure the conditions of communal life that refuses violence, and in order to resolve the tensions and conflicts that are inevitable in a democracy. These are attitudes reflecting self-respect and the respect of others, responsibility and solidarity that are highlighted at all levels of this curriculum.” As such, citizenship became a vehicle for achieving social order, driven by active, engaged individuals.<sup>29</sup>

LIMITS OF “COSMOPOLITAN” DIVERSITY The French cosmopolitan view of citizenship as active, reflexive, diverse, and broadly oriented entered into educational prominence via universalistic, human-rights ideals, legitimated within the framework of European and international developments. Multicultural transformations took root in the United States, however, in a vastly different way, largely as a response to the dynamics of immigration and slavery. Fredrickson sees two different legacies of slavery and colonialism shaping these two countries’ divergent paths. In his view, slavery left its indisputable mark as racial division and discrimination on the formation of “American experience.” The first multicultural legislation that the U.S. government enacted was intended to reverse the injustices inflicted on African Americans alone. Later, the scope of anti-discrimination policy expanded to include other ethnic groups, such as Latinos, on the grounds that they too experienced discrimination.<sup>30</sup>

28 *Programmes du collège*, 26.

29 *Ibid.*, 3.

30 Fredrickson, “Diverse Republics”; John D. Skrentny, *The Minority Rights Revolution* (New York, 2002).

After rescinding the national-origins quotas favoring white immigrants, which had been in place since 1924, the United States received large number of immigrants from Asia and Central and South America, who became a vital part of the multicultural scene. The establishment of a multiculturalist orientation in the United States meant not only the acknowledgment of the nation's multi-ethnic origins and the political recognition of its minorities but also the attempt to offset a dominant "Eurocentric" universalistic perspective. Multiculturalism found its way into U.S. educational agendas during the 1960s and 1970s through the incorporation of African, Asian, and Native American histories into "world history" courses that replaced the emphasis on "western civilization." Though contested, cultural pluralism began to define the collective imagination of the nation.<sup>31</sup>

In contrast to the interiority of the U.S. experience, French colonialism and subsequent decolonization drew "color lines" that were largely externalized. Unlike the domestic legacy of U.S. slavery, the memory and experience of French colonial oppression and inequality were left behind, in Africa so to speak, without dealing with past injustices as an internal predicament.

The massive decolonization and mobilization for independence that sounded the death knell for empires in the twentieth century, particularly after 1945, brought the injustices perpetrated by the colonial powers to international attention. As ex-colonies became nation-states, they demanded status equal to that of other countries according to the parameters codified through UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and other international institutions, amid an ever-increasing awareness of cultural diversity. This development absolved France as a colonial power from its obligations toward its ex-subjects, at least to some extent; they now were the responsibility of their "own" nation-states. The migration of ex-colonial populations, especially those from the newly independent states of North and West Africa, played into France's postwar "guest worker" schemes, temporarily fulfilling its labor shortages. Thus, in France, issues of race and ethnicity did not factor into the French national development as heavily as in the United States but were included over time as part of an elemental, universal diversity.

31 Linda Symcox, *Whose history? The Struggle for National Standards in American Classrooms* (New York, 2002).



A patchwork of policies and practices in France, within universalistic frameworks, have provided for the gradual recognition of immigrant ethnicities and religions in the public sphere. The liberalization of the Law on Associations in 1981 extended support for immigrant organizations and their cultural activities, placing them on the same legal footing as other associations in France. The establishment of the Deliberative Council on the Future of Islam in France (1990) and the French Council of Islamic Observance (1999), with representation from Islamic groups, further amplified the visibility of immigrants and their interlocutors in the public sphere. Research provides increasing evidence of the deployment of immigrant ethnic categories as policy instruments for local educational and other public authorities. More recent attempts to valorize diversity as part of the national convention include the 2001 Act defining slavery and slave trade as a crime against humanity; the establishment of the Council on Muslim Affairs in 2004, placing Muslims on equal footing with Catholics, Protestants, and Jews *vis à vis* the state; and the opening of the National Museum of the History of Immigration in 2007 to memorialize immigration as a constituent component of French history and identity.<sup>32</sup>

Now firmly ingrained in the French and European conventions, cosmopolitan diversity nevertheless transpires as a limitation of the nation's ability to cope with its own diversity and compensate for its ensuing inequalities. This inability is particularly apparent in the two seemingly contradictory aspects of France's new immigrant "integration" agenda, which resonates with larger European developments. On the one hand, France since the late 1990s has adopted a variety of anti-discrimination measures, in line with EU initiatives against inequities based on racism. In 2004, the High Authority for the Fight against Discrimination and for Equality was established, and the Charter for Diversity, signed by 610 companies, was launched as a commitment to change hiring practices. The Union of Employers' campaign for diversity in 2006 further pushed "positive discrimination" on the agenda.<sup>33</sup>

On the other hand, however, France has seen a concerted at-

32 Sala Pala and Simon, "Political and Policy Responses."

33 EU immigration policy, first established in 1999, along with measures to manage migration flows, encourages member states to implement Article 13 of the EC (European Community) Treaty in the fight against racism and xenophobia.

tempt to re-emphasize “French values.” In 2003, France introduced an “integration contract,” which migrants have to sign upon their arrival to obtain a residence card and citizenship. The contract obliges them to respect and uphold the laws and values of France, and to “earn” their residency by undergoing language training and instruction in civic values, thereby proving their “integration.” In that regard, France again follows a European trend; several European countries now mandate integration or citizenship tests, as well as language proficiency.

The critical feature of this integration agenda is the importance placed on individual immigrants’ own efforts to take part productively in the system. There is an obvious relationship between the fundamentals that animate this agenda, the changes in citizenship education in schools, and the newly fashioned precepts of the European Social Project, as manifested in the Lisbon treaty. In 2000, Lisbon Strategy set the goal of creating “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with maximized human capital, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” Thus, it brought what some commentators call a “European face” to the ongoing liberalization of the economy, by accentuating an investment in people, active labor-market policies, and social safety nets, along with flexibility and diversity in the labor force. In a vein similar to the broad social schemes currently adopted in many European welfare states, the integration agenda also places the responsibility—thus, the burden—of belonging on individual immigrants. Citizenship education in schools equally privileges individuality, and its transformative capacity, as a key value, along the lines that the empirical observations herein demonstrate.<sup>34</sup>

Located within a wider context, the cosmopolitan diversity project appears meritorious but hollow. It fails to address the very tension between the transformative capacities of individuality and the establishment of social justice. It is not attentive to the structural disadvantages and discriminatory practices that adversely affect ethnic, religious minorities and immigrant populations, whether in education or elsewhere. Despite the introduction of anti-

34 [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/lisbon\\_strategy\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/lisbon_strategy_en.htm); Katinka Barysch, Simon Tilford, and Philip Whyte, *The Lisbon Scorecard VIII: Is Europe Ready for an Economic Storm?* (London, 2008), 116, at [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p\\_806\\_lisbono8.pdf](http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p_806_lisbono8.pdf).

discrimination measures, the collection of ethnic/religious data to assess minority marginalization is still passionately debated, and not considered as appropriately French. Public and official discourse remains critical of the “U.S. experience,” particularly regarding affirmative action and other minority legislation, as a deviation from the universalistic principles of the Republic.<sup>35</sup>

Multiculturalism in the United States, regardless of its ensuing progression, emerged as an earnest attempt to curtail the injustices that were rooted in racism. Cosmopolitan universalism, which is strongly grounded in universalistic human rights and fundamental human equality, could be France’s (and Europe’s) response to similar problems. But accepting and accommodating diversity is ultimately connected to a serious commitment to social justice, and a redistribution of status, security, and respect—in other words, engagement with the original ideals of citizenship once regarded as a genuinely French legacy. Yet, France seems no longer sure about its commitments.

France was adept at embracing cosmopolitan diversity and folding it into its own—that is, the French—universalistic trajectory. Its deviation from social justice, however, places cosmopolitanism on precarious grounds, jeopardizing its promise to right the wrongs of past and present.

35 In 2009, the Sarkozy government appointed a “commissioner for diversity” to present a bill making it legal to measure ethnic/religious origins. The critics of this move include such organizations as *SOS Racisme*, an anti-discrimination group that sees “ethnic statistics” not only as anticonstitutional but also as potentially discriminatory. See “To Count or Not To Count,” *The Economist*, 26 March 2009, at [http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=13377324](http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13377324).



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