Argenziano, Rossella and Gilboa, Itzhak (2012) 'History as a coordination device.' Theory and Decision, 73 (4). pp. 501-512. ISSN 0040-5833

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Abstract

Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that faces different populations with such games for randomly selected values of a parameter. We introduce a belief formation process that takes into account the history of similar games played in the past, not necessarily by the same population. We show that when history serves as a coordination device, the limit behavior depends on the way history unfolds, and cannot be determined from a-priori considerations.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00745596
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Belief formation; Similarity; Coordination games; Equilibrium selection
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	06 Mar 2013 14:36
Last Modified:	15 Jan 2022 00:20
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5742

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