Mezzetti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic (2012) 'Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium.' Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (6). pp. 2357-2375. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskinʼs definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equilibrium. We show that set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskinʼs monotonicity, is necessary for mixed Nash implementation. With at least three players, set-monotonicity and no-veto power are sufficient. Important correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Implementation; Maskin monotonicity; Pure and mixed Nash equilibrium; Set-monotonicity; Social choic
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	07 Mar 2013 14:41
Last Modified:	07 Mar 2013 14:41
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5781

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