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Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions

UNSPECIFIED (2012) 'Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions.' Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (2). 1014 - 1024. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We revisit a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that under global interactions any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions and in the torus model of local interactions the selection of 12-dominant strategies remains when adding strictly dominated strategies if interaction is sufficiently local. Conversely, if the local interaction structure is "central" in the circular city model any equilibrium strategy of the original game can be supported as long run equilibrium by adding properly suited dominated strategies. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 07 Mar 2013 15:54
Last Modified: 10 Jan 2019 15:18
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5786

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