Grimm, V and Mengel, F and Ponti, G and Viianto, LA (2006) Investment Incentives in Auctions: An Experiment. UNSPECIFIED. University of Cologne, Department of Economics Working Papers.

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Abstract

We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative advantage by investment prior to the auction. We find that, as predicted by theory, bidders invest more often prior to second price auctions than prior to first price auctions. In both auction formats bidding is more aggressive than the equilibrium prediction. However, bidding is closer to equilibrium than in control treatments where the comparative advantage is exogenous.

Item Type:	Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Auctions; Investment Incentives; Asymmetric Auctions; Experimental Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	06 Jun 2013 19:22
Last Modified:	09 Jan 2018 17:15
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5790

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