Research Repository

Awareness in Repeated Games

Mengel, F and Tsakas, E and Alexander, V (2009) Awareness in Repeated Games. UNSPECIFIED. Maastricht : METEOR, Research Memoranda 010.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

In this paper we provide a framework to reason about limited awareness of the action space in finitely repeated games. Our framework is rich enough to capture the full strategic aspect of limited awareness in a dynamic setting, taking into account the possibility that agents might want to reveal or conceal actions to their opponent or that they might become "aware of unawareness" upon observing non rationalizable behavior. We show that one can think of these situations as a game with incomplete information, which is fundamentally different, though, from the standard treatment of repeated games with incomplete information. We establish conditions on the "level of mutual awareness" of the action space needed to recover Nash and subgame perfect Nash equilibria from the standard theory with common knowledge. We also show that the set of sustainable payoffs in games with folk theorems does not relate in a monotone way to the "level of mutual awareness".

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled Keywords: mathematical economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 12 May 2013 16:14
Last Modified: 09 Jan 2018 17:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5797

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item