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(Anti-) Coordination in Networks

JKovarik, Jaromir and Mengel, Friederike and Romero, José Gabriel (Anti-) Coordination in Networks. [UNSPECIFIED]

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Abstract

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Partici- pants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections (neighbors) they have. Other network characteristics are held constant across treatments. We find the following results. Heterogeneity in the number of connections dramatically improves the rate of successful coordination. In addition, even though there is a multiplicity of Nash equilibria theoretically, a very sharp selection is observed empirically: the most connected player can impose her preferred Nash equilibrium almost always and observed Nash equilibria are such that all links are coordinated. As a second treatment variation we let agents decide endogenously on the amount of information they would like to have and find that local (endogenous) information is equally efficient in ensuring successful coordination as full information. We provide an intuitive explanation of these facts which is supported by our data.

Item Type: UNSPECIFIED
Uncontrolled Keywords: C72, C90, C91, D85, Game Theory, Networks, Coordination Problems, Experiments
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 03 Feb 2015 16:50
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 18:01
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5802

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