Mengel, F (2009) 'Conformism and cooperation in a local interaction model.' Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 19 (3). 397 - 415. ISSN 0936-9937
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
We analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner's dilemma game with their neighbors. Agents learn about behavior through payoff-biased imitation of their interaction neighbors (and possibly some agents beyond this set). We find that the Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157-179, 1998) result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In particular, whenever agents use information also of some agents beyond their interaction neighbors, the unique stable outcome is one where everyone chooses defection. Introducing a sufficiently strong conformist bias into the imitation process, we find that full cooperation always emerges. Conformism is thus identified as a new mechanism that can stabilize cooperation.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of |
Depositing User: | Jim Jamieson |
Date Deposited: | 12 May 2013 16:18 |
Last Modified: | 17 Aug 2017 18:01 |
URI: | http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5813 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
View Item |