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Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks

Fosco, C and Mengel, F (2011) 'Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks.' Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 35 (5). 641 - 658. ISSN 0165-1889

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Abstract

We study the coevolution of networks and action choices in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents in our model learn about both action choices and choices of interaction partners (links) by imitating successful behavior of others. The resulting dynamics yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors coexist under a wide range of parameters. Two scenarios can arise. Either there is "full separation" of defectors and cooperators, i.e. they are found in two different, disconnected components. Or there is "marginalization" of defectors, i.e. connected networks emerge with a center of cooperators and a periphery of defectors. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 13 May 2013 19:29
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:17
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/5814

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